OUR PRESENT NAVAL SITUATION
By Commander R. A. Koch, U. S. Navy
November 11 is the fourth anniversary of the Armistice and the first anniversary of the meeting of the Limitation of Arms Conference.
During the past year there have been many articles on this conference, and many arguments on what our naval policy should be. Without attempting a complete review of the subject, it is possible to briefly state the accomplishments of the conference; the need of the Navy; its cost; and what should be our constructive policy.
Accomplishments of the Conference
We recommended definite limits on all classes of fighting craft, based on the ratio of the actual existing battleship strength of the five principal naval powers.
The following is quoted from an address delivered by Rear Admiral H.S. Knapp, U.S. Navy, on April 27, 1922, before the American Society of International Law, and published in its Proceedings for that year:
"A convenient method of examination will be a comparison of the proposal put forward by the Secretary of State on November 12, 1921, with the actual accomplishments of the treaty. Reduced to its lowest terms, the proposal consists of the following main points definitely stated:
"(1) Limitation of the total tonnage of capital ships (battleships and battle cruisers) for each of the signatories. This was established.
"(2) Limitation of the size of future capital ship units. This was established.
"(3) Limitation for each of the signatories of the total tonnage of auxiliary combatant ships classified as follows:
"(a) surface vessels, and
"(b) submarines, neither of which class was limited and
"(c) Airplane carriers, which class was limited.
"(4) Limitation of the size of guns to be carried on board auxiliary combatant ships. This was established.
"(5) Restrictions upon disposal and building of all classes of combatant ships, as follows:
"(a) no disposal for use in another navy, which was accomplished.
"(b) no acquisition from foreign sources, which was partially accomplished, but not entirely.
"(c) no building for foreign account, which failed of accomplishment.
"The ratio of the floating naval strengths to result eventually between the signatories from the acceptance of the American proposal did not appear therein as a definitely stated feature, none the less, the ratio is there, a very important feature, deducible from the tabulations of the proposed allowed strengths in each of the several combatant classes, for each of the signatories of the three principal naval powers. It was accomplished in part, for capital ships and aircraft carriers only.
"Another feature of the proposal that was not definitely stated was the abolition of competition, but the idea lay behind the whole program. It was not so much armaments themselves that had brought the world to the point of exasperation as it was the swollen armaments resulting from competition. Some armament is recognized as a necessity by all but a few extremists; and in this connection it will be recalled that the President of the United States, before the Conference met, took occasion to warn the nation that the Conference was not one for disarmament but for the limitation of armaments. The treaty abolishes competition in two classes only, battleships and aircraft carriers. These are the most expensive ships to build because of the great tonnage of units; but they are not the most expensive per ton. In the cruiser, flotilla leader, destroyer and submarine classes, the nations are free to continue competition, untrammeled by the treaty except for the restrictions placed upon the size of individual units (10,000 tons) and the caliber of guns (eight inches). In passing, it may be noted that competition in the past has not been confined to total tonnage or numbers; it has existed in the design of ships and guns, each nation endeavoring to obtain greater offensive and defensive powers in new designs. Unrestricted competition in design has resulted in constant increases in size of both ships and guns. There is no reasonable objection to competition in design within fixed limitations, such as are provided, in part by the treaty, but not entirely; for example competition in design can still go on in the size of destroyers or submarines up to the 10,000-ton limitation, and in their armament up to eight inches, as well as in their numbers.
"Two other limitations, not mentioned in the proposal, were established by the treaty, both of value because looking toward the general aim of the Conference, and neither objectionable because affecting equally all the signatories. These are the limitation of the size of auxiliary combatant ships (27,000 tons for aircraft carriers and 10,000 tons for all others, which latter is practically a cruiser limitation), and the limitation of the caliber of guns to be carried on board capital ships (sixteen inches). It should be added that regulations for the conversion of merchant vessels, provision for which was declared by the proposal to be a necessity, were established to the small degree of forbidding preparations in time of peace other than stiffening decks for guns not to exceed six inches in caliber.
"It is interesting to note the relative tonnage proposed to be scrapped by the American program. In the following comparisons the American tonnage scrapped will be used as the basis, reckoned as 100 per cent, and the order of mention will be United States, Great Britain and Japan in each instance. Considering total capital ship tonnage scrapped, the percentages are respectively 100, 69 and 53. This is the comparison usually stressed in nontechnical comment, but it is very misleading because it includes for all three nations a number of superannuated ships due already or about to become due, for scrapping, Conference or no Conference. The fairest comparison is based upon new tonnage laid down plus that about to be laid down and for which expense had been incurred in the preparation of material; on this basis the respective percentages are 100, 28 and 46. The offered sacrifice of the United States was not only the greatest absolutely; it was greatly out of proportion to the relative ratio of strength proposed to be retained. There is no gainsaying the generosity of the American offer. No further concession was needed to make manifest the sincere attitude of the United States; nor should the United States have been expected or asked to make further concessions—certainly not unless the result would affect all equally and not involve an additional relative sacrifice by the United States.
"The concessions offered went further than accorded with the general sentiment of experienced officers of our Navy. Occasion is taken to say here that the general sentiment of American naval officers was not in opposition to limitation, but quite the reverse. That officers were not prepared to go as far as others might was, however, both natural and proper. The Navy is the country's first line of defense, and its personnel deeply feels the responsibility entailed. Its motto for the country is "Safety First"; its duty is far-sighted preparedness—such preparedness as the action of other agencies of the Government may make possible. In advice or action, naval officers have a life-long responsibility for the security of the nation, in which respect they, in common with their brothers of the Army, are in quite a different position from that of any other persons in the Government. Questions of immediate expediency do not have much weight with them, and they are not perhaps so inclined to take chances with national security as those having a shorter tenure of office. Upon them is bound to fall the brunt of an underestimate of the necessity for defensive measures. That they are conservative is the natural consequence. Their conservatism did not, however, go so far as to lead them into opposition to the principle of limitation of armaments.
"The opening sentence of Art. XIX of the treaty reads: The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder.'
"When the specifications are read all the territories and possessions to which they refer are seen to be insular. The agreement includes everything insular that Japan holds now or may acquire outside of the Islands of Japan proper; it includes our Aleutian Islands and everything insular, present or future, under our flag west of the Hawaiian Islands; and it includes Hong Kong and present or future insular holdings of the British Empire east of no degrees east longitude, excepting the Canadian Islands, Australia and its territories, and New Zealand. It will be noted that the language of the article is 'fortifications and naval bases,' not 'fortifications of naval bases,' which latter would have been much less sweeping. Status quo is defined in the last paragraph as follows: 'The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified, that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defenses of the territories and possessions above specified…'
"An examination will now be made of the equities of this remarkable graft upon the proposal of the Government that called the Conference. The proposal made no mention of naval bases, or naval facilities of bases, or fortifications or coast defenses, and it must be presumed that the omission was deliberately intended after months of preparation for the Conference.
"Mahan gives position, strength and resources as subjects for examination in determining the availability of a situation for a naval base. Actual strength and existing naval facilities will first be considered, in doing which it must be remembered that the details of foreign fortifications are rarely known accurately; their general scope is, however, usually known or believed to be known.
"The United States has in Guam a location for a naval base that is wonderfully situated strategically. To state that its fortifications and equipment are desirable now is to disclose no secret. This is no fault of the Navy, which for years has sought in vain for the appropriations to make Guam a secure base. In the Philippines there is another great site for a naval base in the Manila region. The entrance to Manila Bay is fortified, but the fortifications need modernizing and the naval facilities are far from being what would be necessary to support the operations of a fleet in war. To meet a menace to the territories under our flag in the Western Pacific, we need a secure naval base in the Philippines and another intermediate between them and the Hawaiian Islands. While neither Guam nor Manila is in efficient condition to support a fleet in war, up to February 6 last, the United States possessed the sovereign right to make them so.
"The British have at Hong Kong a naval base now strongly fortified and well provided with supplies and equipment, including dry-docks, either on the island or in the leased territory of Kowloon on the mainland just across a narrow channel. Hong Kong is ceded territory; Kowloon is leased only. Yet the two are really a whole for British purposes, and Kowloon does not fall under the inhibition of Art. XIX, for it is not insular. In the convention of June 9, 1898, between Great Britain and China for the extension for ninety-nine years of what was therein designated as the 'Hong Kong territory' although the extension was entirely on the Kowloon—mainland side, the right to erect fortifications is recognized. As far as Art. XIX under consideration goes, the right is not denied to the British to fortify and increase naval facilities on the Kowloon side at Hong Kong. It is evident that the British exercised no self-denial in subscribing to Art. XIX."
We made by far the greatest sacrifice. We scrapped our potential naval power consisting of thirteen capital ships well along in their construction on which we had already spent one-third of a billion dollars, and which when completed, would have given us undisputed naval supremacy. We relinquished our right to fortify our possessions in the Western Pacific, thereby reducing our potential naval power in the Far East to an almost negligible amount.
As agreement of limitations was reached only on two classes of ships—capital ships and airplane carriers—competitive building has not ceased.
The Need of a Navy
A navy is essential if we are to exert our influence effectively for the general good; support and secure our national policies; protect our own interests and maintain our security as a nation. The Navy protects our commerce; protects the interests of our citizens, and is thus essential to our general welfare and future prosperity affecting every citizen. Our foreign policy is as strong as our Navy and no stronger.
The part the Navy has played in all great wars has been largely overlooked. It can be given as an almost invariable rule that ultimate success in war lies with the power that controls the sea, having the resources of the world at its disposal and strangling its opponents by blockades.
It must not be forgotten, however, that the Navy is only the first element of seapower which consists of: (1) Navy; (2) Naval and Commercial Bases; (3) Merchant Marine. To these might well be added radio and cable communications.
Sea power is the firm support of peace-loving statesmen. Wisely controlled, it constantly exerts a silent pressure on those who would by the exercise of ruthless ambition, override the right of their neighbors to go about the legitimate business of life in a peaceful, orderly manner; it insures justice and fair treatment to those of our citizens who undertake trading ventures abroad; it enables this country peacefully to perform its legitimate business with the rest of the world without recourse to force of arms to preserve its just rights.
Cost of the Navy
The per capita cost of the Navy is about $3.00. In the Agricultural Districts where the Navy is most opposed, the cost per capita is about twenty-five cents.
The exports of agricultural products amount to about three billions annually and are approximately half of our total exports. Our first Navy was built to protect our export of wheat through the Mediterranean when we decided to quit the policy of bribing the Barbary States to obtain our rights. An Agricultural District is properly represented when its vote is cast for a fully adequate Navy. There is much misinformation about the burden of the Navy—generally the cost of past wars are included which cost is principally "the cost of unpreparedness." The Federal taxes although not as evenly distributed as local taxes amount in total to about one-third of the total taxes, and the Navy is only allotted eight per cent of this third or about two and one-half percent as an average, and only about one-half of one per cent in States of the Middle West where the Navy is most opposed.
There is adverse comment on the small expenditures made by the Federal Government for education; this is not a function of the Federal Government, but one of the chief functions of the Federal Government is to "provide for the common defense." In local taxes, over one billion dollars are collected for schools; this may be insufficient, but education is no more a federal function than is the police force or fire department.
The Navy as an asset to industry alone, has probably paid for itself. The following is quoted from a lecture delivered by Rear Admiral J.K. Robison, U.S. Navy, and Chief of the Bureau of Engineering, Navy Department, before the Michigan Bankers' Association at Detroit, Mich., June 10, 1922.
"I believe I can state without exaggeration that the Navy has done more for commerce, science and labor than any other existing department of the Government. This appears to be an astounding statement in regard to a service whose duty is popularly believed to be confined to fighting battles. Let us examine the facts. The people of our country have first and last spent a lot of money on the Navy, and they have loyally supported it with the knowledge that the money spent was for necessary national insurance. If they knew the money spent was something more than a fire insurance premium, that it was the means of building up the national wealth through the stimulation of industry, our ultra-pacifist friends would have less luck in appealing to the prejudices that many of us have against paying taxes in time of peace to support an efficient Navy.
"The great stimulation of industry in the United States began in the early eighties and dates from the birth of the 'New Navy, ' the original 'White Squadron' which rose out of the ashes of the old Civil War Navy, which, neglected through national lack of interest in events outside our own borders, had all but disappeared.
"The Act of August 5, 1882, provided for two cruising steam vessels to be constructed of steel of domestic manufacture. This requirement aroused the fierce opposition of the shipbuilders because the steel industry of the United States could not furnish enough mild steel for the construction of two vessels of less than 5,000 tons. Industry in the United States used either wrought iron or imported steel from England. In addition the steel we made was inferior and did not come up to the specifications prescribed by the Navy Department. The American Iron companies refused to erect the costly mills to handle the new material required unless they were guaranteed a volume of business that would justify the original investment. These mills were not built until the contracts for the New Navy were let. The Navy Department stood pat on the specifications and insisted on the best grade of steel that could be produced. The mills were forced to experiment until they could make this steel. When they learned how they found it was just as cheap to make good steel as poor steel. Steel suitable for ship plates dropped from eight and one-half to four and one-half cents a pound. This was lower than wrought iron and brought steel within the reach of every industry. Domestic consumption of steel increased a hundredfold as steel was applied in many trades that hitherto had used other materials. The United States Steel industry is now the greatest business in the world. The late Andrew Carnegie said this industry was built up on the United States Navy, whose contracts, specifications and inspection work made steel what it is today.
"The growing Navy demanded in addition all manner of cast, forged and machined steel. This demand called for better and larger machine tools and this industry began to grow apace. The insistence upon a domestic production and the success of the country's machine designers and operators caused a revolution in methods. America became independent of Europe for machinery and new items were added to our export trade. Machines large and accurate enough to handle turret mounts and big guns were equal to any task of private enterprise.
"The Navy Department starting as the parent of industry became its pacemaker. Each new set of specifications set the requirements a peg higher. In battle nothing but the best is good enough. The manufacturer charged the Navy more for the best until he learned how and then quantity production brought the price down to the old level of the inferior product. Private industry could not do this.
"The reason the Navy gives greater stimulation to industry than does private business is that the Navy exists to defend the nation, while private business exists for profit. Private concerns must consider the cost of materials. The Navy is concerned with the quality of materials. Victory cannot be measured by money. If a gun can be built of material that will give greater range, greater endurance and greater accuracy we must have it even if it costs ten times as much as another gun that is not as good. It has been truly said that in battle a second best Navy is like a second best poker hand. Then again on board ship weights must be kept down in order to get the most out of the tonnage. On shore cheap, heavy cast-iron can be used where on board ship you will find forged steel. In addition since metals corrode more quickly at sea than on land there is need for special bronzes and alloys. The Navy has built up the industry in these classes and recently by large orders has put the important Monel Metal industry on its feet. The Navy Department organized and paid for the research that discovered the harmful effect of sulphur on steel and improved the manner of working it to bring out its maximum strength. These discoveries were turned over to industry with the result that the whole nation profited with its safe and reliable automobiles, street cars, elevators and so on. The armor plate industry has carried on more research into methods of treating and alloying steel than any other industry.
"The demands of the Navy for high speed ships combined with low weights necessitated the design of whole plants for our new vessels. The Bureau of Engineering was forced to design these plants, to invent parts that had never been developed, and to conduct a laboratory for constant research and improvement. The urgent demand for increase of speed, reliability, and safety, with vital necessity of economy in fuel consumption has made the Navy the pioneer in all new developments. The merchant service has followed step by step the increase in steam pressures, multiple expansion engines, turbines, internal combustion engines electrical and geared reduction to propeller speeds, which were all developed by the Navy.
"In the electrical field the Navy was again the pioneer. Starting with the incandescent lamp every new electrical discovery has been fathered and adopted by the Navy before its commercial use has been found practicable or profitable. The Navy Department enabled the General Electric Company to produce the first electrically propelled ship in the Jupiter, now the aeroplane carrier Langley. This development is one of the greatest in the art of ship propulsion and has been adopted for all future battleships. The radiophone which is now the talk of the country is simply the coming into commercial use of a development that has been in general use in the Navy for the last five years and was installed experimentally in 1907.
"The great radio telegraph plants that now encircle the globe are owned and operated by the Navy. Without the Navy's interest, experiments, and research, as well as the substantial contracts to manufacture, the radio industry in this country would be wholly in foreign hands.
"The radio compasses that flank all our great ports are owned and operated by the Navy. By their use any vessel by simply requesting her position by radio can be told to a degree what her direction is from each station within call and thus fix her position whether in fog or storm. This makes navigation secure and saves many a big liner from disaster as well as delay in making port.
"In our anxiety to have the best produced in every field of industry every promising device is built and tried out to determine its merit. If rejected, manufacturers are saved the loss of attempting commercial production. If a success they benefit by it. Rigid specifications that require the highest possible results lead to constant improvement and development in manufacturing materials and methods. The results are at once reflected in improved commercial products. A simple case in point was that of a large pump manufacturer whose product was good, but capable of much improvement. The Navy on a large order for pumps required a tensile strength for the naval brass of which they were made of 30,000 lbs. The manufacturers claimed that this was impossible and in their contention they were supported by the rest of the trade. The Bureau of Engineering insisted and pointed out that by experimenting with different heats the solution of the problem would be found to be one of temperature. This proved to be the fact and tensile strengths of 50,000 lbs. were easily achieved. This resulted at once in a lighter, cheaper and more reliable pump.
"In the same way the money we spend for aviation is devoted to study, experiment and research to develop the utmost with the means available. Each new stride in aviation brings the art nearer the goal of profitable commercial use.
"So far I have alluded only to the material side of industry, but there is another side that is more important, that is the personnel side. Due to the fact that the great bulk of the enlisted personnel enter the Navy at an age that precludes knowledge of trade, it is necessary that they be taught one. For this purpose the Navy has become one of the greatest trade schools in the world. On board ship there is scarcely a trade of any importance that is not represented. A battleship is a miniature city, with all the activities of an industrial city represented. Ships nowadays must be practically self-sustaining so that everything that goes into its manufacture must be capable of restoration or repair. As the periods of enlistment are short this great body of young mechanics is turned out into the industrial world in a steady flow, 67,000 last year. What the Navy loses industry gains. All may not qualify but all have improved in knowledge, physical strength, discipline and self-reliance. A crew of 1,200 boys that can keep a battleship going can keep any other plant going.
"Graduates of the Naval Academy equipped with special technical knowledge have passed into civil life and made national names for themselves. Among these may be mentioned Homer L. Ferguson, President of the Newport News Shipbuilding Company, and former President of the National Chamber of Commerce; Joseph Powell, recently head of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Plants; W.L.R. Emmet, Consulting Engineer, General Electric Company and designer of electrical ship propulsion; Professor Michelson of Chicago University, probably the greatest living scientist; Sprague, Fiske, and dozens of others who have gotten their training in the Navy. The Navy turns out men skilled in all the present day trades except farming, mining and masonry. The custom of shop mechanics having to operate a single machine has tended to seriously reduce the number of all-round mechanics. The mechanic on board ship being chiefly engaged on repair work gets a wide variety of experience and has less trouble in finding a job during periods of industrial depression than those with limited training in private plants.
"There is another phase of Naval activity to which I would invite your attention. One of the chief missions of the Navy is to protect trade. In all regions of the world where trade would go and where political conditions are unsettled you will find our Navy on the job seeing that our commerce and our business men get the protection they require.
"In the far reaches of the Yangste Kiang, 1,700 miles up the river, you will find our gunboats guarding our interests, settling troubles and protecting against pirates. This costs the Navy $3,000,000 a year, but our trade with China is over $145,000,000. Our destroyers are operating in Turkish waters and the Black Sea, protecting our tobacco trade of $15,000,000 and our oil trade with Batoum. An American Admiral sits as High Commissioner at Constantinople and combines diplomatic with naval authority to see that our trade is unmolested. Due to his efforts our trade with the Near East has increased 1,000 per cent in the last two years.
"Our naval forces in the Caribbean protect our great fruit trade of $50,000,000 annually coming from that region. Revolutions are constantly occurring and without the protection of our ships our fruit steamers would be held up, cargoes ruined by delays and trade outlets destroyed. As it is now fruit cargoes move with certainty and adherence to schedules of passenger trains in the United States."
What Our Constructive Policy Should Be
Our naval policy is defined by the spirit of the treaty. It is, and can be nothing else than that the United States shall maintain a naval strength on a parity with that of Great Britain and five-thirds times that of Japan. This policy having been provided by the treaty-making power of our Government, it follows that if we maintain the policy thus formally declared we must not only build sufficiently in all classes not limited by the treaty, but provide adequate personnel so that our ratio as thus prescribed may be preserved.
Unfortunately it has been generally overlooked by the public that the strength of our fleet depends almost entirely on the efficiency of its operation. If the 5-5-3 ratio is to have any significance we must maintain the ratio in personnel as well as in material.
The following tables show the relative strengths in cruisers and submarines, of Great Britain, Japan and the United States:
Light Cruisers Less Than Ten Years Old | ||||||
Country | Built | Building | Total | |||
No. | Tonnage | No. | Tonnage | No. | Tonnage | |
Great Britain | 44 | 218,390 | 5 | 34,600 | 49 | 252,990 |
Japan | 10 | 51,210 | 15 | 106,520 | 29 | 157,730 |
United States | 0 | -- | 10 | 75,000 | 10 | 75,000 |
The United States should have a light cruiser tonnage five-thirds times that of Japan. In order to maintain this ratio, 262,883 tons of light cruisers are required. We are short of this ratio 187,883 tons, about nineteen ten-thousand ton light cruisers.
Submarines | ||||||
Country | Build | Building | Total | |||
Under 1,000 tons | Over 1,000 tons | Under 1,000 tons | Over 1,000 tons | Under 1,000 tons | Over 1,000 tons | |
Great Britain | 43 | 9 | 6 | 2 | 49 | 11 |
Japan | 28 | 00 | 21 | 25 | 49 | 25 |
United States | 59 | 3 | 35 | 3 | 94 | 6 |
The United States has urgent need for submarines with long radius, that can operate across either ocean without bases. Our small submarines are useless for that purpose. A large percentage of our submarines are out of commission, due to lack of personnel.
The United States is ahead of her ratio in destroyers, but destroyers cannot take the place of light cruisers or submarines and at the present time about two-thirds of our destroyers are out of commission, due to lack of personnel.
It is difficult to make a direct comparison of personnel with Great Britain for in their estimate they appropriate under fifteen different "votes." In "vote" one, appropriation is made for 88,805 men for the fleet, which does not include a large number of Reservists used constantly on fleet auxiliaries; the Navy's quota of the Air Service; men on shore; men in service under Dominion and Foreign Governments; men in the Colonial Navy. We do not man our Navy in part with Reserves. We include our air force, recruits in training on shore, men at trade schools, recruiting stations and other necessary military activities. On a conservative basis, to place our naval personnel on a substantial parity with that of the British Navy, we should appropriate for about 120,000 men.
Japan has a total enlisted personnel of 65,469 men; if we maintain our 5-3 ratio we require five-thirds times 65,469 or about 109,115 men. We have a total of 86,000 men.
We must modernize our battleships as allowed by the naval treaty,—this has been done by Great Britain. It has been our policy not to spend large sums on modernization but to apply this amount to new construction. Our building program, to be scrapped under the treaty, contained all the latest features.
In time of war all navies are greatly expanded; we must make it an important part of our policy to organize and maintain a sufficient and efficient naval reserve.
Summary
I. The United States made by far the greatest sacrifice in order to establish the principle of Limitation of Armaments by international agreement.
The Conference succeeded only in limiting capital ships and airplane carriers.
Naval strength, although the battleship is the backbone of the fleet, depends also on auxiliary arms of the naval service, such as cruisers, submarines, destroyers and aircraft and most of all on the efficiency of operation, the efficiency and sufficiency of personnel.
We agreed not to establish naval bases in the Western Pacific, thereby reducing our potential power in that locality to a negligible amount.
Competition has not ceased in the increase of material, its design or in the sufficiency or efficiency of personnel.
2. An adequate Navy is necessary in order that we may exert our influence effectively for the general good; secure and maintain our national policies; protect our own interests; insure our future prosperity; and maintain our security as a nation.
3. The cost of the Navy is approximately two and one-half per cent of the total per capita tax; is very much less than this for those paying little or no income tax, and greater with the increase of income tax and with above average purchases of articles on which luxury and internal revenue taxes are levied.
The cost of the Navy should not be confounded with the cost of past wars, it is an insurance against future wars and the excessive cost and duration of war if come it must.
The cost of the Navy during peace is in great part repaid by its aid to industry and commerce.
4. Our policy under the treaty can be nothing other than maintaining a Navy at least on a parity with Great Britain and at least five-thirds that of Japan, in regular personnel, naval reserves and fighting craft.