AMERICAN AND BRITISH DESTROYERS
By Lieut. T. E. Chandler, U. S. Navy
Since such a wide variety of types of light craft were used so extensively during the World War, it will be well for us, in preparing for the future, to give very careful attention to the design of our smaller vessels, particularly destroyers. Torpedo boats, destroyers, and flotilla leaders were employed by the British in many varied activities; against capital ships in both day and night attacks, as scouts and patrols, as fast mine-layers, for convoying, and for all forms of anti-submarine work. In the case of our destroyers, however, no such wide application was found, for they were employed exclusively in anti-submarine work either as patrols or escort vessels. No American destroyer had an opportunity to fire either guns or torpedoes at any other target than a rapidly disappearing submarine and even these opportunities were most infrequent. The highly specialized service rendered by our destroyers must not be allowed to blind us to the true function of the type in a more general naval campaign. It is accordingly advisable for us to observe what types of destroyers are being built by other navies. We should be especially interested in the types developed by the British as they had the greatest experience in the use of destroyers and are the originators of the flotilla leader. A comparison of the newest British destroyers with our own discloses some very interesting points of difference and shows certain features that we may do well to imitate.
The first feature to consider in any vessel is her seaworthiness. In this respect it may be said of all our newest destroyers, for their hull design is identical, that their seagoing qualities are, under most conditions, quite good. The roll, though deep, is slow, which is beneficial for gunnery. However, for bucking even a moderate head sea at speeds of twenty knots or above, they cannot be said to be very satisfactory.
British destroyers of all sizes are also practically of one type as regards hull form but this form is radically different from that of our boats. The outstanding feature is the wide flaring bow, called a "Trawler Bow" by Jane. They also have rounded sterns and are more heavily built throughout than our boats. The design is said to have been adopted at the insistence of the commander-in-chief of the grand fleet for a destroyer that could make twenty-five knots in any weather in which a battleship could steam full power and still use her guns. The type was standardized only after considerable experiment and after several unsatisfactory types had been tried and rejected. Under these circumstances there seems every reason to believe that all British destroyers are highly satisfactory as regards their seagoing qualities.
Seaworthiness is a quality in which it is difficult to make a definite comparison. Furthermore, the writer knows of no one having seagoing experience in both types who could be considered an authority as to their relative merits. Although one can judge only by appearances, the British boats undoubtedly appear to be much the more seaworthy. Certainly in a head sea, at least, they would fare far better than our own.
The next feature to be considered is speed. Our destroyers all have a contract speed of thirty-five knots. Some of the earlier boats cannot make their contract speed but most of the new ones make it with ease and some boats have even made runs as high as thirty-eight knots for short periods. The latest British flotilla leaders, a type not possessed by the United States, but one which merits our careful consideration, have a speed of thirty-six and a half knots, while the destroyers have speeds ranging from thirty-two to thirty-four knots. From Jane we may draw the general conclusion that on the whole the speed of our destroyers is superior to that of the British, but by only a small margin.
It is in the question of the armament that the most radical differences may be found. All American destroyers are practically of one type as regards armament, there being a few minor differences in arrangement but nothing really vital. There are four 4" guns located as follows: one on the forecastle, well forward of the bridge; one on each side of the galley deck house, located near the deck edge; and one aft, either on top of the after deck house or on the fan tail. The guns forward and aft are on the centerline but those on the galley deck house are only available on one broadside. The galley guns possess three advantages, namely: they have a good platform for the loading crew on most bearings, they are dry for use in nearly all weather, and they have the questionable advantage of extreme depression which might be of use in firing at a submarine close aboard. The disadvantages of this arrangement are that they cannot be fired forward of ten degrees on the bow because of the proximity of the bridge and that at least one gun is restricted in its fire aft by a nearby boat. Also the guns in the extreme forward and aft positions would be very difficult to serve. We see then that this arrangement gives no bow and stern fire and that a single gun mounted on the centerline at this point would possess almost as great an arc of train as the two at present installed. A few of our latest boats have 5'' guns in place of the 4'' but the arrangement is the same.
Anti-aircraft guns in the past have been of two different types and have been located in various places. It is understood, however, that it is intended that all boats will ultimately have one 3" twenty-three caliber gun located on the fan tail.
All our destroyers carry twelve torpedoes which are mounted in four triple tubes, two on each side.
The British have twenty-two flotilla leaders of slightly varying types, of which the Douglas class represent the very acme of super-destroyer construction, with five 4.7'' guns, one 3" long caliber sky gun, and six torpedoes in two triple tubes, all on the centerline. The first class of destroyers consists of two "Thornycroft Improved W" and fourteen "Admiralty Modified W" classes. These ships have four 4.7'' guns on the centerline, two anti-aircraft one-pounders, called pom-poms, and six torpedoes in two centerline triple tubes. The next is the "S" class of sixty-one boats, five "Thornycroft," six "Yarrow," and fifty "Admiralty." These boats all have three 4'' high angle (30° elevation) guns on the centerline and four torpedoes in double centerline tubes. The last considered in this article consists of nineteen "Admiralty W," two "Thornycroft W," and twenty "Admiralty V" boats. These have four 4" guns and a long caliber 3" sky gun on the centerline and six torpedoes in two triple centerline tubes.
The characteristics of the different types considered indicate plainly that in, torpedo power our ships are unquestionably superior and it is believed that our doubling the number of tubes instead of having half as many on the centerline is correct. Tubes mounted outboard have a greater arc of train than centerline tubes due to the fact that the falling torpedo must clear the deck edge on leaving the tube and that the impulse charge does not carry it far. This practically restricts the fire of centerline tubes to beam shots. One British officer admitted that their centerline triple tubes could not be fired more than ten degrees forward or abaft the beam. Moreover, should it be desired to fire all twelve torpedoes in one attack it is believed that in most cases there would be an opportunity to turn and deliver the other broadside. Thus our non-centerline arrangement of tubes is considered to be fully justified.
It is equally plain that the British destroyers have a very material superiority in gun power and that our deficiency in this respect is not due to the fewer guns carried but the failure to adopt a centerline arrangement. Only one class of British boats, the "S" type, of which no more are being built, have only three 4'' guns on a broadside as is the case in our boats. The next class have four 4" on a broadside and that gives a 4 to 3 superiority over our boats. The newest class have four 4.7" guns on the centerline, and thus the 4 to 3 superiority ratio is obviously much increased. When we come to the flotilla leaders with five 4.7'' guns on the centerline as opposed to three 4'' on a broadside any comparison is futile. The fact that two of our boats, the Hovey and the Long, have 4" double guns and that a few of the newest boats have 5" fifty-one caliber guns in place of 4'' does not controvert the general statement of British superiority. Even with 5" guns a broadside of three 5'' guns is inferior to four 4.7" and certainly much inferior to the flotilla leaders with five 4.7'' guns. Also the installation of the heavier guns does not correct the error in principle caused by the failure to mount all guns on the centerline; the boats remain correspondingly weak in gun power relative to what they could have been with the guns properly located. Another factor which increases the British preponderance of gun power is the fact that their 3" anti-aircraft gun is mounted on the centerline, is at least a forty caliber, and could be used as a very effective part of the main battery. Our 3'' anti-aircraft gun is but twenty-three caliber and would be of little use except at very short ranges, though it is no doubt excellent in other respects.
A summation of the above material shows that the British destroyers are probably more seaworthy. Our boats should be more heavily built forward, especially at the bridge and chart house, and the "Trawler Bow" should be adopted.
In speed the American destroyers are superior and no changes in engineering installations seem appropriate.
Likewise our boats greatly excel in torpedo power and the present arrangement of tubes is satisfactory and should be retained. The question of obtaining the greatest gun power for a given weight of battery, however, merits careful consideration. The British destroyers can deliver a far heavier broadside than ours due solely to the centerline arrangement. The lessons of the war have brought out even more strongly the already well-known fact that gun power is a vital factor in destroyer design. There were many more gun engagements between destroyers and various other light craft than there were opportunities for firing torpedoes. In the day attacks at Jutland it was shown that destroyers have little hope of reaching a position where a successful torpedo attack can be launched against capital ships, unless the destroyers have sufficient gun power to beat off the enemy boats that are sure to be sent out as a counter measure. The British destroyers' preponderance in gun power was an important factor in the many engagements between scout forces and always gave them a great advantage.
The object of this article is not to show that the British destroyers as a whole are superior to ours but to call attention to certain features in design. The fact that our destroyers are inferior in gun power to the British is not so serious as our persistence in adhering to an incorrect type. The unfortunate part of the whole question is that, whereas the British have adopted an excellent arrangement for their battery and are building boats of that type only we have chosen a less efficient arrangement, have standardized it, and seem inclined to continue to build boats of that kind indefinitely. The location of the waist guns off the centerline, and the standardizing of that type of destroyer so that approximately 300 have been built seems to have been a serious error. Why this occasion was taken to depart from the centerline arrangement of guns, one that was at last arrived at after all navies had spent millions in the construction of relatively inferior ships, is hard to understand.
The proper measures to be taken in the attempt to redeem this error in the location of the battery are briefly as follows: first, the present design should be abandoned at once and any ship not already completed should have her battery relocated. Secondly, a rational centerline arrangement of guns should be adopted for all new construction and unless something better is devised, the British design should be copied. Thirdly, if practicable we should combine our stacks as the British do and have only two instead of four. If this is not desirable we should at least combine them to have only three as in the "Conner-Stockton" type. We could readily build destroyers with two guns forward of the bridge, by using the British super-posed arrangement, one on the galley deck house, a 3'' long caliber sky gun on a platform abaft the after stack (artificial ventilation being installed for the engine rooms if necessary), one on the after deck house, and one on the fan tail. This would give us five guns on a broadside, all 5'' if practicable. The best of the boats already built should be altered as opportunity offered and funds became available. These ships could readily be redesigned to have a broadside of four guns by removing the galley deck house guns and mounting one gun amidships at that point, putting the sky gun on a platform just abaft the galley, and locating an extra gun, on the fan tail or the after deck house. Although it is noted it may be difficult to design the sky gun platform so that the supports will not interfere with torpedo tubes, by careful spacing, and, if necessary, by the use of forced ventilation in the engine rooms, it will be possible to install it.
Emphatically we should not build any more destroyers of the present type. Homogeneity is a valuable quality for the units of a force, but we must not sacrifice all progressive ideas to attain this end. With the modifications suggested in the hull and gun arrangement, our future destroyers can be placed in the same class with our other new construction in being the best and most advanced in the world.