CO-ORDINATION IN ARMY AND NAVY TRAINING
By Colonel Dion Williams, U. S. M. C.
"United we stand; divided we fall."
In the writings of every authority upon military and naval campaigns and operations, past, present, and prospective, there will be found mention of the importance of intelligent co-operation between the Army and the Navy of any nation at war if the best and quickest results are to be obtained.
If Napoleon at the height of his power could have succeeded in his attempts to build and equip a navy even approaching in efficiency his land forces he would have conquered England, the power that was his ultimate undoing; but the lack of proper training for the French Navy of that period and the utter lack of co-operation between the land and sea forces enabled England to retain control of the sea and prevented Napoleon from invading England, although he got the "three days' east wind" that he longed for when his great army was concentrated at Boulogne for the invasion of the one nation he had failed to subdue.
For many years there was a prevalent idea that the functions of armies and navies were so different and their training so divergent as to preclude their combined operation as one force. A lack of mutual understanding of the functions, powers, and limitations of the two services and a lack of acquaintance one with the other had much to do with this. The services were not trained in peace to co-operate in war, and when the need for such co-operation came, failure too often resulted.
To come to a proper basis for combined training of the Army and the Navy which would go far toward preventing a repetition of the mistakes of the past it is necessary to acquire an under standing of the necessity for and value of co-operation between every portion of the nation's military resources. As Rear Admiral H.S. Knapp so aptly states the case in his lecture on "The Co-operation of the Army and the Navy":
The Army and the Navy have the same ultimate function—to serve as the offensive and defensive arms of the Government. In one sense they are separate and distinct, but in a broader and better sense they are parts of one whole just as the arms and legs are members of one body. It will be an ideal condition when the Army and Navy act instinctively together to accomplish the same purpose, as the legs and arms instinctively obey the will. The fact is that the Army and Navy are largely interdependent and both are necessary to the government of a maritime power, each in its own sphere. When working separately that sphere is outlined with such definiteness that neither need concern itself in the doings of the other with any feelings of responsibility; but when they are co-operating neither can escape the responsibility for its own share toward the result.
Lieutenant General Von Janson, in his Strategical and Tactical Co-operation of the Army and Navy, says:
It is certainly desirable that the organs of the Army and Navy called upon to confer with each other should from the outset stand on the same ground and that they should be able to understand each other in general matters without special tactical explanation, so that it may not be necessary to define the meaning of the most common ideas and terms; that is to say, the two branches should not confront one another as though coming from different worlds, each having views and a language unintelligible to the other…The assignment of some army officers to the navy, and vice versa, is a means of fitting them for joint preparation for war and in war for joint command.
In all wars requiring operations overseas both the Army and the Navy will be called upon to do their share. As stated by Sir Cyprian Bridge in his Art of Naval Warfare:
Unless one of the two antagonists is specially circumstanced, or both are, naval campaigns by themselves are not likely to end a war or cause the complete surrender of one side. A purely naval contest may wear out one belligerent; but the process will be long, and if one side is quite worn out, the other will almost certainly have begun to feel the effects of fatigue. Consequently, as a rule naval strategy should aim at enabling a land army to give the finishing stroke.
As a basis for mutual understanding between the Army and the Navy in training for co-operation in war the statement of the case by Colonel C. E. Callwell in his Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, may be assumed:
War on land and war on the sea have this in common, while military tactics and naval tactics are constantly going through a process of evolution as the science of producing arms of destruction progresses, the broad principles of strategy ashore and afloat remain unchanged from century to century.
It remains, then, for the two services to so co-ordinate their training that the tactics of the two may be mutually so well understood as to give promise of smoothness and efficiency when the time for co-operation comes.
In his book, The Crisis of the War, Admiral Viscount Jellicoe says in support of joint training:
In the matter of organization we must be certain that adequate means are taken to insure that the different arms which may co-operate in war are trained together under peace conditions.
In the service publication, Joint Army and Navy Action for Coast Defense, it is laid down as a guiding principle for cooperation that if the main problem to be solved in any operation is an army problem the Navy must co-operate with the Army, whereas if the main problem is a naval one the Army must cooperate with the Navy; but this does not settle the important question of command.
On this subject Colonel Furse in that thorough treatise, Military Expeditions Beyond Seas, says:
In all cases of military expeditions beyond seas there are three distinct phases, viz.: the voyage, the disembarkation, and the subsequent operations. The direction of the movements of a large number of ships and of the squadron detailed to convoy them, requires the technical knowledge and experience of the admiral commanding. The second phase is a combined effort of the army and the navy, in which the general and the admiral are equally concerned; and, though in the third the former acquires the supreme direction of the operations, still he is very often dependent on the co-operation and assistance of his naval comrade.
The above are a few brief extracts from the wealth of authoritative opinion as to the great necessity of effective co-operation in combined Army and Navy operations, but the historical examples of the co-ordination in training which would make such effective co-operation possible are more difficult to find.
In the Influence of Seapower upon History Admiral Mahan first brought to the attention of the public at large the necessity of adequate naval power for the defense of a nation so situated as the United States, but he also laid stress upon the fact that such naval supremacy is not all and that there must be military power available to back up the naval power and make it effective; in other words, co-operation of Army and Navy is vital to success in great contests at arms between nations.
After the appearance of Mahan's great book the term "command of the sea" came into popular usage, but we find it loosely applied to various conditions. On the one hand it is taken to mean absolute control of the sea, the enemy ships swept from the sea beyond hope of recovery, a condition which would make the transport of an army overseas an easy task. A more limited meaning has been applied to the term to cover a condition of temporary control of an ocean or a large portion thereof by reason of the absence of the enemy fleet in distant waters or his temporary withdrawal after partial defeat for needed refit and repair.
It is hardly reasonable in a war between two fairly evenly matched naval powers to hope for the first condition, and the second condition scarcely justifies the embarkation of a large army for a long overseas voyage. If, however, one power gains such mastery on the sea by the defeat or containing of the enemy sea forces as to make reasonably certain the safety of a large transport of land forces overseas, that power may be said to have command of the sea. The term and its proper usage has a direct bearing upon all combined operations overseas of land and sea forces.
A brief review of the more or less recent historical events in which joint army and navy operations have figured, and of our past efforts at joint maneuvers for training, may serve as a background upon which to lay a picture of future requirements in various theaters where the Army and the Navy may be called upon to engage in combined action. In the lines of such a picture we may be able to trace the solution of the problem as to what processes should be followed in co-operative training in order to secure the best results.
The Philippine Islands
When the destruction of the U. S. S. Maine in the harbor of Havana early in 1898 made war with Spain inevitable, after the long series of provocative disorders in the nearby island of Cuba, a squadron of United States naval vessels was on duty in Asiatic waters, where Spain had the important possessions of the Philippine Islands and the Caroline Islands in the Western Pacific. The commander of that squadron, Commodore George Dewey, was a very efficient, active, and aggressive naval officer and when given orders to act against the Spanish naval forces in the nearby Waters, he proceeded with no delay whatever. On April 26, 1898, at Hongkong, Commodore Dewey received the cable announcing the declaration of war by the United States against Spain and the following day sailed with his squadron for Manila, where according to his latest information the Spanish squadron was stationed. Running past the fortifications at the entrance to Manila Bay during the night of April 30-May 1, dawn of May 1 showed the United States squadron off the city of Manila with the Spanish squadron in line off their naval arsenal at Cavite a few miles distant. Commodore Dewey at once steamed to the attack and a few hours later the Spanish squadron was destroyed or captured and Manila and the Spanish naval base at Cavite lay at the mercy of the guns of his ships.
The Spanish commander at Manila was ready to surrender on demand and if Admiral Dewey could have had operating with his squadron a force of land troops sufficient to occupy Manila, he would undoubtedly have demanded the surrender of Manila and occupied it at once. Foresight in planning for a contingency that should have been self-evident during the period of strained relations preceding the actual declaration of war would have made such a force available; but lacking such co-ordination in plans and training, there was no such supporting land force available to take advantage of the naval victory of Manila Bay, either already embarked in transports or mobilized on the west coast of the United States ready to embark.
This is a striking example of the lack of proper co-ordination in planning and training between the Army and the Navy, and as such is worthy of careful consideration. Admiral Dewey, in the presence of the writer some years later, said that had he had under his command with the squadron a force of two thousand Marines he would have forced the surrender of the Spanish land forces and occupied the city of Manila, and that it was his opinion that such action, had circumstances made it possible, would have cleared the way for the subsequent occupation of the adjacent country and the whole Philippine archipelago by the army expeditionary force which came later, and would have probably prevented the native insurrection which later occurred and which cost the United States so much in lives and money and time.
But such a landing force was not available to Admiral Dewey and he had perforce to wait a considerable time until the Army could be mobilized on the Pacific Coast and transported across the Pacific to invest and capture Manila and proceed to the occupation of adjacent territory. In the meantime the native malcontents had been given time to organize their forces and scatter their propaganda of revolt throughout the islands unmolested by any land force of American troops. The hopes of these active insurrectionists for immediate control of Manila and the Philippines was allowed to mount high due to these conditions, and when the belated arrival of the Army of Occupation prevented the realization of their little dream of power it took three years of hard campaigning to convince them of their mistake. All of this could have been avoided by properly coordinated plans and training in the United States prior to the war, or at least when it became evident that war was imminent.
Even after the arrival of the army expeditionary forces there was no prearranged co-ordination of the plans of the two services for necessary co-operation in land and sea operations. This resulted in delaying action while such plans could be decided and in many needless misunderstandings between naval and military commanders, all of which could have been avoided by previous combined training which would have indoctrinated the officers of both services so as to give them an understanding of the powers and limitations of their own service and of the sister service as well.
Prior to the Spanish-American War neither the Army nor the Navy had an organized plan-making agency, and as a consequence both services went into the war without any plans of action for their individual service and no idea of real co-operation between the two services. The Army had no General Staff and the Navy had nothing approaching such an organization. "Any plan is better than no plan," but at this time there was no plan.
In the Atlantic, nearer to the seat of the home government at Washington, it was no better. The hurriedly devised plans of the Army contemplated the investment and capture Havana, the most important city and port in Cuba and the seat of the Spanish government in the island, which was correct as a general decision, but however good the plans we may propose an unexpected move of the enemy may at any time dispose of our well laid plans. In a vain effort to save Cuba until hoped for aid might come in the shape of a European ally, Spain sent Admiral Cervera with all available ships to the West Indies. After the long Atlantic voyage it was necessary for Admiral Cervera to make a friendly port to refuel his ships for further operations, and of the available ports in Porto Rico and Cuba he chose the one farthest removed from the American fleet base at Key West, the harbor of Santiago de Cuba with its narrow entrance and protecting hills. Admiral Sampson arrived just too late to intercept the Spanish fleet before it gained the protection of the port and at once established a close blockade.
The narrow entrance to Santiago de Cuba was mined and commanded by the guns of the Spanish ships anchored within the harbor and mounted in shore batteries. It was impracticable to attempt a forced entrance with the American ships and a land force was requested by Admiral Sampson to assist him in taking the entrance to the harbor. In the campaign that followed the arrival of this land force there was a notable lack of co-ordination of plans and co-operation in action which was measured in delays in time, unnecessary losses on the part of the shore forces, and an undue prolongation of the war. The Navy opinion appeared to be that the Army was slow in its advance on shore toward what they considered the proper objective, the heights that commanded the entrance to the harbor, and that in making the city of Santiago the objective of the campaign the Army was failing to serve the Navy's urgent needs; the Army apparently took the view that the Navy should force the harbor entrance and destroy the Spanish fleet regardless of mines and an enforced presentation end-on of the ships one by one to the concentrated fire of the Spanish ships and shore batteries; and both of these opinions are traceable to the lack of that indoctrination which would have given each service the proper knowledge of the powers and limitations of the other service and have furnished a correct basis for efficient co-operation to the attainment of a common goal.
The centralization of power and control at Washington was another direct result of the lack of predetermined plans for the co-ordination of efforts in the field; strategy boards and war councils sitting in Washington attempted to control the movements of the ships of the Navy and the tactical dispositions of the shore forces landed in Cuba, and such long-range control of movements in the theater of operations was productive of misunderstandings and delays that would have been avoided by a comprehensive, predetermined plan based upon a careful estimate of the situation to be met. Such a plan would have pointed the way clearly to decentralization of control to the extent of giving the naval and military commanders in the zone of operations full control of their forces to carry out the plan.
A study of the errors of the Spanish-American War in both the Pacific and the Atlantic led to a demand in both services for the formation of a General Staff, In the Army the result was the establishment of a Provisional General Staff to be followed, later by Congressional enactments providing for the present Army General Staff, and in the Navy the immediate result was the organization of the General Board of the Navy under the able leadership of Admiral Dewey, to be followed a number of years later by the Congressional authority for the establishment of the Office of Naval Operations, charged with many of the duties of an Admiral Staff, or General Staff for the Navy.
The co-operation of the Army General Staff and the Office of Naval Operations through the medium of the Joint Army and Navy Board and its working coordinating agent, the Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee, has been made possible by the formation of the two original planning and operating instruments of the Army and the Navy, the General Staff and the Office of Naval Operations, and the two services are for the first time in their history ready for constructive work along the lines of co-ordination of plans and co-operation in carrying out such plans in peace and war.
This co-ordination has produced a well-defined policy as to plans and a good start has been made in constructive work on such co-ordinate plans, but as yet but little has been done toward co-operation in training the two services with a view to fitting them to carry out such plans. Each service is so fully occupied with training along the lines pertaining to the action of the individual service that there appears to be but little time to give to co-operative training, yet such training is a clearly indicated necessity; however good the plan may be, the plan alone is not enough, there must be actual maneuvers conducted by combined military and naval forces to test the details of the plans of action, to familiarize the services with the objects and aims of the plans, and to accustom the component parts of such combined forces to the nature of the teamwork required.
The Panama Canal
The project of an inter-oceanic canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by means of a trans-isthmian waterway across the narrowest portion of the western hemisphere at Panama was advanced soon after the discovery of the Pacific by Balboa, and the first survey of the isthmus with such an end in view was made as early as 1534. After long discussion of the subject a French company began the actual construction of the Panama Canal in 1882, with the great engineer de Lesseps, who had built the Suez Canal, as its guiding spirit.
The French company failed, due to climatic conditions and lack of any proper sanitation and the resultant losses by disease in the construction personnel, as well as to lack of funds and the misappropriation of the funds provided, and in 1903 the United States government undertook the construction of the canal, purchasing the rights and works of the original French company. The Panama Canal was completed and opened to traffic in August, 1914, and has been in operation since that date.
From a naval standpoint the most important question connected with the canal is as to its use as a means of transferring the fleet or portions thereof from one ocean to the other, especially in war; and from a military standpoint the most important question is the one of fortifications and mobile defense
forces which will deny the canal to the enemy and thus insure its use to our naval forces whenever the necessity arises. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty between the United States and Great Britain, ratified in 1850, provided that the canal should not be fortified, and at that time it was contemplated that the construction of the canal would be a joint enterprise of Great Britain and the United States. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, ratified in 1901, however, contemplated the construction of the canal by American enterprise alone, and, abrogating the first named treaty, granted to the United States the right to take such means as might be necessary for the military protection of the canal.
One of the great arguments advanced by the American advocates of a Panama Canal was that it would afford a ready means of transferring the forces of the Navy from one ocean to the other without the long voyage around South America and thus obviate the necessity for two separate and distinct fleets, one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. It was early recognized that to ensure this naval use of the canal in time of war it would be necessary to fortify and garrison the Canal Zone in preparation for eventual hostilities. By some the idea was advanced that this military protection for the canal should be furnished principally by the Navy, but the "Blue Water School" of naval students, who advocated a fleet that would be free to proceed to any waters to meet the enemy fleet and not be tied down to any particular locality as a coast defense force, were able to show the fallacy of the attempt to give the canal the needed military protection by ships permanently stationed at or near the entrances to the canal.
The result was that strong fixed defenses have been provided for the Panama Canal and a considerable permanent mobile force is stationed within the Canal Zone to support and protect the fixed defenses. However, the Navy still remains the "nation's first fine of defense," and as such its duty is to prevent, if possible, an enemy fleet or attacking force from a near approach to the canal.
Here, then, is a concrete example of combined action on the part of the Army and the Navy in the defense of a vital element in the military defense of the nation, where co-ordination of plans and co-operation in action of the two services is absolutely necessary to secure efficient and satisfactory results.
In addition to the forces of the Army allotted to the defense of the Panama Canal there is provided a local naval defense force consisting of submarines, patrol vessels, destroyers, and light cruisers for observation off shore.
The docking, repairing and refueling facilities of the canal are provided primarily for the use of the merchant ships using the canal, but all of these facilities are also available for the use of the vessels of the Navy in peace or war as may become necessary, and the canal is therefore capable of being used to a considerable extent as a naval base. The close connection at Panama between the activities of the Army and the Navy are such, therefore, as to require especial co-ordination between the services in both plans and training looking to the successful operation in war of this great link in the national defenses.
The Hawaiian Islands
Prior to 1893 the Hawaiian Islands constituted an independent kingdom under a native monarch, a sort of last survival of the ancient conditions under which the scattered islands and archipelagos of the vast Pacific existed as self-sufficient communities with little or no intercourse or dependence upon the rest of the world, but in that year Queen Liliuokalani was deposed by an almost bloodless revolution and the irresponsible native government was superseded by a provisional government led by the foreign element, largely American. A republic was proclaimed in 1894, and the islands were finally annexed to the United States 1898, largely as a result of the necessities strongly accentuated by the campaign of that year in the Philippines. Prior to the acquisition of the islands by the United States, students of naval strategy had realized the great importance of these islands in the control of the Pacific and they were variously referred to by the writers of that period as the "Key to the Pacific" and the "Cross-Roads of the Pacific," depending upon whether the writer viewed the subject from the standpoint of purely naval strategy or from the standpoint of commercial strategy.
Following out the line of thought thus engendered, the naval authorities advocated the establishment there of a first-class naval base as a position from which the fleet might operate in the Pacific at a distance from the homeland Pacific coast and as a stepping-stone on the route between our west coast and the proposed Panama Canal and the recently acquired territory in the Philippines. The establishment of the naval station at Pearl Harbor followed and since then constant attempts have been made by the Navy to secure appropriations of large amounts of money required to carry out the project of making this position into a first-class operating and repair base for the fleet, so far without avail except for the construction of one large dry-dock and a few repair shops and facilities.
At first it was advocated to make the defense of Pearl Harbor entirely a naval affair, but it was soon evident that the force required would be much larger than the Navy and Marine Corps could furnish without tying up a large proportion of the available naval force in the defense of one locality, thus running counter to the principle that all naval main forces should be primarily mobile forces. Therefore, the permanent land defenses of the naval base at Pearl Harbor were entrusted, quite properly, to the Army. The forces now employed for this purpose are considerable and should be materially increased if the position is to best serve its full purpose.
However, it should be borne in mind that the reason for the defense of any position in the Hawaiian Islands is entirely a naval one, its value to the United States in war being as a base for the naval forces operating in the Pacific, denying the position to the enemy being only a secondary consideration. Here, then, is a typical case of active co-operation of the Army and the Navy in a definite operation where the joint mission of the two services is clearly indicated and understood. Assuming that the planning activities of the two services have fully covered their part of the work, both as to the action contemplated on the part of the services individually and in co-operation, it remains to so co-ordinate the training of the two services in peace that they may be in readiness to properly carry out their mission in war.
In general, the defense of an island position requires the defense of the island as a whole, meeting the enemy at the points of landing, where his tactical deployment would be most difficult, his forces most liable to be thrown into confusion by the attack of the defenders, and his efforts at consolidating any position he might gain would be most difficult. There is nothing to indicate, that the island of Oahu is an exception to this general principle.
The defense of an island naval base normally presupposes active co-operation of the land defenses, fixed and mobile, and the naval forces afloat allotted to the local naval defense of the position. The two forces have the same mission and no question of command, sphere of influence, or separate plans of action should be allowed to interfere in the slightest with the fulfillment of the main mission.
To capture an island position, assuming that it has been properly fortified, garrisoned, and supplied, requires the transportation of a sufficient landing force overseas under convoy of a naval force large enough to insure protection from the enemy naval force that may attack the expedition en route, a forced landing on the island against determined opposition, the consolidation of the positions gained on the beach, and finally the investment and capture of the positions occupied by the defending forces. During these operations the naval defense forces acting in co-operation with the land defense forces of the island would operate against the transports, the ships of the convoy, and the boats used in effecting an actual landing.
In any war overseas our Army and Navy may have to act in the capacity of defenders of such island positions and also as the attackers of such positions. In the first case co-operation of all of the forces, be they of the Army or the Navy, is a requisite to success. In the second case, the attack of a fortified island position, the remarks of Colonel Furse, quoted above, are particularly applicable and clearly outline the broad principles to be followed as to command and control by the army and navy commanders of the attacking forces. But however good may be the intentions of the two commanders, many questions will naturally arise in the future, as in the past, as to the application of such broad principles to special cases and situations. Actual maneuvers of combined army and navy forces in overseas expeditions for the attack of fortified island positions, simulating the conditions of war insofar as it is humanly possible to do, would serve to bring to light many of the points of irritating contact and the solution of the problems thus presented in maneuvers would serve as a basis for plans in organization, command, and execution which would go far to smooth the way should it become necessary to carry out such operations in war.
Such combined maneuvers would give the troops engaged in the expeditionary force valuable training in all the elements of the preparation required for such an expedition, the experience of actual transportation overseas under convoy of a naval force in the face of enemy activity at sea, and training in landing against the opposition of an active enemy on a hostile coast without the use of wharves or docks; while the defending side would be afforded an opportunity to test out their theoretical plans for the defense of the position insofar as might be possible short of actual war conditions.
From such maneuvers the Navy would also gain experience in the different phases of the operation, the embarkation of the troops, the stowage of material and supplies, the protection of the convoy at sea against simulated attack by cruisers, destroyers and submarines, the landing of the expeditionary force upon a hostile shore against determined opposition, and the support of the shore operations after a landing has been effected.
The psychological factor should not be lost sight of in carrying out such maneuvers. It is a fact, frequently brought out in academic studies and war games at the military and naval colleges, that the two services lack intimate knowledge of each other; the Navy is not intimately acquainted with the powers and limitations of the Army and the converse is equally true. The intimate association resulting from several weeks spent in combined maneuvers of this nature would serve to educate and indoctrinate both services in what we may style the art of cooperation, it would give each service an opportunity to see the other service "in action," and it would tend to establish a common ground of understanding which would increase mutual acquaintance and respect and do much to smooth out the rough places that have been stumbling blocks in past campaigns.
The great cost of carrying out such maneuvers on a scale that would simulate actual war conditions with a first-class naval and military power appears as the greatest practical obstacle to the immediate prosecution of the plan above outlined, especially in this era of enforced economy and limitation of armament; but in reply to this objection it may be stated in time-worn phrase, "one cannot make omelets without breaking eggs."
Coast Defenses and the Navy
The first battleships for the "New Navy," the Maine and the Texas, whose construction was authorized by Congress in 1886, were designated as "coast defense battleships." This was in accord with the idea of a Navy for the defense of the harbors and coasts of the United States rather than for distant service on the high seas, but such a Navy would practically constitute an adjunct of the Coast Artillery defenses and would be tied to the harbors it was designed to defend.
Opposed to this idea of a purely defensive Navy for the protection and defense of designated localities was the "Blue Water School" of naval officers, who advocated a deep sea-going Navy designed with great cruising radius to search out and give battle to the enemy fleet wherever it might be found on the seven seas. They advocated "command of the sea" as the best aid a Navy could give to the defense of the homeland and insisted that a fighting fleet must be above all else a mobile force. The "Blue Water School" won in this controversy and it is now universally accepted that the Navy shall not be weakened by detachments from the fleet of main elements for the defense of harbors and special localities. The mission of the Navy is now well understood to be, "To gain command of the sea and keep it."
It is still necessary, however, to have certain classes of naval craft assigned to assist in various ways the harbor and coast defenses of the Army. Such forces, known as naval coast defense forces, consist of patrol vessels, naval aircraft, mine layers and sweepers, and coast submarines, and their part in the general scheme of coast defense is clearly laid down in the instructions for joint Army and Navy action in coast defense.
It was at the harbors where fixed defenses manned by the Coast Artillery of the Army existed, and which were frequented by the ships of the Navy, that the Army and the Navy came most in contact in peace times, and as the Navy was called upon to furnish the naval coast defense forces for such harbors it was here that the need for army and navy co-ordination in plans and training appeared to be most imperative.
Questions as to jurisdiction, command, ways and means of defense, and assignment of areas of control in connection with the coast defenses arose and were referred to the Joint Army and Navy Board from time to time after its organization in 1903, and from the consideration of these questions there resulted the establishment of defensive sea areas with rules for the Army and Navy duties pertaining thereto. These rules and regulations showed the lines along which the training of the two services should be conducted in order to secure effective co-operation in the defense of the coasts and harbors, especially of those harbors in which were located navy yards or naval stations or bases. This constitutes the first instance of co-ordination in plans of the Army and Navy in modem times.
The action of fixed defenses is limited to the range of the batteries and as a rule fixed defenses are most vulnerable to attack from the rear or landward side, and for this reason they must be supported by a mobile force to meet attack from the landward side. The purpose of fixed defenses is met if they are sufficient to force the enemy to land at a distance from them and invest them from the landward side, and to accomplish this they must be strong enough to ward off an attack by the enemy fleet. It is the mission of the Navy to meet the enemy fleet, defeat it away from our own coast, if possible, and gain command of the sea which will enable us to despatch an army expeditionary force overseas to invade the enemy territory and give the finishing stroke, as contemplated in the remarks of Sir Cyprian Bridge quoted at the beginning of this paper. But the fleet may be temporarily absent in distant waters, thus giving the enemy an opportunity to land and invest the fixed defenses of an important harbor, as has frequently happened in past campaigns. In such event the co-operation of a mobile force on shore becomes imperative. This is stated here to show the necessity, first, for cooperation between the Navy and the coast defenses; second, between the coast defenses and the mobile Army; and third, between the three forces involved in the operations.
Having these objects in view, at various times maneuvers were carried out by squadrons of the fleet and the coast defense forces to demonstrate the action to be followed in naval attacks on fortified harbors on the one hand and the best means to meet such an attack on the other hand. In 1900, at the instigation of the Naval War College, the North Atlantic Squadron made an attack upon the shore defenses of Narragansett Bay. Little resulted from these maneuvers but they were a start toward combined training of the Army and the Navy.
In 1902 combined maneuvers were held between the North Atlantic Squadron and the shore defenses of Narragansett Bay and the eastern entrance to Long Island Sound in accordance with a prearranged plan, the details of which are given in Rules for Army and Navy Maneuvers in New London and Narragansett Artillery Districts, 1902. The general idea of this maneuver was stated to be, "anticipating the declaration of hostilities, a strong enemy's fleet (without torpedo boats) determines to make a sudden dash upon Newport, or the eastern entrance to Long Island Sound, to secure a naval base, taking advantage of the absence of a declaration of war to find the land forces somewhat unprepared," and it was also stated in the rules that "the controlling idea should be to test the training of the personnel and the efficiency of the materiel."
In 1903 the rules for the maneuvers of 1902 were revised in the light of the experience gained and maneuvers were held on the Maine coast involving an attack by the North Atlantic Fleet upon the defenses of Portland. After this the rules were again revised and in 1905 joint maneuvers of the North Atlantic Fleet and the Coast Defenses at Hampton Roads were carried out, the employment of searchlights, range finders, and smoke screens being specially demonstrated. In 1913, plans were made for extensive joint maneuvers at Panama but were not carried out for lack of funds and other causes.
All of the foregoing joint maneuvers and exercises as well as some others of a lesser character involved the training of the Navy in the attack of fortified shore positions and the Army in the defense of such positions, but did not go into the wider general field of joint action of the Army and Navy. The experience obtained in these joint exercises and resultant studies of the subject have been embodied in rules for joint army and navy action in coast defense, outlining the lines of preparation and action to be followed by the forces of the two services engaged in coast defense at home and abroad and giving the limits of authority and control for the two services in the common undertaking.
It appears to be well settled that the ships of the first line of the fleet would not be used in an attack upon coast defenses, at least so long as there is an enemy fleet in being which might have to be met in the war, but this general decision does not preclude the use of special ships and second line ships for attacks of shore fortifications if special situations indicate a probable gain from such action commensurate with the risks taken. The use, however, of any class of naval vessel available to support an army landing for the investment of a fortified harbor or position would not be considered an infringement of the general rule, and for this purpose joint maneuvers of capital ships in connection with army landing forces are still desirable.
The naval vessels assigned as a part of the naval coast defense forces belong just as much to the particular harbor or position as do the fixed batteries and their garrisons and as such their training should be carried on at all times in connection with the training activities of the land forces assigned to the harbor defenses. In no other way can both services determine the lines of action to be followed in the joint action that will be imperative to insure satisfactory results under the stress of actual war. Here, as in other situations requiring joint action, indoctrination, mutual trust and respect, and the ability "to speak the same language" is the requirement and these desiderata can be met only by joint training.
The Naval Advanced Base
The mission of the Navy, as stated above, is "To gain the command of the sea by operations against the enemy fleet." To carry out this mission the fleet must first search out the enemy fleet and engage it in battle and to do this the fleet may have to go far afield from its home bases. Ships cannot keep the sea indefinitely, they can only steam so long as their fuel supply lasts and must then seek a refueling station in some conveniently located port; if far from their home bases they must either use their permanent bases near the scene of the operations or take steps to provide temporary or advanced bases in the theater of operations to refuel, revictual, and effect such minor repairs as are from time to time required to keep ships and crews in condition to fight.
Consideration of these requirements led to the plan for establishing Advanced Bases in the theater of operations whenever such action should be required due to operations of the fleet at a distance from the home bases or from permanent outlying bases. The reasons for such advanced bases, the methods by which the Navy has planned to provide them, and the means for their defense against raids by enemy cruiser forces, have been determined and form a part of naval indoctrination. These naval advanced bases will be established entirely for the use of the fleet in war and in effect they constitute a part of the fleet itself, and for this reason their defense is to be undertaken by a part of the naval forces especially trained and equipped for this duty, namely, the regularly organized Advanced Base Forces of the Marine Corps.
The mission of the Marine Corps, as a part of the active Navy, is "To support the fleet, or any part thereof, in the accomplishment of its mission," and one of the best means by which the Marine Corps can carry out this mission is in the defense of the naval advanced bases required by the fleet. This duty has been assigned to the Marine Corps as an integral part of the Navy on account of the fact that this corps possesses the flexibility of organization required for the duty, the mobility by sea gained by service in the seagoing ships Of the Navy, the special training necessary to carry out the task, and as a part of the Navy it can perform the duty without giving rise to questions of unity of command which is an absolute requirement for the successful operations of the fleet.
When the Navy has gained command of the sea by defeating or containing the enemy fleet to such an extent as to justify the despatch of an army expeditionary force overseas, the Marine Corps advanced base forces may be re-embarked for further duty with the fleet at more advanced positions, turning over the occupation of the original bases to the Army, if such occupation will be required as a part of the army lines of communication.
From time to time since the inception of the advanced base idea in 1900 regiments and brigades of Marines have engaged in combined maneuvers with the fleet to fit them for the duty above required; these exercises embracing the fitting out and embarkation of the advanced base forces in naval transports and the ships of the fleet, the voyage to some suitable locality, the landing there, and the fortification with guns and mines of the selected position. Much valuable experience has been gained by these maneuvers, the results of which should be of value to the Army in its preparation for landing operations overseas, and an elaboration of the methods employed, on a much larger scale suited to probable army conditions in large overseas operations might be worthy of consideration in connection with combined training of the Army and the Navy in preparation for such operations. The cost of fitting out and transporting overseas to some suitable locality of a large army expedition, say one or more complete divisions at war strength, would be large, but when we consider the value to the nation that would accrue from the actual experience of fitting out, transporting and landing such an expedition and in the simulated land operations with the aid of the Navy after a landing had been effected, it would appear that the expenditure would be fully warranted.
The recent experience gained by the Army -in transportation across the Atlantic during the World War has given its personnel valuable training in seagoing, but it should be remembered that this movement overseas partook of the nature of passenger transportation on a large scale from well-organized and provided embarkation ports in the United States to almost equally well fitted ports on the other side. Under other war conditions that will probably arise in future wars it may not be practicable to land an army expedition at the well-equipped docks of a suitably located port in enemy territory. Such ports will probably be denied to us by the enemy, necessitating a forced landing at some port not well provided with docks and landing machinery, or possibly at some point with no facilities at hand where men and stores will have to be landed on a beach in ships' boats against enemy opposition, under the protection of the fire of the ships' batteries. The only way to prepare for such a landing is by actual exercises which will serve to train officers and men in the required details of operation.
The British landing at Gallipoli is one which may be cited to illustrate what may be demanded in a future war, and if its fatal mistakes can be corrected by proper training maneuvers we may gain the experience which will spell success instead of the defeat which met that expedition. However complete in every detail the plans for such operations may be, plans alone are not sufficient; actual training at maneuvers carefully following out the details of the prearranged plans will serve not only to test the correctness of the details of such plans and to correct discovered defects in the plans, but will also indoctrinate the leaders on sea and land as to their individual and collective tasks and give every officer and enlisted man an illuminating personal experience in the difficulties to be encountered.
The increasing importance of aircraft in such operations, both for the attack and the defense, is the most important new development having a direct bearing on combined landing operations, and the proposed combined maneuvers would give valuable experience to the naval air forces in operating from the aircraft carriers of the fleet and to the land air forces in meeting such forms of attack.
Co-Operation in Mobilization and Preliminary Training
In the last war the Army and the Navy both created large cantonments or stations for receiving the recruits and for the preliminary examination, classification, and training of these recruits, the recruits being at first received from voluntary enlistments and later from the local boards operating under the Selective Draft Law. This resulted in considerable duplication of effort which could be avoided in future wars of large magnitude by plans for effective co-operation at this stage of national preparation for war employing the available manpower of the nation.
To anyone acquainted with the systems employed by the Army and the Navy in the first treatment of recruits and in what may be termed their elementary training, a striking similarity appears. In both services the system of segregation was the same, the men were thereafter divided into companies after the same general scheme, and it was only after the training had passed the preliminary steps that any marked differences appeared.
Such duplication of effort and its consequent additions to overhead expenses adds to the money required as well as to the number of instructional units. This being the case, it may be practicable to give all recruits for both the Army and the Navy, in time of war or great emergency precedent thereto, their preliminary training at the same cantonments, still leaving to each service the specialist training later required. If, so, the saving in time, money, and personnel would appear to justify a careful study of the possibilities. Under such a system, to secure a proper distribution of the men to the two services, officers from both the Army and the Navy should be included in the personnel of the cantonments designated for the reception and preliminary training of wartime recruits and assignments to the different services should be made with due regard to aptitude for the service and the personal preferences of the men when practicable.
Exchange of Officers
In the past the average army officer has had but little acquaintance with the doctrine, training, and life of the Navy or with its limitations and powers of action, and the converse is equally true. Circumstances of service during long periods of peace and even in war have not brought the two services much in contact. The results of this lack of acquaintance between the services have been productive of misunderstandings and disagreements in the campaigns of the past, and history abounds with examples of lack of efficient co-operation traceable to this cause; such as the lack of co-operation between the Army and the Navy on the Mississippi River during the Civil War and the misunderstandings that arose during the Santiago campaign of the Spanish-American War.
As a means of correcting to some extent this fault in the basic education of officers to fit them for command in combined operations in war, it is suggested that a system of temporary exchange in service might be devised which would give at least a few of the officers of each service an opportunity to observe the daily routine of the other service and thus to learn at first hand the powers and limitations of the elements of that service and the methods of its employment toward the common end, victory for the nation in war.
By such a system officers of the Army would be assigned to temporary duty in the active fleet and naval officers would be assigned to shore duty in the Corps Areas of the Army and with the larger tactical army units. This is already accomplished to some extent in an educational and theoretical way by the assignment of officers of the Navy and Marine Corps to the classes of the Army War College and of army officers to the classes of the Naval War College.
It is a far cry from the "roaring forties" to the "rolling prairies" of Kansas, but as Admiral Luce so aptly remarked in his outline of the first session of the Naval War College, "the military principles underlying war ashore may be applied to war on the sea." This rule, now known as the "Luce idea," was the foundation of much of the constructive work of the Naval War College, and the detail of a limited number of officers of the Navy and Marine Corps to the Army Schools at Fort Leavenworth would be in furtherance of the "Luce idea," and would give these officers a first-hand knowledge of the Army and its methods which would be of great value during combined operations and even in their application to purely naval problems.
The exchange of officers between the two services as above suggested would in time give to each service a considerable number of officers having such a first-hand knowledge of the sister service as would fit them for general staff duties in forces engaged in combined operations of training in peace and the real thing in war.
Occupational Specialists
The methods of the selective draft employed during the World War brought out the great value of a proper distribution right from the start of the so-called occupational specialists. The classification of the draft local boards showed the occupation, profession or vocation of the draftees, but owing to the shifting of population these records are of little use for the future, and it has been urged that a military census of the available manpower of the nation be taken by districts and kept up to date annually in order that they may be available for assignment to the Army or Navy, where most needed, in time of war or the imminence thereof. Such classifications are now being made to some extent, but both the Army and the Navy are engaged in the work and there must come a consequent duplication of effort with lack of efficiency in the hour of need.
It is assumed that all military students of the subject will agree that a selective draft law should be enacted before a war occurs in order that the preliminary lists and classifications may be ready on or before a declaration of war. This would save months in the mobilization, prevent the dislocation of industry incident to a voluntary system of enlistments on a large scale in the early days of a war, and make it possible to send the fleet to sea and put the armies in the field at full force shortly after D-day.
With the present prevalent ideas of our people, however, this seems too much to hope for, but by proper co-ordination of army and navy effort in this direction all available vocational specialists could be listed and classified and tentatively allotted to the service where their services would best serve national rather than purely service ends, having due regard for priority of employment of the services.
It has been proposed that the Army make lists of occupational specialists by Corps Areas and have them ready for assignment to the various arms of the service in such areas. Having only the needs of the Army in view such a plan would meet the requirements, but the Navy in its rapid enlargement from peace to wartime strength on the eve of war will require a large number of these occupational specialists, machinists, engineers, artisans, and electricians for immediate service in the active fleet and its auxiliaries, and as such they can be of immediate use in the Navy with but little strictly military training, whereas for the Army they would require a regular course of military training in addition to their occupational ability already acquired.
In war against a nation having a large active navy our own Navy must be brought to full fighting strength in less time than can be given for the same purpose in the Army and every effort must be made to place the Navy on a war footing before or on D-day. To do this the peacetime personnel must be rapidly augmented by mobilizing available reserves, re-enlisting former service men, and enlisting new recruits who may have had little previous training for naval duties. Large numbers of additional specialists in various lines will be required for immediate service and the occupational specialists to supply these requirements should be at once assigned to the Navy, where they can be of first service to the nation; the question of priority here is a national one, not a service one. Such action would conduce to the best interests of the nation in making the Navy available for service at full strength as the "first line of the nation's defense" in the shortest possible time.
In this, as in practically every feature of the procurement of personnel and material for the national service in time of war or emergency, the zeal of each service and arm of the service to fill its own requirements as soon as possible results in a competition and rivalry that does not work for efficient co-operation, economical administration, or the best and quickest mobilization of all services and arms. Under the voluntary system of enlistment this rivalry and competition is good since it stimulates the public interest, increases publicity required to arouse the enthusiasm of the multitude, and tends to bring esprit de corps to a high standard. Under the compulsory service system of mobilization these features are not so requisite and a more businesslike method can be followed, namely, the assignment of the individual element to the service and arm of the service where he can perform the best service and where his services are most required.
Co-operation in Procurement of Supplies
There is one subject vitally connected with the prosecution of successful warfare on an unlimited scale which prior to the World War had received but little consideration as regards the effect upon it of efficient co-operation of the Army and the Navy; this is the procurement of all classes of munitions, supplies, and provisions required to fulfill the mission of the nation in war.
In all previous wars the two services had each operated its own agencies for the procurement of supplies, co-operation being almost entirely lacking. This frequently resulted in duplication of effort, increased cost, oversupply in each service of some articles at the expense of a shortage in such articles for the other service, and in general a marked increase in the total expenditure under that indefinite but immense item customarily termed "overhead expense."
Where two grand departments of government operated independently with no deciding power short of the President acting as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the nation, it was frequently impracticable or impossible to refer questions of this nature to the President as they arose in the haste and waste of wartime procurement on a large scale engendered too often by an utter lack of foresight in times of peace. Whether or not the proposed scheme of uniting the War Department and the Navy Department under one government department of National Defense will be a cure-all for the difficulties that have arisen in the past remains to be seen; but it is a fact that very early in course of the preparation for our part in the late world-wide conflict it became evident that the procurement of those classes of supplies which would be required by both services must be made a national and not a service affair. There resulted the establishment of numerous wartime agencies for the general procurement and allotment of such munitions and basic materials according to priority tables worked out under the stress of actual necessity.
It appears to be evident that much time and money and labor could have been saved by a united effort prior to our entry into the war, and in this fact lies the guide for future action. That this guiding principle has not been followed since the close of the war will scarcely be questioned. There are still cases of the two services practically entering in competition into the commercial field to obtain necessary supplies, with the consequent duplication of effort and increase in cost.
To avoid this it is suggested that a plan for co-operation of the Army and the Navy in the procurement of all basic supplies and materials would obviate the difficulties to a great extent and would also afford excellent training in peace for the course of action that would of necessity have to be followed in war upon an unlimited scale. As appropriations become less without a corresponding lessening of actual requirements if we are to keep up a state of preparedness the necessity for economy becomes greater, and the stress laid upon the utmost economy in many recent general orders of all of the, services only accentuates the need of the co-ordination of effort here advocated.
Conclusions
In the past there has been but little co-ordination in plans and co-operation in training involving the joint action of the Army and the Navy in tasks where both have important parts to play, each within its own sphere. In recent years the machinery for co-ordination of general and special plans has been provided, consisting of the General Staff for the Army and the Office of Naval Operations for the Navy, with the Army and Navy Joint Board as the duly constituted coordinating agency where the points of contact may be discussed and the mooted questions decided for the common good.
Assuming that these agencies will succeed in the field allotted to them the further action indicated is combined training in actual maneuvers simulating the problems that would arise in war. Such maneuvers should consist of the three steps in such operations; namely, the embarkation of an army force in transports, the voyage overseas under convoy of the Navy, and the landing on a hostile coast against strong opposition using the facilities carried with the expedition and not depending upon elaborate harbor facilities.
The deficiencies in personnel, material, and individual service training disclosed by such joint maneuvers and exercises should be used as a basis for studies of means to eliminate the deficiencies, the results of such studies being used as guides to the changes required in routine training, design of material, and methods of planning.
Co-operation in peace time in the procurement of basic materials and supplies for the Army and the Navy would result in proper training in this respect to meet the emergencies of war.
Co-operation in plans for the assignment of recruits to the two grand branches of the national defense on a basis of aptitude for the service and for the preliminary training of all recruits obtained from the operation of a selective draft law would result in a saving in time and money, the former being the most important in war and the latter being a continuing factor when the bills have to be paid after the war has been won.
Assignment of a few officers of the Army to duty in the active fleet and of a like number of officers of the naval service to duty with the larger tactical units of the Army would tend toward acquaintance and mutual respect which would come from the knowledge gained as to the limitations and powers of the sister service.
Assignment annually of a larger number of officers of each service to the classes at the War College of the sister service would also serve to increase the acquaintance and mutual knowledge which will enable the two services to speak the same language, enlarge their mental horizon beyond the confines of their own service, and get a first-hand view of the psychology of the other service.
In order to secure local co-operation in training in those areas where forces of the Army and those of the Navy are engaged in a common mission of defense or offense, local joint committees should be organized to aid the Army and Navy commanders at such stations in coordinating the plans and training of their forces in such manner as will, under the conditions locally imposed, lead to a common indoctrination of the forces and produce definite results for good in war.
Centralization in planning is desirable to secure uniformity in indoctrination and a general scheme of procurement for manpower and material, but plans for local combined action can frequently be best worked out right at the scene of future action; this applies especially to permanent positions where the defense is composed of land forces and also of naval defense forces permanently assigned and not a. part of the high sea fleet.
In training, however, decentralization is desirable in order to give the commanders in the field or on the sea the opportunity to conduct the training maneuvers of their forces, whether conducted independently by the particular service or in combination with the other service. The results of such training may then be available for use in confirming or revising the centrally devised plans for future training and for actual wartime operations.