DISCUSSION: Employment and Tactics of Aircraft in Naval Warfare
(See Whole No. 238, Page 2135)
Comment by Commander John P. Jackson, U.S. Navy, on Lieutenant R.G. Pennoyer's discussion on the "Employment and Tactics of Aircraft in Naval Warfare."—Regarding Lieutenant R. G. Pennoyer's discussion of my article in the August issue, "Employment and Tactics of Aircraft in Naval Warfare," I have some comments to make.
First, let me acknowledge with gratification the complimentary reference to the article in Lieutenant Pennoyer's opening paragraph. The article originated while I was in Brazil as a member of the U.S. Naval Commission to that country, through the request of the Brazilian Naval General Staff to give them something concrete in regard to the uses to which aircraft could be put in war and their proper tactics to accomplish their mission.
In my researches in preparation of this work for the Brazilian General Staff, I was struck by the fact that little if anything had been written upon the subject, although there was much heated discussion and bitter controversy over the capabilities of aircraft and violent arguments as to whether or not they had rendered battleships obsolete. I was, therefore, reduced to the necessity of an analysis of the problem myself, in the light of aerial accomplishments during the Great War and of experiments subsequent thereto.
My chief purpose in submitting this paper to the Naval Institute for publication was to open up a field, which for some unaccountable reason, had not received due consideration of the services at large from a dispassionate standpoint, and to start a much needed discussion upon the possibilities of this newest manner of conducting war.
In this I have in a measure succeeded, and it is hoped that others will come forward in defense of particular weapons and methods of using them, in which they may be interested or about which they have special knowledge. The subject is one which closely concerns all those to whom the defense of the Nation is entrusted, whether they be of the sea, land or air forces. Every officer of each of these services should be conversant with the capabilities of the others, and there exists at present great need for the education of service opinion in the land and sea forces in regard to aerial matters.
I had rather expected to hear from some champion of the torpedo plane, as I did not make out a very good case for this type of aerial weapon. I have seen no reason, however, to change my opinion, as a result of the recent torpedo plane attacks upon battleships off the Virginia Capes, in spite of the fact that under the conditions of nonresistance to the attack except by maneuvering, a good many hits were scored.
In Lieutenant Pennoyer's comment on paragraph 15 of my article, he is apparently uncertain as to my meaning in stating that the speed of dirigibles is' moderate. The meaning intended to be conveyed is of course that their speed is moderate in comparison with that of airplanes. The passage occurs in the article under the heading "Types of Aircraft," and no reference is made in that section to surface craft. Of course, almost any layman would know that the speed of dirigibles is much superior to that of surface craft, and no allusion was made to the latter, or implied, in the use of the word "moderate."
Lieutenant Pennoyer's comment on paragraph 16 seems to bear out exactly what I have stated as to the failure of the Zeppelins at the Battle of Jutland. His data regarding the British mooring mast, perfected since that battle, is very interesting, but it is not apparent what bearing it has upon my statement, "Dirigibles can operate only from the shore, and therefore cannot be counted on for reliable use with the fleet."
In this case the dirigibles failed in spite of the close proximity of their bases. Their chances of success when operating at great distances from their bases are correspondingly less. Naval battles will not always occur as near bases or stations where masts can be erected as did Jutland. In fact the presumption is quite to the contrary, and that future naval battles may occur thousands of miles away from any locality where there are likely to be mooring masts.
As to the Battle of Jutland itself, it cannot be seen how the existence of this perfected mooring mast could have in any way affected the operations of the Zeppelins. Their failure was inherent in themselves, and not due to their mooring devices.
Referring to Lieutenant Pennoyer's suggestion that mooring masts might be erected upon special aircraft carriers, that of course, is a possibility of the future, but I know of no experiments to indicate whether it is feasible or not. At least no such attempts have to my knowledge as yet been made, and in treating of a problem of this kind, one can only deal with actualities, or at most with conditions which may be created by experiments already in progress. If we go beyond this we get into the realm of pure fancy. Let such a mobile mooring mast be successfully constructed, and I shall readily revise my statement as to how much the fleet can count upon the use of dirigibles. At present I see no reason to alter it in any degree.
In paragraph 41 commented on by Lieutenant Pennoyer, the radius of 1,200 miles referred to means, of course, the total flying radius, just as one speaks of the steaming radius of a ship, and I must take exception to his statement that the total distance this type can perform duty is only half of this, or 600 miles. I made no mention of a flight straight out and back, as he has assumed.
The discussion was regarding the area which could be covered by aircraft in comparison to surface vessels. An airplane can of course fly out along one radial from its starting point, then around the arc of a circle and back along another radial, thus utilizing practically its entire 1,200 miles of flying radius in effective scouting under conditions when it is desired to cover a certain specified area. No comparison was being made between planes and dirigibles, but between aircraft and ships. The greater radius of action of a dirigible is conceded, and a little further on in that paragraph I stated that "Dirigibles are especially adapted to this work on account of their very great radius of action."
I cannot agree with Lieutenant Pennoyer's statement that a dirigible should be able to see as quickly as she is seen, unless he refers to dirigibles in comparison with surface vessels; and even in this case, the advantage probably lies with small surface vessels. In comparison with small fighting planes, which the enemy will undoubtedly have out in his vicinity there can be no question as to which can see or be seen first. The fighting plane can probably approach, rise over, or cut off the retreat of the dirigible, without being seen until in position to attack.
As to Lieutenant Pennoyer's picture of the ease and comfort with which astronomical observations can be taken and worked out on board a dirigible, the recent exploit of Admiral Gago Coutinho and Captain Sacadura Cabral of the Portuguese Navy in flying from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, has shown the accuracy with which airplanes can be navigated, and has gone far toward dispelling the fancied difficulties.
The flight was undertaken solely to prove the reliability of Admiral Coutinho's methods of navigating an airplane and the value of the instruments which he had adopted or invented. The flight was a complete vindication of both.
Lieutenant Pennoyer states that the navigator of a dirigible can make observations without depending upon the horizon or height of eye, with an average error of about ten miles and at worst of certainly not more than twenty miles. Admiral Coutinho did much better than that. In his flight he used the sea horizon exclusively: but for night flying he uses an artificial horizon in taking observations of the stars, and a sextant with an illuminating device by which the bubble is dimly lighted.
When using the sea horizon he obtained his height of eye by measuring the dip of the shadow of the plane by means of a graduated arc easily read to one-half a degree, a simple and accurate operation. From his experience in navigating airplanes, he states that he can trust observations taken from a flying plane with the sea horizon, to within one minute of arc. In other words they are reliable in exactly the same degree as observations made on board a surface ship. He did not use a special windshield, the machine itself creating an eddy, so that he was not annoyed by the wind. Nor did the vibration of the plane bother him in the least.
He completely demonstrated his assertions by his actual performance. On the leg from the Cape Verde Islands to St. Paul rocks, during a flight of 11 ½ hours over the open ocean, he laid his course so accurately that before sunset he picked up the rocks dead ahead. These rocks are only a few hundred feet in extent, for the greater part only twenty feet above water, with the highest point only sixty feet. In this leg Admiral Coutinho took forty observations and on the whole flight over 100 astronomical observations for positions, all with excellent results.
My article was written before the flight from Lisbon to Rio. In the light of this performance, my statements regarding the difficulties of navigating aircraft should be modified, and I believe that Lieutenant Pennoyer will feel the same way regarding his statement that the error in observations taken from dirigibles is ten to twenty miles.
In his comment on my paragraph 62, Lieutenant Pennoyer says that he has already stated the means by which these craft may be maintained with the fleet. True, but he forgets that this means is not in existence, and that no steps have yet been taken to prove its feasibility. When his mobile mooring mast becomes an accomplished fact, I will revise my opinion as to the degree of dependence the fleet can place upon the presence of dirigibles with it at the crucial moment.
While speed and radius of vision are doubtless the most important considerations in scouting, they are of little use if contained in a vehicle so vulnerable as to render prohibitive losses probable. And I still maintain that surface vessels are more dependable than any type of aircraft for protective scouting, especially against submarines, which can be detected more readily by submarine listening devices than by any other means.
Lieutenant Pennoyer closes by again claiming that the climbing ability and greater ceiling of dirigibles would protect them against attacking planes. Again I must invite his attention to the fact that small fighting planes may well attain a favorable position for attacking a dirigible before being seen by the latter, which would, therefore, have no opportunity to use these superior qualities.
Naval Corps, Specialization and Efficiency
(See Whole No. 235, Page 1491)
Captain Elliot Snow (CC) U.S. Navy.—Twice within a year it has become necessary to reply to articles that have appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings affecting the Construction Corps. In one case this was because of unfair statements concerning that Corps and the other was due to the illogical attitude of the author on the subject of amalgamation and specialists.
The article contributed to the September number of the Naval Institute Proceedings by Lieutenant Commander T.C. Kinkaid advocates selective specialist training for Line officers. It was noted with some satisfaction that his position as regards specialists is contrary to the one taken by Commander J.O. Fisher, U.S.N. However, he also advocates the amalgamation of those members of the Engineer Corps who perform shore duty only and the Construction Corps with the Operating Corps, the Line, with specialization in the combined Corps. The contradictory elements in the article are in themselves almost sufficient to refute the position taken. On one hand the author recommends specialization and on the other advocates doing away with several Corps of specialists. Comment on several points will help to clear up the question of amalgamation.
The sweeping statement concerning the lack of judgment of flag officers in selecting the staffs is a complete surprise, as is also the alleged inefficiency of the administration of the fleets because of the lack of experience and training of the staff. Judging from personal experience extending over a period of nearly forty years, the author's statements are not warranted and give evidence of hasty generalization, otherwise there would be cause for grave concern. Many in the service will doubtless await with interest comment on this point from those of experience in the seagoing branch.
Another statement unsupported by facts is found in the opening sentence of the fifth paragraph in which the author states—
"Corps specialization is decidedly unpopular, the feeling being general that special corps are both unnecessary and undesirable."
There are members of the seagoing Corps who hold contrary views—officers of high rank and long experience whose mature judgment entitles them to be counted in reaching a general conclusion. And too, there are many members of other Corps in the Navy who do not subscribe to the author's statement. I ask therefore in all candor, "to whom is Corps specialization unpopular?" Is it unpopular to the younger and less experienced officers or the older and more experienced? If it really reflects a consensus of opinion, then it is but right and just that the Construction Corps be given the facts upon which this opinion is based. It is not necessary to repeat here the reasons why there should be Corps in the Navy. These are to be found in the discussion referred to in the footnotes of the preceding page. Actually there are many more applications from the younger officers of the line to enter the Construction Corps than there are vacancies. Does this have the appearance of unpopularity?
In one of those discussions the remark was made that there are many seagoing officers who consider the present conditions as regards engineering as distinctly susceptible of improvement. The confirmation of this view by the author is decidedly opportune. The question now naturally suggests itself, would the present engineering conditions as described by the author, have been allowed to obtain, had the Engineer Corps continued in existence instead of having been amalgamated as it was in 1899? And does it not emphasize the need for the re-establishment of that Corps?
What is needed in the service today is an expert seagoing Engineer Corps, a condition which should be recognized by the Line. There is excellent material from which to form such a Corps. The surest way for officers to become experts under the administrative conditions that exist and which are likely to continue is through Corps in which all are on an equal footing as to absolute rank.
Many articles that advocate the amalgamation of the Construction Corps refer to the design of ships and state in some form that the majority of the Construction Corps do not exercise this function. In this respect, the article "Naval Corps, Specialization and Efficiency" runs true but in a slightly different way. Concerning this the author states:
"The Naval Constructor and the Permanent Engineer are not the actual designers of material. They are the supervising designers and the run-of-the-line naval officer can be trained to do the work that the specialists do."
Any one so inclined could state with equal lack of force—with practically no force at all—that the Operating Corps does not actually operate the ships. There are signal boys to make signals; quartermasters to handle the helm; sight setters and gun pointers and crews to work the guns; enlisted men in the engineer's force to raise steam and handle the engines; coxswains to control the boats rowed by the crew and so on through the entire gamut of their profession. What the Operating Corps does is neither more nor less than what is done by the Construction Corps or any other of the Corps of the Navy. Through education and experience they direct and control the efforts of others; otherwise, why not simply train and never educate?
It is claimed that the Line officer has the advantage of practical experience afloat and is able thereby to consider recommendations and criticisms from a broader point of view. This is another favorite form of argument for the amalgamation of the Construction Corps with the Line. If I had time to review the technical files of but one bureau and present to the readers of the Institute even a part of the many conflicting recommendations that have been made by the seagoing officers on the identical problem of design, it would be clear at once that there is no force whatever in the form of argument brought forward by the author. The experience gained by a wide awake young officer on a submarine or destroyer has little value on the design of a turret or a stabilizer. If the design of our ships, or the principal systems and mechanisms' of those ships, or even the lesser fittings, are to be confided to one Corps, all progress would at once stop. Insofar as the work of the Bureau of Construction and Repair is concerned and that of all other technical bureaus too, the state of the material of to-day represents the work of many minds. It is apparent that the author and others' who hold similar views as to the design of our ships—the word design here used in its correct meaning to include details as well as general features—overlook the fact that ability to design requires long experience backed by accumulated data correctly interpreted. The many hundreds of minds include not only those of the Construction Corps but of the Operating Corps and all other Corps in the Navy without a single exception. Plainly, the author possesses a meager knowledge of what his neighbor is doing.
The question is not whether the "run-of-the-line naval officers" can or cannot be trained in certain activities, but rather is it wise to superpose additional training on an already overburdened Corps?" According to the author's own statement some of the Line are already deficient in their own special field of endeavor and others too have failed to make a success of Marine Engineering.
To avoid a misunderstanding of what is here written, I now repeat that the individuals in any one of the Corps of the Navy could within the limits of their natural intellectual endowments become equally as efficient officers in any other Corps.
We need experts in the service and not dilettanti. Those who advance the view that the Construction Corps should be merged into the Line, because Constructors do not design ships, often fail to carry conviction with their words for the simple reason, it is evident to the initiated, they do not know the procedure connected with design. In this particular article the author states his views as to what constitutes the design function in the following words:
"The design of new material may be divided into two general functions; first, a clear-cut statement of what the mechanism is to accomplish, giving its general characteristics, followed by a critical inspection of the actual designs ; and second, the actual calculations and arrangement of parts. The first of these functions can be best done by a Line officer specialist who is familiar with practical considerations, etc. The second can be accomplished only by a designing engineer of whom there are plenty available in the drafting rooms of various naval establishments and outside contractors."
The designs of our naval vessels in general are the result of team work; the design of the various systems and arrangements of spaces represent, not the work of one Corps only, but of many, in fact of all seagoing Corps, and of many able civilians. The designs of the fittings that are to be found in the various systems are not the creations of a moment, but of long development and continuous study. Where any of these elements of design affects the work under the cognizance of a bureau other than the one having initial cognizance, the former always has a chance to comment. But in the long run some one Corps must be responsible for combining all these complicated and conflicting requirements into a homogeneous whole.
Who will be responsible for the structural strength and stability of all ships if the Construction Corps is amalgamated with the line?
Would there then exist a legitimately critical attitude of the products of design?
If the present skilled personnel of the Construction Corps be withdrawn from Aeronautics what will be the result?
The answers to these few questions are obvious to one of long experience in the service.
The military characteristics of vessels are now decided by a body of Line officers, the General Board; major alterations that affect these military characteristics are likewise decided by the Line; this of course is as it should be. As to the requirements to be met by the various systems on our naval vessels and even of lesser elements of mechanisms, has not the Operating Corps a preponderating voice? The older and more experienced members of the Construction Corps in discussing technical reports, often make the passing observation: "Why is it that so many of the seagoing officers content themselves by simply reporting some defect without offering any suggestion and apparently without making any endeavor to locate and report the cause of the defect? Is it due to lack of observation, insufficient interest or inability to constructively criticize?"
The author closes his article by stating that it is not an indictment of the Construction Corps, nor the officers who have been designated for engineering duty only, but it is intended to be a constructive criticism of a system which has many evils. The disclaimer and good intent expressed by the author may readily be accepted as some of the suggestions are constructive, but the one which advocates amalgamation is open to most serious question. One of the great evils of the naval service today is not the existence of Corps, but it is the steadfast refusal of the Operating Corps to recognize and admit that the work of other Corps is necessary, is in the main well done and that all Corps are an integral part of the navy. Until the day dawns when this view is accepted, our house will be, in some degree, divided against itself with all attendant disadvantages.
Those who ride the hobby of amalgamation may at this point perhaps observe:
"So long as a man rides his hobby horse peacefully and quietly along the King's highway, and neither compels you nor me to get up behind him, pray sir, what have either you or I to do with it?"
But, to others the query then naturally suggests itself:
"But what shall we do, when he not only attempts to force us to get up behind him but makes us pay for the ride as well!"
A closing word is added to the younger officers of the service who may have read the article on "Naval Corps, Specialists and Efficiency," and have received from it an incorrect idea as to the real merits of the point at issue. False prophets arise and deceive many but the Construction Corps and other Corps too will endure to the end if they will but continue to erect their edifice on the rock of real and substantial achievement and not shift their foundation to the quick sands of gilded and glittering promise. In the long run a Corps will be judged by its works and not by its words.
The real significance of the article is this: in order to release Operating Corps to its legitimate work, the Navy needs more, not fewer corps; an Ordnance Corps, an Engineer Corps, and an Aviation Corps.
The best and only safe policy to be followed by a Corps is, Our Country, FIRST, the Navy, NEXT, then the Corps, and lastly the individual.