SEA POWER in its true sense consists not only in the nation's armed forces afloat, the Navy, but includes the merchant marine and all the various activities that go to make up our commerce on the sea. Sea Power, then, embraces not only the ships, but the men who man them, the industries that build and repair them, the companies that insure them, the docks and warehouses that facilitate loading and unloading them, and last but not least, the great organizations of merchant companies, and shipping companies, ashore at home, and their agents abroad. All these elements of sea power are interrelated, and dependent one upon the other; without the support of one to the other all must sooner or later suffer.
A study of our history shows that during the period wherein we have developed sea power as above defined, we have prospered, and when we have neglected to develop it, we have suffered. We owe the founding and development of the colonies to the sea power of the mother country. Later on sea power of the mother country, unwisely used, was the chief cause of the Revolution and the consequent birth of our nation. The desire to control and monopolize commerce and the repressive measures put into effect to accomplish that policy, were at the bottom of all the oppressive laws that finally forced the colonies to rebellion. On the other hand, the wise measures taken by the Continental Congress to develop our infant sea power and the heroic initiative taken by our naval commanders were largely responsible for the ultimate success of that rebellion.
Without in the least attempting to lessen the importance of the long continued and brave struggles and sacrifices of our people on land in this war, it is probable that ultimate disaster must have befallen us but for the efforts of the brave men that manned our ships and, in defiance of the powerful fleets of the enemy, ventured forth to carry the news of our struggle to the nations of Europe; and to keep open, though in a feeble way, our trade on the high seas.
The daring exploits of our small Navy were largely responsible for the final decision of the French Court to enter the war as our ally. The French people had come to believe that the English were invincible on the seas. No one ever dreamed, until it was repeatedly demonstrated by our Navy, that a British ship could be defeated by a ship of equal power, let alone by ship of inferior power. The brilliant exploits of our naval commanders, especially those of John Paul Jones, raised anew the hope that the English domination of the seas might yet be broken. John Paul Jones was the hero of the hour in France. The extraordinary public enthusiasm was a great help to Benjamin Franklin in his efforts to induce the French Court to take part in the war. When France finally declared war it was the French fleet, far more than the French troops, that were of value to us. From a critical study of the naval campaigns that followed, no one would claim that that French fleet was used to the best advantage. However, its mere presence in our waters altered the entire course of events to a marked degree. It prevented the enemy from concentrating his army and navy forces in any concerted effort. The enemy fleet was kept busy trying to intercept the French fleet. Prior to the French alliance our own naval forces had never seriously interfered with the major operations of the enemy, simply because we had no fleet. All our efforts were merely in the nature of raids by one or at best a few ships, on the enemy detached vessels, or upon the enemy commerce. With the advent of the French fleet on our side, this condition was changed. In fact, it placed us in a position really to dispute the command of the seas along our own coast. The decisive moment came when Washington was enabled to use this fleet in his master stroke at Yorktown. Without the French fleet the surrender at Yorktown would probably never have taken place.
During the period of our history immediately following the Revolutionary War, most of our troubles resulted directly from the neglect to build up the Navy proportionately to the needs of our commerce. The events of this period show conclusively that without the strong arm of the fighting Navy the activities of commerce and trade on the high seas become a menace, and are almost certain to bring on war. During this period the initiative of our seafaring countrymen rapidly extended our commerce on the sea. The loosely built confederation of states that existed prior to the establishment of our present constitution, and our government some years after our constitution was put into effect, were too weak financially to build up an adequate Navy. Furthermore our leading statesmen at that time looked upon regular armed forces with suspicion. This led them into the error of adopting the other extreme, namely, unpreparedness. The natural result of unpreparedness followed; depredations on our commerce by the French all but brought us into war with that new republic. Without question our weakness in naval power invited this aggression. The fact that France had been our recent ally, together with the strong sentiment throughout the country for the ideals of the French Revolution, in the end averted actual warfare.
We failed to learn the lesson, however, and continued to neglect the only obvious method to prevent war—armed naval preparedness.
In Jefferson's administration, in answer to the growing sense of need for a Navy, the fallacious policy of "the Navy for defense only" was adopted. In line with this idea seagoing ships were neglected, and a large number of small gunboats were built capable of operating in harbors or in closed waters only. In the meantime our commerce on the seas grew apace. Our naval weakness invited aggression, first by the Barbary States and later by Great Britain, in both cases finally leading to war. The policy of Great Britain, in asserting the right of search, impressment of our seamen, and capture of our vessels, was ruthlessly carried out. Public indignation steadily increased as a result of these acts. Our government was forced to take some action. As a corollary to our gunboat policy, we were limited to defensive steps only. The Non-Intercourse Act was passed by Congress.
This act was in effect a law forbidding our merchant ships to go to sea. To enforce this law it actually became necessary to employ our gunboats, not against an enemy, but against our own merchant ships in order to keep them in harbors. The effect, of course, was ruinous to our commerce, and disastrous to our economic life throughout the country. Not only was this law ineffective in accomplishing the desired result, but it rather encouraged the British Government's pretentions on the seas. It is not my purpose in this article to dwell in detail upon the part the Navy took in these wars.
The glorious deeds of the Navy in the War of 1812 will forever be a priceless heritage of our country. The humiliation of our land forces, due to military unpreparedness, was relieved in part by the extraordinary daring and successful exploits of our infant Navy. The fact is, however, that with the exception of Perry's victorious campaign on Lake Erie, our naval victories had but very little effect on the final outcome of the war. In the end our insignificant naval forces were blockaded in our home ports by overwhelmingly superior forces of the enemy. The Treaty of Peace finally signed did not even mention the main question that brought on the war: namely, the right of search and impressment of our seamen on the high seas. Fortunately the victory of Perry on Lake Erie, due to its effect upon the military events in the northwest, had settled the question of the future sovereignty of that great territory, so that this sovereignty was not a subject for serious adverse claim during the peace negotiations. In the long era of peace that followed the War of 1812, our naval policy varied with the changing attitudes of the various administrations; sometimes strong, and sometimes weak. Our commerce grew rapidly, especially in the Far Eastern trade. The Navy became more and more an essential factor in this development. It would be impossible in this article to give in detail all the incidents where the power of the Navy aided this commerce, nor is the Navy's effect on this commerce to be measured by the specific incidents where force was actually used; but rather to be measured by the moral influence resulting from the knowledge that there was such a force, that could be used whenever the rights of our citizens abroad were violated.
One incident, however, of force actually used, may be of interest. In the year 1831 the American merchant ship Friendship, lying in the harbor of Quallah Battoo, Island of Sumatra, was attacked by a band of natives. One officer and two of the crew were killed, and the ship looted of its valuables. In those days news traveled slowly, and the report of this outrage did not reach our Government in Washington until seven months later. President Andrew Jackson, "Old Hickory," as soon as he learned of the incident, dispatched the U. S. S. Potomac, Commander John Downes, to Quallah Battoo, with instructions to investigate, and if found advisable, to administer summary punishment on the Rajah's government. Upon arrival of the Potomac at Quallah Battoo, it was learned that the Rajah himself was the instigator of the attack. Commodore Downes landed a detachment of sailors and marines, captured and destroyed the forts surrounding the town, and obtained lasting guarantees that our ships in the future would be protected.
In those days our merchant ships, backed up by our Navy, carried the flag to all parts of the world. The oriental trade was especially important. Commodore Perry, by the show of naval force coupled with diplomacy, succeeded in making a treaty with Japan, opening up that country to our trade. Then, as now, the great question in the Far East was the "Open Door," which simply means an equal opportunity for all in trade and commerce; one nation on equality with another. The Navy is the only means whereby this equal opportunity can be obtained. The advent of the telegraph and other means of communication has lessened the necessity for having the show of power visibly present. Nevertheless, the knowledge of the potential power due to the strong arm of the Navy is just as necessary now as it was then. This is true not only in our diplomatic councils in regard to the "Open Door" in China, but in all matters whatsoever in our relations with nations of the world.
In the old days our rights were obtained by show of power on the spot; now they are obtained by diplomatic councils held in Washington and in foreign capitals. Where would we stand in these councils without the backing of the potential power of our Navy? This power now may be kept at home, but it is none the less potent. The changes brought about by the substitution of steel and iron ships for wooden ships, and the advent of new industrial conditions in our country, have acted temporarily to eclipse our commerce on the seas. Unfortunately the greater part of this change in ships took place during the period of our Civil War. Our Navy was required at home, blockading our southern ports, so that a great part of our prestige in commerce on the seas slipped away from us. Special privileges given to European powers, by forced, one-sided treaties, finally all but drove our commerce from the Far Eastern seas. The burdens and debts caused by the Civil War caused a neglect of the Navy for a long period subsequent to 1865. Our commerce declined along with the decline of our Navy. However, during President Cleveland's administration there was an awakening, and there has been a steady improvement ever since; but we have never really attained that position on the seas that our great national destiny unquestionably demands.
The recent war demonstrated the old, old truth, that the nation dominating the sea really controls the world.
At the recent Washington Conference we signed a treaty.with the principal maritime powers to limit naval armament, so that on paper we are entitled to a navy in capital ships equal to that of Great Britain. What does that mean, however, unless we really maintain that parity? What does it mean, even with that parity, unless we also develop our commerce on the sea, which is that other great factor making up the sea power of our country?
Without the strong arm of the Navy and the prestige of overseas commerce, our national development, however great it may be, will be one-sided. By the rest of the world we will be looked on merely as a money bag, to be looted and punctured whenever a good opportunity arrives. Our influence around the diplomatic council table will be measured merely by the amount of money that may be extracted from us. That proud feeling held by the strong but righteous man will never be ours. The great destiny of our country demands that we take our place in the front rank of the maritime powers.