WHAT STEPS IN ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING SHOULD BE TAKEN TO MAINTAIN AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE NAVY AT THE CLOSE OF THE PRESENT WAR?
By Rear Admiral A.C. Dillingham (Retired), U.S. Navy
It is probable that the steps to be taken to maintain and increase the efficiency of the navy at the close of the present war could best be decided by a serious consideration of the lessons taught us and the experiences we have had during the war.
The major principles presented to us with the prosecution of the war, some of which have developed into axioms, are as follows:
The influence of sea power.
The advantages of preparedness for war.
War must be prosecuted with strategic intention.
The necessity for a well-balanced navy, considering the weapons and appliances at the disposal of sea forces.
The necessity for an adequate personnel reserve for the navy in time of peace, which shall be organized and trained ready in all respects for mobilization.
Single command.
The importance of a military administration for the conduct of the fleet.
Concerted action.
Co-ordination and co-operation of operations and the fleet.
Co-ordination of the makers or framers of policy and the force that is to back the policy.
Logistics.
The influence of sea power has never been more strongly illustrated than by the example we have before us in the case of the Central Powers to-day.
The battle off the Falkland Islands settled the fate of Germany's one squadron at sea; while Jutland compelled the enemy to seek a passive defence, which it has been obliged to endure ever since.
History repeats itself in declaring that the sea cannot be controlled by land, a military principle which has been untenable since man first began to fight at sea.
The external and internal conditions as to the economic state of the Central Powers show that the German faith was founded upon their armies alone, and the fatal error of the German emperor has been in not really understanding sea power, and in believing that he could defy it.
It was the influence of sea power that prevented Europe from being trampled into submission and moral death by a ruthless military autocracy, and the same influence permitted us to complete our preparedness and go to the rescue of civilization and democracy.
It needs no oratory or argument to prove that the influence of sea power upon the destinies of the world was exhibited in the present war, for with this influence and without a decision ashore, which I believe every thinking man decided was impossible, Germany could not win the war.
The influence of sea power is such that it is altogether possible to so control the economic conditions of the Central Powers as to deprive them of a place with the family of nations until they have proven themselves worthy or desirable. It must not be forgotten that with sea power, Great Britain and the United States can control 90 per cent of the stable products of the world, and that Germany depends for its economic existence upon its merchant marine. The moment Germany ordered the vessels of her merchant marine to intern, whether in an enemy or neutral port, in August, 1914, she abandoned her merchant fleet and endangered her economic existence.
The influence of sea power and its advantages have been most conspicuous during the present war, but any future naval policy must depend upon what international agreements or arrangements are made at the Peace Conference, where the ideals of a League of Nations, supported by an international police force, freedom of the seas, free trade and so forth will be thrashed out, and we will be presented with the practical solution of these questions, and our policy governed accordingly.
It is not conceivable that any conditions shall be imposed which would prevent us from preparing our own strength for our own defence. This is a natural law which cannot be violated.
With our declaration of war, there disappeared from our political vocabulary the terms "Old World" and "New World" and for our future policies conies not the Old World or the New World, but the world as we find it to-day. Our declarations will be made at the Peace Conference, and it will be out of place and futile to discuss such great policies as freedom of the seas, control of the seas, free trade and so forth until after this convention has adjourned and the ideals for the League of Nations, freedom of the seas and so forth have taken a practical form, upon which a policy can be based.
Our Secretary of the Navy has asked Congress to provide a three-year building program. This is, in no possible way, a contradiction of any suggested international policy, but, on the contrary, the reasons given by the Secretary of the Navy show that this request anticipates some such world policy and makes a wise preparation for the conspicuous part that we must take in an international police force, if it is to be created, and provides the means for carrying out the ordinary peace duties of a naval force.
As a further support of the position of the Secretary in his recommendations it can be said that from press reports it seems that the tendency of the Peace Conference is toward disarmament, but it is reasonable to suppose that no nation will be expected to abandon its instruments of war until the substitute for such instruments has been proved effective.
Under such circumstances it would seem to be at least a safe policy to maintain our fleet in being with fighting efficiency till such time as its substitute is found to be effective or until we have some positive assurance of perpetual peace.
The advantages derived from preparedness for war have been so conspicuous that we must realize the necessity for preserving the fleet on a war footing and for preserving war habit so far as the absence of actual hostilities will allow. This means that the organization be such that it will not be affected whether we add or subtract units from the active fleet. It means that vessels in reserve at the close of the war shall be actually in reserve, not losing their fighting efficiency, and ready at any moment to take their places in the active fleet, and that the allowed complement of the fleet, active and reserve, be adequate for mobilization at any time.
No amount of preparedness would have allowed us to guard against the piratical use of submarines and other craft, as has been the ruthless, uncivilized practice of our enemies during the present war.
The ruthless murder of women, children and other non-combatants at sea has been a menace not to be anticipated from a civilized government. The settlement for such a violation of all rules of war and civilization can only be made when the terms of peace are considered.
With the advent of the torpedo as a weapon of war and the hydroplane and captive balloon as a necessary facility for long-range fire control and information, the fleet, to be well balanced, must provide against the former and develop to the limit the latter.
Invention has played a conspicuous part in the present war and must receive serious consideration. The aerial bomb is in the progress of development to such an extent as to warrant the assertion that it will be a most important weapon by vessels of the fleet out of range of the enemy's guns, against enemy land defences. The sound detector is susceptible to greater range and becomes indispensable to certain units of the fleet.
The same reasons for a single army under a single commander exist for a single commander for the fleet, and the dependence upon operations for the proper conduct of the fleet is so apparent that no argument is necessary for its continuance in peace. The co-ordination of operations and its representatives afloat has resulted in a singleness of purpose so necessary to obtain desired results, that it must be continued in peace.
Logistics is a problem that has taxed to the utmost not only the interested departments of the navy, but the resources of the country, and we should preserve at the close of the war the methods that have been found most efficient, never with the slightest chance of reverting to pre-war conditions. Logistics bears a most intimate and important relation to preparedness. We must develop and maintain developed, our bases and keep intact the organization for the proper control of the coast, selecting and equipping sub-bases strategically well-located along the coast.
We need most urgently co-ordination of the makers or framers of policy, and the force that is to back that policy, or carry it out. With such co-ordination, strategy and policy will work together in presenting to the navy the reasons for its existence— its mission as a naval force.
The basic principle for all organization is simplicity.
With administration, the authority is centralized in a head of the organization and decentralized to the heads of its units, or parts; these units being such that the results that obtain separately will, when taken together, produce the best results for the whole.
Never before has the administration of the navy been so near ideal as it is to-day, centralized in the Secretary of the Navy and decentralized to the different departments of the navy.
But if the organization of the fleet is not ideal or consistent with the requirements of battle, we will not get the best results from operations, though the administration be ideal.
I claim that the organization of the fleet based upon any other principle than gunnery homogeneity is defective.
In this decentralization we have to do with the administration of the fleet; and necessarily the best organization of the fleet for the purpose of administration, or war, would be a permanent organization as simple as possible, based upon correct principles. The administration of the fleet is centralized in the chief of operations and decentralized to the different departments of operations. Thus, the chief of operations becomes the chief of staff and the heads of his different departments compose the general staff.
Under the direction of the chief of operations, the Atlantic and Pacific fleets are operated to meet the requirements of the political aspects of the world. We thus have the chief of operations assimilating a single command.
If a military organization is based upon a tactical unit, the administration is not affected, whether there is but one or many units; take, for instance, the large number of men at the Great Lakes Station—the unit of the organization is the regiment, so that the administration is the same whether there is but one regiment or 40 regiments.
So with the fleet, if the organization is based upon a tactical unit and is permanent, which it must be if we adhere to the basic principle, the administration is not affected whether we have one unit or many units.
With such an organization based upon gunnery homogeneity, the operation of the fleet needs only the detachment of units for specific service, provided that the units detached are always tactical units, which of necessity, they must be.
With the two fleets, Atlantic and Pacific, if it is necessary to have a force in China, it is only necessary to detail that force from the Pacific fleet—the same with the Atlantic fleet, if it is desired to have a force in Europe or in South America; and again, if, with a League of Nations, an international police is required, it is only necessary that we detail from either fleet, or from both, the units necessary to provide our share of the international force. But for the purposes of our defence and being able to back any policy the government may dictate, we must keep the Atlantic and Pacific fleets in being.
Our navy is essentially a two-ocean navy. As an initial organization, our force shall be divided equally into two parts, to be known as the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. These fleets shall be based upon the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, respectively, and all duty to be performed by the navy shall be performed by units from these fleets. The Asiatic Station is abolished as a separate organization, the duties in the east to be performed by the scout cruisers, or cruiser force of the Pacific fleet, or such other units from the Pacific fleet as may be necessary to meet the requirements of the political aspect of the east at any time.
For strategic purposes, operations will make such disposition of the units of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets as it may see fit, but the initial organization need not be disturbed by the transfer of units from the Pacific to the Atlantic or vice versa. The forces comprising the fleet shall be divided as at present: Battleship force, battle cruiser force, scout cruiser force, destroyer force, submarine force, mine force, train, coast defence force, reserve force.
Let us leave the initial organization, which is an expression of the purpose of our naval force, and consider the requirements of the organization of either fleet, since they must be identical, admitting first that the development of the force depends, primarily, on a sound and permanent tactical organization of ships into fundamental divisions.
Since the climax of efficiency in fleet is to hit the target, and we can only damage the enemy with our guns of sufficient range, ships with similar guns should be grouped together. No other consideration is admissible.
A sound permanent tactical organization of the forces is fundamental, an organization that will not be affected whether we add units, or withdraw them. Let us remember that our defence is one of offence, so that in designing types, if compromise is to be made, it should be made in favor of offence. The tendency to give undue weight to defence is bad in its results, and is not consistent with our needs or traditions. In all modern battles the results desired have been obtained by offence—the guns— and to outrange the enemy has been proved to be an essential advantage.
As the United States may not bring itself to an equality in numbers with the strongest navy, it Incomes the duty of the navy to bring and keep its fleet up to such a superior degree of fighting value as at least to stabilize the inequality, and so make numbers.
Fighting value includes such tangible elements as organization, training, discipline, skill, morale, ship efficiency. Skill alone, supported by perfection in maneuvering, can overcome a disadvantage in numbers by a concentrated gunfire on part of the enemy's line, while the other part of the enemy's line is either out of range or contained by part of our force. Thus it would seem that the skill of our flag officers can only find training and expression in tireless maneuvering of the fleet, and the constant practice of indoctrination. Tactical skillfulness of the fleet can only be obtained through frequent exercises with forces opposing each other. The sole aim of tactical skill is to make numbers; this was illustrated at Nile, Trafalgar and Tsushima.
The tactical unit of organization of the battle line should be the "gunnery unit." The gunnery unit should be the greatest number of ships that can concentrate gunfire on one enemy ship with no loss of ship's destructive fire effect. In the present stage of fire control, it is held that two ships should constitute the gunnery unit. These two ships should be formally under the command of the senior captain—the unit commander—and they should cruise together, work together, overhaul together and play together. Only on the principle of the closest kind of permanent association would it seem possible to drill a gunnery unit to a satisfactory degree of gunnery concentration; each ship must as well be trained to divide its fire on two enemy ships.
The principles of fire distribution to be met by fundamental organization and intensive training are:
First.—That we shall be able to concentrate overwhelming gunfire on a part of the enemy's battle line at shortest range.
Second.—While containing that part of the enemy's line at longest range.
Third.—Keeping, however, every enemy ship within range under our fire, as long as the enemy ship remains in the line.
Necessarily it should follow that the two ships of the gunnery unit should be identical types with identical guns. This principle requires its observance: First, by the creative body (Congress) ; second, by the designing officers of the navy; and third, by the organizing powers in the navy. To pair a 14-inch gun ship with a 12-inch gun ship would be faulty. To pair a 12-inch 50-caliber gun ship with a 12-inch 45-caliber gun ship would also be faulty, for until we get the long base range-finder so developed as to diminish the necessity for continuous spotting, the ideal gunnery unit would seem to arrive when we group identical ships having interchangeable ammunition, and train them so that one ship will spot for both; either spotting, the other relief.
These units, some of which are obsolete, exhibit successive construction to produce types that will meet the demands of gunnery and generally present an effort to create tactical units of identical types. Types have changed until we can approach an ideal type and an ideal unit which is based upon gunnery homogeneity.
The organization then to be best must take advantage of these tactical units by placing them so that the result obtained from separate units shall, when taken together, give the best results for the whole fleet.
In the organization suggested, gunnery units and tactical units would be permanent; they are formed of sister ships; divisions are as homogeneous as our fleet will permit; squadrons would not very well be made more homogeneous with the material. Where a ship's position in the organization is vacant owing to extraordinary navy yard work, the vacancy should remain until the ship rejoins.
A fleet is created by long practice as sea, and this would seem impossible unless there is fundamentally a permanence of tactical organization, including every unit, based on the grouping of sister ships as gunnery units. Without a permanent organization fundamentally sound, we will never get the best results, no matter how intensive the training.
Again homogeneity in maneuvering affected by different underwater bodies must be seriously considered in grouping types. Take, for instance, the Wyoming, New York and Nevada types in turning on a standard diameter. Though these vessels have about the same displacement and speed, the Wyoming type in turning will require 170 rudder, whereas the Nevada will require but 7° or 8° rudder. Under such circumstances there is grave danger of collision unless the speed of the Nevada is changed during the evolution; this is inadmissible. The commanding officer of the Nevada, in battle, should not be handicapped by having his attention diverted from his guns by any consideration of tactics.
With respect to the number of ships in a division, the division should combine two or more tactical units. Four ships may always be maneuvered in column; with more than this number the disadvantages cannot be ignored. Concerning the number of divisions in a squadron, our practice of a squadron of two divisions (four tactical units, eight ships) can be asserted the best grouping so long as the tactical unit, limited by powers of fire concentration, remains two ships. And the squadron is generally accepted as the largest number of ships that can be controlled as a unit independently. It is also very generally accepted that independently operated squadrons co-operating under a plan of battle offer the best chance of success in all fleet actions: Trafalgar, Yalu, Tsushima, Jutland.
All our effort should concentrate on learning to co-ordinate in battle our eight ship squadrons acting under independent command and initiative. Discussing the massed fleet obeying one leader versus the fleet co-operating in units, authority holds that the "fleet which works as a whole not only cannot hope to gain any advantage, but must itself abandon its compactness, if it does not wish to be caught at a disadvantage."
The position of the commander-in-chief in the organization does not seem to be generally agreed upon. Nelson sets, perhaps, the example most profitable to follow. He commanded in person the detachment of his fleet which was designated to handle the most uncertain and most difficult part of the general plan. It would seem that all battles between great concentrations would have to be fought on some such general plan of "containing" a portion of the enemy with a weaker portion of our own fleet, while the stronger detachment of our own fleet had the duty of overwhelming the other portion of the enemy's fleet. The containing operation, usually conducted with an inferior detachment, would appear to be, without doubt, the most difficult, for upon its skillfulness will depend the success of the battle. It does not seem possible to attempt to fix the position of the commander-in-chief.
There is no tactical reason why the commander-in-chief should be in formation, either in battle or in peace. In time of peace, to the contrary, I believe it to be altogether preferable that he be out of formation, flying his flag on a speedy good sea boat with good steaming radius, and large enough to give comfortable accommodations for his entire staff and communication force. This would release a battle unit for fleet work and possibly complete a tactical unit.
Coming to the organization of our destroyer flotilla, the division into groups of six boats seems sound. It would seem evident that the maximum number of destroyers that can attack simultaneously one ship on the same side is three. Thus the unit of three destroyers, which we might call the attack unit, is deduced. A group, therefore, becomes two units (six boats), rendering possible the full power of concentrating the attack of a destroyer group on one capital ship, on both sides. To arrive at the best results the senior attack unit in a destroyer group would operate under the command of the destroyer group commander; the junior attack unit, under the senior destroyer captain in that unit, and his command of his unit at all times should be more than nominal, it would seem, if the best powers of the attack unit are to be developed.
The following is suggested as the result of experience:
Three boats to constitute one attack unit.
Two attack units, six boats, a group. (A group ought to be commanded by a commander.)
Three groups (18 boats) to form a flotilla division. (The division ought to be commanded by a captain, embarked in a scout having as much speed as his destroyers have.)
Three divisions to form a flotilla under a rear admiral. (Three divisions (18 boats each, in all 54 boats) should be the limit of one flag officer's command.)
The organization of the submarine flotilla similarly would doubtless be based on attack units. This merits exhaustive study.
It is intended to express through this article that a fundamentally sound permanent organization is imperative in time of war or peace.
The business or purpose of the reserve fleet and flotillas is to aid or assist the active fleet in war. To this end the vessels in reserve, like those in the active fleet, must never lose their fighting efficiency. The reserve force is a part of the active force, and should be under the command of the admiral commander-in-chief of the active force. The organization of the reserve force must be identical with that of the active force; there must be the same co-ordination of the reserve force and active force that there is in the units of either force. All vessels of the reserve force which would add strength and efficiency to the active force must take their place in the battle line upon mobilization; the other vessels of the reserve force lacking tactical requirements of the active force to be employed as the commander-in-chief may direct in coast defence, defence of bases, etc.
The reserve force should be based consistently with the strategy of the active fleet, and should cruise consistently with that strategy, and be trained under the same system as that employed in the active fleet, and in conjunction with that fleet.
If we are to adhere to the axiom that no vessel in the active or reserve fleet shall lose its fighting efficiency, and no other consideration is admissible, it becomes a question as to what shall be the allowed complement of vessels in the reserve, in order to preserve that efficiency.
It has been found, and I believe it to be absolutely necessary that we cruise and be able to have target practice. This necessitates such a complement of a vessel in reserve as will be able to accomplish this.
In our fleet Sims took the destroyers from navy yards to sea, cruised with them, drilled with them at sea, and had target practice with a complement of 50 per cent of their allowed complement. It was not long before he was able to present to the commander-in-chief a force ready for battle to the limit of the physical endurance of its reduced crews, and it is such a condition that should exist with vessels in reserve, no matter what their type. The allowed complement of the fleet must be such as to carry out the requirements of the vessels in reserve, and to be ready for mobilization at any time. Any vessel of the fleet that is not in this condition is not in reserve. It has been suggested that we have first, second, third, etc., reserves, but this is inadmissible; it is a misuse of the term "reserve," for no vessel is in reserve that is not available for mobilization upon an order from operations.
The present law for creating a personnel reserve for the navy, unfortunately, was not enacted years ago. Such a law is intended for time of peace, and such a law at that time would not only create a force organized and trained ready for mobilization, but would increase the size of the continuous service force of the navy. With any scheme for universal training, it must be provided, so far as the navy is concerned, that the forces be organized so that upon mobilization we will be ready for battle.
We can only maintain and increase the efficiency of the navy at the close of the present war by continuing a sound co-ordinate policy with respect to the fleet, the co-ordination of operations and the fleet, the same intensive training which is now going on in the fleet, the preservation of war habit and the reserve force organized and trained ready for mobilization at any moment.
Mobilization can take place at the time when the reserves report for training, and these reserves can be so organized that each man shall have his billet aboard a specific ship, and living in a locality near the base upon which the ship is based, he would have nothing to do but march aboard and take his place.
Under no circumstances must we allow our naval force to drift into peace habits. A peace organization has no place with the navy. Our whole business should be to profit by the experiences that we have had and the lessons that have been taught us during the present war, remembering how difficult it was for us, so long at peace, so far from the theater of war, to acquire the war habit.
The question of the enlisted personnel is second to no other in importance. No other system than voluntary enlistments will satisfy the conditions of the navy, where we must have a continuous service force, upon which we more or less depend for a permanent organization and which is necessary to provide fighting efficiency.
And there is no organization that I know of so quickly and easily affected by the introduction of an under-trained or untrained element as that of a battleship.
Take, for instance, the Pennsylvania—her main batteries representing a potential killing force of nearly a million rifles, and this concentrated on a front, the length of the ship, say 750 feet. The efficient work of this battery depends entirely upon teamwork, so that the introduction of an under-trained or untrained element to the ship's company would destroy the team-work and fighting efficiency of the ship.
With the forces ashore, this is entirely different—distributed over a great length of front, the under-trained or untrained element can be distributed so as to not affect the efficiency or organization to any great extent.
If we are to adhere to the axiom that no vessel in the active or reserve fleet shall ever lose its fighting efficiency, it at once becomes a question of not only what shall be the complement of vessels in reserve, but what shall be the method of training the reserve, so that upon mobilization we will least disturb the fighting efficiency of the ship.
If the allowed complement of the ship is not sufficient to maintain that axiom then I would prefer to reduce the force so that the axiom can be, or shall be, maintained.
The present law, creating a personnel reserve for the navy, provides for three months' training in four years. This is insufficient, for, as a matter of fact, we spend one year in bringing a battleship to such a state of efficiency as will permit her to go to record target practice.
At the beginning of the war, we were short of the complement necessary to man the available fighting ships, and the navy was suddenly faced with the necessity for tremendous expansion to meet the demands of war, and the demand for trained men became more acute as the war continued.
The phenomenal results gotten in respect to the personnel through the policy of Operations and the methods adopted by the Bureau of Navigation to carry out this policy may cause us to be optimistic with reference to the personnel, but we must not forget that these results were permissible only because the British Navy controlled the sea.