PROFESSIONAL NOTES
Prepared by Lieut. Commander H.W. Underwood, U. S. Navy
FRANCE
French Navy Notes.—Since maritime expansion is par excellence the outward expression of the political and economic vitality of nations, naval interest attaches to the rapidity with which France is recuperating from the devastation and ruin inflicted without raison militaire by the hand of the infamous Hun. Practically the whole devastated area (3,200,000 hectares) has been cleared of projectiles, and half of it has already been tilled. Of the 5000 kilometres of railroads that had been destroyed, 4000 have been reconstructed, as well as 3500 tunnels and bridges, whilst out of the 11,500 factories and mills that have been systematically destroyed or plundered, nearly 7000 have been reconstructed or placed anew in working order, which means a gigantic task that it will, of course, take years to fully complete, as all combatants know, though the Boche has failed in his object to permanently cripple that land of miracles Old Gaul.
The sporting fever has taken hold of the Navy which, as decided by the progressive Minister of Marines, is to take a prominent part in the London and Antwerp athletic competitions and to welcome any challenge from our British friends on the sporting field, for which preparations are being made at Cherbourg and Toulon. Matburin is shortly to show what he can do in the Paris Regatta. Thus a promising new era is opening for French crews that can but improve in all-round quality.
A noteworthy feature of the protracted and eventful world-conflict was the long series of changes that took place in the command of the belligerent armies and fleets. Both the British Army and Fleet changed their heads twice, whereas three successive commanders have been in charge of both the French Army and Navy, Lapeyrere, Dufournet, and Gauchet in turn acting as Admiralissimos. As in the case of Marshal Joffre and of Gen. Nivelle, political intrigue rather than actual failure in their command caused the removal from active duties of the French naval chiefs. The case of Adml. Dartige du Fournet is the most amazing, and, courts-martial being now very fashionable, it may become shortly the object of a Conseil de Guerre. This distinguished flag officer was, it will be remembered, in charge of the French battle fleet at Athens in December, 1916, when a party of French officers and sailors were treacherously attacked and murdered by orders of ex-King Constantino. He was relieved of his command by Minister Lacaze " for not having upheld with sufficient vigor tho prestige of the Tricolor and avenged the foul murder of his seamen." The battleship Mirabeau had then fired a few well-aimed 12- and 94-inch shells on the Royal Palace, just the number sufficient to bring the traitorous Tino to his senses and to obtain the surrender of Greek artillery. The French Commander-in-Chief had the means of reducing Athens to ashes. Under similar circumstances a Boche admiral would not have hesitated a minute. But the chivalrous admiral, who had previously shown his decision in several instances and notably as second of Capt. Bory at the attack of Bangcock (1893), has nothing Boche in him, and for the sake of Old Greece and of civilization he refrained from bombarding and destroying wholesale some of the finest art treasures of antiquity, not wanting besides to visit on many thousand innocent people the crime of a few rascals. It is certain that France's position in the Levant is all the better to-day for the generous course adopted by Mons. Dartige du Fournet. Baby-killing, moreover, is not in the French line. Still, since the scandalous impunity enjoyed by Boche war criminals, there are not a few military and naval experts on this side who think that "next time" it would be an absurdity and weakness for France to try and "humanize war" and to refrain from "hitting first, hard and long on these magnificent targets which large Boche cities and industrial centers offer to aerial bombardiers and to super-cannon. Safety lies along that course.
There have been of late a large increase in the number of 700-850-ton avisos, commissioned for auxiliary duties with the fleet and on colonial stations, where these gunboats form the French counterpart to the fine ultra-rapid British cruisers of the "C" and "D" classes, and there is less and less tendency on the part of our naval men to boast of these war acquisitions, that are both in their hulls and motors patched up, badly designed affairs, little more than make-believe from a military standpoint and laughed at by every experienced constructor. The lines are faulty, the nautical qualities deficient, and the silhouette ridiculous, resembling neither a bona-fide cargo boat nor a warship. "C'est l'oeuvre d'apprentisingenieurs," declared an old naval man, and a similar observation is being freely applied to the 1400-ton cargo boats of the terrier type, also designed by good-intentioned gentlemen of La Section Technique, and which, despite satisfactory paper qualities, have turned out to be somewhat lacking in structural robustness and nautical qualities, so much so that there is no undue haste to sail in them. This shows that personal acquaintance with sea conditions is no less necessary than scientific attainments for the efficient designing of sea craft. The truth is that our "ingenieurs du Genie Maritime," who are over 150 in number, possess superior capabilities so far as theoretical paper work is concerned, their mathematical training absorbing much more time and attention than is the case in any other navy, but, on the other hand, their practical and business training leaves much to be desired, and it has long been felt that the whole branch is in need of a thorough reorganization on new lines. There is something to be learnt in this respect from the British and American navies. Already a "mission" of "ingenieurs d'artillerie navale" under General Charbonnier has been sent to visit American gun factories, and it is probable that Paris constructors, who have given up warship designing for the last five years, will likewise seek information in those Allied yards reputed to lead in the matter of rapid and up-to-date construction.
The examination of recuperated Boche and Austrian scouts, though it has been no revelation to Paris experts, had led to minor changes in the projected eclaireurs, but the opinion is gaining ground that the whole cruiser program falls short of France's requirements, and no wonder. England and America can afford to excel both in the matter of number and quality, whereas our Republic, financially unable to compete with her great allies, has to be satisfied with superior quality, this being a sine-qua-non condition of the efficient peace role and war utilization of warships. Now, superiority means a two-fold advance over all contemporary designs for both speed and calibre, and notably the faculty of escaping from the deadly reach of all rivals with heavier armament. It is because it did not meet those requirements that the fine German cruiser force, that would have done wonders against France, proved of so little avail against the superiorly designed British ocean greyhounds. This means that the 5.5-inch calibre, however improved, is no longer adequate, the latest American and English light cruisers mounting 7.5- and 8-inch weapons; and as to the speed of 30 knots, it is ridiculously out of date in these times of 33- and 35-knot battlecruisers and scouts. Such are the facts. Sea power is getting more and more expensive, and the longer the delay the heavier the outlay will become. Eloquence and literature are no remedy, unfortunately, for our peaceful Republic resembles in one respect the Seigneur Harpagon, the hero of Moliere who wanted "beaucoup de bonne cuisine avec peu d'argent." Over 500,000,000 francs will be squandered this year in the upkeep of a huge army of useless parasites and anarchistic proletaires des arsenaux, whilst the utmost parsimony presides over the measuring of the credits devoted to the forging of the weapons of the national defence. Still, it is felt action will have to be resorted to, and the curtailing of useless expenditure, that is proceeding steadily, will in a few months hence permit an effort to be made with a view to retrieving the situation in the Mediterranean, where our Italian friends are claiming supremacy. The super-Dreadnought Caracciolo, which was launched last month, is not likely to be completed without France adopting a similar step concerning the Flandre, Gascogne, and Normandic, that have not been officially discarded and could be ready, with minor ameliorations in their design, by the end of next year. The bulk of naval opinion is now in favor of the completion of these powerful super-dreadnoughts, that would procure France security and prestige in the Middle Sea. There are signs of a reaction in favor of the much-abused mastodon. Superior power is not attainable without superior size. In the present state of the naval science, and since the submarine and aerial menaces have been squarely faced and guarded against, David cannot be said to stand much chance against Goliath.—The Naval and Military Record, June 9, 1920.
Future of Naval Aviation.—Should Minister Landry succeed in discarding the battleship programme and in doing away for a time with the mastodons "qui n'ont rien fait pendant la guerre," he will go counter to the desire of the bulk of naval men and deal a damaging blow to the naval prestige of the Republic, since there is no questioning the capital value of the mastodon to show the flag in peace time and to assert the command of the high sea. On the other hand, nobody can deny his work-power and his patriotic intentions to make up for the temporary weakening of the armored squadrons by an energetic expansion of the fleet along the lines of la jeune ecole. Even if financial considerations and his limited tenure of office should combine to prevent his securing for France that speed supremacy which Admiral Aube's powerful imagination pictured as the primary factor of success on the water and as the most vital asset for Powers financially and numerically outmatched (a somewhat contradictory ensemble of requirements), the capital service he will have rendered to naval aviation will ever be a feather in his cap and cause his Ministry to be favorably remembered. For he is the first Minister of Marine to have entered Rue Royale with the set determination of making the Gallic Navy supreme in the aerial branch, and with the clear knowledge that an ambitious programme of that sort demands to be realized something more than that unexcelled verbal activity which is the glory of our Republic, viz., persevering will and a firm hand that will brush aside mercilessly those good-intentioned, but obsolete, officials whose narrow minds, cramped up with the beliefs of the dead past and with conventional doctrines, leave no room for new ideas and for the study of the rapidly-changing aspects of the war game, who too long have found delight in thwarting the efforts of the far-seeing pioneers of naval aviation and in sacrificing the interests of their country to their senile prejudice.
The official contention is that aviation is the line of naval activity in which the greatest results can be obtained in the shortest time with the least expenditure, although the creation of a really efficient aerial wing is not so easy a job as might appear at first sight to judge from the fact that "l'aviation navale Francaise," that was the first in the field, is yet in its infancy so far as the materiel is concerned and is under the obligation of defending its precarious existence against the ill-will and jealousy of the older branches of the services. Moreover, naval aviation is expected, with time, to command effectively narrow passages and those inland seas, such as the Mediterranean, which are studded with islands strategically suited for the role of offensive aerial bases. Secondly, France is deemed to be in a privileged geographical situation so far as the effective utilization of maritime aviation is concerned, only being excelled by Great Britain in that respect.
At the same time, it is clearly seen, on the morrow of the fiasco of the cross-Mediterranean flight, that a methodical and persevering effort has to be made before aviation can be considered as a thoroughly seaworthy weapon to be relied upon in all weathers. And the first condition necessary to success in this direction is to ascertain the causes of past failure and speedily remove them. If financial and industrial means of action, together with inventive genius and genuine enthusiasm on the part of young officers, had been the only things that were needed to create a powerful air wing, the 1911 Daveluy aerial programme, comprising scouts as well as fire control and bombardment hydravions, would have been ready at the time of the Boche aggression, and the whole course of hostilities might have been changed: the Gocben would not have bombarded French ports with impunity, Cattaro and Pola would have been promptly made untenable to the Austrian Fleet, and the underwater mosquito would have lost much of its sting. Unfortunately, as noted by Adml. Daveluy, "vouloir" was sadly wanting; that is, a well-defined and stable policy and unflinching will in the realization of the same, desiderata hardly compatible with the continual change of improvised Ministers (seven since 1914) and the consequent rise to (he top of the naval hierarchy of gentlemen generally more eminent by their talent for intrigue and verbal attainments than by their solid practical qualities. A comparison between the parallel developments of French and English aviation speaks for itself. So far back as 1910 Admiral de l’apeyrere publicly confessed his enthusiastic belief in the naval possibilities of aviation, and the best brains of the service then tackled in earnest the study of the new problems, only to find out their powerlessness to achieve anything against the systematic inertia of the Admiralty bureau intent on demonstrating that seaplanes were "de fragiles jouets," and aviators mere lunatics, and delighted at the opportunity the outbreak of war offered them to suppress, once for all. that despised "service aeronautique." The seaplane mother ship Foudre was turned to other duties, and the few machines (14) and pilots then available lent to the army and to the English Navy. After the broadminded and enterprising British maritime authorities had demonstrated at Cuxhaven and in the Dardanelles the scouting and offensive worth of flying machines, official attention was reluctantly turned to avions that had increased to 1100 by 1918, whilst over 60 aerial stations had been created along French coasts, but even then the French aviation maritime remained a purely defensive force in contrast with the larger and offensively-organized British seaplane fleet. On the morrow the war, Admiral Ronarch, the hero of Dixmude, who had got personally acquainted at Dunkirk with the possibilities of aerial bombardment, availed himself, with his ephemeral and mostly nominal powers as chef d'etat-major general, to place in hand an imposing aviation programme, comprising powerful machines of 500horsepower and more designed for 12 hours' continuous flying and intended to eventually assure to France the aerial command of the Middle Sea. Instability, ill-will, and anarchy at the head, and consequent neglect on the part of red-tape officials have caused most of the avions he ordered to rot unused in harbor. Of the 60 seaplanes that were, in August last, to fly over the Mediterranean and back, hardly half a dozen have come up to expectations.
At the same time, a brighter outlook is opening for aviation under the present Ministry. While our naval aviators do not as yet receive the counterpart of the advantages and encouragements enjoyed by their British colleagues, they are no longer being systematically put down and overlooked at promotion time. Com. Lefranc, one of the best-known service airmen, has just been raised to the superior rank, and a similar reward awaits the several officers who have of late distinguished themselves by their flying exploits. The flying sport is being encouraged in the ports militaires, and also in the battle force by Admiral Charlier, who has just taken the effective command of the Mediterranean aerial force, and has announced his intention to test to the utmost the actual scouting and offensive capabilities of seaplanes, as well as of the few A. T. dirigibles placed at his disposal. Henceforth there are to be no fleet maneuvers without avions being at work overhead in their various roles. Similar experiments on a perhaps larger scale are to take place in the Italian Navy, which is just now under the guidance of jeune ecole converts; tendencies which apparently justify the forecast of experienced naval men that a few years hence the mastodons will be definitely ousted from the Mediterranean and seek refuge in the vast and well-sheltered Atlantic roadstead of Brest. There are signs that time is working for aviation in gradually relegating to oblivion those retrograde bureaucratic officers responsible for the slow and unsatisfactory progress of the aerial branch, and in replacing them by new men imbued with new principles and alive to the capital fact that the art of war is not for a moment at a standstill, but perpetually modified by some novel innovation, and that true efficiency is made up of constant research and watchfulness and of quick decision.
The problem of the light, handy, and transportable fleet seaplane has been solved by our naval aviators. Swift Spads and Nieuports make the best "hydravions de chasse" in existence. With the co-operation of private industry, aerial dreadnoughts of over 40 meters span and 2500horsepower will be added to the Landry programme for six scouts, 12 super-destroyers, and 12 super-submersibles of cruiser speed.—The Naval and Military Record, June 23, 1920.
GERMANY
A Future on the Water.—Recent events in Germany have given no encouragement to the pious hopes of a naval renascence expressed by Tirpitz, Scheer, and other distinguished members of the former "Kaiserliche Marine." Admiral Hollweg, writing in one of the Hamburg journals, paints a gloomy picture of the future of German sea power. Herr Noske, the late Minister of Defence, made intelligent and purposeful endeavor to save from the ruins of the old navy the best of its experience and traditions, in order to apply them to the building up of a small but efficient fleet, but according to Admiral Hollweg the effort has been a failure. For the past year a number of the best officers have been giving loyal and devoted service to this end, but without the least success. "Discipline and obedience were indispensable elements in this work of reconstruction, but both have been wanting. Thanks to the demoralizing influence of the seamen's federations, the personnel failed at the first test. The entirely correct attitude of the Commander-in-Chief at Wilhelmshaven availed nothing; the men's confidence in their officers was undermined by agitation, and the Kapp 'Putsch' brought matters to a head." It is a pity that the admiral is not more explicit on this point. What he says suggests that the sailors feared that they might be made the tools of a Monarchist coup, and promptly took measures to avert any such danger. Be this as it may, Admiral Hollweg regards as quite hopeless any further attempt to create a new navy out of the existing material, and he asserts that an overwhelming majority of the officers are resolved to have nothing more to do with a pseudo-navy run on, trade union lines and administered by Soviets." Here and there, he admits, an officer may be found willing, for opportunist reasons, to subordinate himself to the Soviets; but "such officers will not be of the best type; they will simply be mercenaries and parasites." The Soviets insist that all executive positions shall be filled by warrant and petty officers, a scheme which the admiral denounces as Utopian. "Should it materialize, there will be constant friction, for every seaman will want to be an officer."
Since both Kiel and Wilhelmshaven are hot-beds of revolution. Admiral Hollweg proposes that they be abandoned as naval bases and that the navy, as it now exists, be entirely disbanded. "It is a grave and difficult decision, but there is no alternative. It means more than the temporary renunciation even of a small navy; it seals Germany's fate as a nation cut off from any share in sea power, either military or economic. England's victory is absolute. It seems the special fate of navies to disappear amidst revolutionary upheavals. England alone, with her instinct for the sea, has known how to avoid such a disaster in these troubled times."
There is, he considers, only one way of preserving for Germany a modest share of sea power: an entirely new fleet of small dimensions must be built at a new base, such as Pillau, Swinemunde, or Stralsund, where its personnel would be far removed from the revolutionary atmosphere prevailing at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. In the new navy politics would be entirely barred and the Soviet influence excluded; discipline, obedience, and loyalty to the Constitution would be the ruling principles. To ensure the success of the plan it would be necessary to appoint some distinguished officer to the head of affairs, and Admiral Scheer is suggested as the best candidate. It remains to be seen whether Admiral Hollweg's scheme will find any substantial support. From all accounts the nation at large has lost interest in the sea and everything pertaining thereto, and is determined to apply what energy and resources it still commands to the re-establishment of national industry and trade. Consequently, unless some wholly unforeseen development occurs, there is little prospect of a new German fleet coming into existence within the next few years.
In common with Tirpitz and Scheer, Admiral Hollweg appears to throw the entire blame for the old navy's collapse on to the shoulders of lower-deck "politicians" and "sea lawyers." But in justice to the German seamen it must be remembered that they were only following the example set by many of their officers, from Grand Admiral von Tirpitz downward. Politics seemed, in fact, to be the sole hobby of 90 per cent of these officers. They took a prominent part in the Press agitation which contributed so much to the embitterment of Anglo-German relations; they ardently supported those political factions which were working for war, and the Admiralty Press Bureau continued for years to issue a steady stream of violently partisan literature. Nor can naval officers disclaim responsibility for the class hatred from the effects of which they are now suffering. It was often said in pre-war days that the wardroom of a German warship was more exclusive than the Court of Austria. The engineer officers were treated as social inferiors with whom it was derogatory to associate except in purely service affairs. Few executive officers displayed the least sympathy with or understanding of the lower deck, and we know from subsequent revelations that this ultra-aristocratic exclusiveness continued right through the war. In the manifesto published by the revolutionaries at Kiel the officers were charged with having lived like fighting-cocks while their men were on half-rations, and Captain Persius is not the only witness who corroborates that charge.
Labor troubles and shortage of material, but especially the former, are still imposing a heavy handicap on the German shipbuilding industry. There have been three lock-outs at the Schichau yards in Danzig and Elbing during the last eighteen months, and, although work is now in progress there, the firm still complains of its inability to fulfill contracts owing to the low rate of production. After months of bickering with its many thousand employees, the big Blohm and Voss concern at Hamburg has closed down, and is threatening to make the lock-out permanent unless the workmen promptly come to terms. Meanwhile the papers bemoan the ruin that threatens German industry if the Allies persist with their demand for the surrender of tonnage. They declare that the 300,000 gross tons of shipping still remaining in Germany will not suffice even for the carriage of the iron ore which is urgently needed; that East Prussia, now cut off from the Fatherland by the "Danzig corridor," requires large quantities of war material and foodstuffs which can only be carried by sea, and not a single ship is available for the purpose. "Notwithstanding these facts," says 'Schiffbau,' "the Entente demands the handing over, under the peace terms, of half the total number of vessels between 1,000 and 1600 tons gross, a demand that is incomprehensible considering that the Entente at the same time insists on the reconstruction of the devastated territory in Belgium and France, besides the fulfillment of all other conditions of reparation. Instead of making it possible for Germany to furnish her industry with raw materials and her population with food and work by allowing her to keep these ships, the Entente is adopting the contrary course, and thus putting it out of her power to fulfill her various obligations." One of the largest ironworks in north Germany has issued the following statement: "The confiscation of our remaining ships will probably compel us to close down, since they are now the only means we have of importing raw material. Foreign tonnage is much too expensive, and is not to be had. Our works can continue open only so long as they are fed from the sea. The effects of confiscation on the north German iron industry—the main source of supply—will be simply incalculable." In a word, Germany begins to experience the first effects of the world-wide shipping famine caused by her mad orgy of submarine ruthlessness. She is also beginning to realize that the loser pays, and evidently finds the process a painful one.—The Naval and Military Record. May 26, 1920.
GREAT BRITAIN
British Navy Estimates Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty.—An analysis of the gross expenditure of £96,490,181 estimated to be incurred in 1920-21, shows that it can be approximately divided into:
(a) Non-recurrent war liabilities or terminal charges £19,077,000
(b) Recurrent expenditure due to war conditions, e. g., increases in prices and in rates of wages, pensions, etc., and separation allowance £40,023,200
(c) Normal expenditure on basis of pre-war rates and prices £37,489,981
The number that we propose shall be voted in Vote A for the maximum number of the personnel of the fleet to be borne on any day during the financial year, is 136,000 as compared with 151,000 in 1914-15. The numbers at the date of the armistice were 407,316, and by November, 1919, had been reduced to 157,000. The actual number required for the reduced fleet which it is proposed to maintain during the year is 127,500; but the provision under Vote 1 for the pay of the fleet has been based on the assumption that 131,000 officers and men will still be borne at the end of the year, as it cannot be expected that all those who are surplus to our reduced requirements can be disposed of during 1920-21.
There is great difficulty in suddenly effecting large decreases or increases in naval personnel, and the reduction of over 25,000 officers and men in the 17 months from last November to April 1921 will, if accomplished as we hope, be a remarkable feat. It must be remembered that the crew of a ship is made up of numerous small groups of individuals of many trades—gunnery ratings, torpedo ratings, engine-room ratings, signal ratings, electricians, armorers, mechanics of many kinds, and so on, each group possessing entirely distinct qualifications and having an entirely distinct duty, but each absolutely essential to the fighting efficiency of the ship. In every adjustment of naval personnel, provision has to be made for each of these numerous branches of skilled men to be kept up to strength in every ship all over the world; any attempt to wash out naval personnel with a broad brush at once immobilizes far more units of the fleet than was ever intended.
The time is opportune for an explanation of some of the principal decisions which the Board of Admiralty have taken, and of the motives by which they have been guided, while framing these estimates which may perhaps be described (in spite of the considerable provisions for war commitments which they embody) as the first of the new series of peace estimates. I therefore append some notes on naval policy, and a note on dockyard policy. It should be understood that these statements do not purport to be exhaustive even of the decisions already taken, still less of the matters which are engaging the attention of the Board.
Notes on Naval Policy.—(a) General Remarks: 1. During the past year it has not been possible to frame a definite statement on naval policy owing to the changing situation, the necessity for keeping the fleet prepared for eventualities during the armistice period, and the active operations imposed on the navy in the Baltic.
2. It is now possible to estimate more clearly and closely what are the requirements of the future, and to make what it is hoped will be regarded as a fairly full statement of our naval commitments and proposals.
3. Since sea power is essential for the security and prosperity of the British Empire, it is the object of the Board of Admiralty to proceed on lines which they believe will provide us with our vital requirements and at the same time secure the exercise of rigid economy. The expenditure necessary for such a policy is merely an insurance of our existence, and a guarantee of our increased prosperity.
4. In view of the vast efforts made during the years of war, it is possible for us to-day to suspend production for the time being and concentrate largely on assimilating the lessons of the war, the fleet being reduced to minimum requirements as regards both personnel and materiel.
The organization of the fleet as shown in Appendix I represents these minimum requirements.
5. In the first place we have certain definite duties to perform in support of allied policy, and to assist in stabilizing the disturbed conditions which at present prevail in the world.
We have also to provide the units necessary for maintaining adequate sea-going training for our personnel.
We have to station small cruiser squadrons on foreign stations, North and South Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, China, and Australian waters to assist our trade and support the needs of the Empire.
Finally, we have to meet the requirements of technical training to ensure progress in modern devices and methods of warfare.
(b) Strength of the Sea-Going Fleet.—6. We have based in home waters our main fleet, the Atlantic Fleet, consisting of 1 fleet flagship, 2 battle squadrons together comprising 9 ships, a battle cruiser squadron of 4 ships, one of which is conveying His Royal Highness-the Prince of Wales on his tour of the Dominions, 2 light cruiser squadrons, 4 destroyer flotillas and attendant vessels. This is the least number of units to ensure progressive tactical and sea training. A lesser number would destroy the possibility of exercises at sea under realistic conditions; the tactical units would be reduced to such an extent that the problems of gunnery concentration, fleet torpedo tactics, destroyer attacks, anti-submarine tactics could not be studied and practiced; the sea training of officers and men would suffer, and progress would cease. To have one fleet in which the lessons of the war can continually be practiced and new tactical methods devised has been one of our principal objects in maintaining that the Atlantic Fleet should be of the strength laid down.
7. In the Mediterranean we have stationed a squadron of 6 battleships, 1 light cruiser squadron, 1 destroyer flotilla and attendant vessels. This moderately strong force is, in our opinion, necessary to meet political conditions in the near East. That this force is not excessive is shown by the fact that it has recently been necessary to detach a squadron from the main, or Atlantic, fleet to the Levant, the Mediterranean Fleet being fully employed on other important duties, and unable to meet all the demands made upon it.
8. As regards the squadrons on the China, African, North and South American and East Indies stations, the need for them, which has always been recognized in the past, has never been more urgent than it is to-day, in view of the necessity for re-establishing the internal trade of the Empire, and promoting that with foreign countries. The navy constitutes that police of the seas, and all experience teaches that an efficient navy is the surest guarantee for peace.
(c) Remarks on the Capital Ship.—9. There has been some criticism of the maintenance in commission of the present types of vessels, especially in regard to the capital ship. A contrary policy has been openly advocated, this policy being based, it is presumed, on the idea that the battleship is dead and that submersible and air vessels are the types of the future. The naval staff has examined this question with extreme care, and as a result we profoundly dissent from these views.
10. In our opinion the capital ship remains the unit on which sea power is built up.
So far from the late war having shown that the capital ship is doomed, it has on the contrary proved the necessity for that type. On the German side the whole of the submarine campaign against merchant vessels was built up on the power of the high sea fleet. On the British side the enemy submarines in no way interfered with the movements of capital ships in carrying out operations; destroyer screens, new methods of attack and altered tactical movements defeated the submarine.
11. Not at present could the Board of Admiralty subscribe to the statement that aircraft have doomed the capital ship. Aircraft are certainly of the highest importance in naval tactics, as regards reconnaissance, torpedo attacks and artillery observation, but their role in present circumstances is that of an auxiliary and not of a substitute for the capital ship. The past history of this question must be taken into account; many times has the doom of the battleship been pronounced. The introduction of torpedo craft was believed in certain quarters over 20 years ago to have settled its fate. The Board of Admiralty at the time refused to be carried away by the attractiveness of the idea of building small, cheap torpedo craft instead of battleships, and they proved to be right. History has shown that the introduction of a type to destroy the capital ship has been quickly followed by the evolution of counter-measures which sustain its power.
12. We therefore believe that the battleship must remain the principal unit, and that fleet tactics and tactical training must be carried out with the battle squadron as the main unit. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that although the battleship remains, its type may require to be altered. Advances in electricity, in the internal combustion engine and in science generally will inevitably necessitate an eventual change of type, and it is one of the principal functions of the Naval Staff to keep continuous watch on scientific development, with the object of ensuring that the type of capital ship designed meets the requirements of the future. It is even possible that the present battleship will change to one of a semi-submersible type, or even of a flying type, but such types are visions of the far future, not practical propositions of the moment. By gradual evolution and development the types forecasted may arrive, but the immediate abandonment of the capital ship in favor of a visionary scheme of aircraft and submarines would leave the British nation destitute of sea power and without the means of progressive training.
(d) Harbor Establishments.—13. There remains to be considered that part of our fleet organization which deals with harbor establishments. The advance which was made in naval technical science during the war was very great.
Before the war we had no efficient mines, and instruction in mining was neglected; there was no system of minesweeping or of protection against mines as we now understand it; the various methods of submarine searching and attack had not been explored; the torpedo as a weapon was unreliable. The reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs it is unnecessary to consider in this statement, but war experience has shown conclusively that if in times of peace we neglect development of these devices and instruction in their use, years of effort and vast expenditure are required to make good that neglect.
14. As a consequence, therefore, while it is desirable that we should keep down to bare minimum requirements the size of the sea-going fleets, it is essential that the navy should possess all information concerning the latest scientific devices and their use; that in the event of war the sea-going fleet should be equipped with the best weapons modern science can provide; that there should be a personnel fully trained in technical science, and that the arrangements should be such that rapid expansion can take place both in equipping the reserve fleet and auxiliary units, and in training the reserve personnel for manning these units. For this purpose it is necessary to provide
(a) Adequate experimental establishments for the development of the latest scientific devices in accordance with the requirements of the Staff.
(b) Training establishments where the personnel will be fully instructed in the same.
(c) Light cruisers, destroyers and other attendant craft for carrying out practical experiments with the devices developed by the scientific establishments and for giving practical instruction in their use to the personnel.
(e) Scientific Research.—15. The organization of scientific research within the navy which has been set up so as to ensure that the latest developments are understood by the naval service, and that development both in types of vessels and in weapons will keep pace with scientific progress, is given in Appendix II to this memorandum. Under the Controller of the Navy there has been set up a department of scientific research and experiment. As the scientific adviser of the controller, and in charge of this department, there has been appointed a director of scientific research who is responsible for the general direction and organization of research work for naval purposes, keeping the navy in touch with outside scientific establishments, and ensuring that the work at the various naval experimental establishments dealing with mining, sound signalling and navigational appliances proceeds with full cognizance of scientific progress and methods. He will arrange for additional scientific assistance being given to these establishments as requisite. Further, the director of scientific research, by keeping in close association with the Naval Staff, will ensure that we are kept fully aware of the possible practical application of scientific progress in relation to naval needs, thus enabling us to formulate requirements as to types and weapons with a knowledge of the latest scientific possibilities, and to make ourselves better equipped for dealing with the vital problems of naval material development.
16. Consultations with outside institutions will be resorted to; so as to gain the benefit of their research and experiments, but there are some problems which it will not be possible to deal with in this manner, owing to their secret or to their special naval aspect. Special naval problems will be dealt with by the naval establishments—gunnery, torpedo, mining, signalling and anti-submarine—but for research work and secret development it is essential that the naval service should have a small central establishment of its own, independent of the special experimental establishments. Such an establishment was formed during the war at Shandon, and has performed, and is performing, good service. But Shandon is expensive to the country in its upkeep, and suffers from disadvantage in position both in regard to its distance from the naval ports and from the Admiralty, with the consequent liability that owing to insufficient co-operation and contact with naval thought, the research work may be conducted without the necessary consideration for practical requirements.
17. It has been decided, therefore, to close Shandon as soon as suitable accommodation can be provided elsewhere. Such work at Shandon as requires sea environment will be removed to existing naval establishments. All pure research work now being carried out at Shandon will eventually be transferred to a small naval institute adjoining the National Physical Laboratory at Teddington. This institute, under the director of scientific research, will be entirely controlled by the Admiralty, but its close association with the National Physical Laboratory will offer exceptional facilities for co-operation, and the scientific staff of the institute will have the advantage of personal acquaintance with the work being carried out in the laboratory. It is hoped to have this establishment ready at the end of the present year; meanwhile Shandon, on a reduced scale, is being kept going until the establishment at Teddington is ready. To stop pure research work altogether at this moment would be a retrograde step, and might conceivably have a serious effect ultimately on development of types and weapons, and on economy generally.
(f) Technical Training.—18. For the technical training of the personnel special schools are established at the naval ports of Portsmouth, Devonport and Chatham. The schools at Portsmouth are the largest, and attached to each of these schools is an experimental establishment dealing with the work of the school. This general system was in existence prior to the war, except that the experimental establishments were practically non-existent. As a result of the war, however, and of the progress in scientific and technical thought, large increases became necessary, especially in the establishments at Portsmouth.
19. As already stated, mining was considered in pre-war days to be a minor and unimportant branch of naval warfare; the staff dealing with this subject was small, and was attached to the torpedo school.
The utility of mines was emphasized early in the operations of 1014, and the science of mining gradually assumed a position of extreme importance in naval strategy and tactics. On the tactical side as well as on the scientific and material side immense strides were made. This called for staff and technical knowledge of the highest order, and necessitated the setting up of a special mining school at the Gunwharf, Portsmouth. This school, though it started late in the war, finally achieved great results, both on its experimental and instructional side. It is essential to keep this school in being.
The mining school at Portsmouth represents an additional establishment for which there was previously no provision. At this school the personnel will be instructed in the science of offensive and defensive mining, and also in devices for protection against mines, including the Paravane.
20. Apart from mining, the torpedo and electrical, and signal schools have all had to be expanded to meet modern requirements. The war was responsible for tremendous developments, and all these developments have necessitated more advanced instruction for the personnel, and an increased staff to give this instruction. More highly organized scientific and experimental establishments have to be attached to the schools.
21. Another technical branch of the naval service, which did not exist when the war was commenced, is the anti-submarine school; the importance of this school in the future can hardly be over-estimated. We have seen the great effort which was made by means of the submarine to wrest from us our sea supremacy. Science alone can give us the antidote to the submarine, and we have taken steps, as will be seen in the detailed statement regarding the fleet, to ensure progress in experimental work and training. Development in this work will undoubtedly be required to meet the possibilities of the future, and proposals are under consideration for the establishment of a school of anti-submarine work in conjunction with an anti-submarine experimental station.
22. The submarine training establishments themselves have, as a result of the war, become more, rather than less, important. Future developments in the submarine may have a profound effect on naval strategy and tactics. This subject is receiving continuous attention. Experimental work is being pressed forward, and in addition adequate steps are being taken to ensure that the high standard of the submarine personnel is maintained. The necessary staff and the attendant vessels shown in Appendix I have been allotted with this purpose in view.
23. It must be emphasized here that the policy with regard to instructional establishments generally has been to ensure the provision of an adequate experimental and instructional staff, and of the appliances and sea-going tenders required for carrying out the experimental and instructional work with efficiency.
(g) Personnel.—24. It is upon the efficiency of the personnel that everything finally depends, and the Board of Admiralty are taking such steps as will ensure a naval service carrying on the traditions of the past, highly trained in staff and technical work, and will continue to do all in their power to secure conditions which will combine efficiency and contentment.
(h) Entry and Training of Officers.—25. First, as regards the officer personnel, it is proposed to adhere to the system known as the common entry system, by which is meant that the main body of deck officers and engineering officers will be trained in the same cadet establishment. The common entry system was the system introduced by the Board of Admiralty in 1903, but since its inception it has undergone many modifications, and in explanation of the present policy it is desirable to give in brief outline the existing state of affairs.
26. Whereas in the past there have been two colleges for the training of naval cadets, it is now proposed that there be only one college at Dartmouth, and that the Osborne establishment shall be closed.
One college is capable of dealing with the reduced number of cadets required for the present fleet, and economy will result from the change.
27. The age of entry for naval cadets under the common entry system will be between 13 ½ and 14. Consideration has been given to the question of entering boys at a later age, but it has been decided to adhere to the present age as being that at which the majority of boys finish their private school education, before proceeding to public schools.
These boys will go to Dartmouth College, which will in effect be the naval public school where general education on naval lines will be continued under a system of education somewhat changed from that under which the common entry system has hitherto been conducted in that more attention will be paid to general education, and the large amount of time which was previously devoted to engineering will be reduced. The important factor at the cadet college is to ensure that the boys have a thorough groundwork on which to build.
28. The cadets will spend four years at Dartmouth and will then be sent for two terms (8 months) to a training battleship for their practical education and for gaining acquaintance with sea life, afterwards being drafted to sea as midshipmen. As midshipmen they will take their part as officers of the ship to which they are appointed, but their instruction will continue, the majority of their time being spent on their work as deck officers and one-eighth being devoted to engineering.
After one year at sea, those midshipmen who show a special aptitude and liking for engineering will be permitted to volunteer for that branch of the service; such midshipmen will thereafter devote one-third of their time instead of one-eighth, as hitherto, to engineering.
29. On reaching the rank of sub-lieutenant a further opportunity will be given to officers to volunteer for the engineering branch of the service, and from these volunteers and from those who volunteered as midshipmen selections will be made. It may be expected that the majority of officers Selected will be from those who volunteer for engineering after serving one year at sea as midshipmen, and who since that time will have devoted a considerable portion of their time to engineering studies.
Officers selected for the engineering branch when sub-lieutenants will, after going through advanced courses of engineering, be definitely placed on the engineering side of the profession, and will not revert during the remainder of their career to deck duties. They will rise through the various ranks of the engineering branch, with special rates of pay. Higher positions of administrative importance and responsibility at sea, at the Admiralty, and in the dockyards will be open to them.
30. It requires to be emphasized that officers selected at this early age will devote the remainder of their career to engineering. It is essential that the majority of officers forming the engineering branch should be "whole time" officers. There is a definite distinction, both as regards knowledge and capabilities, between those who are to be trained in the science of naval war and strategical and tactical methods of fighting, and those who are to deal with the upkeep and maintenance of engineering and mechanical appliances which are necessitated by the complex machinery and weapons of modern war. Each side requires a special study, and for this reason final separation of the branches is essential.
31. At the same time, although there must be this definite division between the deck and the engineer officers, each being charged with their own important sphere of responsibility, nevertheless, each branch must understand and sympathize with the requirements of the other. In the exercise of strategy and tactics if is necessary that there should be full understanding of the engineering and mechanical possibilities and difficulties, and how such difficulties can be overcome. On the engineering side it is equally necessary that there should be an understanding of the requirements of the strategist and tactician, in order that so far as practicable his requirements may be met and perhaps anticipated.
By means of the Common Entry System and training under a similar system until about the age of 20, when the rank of commissioned officer is reached, it is believed that this sympathy and understanding between deck and engineer officers will be fully and completely obtained.
32. At present there is a further scheme whereby officers, after one year at sea as lieutenant, are eligible to specialize in engineering in the same way as officers specialize in gunnery, torpedo and navigation.
After from 6 ½ to 8 years' service as specialists these officers may elect to revert to deck duties and will be considered for promotion with other deck officers. The efficiency of this scheme, and the necessity for its continuance, is now under consideration, and will be decided without prejudice to officers already specialized under its provisions.
33. Briefly, therefore, the system of general training as an officer will be:
(a) Common Entry System at about 1354 years of age.
(b) Three years eight months (11 terms) training at Dartmouth.
(c) Eight months in a training battleship.
(d) About 2 ½ years at sea as midshipman before becoming a sub-lieutenant.
(e) Midshipmen, after one year at sea, to be permitted to volunteer for engineering and to be given special engineering instruction.
(f) Sub-lieutenants to be permitted to specialize in engineering; officers selected to be turned over to the engineering branch, and to stay for the remainder of their career in that branch.
(g) Promotion to lieutenant after serving about one year as sub-lieutenant, that is about the age of 22.
(h) Lieutenants, after one year to be permitted to specialize in engineering, such lieutenants to remain from 6 ½ to 8 years in the engineering branch, and then to be permitted to return to the deck branch or to remain in the engineering branch. (Continuance now under consideration.)
(i) Promotion to lieutenant commander after 8 years as lieutenant, about the age of 30. Further promotion at approximately the ages and seniorities hitherto customary.
34. Although, as explained in the foregoing, it is the intention that the general age of entry shall be about 13 ½ years, and that boys so entered shall be sent to Dartmouth, it is highly desirable in the interests of the naval service that there shall be a special form of entry at a later age, so that boys who are not ready at the age of 13 ½ may still have an opportunity of entering the naval service, and also so as to allow of a certain number of public school and other boys coming into the service, and thus keeping the navy in touch with the general educational system of the country. To permit of this, it has been decided to continue what is known as the Special Entry System, that is, a competitive examination between the ages of 17 ½ and 18 ½.
35. About 15 Special Entry cadets will be taken under existing circumstances annually; these cadets who will already have received a general education, will be drafted to a cruiser training establishment, there to learn the special subjects required, and to gain an understanding of the sea. After one year in the training cruiser these cadets will be sent to sea as midshipmen, joining up with the Common Entry midshipmen, and thereafter being trained on exactly similar lines. Their time of service as midshipmen will be adjusted so that on reaching the rank of lieutenant. Special Entry cadets will as a whole be not more than one year older than those entered through Dartmouth College. This year's difference in age will make little or no difference to an officer showing zeal and ability; promotion to the rank of commander and captain being by selection, this year can be more than made good, and, in respect of a subsequent career, boys who enter under special entry conditions should understand that they suffer no disadvantage as compared with those entering through the main channel.
(j) Promotion from the Lower Deck.—45. The foregoing gives the general system under which deck and engineer officers for His Majesty's service will be entered and trained. There remains to be considered the system of promotion from the lower deck, which is being devised to ensure that men who display conspicuous character and ability shall have the opportunity of reaching the highest ranks of the service.
46. At present, under the regulations of the special entry examination, a man from the lower deck between the ages of 17 ½ and 18 ½ can sit for this examination, and, if successful, he will become one of the special entry cadets in the ordinary course of events. But owing to the lack of early educational facilities and also to the specialized training received since joining the naval service, as boys, to the detriment of their education in such examination subjects, as French and Latin, it is certain that only a small percentage of men could possibly take advantage of the special entry system. Some other system, therefore, than the special entry system must be looked to in order to give the lower deck of the navy the opportunity of reaching high rank, and to enable us to draw a proportion of officers from those who entered as boys on lower deck.
47. The present "mate system," whereby selected petty officers, provided they have seven years' service, are promoted and receive commissions as mates, and after a series of examinations and further service of two years become lieutenants, was designed to form an avenue of promotion from the lower deck, to the commissioned ranks. Many admirable officers have been produced in this manner. But the mate system has suffered from the disadvantage that, owing to the operation of the seven years' service rule, the majority of men promoted to commissioned rank in this manner do not reach the rank of lieutenant until 28-29 years of age or even later. When it is considered that an officer entering under normal conditions reaches the rank of lieutenant at about 22 years of age, it will be seen that under this system there is little chance of a man promoted from mate reaching a higher rank than lieutenant commander.
48. To remedy this state of affairs, and to give a real opportunity to all men, a certain number of vacancies in each year will be available for men from the lower deck who may wish to become officers.
A man on reaching the age of 21, provided he has satisfied the requirements of a Sea Selection Board and has passed the seamanship examination for officer's rank, and has further taken a first-class certificate in the special educational test, embracing mechanics, geometry, history, physics, and general subjects, will be eligible for selection before an Admiralty Selection Board. Those selected to fill the vacancies available will become acting mates, the earliest age being 21. Provided a man takes a first-class certificate in the further special course he will undergo, he can become a lieutenant at the age of 23. Candidates who take lower class certificates will be required to serve a longer period at sea before promotion to lieutenant, the same procedure being followed in this respect as with Dartmouth College or special entry officers passing for lieutenant.
49. A man, therefore, who takes a first-class certificate, can be promoted to lieutenant at about the same age as a special entry cadet can reach that rank. He will then be on a precisely similar footing to other lieutenants with regard to promotion, the highest ranks being within his reach.
50. In connection with this development of the mate system, it is intended that those candidates who have been selected shall go through a special course designed to inculcate into them the essential requirements of an officer-—knowledge of discipline, maintenance of morale and capacity for command of men; hitherto, men promoted from the lower deck have not had such a course. War experience has certainly shown the necessity for it, and in this respect the navy cannot do better than adopt the methods so successfully practiced by the sister service, which, as explained by the Secretary of State for War, during the last months of the struggle produced 95 per cent of the officers for the army.
51. The above gives briefly in outline the proposals of the Board of Admiralty for ensuring that a proportion of the deck officers of the navy shall be drawn from the boys establishments and from those who have served on the lower deck. An analogous system is being applied to the engineering branch as well; it will ensure to all the opportunity which is their right, or reaching a high rank in His Majesty's service.
52. It is not, however, the intention to rest here; it is hoped in the future to make further proposals with the object of broadening the field of entry and of removing the restrictions which financial contributions impose upon the promising lad who may display the qualities necessary in an efficient naval officer.
(k) University Training of Naval Officers.—53. There remains to be considered the higher education of the officers of His Majesty's service. Before the war this education was almost entirely professional and technical. Officers in their sub-lieutenant's examination were required to pass examinations in various technical subjects. Later, they specialized in gunnery, torpedo, or navigation, and went to special schools for this purpose, where their higher technical education was completed.
54. The whole of this question of higher education has been carefully reviewed in the light of war experience, and it appears that though the former system gave a type of officer of high professional attainments, yet, in many respects, it has left considerable room for improvement, the nature of the courses being rather too strictly professional and technical. Consequently, in certain respects, the naval officer was at a disadvantage as compared with his contemporaries in other walks of life, who had had the advantage of a more general education, and had come into contact with all shades of thought up to a comparatively late age.
55. The effect of the war was, in the case of the younger officers, seriously to interfere with their actual general education at the Osborne and Dartmouth colleges prior to coming to sea, nor was it possible, in the case of a large number of officers, to arrange for the special courses prior to their becoming lieutenants. At the close of the war, therefore, these officers found themselves at a serious disadvantage; first, from the interruption of their general education, and, secondly, from the fact that they had been unable as sub-lieutenants to pass through the courses at Greenwich College and the various naval schools.
56. To remedy this state of affairs, the authorities at Cambridge University were approached. The university authorities showed the greatest sympathy and gave us the most generous assistance, and as a result all those officers who had their studies interrupted by the war are being given a special course at Cambridge University. This course is designed to broaden the outlook on life and to bring officers into contact at an impressionable age with university thought and university ideas. It will not be until 1922 that all officers who had their studies interrupted will have been through Cambridge; meanwhile, we are convinced of the enormous benefit which has already resulted to those officers who have been through the course. We are grateful in the extreme for the help which has been given; it has shown the value to the navy of this contact with the university, and it would be a profound mistake if this contact ceased so soon as the officers concerned have passed through their courses.
57. It is in contemplation to frame a scheme subject to the concurrence of the university authorities, under which in the future a university course will be an integral part of training for about 25 per cent of the sub-lieutenants in each year. It is considered that about this percentage will gain real and lasting benefit from the course.
58. The full details of this scheme of training will be worked out during the coming months. Broadly, the proposals are that all sub-lieutenants shall undergo, in addition to the technical courses of gunnery, torpedo, pilotage, and navigation, a special course of mathematics and physics, and an elementary war course at Greenwich. In this elementary war course, to which great importance is attached, sub-lieutenants will be given an introduction to strategy, tactics and the study of war. After Greenwich 25 per cent will be selected for the special university course, the remainder passing to sea-going ships prior to promotion to lieutenant.
(l) Staff Training.—59. In the interests of the future of the service, great importance attaches to the selection and training of officers for the War Staff. A body of officers is required who have made special study of the lessons of history and of the war, and who are capable of sifting and applying the mass of evidence available.
60. Reduction of the navy to the utmost limit in ships and material makes it the more important that the efficiency of the War Staff shall be of the highest order, and that during the forthcoming years there shall be passed through the Staff College a number of young officers whose training in staff work will ensure a common doctrine on strategical and tactical questions, the right application of the lessons of the past, and the ability to foresee the requirements of the future
61. With this end in view a Naval Staff College has been set up at Greenwich. The first course commenced in June last and will be completed in June of the present year. In the next course commencing in September, the number of officers will be increased and will, it is hoped, include representatives from the Dominions.
62. We must aim at training at least 40 naval officers a year, so that in 10 years 400 will have qualified for the Naval Staff and will be distributed through the various grades of the naval service. It is further highly desirable that the number of army, air force, and Dominion representatives attending the Naval Staff College should be increased to ensure close cooperation between the services, and to build up the naval thought of the Empire on the common doctrine on which the navy must prepare itself. To carry this out it will be necessary to consider methods of increasing the Staff College accommodations; this matter is receiving serious attention, and it is hoped that a decision will be reached in time to enable the staff course in 1921 to be of the dimensions proposed; the matter will be referred to in the Naval Estimates of 1921-22.
63. For the benefit of senior officers who are unable to take advantage of the Staff Course, a War College has been opened at Greenwich and a special staff appointed for instructional purposes. Strategy, tactics, and command are the principal subjects dealt with. The course at the War College will be preceded by technical courses at Portsmouth dealing with the use of weapons and progress in weapon technique. The War College at Greenwich opened on 1st of March.
(m) War Staff Organization, Admiralty.—64. As it exists today the War Staff at the Admiralty, it is correct to say, is largely a war product. Before the war the Staff consisted of the Intelligence Division, Operations Division, and Mobilization Division. No "policy" or "planning" division had then come into being, and no division of the Staff dealt with the tactical side of naval war, types of ships, and use of weapons. The exigencies of war brought about an expansion of the Admiralty including the divisions dealing with the operations and requirements of war, and emphasized the need for separating operational worn on the one side from the work of administration and supply on the other. The reforms were carried out by the Admiralty under war conditions, and as a consequence certain logical divisions of duty in the Naval Staff organization could not be effected.
65. The main consideration on which we have worked in improving the Admiralty Staff organization has been to strengthen that side of the Staff which deals with the use and employment of weapons, the tactical questions consequent on change of weapons, types of vessels necessary to carry out naval policy, and staff questions dealing with scientific research and experiment. The staff view on these matters must be kept in the forefront, otherwise there is the danger that requirements of design and supply will dictate the principles relative to use and employment, resulting in the weapon become the master and not the servant of the tactician.
66. The war has enabled us to test the weapons forged during a century of peace, and has shown that some of them were unsuitable and inadequate. It is clear that the reason they were so was not so much the fault of the design or manufacture, as that the designers are now shown to have been incorrectly or incompletely advised as to the fighting requirements of the moment.
67. In order that progress in naval materiel may be steady, consistent, and well judged, and not impulsive and jerky, it must be based on continuous study and co-ordination of the lessons of war, and of experience and progress of our scattered fleets in their peace exercises and practices. The design of our ships must not and should not depend on the impulse of an individual nor merely on the mechanical possibilities of the moment, though the latter must necessarily limit the immediate accomplishment of our whole aim. Design must primarily depend on closely reasoned "requirements" based on evidence continuously and steadily accumulated from the lessons of our fleets, for whose use the ships and weapons are to be supplied. The aim must, and necessarily will, be provided by the science of the day.
68. The work thus indicated is the work of the Staff, and certain divisions of the Staff are therefore being grouped under the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff to deal with questions relating to the use of weapons, types and designs to meet future developments, co-operation of aircraft and their employment in naval war, weapon technique and the introduction of new weapons. In fact, the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff will be responsible under the Chief of the Naval Staff to the First Lord for dealing with all Staff questions affecting battle tactics and fighting efficiency.
69. The divisions of the Naval Staff dealing with operations, policy, intelligence, and training have been similarly placed under the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, the accepted principle of organization that current work and future work shall not be dealt with by the same division being closely adhered to. Under the operations division will come all those matters of current importance affecting the movements of ships and defence of ports, whilst the policy division will investigate future strategical questions, strengths of fleets, and development of dockyard and other facilities to meet future requirements, in accordance with the policy laid down by His Majesty's Government.
70. Briefly then the organization of the Naval Staff to meet peace requirements is as follows: At the head of the Naval Staff is the Chief of the Naval Staff, responsible to the First Lord for the fighting efficiency of the fleet and the strategic and operational instructions to carry out policy. Under the Chief of the Naval Staff the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff on the one side is responsible for operations, policy, intelligence, and training, and the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff on the other side is responsible from the Staff side for the development and use of material, including types of vessels, weapons, and tactics.
71. Under this organization war experience will be fully laid to heart and the lessons applied to naval training and naval progress. Further, by these means the Staff is reduced to the minimum numbers compatible with efficiency, whilst at the same time rapid expansion on sound lines is allowed for in the event of emergency. From an organization consisting of ten divisions with a personnel of 340 the new organization will shortly consist of eight divisions with a personnel of about a quarter of that number. They should supply a sufficient personnel to study and apply the results of our experience, and by neglect of that experience there would be real danger of embarking on expenditure on wrong lines, the building of wrong types of vessels, incorrect tactics, and a faulty training of the personnel.
(n) War Staff Organization: Sea Commands.—72. The War staffs in all sea-going commands and at the harbor establishments have been organized on similar principles, with reduced staffs according to the size of the command. As with the Admiralty Staff, it is correct to say that before the war the staffs at sea were only partially developed. There was a tendency for study of the technique of naval weapons to overshadow study of their employment.
73. War experience necessitated a change in these methods, and the division of staffs afloat into War Staff on the one side and a technical and administrative service on the other, is now an integral part of the organization of the navy. As trained War Staff officers are produced they will be appointed in their various capacities to fill the positions in those commands. By interchange between officers on the Admiralty Staff and the commands afloat, and also by arranging that Staff officers are appointed at intervals for general ship duties, leaving their staff work for the time being, it will be ensured that touch is kept between the Admiralty and sea thought and sea progress, and also that the Staff officers themselves do not become divorced from the general sea service, with a consequent narrowness of outlook unable to appreciate through lack of sea experience the various problems in connection with sea training and the personnel afloat.
74. With the system of training and organization of staffs on these lines, it is considered that the high efficiency of the officer personnel is ensured; that unity of thought and action will result from a common staff doctrine, and that the full requirements, present and future, will be met with the greatest efficiency and the greatest economy.
(o) The Navy and the Air.—75. We recognize fully that future naval policy is profoundly affected by possible developments in the air. All classes of aircraft employed as adjuncts to naval warfare have already shown the great effect they exercise in naval tactics and reconnaissance, and in combined operations. Looking ahead, it is possible to foresee tremendous developments in the air which may revolutionize eventually our present conception of sea warfare and sea strategy. But whilst giving the utmost consideration to the experience already gained, it is vital to this Empire that it should not be carried away by hasty proposals into the belief that air power is already a substitute for sea power. That day may come, but it is not at present in sight, and in the meantime to give way to these false ideas would be to throw ourselves open to grave peril and to leave ourselves without the means of exercising that influence in world affairs which the navy, as at present constituted, renders possible.
76. Nevertheless, our organization must be such as to enable us to take full advantage of the progress in aerial matters and to appreciate fully the effect of this progress on the art of naval warfare, and to utilize to the utmost extent the combined effect of air power and sea power for the defence of the Empire and the control of our sea communications.
77. The new organization of the Admiralty Staff under the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff is especially fitted for dealing with this vital matter. Arrangements have been made with the Air Ministry for close co-operation between the Admiralty Staff and the Air Staff, and for ensuring that the two staffs are conversant with each other's problems and requirements.
78. To remove all misconception it should be stated with emphasis that we in no way contemplate a return to a separate naval air service. It is recognized that the Air Ministry was created by Parliament as a result of war experience to further the development and maintenance of air power, and that to separate entirely from the Air Ministry that part dealing with the navy would be to retard progress and result in a weakening both in development of materiel and the training of an air personnel.
79. At the same time it is an essential accompaniment of the establishment of a separate Air Ministry that the functions of the two departments should be clearly defined, and more especially is this the case with regard to the responsibilities for the conduct of operations.
The Admiralty have represented to the Air Council, that, in their opinion—
(a) The operations of all aircraft flown from His Majesty's ships and vessels with whatever object in view, that is to say, not only reconnaissance and artillery observation machines, but also machines which are carrying out operations in the air for offensive and defensive purposes; and
(b) All operations carried out by aircraft not flown from ships, but which are being carried out in connection with the command of the sea, that is to say, operations for oversea reconnaissance and for the attack of enemy ships and vessels—
should be under naval control. Dual control would be unworkable. In all matters relating to the command of the sea the Admiralty are and remain the responsible authority.
80. We are working out the scheme outlined in the memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff issued as Cd. 467, and are in correspondence with the Air Ministry with a view to putting it into effect.
So far as can be foreseen, naval requirements will be met by the proposal ultimately to form a naval wing under the Air Ministry, with a personnel specially trained for naval work.
81. To assist in the development of this naval wing, it is proposed to second officers volunteering for air work in the air service for training and for subsequent service in the naval wing. Such officers as are specially fitted for work in the higher ranks of the Air Service will, by arrangement with the Air Ministry, be permitted to continue in the Air Force, but the majority of officers after their term of service in the Air Force will return to the naval service and continue their naval duties. Thus in the course of a few years there will be a body of naval officers who will have had experience in the Air Service, who will be equipped with knowledge regarding air matters, and who will be able to keep the navy as a whole fully up-to-date in regard to air strategy and air tactics in relation to sea power.
82. Thus by seconding naval personnel to the Air Force, by an interchange of naval and Air Force officers between the Staff colleges, and by the special organization of the Naval Staff, the naval service will be prevented from falling behind in air matters through lack of foresight, through ignorance, or through a conservatism which refuses to understand the necessity of change consequent on development.
(q) Miscellaneous Personnel Questions.—(I) Officers of Accountant and Instructor Branches: 84. The committee which was appointed in July last, with wide powers of reference, to consider the position as soon as the report is received, the question of the future conditions of service and scope of employment of the branch will be fully considered by the board.
85. The instructor branch, which was being allowed to die out before the war, is being reconstituted on a wider basis. The instructor officer is being made responsible for the general education arrangements afloat, apart from work of a purely professional character, both as regards junior officers and ratings. It is anticipated that, apart from the advantages of having an officer of special university training on board, naval education generally will derive benefit from the change.
(II) Welfare Committee: 86. A new experiment was made by the Admiralty last year in the shape of what is known as the welfare committee. Special facilities were given to enable full discussion to take place at the home ports on matters affecting the different branches of the service and the lower deck generally. Subsequently representatives elected by the men themselves were attached in an advisory capacity to a committee of officers, and a very large number of questions were brought forward and discussed at a series of meetings extending over several months. The report of the committee, which is very voluminous, was made on the 3d March. Any changes which are decided on after consideration of the report will be promulgated to the fleet in the usual manner. We attach great importance to the operations of this committee, and we hope that, with sympathetic consideration, they may lead to many improvements in matters affecting the well-being of the men.
The Board of Admiralty are much indebted to Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram for the care and sympathy with which he has presided over the deliberations of this committee, in continuation of the work he had previously done in connection with the pay of the lower deck.
(III) Sports and Recreations: 87. A special section has been set up at the Admiralty to supervise physical and recreational training in the service. It is also part of its duty to promote the organization of sports and games, and with this end in view a sports' control board has been set up at the Admiralty, and various sports associations and local sports committees have been formed.
(IV) Reserves: 88. The question of the naval reserves has not yet been finally dealt with.
A committee is considering alterations in the existing arrangements for enrollment, training and employment, and the organization for rapid expansion on the outbreak of war.
It is therefore not possible to make any announcement at present, but the importance of early decision is recognized and the matter will be pressed.
For the moment it may be sufficient to say that the reserves have fully proved their value during the war, and that it is intended to retain them as part of our peace organization.
Note on Dockyard Policy.—The report of Lord Colwyn's committee on work in His Majesty's dockyards having been presented to Parliament, I take this opportunity of adding a few words in explanation of the present situation in the yards.
Before the war the home dockyards were six in number, viz., Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham, Pembroke, Sheerness and Haulbowline, and the number of men employed on shipbuilding and repair work was about 42,000.
We now have seven home dockyards, the great and finely-equipped dockyard of Rosyth having been completed during the war.
The number of men employed on shipbuilding and repair work in the home yards at the time of the armistice was 67,800.
This great increase was necessary in order to deal with the urgent repairs of the fleet, which had to be carried on practically continuously day and night, by means of double shifts, etc
The increase was mostly in the engineering trades and in semi-skilled and unskilled labor, and these classes at the time of the armistice were necessarily out of proportion to the numbers of shipwrights and allied trades.
In the months immediately succeeding the armistice, a large amount of urgent work, in fitting out ships for their foreign stations and in connection with the reconditioning of mercantile vessels temporarily added to the navy during the war, devolved upon the dockyards and kept practically all hands employed.
When this work began to fall off, it became necessary to consider the reduction of dockyard numbers to a normal peace establishment, in fixing which the effect of the existence of the new yard at Rosyth in drawing away work from the southern yards had of course to be allowed for.
It was decided to effect the necessary reduction in numbers as gradually as possible by a system of regular weekly discharges, preceded by a fortnight's notice, so as to enable men to get employment in the merchant shipbuilding yards, where the need for additional labor was stated to be urgent. Experience soon showed however, that the merchant shipbuilding yards only absorbed a small number of the men so discharged. This was largely due to the impossibility of finding married accommodation in the commercial shipbuilding centers, but partly also to the fact that the surplus dockyard men belonged chiefly to the engineering trades and to semi-skilled and unskilled classes, whereas the urgent demand in the merchant shipbuilding yards is for shipwrights and allied trades. Considerable numbers of shipwrights who could ill be spared from the dockyards were set free in the autumn so as to relieve the shortage in the merchant shipbuilding yards, but this was done at a cost of still further disarranging the proper balance of trades in the dockyards, and has added to our difficulties.
In these circumstances His Majesty's Government decided that the discharges from the dockyards should be reduced to a minimum during the winter, and naval work that was originally intended to be deferred until a later date was brought forward, so as to keep as large a number as possible employed during the winter months.
Simultaneously, the committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Colwyn, was set up to advise on other ways of tiding over the emergency, and has made the valuable report which has recently been laid on the table.
In pursuance of the recommendations of the committee, the Admiralty are taking steps to lay down an oil tanker at Devonport immediately, and a second mercantile ship will be laid down at Pembroke at a very early date. It has been decided, in view of the difficulties of the present situation, not to proceed further with the proposal to lease the latter yard. There is no slip at present available at Portsmouth, and one will not become available there until late in the year, but the question whether a dock could be utilized at an earlier date for laying down a third mercantile ship is under consideration. A slip is available at Chatham, but the amount of urgent naval repair work employing shipwrights is so large, and the disproportion of trades is so great, that we could not at present start a merchant vessel there without drawing away shipwrights from the commercial yards, a procedure which would not be in the interests of merchant shipbuilding at the present time. Any further opportunities, however, of taking in hand work such as is contemplated in the committee's report will be carefully watched for and utilized.
Whilst these measures will undoubtedly mitigate to some extent the severity of the reductions that will have to be reintroduced after the end of this month, I wish to make it clear that, in spite of all that has been done and all that can be done, very heavy discharges will have to be made during the year 1920-21. After the most careful consideration the Board are unable to suggest any alternative means of at once meeting the pressing demand for public economy and remedying the serious disproportion of trades in the dockyards.
In the concluding paragraphs of the preceding statement on naval policy, I have made it quite clear that, in the interests of public economy, the Board are keeping down naval repair work and other dockyard services to as low a figure as is possible during 1920-21. ft will, of course, be pointed out to me that the effect of this policy of economy is to increase the discharges during the same period. It is perfectly true that there is the possible alternative of spending a great deal more money in the dockyards that in this way we could make it necessary to employ more men. But to resort once more to this process of bringing forward work which would otherwise fall on a later year could only prolong for a short time the maintenance of the present abnormal conditions in the dockyards, and would necessarily be followed by an even greater and more sudden reduction in numbers, at a time, probably, when the present intense activity in commercial shipbuilding will have abated, and when consequently the difficulties of absorption in outside industry would be increased.
Future of British Shipbuilding.—Whether British shipyards will in time be again turning out more tonnage than those of all the rest of the world put together affords an interesting subject for speculation. The latest one to write on this topic is Sir Herbert B. Rowell who, in an article appearing in the London Spectator, says that the future of British shipbuilding is inseparably bound up with that of the other countries of the world, and to gauge it requires a study not only of that larger subject, but of the capabilities of his country to recover and improve its position in the field of ship-owning. He says in part:
"Before the war we were paramount as the world's carriers, although menaced by the expansion of Germany. Other countries were also making themselves felt, but to an extent that attracted attention rather than anxiety. With the conditions now existing we must feel that, although the direction from which competition comes has changed, it is none the less real, and that it will take all our skill, experience, and industry to achieve our desired end. That this will be done, and that we shall see the flag of our country holding the place on the oceans of the world that it held formerly, is our hope and belief.
Present Situation Gauged.—"To-day we find ourselves in a position which requires careful weighing and gauging to enable us to arrive at a balanced conclusion, and this applies still more to our position in the future. We may take it for granted that our shipyards have more merchant tonnage under construction than at any previous period; that a considerable demand exists for further deliveries; that building on the whole, notwithstanding the recent falling off in America, is proceeding in foreign countries to an unprecedented extent; and that, on the other hand, we have reason to believe that there is now more tonnage afloat than ever before in the history of the world; also that it will for some time continue to be launched at a greater rate than ever before.
"Against these factors we must take into account that the government controls a considerable amount of tonnage which is being used ineffectively or not at all, and that the tonnage in the hands of ship-owners for one cause or another, such as slow working of cargo or bunkers, strikes, want of terminal facilities, and other conditions, is also giving a ton mileage considerably inferior to its pre-war performance. The former of these conditions is certain to change before long, and the latter sooner or later; both, however, are sources from which a virtual increase in effective tonnage will come to supplement new construction, and a study of the future of shipbuilding requires that the potentialities of these two circumstances should be kept vividly before us.
"Against us we have great forces, although of varying character. In China we have efficient and inexpensive labor directed by highly trained European supervision, with ample deposits of ore which are already being developed, and which promise in the near future to enable steel and other materials to be supplied at reasonable prices. There the works are extending and increasing; the supply of labor is inexhaustible, and regularity and diligence are its outstanding characteristics. In Japan the conditions are similar to those in China, except that the shipyard plants are larger, better equipped, and more modern. The management, which is highly efficient, is in the hands of Japanese who have been trained in the best works and colleges in Britain and America, with the thoroughness which characterizes this race. The greatest disadvantage that Japan labors under is that she is dependent on outside supplies for her steel; but this is being rectified by the acquisition of mineral areas in China and the development of the steel industry, which has already reached a producing stage in Korea.
America's Attitude.—"In America there is a determination and patriotic endeavor to establish herself as a ship-owning and shipbuilding country of which we have not seen the end, and the realization of which is assisted by cheap material and efficient if expensive labor. The costs are high, but it is within the power of Americans to say: 'We will have, and can pay.' The reduction in the United States shipbuilding programme will, in spite of the present labor troubles, have a steady effect on the industry later as the demand for its services diminishes, and even though the result of the present dislocation be an increase in rates of wages, it is improbable that this will be permanent.
"In any case a comparison of the present earnings in America and this country does not give the ratio of their respective costs, as the extent to which mechanical appliances are used there, notably pneumatic tools, gives them a great advantage in volume and cost of work, which is further accentuated by the extraordinary adaptability and effectiveness of their labor. The quality of the ships turned out, especially in the newer yards, has been severely criticized from the view both of workmanship and design. In both respects I consider they are inferior to what is produced in this country, but too much importance has been attached to these features as a permanent handicap to the industry. The designing will improve as soon as it passes into the hands of the private builders and the quality of the work will improve under the fostering influence of Lloyd's surveyors, as it has done in other countries.
"In Germany industry is recovering, and she is working today at prices with which for several reasons—her depreciated currency not being the least—we cannot compete. In some other countries the better labor conditions go far to counterbalance the cost of material and fuel.
"In spite of all, however, I believe that, after the disciplinary period of competition through which the shipbuilding industry of the world is sure to pass, Britain will resume her place amongst the other nations as an economical producer."—The Nautical Gazette, June 5, 1920.
JAPAN
Japanese Ships to be Placed in Reserve.—The Fuso, Haruna, and Kirishima, are nearing the "second age" period, and will soon be replaced by new ships.
The present division of ships of the Japanese Navy into ship's age is as follows:
First period Second period Third period
Battleships 6 5 4
Battlecruisers 4 3
Cruisers 7 4 14
Coast defense ships 1 5
Gunboats 16 2
Destroyers 45 35
Totals 63 63 25
Japanese Ship-owners’ Protective League.—According to advices received from the Orient, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, the Toyo Kisen Kaisha and a number of other large Japanese steamship companies have decided to join the Japan Ship Owners' Association. A powerful league of Japanese shipowners is expected to result from this action, which has been taken with the object of offsetting the inroads made into the Japanese carrying trade by the American and British shipping interests since the war. One of the objects aimed at is a closer co-operation between the Japanese shipping companies so as to eliminate competition between themselves and thus making it possible to meet effectively the competition of foreign shipping.—The Nautical Gazette, July 3, 1920.
Japanese Exhibition Ship Starting World Tour.—Japan has completed arrangements for a floating commercial museum. This is being established aboard one of the larger Japanese liners, which will sail from Yokohama on or about July 15. This education tour will take it into the principal ports of the world.
Stops will be made of from two to seven days, so that prospective buyers may see exhibits of Japanese inventions, fine arts, porcelains, lacquer-ware, raw and finished silk and other Japanese products.—The Nautical Gazette, July 3, 1920.
Shipbuilding in Japan.—The new Japanese battleship Mutsu, which was laid down in 1918 at the Yokosuka Imperial dockyard, was successfully launched on the 31st of last month. This vessel is described as the largest in the Japanese Navy, from which it would appear that her sister ship, the Nagato, being built in dry dock at the Kure dockyard since August, 1917, has not yet been floated out. The type they represent is undoubtedly a most formidable one, and to those who are out of touch with current naval progress it may come as a surprise to learn that the Mutsu and Nagato are more powerfully armed than any ship in the British Navy, and larger than any warship now afloat, with the sole exception of H. M. S. Hood. Their chief dimensions are: Length, 661 feet; beam, 95 feet; draft, 30 feet; displacement, 33,800 tons. Geared turbines are to be installed in both ships, from which a speed of 23 ½ knots is anticipated. The main armament will consist of eight 16-inch guns. The Japanese ships, therefore, are slightly larger and considerably faster than their American contemporaries of the Maryland class, the name-ship of which was launched on March 20; but the main armament is the same in calibre and number of guns. Besides the Nagato and Mutsu, six further capital ships are under construction or about to be laid down in Japan, a number that will bring the establishment up to 17 dreadnoughts or, in popular parlance, "super-dreadnoughts," for all save one of the 17 are armed with guns exceeding 12 inches in caliber.
The exact position of the Japanese naval programme at the present moment is somewhat obscure. According to a government measure introduced late in 1017, a sum of £30,054,800, spread over a period of six years, was to be spent on the construction of two battle-cruisers, three light cruisers, 27 destroyers, and 48 submarines. Of this amount, £2,544,000 were to be disbursed in 1918, £4,771,766 in 1919, £5,412,381 in the current year, £6,819,635 in 1921, £7,122,673 in 1922, and the balance in 1923. Apparently, however, the programme was subsequently modified to include a larger proportion of capital ships. The ultimate aim of the Japanese Government, as explained at the time, is to realize the so-called "eight-eight" system, that is to say, squadrons each consisting of eight battleships and eight battle-cruisers, and to create in time at least three squadrons of this composition. But, irrespective of financial considerations, there are factors which augur none too well for the attainment of this goal within the measurable future. Since the close of the war shipbuilding in Japan has been seriously hampered by the difficulty of obtaining steel. She is dependent primarily on the United States and Great Britain for her supplies of this material, and within the past two years her imports from both countries have fallen off considerably, owing, on the one hand, to transport difficulties in the States, and, on the other, to the fact that the unfavorable exchange situation makes it more profitable for British manufacturers to dispose of their steel in the European markets. So serious has the shortage become that this year's output of tonnage in Japan is expected to be less than 600,000 tons instead of the 800,000 tons forecast in January. This scarcity of steel is probably reacting on the naval programme, and may account in part for the delay in floating out the Nagato. When the war boom in shipbuilding was at its crest new yards sprang up in Japan with mushroom-like rapidity. Just before the armistice no less than 70 shipyards were at work in the Osaka district alone, a number that has lately fallen to 20. The home steel supply was gravely prejudiced at the beginning of the year by an act of sabotage perpetrated at the Yawata works, the only concern in Japan which is capable of producing large quantities of steel. So extensive was the damage that the works had to be closed down for several months. Another factor tending to retard the output of tonnage, naval as well as mercantile, is the higher rate of wages demanded by the shipyard workers. Four years ago the average daily wage of a Japanese shipwright was about a yen (2s.). The present-day average is doubtful, but it is certainly much higher, and fresh claims have lately been put forward on behalf of the workers. Thus the immense advantage which cheap labor gave to Japanese shipbuilders over their rivals in the Occident is gradually disappearing.
So far as technical efficiency is concerned, Japan unquestionably stands in the front rank as a shipbuilding nation. During the period of intensive construction brought about by the depredations of German submarines, many new "records" for quick building were made in the United States, and a yard at Ecorse, Detroit River, claimed to have "licked creation" by delivering the steamship Crawl Keys, of 2300 tons gross, 29 days after the keel had been laid. This achievement, creditable as it was, has, however, been surpassed by the Kawasaki dockyard at Kobe in the case of the steamer Raifuku Maru, of 5800 tons gross. The keel of that vessel was laid on October 7th, 1918, she was launched on October 30, and her official trials were successfully completed on November 5. In her case, therefore, the building period also covered 29 clays, but she was larger than the American vessel by 3500 tons, a difference that makes the record much more noteworthy. In speed of naval construction the Japanese yards are equally well to the fore. The 31,300-ton battleship he, built by the Kawasaki Company, was completed in 31 months. Twelve 700-ton torpedo-boat destroyers, ordered in Japan by the French Government at the beginning of 1917, were all in service by the following August, some of them having been built so quickly that the average period for the twelve worked out at five months. In the light of these performances the assertion of a leading Japanese yard' that, provided the necessary material was forthcoming, they would be prepared to deliver a battleship of the largest dimensions within 20 months from the laying of the keel, a light cruiser within TI months, and a large destroyer within five months, does not appear to be exaggerated.
The rise and development of modern shipbuilding in Japan furnishes one of the most striking instances of the national adaptability. The squadrons which _ carried the Japanese flag to victory at the Yalu in 1894 and at Tsushima in 1905 had been constructed almost entirely in foreign shipyards. _ It was not until 1905 that the first large armored warship was laid down in a Japanese yard. But since that date more than a score of fine battleship and cruisers have been built and completely equipped by the national industry, and at the present moment, as we have seen, battleships of unprecedented size and power are approaching completion in Japan. The growth of the late Imperial German Navy during the 20 years preceding the war was regarded as phenomenal; but considering the great difference in wealth and productive facilities of Germany and Japan respectively, the latter’s achievement in the same sphere of endeavor is even more astonishing.—The Engineer, June 18, 1920.
UNITED STATES
Materiel
Our Naval Standing.—The fact that we are the only nation which has continued since the war to enlarge its battleship strength made it inevitable that the question of supremacy of the sea would arise and form the subject of discussion—in other words, that our naval policy should stimulate instead of helping to repress that race in naval armaments to which it was hoped that the extinction of the German Navy had put an end. Evidence of this thought and talk is found in an article by Archibald Hurd in a recent issue of the Illustrated London News, in which a very striking comparison is made of the strength in capital ships of our own navy and that of the British, when our present programme of construction shall have been completed, that is to say, about the year 1924.
Except for the finishing up of a few of the smaller types of vessels. Great Britain has no construction on hand and has no thought of laying down a new programme. The same is true of France and Italy. In this country, at the time the article was written, we had 18 capital ships authorized or under construction, each of which will be larger and more heavily armed than any existing ships in the world. The battleships include the California and Tennessee, of 32,300 tons, mounting eight 16-inch and 14 5-inch guns; the four battleships of the West Virginia type of 32,600 tons, mounting eight 16-inch and 14 5-inch guns; and, lastly, the six battleships of the Indiana class, each of 42,300 tons displacement, mounting 12 16-inch and 16 6-inch guns.
In addition to these are the six battle-cruisers of the Lexington class. The designs for these huge ships have been greatly modified, the speed having been reduced, but the size increased. The displacement has risen to 43,500 tons, and they are thus the largest capital ships of any kind on paper or afloat. They will carry eight 16-inch and 14 5-inch guns.
For the purpose of comparison, Archibald Hurd considers that both battleships and battle-cruisers should be divided into two classes, since the first class, or super-dreadnought, to use a rather common but ambiguous term, are so much more powerful than the earlier dreadnoughts or battleships as to require a separate designation. He considers the same thing to be true of the battle-cruisers. So, basing his comparison on the determination of the British to lay down no new ships for a while, he estimates the relative naval strength of the two leading naval powers will stand in 1924 as follows: In first-class battleships, the British have ten carrying the 15-inch gun, and we shall have ten mounting the 16-inch gun; in second-class battleships, the British have 13 mounting the 13.5-inch gun, and our navy will have 11, mounting the 14-inch gun.
In first-class battle-cruisers, the British have three mounting the 15-inch gun, and we shall have six mounting the 16-inch gun. Of second-class battle-cruisers, armed with the 13.5-inch gun, the British have three; we shall have no second-class battle-cruisers. Summing up, we find that by 1924 the British will have 13 first-class capital ships against 16 in the American navy, and that they will have 16 second-class capital ships as against 11 in the United States Navy. As a final consideration, he asks whether, in view of the modifications which arc sure to be made, as the records of the war are studied, it would not be better to delay the construction of new ships for two or three years as the British are now doing. The answer to that is that our new battleships and battle-cruisers are supposed to embody the facts of more experience.—The Scientific American, June 26, 1920.
“Maryland”—Our First 16-Inch-Gun Battleship.—The super-dreadnought Maryland now completing at Newport News, Va., is the fourth electrically propelled battleship of the United States Navy and sister ship of the California, which is being put into commission at the Mare Island Navy Yard, San Francisco. She is also the first United States ship to mount the new 16-inch gun of which she carries eight in four turrets.
Like her prototype, the New Mexico, pioneer electric warship of the world, the Maryland is electrical throughout.
Her propulsion equipment was designed and manufactured in the shops of the General Electric Company at Schenectady, N. Y., a city, which because of its pioneer work in electric propulsion has, in a sense, come to be known as the birthplace of electric drive.
Four huge electric motors 12 feet in diameter weighing 62 tons and producing 7000 horsepower each, revolve the great propellers. The current is obtained from two turbo-generator units driven by steam from nine oil heated boilers placed in three separate compartments of the ship. Approximately 28,000 horsepower is thus available for propulsion purposes or enough to supply power to a city of 100,000 population.
Steam from the boilers under pressure of 250 pounds to the square inch expands into a Curtis turbine and revolves the turbine blades at high speed. This turbine is directly connected to a generator which produces electric current. Through copper cables this current is then led to a control board where it is measured and passed on to the motors which drive the propellers of the vessel.
A portion of the steam produced in the ship's boilers is diverted to six auxiliary turbo-generator sets which create additional energy for the operation of many other electric features of interest.
These auxiliary generating units for instance will supply the vessel's lighting, operate fans and blowers, run the electric bakery, drive the machine tools used in the foundry, carpenter shop and machine shop, operate the electric laundry equipment, assist in loading the big guns, raise and lower the life boats by means of boat cranes and hoist and lower the ship's great anchors.
Electricity will also be used in the refrigerating room which by means of motor-driven pumps, will produce many pounds of ice a day. Electrically operated pumps will distill gallons of fresh water from the salt waves for the use of the crew and to furnish the boilers with fresh water.
Among other auxiliary uses of electricity on the Maryland may be mentioned searchlights, ammunition hoists, electric cooking utensils, telephones and intercommunication systems, gyroscopic compasses, steering gear apparatus (the ship will be steered electrically), motors for revolving gun turrets, air compressors and many other devices making the Maryland an electric ship indeed.
The Maryland is 624 feet long, weighs 32,600 tons and has a total fuel capacity of about 1,000,000 gallons of oil.
We give below, in chronological order, the various steps in the evolution of the electric drive in the United States:
1907.—First application of the principle adapted to fire-boats in the city of Chicago.
1912.—U. S. S. Collier Jupiter, first naval vessel of any nation equipped for electric drive launched at Mare Island Navy Yard, San Francisco, after design of Dr. W. L. Emmet of General Electric Company.
1917 (April).—Emmet's principles applied to U. S. S. New Mexico, built and launched at New York Navy Yard.
1919.—U. S. S. Tennessee, launched at New York Navy Yard. Navy Department adopts electric drive for six new battle-cruisers, to have a speed of 33 ¼ knots and develop 180,000 horsepower each.
1919 (October).—Fishing trawler of 100 tons equipped with electric drive, the first installation of its kind to vessels of this class.
1919 (November).—Launching of U. S. S. California at Mare Island.
1920 (March).—U. S. S. Maryland, launched at Newport News, Va.—The Scientific American, June 26, 1920.
Two Years of Electric Propulsion on the “New Mexico.”—As the New Mexico, the first United States battleship to be fitted with electric drive, was placed in commission at the New York Navy Yard in May, 1918, she is now just completing her second year of active service. During that time she has seen service of practically every kind that is encountered by a battleship except actual engagement in battle. The results of this service, according to Commander S. M. Robinson, U. S. N., fleet engineer of the Pacific fleet, of which the New Mexico is the flagship, have been highly satisfactory and justify the judgment of those who are responsible for the installation of electric machinery in the vessel.
As Commander Robinson gave a very complete description of the New Mexico's machinery in this magazine a year ago, it will be remembered that the electric machinery for propulsion consists of two main turbo generators rated at 11,500 kilowatts each at 80 per cent power factor and having an overload capacity of 25 per cent, four main motors rated at 7250 horsepower each and having an overload capacity of 25 per cent, two boosters for varying the current of the main field, two 300-kilowatt exciters for supplying the current to the main field and also certain electrically-driven auxiliaries, together with a main switchboard, an exciter switchboard and the necessary wire and cable. The ship uses one generator for speeds up to 17 knots and two generators for speeds from 17 knots to full speed, which is between 21 and 22 knots. For speeds up to 15 knots the motors are run on the 36-pole connection, so that at 15 knots the turbine is running at its designed full speed; from 15 knots to full speed the motors are run on the 24-pole connection. This arrangement gives good economy at all speeds, and in order to give our readers a definite idea of just what Jesuits have been obtained, Commander Robinson has prepared the following report:
The New Mexico has been operating for nearly a year in company with two sister ships, the Idaho and Mississippi, which have hulls identical with that of the New Mexico. During this time it has been possible to get an accurate comparison of the relative economy of the three ships and also the relative maneuvering qualities. In the latter respect, the New Mexico is decidedly superior, and the remarkable part of it is that nearly all the maneuvering in restricted waters has been done with one turbo-generator. When this installation was first proposed, its opponents maintained that, while a ship like the Jupiter could be satisfactorily operated with the screws on both sides of the ship running at exactly the same speed, it would not be possible to get satisfactory operation with that arrangement on a ship which had to operate in formation. But exactly the reverse has proved to be true; it has been found that more satisfactory operation is obtained when using one generator than when using two, and it is customary, when in dangerous waters where it is desired to take all possible precautions, to use one generator for driving the ship and to keep the other fuming over idle. If the ship is getting under way from an anchorage and has to turn, as soon as the anchor is away the signal is given for standard speed ahead on one side and the same speed astern on the other; with this arrangement the ship will turn absolutely on her heel without gaining ground either ahead or astern; with other engines, where it is not possible to regulate the speed so quickly and accurately, the probability of getting speed on the ship in one direction or the other is much greater. All the predictions in regard to trouble on account of the condition that when operating with one generator the screws on both sides of the ship must run at the same speed (if run at all) have proven to be groundless.
In regard to the comparison of economics the results have been very favorable to the New Mexico. The Idaho and Mississippi are fitted with direct-connected turbines (one is Parsons and the other Curtis) and have geared cruising turbines; the Idaho can use her cruising turbines at all speeds up to about 17 knots and the Mississippi can make about 15 knots with her cruising turbines. Experience gained by a comparison of destroyers fitted with geared main turbines and those fitted with direct connected main turbines and geared cruising turbines indicates that the economy of the Idaho and Mississippi at cruising speeds is about as good as it would be if they had geared main turbines. A comparison of the New Mexico with these ships is therefore particularly interesting at the lower speeds.
The advocates of electric propulsion have always claimed that it was very superior to all other forms of propulsion at the cruising speeds, but even the most enthusiastic of these have been surprised by the remarkable showing made. This is doubtless due to the fact that no one made sufficient allowance for the saving due to shutting down one generator and all the auxiliaries that go with one of the condensing plants. At a speed of 10 knots the New Mexico uses about 16.7 per cent less oil than her sister ships, or, putting it another way, her sister ships use about 20 per cent more than the New Mexico; at 13 knots the figures are 29.9 per cent or 42.7 per cent; at 16 knots the figures are 32.3 per cent or 47.8 per cent; at 19 knots the figures are 28.6 per cent or 40.1 per cent; at full power the figures are 24.4 per cent or 32.2 per cent. At 19 knots and also at full power the New Mexico uses about .975 pound of oil per shaft horsepower per hour, and at 15 knots she only uses 1.1 pounds of oil per shaft horsepower per hour. This is a remarkably uniform economy.
The New Mexico has just completed her annual full-power trials and the following table gives an analysis of the data obtained:
Full power Endurance
Revolutions per minute 167.4 151.7
Speed (knots) 21 19.35
Shaft horsepower 28,820 21,650
Pounds of oil per shaft horsepower per hour .975 .973
Pounds of oil per square foot of heating surface .506 .3795
Estimated water evaporated in pounds per hour 395,500 294,700
Estimated water per shaft horsepower in pounds per hour (all purposes) 13.65 13.62
Pressure (gage) in pounds per square inch at the boilers 270 265
Pressure (gage) in pounds per square inch at the turbines 255 260
Superheat (in degrees Fahrenheit) 32 23
Vacuum 28.7 29.0
In regard to the reliability of the machinery, the New Mexico has had nothing but the most minor troubles with her electric plant and there have been no navy yard repairs whatever; there has been one serious accident to the steam part of the machinery which required work to be done by a navy yard, but that was due entirely to a mechanical defect. Due to improper construction of the main governor, one of the weights became detached while the turbo-generator was running without load; the turbine ran away and operated the emergency governor, which tripped the throttle, but the latter did not entirely close and the turbine ran at over-speed sufficiently to stretch the turbine wheels and the entire rotor had to be replaced. The governor has been changed and additional over-speed protection given by arranging for the emergency governor to close the admission valves as well as the main throttle. The machinery has been in operation nearly a year since repairs were completed and no further trouble has developed.
In conclusion, it may be said that the performance of the New Mexico since commissioning has been entirely satisfactory in every way and that the expectations of those who were responsible for its installation have been more than realized.—"International Marine Engineering."—A. S. N. E., May, 1920.
Personnel
The Discipline of the Navy.—The continued controversy and bitter feeling arising from the Senate investigation of the navy's conduct of the war has brought about a situation most unfortunate for the best interests of the navy, and one that is utterly subversive of navy discipline. The injection of politics into service affairs has always been, and it is to be feared will continue to be, a serious injury to its best interests. It is the opinion of many conservative officers of the navy that certain very able officers of the navy are being exploited for political purposes, perhaps without their being fully aware of that fact; and that politics and partisanship have no less been injected into navy affairs by certain of those in authority. Whatever may be the justice of the grievance of officers who feel that political or personal motives have been allowed to influence official action, however admirable may be their purpose in desiring to better the efficiency of the service, it is most unfortunate that this should lead to public attacks upon those in authority. Whatever may be the justice of official resentment against criticism, it is doubly unfortunate that this has found expression in appeals to prejudice, in counter attacks that may be regarded as ingenious examples of special pleading, rather than in proper judicial action and unbiased statements of fact. For the present state of undiscipline, to give it its mildest description, the lack of a judicial attitude on one side has led to appeals to the extra-judicial tribunal of public opinion on the other.
The result can only be injury to the service. Discipline and respect for authority are the foundation stones of the navy as well as of the army; a judicial and unbiased attitude on the part of those in authority is no less essential. Partisan or political appeal should have no part in service affairs. Our civic affairs are largely conducted by appeals to public opinion, as a court of last resort, and in a government such as ours wherein all may share this method of open discussion is without doubt an admirable one. But for the services the people as the court of last resort have already set forth in the laws made through their representatives the methods of orderly procedure, the established rule and regulation, that are best conducive to the needs of military discipline. An appeal beyond the law to the court of public opinion that established that law may be made with no other intent than a desire to correct conditions that are an injury to the service. Yet such appeal can but result ultimately in a worse injury to the service than the evils it is desired to correct—may lead to the disruption of discipline, the undermining of the spirit of loyalty to superiors in command. Without discipline, without respect for authority, military or naval organization is ineffective. Authority should deserve respect and should make itself respected; but whether or not it does so, those with the best interests of the navy at heart must recognize the injury to discipline and to the service of appeals against authority that go outside the channels of regulations and of navy law.—The Army and Navy Journal, July 3, 1920.
Merchant Marine
Jones Bill Signed by President.—After weeks and months of doubts and heart-searching the Jones Bill, reconstituting the Shipping Board, arranging for the disposition of the Board's tonnage, and vitally affecting the future of the American merchant marine passed both houses of Congress on June 4, and was signed by the President the following day.
In many respects the Jones measure is a new shipping act, for it gives the Shipping Board powers over shipping not previously possessed. In all probability the Board will in the near future put into operation several policies which have been in abeyance pending passage of the bill. Among these is a new sales programme, a revised agency agreement with managers and operators, a ship repair policy and a general formulation of policy to conform with the sections of the new law.
Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby made a protest against the approval of the bill, based on an examination by the law officers of the State Department, who declared that in several sections the shipping bill violated existing treaties. It was also believed by them that the provisions as to the ex-German ships and their disposition by the Shipping Board would involve the Government in litigation and that the whole matter would be thrown into the courts.
It is recalled that the State Department objected at the time to the preferential tariff provision of the Underwood Bill on the ground that it violated existing treaties. On that occasion President Wilson declared that the portion of the act in question was unconstitutional and therefore of no effect.
Excess Profits Section.—The section dealing with the war profits and excess profits taxes had to be referred back to the conference committee, as the Speaker ruled the section out of order. As passed, the latter provides that owners of American vessels engaged in foreign trade shall for ten years be permitted to deduct from their income tax return the net earnings of their steamers, provided such net earnings are invested in new tonnage in American yards.
However, two-thirds of the cost of such new tonnage shall be paid out of the ordinary capital or funds of the ship-owners. The section also provides that in the case of the sale of a vessel, income taxes shall not be payable provided the entire proceeds of the sale be invested in new tonnage in American shipyards.
Under the bill the sale of vessels to aliens can be ordered by the Board only after five of the seven members have agreed that they cannot be disposed of to advantage in the domestic market. The Senate provision limiting the sale to aliens of vessels not exceeding 6000 tons and not less than ten years' old, was stricken out.
The limitation placed on sales to foreigners is outlined in a section providing that "no such sale shall be made unless the Board, after diligent effort, has been unable to sell in accordance with the provisions directing the sale to American citizens and has, upon the affirmative vote of not less than five members, determined to make such sale, and it shall make as a part of its record a full statement of its reasons for making such sale."
Sale of Tonnage.—The sale, to American citizens, may be made on such terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe, with a limit of 15 years for the final payment and at an interest rate on the deferred payments to be fixed by the Board.
The bill provides that 75 per cent of the stock of vessels operating in the trade and the majority of the stock bf vessels operating in the foreign trade shall be held by American citizens.
A revolving fund of $25,000,000 to be made up of proceeds of the sale and operation of ships by the Board as created, from which the Board may make loans to any company, corporation or individual, wishing to establish new ship routes, for the building of ships. The revolving fund will operate for five years.
The former German piers at Hoboken are to be turned over to the Shipping Board January 1, next, while other property acquired during the war, except the former German liners already in the hands of the Board, will be turned over at the discretion of the President.
The city of Hoboken is not recompensed for loss in taxation due to the Government acquiring the former German property in that city.
Marine insurance companies may combine, without coming under the jurisdiction of the Sherman or other anti-trust laws, for the "taking of marine insurance risks."
Similar provision is made for the combination of the resources of banking interests for the issuance of ship mortgages.
Coastwise Shipping.—The laws affecting coastwise shipping, which make a monopoly for American ships, may be extended to trade with the Philippines by directions of the President.
The bill provides that the Shipping Board shall be composed of members representing different sections of the country, as follows: Atlantic Coast, two members; Pacific Coast, two members; Gulf States, one member; Lake States, one member, and interior States, one member. The conference committee added the provision that not more than four of the seven members of the Board "may be of one political faith."
The annual salary of members of the Shipping Board is increased from $7500 to $12,000.
Japanese Objection.—From Tokio, Japan, a cable states that, according to the Hochi Shimbun, Japan will protest against the Jones Bill, especially in regard to its relation to the shipping of the Philippines. The protest, the Japanese newspaper says, will be made on the ground that the measure is a discriminatory violation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty and represents a blow to Japanese shipping.—The Nautical Gazette, June 12, 1920.
America’s New Ship Policy.—Has Uncle Sam forfeited the good will of England, France, Norway, Sweden, Holland, and Japan by enacting into law Senator Jones's Merchant Marine Bill? Some of our discerning editors, both on the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards and throughout the central West, shake their heads as they read certain drastic provisions of the Jones Shipping Bill which run counter to obligations assumed by the United States in no less than 24 commercial treaties. Since 1815, they point out, this country has maintained reciprocal relations affecting shipping with foreign governments, and these agreements were made binding in the form of treaties. Many provisions of the Jones Act, they aver, are discriminatory in favor of American ship-owners and against the fleets of other nations.
The New Republic (New York), however, declares that "the Merchant Marine Act is the one notable achievement of the late Congressional session," and the Rochester Post-Express agrees. The New York World asserts that it is in reality "the most important legislation of its kind ever enacted by Congress." "The big thing," editors agree, "is that a beginning has been made toward restoring the American flag to its proper eminence on the seas." "Only the skilful management, wisdom, and persistence of Senator Jones, of Washington, carried the bill through," agree The New Republic and the New York Journal of Commerce, and we read in the latter paper that—
"Senator Jones nursed the Shipping Bill through the Senate Committee hearings over a period of two months, framed its provisions in cooperation with the Shipping Board and other members of the committee, prest its passage by the Senate, worked over its sections in conference, and finally led the fight for the measure in Congress. As the man most largely responsible for the act, he speaks authoritatively in interpreting its intentions."
"This is an American act; it is intended solely for American interests," bluntly asserts Senator Jones. Furthermore he goes on:
"European Powers are freeing themselves from treaty provisions that will hinder them in the struggle for the world's trade. We have been prevented from doing what many thought should be done to aid our merchant marine by treaties entered into many years ago. This is a splendid time to unshackle ourselves and put ourselves in a position to make such treaties, to enter into such commercial relations, and to enact such laws as we think will promote our welfare in the world's readjustment. Other nations will look after their interests. We must look after ours.
"British Lloyd's is one of the greatest factors in maintaining a British merchant marine. We should have a similar organization in this country, and we feel that the American Bureau of Shipping should be to our shipping what Lloyd's is to British shipping. We therefore provide in this act for its encouragement by direction all governmental agencies to use that bureau for classification purposes.
"American mail should be carried in American ships, if at all practicable. Of the more than $3,000,000 paid every year for carrying our mail overseas about $2,500,000 is paid to foreign ships. This is so much aid or subsidy to them. This we want stopt. We want our mail carried in our ships."
The question of the right of the Government to dispose of the ex-German liners has been definitely settled by the Jones Act, we are told in The Annalist (New York), and there are provisions for the exemption from excess- or war-profits taxes of the net earnings of ships engaged in foreign trade for a period of ten years, with the understanding that the shipping companies must invest, either in government-owned ships or in new construction in American ship-building yards, a sum equivalent to the amount they otherwise would have had to pay in taxes. The act also forbids American railroads to grant export rates on freight to be carried in foreign ships, and it directs the President to repeal or abrogate all commercial treaties which prevent the United States from returning to the system of preferential duties. In order to meet foreign competition, the Government may not only charge lower duties, but it may grant lower port charges and canal tolls. All these concessions are not calculated to arouse great enthusiasm in foreign shipping circles, and there are intimations from abroad that retaliatory measures will soon be in order. Some of them are also criticized in our own country, by the New York Journal of Commerce, which says:
"Not the least dangerous element of protection is the grant of low export-rates to goods carried in American bottoms—a measure sure to invite retaliation. Highly objectionable also as a piece of special privilege is the section exempting ship-owners from income and excess-profits taxes for ten years to come provided that they annually reinvest in ship construction a sum equal to the taxes they would otherwise have paid to the Government. The legislation is against the spirit of the times, opposed to all sound, economic doctrine, and essentially inequitable. It is more nearly modeled upon the lines of Prussian protectionism as exhibited in Germany before the war. It must, therefore, be a failure in the broadest sense of the term."
The Journal of Commerce of Liverpool is no less outspoken in its criticism of the new Merchant Marine Act. We read:
"It is realized that a United States mercantile marine can not be operated at the same costs as British, Norwegian, Dutch, or Japanese shipping, and it is therefore necessary to extend to ship-owning interests in the States the large measure of protection which has always been favored for the development of United States home trade. Whether this policy of coddling will yield the desired results is at least doubtful. Our own ship-owning industry has assumed the foremost place without any of the careful nursing which is to be accorded to United States merchant shipping, and the British mercantile marine asks for nothing more than a fair field against all rivals."
"But the common-sense view will be that the United States is solely within its rights in regulating what is, in effect, purely internal commerce," declares the Memphis Commercial Appeal, and the New York Tribune reminds us that "we built a merchant marine as a matter of military policy, and we expect to keep it both for military and economic reasons. The expansion of the merchant marine is a matter of national concern, to be promoted by all legitimate methods." The Newark News looks upon the Jones Act as a new charter of rights for the American merchant marine," and, adds The Sun and New York Herald, "Great Britain can hardly be blamed for watching with something like alarm our 10,000,000-ton merchant fleet." As to our competitors in the shipping business abroad, and the methods which they are said to be contemplating using to maintain their prestige, this paper goes on:
"The hints from London regarding retaliation if we do adopt a preferential policy say that England employed no such discriminatory means to build up her merchant marine, which achieved brilliant and powerful success through a policy of 'no fear and no favor.' Any one who knows the slightest thing about the British merchant marine policy knows this is not a fact.
"England has a perfect right to take these measures if they are necessary to her welfare or if she so desires, her ships; insurance companies, docking facilities, foreign-port concessions, control of trade routs were all obtained by British brains, energy, money, or courage, and England has full freedom to use them as she will for the promotion of her commerce. But to deny to us or to anybody else the same right by saying she practices no shipping discrimination is a plea which must be laughed out of court."—The Literary Digest, July 3, 1920.
The Registration of American Shipping.—It is quite easy to realize the anxiety of those interested in American shipping to make every effort in order to carry on that particular branch of industry apart from any association with the organizations of other nations. It would appear that the Shipping Board of the United States has issued instructions that the managers and operators of vessels belonging to the Shipping Board must obtain their classification from the American Bureau of Shipping. In order to encourage the development of this practice we understand that the bureau is prepared to make examinations without charge and to issue the necessary certificates resulting from such examinations. The primary object, as far as we can see, is the carrying out of the intentions of the Government to supersede Lloyd's by discontinuing the Lloyd's classification of all American-owned ships. As far as one is able to judge there does not appear to be very much hope that this result is likely to be achieved at any near date in the future, even if it is ever achieved, for the reason that Lloyd's classification has world-wide significance and it will take a long time to break down the desire of shipping owners for Lloyd's classification, mainly for the reasons that underwriters are assured that it is so much better than that of any other organization and a strong feeling prevails that vessels classed under Lloyd's Register can always get a better sale. The probability is that political and national influences are dominating the action of the American Shipping Board, but if this is so, the fact must not be overlooked that such considerations do not appeal in any large measure to men of business dealing with problems from a commercial point of view. Although such a policy could be carried out when ships were under the control of the American Shipping Board assuming, however, that those ships passed into the hands of private people, the question of classification and survey will mainly be determined on commercial grounds. We do not see any cause to look upon this action of the American Shipping Board with any anxiety for the reason that all shipping owners of any nationality recognize that the classification of Lloyd's Register opens all the markets of the world to the owner desirous of disposing of a vessel from his fleet.—The Marine Engineer and Naval Architect, June, 1920.
Deck Crew’s New Wage Scale.—Below is the new monthly wage scale for American deck crews negotiated between the ship-owners, the Shipping Board, and the Eastern and Gulf Sailors' Association. It is to remain in effect until May 1, 1921:
Carpenter $100.00
Carpenter's mate $95.00
Boatswain $95.00
Boatswain's mate $90.00
Quartermaster $87.50
Able seaman $85.00
Ordinary seaman $65.00
Boy $40.00
—The Nautical Gazette, June 5, 1920.
A Comparison of Shipbuilding.—The world's shipyards are building a greater volume of sea-going tonnage to-day in the shape of steel steamships than ever in their history, says a statement just issued by Lloyd's Register of Shipping, giving returns from all maritime countries. Steel steamers under construction for the quarter ended April 1 are reported to have aggregated 7,692,000 gross tons, as compared with 4,935,000 tons at September 30, 1918, and 7,504,000 tons at September 30, last, the latter being the high record until the quarter just ended.
Total tonnage of all kinds under construction shows a decrease however, the aggregate being 7,941,000 tons', as against 8,048,000 tons on September 30, 1919. This is accounted for by the progress of the Shipping Board's programme towards completion and the marked decline in the building of wooden steamers. Only 105,000 tons of this type of construction are under way, as contrasted with 1,324,000 tons just before the Armistice, since which time there has been a steady falling off. This has been most marked in the United States, where the shrinkage has been from 1,169,000 tons at September 30, 1918, to 55,000 tons to-day.
Figures for the first quarter of this year show that Great Britain now holds the lead in shipbuilding over the United States by a margin of 821,000 tons, although this country led by 1,930,000 tons a year ago. At the beginning of this year the two countries were neck and neck, the advantage being only slightly with the United Kingdom. The following table shows how the two countries have stood relatively at the ends of the various quarters in the total gross tons under construction:
United States United Kingdom
Sept. 30, 1918 3,382,000 1,746,000
Dec. 30, 1918 3,645,000 1,979,000
Mar. 31, 1919 4,185,000 2,254,000
June 30, 1919 3,874,000 2,524,000
Sept. 30, 1919 3,470,000 2,816,000
Dec. 31, 1919 2,966,000 2,994,000
Mar. 31, 1920 2,573,000 3,394,000
This includes all types of tonnage. In the construction of steel steamers the margin is a wider one. At September 30, last, the United States still led by 279,000 gross tons; but by the end of the year the United Kingdom had a lead of 334,000 tons and has now extended it to 961,000 tons.
But while Britain is building a greater number of steel steamers and a considerably greater aggregate tonnage than this country, the average size of her ships is considerably smaller, her 814, of 3,379,ooo gross tons, averaging only 4,151 tons, as against 5,373 tons for the 450 American ships of 2,418,000 tons.
In the United States more tonnage of all kinds is being built in the shipyards of the Atlantic Coast than in those of the Gulf ports, the Great Lakes and the Pacific Coast combined. In steel steamers the difference is even more marked, nearly 60 per cent of this type of construction being under way along the eastern seaboard. The following table shows the distribution by districts in gross tons:
All types Steel steamers
Atlantic Coast 1,602,167 1,585,827
Gulf ports 213,193 180,793
Great Lakes 173,375 173,375
Pacific Coast 584,563 478,163
Total 2,573,298 2,418,158
A year ago the United States was building nearly 54 per cent of all the tonnage underway in the world, as compared to 29 per cent for the United Kingdom and 17 per cent for all other countries. Today this country is constructing 32 per cent, against about 43 per cent for Great Britain and about 25 per cent for all other countries. Excluding Great Britain, however, America is building 80,000 tons more than all the other countries combined.
Between them the United States and the United Kingdom are turning out three-fourths of the world's tonnage and no other country is within measurable distance of either of them. Japan, which has held third place from the time of the Armistice to the beginning of this year, has now been passed by both Holland and Italy and is being pressed by France. All three of the latter made gains during the past quarter, while Japan fell back from 309,000 tons to 285,000.
The distribution of shipbuilding at the beginning of April, as compared with the previous quarter, was as follows, in gross tons:
Mar. 31, 1920 Dec. 31, 1919
United States 2,573,298 2,966,515
United Kingdom 3,394,425 2,994,249
Canada 169,623 188,375
Other Dominions 61,636 63,105
Belgium 25,640 26,293
Brazil 5,366
China 35,325 35,700
Denmark 114,851 100,335
France 240,225 216,775
Greece 1,500 1,500
Holland 366,581 328,338
Italy 355,241 314,547
Japan 285,676 309,474
Norway 90,449 92,719
Portugal 5,210 5,210
Spain 98,351 107,463
Sweden 118,553 110,765
Total 7,941,950 7,861,363
Of the total tonnage being built in the world at the beginning of April, excluding vessels the construction of which has not actually been commenced and excluding all vessels of less than 100 tons, the total under inspection by Lloyd's Register amounts to 4,965,612 gross tons.—Shipping, June 10, 1920.
AERONAUTICS
Naval Reserve Flying Corps Training.—Admiral R. E. Coontz, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations, has approved a plan of the Bureau of Navigation which will allow qualified aviators of the Naval Reserve Flying Corps to indulge in flying for two weeks during the coming summer. The schedule provided for four stations, which will give 60 aviators practice in heavier-than-air and 20 practice in lighter-than air craft every two weeks. The training is to be given in the discretion of the commanding officers at the stations located at Rockaway Beach, L. I., Hampton Roads, Va., Pensacola, Fla., and San Diego, Calif., so as not to interfere with the regular operations of these stations. The schedule is for the exercise of qualified fliers only, for no provisions can be made for the training of unqualified members of the Naval Reserve Flying Corps at this time. Each of the stations will accommodate 15 in heavier-than-air and five in lighter-than-air craft every two weeks. The training will begin July 1, and the officers who apply for active duty for this training will be assigned as follows: First and Third Naval Districts, to Naval Air Station, Rockaway, L. I. Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Naval Districts, to Hampton Roads. Va. Seventh Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh Districts, to Pensacola, Fla. Twelfth and Thirteenth Districts, to San Diego, Calif.
Commandants of naval districts will arrange all the details concerning the training of the Reserve fliers with the commanding officers of the several naval air stations. Periods of less than two weeks' time actually at the air stations for this training will not be considered. Lack of facilities alone makes it imperative that training of any enrolled enlisted personnel, student fliers or other officers and men in the Naval Reserve Flying Corps be not undertaken during the coming summer.—Aerial Age Weekly, June 14, 1920.
A Flying Academy.—When the American flying service really gets into going order, serious consideration will have to be given to the establishment of an academy similar in type and standing to the military and naval colleges at West Point and Annapolis. Since it is certain that in a few years' time the flying service will be of equal importance if not of more importance than the other services, an air college from which men may be commissioned direct into the service after strenuous tests will become a necessity. The practical interest already taken in aviation by the big educational institutions promises well for the future.—The Scientific American, July 10, 1920.
Naval Reserve Flying Corps of 2,000.—The Navy Department has decided that the Naval Reserve Flying Corps (Class 5) will consist of approximately 2,000 officers, all of whom must be qualified naval aviators. In order to obtain and maintain the officers the following plan has been adopted: The required percentage of graduates of designated universities and colleges, who have completed a syllabus of training in aviation approved by the Navy Department, and who meet all other requirements defined by the Navy Department, will be enrolled in the Flying Corps as midshipmen. They will immediately be sent to Pensacola, or other naval air stations, for an intensive course of training for three months or longer. Upon completion of the course graduates will be commissioned either as ensigns in Class 5 or will be discharged, according to whether or not they are considered qualified for all the duties of an officer in the Flying Corps. Every officer in the Flying Corps will be confirmed in appointment after graduation and thereafter will be required to take at least two weeks' active duty for training at a naval air station or with a fleet aviation detachment each year.
Facilities will be open at all times to officers of the Flying Corps at all naval air stations to engage in flights at their own convenience. In order to remain in the Flying Corps each officer must have at least 15 hours' actual time in the air each year of his enrollment. There are approximately 1500 qualified aviators in the Naval Reserve Flying Corps. An officer in the corps will not be re-enrolled after he has had eight years' service; therefore, in order to provide and maintain the necessary number it will be necessary to enroll and train about 400 midshipmen every year. Only officers now in Class 5 who are qualified naval aviators and have had less than eight years' naval service will be eligible for re-enrollment. Enrolled enlisted men will not be eligible for enrollment in this class.—Aerial Age Weekly, June 21, 1920.
Something New in the Way of Airplane Metal Ribs.—Extreme altitudes—the objective of Major R. W. Schroeder and aviators of like ambitions—are not to overshadow another problem of aeronautics, that of multiplying the speed range of airplanes. A new type of airplane rib developed by the United States Bureau of Standards, by varying the angle of attack, is capable of making greater speed than hitherto possible with the prevailing wings.
Described as the Parker variable-camber wing, the newly-designed equipment recognizes the principle of construction that if the angle of attack can be efficiently varied from a very small to a very large angle, a wide range of speeds is possible. The properties of the type of wing usually seen are held responsible for the restricted speed of airplanes.
Among the features of the rib structure of the Parker variable-camber wing are: Deformation regularly with the load up to the unit flying load, then remains rigid under further applications of weight, being strong enough to stand up under several times its normal load without failure. Simple, foolproof and easily manufactured are the virtues claimed for the wing. Metal construction is necessary in the new type of rib; other portions of the machine such as spars, bracing wires, and struts are not altered. The essential parts of the new wing are: channel-shaped strips forming upper and lower surfaces of the rib between the spars; compression links are of channel section also and fixed to outer channels by pins, allowing necessary angular motion between links and strips; the tension links are flat strips of steel attached to the same pins which carry the compression links.
A radical departure from the prevailing type of wings, these links in stream-line position carry no load, but in a lifting attitude they straighten out and make a truss of the rib, thus preventing further deformation under loads. The links in the first two and last two panels are slotted to permit of the insertion of reserve links. A tail piece is fixed in shape, riveted to the upper strip and constructed to slide over the rear spar. A spring is placed between the rear spar and the tail piece, this spring being used as a tension attachment to the rear spar and the front compression member of the tail piece.—The Scientific American, July 3, 1920.
Superchargers for Airplane Engines.—An airplane flying at high altitude is in an atmosphere of comparatively low density. For instance, at 20,000 feet altitude the density is practically half that at sea level. This means that a given volume contains half as much actual air by weight. The cylinders of an airplane engine are therefore charged with an explosive mixture which has about half the value of a charge at sea level. The engine actually delivers about half of its sea-level power at 20,000 feet.
Both the low temperature and the decreased pressure at high altitude have effect in fixing the high-altitude density. Both the decrease of temperature and the decrease of weight of the charge affect the carburetion at high attitude. The fixed clearance volume and the decreased initial pressure give a decrease of compression pressure resulting in a loss of efficiency. There is, therefore, a combination of causes which gives as a net result a decrease in engine power very nearly proportional to the decrease in density. At high altitude the resistance of the air to the motion of the airplane is decreased directly in proportion to the decrease of density. The power required for a given airplane speed is therefore greatly reduced. However, the engine power has been so reduced that the usual net result is a considerable decrease in airplane speed. When the engine power is maintained at the sea-level value, there is, however, a considerable increase of speed at high altitude.
Filling the cylinders of an internal-combustion engine with a charge greater than that which would normally occur, is called "supercharging." Methods of doing this have engaged the attention of a great many experimenters.
The centrifugal compressor is an apparatus similar to the fan blower except that the shape of the impeller blades and the passages leading air to and from the impeller are so arranged as to give an efficiency very much greater than that of the usual type of fan blower, so that the apparatus forms a satisfactory means for compressing air to appreciable pressures. A line of single-stage centrifugal compressors has been developed for compressing air from 2 to 5 pounds per square inch above atmosphere, to be used for many industrial purposes; as well as a line of multi-stage machines for compressing air and gas up to pressures of 30 pounds per square inch above atmosphere.
The turbo-supercharger is a combination of a gas turbine and a centrifugal compressor, arranged as part of an airplane gasoline engine. The hot products of combustion from the engine exhaust are received upon the turbine runner and furnish power whereby is driven a centrifugal compressor mounted on the same shaft, which compresses air for supply to the carburetors. A more detailed description is given later, as well as particulars regarding its development.
In the latter part of 1917 the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics requested the co-operation of the General Electric Company in the development of the turbo-supercharger in the United States. Our work was originally started at the suggestion of Dr. W. F. Durand, then chairman of the committee, who knew of our long experience with gas turbines and centrifugal compressors. It has since been carried on under the supervision at various times of Col. J. G. Vincent, Col. T. H. Bane, Major H. C Marmon, Major G E. A. Hallett and Major R. W. Schroeder. Major Hallett has had charge of the development since the armistice, and he has given considerable study to the matter of superchargers in general.
The Turbo-Supercharger Cycle.—Fig. 1 shows an airplane engine equipped with a turbo-supercharger. The exhaust of the engine is received by an exhaust manifold which leads it to a nozzle chamber carrying nozzles which discharge it on to the buckets of a turbine wheel. On the same shaft as this turbine wheel is the impeller of a centrifugal compressor. This compresses air from the low-pressure atmosphere to approximately normal sea-level pressure and delivers it to an air-discharge conduit which supplies the carburetors.
The turbine nozzles are of such area as to maintain within the exhaust manifold and nozzle box a pressure approximately equal to that at sea level. The difference between this pressure and the altitude low pressure gives a pressure drop for the exhaust gases which furnishes the power that operates the system.
Due to the respective temperatures this power input suffices to give the desired compression and also to supply the inevitable losses. However, in order to avoid back pressure on the engine, above the normal sea-level value, both turbine and compressor must be designed with utmost attention to efficiency.
With an efficient arrangement the engine when at high altitude exhausts at normal sea-level pressure and receives its air at the carburetor at normal sea-level pressure. Hence, normal sea-level power is delivered at all altitudes up to the maximum for which the supercharger is designed, so that the plane speed will increase uniformly as the altitude density decreases.
Mechanical Problems of Supercharging.—The General Electric superchargers thus far constructed have been designed to give sea-level absolute pressure at an altitude of 18,000 feet, which requires a compressor that doubles the absolute pressure of the air. This pressure ratio, with the quantity of air involved, means about 50 shaft horsepower input for the compressor. The design of a complete power plant of this size to suit an existing airplane engine, with such weight and location as will not impair the flying characteristics of the plane, has of course offered many problems. The possibility of driving the compressor of the supercharger by engine power instead of by the exhaust gases suggested itself. Much experience with the operation of the gas turbine, however, led the writer to prefer its problems to those of the driving mechanism of a supercharger operated from the engine. The turbine involves merely the addition to the compressor of a single extra wheel, designed for the conditions, with no extra bearings. The engine-driven scheme involves a 50-horsepower transmission with a multiplicity of gears, bearings, clutches, belts, and the like. These offer more or less drag on the engine when the supercharger is not in use at low altitudes, and very serious problems of acceleration when the supercharger is to be thrown into action, since the engine will be then running at its full speed of about 1800 r. p. m.
The exhaust manifold and nozzle box have proved to be a very efficient exhaust muffler and conductor. Such a muffler and conductor is needed in any event, and the design of means for withstanding the increased pressure difference of the turbo-supercharger has been successfully accomplished.
Power for Turbo- and Engine-Driven Superchargers:—An efficient turbo-supercharger theoretically deducts from the indicated horsepower of the airplane engine an amount corresponding to the difference between sea-level absolute pressure and altitude pressure. There is this additional back pressure during the exhaust stroke. The theoretical power available for driving the turbo-supercharger is greater than this, however, owing to the fact that there is available not only the energy due to the direct pressure difference mentioned, but also the energy of perfect expansion from the higher to the lower pressure. If there were no turbo-supercharger the engine would waste this energy in sudden pressure drop as the exhaust valve opens. The turbine can utilize this energy. The sum of these two amounts of available energy, multiplied by the efficiency of the turbine wheel, gives the shaft power delivered to the compressor.
For an engine-driven supercharger compressor there is greater engine indicated power due to a lower exhaust pressure. However, the shaft power for the supercharger compressor must be transmitted through the engine connecting rod and crankshaft, with losses, and then through the supercharger driving mechanism with additional losses. The total shaft power thus subtracted from the engine, multiplied by the efficiencies of these two transmissions, gives the shaft power delivered to the compressor. This is the same as for the turbo-supercharger. For a Liberty motor of about 400 horsepower and sea-level power at 18,000 feet altitude, this power is 50 horsepower.
The comparison then is as follows: The turbo-supercharger substracts from the engine indicated power, adds power of expansion which would not otherwise be used, and has turbine wheel losses. The engine-driven supercharger puts this indicated power through the engine (with some additional loads on the pins and bearings) and has engine and transmission losses.
With usual efficiency there is probably not a great difference between the gross substraction from engine power in the two cases. There is then the disadvantage of transmitting the supercharger power through the engine pins and bearings, as well as through some mechanism between engine and supercharger, to be compared with the collection of the hot gases under pressure (with muffling advantages) and delivery to the turbine wheel. As already mentioned, practical success to date is in favor of the turbo-supercharger and the writer feels that this is really due to its innate superiority.
Engine-driven superchargers with positive-pressure blowers have been proposed. These have the additional disadvantage that with the desirable' pressure ratios of about two to one there is an appreciable compression loss due to the fact that the machine only displaces air and has no direct means for compression.
Supercharging engines of various kinds, in which the engine crankcase or the engine cylinders themselves are arranged for additional compression, have been shown to give excessive weight and complication as compared with a turbo-supercharger.
Development of the Turbo-Supercharger.—The machines used thus far have been designed to give sea-level pressure at 18,000 feet altitude, which corresponds to a pressure ratio of about two. The rated speed for these conditions is 20,000 r. p. m. Sea-level pressure has readily been obtained up to 22,000 feet altitude. The control is entirely by hand operation of waste gates, which permits of free escape of some of the exhaust gases.
The entire apparatus, exclusive of exhaust manifold and air-discharge conduit, weights about 100 pounds. The exhaust manifold and air conduits have nearly the same weight as equivalent parts with no supercharger.
The turbine and compressor wheel have diameters somewhat less than a foot. The present design has been hampered by necessity for accommodation to existing engines and planes. It is proposed, however, to construct apparatus in which engine and supercharger are integral, with all parts arranged for the full possibilities of the combination.
In the combination under consideration the airplane, propeller, engine, radiator, cooling system, and supercharger are so intimately associated that no adequate tests can be made without the complete system in operation at full speed at altitude. During the initial development of the Liberty motor a testing expedition had been sent to the summit of Pike's Peak, and it was decided to repeat this performance with the supercharger. Fig. 2 shows the motor truck that was prepared for the expedition and Fig. 3 the way it was left after each day's work. The Liberty motor carrying the supercharger was mounted on a cradle dynamometer, with scales and all arrangements for accurate measurement of power, gasoline consumption and the like. In fact, a complete testing laboratory was provided. The motor truck was shipped by rail to Colorado Springs, and then proceeded by its own power to Pike's Peak summit on the "Pike's Peak Auto Highway," a well-constructed but very tortuous mountain road 28 miles long. The summit has an altitude of 14,109 feet and it is the highest point in the United States easily reached by road.
The testing work at the summit lasted through September and half of October, 1918. The usual difficulties with experimental work were, of course, encountered with the addition of many delays, due to the cold and snow, and distance from repair shops. The apparatus was finally arranged to give good mechanical operation and it was found possible at the existing altitude of 14,000 feet not only to supercharge so as to give full sea-level power, but also to overcharge so as to cause the engine to pre-ignite.
It was agreed that results of the tests warranted the immediate installation of the supercharger on an airplane, and arrangements for doing this were in progress when the armistice caused a cessation of the work. After the armistice, careful reexamination of the situation resulted in resumption of the work in the early part of 1919. Various rearrangements were made in view of the experience gained at Pike's Peak and the apparatus was finally installed on an airplane.
It soon developed that a very appreciable increase of power was easily obtained when the supercharger was opened up. The whole airplane installation was not properly arranged to take advantage of this power, however, and changes were necessary in the radiator, cooling system, propeller system, gasoline tank, pump system, etc. Changes in these parts have been made from time to time, and this work is still in progress. As the work proceeds more and more power is developed by the engine. Changes have also been made in the supercharger itself.
Fig. 4 shows Major R. W. Schroeder, who has made all of the flight tests to date, together with Lieut. George W. Elsey, who has made all of the flight observations to date. The aviators are of course clothed for the intense cold of high altitudes and carry the parachutes that are now regularly used by the U. S. air service in experimental work.
Supercharger Performances.—The supercharger which has been used to date was primarily desired for high speeds at altitudes of 18,000 to 22,000 feet. The Le Pere plane on which the installation was made had a ceiling of about 20,000 feet with two men, and a speed at this altitude of 70 miles per hour. With the supercharger in use, a speed of about 140 miles an hour has been attained at 22,000 feet. As already pointed out, this has been attained with various parts of the plane installation in a partially developed state. Theoretical computations have been made showing that much higher speeds at high altitudes are to be expected, and the flight tests to date indicate that the theoretical expectations will be fully realized.
The making of high altitude records has been very attractive and the supercharger has, of course, been used for this purpose as well as for the speed courses mentioned. Successively higher altitudes have been reached as experience has been gained regarding the manipulation of oxygen, gasoline, and other details.
On February 27, Major Schroeder made a flight alone, attaining an actual height above the ground finally computed as 36,130 feet (6.85 miles). The lowest temperature reached was minus 67 degrees Fahrenheit. At the maximum altitude his oxygen apparatus failed and he became unconscious and lost control of the plane, which fell almost vertically. As he neared the earth he partly recovered consciousness and, at an altitude of about 3000 feet, succeeded, in a half-dazed semi-automatic way, in righting the plane and making a good landing in his own field, again becoming unconscious. He was taken to a hospital in a serious condition, but has since almost completely recovered. The supercharger, engine, and plane were in perfect working order after the flight.
At the maximum altitude attained, recording instruments showed that the plane was still climbing at the rate of about 125 feet per minute and it was estimated that an altitude of 40,000 feet would have been attained if the oxygen apparatus had not failed.
[In the May issue of the General Electric Review there also appears a reprint of a paper on Superchargers and Supercharging Engines, by Major George E. A. Hallett, U. S. A., presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Automotive Engineers, January 7 and 8, 1920. Major Hallett, who is chief of power plant division, U. S. air service, deals at some length with the various methods employed in supercharging and refers to the work of the U. S. air service on the Rateau type of turbo-compressor, under the supervision of Mr. E. H. Sherbondy, prior to that undertaken by Dr. Moss. Commenting on the working of the Moss supercharger, he says:
"It would naturally seem at first thought that the extremely low temperatures always found at great altitudes would make possible the easy solution of cooling problems, but in reality the low density of the air reduces its heat conductivity and capacity for heat absorption to such a point that a supercharged engine developing sea-level power at 20,000 feet requires a little more cooling surface than it does when developing normal power at sea level.
"The Liberty engine and many others run best with a water temperature of about 170 degrees Fahrenheit. To maintain the cooling water at this temperature in the reduced atmospheric pressure at 25,000 feet it is necessary to use several pounds of air pressure in the radiator to prevent the water from boiling away. Very effective radiator shutters are needed when the engine is throttled to make a descent from altitudes of over 20,000 feet to prevent the water in the radiator from freezing before warmer air is reached.
"Contrary to expectations, the Moss turbo-compressor now being tested at McCook Field does not complicate the pilot's controls. On a normal engine the pilot handles the throttle and the altitude carburetor control which thins down the mixture as he ascends. With the turbo-compressor the altitude control becomes unnecessary up to the altitude at which the engine can no longer deliver sea-level power but is used, as with a normal engine, if the plane is driven higher."
As to the future of the supercharger, Major Hallett says:
"The uses of the supercharger for military service can be divided into: first, for airplanes in which it is desired to reach extreme altitude; second, for airplanes in which it is desired to increase the rate of climb and horizontal speed and therefore maneuverability at altitudes where it is intended to fight; and, third, for airplanes which carry large loads such as bombers, which normally are handicapped by having a very low ceiling and whose entire usefulness would, if larger engines were installed to pull them to a higher ceiling, be lost on account of the large amount of fuel and other material that would have to be carried, thus decreasing their radii of action.
"In the first case it is believed that a special supercharger can be built that will make feasible much greater altitudes than any that have been attained with the present General Electric turbo-compressor; and it is considered essential that we have airplanes, capable of reaching very great heights. In the second case, it is pointed out that military machines not fitted with supercharging engines, when fighting at an altitude of 20,000 feet or more, are so near their ceiling that their rate of climb, speed, and maneuverability are comparatively poor, but the use of a supercharger seems to overcome this difficulty easily.
"The use of superchargers in commercial airplanes of the future is assured because superchargers will make possible far more miles per hour and more miles per gallon with a given engine and airplane, and speed is the main advantage of air over other kinds of transportation. It is thought by many qualified judges that by flying at a sufficient height with a supercharged engine and a suitably designed airplane, a speed of 200 m. p. h. can be maintained."]—The Journal Am. Soc. M. E., July, 1920.
Helium Gas.—The development of a non-combustible gas, of good lifting power, for all balloon purposes, is such as desirable thing, that it is not surprising that the war led to a strenuous effort to separate large quantities of helium from the enormous gas supply in certain fields. Helium has a molecular weight of four against two for hydrogen, hence its lifting power is about 92.6 per cent that of hydrogen. Helium is monatomic.
The Petrolia, Texas, field alone has in the past delivered as much as 30,000,000 cubic feet of natural "gas per day carrying as high as 300,000 cubic feet of helium to waste in the furnaces and stoves of the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth. Even greater quantities of gas exist in Ohio, but the helium content is much less.
It appears that natural gas carrying 1/3 to 2/3 per cent helium is available in immense quantities, and it only remains to separate the helium cheaply to make ballooning perfectly safe, particularly against accident from fire.
However, it is no small problem to liquefy a gas which may consist of 30 per cent nitrogen, 50 per cent methane and 19 per cent ethane, propane, butane, etc. Fortunately, the remaining one per cent of helium need not be liquefied, since its boiling point is 4 ½° C. abs. The nitrogen and methane liquefy at minus 195.66° and 161.7° C. respectively, and these temperatures are not difficult to reach.
Three plants were installed during the war. Two of these were located at Fort Worth, Texas, and both produced some helium at a very high cost, say, from $200 to $300 per thousand cubic feet.
The third plant was located at Petrolia, Texas, immediately at the gas wells, and unfortunately depends on the operation of a privately-owned and operated gas compression and gasoline extraction plant.
The interference of the residual gases, ethane, propane, etc., from the gasoline extraction system, has prevented even a study of the operation of this plant under proper conditions.
It is evident that if the condensing system becomes cold enough to condense nitrogen, for instance, the sudden admission of even methane would at once put the condensing system out of commission, while a gust of ethane would be even worse.
Under the most adverse conditions, as to variable gas supply, the plant has been operated for about one year. Helium up to 20 per cent has been recovered in small quantities, and it only remains to remove the external difficulties and to provide reasonable control over the gas supply to make an increased output and higher purity a matter of natural sequence.
The system used at Petrolia differs from the other plants in that the gas is liquefied and distilled at a pressure of 300 pounds per square inch.
Very powerful expansion engines, three in number, expand the gas after separation, and their very cold exhaust serves to refrigerate the interchanger system. These interchangers resemble counter current condensers, and have about 14,000 tubes, and a surface of 8,000 square feet is available to cool and condense the gas.
The stills are essentially of standard type, except that they are maintained at high pressure. As high a ratio as 80 has been reached in the relative helium content of gas treated and the discharge of still.
The economical production of helium depends altogether on the seemingly independent matter of freeing the gas from gasoline vapors.—The Tech. Engineering News, June, 1920.
ENGINEERING
Welds and Welding.—There can be no doubt about the attractiveness of "welding" as a means of making joints in metal structures. Its advantages are so obvious and appear to be so great. First and foremost is the advantage of cheapness and convenience; electric and acetylene welding can be carried out not only with much less labor, but with much greater speed and convenience than the older methods of making joints. By comparison, riveting—involving, as it does, the drilling or punching of holes in accurately determined positions, followed by the insertion of the rivets themselves—is a clumsy and a costly operation. From the point of view of the strength of the resulting joint also, riveting is far from satisfactory; only by great care in design and construction can a strength approaching as much as 70 per cent of that of the original bar be obtained, and in most joints the strength is very much less. Further, there are many cases where broken parts can be re-joined by "welding" while riveting is out of the question and other methods are impracticable. It is small wonder, then, that this method of jointing structures by autogenous fusion is finding ever wider and wider application. Its rapid rise into widespread popularity has, further, been very materially assisted by the conditions prevailing during the war, when very rapid repair work, particularly, was rendered possible by the use of arc or blow-pipe, where older methods would have failed us.
When a new method of this kind achieves such widespread and growing application it can no longer be a question of discussing whether it is or is not useful. On the other hand, the question does remain to be considered— and it needs very careful consideration indeed—whether the application of welding methods may not be pushed too far, whether the cheapness and convenience of the method may not lead to its use where such use is undesirable or even seriously dangerous. To discuss the matter from this point of view, and even to insist upon certain important limitations to the use of welding, is by no means a sign of hostility to the progress of what is really a new industry. On the contrary, the most ardent advocates of welding, and those most directly interested in its development from the business point of view, must admit that it could only do the process serious harm if its use were to be extended to cases where serious harm might result. The occurrence of a few failures, even if by good fortune they should not be disastrous if traceable to the injudicious use of welding, would do more to hinder the useful and sound development of the welding industry than a hundred really successful applications could do to stimulate it. For that reason we would ask those who advocate the application of welding to all manner of engineering structures, and those whose safety depends upon the soundness of those structures, to consider very carefully where and how welding can be safely and judiciously employed. Failing such judicious restraint, a reaction is likely to occur, leading possibly to the imposition of stringent restrictions if it should be found that public safety may be jeopardized. In considering what limitations, if any, should be placed upon the use of autogenous welding it is necessary to consider the character of the weld itself. In the case of a "perfect" weld—that is, a weld free from any unsoundness—there is no doubt that we have a joint in many ways stronger than and superior to a riveted joint, and one possessing at the same time the considerable advantage of being water and steam-tight. But although stronger than a riveted joint, such a joint does not attain the strength of the unaltered material. In the first place, the weld proper consists of steel or iron which has merely cooled down from a state of fusion without undergoing subsequent refining either by work or heat-treatment. Even though such material behaves well under an ordinary tensile test, there can be no doubt that it is much less reliable and satisfactory than properly worked and heat-treated steel. Tests show, however, that this material which has been actually molten is not the weakest part of a sound weld; the weakest area is generally found a short distance on either side of the weld proper, where the adjacent steel has been exposed to that temperature which leaves it in the weakest and softest condition. It is, of course, true that even in this softened, weakened condition, the steel may be amply strong enough to bear the stresses coming upon it; but this weakening, and particularly the lowering of the elastic limit, requires careful consideration by the designer who intends to rely on welded joints in his structures.
The most serious difficulty in the use of welded joints where the main stresses of a structure have to be borne arises from the fact that it is not only difficult to produce sound joints, but that it is practically impossible to tell by examination whether a given weld is or is not really sound. Cases of failure having more or less serious consequences are of increasingly frequent occurrence at the present time, where the trouble is directly traceable to a defective weld. In some of these cases careful inspection would at once have thrown serious doubt on the adequacy of the weld, but in other cases the defects are entirely covered and can only be seen when a section is cut through the weld or its two parts are torn asunder in service. Careful workmanship and rigid inspection can no doubt serve to reduce risks of this kind, but it is at least open to very serious question whether a process which is undoubtedly liable to this danger should be employed for making joints of primary importance exposed to heavy working stresses. Even during the war the risks involved in the use of welded joints in aeroplane construction were fully recognized, and the use of the process for that purpose strictly limited. But even where, in the repair of boilers and bridges and in the construction of ships it was rightly regarded as a legitimate war risk to employ electric or acetylene welding even for vital parts exposed to main stresses, it is another matter to adopt the process broadcast for the regular uses of peace time. The improvement in the methods of welding and in the knowledge of the materials welded and the increase in the skill and experience of welders may in time put the process beyond all doubt. But we have not reached that stage yet, and until we do, it is advisable to move slowly and not to be deflected from a cautious path by the remarkable successes already attained.—Engineering. June 25, 1920.
Obturators in Internal-Combustion Engines.—Obturators versus Piston Rings.—Experiences in air-cooled engines on aircraft led in some cases to the replacement of the ordinary piston rings by an obturator, which is essentially the equivalent in metal of the cup leather used for packing hydraulic cylinders. The air-cooled cylinders of rotary engines, it was found, suffered distortion when at work owing to the leading side of the cylinder being more effectually cooled than the trailing side. As a consequence, piston rings often failed to hold the pressure satisfactorily. Any increase in their number would have involved a longer and heavier piston, and the obturator was introduced in consequence. This, as explained in an interesting and valuable paper by Mr. W. Fennel, M. L E. E., which was read at a recent meeting of the Diesel Engine Users' Association, consisted of a flexible L-shaped ring forced against the cylinder wall by fluid pressure. At the outset the life was short, but improvements made at the works of "Engineering and Arc Lamps" increased the life from 10 hours to 60 hours, and in exceptional cases to 250 hours. Brass was the metal first employed, but a special phosphor bronze is now used. The obturator was placed near the top of the piston, but being flexible and forced by the pressure into close contact with the relatively cool wall of the liner, it did not burn. Nevertheless, it is now considered preferable to fix it some little distance below the piston head. As originally fitted the rings were split similarly to a piston ring, but a lap joint is now used and with this the obturator works well, even if the liner be worn out of true. In consequence of the satisfactory behavior of these obturators, Mr. Fennell determined to fit one to a three-cylinder Sulzer-Diesel engine rated at 140 horsepower. The liners of this engine had worn badly, being far from circular and tapering to the extent of 0.1 inch. It was impossible under the conditions to obtain new liners, and piston rings failed so rapidly the engine could not be run save at a prohibitive cost. It was decided accordingly to fix the three top rings of the piston and to place an obturator in the fourth groove. After a run of 100 hours without loss or blowing by, the obturator was examined. The wear was less than one mil, and the engine was set to work again, without replacing it. This obturator lasted 380 hours and then failed, due to wear at the lap joint. Here the motion was considerable, owing to the taper of the liner. Further experiments showed that even with these badly-worn liners the obturator might be counted on to last 300 hours, which was longer than the piston rings would stand. Further tests, Mr. Fennell stated, are in progress, and they indicate that with the liners in proper condition the life of the obturator should bf well over 1000 hours. Engineering, April 16, 1920.—The Journal Am. Soc. M. E., July, 1920.
Increase in Motor Ships.—It may be a matter of general interest to know that there are at the present time no fewer than 150 motor ships being built, representing in cargo capacity over one million tons. Statistics regarding the number in use give an adequate idea of the extent to which the motor ship is supplanting old and familiar types. There is no need at this stage to discuss the advantages claimed for the motor-driven vessel in comparison with the steamship. These are known; the disadvantages are also recognized. It would be futile, of course, to expect the same reliability of operation in the case of the marine internal combustion engine in the sizes required for ocean-going ships to that which is associated with steam propelled vessels. In spite of the considerable advances which have been made, there are still problems which have to be solved before the majority of ship-owners will be persuaded to turn their backs upon the steam engine and adopt the internal combustion engine for purposes of ship propulsion. The argument which is sometimes used, that the space required for fuel storage in the case of the marine motor is very much less than that required for the storage of coal, scarcely applies to-day, when so many vessels are being fitted to use oil instead of solid fuel under boilers. Those who are interested in the progress of the motor ship need not, however, entertain any fears that the subject is not rated at its full importance by our shipbuilders and marine engineers. Some of the leading shipbuilding and engineering firms are not merely "standing-by," awaiting for a new development, but are allocating considerable sums to the investigation of the features which underlie successful design. Work on the evolution of the best type of motor for purposes of ship propulsion is in hand, and, as one or two recent installations have indicated, some notable results have been achieved. In spite of the lead gained by German manufacturers in the field in the pre-war period, we need not imagine that we are going to do anything in the future but show the way in developments in this field.— Shipping, May 25, 1920.
The Solid Injection Oil Engine.—The air compressor, be it a direct connected or a separate unit, furnishes a large percentage of the Diesel engine troubles. The pressures and conditions under which it operates are such that lubrication is difficult; valves often leak and packing trouble-i are always present. Furthermore, since considerable quantities of air are employed in the injection of the fuel charge, the power demands of the compressor range from 6 to 10 per cent of the horsepower developed in the engine. Many Diesel designers have attempted to eliminate the compressor, but with little success. Where the engine on the Diesel cycle, the injection of oil occurs a considerable period of the power stroke, and it is necessary to have some means whereby the pressure in the fuel-oil lines can be kept constant during the period of injection. ,
The Vickers Co., of England, several years ago abandoned the air blast on their Diesels and now make use of a fuel-injection system having a flattened steel tube to maintain the oil pressure. This design apparently is very successful since many Vickers Diesels are in daily service in the British navy and in the merchant marine.
The explosive, or constant-volume, oil engine does not require a constant oil-line pressure nor the somewhat complicated fuel-valve mechanism of the Diesel, and it is to this type of engine that the solid injection principle is most adaptable. The one feature with the solid injection engine that requires the most careful designing is the atomizer, or injection nozzle. Since there is no air blast to break up the fuel, the atomizer must do this mechanically. In fact, the oil must be atomized in a more perfect manner than necessary with the air-injection engine. Furthermore, the nozzle must handle the oil without the dribbling effect so prevalent in hotbulb designs.
In the Diesel engine it has been customary to employ a compression pressure ranging from 450 to 600 pounds per square inch. Those engineers accustomed to these pressures are under the impression that with the lower pressures encountered in the explosive engine the temperature will be entirely too low to cause auto-ignition. It then appears unreasonable to operate an engine having a compression pressure of 200 to 300 pounds without a hotbulb or other ignition device. The following explanation is given with the idea of clearing up this question.
It has been proved that a fuel will ignite at a temperature well below 800° F. provided it is atomized or broken up to allow each minute oil particle to be in contact with the necessary amount of air. It is apparent that two things are required—thorough atomization and proper temperature. Fig. 1 is a curve showing the relation of temperature and pressure where the compression is adiabatic. This curve is based on the equation, T1, the temperature at the beginning of compression, is here assumed to be 212° F. When the engine is warmed up, this value is about correct, although on starting cold, T1 will be somewhat lower. The exponent n is assumed to be 1.35 instead of 141, with the intention of making allowance for the loss to the cylinder walls during compression.
The temperature with 300 pounds final compression pressure is approximately 1050° F. This is amply high to ignite any of the fuel oils. The Diesel engine, with its large radiating surface relative to its compression volume, experiences a loss of temperature that is much greater than in the case of the solid-injection engine having a combustion chamber with a large volume and a small radiating surface. It is quite likely that the chilling effect of the expanding air blast in the Diesel causes a drop of at least 150° F. in the temperature of the air and oil. As a practical example of the ability to operate at 300 pounds, many operators are running old Diesels with a still lower compression.
As has been stated, the curve in Fig. 1 is based on an initial air temperature of 212° F. On starting a cold engine, this value is much too high: if there is no throttling of the air, it should be around 70° F. This would give a final temperature of about 725° F., which is sufficient to ignite a well-atomized fuel charge, although the first few explosions will probably smoke badly. To secure thorough atomization and ignition, it is necessary that the oil be broken up without any part striking the relatively cold walls of the combustion chamber. This has led to various designs of combustion chambers as well as atomizing devices.
In this discussion no consideration has been given to the effect the injected oil has on increasing the pressure and temperature of the mixture in the combustion chamber or to the time element as applied to the period of vaporization of the oil. There is no doubt that both these factors have marked influences on the action of the engine.
The timing of the injection of the fuel varies in different makes of engines from 40° to 6° ahead of outer dead center. The operator of a Diesel knows from experience that an injection point much over 7° ahead of dead center will produce marked pre-ignition; in the hot-bulb engine an injection point of 30° will cause severe pounding unless water injection is employed. In the solid-injection oil engine it has been found that the timing is largely dependent on the compression carried. If the compression is as low as 200 pounds as in the Price engine, the injection must be earlier than 30° to give ample time for the vaporization of the oil, while with 300 pounds pressure, as with the De La Vergne S. I. engine, the injection is not over 6°. To avoid danger of pre-ignition at early injection periods, a combustion chamber is placed in the head. The oil is injected into this space where it mixes with the air. Since the major part of the air charge is contained within the cylinder, the amount of air in the combustion chamber is not sufficient to produce ignition even with a sufficiently high temperature. Ignition can occur only when the moving piston forces the main air charge into the combustion space.
The fuel consumption per brake horsepower is low; in many cases it equals the best Diesel results. Since the compression is much lower than with the Diesel engine, the thermal efficiency based on indicated horsepower is not as good as with the latter engine. The extremely high mechanical efficiency, due to elimination of the air compressor and lower frictional loss, is responsible for the excellent fuel economy.—Power, June 29, 1920.
NAVIGATION AND RADIO
The Russell-Ranken Steering Recorder.—The question of good steering, in addition to being of vital importance to the safety of a vessel, also greatly affects economy of propulsion by the maintenance of a steady course, while there is also the question of economical use of power for the steering engine. A recent series of tests on a large modern steamship showed surprising results in regard to different helmsmen. It was found that the best helmsmen made 85 movements of the steering wheel per hour, and the worst 565. A device, therefore, which records the steering operations, and thus enables investigation of them, has possibilities of great practical usefulness. Such a device is available in the Russell-Ranken steering recorder illustrated in figure, which records graphically, without need of subsequent plotting or calculation, every movement of the helm, at the same time registering the hour, the minute, half-minute and quarter-minute. It shows the amount of helm to port or starboard, the length of time taken to operate the rudder, and the length of time it remained in a stationary condition.
The recorder may be connected to either the controlling shaft of the steering engine or to the rudder-post, and, depending upon which of the plans is adopted, the position of the instrument may be either aft in some suitable position, or on the bridge.
The instrument is a combination of three main features, viz.:
1. A slide carrying the marking device, and attached either to the rudderpost or to the intermediate fore and aft shafting between the engine and steering gear.
2. A clock, having combined with it an automatic recording apparatus.
3. A clockwork mechanism operating the paper.
Each of these mechanisms operates free of the others. The paper is speeded at approximately one-half inch per minute; but as the paper is automatically stamped by a mechanism controlled by the clock, the approximate time of any recorded movement may be at once read off without taking the speed of the paper into account. A movement of one-half inch per minute of paper is calculated to give a clear diagram, that is, transverse lines made by the pen will not overrun one another, and they will be sufficiently far apart to give a clear indication of the length of time the rudder remained stationary. The paper may be ruled lengthwise with a black central line, and red lines to indicate differences of five degrees to port, and green lines five degrees to starboard; or if plain paper is used, the number of degrees may be at once determined by use of a transparent scale, laid off against one edge of the paper.
The instrument is contained in an air-tight case, arranged horizontally, the case being in plan 20 inches by 20 inches by 12 inches deep, with a receiver below to contain the record after it passes the friction rollers which draw the paper over from the "stock" roll.
The face plate carries, in addition to the face of the recording clock, a scale and pointer, which is a duplicate of that on the steering pedestal fitted on the bridge. Both the clock mechanisms are wound from the face plate, and all that is necessary in starting the machine is to wind the clocks, see the recording clock is set at the correct time, and set the recording pen regulator so that its position coincides with the pointer on the scale.
By thus having an exact record of every movement of the helm, a spirit of interest and competition should become general among the various quartermasters and helmsmen, erratic or careless steering would be brought to notice as well as good steering, and a higher state of proficiency reached.
Another advantage is the complete record available of the doings of the steering gear, information which, in collisions and other incidents in shiphandling, it is often very desirable to bring forward when legal or other proceedings are resorted to.—The Shipbuilder.
Pitot Tube Adapted to Use as Navigator’s Log.—The navigator log is a Swedish invention and is being placed on the American market by the American Navigator Log Corporation, Park Row Building. The device is based on the principle of the Pitot lube and is simple in operation. The business end of it protrudes vertically from the bottom of the vessel and consists of a hollow tube with two passages. Near the end of the tube are two holes, one facing the direction in which the ship is traveling, and the other opening on the side of the ship. A passage through which the water flows leads from each hole to the mechanism immediately inside the hull.
The hole facing towards the ships bows registers the water pressure produced by the speed of the vessel, while that on the side gauges the hydrostatic pressure, or that resulting from the draft of the ship. The pressures record themselves upon a membrane in an indicator located in the engine room, which measures the difference between the speed and draft pressure of the vessel and thus determines her speed. From the engine-room indicator there is conveyed to a second indicator on the bridge by means of an electric current a registration of every knot traveled by the ship. The officer on duty is thus able to tell not only how fast his ship is traveling, but also the total number of knots the ship has traveled since the indicator was set.
The log is said to begin to act as soon as the vessel is set in motion and to indicate with the greatest precision both the speed of the vessel, as well as the distance traveled. It further begins to register at very low speed (1 to 1 ½ knots), and acts independently of all external conditions, such as changes of temperature, the draft of the vessel, the rolling and pitching of same, etc.
The apparatus is well protected and easy to install. When once in place it requires little attention. Nor does it call for frequent adjustments, refilling, winding, etc. It is of small dimensions, weighing only 80 pounds. One of these logs has been installed on the United States Shipping Board steamer Huron.—The Nautical Gazette, June 19, 1920.
Wireless Halfway ‘Round the World.—The Lafayette Radio Station, situated 11 miles southwest of Bordeaux, France, the most powerful radio station in the world, has just been completed by the United States Navy and turned over to the French Government.
The erection of a super high-powered radio station in Europe was the result of a decision made by a military committee called by the Navy Department, which met at New London. Conn.. October 4, 1917, and constituted part of a general programme adopted for the improvement of transatlantic radio facilities. It was felt a substantial transatlantic radio service was needed in the event that enemy depredations might destroy or impair communications by cable.
After several preliminary discussions it was agreed that the French Government would furnish a suitable site in France, properly protected, and would erect and furnish buildings, foundations, a water supply and power facilities. The Navy Department agreed to design the plant supply and erect the towers and to install equipment in complete operating condition.
In view of the small size and inadequacy of the existing European stations (Eiffel Tower, Lyons, Nantes and Rome), it was realized that the new station would have to carry an immense volume of traffic in the event that the entire communication burden should be thrown on the radio service; so it was decided to design a plant larger than any in existence.
Signals from European stations were studied, and it was found that even a station as powerful as Nauen (which had been greatly enlarged by Germany during the war) would not be able to give proper service during periods of the day when fading and static combined to produce the most unfavorable conditions.
Alternator equipment for producing radio high frequency currents had not been satisfactorily developed in this country at the time the design of the plant was undertaken and the selection of apparatus narrowed down to the only type which had been demonstrated as entirely successful, namely, the Poulsen arc. The navy was well informed regarding transmitter types, and a contract was placed with a responsible concern for the radio equipment which was to be rated at an antenna current of 550 amperes with an antenna effective height of approximately 600 feet. This design involved an arc converter and power machinery of a capacity between 1000 and 1200 kilowatts. The apparatus was to be furnished in duplicate throughout to avoid any possibility of failure.
While these arrangements were being made the Bureau of Yards and Docks completed designs for an 820-foot three-legged self-supporting steel tower similar in type to the Eiffel Tower. The Eiffel Tower, however, weighs about 2700 tons while each Lafayette towers weighs only 550 tons.
In fact the Lafayette towers, eight in number, are the real engineering marvel of the plant. Their three legs rest on large circular concrete platforms which in turn rest upon a series of concrete "feet" placed upon planks sunk deeply into the ground. The sturdy towers are quite capable of carrying elevators and the French have already considered their installation.
Because of the difficulty of carrying on work over seas by contract, it became necessary to organize a military detachment to erect the station, particularly as the French Government was desirous of carrying on all such work under a military establishment. Through the co-operation of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, a special recruiting party was organized and a detachment containing nearly 600 steel workers, bridgemen, electricians, and all others required (cooks, yeomen, etc.), was sent to the selected site in the spring and summer of 1918, and began work under the supervision of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, Navy Department.
In order to cope with the transportation problem, special officers were stationed at Philadelphia and at Bordeaux to personally supervise shipments. The duplicate radio equipment parts were forwarded on separate vessels to avoid possible loss by submarining, and it is to the credit of the transport service that no material was lost.
Practically all the tower steel and radio equipment was on the station site in September, 1018, an incredibly short time after the inception of the project, together with a complete erection crew and camp. At this date, however, the French had not yet started on the radio buildings or power supply and were just commencing on the tower foundations. The detachment, therefore, had to erect a temporary power-transmission line and furnish a water and drainage system. The officer in charge urged more rapid progress on the part of the French authorities regarding their portion of the work, with the result that several towers were partly under way on the date of the armistice, although nothing could be done toward installing the radio equipment. At this time the rainy season in western France commenced and all progress ceased.
The withdrawal of our military forces from Europe early in 1919 made it necessary to disband nearly the entire detachment, the members of which were returned to the United States. The skeleton of an organization was retained at the radio station, however, and an agreement was finally consummated with the French Government whereby the Republic of France contracted to purchase the Lafayette station on condition that the navy would complete it. Work again proceeded, therefore, in June, 1919, the tower erection being taken up by an American contractor, and the remaining work undertaken by the navy, utilizing labor from the New York Navy Yard and elsewhere.
The incoming power supply is 3-phase alternating current of 11,000 volts and 50 cycles frequency. The 1000 kilowatt, 1200-volt direct-current generators are driven by synchronous motors with direct-connected exciters for both motors and generators. Special 20-kilowatt direct-current motor generator sets are provided to excite special field-winding on the arc converters, designed to enable accurate adjustments of the field flux density to be made.
These windings are arranged so as either to assist or to oppose the effect of the usual series windings, which also exist.
The antenna system is of an extent far exceeding that of any existing radio system. The eight 820-foot towers are arranged in two rows of four each. The rows are spaced 1320 feet apart, and the towers in each row are 1320 feet apart, making a plot approximately a mile long, a quarter of a mile wide, and containing 5,227,200 square feet.
The power house is located in the center at one end of the aisle formed by the two tower rows. Triatics stretching across this aisle between pairs of towers support the longitudinal antenna wires, which are of number three silicon bronze cable.
A special problem arose in connection with the insulation of this antenna because of the extremely high mechanical loads which the triatics are required to carry, but a special porcelain tubular insulator was eventually developed having a length of about ten feet with a mechanical ultimate strength of over 15 tons and an electrical flash-over voltage when dry of about 100,000 volts at a frequency of 50,000 cycles.
The largest station previously constructed by the navy is the one at Annapolis, Maryland, which -can deliver a maximum output of 168,000 ampere-feet, whereas the Lafayette station should be capable of delivering 330,000 ampere-feet with more on overload. The maximum wave-length of the Lafayette station will be about 23,000 meters.
From these facts it is evident that the Lafayette station, and it is quite appropriately named, will be practically twice as powerful as any radio station now in existence. It will be capable of transmitting messages approximately 12,500 miles or halfway around the world.
France has a colony at Noumea, New Caledonia, which is just about halfway around the world from Bordeaux. Messages from Bordeaux will reach New Caledonia from both directions, which will probably develop some interesting scientific data.
The present plan is for the Lafayette station to transmit at the rate of 50 words per minute, or 72,000 words per day. Sending messages at such a high speed by hand continuously is out of the question, so the signalling will be done by a mechanical device through which a narrow tape is run bearing the dots and dashes previously perforated by a special kind of typewriter made expressly for the purpose. There are few radio receiving operators who can handle incoming messages at this speed for hours at a time, no matter how expert they are, and to meet this contingency, as well as to guard against errors, it is said that the French intend to equip their stations throughout the world with mechanical receiving apparatus that will make phonographic records of incoming messages. These records may afterwards be "played" over more slowly and transcribed.
Practically all of the great nations now have powerful transoceanic radio plants. Norway has, at Ullenhaug near Stavanger, a transmitting station using tape sending machines. There are ten 400-foot masts in pairs holding an antenna of 24 wires. The power is 300 kilowatts, and the normal sending wave is approximately 10,000 meters. This station sends to America, while its mate, at Naerland, 20 miles south, does the receiving, using the phonographic roll method. Its antenna is held by eight iron masts 300 feet in height.
The Lyons radio station, the largest French station previous to the construction of the Lafayette station, uses apparatus originally intended for a plant in Indo-China. Eight towers, six of which are 590 feet high and two 787 feet high, carry an antenna in a sheet 2952 feet long by 492 feet wide. The wave-carrying capacity of Lyons is approximately 6210 miles on a power of 150 kilowatts. It is reported that Shanghai papers get their daily news from the Lyons station, and that messages from this station have been heard distinctly at Guam, in the Ladrone Islands, 7452 miles distant.
Back in 1913 there were 560,000 cablegrams handled between the United States and Japan. This number jumped to over 3,000,000 in 1917 and touched the 5,000,000 mark the following year. It is reported the Japanese are constructing a very powerful radio station in northern Japan for commercial use. At present their navy radio plant close to Funabashi is giving a few hours daily to transpacific radiograms most of which are sent to Hawaii for further relay to the United States. Funabashi is powerful enough, however, to work direct with San Francisco, when atmospheric conditions are favorable. The normal working wave of this big plant is about 7000 meters. The station compound takes up about four acres of ground. A triangular pillar 787 feet in height is in the center, and ranged in a circle around it at a radius of close to 360 feet are 16 secondary square pillars 196 feet high. The antenna wires radiate from the central tower to the secondary pillars like the ribs of a colossal umbrella.
In the United States the Naval Radio Station at Annapolis, Maryland, is probably the most powerful. Its four towers form a square and they are 620 feet in height. The radius of action is normally 6,500 miles under a power of 500 kilowatts.
Germany has two big radio stations, Nauen and Eilvese. Great Britain has a monster plant at Carnavon, Wales. Italy can radio to America from Coltano, and Spain has apparatus by no means tiny at Aranjuez which is worked through a distant control wire at Madrid. These facts and figures serve merely to give a general idea of the radio system of the world and to emphasize the magnitude of the Lafayette station.
Our army and navy will leave many monuments in France as a record of our participation in the World War. Among these monuments the Lafayette Radio Station will be one of the most striking and useful.—The Scientific American, June 26, 1920.
The Thermoinic Tube.—The thermoionic tube or valve has become an instrument of such wide utility that the lucid exposition of its principle, which Professor W. Eccles, D. Sc., of Finsbury Technical College, gave last April in two Royal Institution lectures on "The Thermoionic Tube as Detector, Amplifier and Generator of Electric Oscillations" will be welcome to our readers. Every substance, he explained, emits electrons when heated. The mechanism resembles that of ordinary evaporation: but the electrons carry electro-negative charges, whilst the evaporated molecules are uncharged. The phenomena are complex in gaseous atmospheres, but simple in high vacua. When we apply an electromotive force E. M. F. to two electrodes facing one another and heat the cathode, a stream of electrons will flow from the cathode to the anode, i.e., in the opposite direction to the old conventional current (see Fig. 1 and also Fig. 2, on page 1359), the thermoionic current rising as we raise the temperature in a steep curve (Fig. 3). A heated tungsten filament will hardly emit electrons below 2,000° C.; above 2000° the current increases rapidly, reaching at 2500° 200 times its value at 2000°. In the Fleming valve or diode the anode is a cylinder surrounding the tungsten filament of a lamp, and the diode is used as rectifier, the current travelling only in the direction mentioned. Dr. Eccles exemplified this by reversing the key in the battery circuit by hand, about five times per minute, when the galvanometer deflections were always to the right—never to the left. Since now the current is carried by the small electrons, practically devoid of inertia, the valve can likewise rectify currents of 10,000,000 reversals, per minute. But the curve of Fig. 3, which turns level, and Fig. 2, will help to show that temperature and electromotive force applied have to be adapted to one another. With a low E. M. F. of 55 volts, e. g., the current will cease to increase when we raise the temperature above a certain value, of 2300°; we pass then to the flat maximum of the curve. It is true that we can liberate more electrons by heating the filament to a higher temperature. But these electrons are not emitted at high speeds; they gather near the cathode and, being all electro-negative, repel one another, so that their further liberation is stopped. This "space charge," due to the neighboring electrons, will not shift a particle midway between the electrodes, but will tend to drive an electron near the cathode back into the cathode, and drive another one near the anode upward towards it (Fig. 2), unless we overcome this space charge by applying a stronger E. M. F. The more positive we make the upper electrode, the more the zero position (between the electrodes) will be shifted towards the cathode. Starting with a battery current of 150 volts, Dr. Eccles could reduce the volts to 52, without diminishing the galvanometer deflection by more than 2 divisions, from 25 to 23. That showed that the current was on the level portion of the curve (Fig. 3) in the saturated condition, in which all the electrons emitted are utilized. A valve used in this condition served as a limiting device safeguarding the apparatus to which it was coupled; the current would not rise above the maximum corresponding to the level portion of the curve. To make the valve more sensitive to fluctuations in the E. M. F., we should try to work on the rising straight portion of the curve, a result which in this case, the lecturer remarked, would be obtained by raising the temperature of the filament.
Value of the straight curve was, however, better seen in the case of the triode, which contained a third electrode, the "grid," between the anode and cathode. The grid may be a wire bent to the shape of a grid, or a spiral, surrounding the filament. The diagram, Fig. 4, shows the parts of the triode [within a circle] and the rather complicated connections. The upper electrode, the anode, is joined to the main battery, and this circuit is known as the anode or plate circuit; the grid is indicated by the dotted line; the cathode or filament circuit comprises the small battery heating the filament. When the grid and anode are directly connected the triode becomes a diode. The advantage of the grid is that it enables us to alter the 1 space charge. When the grid is made positive, it eliminates the repulsive force between the electrons, facilitates their emission and increases the current; when made negative the grid reduces the emission and the current is decreased, the point being that one grid volt is able to cancel x plate volts, the x increasing as the grid is approached to the cathode.
With the aid of a galvanometer in the external circuit, Dr. Eccles demonstrated that the addition (or cutting out) of one dry cell to the grid circuit had the same effect as the addition of 6 cells to the plate circuit. The triode, he said, was used for the amplification of the current input on the constant current system, the constant. voltage system, or (more generally) by combinations of the two systems. By coupling 20 triodes in cascade, each giving an amplification of 10, the total magnification obtained would be 1020). The regulation could be effected by transformers as well as by resistances, the coils acting largely as choking coils. Since the grid required little current to feed it, the triode was very convenient to get over the difficulties of bad contacts. Dr. Eccles exemplified this by an experiment ascribed to Edison. A contact is made by approaching a lighted cigar or a match to a strip of ebonite which bends under the influence of heat; the effect was much more striking when afforded another illustration of the power of the triode. In this device (due to the present Lord Rayleigh) a small radium tube and a small metal-foil electroscope are enclosed in an evacuated bulb; the radiations charge the electroscope, the expanding leaves of which touch contacts in the bulb; when one of these contacts was joined to an amplifier, the discharge became audible.
Since the expenditure of small energy in the grid circuit liberates large energy in the plate circuit, the triode can also be utilized in controlling devices. A master pendulum inducing minute current oscillations in the grid circuit can sustain the oscillations of another pendulum of the same period through the aid of an electromagnet in the plate circuit. Fig. 5 illustrates a novel alternating-current motor of Dr. Eccles, based upon this principle. There are two electromagnets, I in the grid, II in the plate circuit; between them rotates an ebonite wheel set with contacts or teeth. When the motor is turned and a tooth approaches I, the current induced is magnified in II, enabling II to pull the next tooth round; the effect is repeated when a tooth recedes.
The small motor exhibited was not self-starting, but when brought up to speed by hand it keeps its speed, and Dr. Eccles has found it very convenient for producing currents, of variable, but constant frequency for testing purposes; the alternating currents may be branched off from terminals in the plate circuit or from a transformer coil. The motor is probably the first of its kind working without slip rings or commutator; the sparking of the commutator would seriously interfere with any delicate testing of high-frequency apparatus.
In another device Dr. Eccles had replaced the motor wheel by a tuning fork, electromagnet I being above the one prong, II below the other. But any oscillating device may be coupled with a triode to produce amplified electric oscillations, and Fig. 4 already mentioned exemplifies the connections of a coil for this purpose. The ends of the coil are joined to the grid and the plate circuits, the middle of the coil being connected to the filament. The oscillations act upon the grid and are themselves acted upon by the fluctuating plate current. There was no outward sign that Dr. Eccles' coil was really oscillating. To prove it, he approached a similar coil circuit, containing a crystal detector (serving as rectifier for the induced currents) and a galvanometer.
Of more practical interest was the other demonstration by the "heterodyne or beat method." When two oscillating circuits are tuned to nearly the same frequency, 500,000 oscillations per second the one, 500,100 oscillations the other, the second circuit comprising a rectifier and a telephone, the telephone will give the difference (or beat) note of d = 100 oscillations per second. It is essential that the currents should be rectified as well as amplified, and that is secured by the arrangement illustrated in Fig. 6. The additional devices shown are (apart from the telephone) a small condenser and a high resistance in shunt to it, both in the grid circuit. Electrons can accumulate in the condenser only when the grid is positive; that accumulation, however, turns the grid negative and would diminish the plate current, if the resistance mentioned, the " grid leak," did not allow the negative charge to escape so that the plate current can rise again. The frequency of the oscillations now can be varied by altering the capacity. When the frequency difference d amounts to thousands of oscillations per second, no sound will be heard; as we increase the capacity in the one circuit, the d will decrease, and the sound will become audible; when we come down to </=3o, the sound will be inaudible again. The audibility will depend upon the listener and his age and upon the kind of telephone, and the listener can adjust the pitch to his own liking. If we increase the capacity beyond the perfect tuning adjustment where d=o, the sound intensity will become stronger again, and the position intermediate between the positions of maximum intensity will mark the capacity for perfect tuning.
The extraordinary sensitiveness of such oscillating coils, especially if of small dimensions, to intentional or accidental slight changes in the capacity or inductance was demonstrated by Dr. Eccles, and its various utilisations were explained. When a piece of apparatus or simply a piece of wire, particularly if forming a closed ring, was brought near one of the oscillators the pitch of the telephone hum at once changed; even the mere movement of the hand of the experimenter had a pronounced effect. When radiotelegraphic appliances are coupled for heterodyne receiving, it may hence be sufficient to give Morse signals by moving a small wire loop instead of working the key. On the other hand, such a pair of oscillators can serve as a delicate induction balance. A small loop of copper wire had a stronger effect than a loop of iron wire. Taking a condenser made up of two vertical zinc plates standing in a glass cell, Dr. Eccles held an open bottle containing ether over the cell; the sinking vapor (heavier than air) affected the capacity and the note. The insertion of a piece of ebonite or paper, or of a gas flame between the condenser plates would produce similar or opposite effects. The thermoionic valve works with electrons. From the energy point of view it is still very inefficient; but it does wonderful things by simple means.—The Engineer, May 28, 1920.
Hot-Wire Telephones.—Thermophones are actuated by heat instead of electro-magnetism, and hence their characteristics are different from those of the usual telephone receivers. Speech is reproduced in the receiver by the motion of columns "of air adjacent to the small heated wires. In this case the diameter of the wire is of greater importance, and it is well to consider the relationship between the watts in the wire and the diameter of the wire, the London Electrician goes on to say. It is really understood that with very thin wires the great area of radiating surface as compared with the small cross-section allows the heat generated by the current to dissipate very rapidly. This property is made use of in the construction of thermophone receivers. The hot-wire receiver will only respond to the transmitter to which it is connected. When speaking it is necessary to speak close to and into the transmitter mouthpiece for the best transmission. Inductive effects are absent and, there being no diaphragm, there is no inherent distortion. The instrument has the great advantage of responding perfectly to low-spoken tones or whispers, and if the voice is raised there is no clash or confusion of sounds. It is extremely light in weight, from 0.25 to 0.5 oz.—The Scientific American, June 12, 1920.
ORDNANCE
The Era of the Eighteen-Inch Gun.—Although there is not as yet an 18-inch gun afloat in our navy, there is reason to believe that already the adoption of the 18-inch gun is contemplated by the Bureau of Ordnance. If so, we shall probably have a renewal of the old controversy between the advocates of great volume as against great weight of fire, such as more than once has stirred up no little tempest on the calm waters of bureaucratic procedure and found an echo in the outside civilian world.
The contention that the discharge of a large volume of projectiles of moderate weight is more effective than that of a smaller number of much greater weight and power, is as old as the history of the rifled gun. The question was hotly debated when we moved up from the 12-inch to the 14-inch gun, and again when we discarded the 14-inch for the 16-inch gun; and it is certain that, if the tests of the new naval 18-inch gun should be satisfactory, the question will once more be threshed out along the old lines.
If the 18-inch gun should be adopted, it will probably be placed on some of our new 43,000-ton battleships. As designed, they were to carry 12 50-caliber 16-inch guns, which means that on the same displacement and with the same speed, fuel supplies and general accommodations, they will be able to mount only eight 18-inch guns, particularly if the new pieces are to be of 50-caliber length. Many people will be surprised that a reduction of 50 per cent in the number of guns should be necessary when the caliber is increased only about 12 per cent, but this is because the weights of guns and projectiles increase approximately as the cube of the diameter. This applies not merely to the rifle itself, but it affects also the weight of the mount and the loading mechanism, the total weight of projectiles in the magazines, and so forth.
In favor of an 18-inch gun are the following points: The gun is more accurate; its range and energy are much greater; the bursting charge also is greatly increased, and therefore the destructive effect, when penetration of armor has been effected, is far greater.
The disadvantages are that not only is the number of shells delivered in a single salvo 30 per cent less for the eight-gun battery, but because of the greater weight both of gun and ammunition, the rate of fire is slowed down, so that the total number of projectiles delivered in a given time against the enemy is considerably over 30 per cent less than that delivered from the 12-gun ship.
Now, bearing in mind the common saying aboard ship that it is the shells which hit that count, it can be seen that there is over a 50 per cent better chance of landing on the enemy with a 12-gun Indiana than there would be with an eight-gun Massachusetts. The 16-inch shell weighs 2100 pounds, and if we aim at the highest velocities and make our 18-inch gun 50 calibers in length, the weight of its projectile will probably be about 3000 pounds, a 50 per cent increase in weight which must necessarily slow down the speed of handling. The only 18-inch gun afloat is the big fellow which the British built for the 32-knot cruiser Furious, but subsequently mounted on a monitor and used in the bombardment of Zeebrugge. With a view to extending the life of the gun, the British used a heavy projectile weighing 3600 pounds and having a moderate velocity.
Despatches from Washington state that 18-inch guns are to be used on two of the new battle-cruisers. If so, one turret and a pair of guns would have to be dropped, leaving these ships with six 18-inch guns in two-gun turrets, which would be an arrangement similar to that on the battlecruisers Repulse and Renown, which mount six 15-inch guns in three turrets.
If the 18-inch gun is to be adopted because of its superior range, it will be possible to utilize it at the longest ranges only in combination with airplane spotting and to make sure of spotting from a point above the enemy's ships, it is necessary that the attacking ship be accompanied by a fleet of fighting machines, sufficiently powerful to insure absolute superiority in the air.—The Scientific American, July 10, 1920.
Erosion of Guns.—The opportunity of studying the salient features of a large number of experiments on erosion—instead of following the more usual practice of an intensive study of a small number of experiments— was taken advantage of to some extent during the war, but, according to a paper by Mr. H. E. Wheeler, of Chicago, no new facts were developed. Cracking of the surface of the bore, due to the formation of a hard layer of metal of low ductility, is the most serious form of erosion. The enlargement of these cracks and the consequent roughening of the bore is one of the principal factors determining the life of guns of large caliber. Steel that will resist this penetration must be of such composition as to resist the formation of the solid-solution phase—chromium, etc.—and at the same time must be as little penetrable as possible by the gases. Tests made by the Ordnance Department of the United States Army showed that even after a few rounds there is a noticeable hardening of the surface. The formation follows the driving side of the lands preferentially, and eventually affects the entire land and groove, and even the powder chamber. The formation on the bearing surface of the lands extends much further down the bore than on any other part of the circumference. Owing to its low ductility, it at once develops a network of fine hair cracks which make a characteristic pattern, the largest cracks being parallel with or perpendicular to the axis of the bore.—The Engineer, June 25, 1920.
The Capital Ship: A Triple Verdict.—The methodical way in which the United States and Japan continue to add dreadnought after dreadnought to their respective fleets indicates more convincingly than words could do the confidence which these two Powers retain in the big battleship. On March 3 of this year the Maryland was launched at Newport News, Va. and a few days ago the Mutsu was put afloat at Yokosuka foe the Japanese Navy. The two ships are strikingly similar, as the following details show:
U.S.S. Maryland H.I.J.M.S. Mutsu
Length 624 ft. (overall) 661 ft.
Beam 97 ft. 3 in. 95 ft.
Draft, mean 30 ft. 6 in. 30 ft.
Displacement, normal 32,600 tons 33,800 tons
Speed 21 knots 23 ½ knots
Main armament 8 16-in. 45-cal. 8 16-in. 45 cal.
The Japanese ship is thus 1200 tons heavier, and has an advantage in speed of 2 ½ knots. Probably, however, she has less protection than the Maryland, which carries 16-inch armor on the belt and o-inch to 18-inch on the turrets. The Mutsu’s secondary battery will consist of 5.5 mm. or 6-inch Q. F., as compared with 5-inch guns in the American vessels, while the former is likely to mount a heavier torpedo armament. Generally speaking, in modern ships the size of the beam gives the measure of anti-torpedo protection, in which feature the Maryland apparently is superior to her contemporary. But to those who attach value to a good turn of speed the Mutsu will appeal as the better ship.
Powerful as these two ships are, they are far from representing the apex of foreign battleship development. For the time being Great Britain is out of the running, and, as it were, living on her capital. But sooner or later—failing the establishment of the League of Nations on a solid basis and its corollary of a limitation of armaments—she will have to resume the burden of naval shipbuilding, and by that time dimensions and cost will probably have risen to a gigantic figure. It is as well that this probability should be recognized now; otherwise there is sure to be an outcry when Parliament, a few years hence, is asked to sanction the building of 50,000-ton battleships, costing anything from eight to ten millions sterling. The monster vessels on which the United States and Japan are working cannot be dismissed as "mythical armadas." Six American ships, constituting the latest class, have been laid down in the past eight months, and two of their number (South Dakota and Indiana) were seven per cent complete on March 1. This type will displace 43,200 tons normally, 45,000 tons at full load, and mount a battery of 12 16-inch 50-caliber guns. Larger and more expensive still will be the six American battle-cruisers, the first of which, Saratoga, was laid down a few weeks ago. Not to be outdone, the Japanese are beginning work this summer on two new battleships, Amagi and Akagi, reported to displace 53.400 tons at normal draft; and, if precedent counts for anything, the United States will soon produce something bigger still. It is therefore quite misleading to talk of the Hood as the "last word" in naval design, as some papers persist in doing. Alike in size, speed, fighting power, and cost that ship will be surpassed by the U. S. S. Saratoga; and whereas the Hood is the sole representative of her type, the Saratoga boasts no less than five sisters.
Those who are not conversant with the technicalities of the subject may well feel puzzled at this wholesale production of ships which certain eminent naval officers in this country have pronounced to be so much scrap iron. But there is really no mystery about it. After a patient and exhaustive examination of all the data provided by the war, the shrewdest experts in America and Japan have come to the conclusion that an effective substitute for the capital ship has yet to be devised—in other words, that the large, well-armored, heavily-gunned battleship is not seriously menaced by attack from above or below, and can only be fought on equal terms by a ship of her own type. No one will accuse either America or Japan of ultra-conservatism; both are thoroughly progressive nations, and are always among the first to seize and exploit a promising innovation in the realm of naval science. Consequently, their action in continuing to lay down huge battleships designed to move and fight upon the surface of the sea may carry conviction even in circles where the British Admiralty's recent defence of the capital ship was attributed to the traditional conservatism of Whitehall.
I am assured on good authority that the Japanese. naval constructors within the past three years have spent large sums of money on experiments to determine the best method of enabling heavy ships to resist underwater explosion; further, that the result has been to confirm their view that a ship may be made virtually invulnerable to such attack by devoting a not unreasonable percentage of displacement to protective devices, which also assist in minimizing the effects of gunfire. The same conclusion, based either on practical experiment or war data, had previously been reached by the British Admiralty and the United States Navy Department. This means that the technical directors of the three leading naval powers of the world have awarded a certificate of the highest efficiency to the capital ship, and it will take something more than theory to upset this triple verdict.
Apparently there is still an acute divergence of opinion regarding the value of speed. The prevailing view on this side is that very high speed does not balance a deficiency in armament or protection; and, in conformity with this view, the original plans of the Hood were modified on the basis of reduced speed and increased protection. In America, on the other hand, they are still prepared to make heavy sacrifices in order to obtain superiority in speed. According to latest report, the battle-cruiser Saratoga, which is two knots faster than the Hood, will have a belt only five inches thick, compared with 12-inch armor in the British ship. Should this be correct, it will incline naval opinion in this country to assess the actual fighting value of the Saratoga at a figure considerably lower than the rank she occupies on paper. The lesson of Jutland, where several ships superior in speed and armament were destroyed by opponents inferior in every quality but that of protection, has sunk deep into naval minds on this side, and armor, once held in very light esteem, is now regarded as second only to gun power.—The Naval and Military Record, June 9, 1920.
MISCELLANEOUS
Character Building in the Army.—There was no finer result of the World War than the liberation of the spirit of service caused by the call to arms. The war presented a single objective for the creative energies of the entire nation, and in striving to attain this objective the people became a united nation as never before. The national spirit was expressed in a democratic and effective army and navy which maintained American ideals abroad with success and dignity. All of the diversified national forces and capabilities were organized to accomplish a single end, and the war was won.
The people of the United States, having experienced the exhilaration that comes from service in a righteous cause, are now searching for new ways and means of continuing this service in time of peace. They have learned that personal interest and ambition are not so inspiring or absorbing as national interest and service. They have learned to cooperate with one another in new ways and desire to continue to cooperate for the public good. The problem of preserving the lasting lessons of war experience is one of the most pressing problems now before the country.
As far as the army is concerned, this problem may be analyzed by noting the changes that were wrought in army activities by experience. For before the war the army was a numerically small and frequently unrecognized factor of national strength. It always was a symbol of national defense and an embodiment of the spirit of national service; yet it was a tight little army—a thing little observed and apart from the national life except when disorders arose. There was little intercourse and less mutual understanding between soldier and civilian. In fact, many civilians were prone to regard the soldier as an anachronism, as a relic of a bygone age.
With the outbreak of the war, these untoward conditions were suddenly changed. The soldier was dragged from his military isolation and placed in the center of the stage. The nation went enthusiastically to work to create an army that 'would adequately express the national spirit and power. In the process old misunderstandings have been cleared up. The civilian has caught the spirit of service and discipline of the soldier, while the soldier has grasped the value of the humane and liberalizing elements of civil life.
Inspired by the belief in this opportunity for national service, the army has definitely instituted a system of human development based upon its long practice as a military training institution and its experience during the emergency, and since the armistice, in education, vocational training, citizenship instruction, healthy recreation and development of a real sense of moral values. This system is conducted according to the high standards and ideals of national service which the army throughout its history has possessed. The system broadens army activities. It intensifies, animates and modernizes military training to agree with the conception derived from the war of the man as a combined soldier and citizen.
In this work the military training is being conducted in such a manner that adequate means for national defense will be always available. The officers are being trained as the leaders of men, and the soldiers are trained as intelligent and capable national defenders who have at all times every incentive and opportunity to become themselves leaders if they can develop the qualities of leadership. The education now given in the army effectively guarantees that soldiers, whose pre-army education has been defective, cannot remain illiterates, and offers to all members of the army a real opportunity to acquire occupational skill which will enable them to leave the service qualified to be self-supporting citizens. Education for illiterates and non-English speaking soldiers is made compulsory and is conducted by officer, soldier and civilian teachers and according to methods devised by expert civilian educational counselors. Occupational training is given under instruction methods developed by expert vocational trainers who have been employed by the army, many of them on leave from the leading educational institutions of the country. Teachers of occupational training are obtained by the employment in the army of well-qualified civilian teachers and by the use of officers and soldiers as instructors who have, by their pre-war experience or their experience during the war, learned the practical details of the occupations in which they instruct. Army education also provides for the army the large number of technical specialists that modern war demands.
The question of leisure time of officers and soldiers also receives careful consideration. The army is a very closely knit community. Officers and soldiers not only work together but live together. The army realizes its obligation to provide means whereby officers and soldiers may be given a moral equivalent for the home environment which civilians possess. It has therefore established clubs and recreation centers in its various posts, camps and stations. It equips libraries, builds theaters, provides professional entertainment for these theaters, and encourages the development of amateur dramatics. Experience during the World War has shown that soldier players can produce dramatic work of high character. Music is encouraged, and the formation of vocal and instrumental musical organizations is fostered. Athletics, which has always been an important army activity, is given further stimulus, and athletic equipment and instruction is adequately provided. Exchange or cooperative stores run by the army for the benefit of the army have been maintained for a great number of years. These, conducted according to modern business methods, will continue to serve officers and soldiers, their profits being used for promoting recreational activities.
The World War emphasized the fact that strength of character in the nation and strength of character in the soldiers of the nation are the final decisive elements upon which victory rests. Every activity of the soldier's life has a definite effect in strengthening or weakening character. Hence, military training and duties, general and vocational education, recreation and all functions of army life are coordinate with the definite purpose of developing self-control, self-respect, realization of the obligation of service and moral thoughtfulness in all officers and soldiers. This ideal of service is emphasized in every activity of the army. Recreation is conceived in the spirit of fair play, athletics emphasize fair play, clean sport, and teach officers and soldiers not only to be successful winners but to be good losers and to combat the ever present temptation to make "anything to win" the standard.
Religion as an essential to life is recognized, and provision is made for the religious needs of the army personnel. It is believed that each citizen of our nation is free to establish his relationship to God according to the dictates of his conscience, and each officer and soldier is given an opportunity to follow the faith of his choice. Respect and encouragement for religion are held as important obligations of an officer's position of leadership.
The army believes that the soundest morality and the highest character are those developed by the individual himself in response to his own incentives. Therefore soldiers have been urged to form clubs or associations with the explicit purpose of encouraging initiative, self-reliance, "team play," a broadminded tolerance, an intelligent patriotism, and the desire to serve one's group, one's neighborhood and one's country. These clubs are looked to for the development of a fine spirit of service on the part of their members. In these clubs the soldier learns the practical details of community life and its consequent community obligations. Upon the soldier as a club member rests a portion of the responsibility for the success of the club. Upon the citizen who returns to civil life from the army will rest his share of the responsibility for his community.
This broad conception which the United States Army now has of its full mission to the country and the diverse activities it has entered upon make it most vitally necessary that the army, if it is to succeed in this mission, have the greatest amount of cooperation from the communities near the posts, camps and stations of the army, from all of the finest and best organizations of our social life and from the common enthusiasm and spirit of the whole nation. The army has set up specific machinery to insure the fullest cooperation between its officers and soldiers and the communities in which officers and soldiers are located. It is urging communities and the people of the country to consider the army as a vital and natural part of the social organism of the nation and not to consider the armed forces as separate and distinct from the rest of American life, but as inevitably and permanently interwoven with the whole social fabric.
In its purpose to express essentially American ideals and to develop American men according to this program the army feels that it may properly ask and will undoubtedly receive the support of all good Americans and of all organized bodies of American life that stand for the progressive betterment of our country.—The Infantry Journal, July, 1920.
The Scientific Value of Speed Contests.—In all great sporting contests in which high speed is the deciding factor, many people, in whom the critical faculty is developed at the expense of others equally valuable, make themselves audible in protest against the sacrifice of strength and durability which is necessary in producing a first-class racing machine, be it airplane, yacht or automobile. "What is the sense," they ask, "of building a contraption which, if it should be so fortunate as to hold together for one supreme effort, has no further use in the broad field of sport and pleasure?"
An off-hand answer to this question would be to remind these gentlemen that sport is sport; that the craving for high speed is a protest against the natural inertia of things; and that, if a man does not possess in his veins the good, red blood to which speed as an element of sport appeals, it is ' more his misfortune than his fault, and he is to be pitied rather than blamed. But, as a matter of fact, the ardent pursuit of speed in racing machines has reacted most favorably upon the mechanical arts. The race course is a very practical, man-sized kind of laboratory, where the products of the labor of the designer at his drafting board are given a grueling test, during which the one weak link in the chain, if there be such, is certain to be disclosed. The great value of the construction and competition of racing machines is that we gain in knowledge of the dynamic as compared with the static stresses. Static stresses can be determined with great accuracy, and the testing machine gives us equal accuracy in determining the strength of materials; but in driving an automobile at a racing speed, and even more in smashing one's way with an over-sparred and lightly constructed yacht against short, snappy seas, there are dynamic stresses developed, the exact strength and effect of which no man can foretell through the medium of theoretical calculations.
Moreover, racing has greatly stimulated the quest for materials that are light in proportion to their weight; and there can be no doubt that for the many wonderful alloys which are available in the constructive arts to-day we are beholden, not a little, to the craze for speed, with its demand for a maximum of strength with a minimum of weight. To think of the racing car is to think of aluminum, vanadium steel, and last, the wonderful molybdenum steel; and a retrospective survey of the America's Cup races calls to mind the hollow steel boom of Valkyrie III, the Tobin bronze and aluminum hull of Defender, the light but strong hollow wooden spars culminating in the great hollow mast of Shamrock IV, and the tapered, hollow aviation spar which forms the topmast of Vanitie, to say nothing of the aluminum gaff carried by Resolute. A test case as to the industrial value of yacht construction is the three-ply mahogany shell of Shamrock's hull, which/proved so tough and strong and water-tight that its designer built Government ships, during the war, of a thousand tons capacity, on this principle.—The Scientific American, July 10, 1920.
Signalling by Invisible Rays.—Remarkable feats in signalling by radiations outside the visible spectrum, both infra-red and ultraviolet, were accomplished during the war and, it must be added, still more strange things were attempted. It was found possible, for instance, to detect the presence of a living warm body, lying outside a trench in the dark, by the heat rays coming from it. But it was hardly possible, though repeatedly suggested, to discover the approach of a steamer or submarine, in a fog, by the thermal radiations from the smoke stack, since water vapor is opaque to infra-red radiations. The experiments on secret signalling were not initiated during the war. Books on the subject were published in 1913, by Ruhmer in Germany and by Miessner in the United States. Since selenium was the most sensitive photoelectric substance then known, the first war experiments were conducted with selenium. But a search for photoelectric substances was made, notably by Case and by Coblentz and others in the Bureau of Standards, and several sulphides were found promising. Some crystals of molybdenite, molybdenum sulphide, in particular proved up to 200 times as sensitive to heat rays as a gold leaf radiometer, an instrument of the bolometer type. Gold and platinum, blackened on the one side with soot, absorb all the incident radiations and are hence not suitable for the selective absorption of heat rays. The man in front of a trench is difficult to detect when he wears a heavy coat and covers his face, and a boat is not easily picked out from a shore background.
In the radiophonic signalling of the Bureau of Standards, so far as described by W. W. Coblentz last year before the American Physical Society (the full paper is not yet available), a pulsating electric current is produced by interposing a rotating sector-disc between the source of radiation and the receiver. The receiver consists of a crystal of molybdenite, a battery of dry cells, of about so volts, connected directly to the input terminals of a three-stage amplifier and a telephone; a concave mirror, silver on glass, of 16 cm. diameter and 50 cm. focal length, concentrates the radiations on the receiver. In the simpler field apparatus, the crystal mirror, disc and battery of six cells are mounted on a camera tripod.
In the experiments conducted at Washington, the transmitting and receiving stations were situated on the roofs of two houses, separated by three miles of houses and dusty streets. When the radiation source was a 300candle tungsten lamp mounted in a searchlight reflector, the transmission was very good at the full distance mentioned. With an automobile headlight of 20 candles in a metal reflector the signals were not always audible; sighted on a street lamp (80 candles) the apparatus still responded at a distance of half a mile, but the interposition of a glass screen and the exclusive use of the infra-red rays made the signals uncertain.
The full moon proved an excellent source of radiation; the intensity of the moonlight is estimated at 3 X 10—gramme-calorie per second. Since the sector disc used cut off about half of the light and reduced the time of exposure to about 1/500 second, the sector wheel radiophone could not be very efficient, and attempts were made to change the pitch in the telephone note, apparently on the heterodyne reception principle. It was observed that the high resistance then wanted in series with the crystal weakened the sounds, but when several crystal-receivers were connected in series to make up the resistance, better results were obtained. Considerable success was realized with potassium-hydride photoelectric cells of the gas-ionic type; but particulars were not communicated.
Professor R. W. Wood, of Baltimore, who came over to France, devised several other ingenious devices which he himself built up out of very primitive apparatus. When he demonstrated their use, so far as desirable, before the Physical Society of London, he particularly spoke of a small lamp arranged in telescope fashion so as to give a very narrow, almost invisible, beam of light. To secure further secrecy he used a red light filter for day service and an ultraviolet filter for night service, the observer being correspondingly provided with a red screen (which shut out the daylight but transmitted the red beam) or with a fluorescent screen.
Another device was Professor Wood's lamp for naval convoy, radiating in all directions. This was a mercury lamp provided with a glass chimney permeable only to rays of ? 3660; these are invisible, but they make the retina and lens of the eye fluoresce so that an observer at close quarters sees a haze, the so-called "lavender fog," filling his field of view; the rays could only be picked up by a receiver comprising a fluorescent screen. This instrument had a range of four miles (that previously described had a range of six miles) that by its aid ships were kept together without showing any light.
We need hardly say that similar devices were worked out in this country. It is to be hoped that the researches are proceeding, though they may remain for the present locked up in official archives. There is, however, little need for secret signalling in normal times. But astronomers, meteorologists and other scientists might find such instruments useful, and the thermoionic valve, which forms part of some of these devices, has sufficiently established the startling technical possibilities of observations apparently of purely theoretical interest.—Engineering, June 11, 1920.