A FIGHTING LEADER FOR THE FLEET
By Lieut. Commander R. K. Turner, U. S. Navy
Napoleon postponed his visit to England until July, 1815, because he was not possessed of the "seaman's eye." A correct view of the way to Britain from the continent cannot be gained by a man who has confined his activities to shore, since it leads across a bit of water whose management is only possible to one familiar with ship and the sea. The genius who reorganized France during the Hundred Days was unable to effect a combination to baffle the storm-tossed Nelson; to control Nelson's element required, not a Napoleon, but a greater Nelson. Had Napoleon been an admiral he would have succeeded in reaching England, but his success would have been gained with the methods of a seaman and not with those of a soldier.
Those who spend their lives on shore are not fitted to solve the problems of the sea, since at sea through countless years have grown up certain customs in the conduct of affairs, the results of necessity, that are quite different from those obtaining in analogous situations ashore. The seafaring man has, in fact, methods of his own for accomplishing his ends that are peculiar to the sea and for which methods suitable enough for work on land cannot be substituted without detriment. These customs, these methods, exist alike for the prosecution of warfare as for the business of peace.
The principles of war are few, easily learned, and correctly put into practice with only the greatest difficulty. These principles apply equally to war on the land, in the air, on the water, and under the water and even their correct application in the most widely different circumstances does not change as regards men but only as regards changed weapons and conditions. Thus warfare on land and sea today is, except in details, like it was in the days of Hannibal and when Antony fled from Actium to his doom. But the detailed application at sea of the few great truths of warfare differs from their application ashore, and largely because the vastly superior means that exist at sea for transporting the fighting forces and the resulting speed with which unexpected situations develop requires leadership to be exercised in an entirely different manner in the conduct of the affairs of fleets than in the direction of those of armies. The tradition of the sea is the fighting leader commanding the fleet from a fighting ship and exercising a personal control whether of strategical operations or tactical movements in battle that has in the case of shore forces necessarily been delegated to subordinates by the general in command. Napoleon from the shore at Boulogne attempting to effect, with the same methods, the concentration of an army and a fleet, and from a position distant from this fleet essaying the exact direction of its movements, displays his lack of appreciation of the correct use of that weapon. Because his unfamiliarity with the sea made him fail to realize the importance of the element of personal command by his admirals, the greatest soldier of the age could not, in two years' time, absolute master of the continent as he was, cross the twenty wet miles of Britain's frontier.
Successful war at sea has in the past been waged by seamen with seamen's methods; in the future seamanlike methods will gain like results. The study by seamen of war rightly includes both land war and sea war, but while our libraries abound with books on land warfare, from strategy through tactics to detailed organizations of staffs and the varied forces, we have but the bare outlines of accomplishment recorded for the sea warriors. Even Mahan's writings, dealing almost solely with strategical considerations, throw us on our own resources as regards tactics and organization. Therefore we turn to the many German and other writings on staff activity and training, and hunt through voluminous reports and charts of the late war in the course of study. Not content with the British system, since, in the only sea battle of first importance, it (or something) failed to produce satisfactory results even with overwhelming forces, we attempt to adapt the devices of the soldier to the solution of the problems of the sailor. Rather should their solution be guided by sound thought and by study of the battles of former masters of the sea. Nor may we blindly accept their methods where these are susceptible of improvement; on the contrary they must undergo such modification as experience shows will give effective results. But we must take care that in hasty change we do not discard any of the fundamentals of three thousand years of practical war.
One of the changes that is popular at the moment concerns an increase in staff functions and the centralization of detailed staff control under the personal direction of the commander-in-chief. Under this plan that officer is relieved of direct command of any part of his fleet. Following adoption of the German method we have seen the armies of the world transformed by staff control into closely knit organizations having an efficiency undreamed of a few years ago; it is inevitable that there should be an increasing agitation to extend this system to the navy in order to gain the same benefits that have accrued to the army.
It is certain most naval officers feel a hearty sympathy with any agitation which will assist in creating the centralized authority and decentralized initiative that will win battles. There is one phase of this movement, however, that contemplates a change savoring too much of the camp and too little of the quarterdeck. Doubtless it is the example set by the German Great Headquarters Staff that is responsible for the recurrent demand for a special flagship for the admiral, which shall be devoted wholly to his service. This demand is not entirely new, and at one time in the recent past there was wide discussion of the tentative plan for a heavily armored, practically gun-less vessel for the purpose of carrying the flag at all times, even during battle. At the present time we hear no more of this plan because of the wave of economy as regards military matters, but instead we behold the admiral of the United States fleet embarked upon an unarmored, practically unarmed vessel, the Columbia!
The Columbia, formerly an army transport, and not designed for her new use, is designated as the "Administrative Flagship" of the fleet, while the Maryland, the newest and most powerful of our battleships, is termed the "Tactical Flagship." The latter, when the admiral is not embarked on board, will take her place as one of the units of a division for ordinary tactical and administrative purposes. The present view as to the employment of the Columbia may then be presumed to be that under normal conditions of peace, and for about nine-tenths of the time, the commander-in-chief and his staff will perform their functions on board that vessel. During combined maneuvers, both in peace and war, the admiral, with a certain number of his staff, will take up his station on the Maryland. With this scheme it is obvious that the Columbia is not likely to be used in war as a tactical flagship, if only because of her vulnerability to attack while at sea.
In any discussion of this matter we can not ignore, however, the former opinions of many members of the service who felt that experience and study showed the desirability of the abovementioned heavily armored and gun-less flagship for the use of the admiral in the actual tactical direction of battle. It appears that the idea back of the present administrative flagship, the Columbia, is a development of the previous scheme, and doubtless we may expect to see, during maneuvers, that vessel occasionally used as the tactical flagship if only for the purpose of demonstrating how a battle may be conducted from a ship not engaged in fighting. If such a demonstration shows promising results it is more than possible that the old agitation for a combined administrative and tactical non-combatant flagship may be renewed. Therefore in any discussion of the present "Two Flagship" system we should at the same time go into the older question of whether or not a special tactical flagship would increase the efficiency of operation of the fleet during war.
The reasons that influence those favoring either the "Special Flagship" or the "Two Flagship" system may be grouped together as follows:
- The existence of the varied forces of modern warfare requires that the commander be in such a tactical position as will allow him to give consideration to all, and not alone to the battleships. It is argued that the admiral, embarked on a battleship in the line, sees only the ships about him and loses touch with the cruiser force, the destroyers, the submarines, and the aircraft.
- The smoke and noise interfere with the transmission of signals. It is said that a ship behind the line can send signals with greater certainty than if in the line itself. In addition, it is assumed that signals can more easily be exchanged with the other forces.
- The admiral, since his ship is neither firing nor is close to other ships that are firing, can, it is said, gain a better view of his own and the enemy's line and thus be better informed as to the tactical situation.
- Since a battleship is built for the definite purpose of fighting and must carry a full complement for ship operation there is insufficient space for a staff as large as desired; both the staff and ship facilities are thus improperly reduced. With a ship built only for the admiral all the staff functions, now sometimes either curtailed or performed in other ships, can be collected and a thoroughly efficient organization provided.
- In peace, or while the flagship, if a battleship, is cruising for primary training, both the ship and staff are unavoidably hampered by the necessary duties of the other.
- During peace, or in war when operations cover a wide area, the admiral must be able to inspect and supervise the work of scattered forces by paying personal visits to all units. He must not be tied down to the battleships alone, but it must be possible for him to be absent from his major forces for weeks or even months; it is necessary therefore, for him to have such a vessel as will carry his entire staff.
It would seem that the recital of these arguments would indicate answers sufficiently powerful to defeat the whole project. Such has not, however, been the case, since, although the original idea of the special tactical flagship has been abandoned, the compromise represented by the Columbia has been accepted. Before combating these arguments put forth to support a device copied from the headquarters organization of the land forces, it will be well to examine more fully into some of the essential differences between the problems confronted on land and at sea, in order to appreciate the very good grounds that exist for the differences between the organizations as they have been up to the present;
In the first place, land battles are local, their movements and developments taking place very slowly, while at sea an action is fought at full speed, miles are covered in a few minutes, and the trend of success or failure develops very suddenly. The time element at sea is of so much greater importance that it cannot be too greatly emphasized. No fire superiority on land, except in case of complete surprise, can possibly be so great that the action may be decided by it alone within a few minutes. At sea, five or ten minutes' decisive fire superiority may well mean a great victory. The admiral must estimate a situation, decide upon his action, and see to its execution, all within a very few minutes; under such circumstances it is upon his own judgment of the moment that he must rely, a judgment comparatively uninfluenced by staff or subordinate advice, but formed instantly as a result of personal observation, previous study, and experience.
The amount of staff direction prior to or during combat, so necessary on shore, is not required at sea. Land battles on a great scale often occur after weeks of planning in great detail for the tactical use of an army over a particular and well known terrain. The conditions most likely to develop are assumed, special plans are made to meet them, and the result often depends upon close adherence to plan and the correct use of a large tactical reserve. For this reserve particular arrangements must be made both before and during battle. At sea there is no tactical reserve under ordinary circumstances and after the battle is joined: both admirals endeavor at the earliest moment to bring their full force to bear. Nor can the exact locality of the action be known far ahead of time, nor the direction, the formation, the course, nor the strength of the enemy; the battle must be fought under the influence of a general and flexible doctrine supplemented by maneuver orders only. No such thing as the definitely fixed and coordinated plan of the army, requiring staff work on a large scale, will ever exist for the navy. The movement to the battle line of new troops, supplies, and ammunition does not take place at sea while the fight continues because they are already present and so this matter requires no special battle orders. Even admitting that it is necessary to enlarge the scope of naval staff work, it is difficult to see how it can ever reach the proportions to which some persons, impressed with the army organization, believe it should grow.
The modern battle lines ashore that extend for many miles in front and depth owe their existence to the development of rapid communication secure from interruption. The commander-in-chief is in touch with all parts of his army through his headquarters organization, and his battle decisions, made after a study of many reports and recommendations from his subordinate commanders and staff, are made from a view of the map alone—a personal view of the battle may even lead to false conclusions, since the whole field cannot be seen by one man. This personal view of a sea battle is admittedly the first essential for an admiral, and the many tactical decisions he makes are necessarily the results chiefly of impressions rather than a long series of information reports. Such reports are fragmentary and slow in reaching their destination because of the meager means for communication, subject, as it is, to constant interruption. The transmission of information, while of vast importance, is notoriously unreliable and can never keep pace, in rapidity, with the development of the action and the necessity for quick decision.
One need have little discernment in reading history to note that the more or less flexible command exercised by the commander-in-chief of land operations is entirely different from the very close personal command of engaged forces exercised by an admiral commanding a fleet. This characteristic difference in the past must not be ignored because very good reasons require the use of each method in its own place. This is not to say that great sea battles have not been fought when the commander-in-chief was not present, but in such circumstances the supreme command of the action has been out of the hands of the commander-in-chief and the entire responsibility, initiative, and execution have been with the commander actually with the fleet. We cannot alter the fact that the commander at sea has always been the fighting leader. The most notorious case in history of a commander-in-chief in a flagship separate from but near the battle resulted in fresh laurels to Nelson at Copenhagen. Here the fighting leader was, as always, in the thick of the fight, and the name of Sir Hyde Parker, his commander, is forgotten because of his small influence upon the event. Nelson invariably planned his actions to win and wished always to be on the best fighting ship and in the thickest of the fray where he knew victory was to be found. At Trafalgar he was urged to hold his flagship back from the fight; he had a splendid opportunity to remain on a fast sailing frigate out of the line and thence to direct the battle. He chose instead to lead the left column straight for the enemy's center because he was a fighting and not a non-combatant admiral.
The answers to the arguments for a special flagship thus suggest themselves. As to (a), the reason the admiral places himself on board a battleship is because the battleship force, combining both infantry and artillery, with ability to take and give hard knocks, is the force which wins the victory. These vessels will always be at the tactically important center of the action, and it is essential that the admiral, whose decisions necessarily flow largely from a personal view of the action, must be where he can keep control of the controlling force of his fleet. The other forces are important for subsidiary uses, but the battleships must be employed for the decisive work whether he aims to destroy the enemy or to save his own fleet. If he wishes merely to frighten the enemy, to baffle him, to evade him, or to cause him minor damage, the other forces may find larger active use than the battleships, but if he is seriously in earnest in his desire to do the enemy harm, the minor forces but prepare the way.
Since radio signals are used almost to the exclusion of visual methods, the argument set forth in (b) falls flat. Even with visual signals, it is entirely a matter of wind direction whether they can more easily be seen if the flagship is in the line or out of it. This reason, advanced some years ago when the special flagship idea first appeared, has no longer its former potency.
As to (c), it is, of course, impossible to watch the enemy better behind the line than in the line, and it would seem a matter of considerable importance to see exactly what the enemy is about at all stages of the battle. It is certainly of more importance to see the enemy, and to see our own ships that lie between or flanking the two lines than to view the unengaged side of our line and our other vessels that are altogether out of the action. If the wind is blowing from the enemy toward ourselves, the smoke will shut off the view from a flagship behind the line not only of the enemy, but also of all our own forces. Ideas as to the progress of an engagement gained from such a position would probably be erroneous.
The statement in (d) is, however, one that cannot easily be passed by. It is quite true that the ship's complement and the flag complement are both crowded and hampered by each other, but these unfortunate conditions have been accepted in the past without any great effort having been made to overcome them. The question of quarters is important, but since, in the opinion of many, the present officers' staterooms on board can be reduced in size without any great sacrifice of comfort, and additional rooms more habitable than those on many smaller ships can be built, this crowding can, with some care, be partly reduced and partly accepted with small loss in efficiency. As the number of enlisted men required for the flagship is only slightly greater than for a battleship, the question of their billeting is easily settled. As to the staff functions now performed on other ships these are, in fact, minor, and it is difficult to see why in any case there need be a fleet marine officer, a fleet supply officer, and a fleet chaplain attached to the staff of the commander-in-chief. There are few marines afloat except on the battleships, and the battleship force marine officer could, it is thought, combine his duties with those of the fleet marine officer. The fleet supply officer now seems out of place and should be on the staff of the commander of the train, while the fleet chaplain could perform his duties as well on any other ship. It is possible that a scrutiny of the existing staffs would disclose that other positions might be abolished and so allow room for the desired increase in staff officers of the line whose duties would be wholly military. In the past, in the navy, staff officers have been regarded as luxuries, and adequate quarters, offices, and battle stations have not been included in the designs of flagships. Suitable facilities of this nature should be provided, however, even if at the expense of reducing the actual fighting efficiency of the ship.
So far as (e) is concerned, it is probable, that all of the duties required of the admiral's staff can be performed as well at sea as in port. Urgent communications with other stations are sent by radio, while others can wait for the mail tug which visits the flagship daily unless the latter is well out to sea. It assuredly isn't desirable, as one officer expressed it, to "set up a little Navy Department at anchor in Hampton Roads," and sea cruising is equally good, as a matter of battle training, for staff as well as for all other naval officers.
The reason set forth in (f) appears as important as (d). It is undoubtedly a fact that if a battleship is the only ship an admiral has at his disposal he will largely be prevented from paying those personal visits to the various forces that add so much to military efficiency. This is particularly true at present, when the fleet is scattered to the winds, with detachments all the way from Hawaii to Boston. But are we not attempting to correct the faults inherent in such lack of concentration by an equally faulty device? By all means let the admiral have a suitable tender for his own use—even the Columbia—but his actual flagship, the ship in which he cruises and where his staff functions should be the battleship in which he will some day fight. What is to prevent the real flagship from cruising this year in the Atlantic and next in the Pacific, and why can't the very small number of inspection trips by the admiral (once a year to Newport and Charleston, or Panama and Hawaii) be made in his tender? In any important war involving the United States it is not probable that the commander-in-chief will make extended trips away from the battle forces in such a vessel as the Columbia, while he will doubtless make short trips in a destroyer. Therefore this reason is not so important after all, particularly if the policy of yearly fleet concentration and maneuvers is carried out.
The errors that have arisen in considering this question are doubtless due to a misconception as to what really constitutes the fleet. We look upon the fleet as made up of a collection of forces composed of vessels such as battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft. In this we are wrong. In any war in which the United States will seriously rely for success upon its fleet that fleet will consist of the battleships—with numerous other craft to assist the battleships in carrying out their mission. The battleship force is the fleet; it is the force with which victory will be won, and all the other forces will be used merely for the preliminary work and to make ready for the effective use of the battleships.
Any device that takes from the commander-in-chief his power of using the battleship force with instant facility for gaining his ends is fundamentally wrong. He should, indeed, be its immediate commander, and whatever organization is necessary to relieve the admiral of administrative details should never be allowed to separate him so far that he will cease to be the actual tactical commander of that force. The battleships will decide the day in our future naval actions, and since no argument will ever displace that fact, then we should at once admit that the place of the admiral, the responsible leader, is with those vessels at all times. It must be in his power to employ them as he sees fit, and this he cannot do if he is in a special flagship miles away at the decisive tactical moment.
It may seem at first sight that the present "Two Flagship" system will meet these requirements, but further consideration will show that many of the disadvantages of the "Special Flagship" system have been accepted, while most of the advantages of the normal system have been discarded. This apparently is the proposal of those who, being unwilling to go the whole way, would stop in the middle; unable to cross the river at one jump we would make it in two, which will be fatal if the flood of war catches us in mid-stream. The whole movement stops but one step short of the old British system that allowed the commander-in-chief of the battle fleet to hoist his flag on his house in the dockyard.
Let us suppose that two years hence we engage in a war in which the employment of our battle fleet is required a short time after the declaration. Also let us picture what will happen if the "Two Flagship" plan persists until that time.
This year, because of lack of funds, there will be no joint maneuvers and the Columbia may be expected to remain in the Atlantic. The admiral and his staff will therefore be unable to direct the tactical handling of a battle line of our most important vessels, which are in the Pacific, at least until next year. After these maneuvers the admiral will then return to the Columbia for another year, at the expiration of which we assume that war breaks out. If the fleet has already been concentrated, we may then expect the admiral to take up quarters on the Maryland, in view of the imminence of a capital action. However, he may elect to remain with his entire staff on the Columbia while in port going aboard the Maryland, with a few assistants, only when the fleet puts to sea.
When he goes to the Maryland, which meanwhile has been exercised as one of the units of a division, whom will he take along? Will the entire administrative staff go, or just those officers concerned with the tactical handling of the fleet? The former plan can not well be followed if, as has been stated, the staff is too large to add to the personnel already on a battleship. Then who will remain on the Columbia to direct the reduced "administrative" staff, and what will be the result, at the outbreak of war, of such a division of this staff?
The duties required of the signal and radio forces, the yeomen and the internal communication force are very onerous on board the "Big Flag," whether at sea during maneuvers or in port. These officers and men require careful training; the work performed by the similar personnel of an ordinary ship, such as the Maryland would be under usual conditions, is by no means so heavy or important as in the case of a flagship. When the admiral goes on board the Maryland at the outbreak of war will he take his own communication forces with him, or will he depend upon such a hastily organized staff as that vessel will be able to improvise? Will the routine communication work still be handled by the Columbia with a reduced force, or will it be taken care of on the tactical flagship no matter what distance separates it from the administrative flagship?
How many of the administrative files, reports, war plans, and other papers will the admiral take with him? Certainly some must go, because the Columbia can hardly be expected to go to sea with the battle fleet when an action is impending. Can all of the files go, in view of the fact that certain staff work is still to be performed on the Columbia?
When several officers from the Planning Division of the Office of Naval Operations join the admiral, will they go to the Maryland or the Columbia?
Some of these are knotty questions requiring careful consideration to answer, since upon the correct answer depends a great part of the efficiency of the staff and fleet. They are not, however, the really important questions.
Everyone knows the extraordinary amount of detailed drill required of both officers and men to keep a ship efficient in matters of fire control. Drills are held daily for the purpose of testing communications and training men to speak and hear over the telephone standardized words that have been reduced to a minimum by careful elimination. Fire control duties are all simple, and yet they require constant and unremitting practice in order that efficient co-operation may be attained. Simple duties in various parts of a single ship are coordinated by simple words—and yet what long hours of training this takes and how hard it is to keep the system efficient ! Merely for the sake of keeping these simple affairs in order we require all hands to drill daily at their battle stations so that familiarity may bring perfection.
Such work is indeed simple compared to the work of maneuvering a fleet of varied forces. How then more necessary it is for the admiral's staff, and the admiral himself, to exercise at their vastly more important, intricate, and difficult battle duties with sufficient frequency to eliminate error! It is no more possible daily to maneuver a fleet than it is daily to fire a target practice, but it is of the utmost importance that each detailed duty performed by the staff in action be performed very frequently, even daily, so that the mechanism of command may run smoothly. The staff personnel should be as familiar with their battle stations and their battle duties as are the ship's personnel—their telephones, and signal flags, and code messages, and plotting, and casualty drill are the most important in the fleet.
It was but a few years ago that the fire control personnel of a ship were few in number and exercised but seldom at their stations; the growth of our knowledge of what is necessary in the way of controlling a ship's fire has made us increase the number of men performing such functions until the complexity of the machine requires frequent operation of all its parts. Perhaps even yet we haven't realized that we need an even more intricate machine for the control of a fleet in battle, a machine that can be made efficient by one means only—hard work and frequent drill. These cannot be directed from the administrative flagship, but only in the exact surroundings, with the same facilities, and on the same ship where the admiral fights the action, so that on the day of battle his staff may know the use of their weapons.
Furthermore, it is important that the battleships continue to look to the commander-in-chief for direction and for personal leadership. The habit of mind produced by frequent contact between the division, squadron, and supreme commanders will be a very important factor in an action. Indoctrination of this force with the ideas of its commander and the resulting unity of action cannot be attained except through the personal relation that has invariably had so great a part in the maintenance of the fighting spirit in successful fleets. The subsidiary forces, who do not fight under the detailed direction of the commander-in-chief, require this personal contact to a less extent; this can be supplied at times of combined maneuvers or by special visits undertaken during periods of overhaul or primary drill of the battleships.
The battleship force should be handled as frequently as possible—every time it gets under way as a force—by the man who is to handle it in action. The Germans were long known to be very expert in fleet maneuvers, having attained their proficiency by constant drill. Is it to be supposed, with the present system of employing two flagships, or with our present tactical organization, that the United States Fleet will ever be able to perform so superb a maneuver as that of Von Sheer's in the battle of Jutland when, after two complete reversals of fleet course, he hurled himself, in emulation of Trafalgar, at the British center? Can we execute such precise drill unless we return to a system of active personal command that will allow such performance?
The British failure at Jutland cannot be laid to lack of administrative facility, for, as has been shown, their preliminary staff work up to the moment of battle was well-nigh perfect. The information sections, the planning units, the communication service, the guard and sweeping divisions, and the control of forces scattered over a wide area all functioned so marvelously that the Grand Fleet was brought to the correct meeting point with a smooth perfection that is admirable. Every precaution was taken, every contingency provided for; but the British failed to gain the decisive victory they so confidently expected. Success eluded them not because of defective ships, faulty organization, poor gunnery, or lack of information, but because of ineffective tactical handling of the battleships.
It may seem necessary to distribute the detailed administrative duties connected with control of the battleship force, but these can well be taken care of in the squadron system of organization, which yet leaves the commander-in-chief as the actual commander of that force. In war it is extremely doubtful if the admiral will leave his battleships if their use is at all likely, and we should simulate in peace conditions that will obtain in war.
The logic of circumstances is against the older movement to put the admiral, during action, any place but in the heavy battle line and in the best position therein to control his most important fighting ships. It is unthinkable that he will remain in the line in any ship incapable of giving blows as hard as it receives, of taking but not inflicting punishment. Therefore the special tactical flagship idea will not persist. But the newer movement for the "Administrative Flagship" should not be accepted without very searching consideration. The subject has as yet received but little thought by the service at large, doubtless because it appears at first as not of major importance. Unless, however, we are willing for the lethargy of peace to allow this new plan to become a fixed institution that may plague us in war we should view the experiment with a critical suspicion that will be satisfied only in case of its unqualified success. The navy must have proper facilities for the conduct of its affairs both in peace and war, but, though the former is the normal state, the latter is the fleet's sole reason for existence; steps taken to increase our ease in peace must not compromise our effectiveness in war. The fleet must, in peace as in war, be directed by a fighting leader in a fighting ship.