DISCUSSION: The Part of Engineering in Command
Rear Admiral Henry B. Wilson, U.S. Navy.—This article was referred to me with a request for a discussion. The article is timely but must be read with reservations, having due regard that Admiral Robison, my very good friend, is publishing this in the nature of a "sales talk," to interest young officers in engineering duly.
I say it is timely because it is common service gossip that certain officers have failed of selection because of "too much engineering duty." This may or may not be true. In my own experience on various Boards of Selection I have seen none passed for that direct reason. Some officers may have sought engineering duty repeatedly and have stayed in it so long, proportionately, as to fall behind their classmates in all around professional attainments, which may thus have caused engineering indirectly to shoulder the blame. This rumor has no doubt convinced certain young officers against seeking engineering duty. On the other hand, officers' must perform whatever duty is assigned them and, especially in considering young officers, an officer's assignment is seldom his for the seeking. Unquestionably a senior much prefers giving a junior what he desires if feasible. This article is valuable in that it may turn more young officers toward seeking engineering duty to such an extent as to give them a well-rounded experience before reaching command rank.
I believe too that he should differentiate between engineering and marine engineering. True, as Admiral Robison says, many weapons are triumphs of engineering skill, but not necessarily marine engineering. Something of a similar nature might be said of his adoption of the communication service. As a far fetched example: pigeons are under the cognizance of the Bureau of Engineering, but it can scarcely be maintained that engineering experience is necessary for the care and upkeep of a pigeon. By all means let there be sufficient engineering training, but let us not lose our sense of proportion.
I believe that Admiral Robison has shown a commendable and quite common fault, in that he places his particular assignment supreme. In the Service, no one component of a fighting unit can be supreme. In his reference to the Oregon's and other triumphs of Engineering, he neglects to give any credit to the hull designers who built the ship on lines suitable to the propelling plant's power. Nor does he give the captain or the navigator credit for having chosen courses saving in fuel. And so I might go on, down to the ship's cooks who burned the galley fires economically that more coal might be available for steaming. Reductio ad absurdum.
In short, a successful fighting unit must be a fine example of team work. Admiral Robison has mentioned the four components. Each of these components is indispensable to the others. Supposing that the Oregon did make a wonderful engineering performance, of what avail was it save to carry armament to where it could be used? Conversely, of what avail would this armament have been unless the machinery had placed it where it could be used? We may liken a ship to a fencer. Communications are his brains and eyes, engineering his feet, offensive power his' foil and hand, protection his mask and pad. A fencer equipped with all of these, meeting one similarly and as effectively equipped, will win if his skill and training are superior. So it is in the navy. A unit must have the four elements in proper proportion for success. A preponderance of any one causes a corresponding weakness in the others. Each is indispensable to success. Each is important. Each is vital. Excessive training in any one branch will cause a corresponding deficiency in the others. We must have trained engineers, but so must we have trained navigators, trained communication officers, trained ship handlers, trained gunnery officers, and so on through all the links of the chain of which each link must be strong, and not the least of these is a trained, capable captain, who can and does keep a happy, contented, earnest crew, full of enthusiasm for doing their particular mite toward making their ship the best ship in the thousand and one ways a ship can be successful, or unsuccessful.
DISCUSSION: Life Insurance as Applied to the Naval Service
(See Whole No. 238, Page 2107)
Lieutenant C.K. Blackburn, U.S. Navy, Retired.—Mr. Webb's article was a very valuable one and one which presented much information of interest to naval personnel. I cannot, however, allow certain statements in his article to pass without taking an opportunity to discuss them.
Although I am an Actuary of a Non-Participating company, I believe the Mutual companies to be acting in good faith and to be making a valuable contribution to Life Insurance as a whole. From Mr. Webb's article one would consider that Non-Participating companies or "Stock Companies," as he calls them, are not acting in good faith and are robbing the insurance policyholder because they do not give dividends.
It is true that a Non-Participating company does not give dividends as such. The Non-Participating contract provides protection at the actual flat basis of safety as determined from previous experience. Non-Participating rates as originally fixed are based on the previous' savings on mortality, savings on expenses of operation, and probable future excess earnings on investments. Just as a basis of comparison I will quote the rates charged by one of the best Non-Participating companies for the contracts mentioned in Mr. Webb's article:
Non-Participating or "Stock Companies" | ? | Rates—Mr. Webb’s Article |
Straight Life | $15.10 | $18.28 |
Endowment at 60 | $20.96 | $24.64 |
20 Payment Life | $22.53 | $26.48 |
30 Year Endowment | $24.94 | $28.74 |
20 Year Endowment | $40.51 | $44.84 |
The Participating company equalizes the original difference between their rates and those of the Non-Participating company by means of dividends. Such dividends are the earnings for the previous year and are based on the savings on mortality, savings in expenses of operation and excess earnings on investments during that year.
I disagree most thoroughly with Mr. Webb's recommendations for the Straight Life contract as the best form of contract for the naval man. It is true that the actual annual cost to the individual is the least. Premiums under the contract are payable throughout the lifetime of the insured. At no time during the duration of a contract does the cash value increase between anniversaries by an amount equal to or greater than the premium. The burden of premium payments under the Ordinary Life contract becomes excessive as time passes. A limited Payment Life contract, on the other hand, provides for payments for a certain stated number of years and the insured can count on being relieved of this burden at its conclusion.
The insurance companies of the United States have done their best to equalize commissions on the various forms of contract so that no insured would be urged to take a contract which was not satisfactory to his needs. At the present time the amount of commission received on the different contracts is so very nearly the same that it does not pay an agent to secure an application for a contract which is not fitted to the need of the applicant. Many agents are known to specialize; some on Ordinary Life prospects, some on Limited Life prospects, and still others on Twenty-Year Endowment prospects. If there were a decided inequality in the commissions paid the agent under these forms of contract all agents would try to specialize on the higher premium forms.
I might go on to discuss in general the various forms of contract listed in Mr. Webb's article. No insurance man is capable of knowing which contract is most suitable and most satisfactory for the entire naval service. I remember distinctly that the easiest way for me to save while I was in the service came from certain definite and stated payments for Liberty Bonds. I can well conceive that for certain people an Endowment policy would be equally satisfactory.
The fact remains that each individual must settle what form of contract is most satisfactory for the needs which he desires to provide for. I can only say that I should have too much consideration for my clients to even suggest that a man above thirty-five years of age should take out an Ordinary Life contract. At the younger ages this form of contract is fairly satisfactory. As the age increases its value becomes less.
The Monthly Income contract is very satisfactory if the individual can afford a sufficient amount to give a satisfactory income. The amount of insurance necessary to provide $100 a month for twenty years is about $17,300. Such a monthly income should be the minimum provided. If the individual cannot afford this amount of insurance I am inclined to favor the lump sum method of settlement.
In conclusion I should advise all officers to choose their own insurance forms basing their decision on:
- Whether they desire to pay for protection their entire lifetime.
- Whether they desire to pay for protection for a limited period.
- Whether they desire to pay for protection and savings simultaneously.
If the first is desired, choose an Ordinary Life contract; if the second, a Limited Payment Life contract; and if the third, an Endowment contract.
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A Program for Naval History
(See Whole No. 232, Page 973)
Captain J.M. Scammell, Inf. R.C, U.S. Army.—Since I prefer not to go down on the records of the Naval Institute forever as being guilty of "gross ignorance" in an article, or as having been guilty of insulting by wholesale a group of hard-working and sincere officers, may I be permitted to clear up some misunderstandings regarding my article on "A Program for Naval History" which appeared in your June number and upon which Captain Robert H. Woods commented so vigorously in the September issue?
I have made clear my point of view—I believe to his satisfaction—to Captain Woods; I should like similarly to make it clear to your readers.
In the first place, I understand perfectly well that the Rebellion records are not designed to be history, but only material for the use of historians.
I made a very serious error, not in fact, but in rhetoric: I forgot the injunction of Quintilian, that one should write, not so as to be understood, but so that one could not be misunderstood: When I said "One collection bears this notice 'Edited by the clerk of the joint committee on printing,'" I referred, not to the Rebellion records, but to "the manner in which such things are done by our government."
In criticizing the editing of the records, I judged the scholarship by present-day standards, and the advance that has been made since the Civil War is enormous. To have done this was, perhaps, unfair. Doubtless in their day the men to whom Captain Woods refers were among the most distinguished of their time.
But none of these considerations affect the actual present-day value of the work. My criticism, however, does' not represent my own personal point of view alone. I have heard the undertaking criticized for years. In fact, within the last few days I have noted the following comments:
- Colonel John R.M. Taylor, U.S.A., in the American Historical Review: "The Rebellion records are not only not history, but they are hardly a model to be followed."
- Captain Alfred Dewar, R.N., in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, August, 1921, uses almost the same words: "Not an example to be followed."
- The late Professor R. M. Johnston—whose reputation as a judge is secure—in the September-October, 1912, Infantry Journal:
"It is perfectly well known among historians that the War Records fail to satisfy the standard in several particulars, and, invaluable though they may be, are a monumental example of how not to spend good money and how not to do a piece of work."
Of course, in attributing the defects to politics I may have jumped at a conclusion that was' unwarranted; but at least, it was a perfectly natural one.
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Employment and Tactics of Aircraft in Naval Warfare
(See Page 1263, Whole No. 234)
Commander H. D. Cooke, U. S. Navy.—1. In the article on the "Employment and Tactics of Aircraft," by Commander J.P. Jackson, the concluding remarks are devoted to the control of operations from the air. The author states that, under proper conditions, a Commander-in-Chief would have a decided advantage in handling a fleet from a dirigible, but that, on account of the vulnerability to airplane attack and the inherent weaknesses in the design of modern airships, a Naval Commander would not be justified in separating himself from his fighting forces.
2. It requires no argument to convince officers who have worked with the game board, or those who have taken part in fleet maneuvers, that a dirigible would afford an ideal position from which to direct the movements of surface craft, providing the weather is clear. While it appears possible to give adequate protection by the use of our own fighting planes, the main difficulty seems to depend upon the questionable ability of such aircraft accompanying the fleet during extended cruises at sea.
3. Commander Jackson also states that, although dirigibles have a large radius of action, they must rely upon a shore base for gas, supplies, and as a place to secure. If this remains true, the future usefulness of this type of aircraft to the fleet will be seriously curtailed. However, although the writer acknowledges a very limited knowledge of aeronautics, the feasibility of towing a dirigible from a surface vessel, to economize fuel and gain a source of supply, does not seem to present insurmountable obstacles.
4. If this can be accomplished, under varying weather conditions, it should be no great feat to refuel and replenish a dirigible, as required, from the towing ship, and make her one of the fixed units of the fleet, ready to cast off and operate independently on scouting or other duty. Such an arrangement would require some means of transfer of personnel, but it is believed that this problem can also be satisfactorily solved.
5. With a dirigible attached to his flagship, a Commander-in-Chief could take to the air or not depending upon conditions. If the weather is fine, he should be able to control all of his forces by means of radio communication from a dirigible, free to cruise in any direction, as readily and accurately as could be done on the game board. If, on the other hand, the weather is thick, he would probably elect to remain on his flagship, depending upon an experienced officer of his staff to cruise over the battle area and give what information he can obtain of the disposition of forces and progress of the engagement.
6. Considering a helium filled dirigible, and a number of fighting planes acting as an aerial defense, in addition to the anti-aircraft guns of the fleet, it appears that an airship of this type could be made reasonably safe for the Commander-in-Chief during battle. Even should the experiment prove hazardous, would not the probable initial advantage gained, which is all important in naval battles, more than offset the disadvantage of placing the Commander-in-Chief in jeopardy during the later stages of the engagement?
7. A number of articles have recently appeared recommending various locations for the Commander-in-Chief in battle. These remarks are, therefore, submitted as an argument for an aerial flagship, in a belief that future development will result in surface fleets being controlled largely, if not entirely, from the air.