SEA POWER IN ANCIENT HISTORY—The Story of the Navies of Classic Greece and Rome. By Arthur MacCartney Shepard, with a Foreword by Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, U. S. N. Boston; Little. Brown, and Company; 1924. Octavo, pp. i-xxx, 1-286. $5.00.
A Review by Captain Roy C. Smith, U. S. N. (Ret.)
This is an interesting and readable summary of the sea power of the Mediterranean peoples from the earliest time to 476 a. d. The author traces the growth and necessity of sea power in relation to commerce and warfare from the early Phoenicians to the end of the Western Roman Empire. He finds that the underlying reasons have not changed materially, though methods were and are continually changing. Through it all is the great influence exerted by sea power in all times, the thesis first strikingly analysed and illustrated by the late Admiral Mahan.
There are descriptions of warship and personnel, of training, administration, maintenance, weapons, and of tactics and strategy, the last two rather general. (The author in his preface states that his work is not planned primarily for naval officers but for the large class of readers interested in historical literature). Sea warfare was at first like land warfare, combats of armed men at close quarters, their ships in contact and grappled. Later there was maneuvering, and injury to vessels by ramming, or breaking off of oars, or by missile-throwing engines. The tactical combinations, breaking the line, outflanking (capping), were for the purpose of bringing a superior force against a portion of the enemy force (the basis of all tactics), and resulted in formations and maneuvers that have been employed throughout the history of naval warfare.
While tactics have varied greatly with the means employed, strategy remains much the same, owing to the natural configuration of the theater of war, and the effort to move an adequate force to the strategic center and maintain it, both during transit and on arrival. The galleys were not very seaworthy, and had limited storage capacity. Fresh water and the weather were their main concern. They usually, on both accounts, cruised near the shore and hauled up for the night.
The author’s account is more concerned with a narrative of the main events of the period he is describing; but from this narrative the naval student may discern certain unvarying principles of tactics and strategy applicable to all times. For instance, all warfare is the application of force. It depends on factors peculiar to the means employed, as well as on exterior factors dependent on the climate and the characteristics of the theater of war. For convenience the factors may be called the elements of warfare. They are the weapons, the masses in action, the motion or movement of the masses, the resistance to deformation or destruction of the masses, the means of communication, the self-sustaining capacity of the masses, the climate and weather, and the natural and artificial features of the terrain and the theater of war. Some of the elements are seen to be internal, or peculiar to the forces themselves; others are external, or dependent on weather, climate and the theater of war. Some of the elements govern tactics, as weapons, masses, motion, resistance, communications, terrain and weather; others govern strategy, as self-sustaining capacity of the unit masses, motion or movement, communications, climate, weather, and the features of the whole theater of war. The reader, by considering the above various elements successively in the events narrated, will find that the tactics and strategy of the period are the natural result, and become at once apparent. The average tactics and strategy only of the period are here considered. The personal element will always rule, but cannot be considered as an element of the average tactics and strategy; for the personal element itself is of the same average in all times and will not change the average result.
As an instance of an analysis of this character, what would be the tactics of the trireme? First, weapons: Main weapon the ram (beak); others, war engines, bows and arrows, javelins, hand-to-hand weapons. Next, masses: The mass of the unit considerable relatively; the number of units variable. Next, motion: Internal, oars; in calms and light winds can move at will; speed considerable for short periods. Next, resistance: Light construction, flanks weak, hut bows strengthened for ramming; can he easily sunk by ram attack in flank; motive power may be destroyed by breaking off oars. Next, communications: By word of mouth and visual signals; adequate for ordinary purposes. Next, terrain: Sometimes in the open, sometimes constricted by land. Next, weather: Variable, but the average conditions suitable for the handling of the units. Resulting tactics: To attempt by speed and suitable formations to bring a superior force in contact with a portion of the enemy; breaking the line or capping. To attack by surprise in flank and ram. To use war engines and missile weapons when in range; to sweep off the enemy oars; to board and defeat in hand-to-hand combat. The best results in case of a superior force to be obtained in the open, unrestricted by proximity of land. Such were the actual tactics of the period, and such is the deduction from a consideration of the elements.
It is interesting to note that when the interrelation of the elements is similiar, similiar tactics will result, though the elements themselves are quite different. For instance, modern cavalry: The horse himself is the principal weapon, head-on attack (charge) strong. Cavalry weak in the flank. Speed and mass considerable. Tactics: Attack by surprise in the flank, if possible, in any ease by charging. In other words, the elements bearing a similar relation to each other, the tactics are similar to galley tactics.
The author’s narrative embraces the early Phoenician and Greek navies, the growth of commerce, sea power and colonization; the Graeco-Persian war, the rise of Athens as a sea power, and the battle of Salamis; the necessity of sea power for supremacy and empire; the Peloponnesian and Sicilian wars; the decline of Athens; later Greek naval history, sea power in the campaigns of Philip and Alexander; early Roman history, Sicily and Carthage strongest at sea; decline of Greek power in Sicily; the Romans a land people, but forced to take account of Carthage; the Punic wars, Romans use corvi (crows, boarding bridges) to facilitate boarding and hand- to-hand combat, battles of Mylae, Ecnomus, the /Kgates Isles; sea power decisive in these struggles; decline of sea power under the Roman Republic, battle of Naulochus; campaign and battle of Actium; sea power under the Empire mainly for police purposes, suppression of piracy, further decline coincident with that of Empire; Vandals destroy Roman sea power.
The author’s conclusions are given in a final chapter, in which early sea power is considered in relation to piracy; its constructive and destructive influence; its influence on the growth of civilization and imperialism; sea power and Athenian culture; sea power and democracy; its malign influence; small importance of sea power in development of Roman institutions; later decisive influence on imperialism; the Mediterranean a Roman lake, effect on civilization and Christianity.
The following are characteristic extracts. Page 208: “. . . . the early Cretan, Phoenician, Carthaginian, and Grecian navies alone made possible an extensive commerce. Only by the protection of the fleets of war could the riches and products of many lands be brought together by commerce for the development of a higher and finer civilization; only through commerce upheld' by sea power could the rudiments of civilization, the higher mechanic arts, the alphabet, the art of writing, be disseminated among barbarous or savage peoples over the basin of the Mediterranean.
The broadening and enlightening effect upon the human mind of knowledge gained through voyages of commerce and discovery—such as the rotundity of the earth and its revolution about the sun as proved by the Phoenician circumnavigation of Africa—must likewise have been incalculable.”
Page 222: A great naval battle, Actium, saved the empire from probable dissolution and established the pax Romana by land and sea. The consequences that followed were simply incalculable. For the first time in history a single people held absolute sway over the whole Mediterranean; for the first time the peaceful merchant might ply his trade tolerably secure from pirate or hostile war craft. The result was a tremendous commercial prosperity, an outpouring and diffusion of wealth such as the world had never known and which has only been surpassed in comparatively modern times. Through the channel of commerce, upheld by sea power, there flowed into Rome and Italy the arts, the sciences and the literatures of the nations of the eastern Mediterranean, particularly of Greece; this culture, after a slight transmutation by the Latin mind, was handed on, largely by sea-borne commerce, to the barbaric peoples of Gaul, Spain and Britain. As the conquests of Alexander spread Greek civilization over a large part of Asia, so Roman sea power was largely instrumental in completing the Hellenization of western Europe and in diffusing Roman genius for law, order and organization over the face of the known world.”
Following are thirty-two pages in interesting appendices, containing extracts from ancient authors on ship construction, blockades, sea fights, tactics, need of preparation, galleys and sailing ships.
Then follows a very complete bibliography of about nine pages, which will be most useful to students of naval history.
Finally there is a copious index of twenty-eight pages. There are throughout the text two maps of the Mediterranean and twenty-two plans and illustrations.
The foreword of Admiral Moffett draws an interesting comparison between the controlling factors of sea power in ancient times and at present. There are lessons from the past that may well be taken to heart today. His comments in this connection are just and to the point, as for instance, page xi, “Mr Shepard’s hook abounds in proofs of the fact that sea power since the early days has always affected the welfare of maritime nations. Those developing it gained great prominence and lived long. Those neglecting it suffered thereby. This should be taken home to our own condition among the nations of the world. Our maritime interests must be protected. Adequate sea power alone can guarantee that protection. Even our existence among the first powers of the world depends upon the development of our sea power to a stage which will preclude attack by other nations. The Washington Conference treaties have placed restrictions on the strength of our fighting force; but other nations entering into the agreement have also restricted their fighting forces. It is our duty at all times to maintain in a highly efficient state the force allowed ns by the treaty.”
The book is attractively gotten up, with large print and numerous plans and illustrations. The spelling dreadnought is employed throughout the hook. There is authority in the dictionaries for nought as well as naught, but dreadnought is the spelling given as meaning a waterproof cloth. Finally, some years ago, the Navy Department ruled that in that department the word should he spelled with an o. However, the type is named after the British battleship Dreadnought, the first of the type, which thus becomes a proper name; and unless such derivation is to be discarded, the word should he spelled the same, that is, with an o.
On page 121, and in the map and index, occurs “Sycros.” This seems to he intended for “Scyros,” or “Skyros.” On page 166, it is stated that the Roman vessels built in 243 n. c. to meet the Carthaginians had discarded the corvi (hoarding bridges), which were heard of no more. The battle took place the following year off the ZEgates Isles. In the illustration facing the same page several boarding bridges appear. On page 198, the date 277 d. c. is apparently intended for a. d (See the next paragraph, ten years later, 287 a. n.) On page £03, the date 44s a. n. for the sacking of Rome by the Vandals is apparently meant for 455 a. d.
Note is to be made of the author's adherence to the old version of the guilt of Theramenes and Thrasybulus, after the battle of the Arginuste Isles, 406 n. c., page 115. These two captains are said to have shifted the blame on the shoulders of the admirals (generals) in command, for not providing suitable means for rescuing the Athenian sailors from the disabled galleys, resulting in the condemnation of the admirals. Xenophon took this view, among the authorities quoted, also Lysias, not quoted. The author describes the condemnation of the admirals as “one of the foulest judicial murders known in naval history.” Grote, who is mentioned in the bibliography, but not quoted, takes the opposite view, having found Xenophon biased and untrustworthy. It is of interest that Theramenes is the hero of Professor Gaines's Gorgo, which Lord Bryce has characterized as the best ihistorical novel. After the appearance of Gorgo, Professor Perrin of Yale published in the American Historical Review for July, 1904, “The Rehabilitation of Theramenes.” Finally, Aristotle, in the Constitution of Athens, named Theramenes as one of the three citizens who had rendered Athens the greatest service.
The minor imperfections that have been noticed do not detract from the value of the work as a whole. The author evinces much study and research and has provided a volume of unusual interest. While the story, as has been mentioned, is meant primarily for the general reader, naval officers will not fail to be interested; and apart from the general bearing of sea power, they may draw their own conclusions as to the dependence of tactics and strategy on certain inherent principles that may be deduced from the facts that are so entertainingly narrated.
LIFE OF ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR ARTHUR KNY- VET WILSON, Bart., V. C., G. C. B., O. M„ G. C. V. O., by Admiral Sir Edward E. Bradford, K. C. B., C. V. O. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1923. $5.00
A delightful book; one which, though naturally appealing more to the naval profession and historians who will find in it a store of interesting historical sidelights, is yet of keen interest to the non-professional mind. It is a book, indeed, worth owning and rereading, and should find a well deserved place, especially in the naval family’s reading list, for its graphic descriptions in the portrayal of the English naval service for the sixty years preceding the World War make it delightful to read aloud. Embodying, as it does, the true spirit of naval service, it has a particular value to the young officer. The charm of the biography, which, indeed, has only two really dry spots, one at the beginning in describing the Wilson family tree, and the other in what seems a rather profitless discussion of the armored cruiser program, rests upon the author’s wise use of Sir Arthur’s letters which are characterized by an unusually happy faculty for the picturesque and the graphic.
Wilson, whose whole soul was in his profession, was an indefatigable worker. This, with his desire to accomplish a task and with his tenacity of purpose, often led him to require an undue amount of work from others. In consequence he had long been known to the men as “ ’Ard ‘Eart” and “Tug,” the latter having been a famous prize-fighter noted for his tenacity and pluck. On the other hand, he knew the value of recreation and liberty, and “imposed no petty restraints on the liberties of his officers or men.” He was "straightforward and firm as a rock,” and “always accessible and unruffled,” though rarely gave reasons for his “actions or opinions.” If he did, his answers were so condensed that little could be got out of them. This made it difficult at times to collaborate with him.
This main non-professional hobby was hunting which generally occupied his periods of leave, though he was fond of all outdoor sports and when serving on the Britannia, the school for young cadets, “he created quite a new departure by personally taking part in cricket, football and other games of the boys, considering it to be as much a part of his duty to do as anything else.” His simplicity was most pronounced. He objected to being cheered by his crew and when he was awarded the Victoria Cross for valiant work with the naval brigade at El Teh, he wrote: “If I could only have got a basin of water and washed my face I should have escaped notoriety, but I only had a little cold tea in my waterbottle, and until we got to the wells there was no water to be got, so the blood ran all over my face, and the correspondents spotted me.” Sir Arthur had an especially warm place in the hearts of the Japanese naval officers, as* he had been a member of the British naval commission sent to Japan in the late ’6o’s to organize a Naval Academy. Unfortunately the outbreak of a civil war in Japan brought the work to an untimely end. In the latter part of his life he took much interest in the establishment of a sailors' home in Weymouth, contributing both money and effort, and often responding with effective sympathy to those in need.
After two years at Eton, with some additional coaching by his father, Commander Knyvct Wilson, R. N., Arthur Knyvet Wilson began his noteworthy career in the Royal Navy, under real war conditions, as a midshipman on board H. M. S. Algiers, then participating in the Crimean War operations in the Crimea. He again found himself under fire on the China station, in one of the periodic Chinese outbreaks, in 1857, when he wrote in much disgust: “Captain Hall takes too much care of youngsters altogether.” In 1886, after two other cruises, he joined the Excellent “to qualify for gunnery lieutenant,” contributing much from then on to the development of gunnery. In 1870 he began his outstanding professional specialization in torpedo work, as a member of a committee appointed by the Admiralty to investigate Mr. Whitehead's torpedo. In the spring of 1876 after a cruise to India in the Raleigh, he was appointed as a commander of the Vernon, the school of torpedo instruction. “This,” writes his biographer, “was a new departure in his professional career .... and there lay before him the development and improvement of new weapons which were to revolutionize naval tactics and ship construction.” After his promotion to captain in 1879, he was given the command of a torpedo depot ship, the Hecla, attached to the Mediterranean fleet. He at once began a series of “fleet exercises in mining, counter-mining, running torpedo boats and practicing jumping booms,” as well as practical work in rigging net defenses, but, in spite of hard work, time was found for recreation for all hands. "There were expeditions to places of interest, lawn tennis parties, picnics and dinners, seining parties and fishing excursions.” It was during this cruise that Wilson rendered such valuable service in cooperating with the army to quell the “Revolt of the Colonels,” led by Arabi Bey, in Egypt in 1882. He and Fisher constructed an armored railway truck with gatling guns and upon another truck mounted a 40-pounder. It was during this campaign, while preserving order at Port Said, that he wrote: “I got myself in hot water with everybody in this country by giving passage from Malta to a Mr. Broadly, who is the lawyer retained to defend Arabi. They all are so bloodthirsty they want to shoot him, too; but there are so many other rebels in high places in England that I should like to shoot first, and as rebels go, I think Arabi is rather a good sort.”
His next torpedo work was done as chairman of the Torpedo Discharge Committee, and though his specialization was interrupted by a tour of duty on the Cape station, as flag captain, where he took up the gunnery problem of smoke interference in night firing, he returned to England in 1887 to accept the post of what he thought would be Director of Torpedoes at the Admiralty but what really turned out to be Assistant Director of Torpedoes under the Director of Ordnance. “It is,” he wrote, “as if they had offered me a situation as cook and then made me a scullery maid.” He contributed much, nevertheless, by his experiments in firing torpedoes from submerged tubes and his devices of “hook brackets” and the two steadying studs “have been continued ever since.” Defense torpedo tests with “continuous” and “ladder” booms were taken up after his transfer, in 1889, to the Vernon, the torpedo school, as captain. Associated with him in this boom testing was Lieutenant Sturdee, of Falkland fame, who was then in command of a torpedo boat. It was at this time, too, that Wilson invented the “Pioneer,” a device that “fixed in the head of a torpedo would shear its way through the wire nets suspended as a protection round the ship.” His next torpedo work was to test out the qualities of a “new type of vessel called a torpedo boat destroyer,,’ but this was not done till after a tour of duty in the Mediterranean as captain of the Sans Pareil, with Jellicoe as his commander, whose promising abilities, however, tempted the admiral to take him on the flag ship, much to the disgust of Wilson who considered it sheer “poaching.” In August, 1897, he became Controller of the Navy in charge of all materiel from ship construction to supplies. This was one of the most hectic periods of his career, for his department bore the brunt of the attack led by the Navy League against the naval administration. It was on this occasion that sandwich men “paraded the streets of London, bearing placards headed ‘Death Traps,’ and professing to give a list of Ships armed with obsolete muzzle-loading guns.” In the excitement of the general election in 1900, known as the Khaki Election, over the government’s Boer War record, the interest of the public, whose naval confidence had seemed shaken, “was soon swamped, in spite of the efforts of the League.” Shortly afterwards Rear Admiral Wilson was given the command of the channel squadron.
“What everyone was looking forward to with critical interest was how he would handle the squadron at sea,” but no one had long to wait, for “on the first occasion of going out of harbor he introduced a new practice by taking the battle squadron out in two lines instead of one as had always been done before.” It was considered a decided improvement and quickly imitated a year later by Prince Henry, then commanding the German Fleet. When, in 1903, Wilson was selected as the “first commander-in- chief of the home fleet,” it was universally felt that no better selection could be made. This feeling, “both in and beyond professional circles,” was well voiced in the Times, which described him as "intrepid in tactics,” “astute and original in strategc interprise,” and “a very type of a fighting admiral.”
Under a new plan of ship distribution, in 1904, the home fleet, with an additional battleship division, became the channel fleet, with Wilson continuing in command as vice admiral. This was his last command which he relinquished early in 1907, when he was completely surprised by the King’s giving him the “commission as admiral of the fleet.” His simplicity of spirit was well shown by his last official act before leaving the ship, when in bidding his officers and men farewell he said: “She had been first in gunnery and sports as well as in good discipline, and in wishing them ‘Goodbye’ he hoped they would maintain this to the end by not cheering him when he left.”
His expected ease of life, however, was of short duration, for upon the retirement of Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord, he was prevailed upon by the King to fill that vacancy. It was a most happy selection as Admiral Wilson had a national reputation and “was recognized as the most capable sea officer of his time,” the navy having “ample confidence in his firmness and justice, and in his sound and independent judgment.” Those qualities were especially needed as the previous administration “had created feelings of distrust and insecurity among officers of high rank.” With the replacement of Mr. McKenna as First Lord by Mr. Churchill, a new board was summoned and Admiral Wilson retired again to Swaffham, declining the offer of a peerage. When the World War broke out he was again called to the Admiralty upon the appointment of Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord, as an assistant to him, Admiral Wilson accepted at once, “stipulating only that he should give his services without accepting appointment or pay.”
His joining the naval administration “greatly helped to restore public confidence after the loss of the three cruisers, and to maintain it under the worse shock of Coronel.” The assistance he rendered during the week following Lord Fisher’s resignation and abrupt departure, without waiting to turn over the duties to a successor, “was a great service to his colleagues, to the government, and to the country.” After the reconstitution of the board he became what was really “an unofficial staff officer,” ready to give help wherever wanted, attached to no particular office, “but working principally with the chief of the staff. ‘There is no man in this building,’ said this officer one day, ‘whom I would rather trust to thrash out a difficult problem than Sir Arthur Wilson.’ ”
H. F. S.
The Best News Stories of 1923. Edited by Joseph Anthony. Small, Maynard & Co., Boston. Price $2.50 Net.
In the June issue of the Proceedings (whole number 256) under the title “Newspaper Publicity for the Navy,” attention was drawn to the necessity for a more general dissemination of Navy news. Those who are interested in this subject and who desire to do work along the lines indicated will find in Mr. Anthony’s book practical models for their guidance. The volume contains seventy-four stories, selected from many hundreds that were considered. It may be taken as fairly representative of the best products of the newspaper practices of the day. A study of these models will indicate more clearly than much descriptive matter and many instructions the accepted style and method to adopt in the preparation of copy for the press. Although the stories are interesting in themselves and make entertaining reading, it is not for this reason that the book is recommended. It constitutes a valuable textbook and guide for all who desire to produce acceptable copy for newspaper publication.
There is represented in classified form the best pieces of straight reporting, the best feature and magazine page stories, the best foreign correspondence, interviews, human interest stories, sport stories, etc. It is interesting to note the general application of the newspaper rule which calls for the whole story in the first paragraph; interesting to see how details are mentioned in the order of their importance; interesting to note how the story may be "cut” by eliminating paragraphs from the end. Those who write for newspapers will find the book a big help. Those who read newspapers will find it delightfully entertaining.
G.E.B.