Excellence of Naval Material
(See page 1573, September, 1925, Proceedings)
Commander C. S. McDowell, U. S. Navy.—Lieutenant Commander Craven has given us a paper which contains so much truth and so many thought provoking facts that it should be carefully read by all in the naval service. I have found it difficult to obtain the author’s exact viewpoint at all times, due to his unusual use of terms. In particular, I wish he had found some substitute for “conception” and “conceptive.” This, though, does not vitally affect the value of the paper. The author’s title is misleading, for, though he does logically cover naval material in considerable detail, the real purpose of the paper evidently is to present reasons for reorganizing the entire Navy Department.
I am in hearty agreement with the author’s proposal to organize the material part of the Navy Department under functional duties. He has pointed out the glaring example of electrical material which is now handled separately by six bureaus. There would undoubtedly be a considerable saving in funds and better material obtained if all electrical engineering questions and electrical material were handled by one group.
The author proposes two major subdivisions of the Navy Department, to be known as “Naval Operations” and “Naval Material.” It is noted that this follows closely the present navy yard organization except in the use of terms, which, of course, are of no great importance. The retention of the designation “bureau” as the name for the subdivisions under the major departments is believed undesirable. It would possibly create the belief that a certain bureau under the new organization was simply a former bureau transferred to a new setting. This would endanger the smooth functioning of the reorganization, by personnel endeavoring to carry over former duties to their new bureau. The Navy is not bureaucratic and a better term than “bureau” can undoubtedly be found.
I recognize very clearly the need of technical officers in the Navy, but I do not see the need of a technical corps in the Navy, provided officers are assigned to the duties which they are best fitted to fill, and the only criterion for promotion is whether or not they have performed satisfactorily the duties which have been assigned them. As I understand the author, he proposes that the technical officers shall be employed on research, development, design, and production of all types of naval craft, naval apparatus, and naval material. The officers would be scientific engineers, or applied scientists, capable of diligently searching for facts and putting the results of their search into practical use. It is my opinion that the Navy possesses a large number of technical officers who are now in the line. I might even go further and say that I believe that all of the best of our line officers are essentially technical officers. I have served at sea on the staff of four admirals, as a technical member of the staff, and I know that those four admirals were each technical officers themselves, capable of performing technical work of a high order. One of these flag officers, Admiral A. W. Grant, has carried out eminent technical work since his retirement. Experience and special training are important factors in the making of a technical officer, but of greater importance is the desire to investigate and the will to persevere until bedrock facts are obtained, coupled with the ability to interpret facts and put them into use. Interest enters very strongly into the making of an efficient technical officer. I feel that it is impossible to take a graduate, a couple of years after he leaves the Academy, put him into a technical corps and be certain that he should remain a technical officer throughout his service. Possibly in the course of a few years he might be better back in the line and, conversely, an original line officer better in his place.
If there are no corps, except the Medical Corps, officers can be assigned to technical duties or line duties, depending upon their particular aptitude for different kinds of work. This gives a flexible arrangement and permits of officers being used where most needed at the time during their careers. Many officers would undoubtedly be kept on technical work throughout their entire service. Other officers could be detailed to technical duties at times and at other times to line duties.
During the war I directed the work of several hundred scientists. These numbered among them some of the most eminent research men in the country and several of them were internationally known for their brilliant achievements. It was the greatest pleasure to work with these men and see how unselfishly and whole-heartedly they devoted themselves to their problems. Much time was lost, however, in getting practical results, due to the fact that these scientists did not know the service conditions which apparatus would have to meet. As a result of this experience I am thoroughly convinced that naval technical work must be directed and much of the work actually done by technical officers. These officers should be kept in touch with the service conditions afloat by periodic tours of duty at sea. These tours of sea duty need not be lengthy, but they should be fairly frequent so that the touch of the sea will not be lost in their investigations, designs, and developments.
Lieutenant Commander Craven is to be congratulated on the great amount of study he has given to his subject and on the logical deductions he has obtained. It is to be hoped that this paper, and some of the other papers lately appearing in the Proceedings, will stir up service opinion and result in concrete improvements.
Excellence of Naval Material
(See page 1573, September, 1925, Proceedings)
Captain B. B. Wygant, U. S. Navy.—The most important part of Lieutenant Commander Craven’s article seems to be in the conclusions, which may be generally stated thus:
A reorganization of the Navy Department is required, comprising (1) a division of naval material which should perform the material functions of the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Ordnance, Engineering, Navigation, Aeronautics, Supplies and Accounts, and Yards and Docks; (2) division of naval operations very much as at present constituted, but including personnel; (3) “The Secretary’s Office,” which is further subdivided into the budget section, accounting section, and general board.
It is, of course, plainly obvious that the present system results in confusion and waste of money, and that a division into co-equal parts based on functional activities is essential to the proper conduct of the next war. As for the particular division that Lieutenant Commander Craven has selected, it is certainly in the right direction, although a somewhat different division of the organization might be conceived that would be more in keeping with the generally accepted ideas of efficiency in military organization.
The further segregation of the material division into
- Conception,
- Design,
- Production,
- Maintenance,
- Operation,
appears to be a logical one.
There are certain “high spots” in this article that deserve to be emphasized. In speaking of the indirect factors which determine the composition of the fleet, he says:
“Surrender to the limitations of money is as dangerous a compromise as any.”
This fact is often neglected by those who pride themselves on having of practical minds. Naval officers should bear in mind the fact that in war they enter the market place and bid for a certain commodity called victory and, unlike commercial bidding, no price can be too high, and no other market place is available than the battlefield. The price must be paid: so much in lives, so much in money. If the legislators prefer to pay later in lives than presently in money, that is their business, but they should not do it with connivance of naval officers.
Another sentence deserving mention is the following:
“It is no more necessary that an officer shall command a battleship to be qualified to command a fleet than that he should also command a mine layer. This is because no officer is really qualified to command in war until he has had general tactical training.”
This statement is a truism to those who look upon a fleet in the broad sense, and who realize that he who commands a fleet successfully must command tactical units and not ships. This statement, however, is subject to the limitation that since battleships usually form the major unit, familiarity with their maneuvers is of somewhat greater importance than familiarity with the maneuvers of subsidiary units.
Excellence of Naval Material
(See page 1573, September, 1925, Proceedings)
Commander C. W. Fisher, (CC), U. S. Navy.—This paper is a timely and valuable addition to the literature on a subject which, whether we like it or not, will shortly become of vital importance to the Navy. I hope to see an increasing number of similar articles from different points of view so that the service at large may begin to realize the varied aspects of the problem that confronts it.
I am in general agreement with Lieutenant Commander Craven’s analysis and conclusions to such an extent that I do not wish to cloud the importance of the main question by differences as to details. His arrangement of the Navy Department differs somewhat from that proposed by me (see “Proposed Administrative Changes in Navy Department,” page 357, March, 1925 Proceedings), and his treatment of the whole problem is broader than was mine. Many solutions can doubtless be found. The vital thing is that responsibility, authority, and control of funds must form one unbroken chain.
It has been said that “Cooperation is where I do what you want me to do.” Such cooperation has been the basis of the relations among the existing bureaus of the Navy Department. The establishment of the Office of Naval Operations was an attempt at coordination of departmental effort. It has been successful in part—up to the point where its activities begin to infringe upon bureau control of funds, at which point the bureaus clamorously protest, and it is at exactly that point, the control of funds, where forcible coordination is most needed. Naval Operations and the present bureau system are inherently antagonistic:
The Navy Yard Division represents another attempt at coordination. So long as the Navy Yard Division voiced only the unanimous opinion of the bureaus, and required no money, it was a welcome addition to the bureau family; but it has failed thus far in every attempt to execute its duties in the face of a single opposing bureau vote, and, furthermore, during its four years of life has, (with perhaps one recent exception) been equally unsuccessful in exercising any authority whatsoever that touched the all-important question of bureau funds.
Going a few years farther back we find sad memories of an aide for material, an aide for inspections, and an aide for navy yards. The life of each was short. Why?
Lieutenant Commander Craven has given us the answer. All these functions relied upon cooperation instead of coordination. There was no power behind them. Secretaries issued orders, regulations were changed, offices were established, but the vital thing was missing—power—the power inherent in the control of appropriations; and until that power is made part of any departmental re-organization it cannot stand.
But is any such re-organization needed? Lieutenant Commander Craven from a coldly analytical study of the functions of the Navy proves with irresistible logic that it is. Attacking the question from a different point of view I reached the same conclusion. There is an ever increasing group of officers who are progressively reaching this identical conclusion. The establishment of extra-bureau offices, referred to above, indicates that others thought so many times past. How long shall we wait for the correct solution and the necessary action? How long can the Navy wait?
The rumors of another drastic cut in the Navy’s budget estimates to be presented to Congress this fall seem to show the urgency of immediate action. If personnel is to remain at its present strength, then any cut must necessarily fall upon the maintenance appropriations in greatly magnified proportions. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that such a condition might spell the break-down of the present departmental organization.
National Strategy
(See page 1343, August, 1925, Proceedings)
Brockholst Livingston.—Lieutenant Commander Frost’s paper proves that he has joined the ranks of the advocates of cooperation between the State and Navy Departments. Since he comes so ably equipped through his extensive study he is consequently a most welcome adherent;
In this latest paper he suggests that in war time the State Department be made the agency “to guide our work and the definite diplomatic and propaganda plans to attack the enemy morale.” He advises a defense council under the President and composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and economic administration. “These agencies,” he writes, “are just as important now in peace time as in war.” The defense council which he urges is, indeed, as important in peace as in war. It would serve as the clearing house of national strategy. Therein could be formulated national policies only as powerful as could be backed by our armed forces. Within its meetings could be decided the strength which would be needed to support proposed national policies. A defense council would serve the purpose of an exchange of departmental policies. It would increase or, might I say, bring about, cooperation between the departments.
“A real coordination of our national forces in the next war will be worth many army corps and battleships.” Let us carry this even further. A real coordination of our national forces in peace may prove the prevention of war.