REVIEW OF BOOKS
"AN INTRODUCTION TO WORLD POLITICS" By Herbert Adams Gibbons, The Century Company, New York. Price $4.00.
Review and Interpretation
Foreword
On behalf of the Naval Institute, the review of this book was undertaken. In reviewing it, the thought has been that it was written for naval men to read. I have therefore taken the liberty of reading a little more into this article, in the shape of naval lessons, than a strict review would warrant.
W. V. Pratt,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
It is rarely that one runs across a book so full of historical material and so useful, in an educational sense to the older naval man. The author has truly said that this is an introduction to world politics. Of the very nature of things, one book could not be more than that, but the arrangement is such that a clear and continuous picture of world political events, particularly those of Continental Europe, is given to the thoughtful reader. In addition to the facts which the author so succinctly presents, he gives his own views of the results of the application of world politics to the various nations and races of this earth. To this extent the book is more than an introduction, it is at least a partial attempt at an interpretation of world politics. If one may glean what is the author's definition, it might be said that world politics is the game of national interests played by the powers of Europe since the end of the eighteenth century. The birthplace of the game was Europe. Minor and backward nations have been the pawns. The players were statesmen. The world was the game board, but the controlling threads always lead back to Europe.
It is necessary to remember the above conception of world politics if one is to apply the lessons of the past to the problems of the future, for it indicates clearly that no American, brought up in a country singularly free from the influences which have controlled the policies of Continental Europe for over one hundred years, can, in the realm of world politics, on equal terms, cope with the foreign diplomats and statesmen who breathe this atmosphere from childhood on, and who sharpen their first set of diplomatic teeth on the problems of the Near East.
This book is of much value to the naval officer who is interested in the study of international questions and who wishes to have a correct background upon which to base his naval strategic studies. It does not replace Mahan, but it does furnish a Setting in which we see portrayed the naval lessons Mahan so skillfully drew out of the history of the past. While not viewing his problem in the light of a naval man, or even necessarily being in sympathy with him, the author has made such a clear analysis of the relationship existing between naval strength and world politics, as it was played in Continental Europe, that he has practically arrived at the same conclusions which Mahan, our great sea strategist, reached. Before attempting to read the book at length, it is recommended that some study be given to the list of contents in order that one may get an idea of the general scheme, or perhaps it might be said, the atmosphere of the book. Ancient history is not touched, though it, particularly Roman world history, furnishes lessons pertinent to the present age. Little space is given to the older colonial conquests of the British, Spanish, French, Portuguese, or Dutch. No attempt is made to form a connecting link between the limited political aspirations of nations before the French Revolution and the world politics of the more imperialistic age following after. In reading this book one should not attempt to find world politics explained or justified by any continuous thread which runs back through a long past. The Spanish and Portuguese relations to their Colonies were so different from the conceptions of world power which came into being about the time of the French Revolution, and which have existed since then, that they have been barely touched upon. Insofar as the scope of the book is concerned, this would be unnecessary if, in some of his later chapters, the author had not appeared to interpret world politics with a view to deriving lessons applicable to international problems of the future. The instant we attempt to speculate about the future it is inevitable that the United States and other countries of North and South America should become involved. The history of the colonial expansion of North, and particularly South America, is so interwoven with the older world policies of Spain, Portugal, and France, that it is impossible for the political atmosphere of the new world not to be tinged with the policies and practices of an older time. So it may be said of North and South America that they, at a period before the one so intimately analyzed by the author, acquired a political complexion of their own, which later as independent states they have proceeded to develop undisturbed to any great extent by the more complex problems which have agitated Europe since the end of the eighteenth century.
Dating from the Act of Vienna in 1815, it may be said that a new colonial policy arose in Europe. Previous to the Napoleonic wars, much of the colonial expansion which had been undertaken, except in North America, was carried on for the purpose of proselytizing the natives or of enriching the coffers of the mother country from the stores of gold, silver and other valuables found in the overseas colonies. During this period many wars were fought, but up to the nineteenth century most of the wars were fought for limited objectives. The entire nation rarely felt the full stress and effect of war. The Napoleonic conception of world conquest, resembling somewhat the Roman, changed this situation. His ambitions were unlimited, but his appreciation of the factors constituting world power was faulty. Napoleon never appreciated the true value of colonies' or of sea power. The point to remember is, that following the Napoleonic era, the world gradually became the stage of operations, and the era of world politics was born. After 1815 there came a period devoted to the consolidation of gains; the value of colonies as a world asset to a nation became more thoroughly appreciated and the relationship of sea power to world power recognized. The result was that the colonial expansion after 1815 was of quite a different character from that which antedated the Napoleonic wars. In the inter-relationships existing between national aspirations, colonial expansion, industrial expansion, trade, sea power, and military power, you get the tangled threads out of which the statesmen of the day wove the web of European world politics.
In the discussion of national aims and practices from 1815 to the date of the Washington Conference in 1922, the author has gone as deeply into particulars as was necessary to give his story the thread of continuity. Where details are required, he has referred the reader to the sources of more particular information. However, sufficient data have been given the average reader to follow the trend of the story.
Though modern world politics, in the sense used by the author, has touched North and South America but slightly, its mantle was spread quite definitely over Asia. It may be that our Continent owes partial immunity to that cycle of political events, the American Revolution, the French Revolution and the Monroe Doctrine. One cannot read this book, or in fact, any history, without seeing that Great Britain has been the dominating factor in modern world politics.
From the beginning of the seventeenth century, Holland had extended her commercial sway into the Far East and into the Americas' through the agencies of the Dutch East and West India Companies. Her fleets contested, and for a time successfully, under Tromp and De Ruyter, the supremacy of the seas with Spain and with England. The Napoleonic wars ended disastrously for Holland. Her forced alliance with France gave the British the opportunity to seize much of the overseas holdings of the Dutch as they were helpless against England's sea power. The Dutch East Indies were restored and are today the world's' richest island empire.
The battle of Trafalgar in 1805, won by the great Nelson, broke forever the sea power of France and Spain, leaving Great Britain mistress of the seas. Blessed in the possession of many world strategic positions, and in the greatest sea fleet, the road to India lay open. Her other colonial possessions were equally accessible. Wherever the native islander could settle he brought from his native soil a bit of the homeland. These overseas Dominions, settled by native stock, today constitute the strength of the British commonwealth. In colonies such as India, already densely peopled by native races. Great Britain's colonial policies were different. They were administered through various agencies as a part of the property of the Empire, but never enjoyed Dominion rights. British colonial expansion, however, was well in advance of the times, and the territories over which she ruled, in the main, received a wise administration. Through the impetus given by colonial expansion, it was natural to see a great carrying trade established between the colonies and England. With the disappearance of the American merchant marine following the Civil War, Great Britain had hardly a competitor until the merchant marine of Germany began to make its power felt. With the growth of her colonies, and through the agency of her merchant marine, it was natural that England should develop as a great industrial country, with the trade and money of the world flowing toward her. Her safeguard was the British Fleet. It not only protected Britain's shores, but it backed up her diplomatic efforts in peace, and forced her opponents to strain every effort in war. Her own resources up to the time of the Great War had never been taxed to the utmost. In time, Great Britain practically took the middleman's toll of the commerce of the world. Afterwards came Russia, France, Italy, and other lesser powers, and at a later date, Germany. But, whether the exploiting nation were governed by an autocrat, or administered under the laws of a republic, or of a constitutional monarch, the aims have not been dissimilar. At the root of each national policy was the controlling idea that the native peoples might be exploited for the benefit of the mother country. As a by-product, in the processes of exploitation, the native populations, where such existed, were supposed to be benefited by the superior civilization of the greater power. It was not the difference of aims, but the difference of methods used, and the character of the colonizing stock, which made Great Britain's colonies successful in contrast to the colonies under the jurisdiction of other powers. In a practical sense, while the colonies of Great Britain have advanced, those of the other great powers have not kept pace. The awakening sense of national and racial consciousness which is making itself felt, particularly in Asia, will force the world politics of the past to come to a different adjustment of values in the future. The Continent of Asia has not been free from the influence of world politics to the same extent as have the North and South Americas, and in the future may present many interesting and complex international problems. As the French and the English have in the past been the greatest exponents of world politics, so they are at present. The problems of the Near East are today but a continuation of the problems which have been vexing the Balkan and other neighboring states for centuries. The relationship of France and England to these questions, is today, on the whole, what it was in the past before Germany entered the scene. The policy of Russia, owing to the great debacle, has been completely overturned. At one period in her history she appeared like a giantess endeavoring to shake herself loose from the bonds which bound her, in an attempt to seek an outlet to the four seas. This striving to gain access to the seas usually conflicted with the policy of Great Britain, that could brook no power which might threaten her sea supremacy. The interests of France lay sometimes with one and sometimes with the other power, but in the main, France aspired to be a dominant continental power while England aimed to control the seas.
With the Americas closed to European colonization projects, and with Asia preempted by native races, Africa loomed large in the world political horizon. The Suez Canal opened a short road to India. French and British interests clashed at intervals. In emulation of France, Italy took over to herself certain holdings in Northern Africa, on the Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden. Portugal, Belgium, Spain, and later Germany, appropriated vast territories. The clash of national interests was felt from time to time.
The Balkans and Near East were always fruitful sources of trouble. Wave after wave of conquest had swept over this part of Europe and Asia Minor. Racial and boundary difficulties had vexed the Balkans for centuries. When the great powers started playing one small nation against another, in the game of world politics, fresh fuel was added to the flames. Two late wars had pitted the Balkan states against the Turk and then against each other.
Germany and Japan came late. Germany had been too engrossed in her own problems of internal development and consolidation to seize upon the valuable outlying possessions of the world, when the opportunity to grasp them was good. Under the guiding statesmanship of Bismarck, the German Empire, in a manner somewhat similar to Russia under the autocratic regime, was to expand outwardly from the Empire as a center. The natural direction of expansion was toward the East and Southeast, and this led to the desirability of reasonably friendly relations with the great Empire of Russia and to close ties with Austria. With the passing away of Bismarck conceptions of correct German policy, the lessons gleaned from a study of British methods took firm hold on the directing German imagination. The nature and value of sea power began to be understood. But the world was small. The best unoccupied places had already been preempted, and there arose, naturally, a state of tension when another competitor entered into the field of European ambitions. So long as the clash of interests occurred in overseas possessions, while the danger of war was ever present, it was not inevitable. But the instant that commercial rivalry became too great, and Germany's sea power menacing, the danger grew. When Germany directed her attentions and interests to the Near East, always the source of Europe's troubles, war was almost inevitable. In pursuing her line of conduct, Germany took a leaf out of the history of England and France. But she had neither the political astuteness nor the backing of experience, to enable her to play the game as skillfully as it had been played before. The author is inclined to excuse Germany on the ground of precedent. It would seem fair, perhaps, to excuse German aims; yet the German methods' were, to say the least, unsportsmanlike.
Japan, as a world power, also arrived late in the world political arena. Her acquaintance with modern occidental civilization of less than a century's growth, could not be thorough. To a young power, spreading its wings and learning to fly under the modern methods of world politics, it must have been apparent that the law of nations was the law of force. At least, this is the conclusion which a nation studying European methods of the past century and a half must arrive at. Probably for these reasons the author has made excuses for the attitude of Japan toward Korea and China.
The Russo-Japanese War marked an epoch in Asiatic political history and showed Japan her military strength, which she was not slow to use for her own ends, during the late war. It seems fair to believe, however, that no country like Japan, with over two thousand years of splendid continuous historical or traditional record behind it; of a racial purity and imbued with sterling qualities; with a national spirit which permeates the Empire, will in the end draw conclusions from the historical lessons of the past which do not accord with the future advance of civilization.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century and with the rise of Germany, there developed a competition for the markets of the world which resulted in intensive production arid a consequent industrial inflation. This industrial inflation affected many of the white races, inducing a tendency to move away from the soil, and to gather in cities. There they could engage in occupations which apparently gave a larger share of the luxuries of life. Other nations were ready to see the advantages enjoyed by Great Britain, and were quick to follow her lead; but the best spaces of the world already had been preempted. Although wars, as for example our Spanish War, which first brought America into the realm of world politics, and the Russo-Japanese War, which marks the turn of the tide in Asiatic policy, had been fought, no great European War between the powers had taken place since the Franco-German War of 1870. There had been, however, warnings from time to time that the state of peace in Europe was not resting on stable foundations. The intense commercial and political rivalries of the early twentieth century furnish the foreground of a picture, of which the background is made up of national aspirations pursuing selfish ends for over a century of world political history. Finally a combination of interests aligned Great Britain, France and Russia on the one side, and Germany, Austria and Italy on the other.
By 1914 the inflammable materials for war had been accumulated; the train was laid, and it needed only the spark to set Europe ablaze. Serbia furnished the spark. The devastating World War followed. Many of the pre-war policies were submerged for the time being. As is always the case in great crises, an appeal to emotions and to ideals will call to the instincts of man more strongly than do material things. When life and all are staked in the great game, the value of material things vanish. This has been true in the religious wars of the past, and probably will repeat itself in the future. Therefore, it is to be expected that many of the material causes which led to the war, should disappear in the ideals created after the war began. These facts should be kept in mind, for they may help to explain the waning of that idealism, which, binding the Allies firmly during the later and more trying days of the war, began to disappear with the signing of the Armistice.
If we may judge from present and past history, while the other nations of Europe have run somewhat true to form, Russia has been an exception. Even during the war she reversed her policies toward her Allies. It is probable that the great upheaval in Russia marks a new period of European History, as did the French Revolution over a hundred years before it. Students of world politics cannot afford to leave Russia out of the reckoning in dealing with future international conditions. The war has left all of Europe the poorer, and much of it in a chaotic condition. Out of the war have emerged new countries, new national boundaries, new alignments of interests; but the same old national and racial animosities exist, and the same world problems clamor for solution. In certain countries the militaristic spirit still dominates. In others, the birth of a new nationalism is evident. In still others, socialism has run mad. The European world seems to be striving to find a way out, but co-operation is lacking.
With the signing of the Armistice the day of the warrior passed, and the reign of the diplomat and statesman began. Coincident with the passing of the military situation brought into existence by the World War, the idealism which had actuated the men of all the warring nations, began to disappear. The same spirit which had controlled world politics for centuries was responsible for the treaty of Versailles. In the atmosphere of Versailles the League of Nations, conceived as a great ideal and as a solution for the ills which world politics had inflicted upon Europe, started on its world career. Under such conditions it was natural that many of those lofty conceptions should be modified to meet the demands of local interest. America would have none of it. She desired neither to be entangled in European politics, nor to have imposed upon her sovereignty the authority of a super-state. As a panacea for Europe's ills, or those of the world, the League of Nations has not solved the problem. Neither would the problem have been solved had America participated as a member. Unless the spirit which animates the League be different from that which has influenced the world politics of the past, the problem will not be solved after this fashion. Nevertheless, every participant in the Great War has a task to fulfill, which did not cease with the ending of the war. That duty is to see that world conditions are stabilized in the interests of a just and enduring peace, so that civilization may advance, and man live a normal life at peace with his neighbor.
When the Washington Conference was called in 1921, there existed two spheres of world political unrest. One was the Near East, and one the Far East. In the Near East we find the same national animosities, the same clash of interests, that existed before the Great War. Though they strive to keep alive the alliances brought into being during the stress of war, the same national attitudes toward world politics affect France and England today, as they did before Germany grew to be a world power. The problem of the Near East is ages old, and cannot be settled in one generation. In the Far East no enduring political animosities had affected the relationship between the United States and Japan. Consequently, the question was one far easier of solution than the Near Eastern problem. The way of the Washington Conference may have been a crazy way, but it certainly was a new way, and it was a method which had never been adopted by any of the great powers before, in their dealings with other nations. The atmosphere of the Washington Conference was free from the sinister influences which world politics had imparted to conferences held in Europe. As the initiator of the Conference, it was fitting for the United States to take the lead and to make radical and definite sacrifices, in the interests of stabilizing conditions in the Far East, and of promoting a peace in the Pacific Ocean which should be lasting. Therefore, the national sacrifices made in the interests of stabilizing Far Eastern conditions are not to be measured in dollars and cents or in material values. Their value lies in the imponderables. But it is a fact that through the very material sacrifices which the United States made, a spirit of fairness, of good feeling, of give and take, was created, which has had the result of relieving the tension in the Far East, and may be productive of a peace which, it is hoped, will last for many years. The spirit of the American Open Door policy has received a new lease of life and an impulse, which may make its principles a potent force in the future. Perhaps a way has been paved toward the solution of many perplexing Far Eastern questions. The Conference marks a new departure in world politics, and it indicates a way of adjustment more in keeping with the spirit of the times, the needs of humanity, and the interests of smaller nations, than do the methods which have controlled the world politics of the past.
Perhaps the best and strongest chapter is Chapter XLVII, entitled, "Basis of Solidarity among English Speaking Nations." It is, without doubt, the most constructive chapter in the book. In it the author states, "The creation of a sentiment of solidarity among the peoples of the English speaking world will do more to improve international relationships generally, and to hasten the era of a durable world peace, than any other concrete proposal that has been advanced." The bases of solidarity are: "(1) common laws and the same spirit of administration of justice; (2) similar development of democratic institutions; (3) common ideals, and (4) common interests." This idea of the author is constructive, sane, and sound. It makes no appeal to the racial minorities within our states, nor should it arouse the hostility of those who come to America to become its citizens, obey its laws, and abide by the traditions and principles upon which our great American commonwealth is founded.
In reading between the lines, one cannot fail to see the part which sea power has played in the era of world politics. It has been the power behind national policy. It was the tool of the statesman in peace. It was the weapon which, in the hands of naval men, imposed the will of a nation upon an opponent in war. It twice saved Europe from militarism, and often dictated the terms of peace. It spread occidental civilization over the world. In the future, if America is to play the part in international questions which her destiny indicates she must play, her sea power will be a potent factor in making her ideals felt.
Finally, the book is sound. In the main, the interpretations by the author, of the lessons learned from world politics, are good. It is a book which should be read by every naval man who wishes to inform himself of the outlines of modem world politics, in order that he may be the better servant of his country in the future. In writing this review it has been the intent to stick to the facts, and to the periods treated in this book. If, in the endeavor to read between the lines and to offer interpretations, this review has differed from the spirit of the author, or has recorded opinions which will not bear the test of analysis, apologies are offered.
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LA GUERRE DES CROISEURS, par le Capitaine de Fregate P. Chack, Du 4 Aout 1914, A La Bataille Des Falkland avec Atlas, Augustin Challamel, Editeur.
A Review by Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, U. S. Navy
This book is published under the direction of the General Staff of the French Admiralty, and bears the stamp of earnest, painstaking research, and accuracy of detail. It consists of a volume of more than 300 pages, and a separate volume of charts. The period covered is only about eight weeks. Captain Chack was fortunate in having the official histories of the British, German, and Japanese to consult; and to all he makes full acknowledgment. The Japanese account of the Naval War, he states, is in three volumes, but it has not yet reached this country. The well-known Captain Castex of the General Staff has written the preface. It is a graceful foreword to Captain Chack's book, and highly compliments the author on the success of his brilliant labors. The interest and value of the book is heightened by footnotes, telegrams, letters, etc.
The charts deserve special mention. They are admirable, especially in the unique method in which the development of events is presented, each chart covering a period of two weeks, following the outbreak of war. No ship tracks' are plotted after the conventional, but for the most part incorrect and misleading custom. In the charts under consideration the cruises of the various ships and divisions are merely indicated by a few colored lines and curves and arrows. Chart 1 presents the location of the belligerent cruisers during the period of tension up to August 5, and shows the first concentration of the various forces. The Karlsruhe is depicted leaving the West Indies; the Dresden is standing down the northeast coast of South America; the French and English ships are leaving Mexico, etc. In the Pacific Von Spee with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are in the Caroline Islands awaiting developments, the Nurnburg is en route from San Francisco to join him, and the Leipsig is on her way up the coast from Mazatlan. The Konigsberg is between Zanzibar and Aden, and the Emden is near Tsingtau. The British Squadron is concentrated at Hong Kong, the Australian division at Sidney, and the Cape Squadron en route from Mauritius to Dar-es-Salaam. Chart II shows the great ocean trade routes, the focal points of sea-borne traffic, and the zones of observation.
The Atlantic Ocean was divided by the Germans into five zones, I-V. It was divided into eight zones by the British, lettered A-H.
The plan of the book is simple. In a modest introduction the author states the scope of his work. First he tells the story of the German attempt, more or less successful, to prevent the Allies' colonies from sending troops and supplies to Europe, and next he describes in detail the measures taken by the Allies to keep open and safe the principal trade routes, and at the same time their efforts to capture or destroy the German Merchant Marine. He discusses with remarkable cleverness the confusion into which the finances of the world were thrown by the war, and their profound effect upon the world's economic equilibrium.
A statement of the cruiser forces engaged and their stations overseas is followed by a sketch of the period of tension immediately preceding the declaration of war; this comprises an account of the observation of ports where there were German ships, the concentration of the various squadrons on foreign stations, and the reaction on trade. The succeeding chapters cover the periods of two weeks each, into which the author divides the time covered by the book, in which the various operations of the belligerents are described in detail. The author states that the Japanese history of their naval war with Russia comprises no less than one hundred thirty volumes, as a precedent perhaps for the minute detail of his own history.
"No wars of former times," observes Captain Chack, "have developed such naval effort; no other conflicts, even the most gigantic, will see the result depend so entirely upon the freedom of the seas." On the great ocean routes of trade and their extensions, and in those regions where the density of traffic was greatest was naturally where the heaviest blows would be struck. The British Admiralty was keenly alive to this, and when the war clouds gathered and the British and German cruisers were lying off Vera Cruz in the summer of 1914, it impressed upon Admiral Cradock the importance of keeping in touch with the Germans that they might not escape if war came.
The task allotted to the Allied cruisers was tremendous. They blockaded, visited and examined suspicious ships; convoyed troops, protected merchant marine, patrolled the trade routes, guarded their distant colonies, co-operated with expeditions against the enemy's colonies, and assisted to gain control of the sea. The German cruisers had a simpler, but not less difficult problem; their mission was to isolate the enemy by destroying her commerce.
The insular position of England, and the fact that the richest departments of France had been invaded at the beginning of the war, made both countries more than ever dependent upon the uninterrupted flow of overseas trade. Therefore the freedom of the sea was a life and death question to them. Thus a tremendous responsibility devolved upon the Allied cruisers, and until the safety of sea transportation was assured, their main objective was the German ships on the high seas.
Captain Chack points out the hard luck the Allies played in at first in their efforts to capture or destroy the German cruisers and swift auxiliaries. Their experience reminds one of the old saying that the English lose every battle but the last. Repeatedly the German ships escaped by narrowest margin. The Emden after leaving Tsingtau ran so close to a British squadron in a fog that she crossed their foaming wakes, and again in the Gulf of Bengal she just missed running into the Hampshire. It was so in the West Indies at the beginning of the war, when the Bristol all but captured the Karlsruhe; the ships sighted each other in the moonlight and an indecisive action followed, which ended in the escape of the Karlsruhe; and so also in the channel ways of Tierra del Fuego when the Dresden got away from Admiral Stoddert's ships. In evasion and flight from superior force the Germans showed great skill. The conduct of their cruiser warfare reflects credit on their pre-war plans. They never seemed to experience any trouble in establishing their rendezvous with colliers and supply ships, and they sustained themselves largely on the stores from their prizes.
The most successful of the German commerce destroyers were the Karlsruhe and the Emden. Each destroyed or captured sixteen British ships, of 72,805 and 70,360 gross tons respectively. The Krons-Prince Wilhelm had 30,728 tons to her credit, and the Dresden 11,266.
The author accounts for the difference between the sinkings of the Karlsruhe and the Dresden, both operating in the same region, by the fact that the ships pursued different methods of cruiser warfare. The Karlsruhe reaped a harvest of British ships at the focal point of the trade routes off Cape San Roque; her game was to sink as many ships as possible, and to withhold the news of the work and her own whereabouts to the last moment. The Dresden on the other hand contented herself with fewer sinkings, but she spread the news as quickly as possible by sending in immediately the survivors, and hiding herself in the unfrequented waters of the South Atlantic. The Emden, though most brilliant of all the sea-wolves, combined the two methods; she equaled the number of captures of the Karlsruhe and threw into a panic the entire traffic of the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. Captain Chack surmises that both methods were authorized by the German Admiralty, and he inclines to the belief that the Dresden method was better in its final effects on the war.
The book is a notable addition to the literature of sea warfare. It is hoped that it will be translated into English by some naval expert, and placed in the library of every ship in commission. It merits a cordial reception by our Naval officers, and the author is to be congratulated on the thoroughness and excellence of his work.
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THE WAR IN THE AIR, Vol. I, by Walter Raleigh, Oxford University Press, American Branch, Price $7.00.
A Review by Rear Admiral W. A. Moffet, U.S. Navy
The history of aviation development is daily in the making. Within the past ten years the possibilities of conquering the air have only been envisioned if we are to judge by the almost daily achievements which are recorded. It is well, however, even in the midst of the rush of present development to pause and survey the past and gain thereby a perspective of the future.
The War in the Air deals intimately and in detail with the development of the British Air Force and as such constitutes a valuable addition to the history of aviation. A painstaking record of this nature is not only of value for the detailed information and facts that it contains but it enables the reader to study from perspective the building of a great war machine under the stimulus of necessity, and clearly presents the difficulties encountered, the heroic efforts put forth to surmount obstacles, and the success which crowned those efforts.
The first chapters are of exceptional general interest. The author traces the development of aviation from the time when men first dreamed of the possibilities of flight down to the successful experiments of the Wright Brothers in this country. In these chapters he has successfully presented the romance of aviation in a narrative style which captivates the interest and stimulates the imagination.
His advocacy of the policy of a United Air Force in Great Britain is somewhat less fortunate in the light of recent events. A defense of this policy, which has of late been under such a withering fire of criticism from all quarters in England, gives a flavor of bias to an otherwise admirable and disinterested work.
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THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, by Raymond Leslie Buell. (D. Appleton and Company, New York. $3.00).
A Review by Colonel George C. Thorpe, U.S. Marine Corps
If there is any need to introduce Raymond Leslie Buell to the American reader, especially after his Contemporary French Politics, that introduction might be summarily accomplished by characterizing him as the epitomizer par excellence of world polities.
His books cannot fail to impress any cosmopolite with his remarkable capacity for mobilizing facts from the far corners of the earth.
The importance of having all the facts—pertinent facts—available for the one who would estimate a situation is now a quite trite observation for our trained Navy and Army officers. The readers of the Washington Conference is impressed with the conviction that Mr. Buell—or Professor Buell—has illuminated the important international facts against the background of the whole massive conglomeration of years of intrigue and racial strife.
The book is not only blessed with the virtue of logical arrangement but is as intensely interesting—one might say thrilling—as any of the best sellers. It presents a vivid picture of the workings of the master statesmen of the Occident and Orient in Washington assembled for the great conference and it prepares the reader for a true understanding of their parleys by spreading out an elaborate array of important incidents, especially in the Orient, that count as causatives.
For the officer student at our war colleges, either just getting his introduction to the subject of Policy, this is precisely the book to show him the fascinating mental exercise he is coming into. And it certainly will make his task easier for, blessing of blessings! It has an appendix that is a veritable encyclopedia of diplomacy re the Orient.
Of what immense importance it is that the American public appreciates the purport of these incidents! Hear a quotation from the first paragraph of Chapter I, wherein General Jan Smuts, "one of the most farseeing statesmen of the present day," is represented as declaring that "the problems of the Pacific are to my mind the world problems of the next fifty years or more," thus verifying the prognostications of an American statesman of nearly a century earlier. General Smuts' statement is the more significant in having been made at the last Imperial Conference of the British Empire. He was merely tolling the funeral bells for the departed first-class powers of Europe who may be theosophically coming forth in a new birth as second-class brats.
One need not assume an abstruse attitude of mind, nor yet stimulate the imagination, in perusing the Washington Conference, to see with perfect clearness that the great theater is now the Pacific and that our own fair Columbia is the dazzling prima donna. In fact, we see her coming into her own quietly and gracefully, with no climber effort, scarcely aware of all her alluring power to impose her will. Without effort, a great duty of leadership is imposed upon her—who is so capable and qualified for world leadership, and so endowed with resources to sustain that great position.
This tacit tender of leadership has been foreseen by the cosmopolitan lookers-on for some time and there has been much gossip as to just what modest Columbia, the Fair, would do about it. In some quarters it even has been whispered that she might play the prude.
The situation reminds one, indeed, of incidents of the brilliant society world of the American, English, French metropolis, such as occur when a great dowager-social-dictator passes on to a better world. Who will succeed her in social leadership? Madam B—? Well, of course, it is her logical right of place, but she is so retiring, cares more for domesticity than for society, abhors gossip and social intrigue, etc. The season approaches, arrives. Madame B— sets all conjecture at rest by issuing invitations for a brilliant ball for the elite. The event is the perfection of good taste and is marked by due deference for all the proprieties: just the right people present, exactly the right wines in proper quantities, etc.
The Washington Conference was the stellar event of the season. Madame Columbia did the thing properly: the right people were there and all that. The Conference served a purpose: our Columbia, in the best of taste, modestly and charmingly announced her leadership.
How did the party affect business? That is another story. Read Chapter X and the last section of Chapter IX—the Crux of the Situation and Conclusion as to the Results of the Conference.
This book should be a textbook at the War Colleges where someone should make an epitome of the salient features and facts for easy and ready digestion in tabloid form. The epitome should be printed at the Government Printing office for distribution to every member of Congress, to publicists, etc. In brief every American voter should read the book itself. As a part of that missionary work, a few further details of its subject matter may not be amiss.
For instance, the first chapter bears the attractive caption Nibbling at Asia, wherein the reader is served a caustic review of Japanese diplomacy and strategy in Asia, bringing up to the situation when the Conference opened. The alleged fallacy of Japanese pretensions of defensive strategy is exposed. Japan is presented in Manchuria, Shantung, Siberia. The matter of the celebrated Twenty-One Demands' is explained as well as Japan's position in the Consortium and in reference to the Open (or Closed) Door. In these thirty-eight pages are some highly spicy bits of gossip which bear down heavily upon Japanese military methods in Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia, such as the Chientao affair, the Nikolaevsk affair, the Semenoc scandal, and the exposures alleged to have been made by the delegation of the Far Eastern Republic in Washington, January, 1922, in reference to which the French and Japanese representatives denounced the documentary evidence as forgeries. It is mildly suggested that Japan has learned something of imperialistic methods from European chancelleries.
We are next treated to a set of facts about the Japanese argument of an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine and shown how very different Japanese pretensions in that regard are from the American in respect to its Monroe Doctrine. Naval readers will be interested to find the book strictly up-to-date in discussing the Langdon affair and the Wireless concession.
Chapter III explains and discusses Japanese governmental organization in its militaristic import: the power of the military hierarchy, the supremacy of the general staffs, the plutocracy of the military leaders and their control of policies.
All mysteries of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance are clarified as the sun dispels the fog, in Chapter IV. An interesting sidelight to the diplomacy that accomplished this treaty, 90 much desired by both the Army and Navy parties in Japan, was the sending of Count Ito to Petrograd to arrange a treaty with Russia at the very time that the Japanese ambassador at London was negotiating for the Anglo-Japanese treaty, the purpose of the Petrograd mission being to hasten the British decision. It is said that this epoch of diplomacy was a masterpiece in the Machiavellian school, and it is worthy of note that Count Hayashi in London and Count Ito in Petrograd were working in sealed compartments: Ito being exceedingly anxious for a Russian understanding and Hayashi quite mystified over the other's activities. England signed.
England had her profit therefrom, but the author strongly intimates that this entree into Occidental society bred Japanese imperialism that must be paid for in good time. It imposed imperialistic responsibilities: and it left England free to deal with Germany in the West. It is said that Japan and England co-operated intimately in working out their joint needs of naval expansion.
The original treaty made in 1902 was revised in 1905, two years before its expiration, permitting the annexation of Korea, making the military obligation universal, and including India within its scope. Whereas, originally England had obligated herself as a military ally only in case of the intervention of a third power, each of the contracting powers in 1905 promised that "If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers either Contacting Party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests…the other Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally…"
In 1911 there occurred one of the most interesting phases of diplomatic history in the negotiation by President Taft and Secretary of State Knox of an arbitration treaty with England. Before it was finally acted upon by the United Senate, the Anglo-Japanese treaty was amended to meet the conditions of the said arbitration treaty. Then the Senate refused full ratification of the latter!
Japan was quite unwilling to accept this attempt to except the United States from the operation of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, and there was a strong feeling in Japan that "Japan is now America's slave and India's policeman."
But as the Senate had virtually killed the arbitration treaty, the article in the Anglo-Japanese treaty exempting nations with which one or both of the Anglo-Japanese allies had an arbitration treaty was inoperative. The British Foreign Office avoided this difficulty by announcing its now-famous interpretation that the treaty concluded between the United States and Great Britain in 1914 would be considered an arbitration treaty in the meaning of the Anglo-Japanese treaty. (The 1914 treaty provided only that the contracting powers should not go to war pending investigation of their mutual disputes by an International Commission.)
The last phase is found in the part played by the British dominions hostile to the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
The story of the Washington Conference itself is, perhaps, as interesting as the gossip about the causes that led up to that momentous assembly.
In conclusion it is quite worthy of note that until recently the literature dealing with Japan available to English speaking readers was overwhelmingly pro-Japanese because writers who could pretend to familiarity with the subject were usually men of long residence in Japan, who naturally were there because they liked Japan or because their interests were allied with Japanese interests, or the writers were Japanese men like Kauwikami who is married to an American.
But it may be remarked that the older writers rather emphasized issues that are now regarded as insignificant, while later writers have reviewed the events of the greater diplomacy and the problems in power.
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NOTES AND SKETCHES ON MARINE DIESEL ENGINES, by J.W.M. Sothern, D. Van Nostrand Company, New York. Price $8.00.
A Review by Commander E. D. McWhorter, U. S. Navy
The author states in the preface that the book is intended purely as a guide and help to engineer officers of motor ships who have been trained on lines of steam practice only and to show that there is no "magic" in the Marine Diesel Engine. The book very ably fulfils the intent of the author. It might be said to go further than the author's intent in two ways; first, it is a valuable reference book for engineer officers of motor ships who have had an average amount of Diesel experience and training and, second, in attempting to remove any idea of "magic" in Sections III and VII, "Practical Operation of Machinery," and "Running Troubles, Their Cause and Remedy," it tends to make many points appear more simple than will actually be found to exist. In other words, it is believed the engineer officer should be shown the importance of taking every opportunity, at the end of voyages or when otherwise available, of referring all matters of maladjustments, repairs, etc., to expert trouble finding and repair squads.
The first Section—"General Definitions and Explanations"—is well conceived and fairly well arranged. It permits one with limited knowledge of the subject to read and understand the book throughout without outside reference.
Section II—"Illustrated Descriptions of Various Types of Marine Diesel Oil Engines" covers the field of British manufactures and some of the most prominent continental manufacturers very thoroughly. It notably lacks mention of description of American types and of many good continental types, especially German. This is probably the fault of the engine builders. in not making the information available.
The book is conveniently compiled, easy to read, accurate, and is considered a valuable reference book as concerns the subject of Marine Diesels.