NAVAL WAR NOTES
Prepared by Lieutenant W. B. Jupp, U. S. Navy
STRATEGY
Allies and U. S. Begin Supreme War Council.—Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States were represented at the session of the supreme war council which was convened at Versailles, France, January 29, presided over by Georges Clemenceau, the French premier.
The meeting is regarded as one of extraordinary importance, because the plan of operations during the coming campaign is expected to come before it for determination.
The United States was represented by General Tasker H. Bliss, Chief of Staff of the American Army. Arthur Hugh Frazier, Secretary of the American Embassy at Paris, attended as a diplomatic officer, to report the proceedings, but not to participate otherwise. The other participants in the conference were:
For Great Britain: Premier Lloyd George and Major General Sir Henry Hughes Wilson, sub-chief of the British General Staff; for Italy: Premier Orlando, Baron Sonnino, the foreign minister, and General Cadorna; for France: Stephen Pichon, the foreign minister; General Ferdinand Foch, Chief of Staff of the Ministry of War, and General Maximo Weygand.—Evening Star, 29/1.
Ships Pooled to Hasten Aid to Allies.—American, Allied, and Neutral Vessels Under Board of Three.—Centralized control of transatlantic shipping was established recently with the creation of a Ship Control Committee to have supreme charge of the operation of all ships—American, allied and neutral—entering and leaving American ports.
The committee was named by representatives of the Shipping Board, the War and Navy Departments, the Food and Fuel Administrations, the Director-General of Railroads, the British Government and ship-owners, who met to devise some plan for speeding up the movement of supplies to Europe. It comprises P. A. S. Franklin, of the International Mercantile Marine, chairman ; H. H. Raymond, head of the Clyde and Mallory Lines, and recently made Shipping Controller at New York, and Sir Connop Guthrie, director of British shipping in this country.
The arrangement, as explained by Shipping Board officials, in effect
creates a pool of ships moving supplies to Europe. Goods destined for
overseas will be loaded in available ships, whether operated by the United
States or the allies. With the aid of the Railroad Administration the committee
will divert to southern ports much of the supplies that heretofore
have clogged the port of New York, and incoming vessels will be directed
by wireless to proceed to the ports in which materials of the most importance
await shipment.
The plan yet has to be approved by the British Government and by the other
allies, but officials have received the assurance of Sir Connop Guthrie
and Sir Richard Crawford, of the British Embassy, that this would be
forthcoming.
Approval of the neutrals is not necessary, inasmuch as neutral ships
operated by the United States and the Allies are operated under charter.
The British long have urged an arrangement of the kind, and months ago
sought to have the United States enter the inter-allied chartering conference.
The centralized control now authorized virtually creates such a
conference on this side of the water.
Shipping experts here have expressed the belief that at least 30 and perhaps
50 per cent greater efficiency could be obtained from the shipping al
the disposal of the United States and its allies by close coordination of
effort. Great Britain's shipping, it was stated, represented about 80 percent of the overseas service.
In a general way, the British Government's shipping will be used to carry foods in quantities sufficient to meet the emergency conditions abroad. The United States will endeavor to get the men across and supply to them the necessary arms and ammunition.
The direction of all this tonnage, American and allied, will come under the jurisdiction of the council of which Mr. Franklin is the head. The War and Navy Departments and the Food and Railroad Administrations will not have representatives on the council, as it is intended to concentrate power for action in a small body. Agents of these departments, however, will work in the closest cooperation.
There will be representatives of the new council in all of the important American ports, and agents will be sent also to France, England, and Italy. By the use of the cables the men at the helm here will be kept in constant touch with all developments.
One of the first problems to be taken up will be quick routing of vessels, which often have been delayed for many days because of a division of power in their direction. Arrangements will be made so that ships will know in advance and definitely the place where the convoys are to meet them and the time they are expected to be on hand. Orders in this connection will be applied to American and allied ships and will be mandatory. It is said that there has been much confusion and delay in the past.
Incoming ships will be informed in advance also of the ports at which they are to land, thus doing away with the delays which have been caused by vessels arriving at docks already overworked. Outgoing vessels will be instructed where to get their bunker coal and cargoes.
Where it is found essential cargoes of foodstuffs may be sent over the transportation lines of the nation to southern instead of northern ports, and ships receiving directions from the new council will call at such ports when instructed, even if the overseas course thus allotted to them may be longer. The shipmaster will have no right to use his discretion in such matters under the proposed system of control.
In fact, it is intended to give to the Shipping Control Committee practically absolute power over the employment of tonnage, with the single proviso that there will be no effort in the direction of fixing rates for the allied as well as the American tonnage.
Activities will not be restricted to this side of the Atlantic, as much work will be done in the development of port facilities in Great Britain and France to provide for the rapid unloading and loading of vessels.
Mr. Franklin will spend most of his time in Washington and will keep in close touch with Edward F. Carry, director of operations of the Shipping Board and the various departments involved. Mr. Raymond will establish headquarters in this city.
Raymond B. Stevens, vice-chairman of the Shipping Board, and George Rublee, of the board's legal staff, are to be sent to London as permanent representatives of the Shipping Board.
Mr. Stevens will take his place on the Inter-Allied Chartering Executive, which sits at London and Paris and has control over all British, French, Italian and neutral tonnage operating under charter to the Allies.
The Shipping Board is understood to have under consideration several shipping men for the posts of representatives of the Division of Operations at London, Paris, and Rome.
Robert P. Bass, former governor of New Hampshire, and a labor expert, who has been assisting Mr. Stevens in dealing with labor problems, will take over such of the vice-chairman's duties as have to do with labor, it was learned. Whether one of the four remaining commissioners will be appointed acting vice-chairman during Mr. Stevens's absence could not be ascertained.—Nautical Gazette, 1/2.
Alleged Success of Convoy System.—The Pall Mall Gazette recently published an interview with Sir L. Chiozza Money, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Shipping, on the question of ships and food.
Referring to the effects of the U-boats, Sir Leo remarked that the rate of our losses had fallen so greatly since the spring of 1917 that it is quite certain the enemy cannot beat us or starve us by a submarine campaign.
Regarding the convoy system, he said the public hear only of quite exceptional cases of loss without knowing what excellent results have been achieved. As regards homeward convoys, I have here a list of 186 homeward convoys, concerned with no fewer than 2430 ships, carrying no less than 17,500,000 tons of cargo. And what was the loss on the whole? Almost exactly 1 ½ per cent.
As to food ships, so well have, they been cared for that the recent losses, including the exceptional cases to which public attention has been directed, have been exceedingly small. In the last few months, for example, scarcely any of the wheat homeward bound to the United Kingdom has been lost by enemy action. But no one, added Sir Leo, should find excuse for waste in that statement, for, as has been said, the cumulative effect of past losses remains. Further, we have, unfortunately, had to divert food cargoes from the United Kingdom, France, and Italy.
If, therefore, I tell you, added Sir Leo, that the convoy system has been a magnificent success, I say no more than the truth, but that success does not put us back to the position we occupied before the serious losses began. Only new building by Britain and the United States can do that, and it will be some time before that building tells and raises the aggregate tonnage position of the Allies.
Commenting in its issue of January 14 on the above interview, the Liverpool Journal of Commerce comes to the conclusion that Sir Leo's figures are misleading. In part it says as follows:
A week ago Sir Leo Money is reported by the Pall Mall Gazette as saying:
"The public hear only of quite exceptional cases of loss without knowing what excellent results have been achieved. As regards homeward convoys, I have here a list of 186 convoys concerned with no fewer than 2430 ships carrying no less than 17,500,000 tons of cargo. And what was the loss on the whole? Almost exactly 1 ½ per cent."
Observe the "no fewer" and the "no less," for we are inclined to the opinion that Sir Leo indulges in exaggeration when he wishes to appall us by the immensity of the figures with which he dabbles. A week later he is reported by the Daily Mail as saying:
"Or consider the success of the convoys. The last report which has just reached me shows that over 18,000,000 tons deadweight have been convoyed with a loss of only 1.52 per cent. Or, take all inward cargoes. In the last four months the loss has been only about 3 per cent, of which only about 1 per cent is represented by food."
Sir Leo Money does not state that "the list" quoted in the Pall Mall Gazette is one and the same as the "last report" quoted in the Daily Mail. However, he speaks of 2430 ships carrying 17,500,000 tons of cargo, which he works out at 7200 tons per ship, and if he is sincere in his utterances he would speak of an average convoy of average ships, with the average deadweight capacity of 7200 tons. If we apply such figures to all inward cargoes in the last four months we find there is something wrong, else our figuring is not what it should be. During September, October, November, and December, there were 43.438 arrivals at British ports, according to the weekly returns issued by the Admiralty, and on an average carrying capacity of 7200 tons we have a total of 312,753,600 tons brought to this country. Obviously, this is wrong. Its ridiculousness is apparent on the face of it, and at the same time Sir Leo's own figures help to disprove it. He says "the loss has been only about 3 per cent," which represents 9,382,608 tons, or 1303 vessels. Yet the total of sinkings, out of arrivals and sailings, reported by the Admiralty in the same period is 311 vessels, of which 222 were 1600 tons gross and over, and 89 under 1600 tons. There is something wrong.
Again, he says 2430 vessels were convoyed with a loss of only 1 ½ per cent, that is, 36 vessels. (Again we say we do not know whether "the list" quoted in the Pall Mall Gazette is one and the same as the "last report" quoted in the Daily Mail.) A simple proportion arithmetic calculation tells us that if 36 vessels are sunk out of 2430, then proportionately 644 would be sunk out of the 43,438 arrivals during the last four months. But we are officially advised that there were only 311, and the deduction we draw from Sir Leo Money's illustration is that the proportion of sinkings is exceedingly high in the convoys. If 311 is the total sinkings, then proportionately only 18 should have been lost out of his convoys.—Nautical Gazette, 7/2.
The War at Sea.—The following is the first sentence of a leading article in the Army and Navy Journal of New York for December 8, 1917: "From statements made by the navy authorities of France, England and the United States in the last few days it would appear that the long-looked-for more aggressive naval policy on the part of the Allies was in sight."
It has long been apparent to those who read the American professional journals and the expressions of opinion which have appeared from time to time in other American papers that the view was held very generally on the other side of the Atlantic that the naval policy of the Allies was susceptible to improvement. While praise was lavished on the officers and men of the British Navy and its auxiliaries afloat for their gallantry, endurance and technical skill, it was suggested that while the fleet was under the control of politicians suddenly called upon to face the problems of war in a serious way and insufficiently equipped for the purpose, it was unlikely that the very best use would be made of it. The United States, like this country, describes its navy as its first line of defence, but it has learned also the potency of its fleet as an offensive weapon. Like this country before the war, it possessed only a small but highly trained professional army, which on occasion it had used as the spear point of its naval forces. Although, then, when the United States came into the war, measures were taken to increase the land forces, it was to the navy that the nation looked primarily to assert its strength on the side of the Allies. Mr. Daniels, the Secretary of the Navy, in his annual report recited the steps taken by his department to cooperate with the fleets of the Allies, and described the frank and free interchange of information which in the conduct of the naval war was a proof of "the partnership of democratic nations which will yet ensure a lasting peace."
The decision to create an Allied Council composed of the high naval officers of all the allied powers has been regarded as a significant sign of a change in policy more in accordance with this American view. This belief was held to have support in the statement made by Mr. Daniels on December 5 that "there is to be the greatest possible measure of cooperation between the American and allied navies. The plan is to get the highest degree of efficiency out of our naval forces wherever they may be needed." It has been admitted by the changes which have been made during the past year that a weak place in our Admiralty organization was the Operations Department, and among the measures which have been taken to strengthen this department Sir Eric Geddes has mentioned an infusion of younger officers with recent experience afloat. If, then, the Army and Navy Journal is justified of its surmise, the new policy will have as its sponsors not only the French and American professional writers who have pressed for it, but the young British naval officers with war experience, whose opinions after all must appeal more strongly to their countrymen.
It is not proposed to speculate here as to the form and substance which this more aggressive policy will take. Commenting on the appointment of Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, the Times said "our younger seamen are convinced that they can entirely overcome the submarine peril if they receive the free hand which they have never yet been granted," and the Daily Mail said of the new First Sea Lord that "his record suggests that young and energetic officers will find a more open path to promotion and greater opportunity of making good than was ever the case under the old regime." Obviously, there is here pointed out one direction in which offensive policy may make itself manifest. The Westminster Gazette also on this point says, "the younger school will be well advised if, with the experience of their predecessors behind them, they refrain from making promises and restrain their sponsors from promising on their behalf. What their plans are they will rightly keep to themselves, but their main defensive task is still to grapple with the submarine and to bring all their wits to bear upon mastering as well as holding that peril." On the other hand, the American Journal, which has been already quoted, looks further afield. We are told, "opinions have been advanced in Washington that the logical developments of the formation of the naval council are that either the American naval forces abroad will be sent to the Adriatic to join in a combined attack on the navy and naval bases of Austria, or that the Naval Council will control the merchant fleet of the Allies, and to our ships will be entrusted the entire task of convoying them." This is the kind of speculation which British writers and publicists are not prone to indulge in. It can serve no good purpose. More to the point it is to say that there is no likelihood whatever of "a younger British school," or the allied naval authorities conjointly, undertaking any risky adventures or ill-conceived "gambles," because our naval forces have now been reinforced by those of the United States.
That the strategy of a naval offensive can be pushed without incurring risks is absurd, and if there are any who believe that Admiralty reconstruction is going to prevent entirely mishaps, such as that to the three destroyers, or an occasional successful attack by the enemy on a convoy, they will assuredly be disillusioned before long. The public should bear in mind that not every German adventure turns out a success, and it is silly to describe every British mishap as a disaster or a catastrophe.—Army and Navy Gazette, 5/1.
Chief of Staff Will Represent Army on Supreme War Council.—General Tasker H. Bliss, chief of staff, who arrived in Paris to-day, will represent the United States Army on the Supreme War Council. Secretary Baker in so announcing disclosed that the general is accompanied by high officers of every branch of the service to advise him about any question that may arise.
General Bliss attended the first meeting of the council and decision to send him back to Europe as a permanent representative in that body was made because it was recognized that General Pershing's duties in organizing and commanding the ever-increasing American Expeditionary Forces were too great to permit him to undertake the presentation of American views on military operations and to sit with the council in framing plans of strategy that cover all fronts and all armies.
No word of the departure of General Bliss had been published until the news of his safe arrival came.
From General Bliss the War Council will obtain an up-to-the-minute report on what the United States will be able to contribute to operations on the western front this spring and summer. His report in this regard has been forecast to some extent by President Wilson's statement to Congressional visitors that there would be in Europe in June twice the number of American troops which it had been originally planned to send by that time.
General Bliss also can inform his conferees exactly the situation in which the United States finds itself now as to delivery of supplies of all sorts to the Allies, and this information probably will have great weight in the shaping of war plans.
While Secretary Baker's statement merely said that General Bliss had arrived in France to represent the army on the council, there have been intimations that renewed recommendations for vigorous offensive operations on the widest possible scale were included in the instructions the general received before sailing.
Probably the primary consideration before the council when it reconvenes will be the widely advertised proposed German offensive on the western front. A mass of information has reached the allied powers from many quarters indicating an impending drive against the British or French lines, or both, which will be carefully reviewed.
The possibility suggested by Colonel Repington, the British military critic, in his initial article in the London Post to-day that the "German concentration may be to support negotiations" rather than for an assault is in line with views held by some American officers here. They feel that had Germany really intended to make a great drive she would not have given advance notice of it and are inclined to the opinion that the German high command is endeavoring to set up the bogy of a great attack as a preliminary to another peace drive.—Baltimore American, 24/1.
Mines Playing Big Part in War at Sea.—Hunting and Dragging Bring Wireless and Aircraft Into Service.—How Germans Lay Them.—With the exception of the few general naval engagements which took place early in the war, sea warfare has consisted almost entirely of submarine attack and defence, along with mine laying and mine dragging. The warfare of mines has developed enormously during the last year, until its importance almost equals that of submarine warfare. At present it is a race to determine whether the Allies can drag the mines faster than the Germans can manufacture and lay them. Usually the Allies are able to keep the sea lanes clear, and sometimes the Germans manage to plant their mines in a position to keep several sea lanes blocked.
Almost invariably the Germans lay their mines from shallow draft minelaying submarines, that carry but a few torpedoes, besides their eight or a dozen mines. These minelayers operate under cover of darkness, laying a string of heavily charged mines diagonally across the channels, often forming a double barrier to the sea route. Besides mining the channels at the entrance to important ports, the minelayers sow their charges off the coast along routes usually taken by convoys.
The Germans have concentrated their minelaying in a few regions—Saloniki, Malta, where one British officer dragged more than 200 mines; certain Italian ports; a few parts of the English Channel, the southern Irish sea, the eastern English coast and the Atlantic ports of France.
Before dragging the mines they must be located. This is done by means of a complete series of reports from all kinds of air and sea craft. Seaplanes, airplanes and scout dirigibles explore the channels and sea lanes whenever atmospheric conditions permit and especially ahead of each convoy. And to this group has been recently added the captive balloon, towed by a patrol boat. Hundreds of mine fields have been located by these means.
The aircraft, when a ship is running toward a newly discovered uncharted mine field, drop messages attached to cylindrical floats, which are picked up by the ships. However, especially at this season, the weather is prohibitive of good aerial patrol work.
Sometimes mine fields are discovered in ways that thrill. Several patrollers have seen mines at low tide in the trough of an extra large wave. And the patroller crews know enough of the mine's possibilities to fear it. Another costly but sure indication of the presence of a mine field is the blowing up of a ship. Often this is the first warning that the enemy has passed that way.
By wireless from the aircraft and the sea patrollers; by semaphore from the coast defence stations and by the detailed reports of each vessel that touches port, the locations of the mine fields are forwarded to the staffs of the different navies. Regularly published maps spread the news broadcast to warn all ships until the mines can be dragged and the dangerous channels and sea lanes once more thrown open to navigation. Channel dragging is comparatively simple, because the space to be cleared is well defined and the proper moment can be chosen. Conditions of tide, wind and fog are not so important.
Off shore dragging, on the other hand, is very difficult for many reasons. In the first place, the exact location of the mine field is rarely known, hence an enormous area must be dragged in order to be sure that all the mines have been discovered. Sometimes aerial observers have seen "moons" and have reported them for mines. "Moons" are large round fish that have caused a lot of fruitless dragging.
Once the definite location of the mine field is known, the dragging can proceed quite accurately and rapidly by obtaining two points on shore. This is usually possible, since the mines are rarely laid in over 75 fathoms of water. Foggy weather obscures the landmarks and prevents dragging.
If the wind is high and a heavy sea is running it is impossible to drag, partly because of the danger of dropping on a mine in the trough of a sea and partly because of the impossibility of exploding or sinking the mines when the shears cut them loose. A drifting mine is a menace to friendly and enemy ships alike.
Conditions of the tide must likewise be considered for the angle given the mine cable; a strong tide would oblique the cable and hinder dragging.
Once at sea the Germans cannot touch their mines, because they are stored in compartments, opening at the bottom of the submarine. A pin is pulled out when over the channel or route to be mined and the mine falls of its own weight. When the mine hits the ocean floor the cable is released and the anchor, usually of the mushroom type, grips the bottom. The mine rises to the surface until a hydrostatic valve stops the unrolling of the cable. The desired distance is about 12 feet below the surface of the water.
Often the Germans make mistakes in setting the hydrostatic valves. Air pressure is considered, but this changes between the time the minelayer leaves port and arrives over the area to be mined. Also, if the mines are dropped in a fast tide, they rise in an oblique line until the valve stops them when at the desired depth. Later, at slack water, the mines rise very near, or even to, the surface, where they are readily seen.
In the near future I hope to see some mines cut loose from their cables; to see them jump partly out of water; to see a well directed rifle shot from the little yacht break one of the four antennae surmounting a mine, thus causing the up-heaving cataclysm following the explosion of 310 pounds of trinitrotoluol.—Evening Star, 28/1.
Blames Von Tirpitz for U-Boat Failure.—An article attacking the submarine warfare, which was suppressed by the German censor last October, has now been published "with the sanction of War Minister Von Stein" by the Kiel Zeitung. The article was written by Dr. Struve, a progressive member of the Reichstag, who asserts that the submarine war is a failure, and discusses at considerable length ''who was responsible for the unrestricted submarine warfare agitation and for the statement that England could be forced to her knees within six months."
Dr. Struve asserts, after quoting a variety of witnesses, that the whole agitation was conducted and engineered by Admiral von Tirpitz after the latter's retirement. The article then develops into an attack on von Tirpitz and the new Fatherland Party for "getting Germany into this difficulty." and closes with the assertion that the submarine warfare might have been a success except for the fact that von Tirpitz, while in office, had neglected to build submarines in sufficient numbers to insure success.
"That was the reason," adds the writer, "that unrestricted submarine warfare was always opposed by von Capelle. Minister of the Navy, and the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg."—Evening Star, 9/2.
The Proposed U-Boat Drive.—Neither the Allies nor the United States are deceiving themselves as to the U-boat situation. And the United States knows well that it may expect this present year a drive of the submersibles against the Mexican coast points, for once it is seen that the war must be carried into the breakdown of Germany that country will make a desperate effort to have the United States pay the cost of its entrance into the strife as heavily as possible.
Such is the outlook for the coming months. And the government, with its patrols and its nets and other measures will be quick and alert to offset the plans of the Germans and to frustrate their raiders. At any rate, the fact remains that the menace of a tremendous drive of the submersibles on this side the water, as well as the other, is apprehended. The most momentous drive on land and seas that the world has ever seen in military and naval action is the standard of probability that the United States' military authorities, in combination with those of its friends abroad, are taking as the standard of full preparation.
Either peace or the worst chapter yet of the war is the outlook—who can doubt which.—Baltimore American, 29/1.
LESSONS OF THE WAR
The Unarmored Battleship.—Tendency is Toward High Speed, Great Gun Power, and Large Displacement. By Commander Yates Stirling, Jr., U. S. Navy.—Until quite recently, the evolution of the battleship was based almost solely on the power of the gun, for the danger of the torpedo from a surface craft was being discounted. Battleships strove to carry sufficient thickness of armor to prevent shell penetration. Those nations who built their battleships with internal underwater armor reckoned only with a moderately heavy torpedo war head. That such underwater protection is wholly inadequate can be readily understood when it is remembered that a torpedo war head is now used which contains nearly 500 pounds of the highest explosive known. This is nearly double what was used at the commencement of the war.
The present-day battleships or the super-dreadnoughts, as they are called, are fairly adequately protected from gun fire by their great weight of armor. The maximum speed of the battleships is but little greater than that of the latest submarines. A battleship requires probably more than half an hour to go from its cruising speed to its maximum, while a submarine can be going at its highest available surface speed within a few minutes. A submarine can sight a battleship at a distance of about 25,000 yards or 12 ½ miles. A battleship can recognize a submarine in the awash condition at no greater distance than 5000 yards or 2 ½ miles. A submarine, on sighting an enemy ship, would immediately sink to as near the water as possible, in order to avoid detection, for a submarine, when silhouetted against the sky, can be recognized a long distance away.
If the battleship's course heads through the tactical area of the submarine, there is almost the certainty of destruction involved for the big ship, unless it is accompanied by numerous anti-submarine craft.
The control of the surface of the sea is an important factor in the command of the sea. To control the surface, gun power, coupled with high speed, is essential. To gain high speed, retaining gun power at a maximum, armor must be sacrificed. The evolution of the dreadnought battleship of 21 knots speed was shaken to its foundation when the submarine reached its present state of offensive development. England and Germany both realized this shortcoming in speed when they laid down, respectively, the Queen Elisabeth of 25 knots and the Ersatz Kaiser Friedrich of 23 knots. Although data is not available, armor protection was probably sacrificed for the added speed. Each nation aimed at the control of the surface.
The logical development of the dreadnought battleship is towards the maximum number of the largest caliber guns with the highest speed attainable on the displacement permitted by other circumstances. The cruiser development seems to be toward guns of larger caliber than that carried by a contemporary battleship and with higher speed for the purpose of outranging the battleship. The battleship probably will retain some armor, but when it finds itself outranged by its enemy and without the speed to force a closer action, it too must eventually sacrifice all armor for gun power and speed. Thus, the development of these two types, the dreadnought and battle-cruiser, appears to be toward an amalgamation.
From the very nature of the problem of defence of our shores we require a type in which must be combined great gun power, large cruising radius and high speed. We should be able to hold possession of our own waters. It does not suffice for our fleet to meet an enemy on or near our coast line; we must meet him beyond in order that our peace lines of communication may remain unmolested. This principle holds for every type of warship.
Barring England and Mexico, an attack upon the United States, in its initial stages, must be conducted in many vessels across many miles of sea. In the event of war, therefore, with an enemy across the sea, our first duty will be to gain touch with his attacking expedition as far from our coast as possible and convenient in order to harass and eventually annihilate it. Slow battleships seem to have no place in our "attacking" fleet. We should have types capable of "controlling the surface" from our shores to the advancing enemy. By this means we shall lessen, if not eliminate, the danger of enemy submarines, and give our own mobile offensive type of submarines an added value. Gun power, radius of action, and speed are essential for this work. These are the pivotal attributes. To gain them, all purely defensive attributes will have to be sacrificed.
Every nation must eventually reach a maximum limit of displacement, which it would be ruinous financially to go beyond. In our case this limit is for all times fixed by the size of the Panama Canal locks. These locks have the following dimensions:
Length 1,000 feet
Width 110 feet
Depth 40 feet
This most important passage, enabling us to concentrate a fleet in either ocean, can pass in safety a vessel with the following maximum dimensions:
Length 950 feet
Beam 100 feet
Draft 36 feet
"You cannot have anything for nothing," is a truth that the naval constructor and designer of warships never ceases to expound to the sea officers who seem to want thick armor, great gun power, and high speed on a moderate displacement. There must be sacrifices. The least important must feel the knife.
If great speed is desired while retaining maximum gun power, radius of action, and armor protection, we must send the displacement to illimitable heights. The figures in table No. 1 are authentic and sufficiently accurate.
If, on the other hand, we thin down the armor to what has been termed by naval architects the "Safest minimum," we have the figures given in table No. 2.
From the figures in the tables a comparison of the two largest ships capable of passing through the Panama Canal would appear instructive.
With maximum armor we can build a vessel of 45,000 tons of 26 knots speed; with safest minimum armor, one of 39,500 tons of 29 knots speed. Gun power has been taken as equal; that is each is armed with twelve 14-inch guns. The two vessels having the same caliber of guns must fight at a range within the capabilities of that caliber. At the range which must be chosen the 8 inches of armor carried by the faster ship will not furnish adequate protection. It is. therefore, weight wasted, which should have been put into a larger caliber of gun to enable the faster and more lightly protected ship to outrange the slower.
The warship of highest speed with guns outranging any vessel afloat need carry no side armor for protection against the gun. Even the number of guns carried is unimportant except to shorten the time required to destroy an enemy. Once a vessel embodying this idea is built, a similar but faster and stronger vessel in a rival's fleet will appear. Thus, we shall see the old course of evolution repeated in a new cycle.—Scientific American.
The Destroyer and the Torpedo.—High Speed and Quick Turning Ability the Effective Answer to the Torpedo.—The torpedo is not, in the military sense, nearly so important a weapon of offence as it is popularly supposed to be. We say "in a military sense"; for the enormous destruction of unarmed and helpless merchant shipping which the Germans have accomplished, is not a military operation, but mere outlawed piracy. If Germany had obeyed those humanitarian laws of war, which are the outgrowth of many centuries of endeavor to protect the non-combatant from the cruelties and losses of war, there would have been a comparatively small toll of sunken ships to their credit.
All through the history of the development of torpedo warfare, the inventors, in their plans and specifications have shown that they were trying to devise some means of sinking warships, unseen by the enemy. Bushnell, Fulton, and Holland in this country, to say nothing of the French and Italian inventors, carried in their minds as the object of attack only the warship. The merchant ship, they well knew, was recognized, in the universal opinion of civilized nations, as exempt from torpedo attack.
To Germany belongs, and will forever belong, the distinction of being the first naval power to break away from those safeguards of human life which have the sanction of centuries behind them, and divert the torpedo from its legitimate work as a weapon of war, and use it as an instrument for the wholesale murder of passengers and sailors upon the high seas.
So having now disabused our minds of any undue appreciation of the torpedo, drawn from its misuse against helpless and unarmed ships, we shall be prepared to recognize the surprising fact that against swift and well-guarded warships, the torpedo has shown itself, in the present war, to be a surprisingly ineffectual weapon. Thus, in the battle off the mouth of the Elbe, lasting several hours, in which some 50 to 60 ships, all heavily armed with torpedoes and using them very freely, were engaged, not a single torpedo hit, if we remember rightly, was reported on either side. Even more significant is it that in the great battle of Jutland, in which over 120ships were engaged, and the destroyer flotillas were exceedingly active, only one torpedo hit was made on the whole of the British fleet, which must have included at least 70 to 80 vessels of every type. The battleship Marlborough was struck near the stern and listed rather heavily; but she was able to bring herself back to a level keel and continued the fight.
High speed and quick turning power have proved to be the best defence against the torpedo. The fast battle-cruisers and scouts are well able to take care of themselves and the slower battleships are protected by numerous screens of destroyers, each flotilla being led by a fast light cruiser, carrying heavy torpedo defence guns, of from 4- to 6-inch caliber.
The failure of the torpedo to get in very much effective work against naval vessels is not due to the inefficiency of the torpedo itself; for the torpedo is indeed a wonderfully efficient weapon. It is stated that our latest 21-inch superheat torpedo will travel with marvelous accuracy for 10,000 yards at a speed of between 30 and 40 knots. Target practice with these weapons, in time of peace, has proved that it will do this consistently; but target practice conditions, when the target is stationary or moving at a comparatively slow speed, and conditions in a sea fight, when the enemy's ships are moving at from 20 to 35 knots, are two very different propositions.
The failure of the torpedo against warships is not due to the weapon, but to the human element—the great difficulty of estimating the distance, speed, and course of the enemy's ship. This is so far recognized in battleship tactics, that no attempt is made to fire the underwater torpedo tube of a battleship against the individual battleships of the enemy's column. The torpedoes, should the two fleets come within torpedo range, say 10,000 yards or less, would be discharged against the enemy's line as a whole, on the chance that while many of the torpedoes would pass between the ships, others would score a hit. The modern warship is about 200 yards long and the interval between the ships is about 500 yards, if they are keeping proper station, so that theoretically two out of seven torpedoes should hit the mark.
It is extremely difficult to hit a fast ship at a distance of 5000 to 10,000 yards. Thus, a 700-foot battle-cruiser going 30 knots will cover a distance equal to her own length in 14 seconds, whereas it will take a torpedo of the latest design at least eight minutes to reach a ship 10,000 yards away. Now a 30-knot ship, moves at the rate of 50 feet per second, and hence it is necessary for the torpedo officer to estimate very closely the distance of the ship and the speed at which she is traveling, before he can determine how far ahead of the position of the ship he must aim his torpedo if ship and torpedo are to meet some minutes later. If he estimates the ship is traveling 30 knots, when she is traveling only 25, and calculates the course of his torpedo accordingly, the torpedo will reach the proposed meeting point too soon and will pass ahead of the ship. Vice versa, if he estimates she is traveling 25 knots when she is really going 30, his torpedo will arrive too late and will pass astern of the ship.
How difficult these calculations are is proved even in the attack by submarines at close range on slow-speed merchantmen; for many times during the past two years it has been recorded by the officers and crew of such ships that torpedoes have passed ahead or astern of them.
In spite of its visibility, the 30- to 35-knot destroyer, carrying from 8 to 12 torpedo tubes, is the most effective means for torpedo attack. The work is hazardous, of course, but several flotillas of these craft, rushing down upon the enemy at 35 knots, particularly if they are protected by a smoke screen, are very likely to get a battleship or two, even though several of them are disabled or sunk by gun fire.
The smoke-screen or smoke attack, which has been used so frequently and effectively in this war, originated in the United States Navy, being first used in our destroyer fleet, when it was under the command of Captain Eberle. The writer well remembers being present at such an attack off Block Island several years ago, when five groups of destroyers, 20 in all, crossed the head of a column of battleships, until they were in the windward position, and then, with the leading destroyers smoking heavily, swept down the line of the enemy at a distance of about 1300 yards. The pall of dense smoke rolled down to leeward, enveloping the enemy and screening the destroyers from observation ; but above the dense and low-lying bank of smoke could be seen the successive pairs of fighting tops of the battleships; and, had the maneuver been an actual battle, some of the capital ships would have been heavily torpedoed.
In the battle of Jutland, the German destroyers made use of this smokescreen as a protection to their own battleships, when they were being heavily hit by the battleship divisions under Admiral Jellicoe. A noticeable feature of that fight was the use of fast 30- to 35-knot light cruisers, armed with 6-inch guns, as leaders of the destroyer flotillas. One well-placed shot from a 6-inch gun will usually cripple a destroyer, if indeed it does not sink her, and the object of these light cruisers is to lead the attack, break up the counter-attack of the enemy, and bring her own destroyers within torpedo range.—Scientific American.
President Wilson on the Freedom of the Seas.—In the course of his masterly address before the House and Senate, setting forth the fourteen terms of peace for which we are "willing to fight until they are achieved," President Wilson stated that the United States stands for "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants."
Now, this, the true freedom of the seas, is a very different matter from the freedom of the seas which Germany is seeking to bring about.
We stated in our editorial upon this subject, last week, that Germany has never given any clear statement of what she intended by the phrase; and it is certain that no formal definition has ever been made by the German Government.
But although the government, for obvious reasons, has been silent, one of Germany's leading naval and military critics. Count Reventlow, has declared his interpretation of the phrase in terms which remove the last vestige of doubt as to what he and. it is reasonable to suppose, the German Government has in mind. For Prof. Selfton Delmer, who was present at a mass meeting in Berlin last March, when the Count lectured on war aims, has recently supplied the Daily Mail with a translation of certain passages from the address, which leave no further doubt as to the manner in which Germany interprets the "freedom of the seas."
Attention is drawn to this translation in an article contributed to the Naval and Military Record by the well-known British naval critic. Hector C. Bywater (for many years a resident of Berlin) who quotes Count Reventlow as follows: "What do we Germans understand by the 'freedom of the seas?' Of course, we do not mean by it that free use of the sea which is the common privilege of all nations in times of peace, the right to the open highways of international trade. That sort of freedom of the sea we had before the war. What we understand to-day by this doctrine is, that Germany should possess such maritime territories and such naval bases, that at the outbreak of a war we should be able, with our navy ready, reasonably to guarantee ourselves the command of the sea. We want such a jumping-off place for our navy as would give us a fair chance of dominating the seas and of being free of the seas during a war. The inalienable possession of the Belgian seaboard is therefore a matter of life and death to us, Our aim must be, not only to keep what our arms have already won on this coast, but sooner or later to extend our seaboard to the south of the Straits of Calais."
So here, at last, the truth is out. The freedom of the seas is to mean freedom for the shipping of all the world until such time as Germany may see fit to declare war, when freedom of the seas is to become a German monopoly. Now, in view of the fact that this question of the seas is to figure so prominently in the terms of peace, whenever these shall come to be discussed. Count Reventlow has certainly done the world good service by thus so unreservedly letting the cat out of the bag.
"It is not the freedom," says Bywater, "but the absolute mastery of the seas that Germany covets, and scarcely a day passes without bringing new proof of this ambition." Thus in a recent issue of the Deutsche Tagesseitung, Count Reventlow made a vigorous demand for the full exploitation of the military successes in Italy. Austria-Hungary, he declared, absolutely needed the freedom of the Adriatic for her future development. "We confine ourselves to-day," he wrote, "to a general statement of our aims—that for the future an active Adriatic policy on the part of Italy shall be made completely impossible, and this, not by paper guarantees, but by real guarantees—that is to say, by appropriate territorial changes on the coast of the Adriatic." Evidently, the Teutonic alliance, if successful, intends to annex all the important strategic points on the Italian side of the Adriatic, and form a chain of bases that would enable its naval forces completely to dominate the Mediterranean. But Count Reventlow would not stop there. He would secure "two central points of power,"—the Adriatic and Constantinople with the Dardanelles. Such political, maritime and economic position would stand in the closest combination with the position of the German Empire in the Baltic and on the coast of Flanders. Says Bywater: "Here we have the same cynical avowal of the real aim that is disguised in the 'freedom of the seas' catch-word." With the Baltic a German lake, all the northern waters would be ruled by Germany; with the Flanders coast and the Pas-de-Calais fortified and honeycombed with naval bases, she would sit astride of every trade route converging on England; while from the strongholds of the Adriatic her raiders could issue forth to close the Mediterranean.
It is the command of the seas by the Allies that has saved the world from subjugation by the Teutonic alliance, and when the military and naval power of Germany has been completely disrupted, and the various plenipotentiaries assemble for the peace conference, this question of the "freedom of the seas" must be placed on such a sure basis and secured with such rigid guarantees, that this dream of Reventlow and the Kaiser for whom he speaks, shall be placed beyond any possibility, not merely of attainment but even of attempt.—Scientific American.
Expert Control in Conduct of War.—Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, professor of military history at Oxford, and author of the article on "The Dardanelles" reprinted in the February Proceedings, has an interesting essay in the January Nineteenth Century and After entitled, "The British Constitution and the Conduct of War." His general thesis is that the governmental machinery established by the British constitution, while admirable in time of peace, has this weakness in war, that it fails to provide expert leadership and control of war departments and operations. In support, he quotes the Marquis of Salisbury, speaking in the House of Lords at the time of the South African War:
"If you will look back over the present century [he said—the nineteenth century] you will see there have been four occasions on which the British Government has engaged in war. On each occasion the opening of these wars was not prosperous. These were the Walcheren Expedition, the Peninsular War, the Crimean Expedition, and now the South African War. In all these cases at first—in the case of Walcheren not only at first—there were lamentable losses We cannot have been so unlucky as to have fought four times and to have lighted upon the most incompetent and worthless ministers that the world has ever produced. It is evident that there is something in your machinery that is wrong."
Mr. Wilkinson points out that the executive branch of all governments, whether monarchical or democratic, consists of a set of ministers and a chairman, the chief difference being that in monarchies the king either holds the position of chairman himself or selects his leader, whereas in democratic systems the leader is selected by popular vote, either directly or indirectly through a legislative chamber.
Speaking in general, the most important member of this committee or cabinet in time of war is, in Mr. Wilkinson's judgment, "the designer of victory, the exponent of the general's art, of which success in war is the object. In many governments no such office is found among the ministers because the task is reserved for himself by the head of the government, the King or Emperor. Of some governments a commander-in-chief is a member, and in the United States the command of the forces is by the constitution vested in the President.
"Some representative of the art of war is always necessary, for every question of policy is in the last resort one of force, and the key, both to the avoidance of war and to success in it when it becomes inevitable, lies in the due co-ordination of policy and strategy. The mode in which that co-ordination must be sought is a conference between the chairman of the committee, the minister of foreign affairs and the strategist, on each occasion when any new departure is taken in external policy. At such a conference the foreign minister would explain the course he had to propose, the strategist would then say what it might involve in case of conflict.
"Throughout the course of a war the strategist is required by the government; for once the appeal has been made to force, by force the issue is decided. Yet nothing is so common in war as for persons of great influence to urge a government to scatter its forces for purposes not directly conducive to victory though thought in themselves desirable. Especially is this the case when the possession of particular places seems advantageous or likely to influence opinion at home or abroad. New but trained strategists understand that in war everything can be had by victory but nothing without it; and that victory requires the concentration of all possible forces to strike a blow at some one point in order to destroy the enemy's fleet or his army. There seems to be no limit to the errors in the direction of fleets and armies that can be committed by governments in the deliberations of which the voice of strategy is silent, divided or overruled.
"The strategist is even more essential to a government than the minister who maintains the naval or military forces, for that minister must base his arrangements on the requirements of the fighting, of which the strategist alone can judge. The minister's presence in the governing committee is needed mainly in order that his financial proposals may be presented to the representative chamber with all the authority of government.
"In the case of a maritime state and especially of an insular power there must of course be two strategists : one for the navy and one for the army, for the mastery of both sea and land warfare is rarely combined by one man."
After a historical review of control of the Army and War Department in England in time of war, Mr. Wilkinson turns to the navy:
"In the epoch of Nelson and Napoleon, the action of the navy was directed by a board which represented the Lord High Admiral in Commission. Another board was entrusted with the duty of supplying the ships and stores which formed the material portion of the fleet. But before the beginning of the reign of Queen Victoria, these two bodies were amalgamated into one, which combined the functions of command and supply. The chairman of this Board of Admiralty was the First Lord, the Cabinet Minister, a political personage unacquainted with war. Its other members were four Sea Lords, one or more Civil Lords and a secretary. The political chief, the First Lord, had power, with the concurrence of one other member of the board, to act in the name of the whole committee. In 1895 I ventured to criticize this arrangement by pointing out that it failed to provide the navy with a commander-in-chief for war, and suggested that the First Sea Lord should be made commander-in-chief and be given authority in peace and war to issue all orders for the distribution and movement of ships and fleets; that his should be the office in which should be prepared all orders to the admirals commanding squadrons or fleets, and that he should be selected on the sole ground of his strategical and tactical qualifications for this duty. These criticisms and this proposal were supported, for a few weeks only, by the Navy League, with the net result that the First Sea Lord was formally recognized by the government as its naval strategical adviser. But there was no consistent attempt to select a First Sea Lord on the ground of mastery of naval operations, and no attempt whatever to relieve him of the many administrative duties to which it was impossible he could properly attend if he really devoted himself to strategical problems and to the study of the operations of a future naval war. Mr. Churchill, indeed, on becoming First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, created at the Admiralty an office akin to that of the chief of a General Staff of an army, but the head of this office was not made a member of the Admiralty Board, and occupied a comparatively subordinate position.
"During the course of the war there has been some slight development. The Chief of the Admiralty Staff has been brought into closer relation with the First Sea Lord, whose function as strategical director of the navy has been emphasized, though he still seems to be more deeply immersed in general administrative business than is consistent with complete concentration on the business of a strategical direction, which ought always, in my judgment, to be inseparable from his position. Authority without strategical insight must be expected to fail in war; for without the judgment produced by a life's study of the operations of war, no man can hope to solve happily the problems which war presents. But no insight will avail unless it is coupled with authority. A strategist who has not the power to have his solution carried out and put into execution is not a commander.
"The government has lately appointed a most distinguished administrator to be First Lord of the Admiralty. It is beyond doubt a wise move to appoint an administrator to be the head of the administrative business of the navy. And this, according to my reading of the lessons of history, would be best accomplished by reviving the distinction between supply and command. Command should be the function of the First Sea Lord; his should be the voice to explain in the cabinet his design for the conduct of the naval war; his the voice communicating that design to the naval officers afloat. If the administrator must also be a First Lord, it might conduce to a better understanding of his functions if he were to be called the 'First Shore Lord.'
"There are two delicate points which I have hitherto passed over. The first is, the place, in a geographical sense, of the commander-in-chief of either service. Should he be at the headquarters of the principal army or of the main fleet, or should he remain at the seat of government? I suggest that this should be left entirely to him. The modern facilities for movement from place to place and for the transmission of documents—even of considerable length—make it easy for a commander to communicate his views from one place to another.
"The great difficulty consists in the selection of men qualified for supreme command. To produce leaders is the chief function of national education; to discover them and to put power into their hands is perhaps the highest and the hardest function of the statesman. For there is no selection without rejection. The task is, however, less difficult in war than in peace because in war everyone understands the application of the precept 'by their fruits ye shall know them.'
"The general answer to the question raised by the title I have chosen is that the cabinet system is a machine suitable for the conduct of war, provided the cabinet is a council of heads of the great departments—under the presidency of the Prime Minister—and provided also that each minister is a master of the subject with which his department is concerned. Its efficiency is diminished in proportion as the members lack the necessary command of their subjects, and by the presence of members having no departments to supervise. Only the head of a department can be fully in touch with the problems that arise in it; and the opinion of a person deprived of that touch is apt to be in the nature of advice in the air.
"The story which I have told of the attempts of governments carried on during a quarter of a century to set in order the machinery for the direction of the army and the navy, illustrates what I believe to be the chief weakness of our national life—the want of faith in knowledge.
"The members of a government require more than ability; each of them requires a mastery of a subject, of the art or science upon which are based the activities of the office which he aspires to direct, and of its application. This mastery is to be had only through a long apprenticeship—the devotion of the best years of a man's life to the profession to which he is called. There are only two methods of forming a committee for governing a nation—for directing the nation's work. One is that hitherto practiced, by which a personage distinguished by party services, or by anything except mastery of the business which he is to superintend, is placed as Cabinet Minister at the head of a department, while its permanent chief, presumably the competent man, is made his subordinate, his adviser whose advice he may reject. This is government by incompetence. It has been accompanied by inefficiency and confusion and can lead only to defeat. The other method is to appoint as Cabinet Minister at the head of each department the most competent master of the work which that department has to do. The old wrong method was due to conditions which made the consideration of party all-important. It may be doubted whether, worked on that method, the constitution is as satisfactory as the late Lord Salisbury thought it for the production of happiness; assuredly it will never produce victory. But in war the mere thought of party is treason.
"Unless the spirit in which the constitution has been worked for the last 50 years is changed within the next six months, the constitution and those who have worked it will disappear in defeat and revolution. To-day the submarine and the aeroplane are telling all men that the alternative is between defeat and victory. Victory cannot be won by a government of amateurs. A' government that seeks victory must begin by entrusting the conduct of the war to men who understand war."
Dazzle Ships.—The following statement has been issued through the British Press Bureau:
"It has been stated at various times in the press that the Admiralty have not realized the value of camouflage as a means of assisting to defeat the attacks of enemy submarines on mercantile shipping, and that such camouflage as has been tried is not of British origin.
"It can be stated that the Admiralty are fully alive to its value, and several months ago a system of camouflage was originated. The principles governing it cannot be divulged at present, but it may be said that it has not invisibility for its basis.
"The theory of rendering ships invisible at sea by painting them various colors is no longer tenable; endless endeavors have been made in this direction, and numerous schemes given fair trial by the Admiralty under actual conditions at sea.
"The results of these trials have invariably been disappointing, and it has been finally established that, unless a vessel and her smoke can be rendered absolutely invisible, no useful purpose is served.
"The application of Thayers law is most commonly put forward as a means of obtaining invisibility. This, broadly speaking, is an adaptation of nature's means for eliminating shadows, and so reducing the visibility of birds and animals at close quarters, either for purposes of attack or defence, and it is stated that this can be applied to ships by painting the ceilings of promenade decks or other projecting structures white, in order to eliminate all shadows.
"Actual experiences at sea have proved that this is a fallacy, and that the paint itself being dependent on the light of the sky will not overcome shadows.
"The scheme now in use has been extensively taken up, not only by the British, but also by the allied governments, and no stone is being left unturned to utilize this important asset, which is only one of the many devices which are used to combat the enemy's submarine activity."—Nautical Gazette, 31/1.
The Need of Convoys.—With the expansion of the shipbuilding program, it has become necessary for the naval authorities to take up the question of furnishing a sufficient number of convoys for the increase in vessels that will be available for oceanic transportation of troops and supplies. At present there is a deficiency in this type of vessel. For many years the Navy Department regarded vessels now suitable for use as convoys as of no special military value. They were useful, of course, in certain waters and on certain duties, but the policy of naval construction favored, instead, destroyers and capital ships so that the small cruisers and the gunboat were overlooked without anticipation of the great value and serviceability they are in this war. It is necessary, therefore, to provide ships of this type with the least possible delay in order to have them ready for service by the time a corresponding number of transports is available under the completing plans of the shipping board. These should be, it is represented, as of from 1500 to 1800 tons displacement, with speed of 16 knots.—Nautical Gazette, 31/1.
Failure of the Wooden Ship.—Rear Admiral Bowles, testifying before the Senate investigation of the affairs of the Shipping Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation, was forced to admit that the wooden ship plan was a failure. His evidence completely vindicates General Goethals's stand, and proves that Mr. Denman's plan to build a thousand wooden steamships is absolutely impracticable, and that there is not enough lumber available to build the half of them.
Admiral Bowles said that, in his judgment, 90 per cent of the effort spent upon wooden ship construction could have been better utilized in building steel ships, which are much more quickly constructed than wooden vessels. Mr. Hurley's position is understood to be that the construction under contract of wooden vessels is far advanced, and that he will push through those already started, although it is certain that the United States cannot build more than 250 wooden ships in 1918, and it is very doubtful if they will be of any use for transatlantic service. All the efforts of the Shipping Board are being bent on the construction of fabricated steel ships.
It is now apparent that one of the principal causes of the unsatisfactory tonnage situation is Mr. Denman's adoption of thoroughly impracticable plans for wooden ships, on which, since the beginning of May, millions of dollars have been wasted, transportation systems taxed, and the labor situation strained all to no purpose, when, if the energies had been devoted to steel construction, the ships would now be in the water.—London Times, 31/12.
ATLANTIC
Six U. S. Seamen Killed by Falling Foremast on the U. S. S. "Michigan."—Secretary Daniels gave out the following statement this morning:
In a heavy gale at sea on January 15 six men were killed and three injured on the U.S.S. Michigan by the falling of the foremast.—Official Bulletin, 17/1.
Patrol Boat on Rocks.—An American patrol boat was to-day reported to the Navy Department ashore on a rock in European waters.
The vessel went ashore during a fog on January 25. There was no loss of life or injury to the crew. The vessel will probably have to be abandoned.—Baltimore American, 29/1.
Loss of the Army Transport.—The first loss of an army transport has been mercifully lacking in a formidable casualty list. The place of the occurrence of the sinking of the Tuscania, while evidently a surprise, was accountable for the rescue of so many of those on board. The accident has failed to produce the sensation, while it has not failed to arouse public sympathy, expected of the loss of the first army transport en route to Europe. It has been felt that a dire disaster was needed to stir the people of this country to a realization that we were actually at war. It was appreciated that this would be an exceedingly heavy price to pay for securing the necessary national ardor and resentment against an enemy necessary to give support to the war. The successful attack by the German submarine in this case is probably only the beginning of like disasters, of which the public has been repeatedly warned. It has the immediate effect of effectually dispelling the complacent impression that our adversary did not seriously intend to attack our troop ships for some occult reason that would have been characteristic enough in some particulars, but hardly supposable of pitiless, determined German warfare in the presence of an opportunity. The disaster invoked the following statement from the Secretary of War:
The sinking of the Tuscania brings us face to face with the losses of war in its most relentless form. It is a fresh challenge to the civilized world by an adversary who has refined, but made more deadly, the stealth of the savage in warfare. We must win this war, and we will win this war. Losses like this unite the country in sympathy with the families of those who have suffered loss; they also unite us to make more determined our purpose to press on. As rapidly as details come in they will be given to the public in order to relieve anxiety where possible, and notice will be sent as promptly as possible to those whose sons and brothers have been added to the nation's heroic dead.—Army and Navy Register, 9/2.
This was not in the zone patrolled by the U. S. destroyers.—N. Y. Times.
Our Hardy Destroyers.—One in European Service Steamed 25,000 Miles Without Docking.—American destroyers are standing the strain of war service in foreign waters better than the most sanguine official here expected. Recent reports from the destroyer force show that few vessels have been out of commission for any length of time for repairs, despite the arduous character of their work. The seamanship of the men aboard the fighting craft and the skill of the picked forces on the repair ships are held responsible for the result, although substantial construction, selected material and good designing play their part.
The most striking instance of the seaworthiness of these light craft is that of a destroyer which went into dry-dock only after having steamed more than 25,000 miles. Examination showed the boat needed only scraping and painting. Her engines and machinery equipment generally had been kept in perfect order by her own men and the repair ship crews while she was afloat.
The durability of the boats is especially striking in view of the fact that their plating is only a little more than a quarter of an inch in thickness. They were not built for high speed in rough water, yet the call of a merchantman, beset by a submarine, sends them plunging through gigantic seas at a racing gait. There have been cases where the impact of the water twisted the bows somewhat, but these are few, and the damage was easily repaired. Steering engines have worn out, and boilers have been replaced or retubed, in most instances by the repair ships. British officials have expressed high admiration for the handling of the flotilla in this regard.
A complete supply of spare parts for the boats has been assembled at the base, and the officers in charge of the engineering problems are picked men.
As the destroyer construction program moves forward at home, the strain on the boats abroad will lessen. Congress has been warned, however, that the strenuous character of the work in chasing submarines is certain to wear out some of the older boats.—N. Y. Times, 21/1.
U. S. Fleet on Guard with British.—We are apt to forget that over on the other side the control of the surface of the ocean has been absolutely maintained by the existence of the British battleship fleet. There have been a few raids on the coast of England, and a few engagements in the North Sea, but to-day the relative strength of the British Navy is at least as great against the German Navy as at the outbreak of the war. Furthermore, they have the active cooperation of the French and American surface ships of heavy tonnage. We have, of course, many battleships on this coast that little is heard about. We have had to use the oldest ones largely as training schools, especially for the training of the gun crews of the merchant ships. (From speech of Assistant Secretary of the Navy.)—N. Y. Times, 17/2.
The work of the United States is not now confined to destroyers. The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Daniels, has announced that naval vessels of every type are now doing service abroad.
The most definite information on this subject, however, is given by Representative Miller, of Minnesota, who recently returned to the United States after interviewing many British and French naval commanders.
The American battleship fleet is no longer "bottled up" in sheltered waters in fear of submarine attack. Several of the first-class ships have been sent abroad. These are coal burners, which for a time, at least, will relieve the British battleships of the oil burning type.
What portion of the fleet is now working with the British Navy is, of course, kept a military secret, but the American people at least have the assurance that the United States Navy is doing its full duty in maintaining the allied guardianship of the seas.
The facts about the American fleet are woven into a speech made in the House by Representative Miller in the course of a presentation of war conditions as he observed them while abroad. His statements, made partly because he told of things he saw and partly from things he was told by British and American naval commanders, shed a light upon the whereabouts of the American fleet and its operations that hitherto has been locked in the secret archives of the Navy Department.
Mr. Miller frankly told the House that when he was there Vice-Admiral Sims had 36 destroyers—not the number now—with which to patrol waters assigned to him. These waters extended west of the coast of Ireland, down across the western entrance of the English Channel, clear across the western coast of France and Ireland, the coast of Spain, down to the Azores Islands.
"This number was grossly insufficient," Mr. Miller said, "but the navy has started on a program that will produce any needed destroyers. Some of these destroyers are being delivered."
Before the sinking of the Tuscania, which occurred in waters outside the zone being protected by American craft, Mr. Miller said that disaster had been narrowly averted more than once, and that the navy's first duty was to protect the line of communication between France and America.
The speaker said he was in Europe when the request was made for American battleships, and he said that request had been granted.
"They have been sent," he said, "and no better battleships ever floated on a sea. I was afraid our navy would not send them, but I made particular inquiry and followed it up and found they have been sent."
That the American war craft are in the thickest of the submarine danger zone is shown by what was said of the area covered by the German submarines. Much of this area is said also to be covered by American craft.
"The main submarine base," Mr. Miller said, "is at Zeebrugge, on the North Sea. The main area of operation is across the northern part of Scotland and the upper part of Ireland, and then the English Channel. Continuing, their field is the Bay of Biscay, then along the coasts of Spain and Portugal, and then out to the Azores."
"Moments of grave danger are just about sunrise in the morning and sunset at night, especially if the sea is calm. Because during that twilight period there is that uncertainty of light which makes it difficult to discover the periscope of a submarine, but easy for the submarine to see the hulk of the ship in bold relief," said Mr. Miller.
In showing the valuable contribution made to naval strategy by Vice-Admiral Sims, Mr. Miller said his suggestion was this:
"What is the use of sending destroyers and ships of your navy scouring the seas, hunting for submarines? The seas are vast and the submarine is small. They may seek for days and weeks and not find their quarry, but you group your ships together and put your destroyers about your ships and you are bound to have your destroyers meet the submarine. The submarine must find the ships and in finding the ships he meets his deadly enemy."
This suggestion of Vice-Admiral Sims was finally accepted by the British Admiralty.
Mr. Miller declared Congress and the Navy Department should give Admiral Sims absolute carte blanche and carry out whatever he recommended.
Mr. Miller related this incident to emphasize his belief that there should be better co-ordination in the handling of both merchant ships and the protecting war craft.
"Two ships had left a port in France and were some fifty miles up the coast when instructed by wireless to wait for some other boats. They were to leeward of an island, with all communication between them and the shore cut off.
"After they had waited five days the destroyers to escort them through the submarine zone appeared. For some unaccountable reason the ships did not sail even then. The destroyers fooled around, going back and forth for further orders. On the eighth day, under most unfavorable conditions, this group set forth. Why, submarines had been for a week spotting exactly where they were. Is it any wonder they were attacked twice before they got through the zone?"—N. Y. Herald, 15/2.
Germany Extends Submarine Blockade Zone; U. S. is Notified Through the Swiss Legation.—The Swiss Legation in Washington has transmitted to the Department of State the following communication from the German Government:
"Supplement to the German declaration of January 31, 1917, concerning the blockaded zone.
"On and after January 11, 1918, a new zone of sea is declared blockaded around the enemy point of support in Cape Verde Islands and Dakar and the adjoining coasts. That zone is bounded as follows:
"From the Cape Palmas lighthouse toward the point 10° 0' N., 29° 30' W., to the point 17° 0' N., 29° 30' W., to the point 20° 30' N., to the point 25° 30' W.; there the line follows the parallel 20° 30' latitude northeastwardly as far as the point where that parallel strikes the western coast of Africa.
"On the same date the zone blockaded around the Azores will be extended eastward as far as Madere Island, which is used by our enemies as a point of support, so that the zone will be bounded as follows: From point 44° 0' N, 34° 0' W., to point 42° 30' N, 2,7° 0' W., to the point 17° 0' N., 37° 0' W., to point 30° 0' N., 27° 0' W., to the point 30 0 N., 17° 0' W., to the point 34° 0’ N., 12° 0' W., to the point 36° 45' N., 12° 0’ W., and back to the starting point.
"Neutral vessels which at the time of publication of this declaration happen to be in ports within the new blockade zone may yet leave those ports without coming under the military measures ordered for that zone if they can leave before or on January 18, 1918, and take the shortest route to the free regions. Sufficient time has been allowed so that neutral vessels that may enter the new blockaded zone without having a knowledge of the present declaration or unable to gain such knowledge be spared.
"It is earnestly recommended that neutral shipping be cautioned and warned off the blockade zone."
Berlin, January 5, 1918.—Official Bulletin, 31/1.
Hunting U-Boats 300 Miles at Sea.—Commander Taussig, Who Took Over First Squadron of Our Destroyers, Tells of Hazardous Work.—A Hard Bird to Catch.—Advantage Over Surface Craft is Difficult to Overcome, but Destroyers are the Best Weapon.—More destroyers as the surest defence against "the submarine are recommended by Commander J. K. Taussig, U. S. N., who commanded the first squadron of American destroyers that joined the British patrol vessels in Irish waters after the United States entered the war. Commander Taussig made this statement in an address delivered at the recent war thrift meeting in Carnegie Hall, and gave a picture of the routine of patrol work and the difficulty of actually getting at particular submarines.
That actual destruction of enemy submersibles, a comparatively infrequent feat, is only a part of the work of protecting the merchant marine was evident from Commander Taussig's statements. In seven months, he said, his own destroyer got a chance to fire at a submarine only once. With depth bombs, he said, he thought he had damaged one or two, but could not be sure he had sunk any. And yet in convoy and patrol work his vessel, and those associated with it, did extremely valuable work in the protection of the lanes of traffic.
"When the United States became a belligerent last April," he said, "one of the first requests the Allies made was that we send as many destroyers and other patrol boats as we could possibly muster over to the other side to assist them in combating the submarines. At 9.30 one April night I received orders to proceed at daylight to my home navy yard to fit out for distant service. What was before us I did not know. There were five other commanding officers of destroyers who received the same orders, and at 5 o'clock the following morning we left Chesapeake Bay and were on our way to New York and Boston at a high speed, in order that we might get ready as soon as possible for whatever it was to be.
"So anxious was the Navy Department that the outside world in general know nothing of the movement of these ships that not even I, who was in command of the expedition, was informed of our destination. We went to the navy yards, the ships went in dock, had their bottoms cleaned, painted; we took on stores and provisions to last three months, and in a few days sailed from Boston. My orders were to proceed to a point 50 miles east of Cap Cod, and then open my sealed instructions. Until I got to that point, at midnight of the first night out, I did not know that our first port of call was to be Queenstown, Ireland.
"It is quite natural that the few in authority who knew of our movements watched with anxiety for news of our crossing. It was the first time that vessels of this type had ever made so long a continuous passage without refueling or without the company of larger vessels. We were 10 days in making the trip, due mostly to a southeast gale, which accompanied us for 7 of the 10 days. So rough was the sea during this time that for 7 of the 10 days we did not set our mess tables; we ate off our laps. On the ninth day we were pleased to be met by a little British destroyer named the Mary Rose. She picked us up early one morning and came along flying the international signal, 'Welcome to the American Colors.'
"To this I replied, 'Thank you, we are glad of your company.' The little Mary Rose then accompanied us to Queenstown. I am sorry to say that three months later the Mary Rose was sunk with all hands by a German raider in the North Sea. We received a very hearty welcome at Queenstown by the British Admiral, Sir Lewis Bailey, and by the others in authority there. They were very glad to see us.
"Things were looking black. In the three previous weeks the submarines had sunk 152 British merchant ships. It was manifest that this thing could not go on if the Allies were to win the war. The British admiral gave us some wholesome advice in regard how best to fight the submarines. We immediately prepared for this service by having what are known as depth charges or depth bombs installed. We put ashore all of our surplus stores and provisions in order to lighten our draft, as it was possible that a few inches might save us from striking a mine.
"The seriousness of the work before us was made very evident, not only by the large vessels that were being sunk, but by the fact that the night before we entered the harbor a German submarine had planted 12 mines right in the channel. Fortunately for us, they were swept up by the ever-vigilant British mine sweepers before we arrived. The day following our arrival one of the British gunboats from our station was torpedoed and her captain and 40 of her crew were lost.
"Patrol vessels were continually bringing in the survivors from the various ships as they were sunk. The British admiral told us that we would go on patrol duty for six days at a time, and then come in for two or three days' rest. In this patrol duty we were assigned to certain areas, as far as 300 miles off shore, as the submarines were then operating that far out. Our orders were first to destroy submarines, second to escort our convoy valuable merchant ships; third, to save lives if we could. We did escort many ships, and we did save many lives.
"I cannot say that we sank many submarines. The submarine, I found, was a very difficult bird to catch. He has tremendous advantage over the surface craft. In the first place, he always sees ,you first. First, because when on the surface he is very low, and when submerged he has only his periscope out, or perhaps nothing at all. As he was not after destroyers, he avoided us whenever he could. That is, if he saw the destroyer on the horizon, the submarine immediately went the other way.
"When we saw a submarine, which sometimes happened frequently, and at other times several weeks might pass without seeing one, we would immediately go after him full speed, and open fire with our guns in the hopes of getting in a shot before he submerged, but he always submerged very quickly. Only once did my vessel in seven months succeed in actually firing at a submarine. He then went down after the fifth shot was fired. At that time he was S miles away. But what they are afraid of are the depth charges or depth bombs.
"I will tell you how they operate. A depth charge is about two or three hundred pounds of a high explosive. It is fitted so as to explode automatically at any depth we may desire. The destroyers and patrol vessels carry them on deck at the stern. When we see a submarine submerge we try to find his wake, and if we can see the wake of a submerged vessel we run over it, drop the depth charge by simply pulling a lever, and in a few seconds there is a terrific explosion.
"This explosion is so great that on one or two occasions, when I happened to be in the chart house when they let go, I thought my own ship was torpedoed. They can be felt under water for a distance of several miles, but of course they must be dropped very close to the submarine in order to destroy him. If we get it say within 90 feet of the hull, it may damage it enough to cause him to sink, otherwise only superficial damage may result.
"I cannot say positively that I sank any submarines. I saw results on several occasions which led me to believe that I had at least damaged one or two.
"The patrol duty was very trying, as the ocean was strewn with wreckage for a distance of 300 miles off shore. It was hard to tell a periscope when we saw one. Fish, floating spars, and many other objects were taken for periscopes and fired at; we could not afford to take a chance, as our whole safety depended on our being vigilant.
"The submarines became less active—I won't say they became less active, but they did less damage as the summer wore on, due, undoubtedly, to having more patrol vessels.
"Then the scheme was taken up of having convoys. The advantage of a convoy is that 6 or 10 destroyers can protect from 20 to 30 merchant ships, while in the patrol system only one destroyer could be with one merchant ship at a time. The convoy system has now developed so that practically all vessels passing through the danger zone are in large convoys of from 10 to 30, with an escort of from 6 to 10 destroyers.
"These convoy trips would take us out of port from six to eight days. They were very trying days, especially during the latter part of the fall, when the weather got bad. When we are at sea in this way we do not take off our clothes, neither officer nor man. We must be ready at all times. We do not even have the pleasure of taking a bath, as something might happen and you would not be ready for it. As one young officer expressed it, we had to come down to the Saturday night bath habit, and if we happened to be at sea Saturday night we might be out of luck.
"The night work was very difficult, as the danger of collision was great, with so many ships without lights operating in close proximity. There are frequent collisions, and we must use our judgment as to whether we should turn on our lights and avoid the danger of collisions, and take the risk of a submarine seeing us, or keeping our lights out and taking our chances. We have this to remember, that if a submarine sinks us, she only sinks one ship, but a serious collision may result in the sinking of two ships, so it is a matter of judgment.
"The question is, can we beat the submarine? I am sure we can if the people will do their part. We now have enough destroyers, or almost enough, to make the convoy system successful. We want more destroyers in order that we can have a patrol in addition to the convoy. When we convoy we are on the defensive, we do not see the submarine unless it comes to us, but when we are on the patrol we are on the offensive, we go out and look for them, and we hound them until we destroy them or drive them out of the area. So we must have enough for both."—N. Y. Times, 3/2.
NORTH SEA AND CHANNEL
Collision Sinks Gunboat in Channel.—The British torpedo gunboat Hazard was sunk in the English Channel on January 28 as the result of a collision, the Admiralty announced. Three men were lost.
[The torpedo gunboat Hazard was built in 1894 and measured 1079 tons. She was 250 feet long and her normal complement was 115 men.]—N. Y. Herald, 31/1
Berlin Reports Naval Attacks on Ostend.—Ostend, on the Belgian coast, has been bombarded by naval forces, it is announced in army headquarters' report.—Evening Star, 21/1.
German Mines Sink Own Destroyers.—The mine field responsible for the sinking of the German destroyers A-73 and A-79 was of German origin, the 17 men from the crew of the A-79, the only survivors from the two vessels, suffered greatly four days in the open sea. It was from these survivors it was learned the mine field was German.—N. Y. Herald, 26/1.
Widen Prohibited Zone in North Sea.—Notice of the alteration of the prohibited zone in the Irish and North Sea channels issued by the British Admiralty was transmitted to the State Department by the American Consul General in London. Navigation is now forbidden to all vessels in the area bounded on the northwest by a line joining latitude 56 degrees, 22 ½ minutes north, longitude 6 degrees, 17 minutes west, and latitude 55 degrees, 31 minutes north, longitude 6 degrees, 2 minutes west, bounded on the southeast by a line joining latitude 55 degrees, 13 ½ minutes north, longitude 5 degrees, 30 minutes west, and latitude 55 degrees, 2 minutes north, longitude 5 degrees, 40H minutes west, bounded on the southwest by a line joining first and fourth points, bounded on the northeast by a line joining second and third points.—N. Y. Herald, 5/2.
Fighting U-Boats from Towed Kite Balloons.—Among other agencies brought to bear on the German submarines is the kite balloon of the type so extensively employed on the fighting fronts. The French Navy, in particular, is employing a number of kite balloons with tenders for the purpose of spotting U-boats lurking near the coast and at the entrances to important harbors. The life of the kite observer at sea is full of thrills, especially during those times when he climbs up to the balloon swinging above the trawler and when he slides down the ropes to the deck of the trawler. It is said of these kite observers that some of their feats in this connection would compare most favorably with those of a trained tight-rope walker. But once in the basket of the balloon, the work is devoid of that excitement which is part and parcel of the work of the land observer. The U-boat can be readily spotted from a height of a few hundred feet, even when they are below the surface of the water, provided the sea is not too choppy and the light conditions are favorable.—Scientific American.
Sea Yields Up German Dead.—Belief that a naval engagement has occurred is expressed in a dispatch received in Stockholm from Gothenburg and forwarded by the correspondent of the Morning Post. The dispatch reports the recovery of a large number of bodies of German sailors, who apparently belonged to a warship.
Gothenburg is on the western coast of Sweden, and is near the Skagerrak, one of the bodies of water connecting the North and the Baltic seas and the one nearest the North Sea. The North Sea in the vicinity of the Skagerrak has been the scene of previous naval engagements, the great battle of Jutland having been fought there.—Washington Post, 17/2.
The Third Attack on Yarmouth.—Yarmouth, January 15.—Yarmouth, which was bombarded in November, 1914, and again at Easter, 1916, was made the target of enemy guns for the third time last night. It is not known whether a destroyer or a submarine made this last attack, which opened at 11 o'clock when a star shell lit up the town. A fusillade of shells followed, and swept the town for about five minutes, after which the raider vanished. Many of the inhabitants were in bed, and others were at supper, while some were making their way home from picture theatres. People who were out state that they heard the whistle of the shells overhead, and saw glares in the sky as the explosions occurred.
Four deaths have been reported. One person was killed and another severely wounded in one house by a bursting shell. A man and his wife are two other victims, and a sailor was killed on board a steamer in the harbor. Other casualties occurred, some persons being severely, and others only slightly, injured.
One shell wrecked the frontages of several houses and shops. The roofs of some houses were carried away, and the fronts of other premises were destroyed. A doctor's house was badly knocked about, while concussion caused by the exploding shells caused other damage to property. On the whole the damage was not great. Houses were filled with brickwork, stoves were blown out. doors wrenched from their hinges, and much window glass was broken. Many persons had remarkable escapes. One room was wrecked, but the child sleeping in a cot escaped without a scratch. Everything happened so quickly that all the damage had been done before people realized what was happening.
The inquest will be held to-morrow.
The Raid: A Comparison.—The accounts of the British raid on Karlsruhe and the German raid on Yarmouth contain instructive points of contrast. The former was presumably in the nature of a reprisal, and it may be recalled that the bombardment of Whitehaven by a submarine in August, 1915, was said to be a reprisal for the shelling of a Turkish troop train by a British submarine in the sea of Marmora. But in every other sense, what a difference! The British airmen attacked in broad daylight, selecting as targets for their bombs railway junctions, munition works, and other establishments, all of military value. They also waited after the job was done in order to obtain photographic confirmation of the destruction wrought. The place they attacked was defended both by anti-aircraft armament and by aeroplanes.
Compare these details with those of the attack on Yarmouth. It occurred on one of the darkest nights of the winter, and the raider hurried off in haste after he had thrown a few shells into the town. No damage was, or could have been, done which is likely to have any influence on the progress of the war. This business was pure devilry. There is no real menace to the security of our shores from such attacks, which from a naval or military point of view are singularly futile. That the raider was a submarine is most probable, for a formation of destroyers or a squadron of light cruisers would have carried out a heavier bombardment. There is, indeed, a close resemblance in this case to those of Seaham, Southwold, and Scarborough. The object of the enemy is to maintain the fiction that , our control of the North Sea is in dispute, and to produce a pleasing spectacular effect for German eyes, which acts as a set-off to disasters elsewhere. Funchal, in Madeira, and Bayonne, in the Bay of Biscay, are other places which have been subjected to the same kind of wanton outrage.—London Times, 10/1.
MEDITERRANEAN
British Craft Sunk in Mediterranean.—The transport and the fleet auxiliary which were sunk early this month in the Mediterranean, as announced in the House of Commons last week, were the Aragon and the Osmanieh.
The British steamship Aragon, 9588 tons gross and 513 feet long, was built in Belfast in 1905 and was operated by the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company of Belfast before being taken over by the British Admiralty. The British steamship Osmanieh, 4041 tons gross and 360 feet long, was built in 1906 and owned in London.—N. Y. Herald, 31/1.
Sunk a Dummy Cruiser.—U-Boat in the Mediterranean Neglected a Convoy to Attack it.—Apropos of the story printed in the New York Times, of the exploits of the British dummy naval vessels, which has been republished here and read with much amusement and interest. Renter's Agency is informed of one authenticated case of a valuable convoy proceeding to the Dardanelles, followed by a "cruiser."
A German submarine that was in the neighborhood allowed the convoy to pass and reserved its energies for the "cruiser." The Germans must have been greatly surprised when they saw the big guns from the supposed warship floating away from the wreck.—London Times.
British and Turkish Sea Actions.—In an action between British and Turkish warships on the morning of January 20, at the entrance to the Dardanelles, the Turks lost one of their most effective warships, with the chances that the tine battle cruiser Sultan Yawuz Selim, formerly the Goeben of the German Navy, may also prove a total loss. The armored cruiser Midilli, formerly the Breslau of the German Navy, was the vessel lost. Both of the Turkish warships were manned by Germans, and they only had opposed to them two old monitors and two destroyers and some seaplanes. The British lost the monitor Raglan and the small monitor M-28, which, so far as vessels go, are minor losses. The Sultan Yawuz Selim was so badly damaged by a mine that she had to be run ashore at Nagara Point, in the narrows of the straits. She has been further bombed by British aircraft and may yet prove a total loss. The Midilli was sunk by striking a mine after being driven by British destroyers during the fight into a British mine field. Turkish destroyers attempting to go to her rescue were driven off by British destroyers, and the British rescued 172 Germans of the Midilli. Her complement was 373. Of the total men on the two British ships 132 were saved; 220 men perished. The Sultan Selim and the Midilli, the British Admiralty explains, had emerged from the Dardanelles to attack British naval forces north of the island of Imbros. After the Raglan and M-28 were sunk the Midilli went to the bottom, and the Sultan Selim to escape then headed toward the Dardanelles at full speed and struck the mine. The British Admiralty reported on January 22, that the bombing attacks on the Sultan Selim were being continued, and that two hits with heavy bombs had been made.
The Turkish official report of the action says: "In a clever attack the cruisers Sultan Selim and Midilli, with some torpedo-boats, issued from the Dardanelles January 20 in order to destroy enemy forces which had been located near the island of Imbros. Two enemy monitors, the Raglan, 4500 tons, with two 14-inch guns and the M-28, 500 tons, with one 9-inch gun, and another smaller gun; a transport ship of 2000 tons, a signal station and numerous munition depots were destroyed. There was lively aerial activity on both sides. An enemy airplane was shot down in an aerial fight, and a second was seriously damaged. Our coast batteries successfully bombarded enemy torpedo-boats. On the return trip the Midilli was sunk by striking several mines."
The Sultan Selim was a sister ship to the Moltke, and was completed in 1912. She was a 28-knot ship, had a length of 610 ¼ feet and a displacement of 22,640 tons. She used both coal and oil in her furnaces. Her main battery was ten ii-inch guns and she was provided with two torpedo tubes. She had side armor of 11 inches and armored decks of 3 inches. Her complement was 1025 officers and men. She and the Midilli were nominally purchased from Germany in August, 1914, but the sale is held to have been entirely spurious. Both vessels successfully eluded the Allied warships on the watch for them in the Mediterranean and reached a Turkish port safely.
The Midilli was completed at Stettin in April, 1912, and her best speed on an hour's run was 27.55 knots. Her length over all was 446 feet and her normal displacement was 4550 tons. She had an armor belt amidships of33 ½ inches, an armored deck of 2 inches and carried twelve 4.1-inch guns and had two torpedo tubes. She burned both coal and oil.
Both ships have been very active in the Black Sea and have been reported in Russian dispatches as sunk or seriously injured on several occasions. A British official report told of dropping bombs on the Sultan Selim in July, 1917, with the result, it was said, that her injuries would keep her in port several months. Her inactivity since that time would indicate the correctness of this last report.
The Turkish Navy has suffered heavily during the war. The known losses are: Two battleships, two protected cruisers, ten gunboats, two torpedo-boat destroyers, three torpedo-boats and twenty-three supply ships and transports.—Army and Navy Journal. 26/1.
Airmen Continue "Goeben'' Attacks.—London, Wednesday.—Several attacks by day and night have been made by British naval airplanes on the cruiser Goeben, stranded in the Dardanelles, and two hits with heavy bombs were made, it was officially announced to-day. The announcement reads:
"Naval air service machines have made several day and night attacks on the Goeben and secured two hits with heavy bombs. They have also bombed one of the tugs which is secured alongside the Goeben. In every case heavy anti-aircraft gunfire was encountered, but all our machines returned safely.
"The attacks are continuing."—N. Y. Herald, 24/1.
The Goeben was floated and reached port.
PACIFIC
The Japanese at Vladivostock.—No official announcement has been made with regard to this new development in the Far East. The only people who criticize it adversely are those who think that Germany will be sooner moved to practical repentance by the Allies assuming that she is a civilized nation than by teaching her that she is not one in the way she understands—that is to say, by force. That Japan's occupation of Vladivostock may not square with the letter of Allied professions may be true enough; but it certainly squares with their spirit, which, after all, is the chief thing. As for the contention that Russia is our ally, and that Japan by this action is violating the obligations of partnership, it is as if when a man's house is on fire his friends should refrain from saving as many of his goods as they could in case he might misconstrue their help. At present Russia is voiceless, except on a note that no one cares to hear except the enemy. Japan wisely cuts the far-fetched considerations of the "defeatists," and keeps guard in Vladivostock. She has several good reasons, all of which are understood by the Allies. One is that the port is the Pacific terminus of the trans-Siberian railway, and as such is a great depot for vast quantities of munitions and other war material supplied by Britain, France and the United States for the use of Russia's armies. As the Bolshevik caricature of a government knows why they are not performing their share in the war, it cannot be permitted to inflict further loss upon the Allies by disposing of the war material at Vladivostock. Again, there is a large internment camp in the vicinity, the prisoners in which must not be permitted to escape. That Vladivostock may be turned into a base for enemy raiders and submarines in the Western Pacific is, too, a contingency, however remote, which must be provided against, and Japan is doing it in the only way possible. How could the situation be met in any other way?—Army and Navy Gazette, 22/12.
More Entente Warships Arrive at Vladivostok.—Five more Entente warships have arrived at Vladivostok, according to special dispatches from Petrograd. It is added that China, acting on allied advice, has forbidden exportation of foodstuffs to Russia.
The British embassy in Petrograd January 26 informed the Bolshevik Government that British warships were at Vladivostok to protect Allied subjects against possible disorder.—Evening Star, 1/2.
Japanese Troops Land at Vladivostok.—The Naschivck, formerly the Retop, asserts that a Japanese cruiser at Vladivostok has put troops ashore and that the Japanese consul there has issued a proclamation declaring that the Japanese soldiers are to keep order, owing to the danger threatening Japanese citizens. The proclamation of the consul adds that the soldiers have no other motives and no desire to interfere in Russian affairs.—Evening Star, 19/1.
Chinese Fire Upon Gunboat "Monocacy."—The American gunboat Monocacy was fired upon by the Chinese 50 miles above Yochow, on the Yang-tse-Kiang. A sailor named O'Brien was killed and two other sailors were wounded.
The attack was made near Kien-Lih-Sien and came without warning. The attackers hid behind a dike on the north bank of the Yang-tse-Kiang. The gunboat returned the fire but with what result is not known. Afterward the Monocacy proceeded to Hankow.
The firing lasted for half an hour. It is presumed that the assailants were a detachment of the southern revolutionary forces.
The reason for the attack and details of it have not yet been received. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, the American ambassador, will demand of the foreign office that responsibility for the attack be fixed and the offenders punished, and also that measures shall be taken to safeguard shipping. Dr. Reinsch does not believe that the attack indicates an anti-foreign feeling, but rather that it was intended to bring up complications for the central government.
The Japanese steamer Tayuen also was subjected to fusillades.
The commander of the American gunboat fired upon by Chinese rebels reported that he returned the fire and silenced it.
American Minister Reinsch's dispatches to the State Department to-day bearing on the attack on the Monocacy, contained no additional details to those already received in press dispatches. Minister Reinsch said he had already made representations to the Chinese Government.
Secretary Daniels gave out the following:
"On January 17, at 9 a. m., the United States gunboat Monocacy, while cruising about 50 miles above Yochow, on the Yang-tse-Kiang River, was fired on by intrenched Chinese, and was hit a number of times. H. L. O'Brien, chief yeoman, was fatally injured, and W. N. Donelly, seaman, slightly wounded. The fire was returned by the Monocacy and silenced.
"It is believed that the Chinese were bandits or revolutionists."—Evening Star. 22/1.
GENERAL NOTES
U-Boats Have Sunk Over 6,000,000 Tons.—End of Year of Gennan Frightfulucss at Sea Shon's Britain the Heaviest Loser.—Norway Leads Neutrals.—America's Loss Put at 69 Ships in the 12 Months of German Attack.—A year ago the Gennan Government decreed unrestricted submarine warfare against enemy and neutral merchant vessels. The decree read:
"From Feb. 1, 1917, sea traffic will be stopped with every available weapon and without further notice."
The danger zone around the British Isles, established in February, 1915, was enlarged and made to include the western Mediterranean. A prohibited zone was also established for hospital ships on the ground of the alleged misuse of these ships by the Allies.
The decree repudiated Germany's note to the United States of May 4, 1916, in which she promised henceforth to conduct her submarine campaign in accordance with the laws of nations—search and capture, and sinking only when the presence of contraband aboard had been proved and there was no opportunity to take the vessel to a home port and the safety of the personnel had been assured.
According to figures in the following tables, which are official unless otherwise designated, the total of tonnage lost of Allies and neutrals from January 1, 1917 to January 26, 1918, was 6,617,000 while in the same period fall official accounts either begin with the last week of February or combine January and February), the total number of British ships, exclusive of fishing craft, was 1169.
Aside from the belligerent, Great Britain, with a loss of 1169 ships, exclusive of fishing craft, Norway, a neutral, has been the heaviest loser.
On January 4, a Copenhagen dispatch announced that in 1917 Norwegian vessels with an aggregate tonnage of 566,000 were sunk. According to figures kept in the Times office 69 merchant vessels flying the American flag were also sunk in the same period.
The exact number of submarines which came to grief in their unrestricted campaign is not known, but, according to the State Department, the average sinkings of them for the first 11 months were 1.25 a day, or about 38 a month, while the German rate of construction had been .75 a day, or about 23 a month.
The visible falling off in the work of the submarine during the last three months is accounted for in three ways, each backed up by authoritative and sometimes official conjecture: That the protection offered convoys was growing more adequate; that the engines against the submarine were becoming more effective, particularly the "depth charge"; that many of the super-U-boats had been withdrawn either for refitting or on account of the debilitation of both officers and men.
It has been reported that mutinies at German naval bases have been caused by the enforced draft of men for submarine work. There is also the report that Germany is harboring her submarine strength for a monstrous campaign against American shipping, bearing troops and supplies abroad. Secretary Baker on January 27 predicted such a campaign in the words:
"The most powerful submarine offensive hitherto undertaken may be expected."
With the reason given for the recent falling off in sinkings by U-boats, the requisitioning by the government of 426 ships, totaling more than week in June the total of British entrances and clearances reached the maximum for the year—28,204 ships. This figure has dropped steadily until the week of January 26, when the total was 4661. In the first week designated 130 British ships were sunk; in the second, only 21.
A dispatch from France on January 29 stated that 16 former German vessels, including the Leviathan (Vaterland) had just landed supplies and men in that country. By taking over German ships the United States has added 515-435 tons to her flag. A further offset to the Allies' loss of tonnage is the requisitioning by the government of 426 ships, totaling more than 2,000,000 gross tons, while contracts have been awarded for 884 ships.
Great Britain had in commission in August, 1914, 16,841,919 tons. She has added to this by construction: In 1915, 1,386,914; in 1916, 2,050,000; in 1917, 2,850,000, and by purchase during the whole foregoing period 80,000 tons, giving a net total of 23,208,433 tons. Of this it has been estimated that she has lost from all causes since the war began 9,116,914 tons, which should leave her in possession to-day of 14,091,514 tons which is only 2,750,000 tons less than what she had when the war began.
Sir Eric Geddes, the First Lord of the British Admiralty, announced in July that Great Britain had 15,000,000 tons afloat, and that the empire's building for the year would be over 2,800,000. Of the 6,000,000 tons contracted for by the United States, it was reported in Washington on January 13 that 327,150 tons requisitioned while under construction would be put into service before the end of March.—N.Y. Times, 2/1.
69 OF Our Ships Sunk; 300 Drowned.—Official Record of a Year's Experience with German "Frightfulness."—Net Gain of ji5,435 Tons by Seizure of German Craft—426 More Ships Requisitioned and 884 Are Being. Built.—In the 12 months of unrestricted warfare launched against American and allied shipping by Germany one year ago there have been sunk by submarines, mines and raiders 69 American vessels, totaling 171,061 gross tons, according to a careful compilation of records of sinkings which have been made public in the period.
Offsetting this loss of American vessels, most of which were sailing ships, the United States since February 1 has added to her merchant marine by the seizure of former German and Austrian owned ships a total of 107 vessels having a gross tonnage of 686,494, leaving on the credit side of the American ledger in the account with the Central Powers a net gain of 515,435 gross tons. The loss of life caused by the sinking of the 69 American ships was more than 300 persons, however.
The percentage of sinkings of American ships compared with the number of vessels which have sailed through the war zone successfully is small. Records of the Department of Commerce show that for the period beginning February 1, 1917, and ended December 1, there were cleared from American ports in the foreign trade ships aggregating 17,738,900 tons net. or approximately 24,834,400 gross tons. The number of ships making up the total of tons was not made public by the department.
Further offsetting the loss of tonnage occasioned by the submarine warfare, the United States through the Shipping Board requisitioned in American shipyards 426 vessels totaling more than 2,000,000 gross tons, and contracts have been awarded for 884 ships, a large number of which are now under way and are being rushed to completion. In addition, the Shipping Board on October 15 last placed under government requisition 393 American vessels of more than 2500 tons deadweight capacity, which were afloat and immediately assigned them to the task of carrying supplies for the Allies and the American forces abroad.
Including in these requisitioned vessels were 21 ships in Great Lakes trade and in addition there were commandeered 24 steamers building on the lakes for a foreign account and ready for launching. Virtually all of these were brought to Atlantic coast ports and immediately put into service. Almost one-half of them had to be cut in two to get them through the Welland Canal, but the task was accomplished and the ships rejoined in less than three months from the time the contract was awarded.
Another difficulty which faced the United States in the task of putting to sea vessels to offset the ravages of the U-boats was the repairing of the "willful damage" done to the former German ships by their officers and crews before the ships were seized. This cost millions of dollars, and in many instances called for the highest engineering skill to make and replace parts of foreign-built engines and boilers removed or broken.
Indicating that the task has been attended by success, the statement was made to-day by a prominent official connected with the Shipping Board that every seized vessel was now completely repaired and in service. Many of them have made three and four round trips through the war zone.
Three of the former German vessels have been the objects of successful attack by the submarines. The Actaeon, formerly the Adamsturm, and the Owasco, formerly the Allemannia, were sunk and the Armenia was hit by a torpedo but was saved after being beached. Several other former German ships have been attacked, but escaped.
The announced sinkings of British ships for the year up to and including the week ended January 23 have been 1033 vessels, of which 763 were of more than 1000 tons, and 270 were under that figure. The joint losses of France and Italy have averaged three to four large vessels weekly.—Washington Evening Star, 2/1.
Assert Submarines Sank 9,000,000 Tons.—The German newspapers assert that in the first year of the unrestricted submarine warfare 9,000,000 tons of Allied and neutral shipping were sunk, and that only 4,000,000 tons have been built to offset this.
As showing how unreliable is the information which the German authorities give out, the Associated Press is authorized to state that the figures put forward exaggerated the actual tonnage lost by more than 50 per cent.
The total net loss of the world's ocean-going tonnage since the beginning of the war, including the losses by marine risk as well as by enemy action, and allowing for enemy tonnage captured, amounts to less than 3,000,000, or 9 per cent 6f the tonnage available at the beginning of the war.
The semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung and other Berlin newspapers publish articles on the anniversary of unrestricted submarine warfare. They glorify the U-boat as a "weapon which has achieved strategic and moral results, particularly against Great Britain in its world position."—N. Y. Times, 3/2.
The Submarine War.—Secretary Daniels Expects a Continuing Fight, With Losses to Both Sides.—Washington, January 28.—Prospects of concentrated effort on the part of German submarines to break down the transatlantic line of communication to the American expeditionary forces predicted to-day in the weekly review of the War Department has been foreseen also, but navy officials, it was learned to-night, believe the imminent offensive to be only the usual activities which has always succeeded a lull in submarine warfare.
Secretary Daniels, in reply to questions, said to-day that the navy expects a "continuing fight" with the submarines, with losses to both sides expected. He expressed the belief, however, that new weapons now in use will make such operations increasingly costly to the German Admiralty.—Baltimore American, 29/1.
Third of U-Boats Lost in id Months.—Germans Fear Depth Bombs, Says Engineer from Kiel.—Geneva, Switzerland, February 16.—A Swiss engineer employed for the last 10 months at the electrical works at Kiel and who has recently returned, informs the Associated Press that the Germans are making every effort to conceal their submarine losses, especially from the navy, because of increased difficulty in mustering crews. He estimates the Germans lost 30 per cent of their submarines during the time that he was at Kiel.
"I saw a score of submarines lined up in the canal undergoing repairs," he said. "They had been hit by depth bombs, which the Germans seem to fear greatly."
The engineer added that there had been two serious mutinies at Kiel during 1917.—Washington Post, 17/2.
U-Boats Sunk as Fast as Germany Can Build Them.—Back from the Front, Representative Miller Makes Encouraging Report to House.—Washington, D. C., Tuesday.—Representative Miller, who recently went to the front in France, told the House to-day that he believed German submarines are being destroyed nearly as rapidly as Germany can build them.
He praised Vice Admiral Sims for the methods he had adopted with American destroyers and cruiser convoys to combat the submarine menace, and argued that American shipping should be handled by naval officers and not by the Shipping Board. There were no Americans in the crews of the two transports aboard which he crossed the Atlantic, he said.
Mr. Miller said that during the last 10 months three times as many submarines have been destroyed as were destroyed during the previous two and a half years.—N. Y. Herald, 6/2.
Only 30 U-Boats Now in War Zone.—A correspondent of the Associated Press, recently returned from Europe, is authority for the statement that the number of German submarines operating in the prohibited zone had until recently been surprisingly small.
During the early period of the winter the number of submarine raiders at work in the zone varied from 12 to a maximum of 18. It was then expected, however, that the Germans would endeavor to increase this number, largely as a threat to the American troop transports, and that they might by this time be able to increase this maximum perhaps to 30 boats. These estimates did not include the smaller "egg planters" or mine-laying submarines.
The most formidable German submarines of which there is any definite record were armed with the new German 15-centimeter (5.9 inches) gun brought out in the war, which is a more powerful, longer-ranged gun than the 15-centimeter gun mounted in the main batteries of the German light cruisers at the outbreak of the war. The newest submarines carried two of these guns, forward and aft.
Much has been heard in the press, neutral and belligerent, of giant 5000-ton "submersible cruisers," but none of these had been identified definitely, according to the latest information in possession of the correspondent, nor had there been any trustworthy news from Germany that the Admiralty was laying down any boats of a tonnage representing such a jump from the size of the most modern submarine operating in the late summer and autumn.
The numerical production of submarines in Germany at that time had fallen off decidedly, due in part perhaps to difficulties with raw material, but chiefly to a decision to suspend the manufacture of small submarines of the "canal" type.
These boats, small enough to proceed to the sea through the canals of Belgium, had been built in comparatively large numbers in series production all over Germany and shipped to salt water, but were found to be too small for effective use under present conditions in the war zone, where destroyers and armed patrol boats compel the representatives of ruthlessness to operate chiefly submerged and to carry armament heavy enough to outrange the light guns on the armed merchantmen.
German experts believed, in fact, that a serious mistake had been made in designing and constructing these craft.—Nautical Gazette, 14/2.
Discontent in German Fleet.—London, January 25.—A German naval engineer with the rank of lieutenant, who has deserted from Kiel, according to an Amsterdam dispatch to the Daily Express, states that dissatisfaction among the men of the German fleet is much more serious than in the army. He asserts there have been important revolts, generally among the crews of mine sweepers.
Three weeks ago a squadron of mine sweeping trawlers entered Hamburg after an expedition in which three men were lost in an encounter with the British, and one of the trawlers was damaged. Before the men were permitted to go ashore, according to this account, they were notified that they must report back for duty within an hour. They asked time for rest. The Hamburg commandant refused, whereupon 150 men declined to obey the order.
An hour later a lieutenant named Wagner arrived and ordered the men to return to their boats. They refused. The lieutenant swore at the men and struck two of them, the dispatch continues. He was thrown into the water and left to drown.
The commandant who had watched the mutiny dispatched a motorboat carrying two machine guns which were fired into the crowd of sailors, killing 44 and wounding 73. The others were arrested and sentenced to terms of imprisonment varying from 5 to 20 years.—Washington Evening Star, 28/1.
The German Revolt.—It is undoubtedly premature to look for the collapse of the German military program because of the internal troubles now prevalent in the empire. Strikers may have quit work by the hundreds of thousands, tying up important industries and spreading disaffection among the people. But the German Government is not impotent to cope with such a strain. It still has the army at command to put down revolt and it will probably do so.
Indeed, it would not be desirable, from the point of view of the Allied nations, for the present strikes to bring the German Government to the point of peacemaking. There is in this outbreak of discontent not yet a symptom of revolution against the dynastic rule, no protest against the mode of autocratic government. Not until the German people are at the point of refusal to follow longer the lead of irresponsible rulers will the spirit of conquest that is the root of the evil of to-day be broken.
Repression by force of arms may come in Germany in the immediate crisis. In one respect it is to be hoped for by the enemies of Germany. For repression will not allay the sentiment for peace and bring alleviation of intolerable conditions. It will merely postpone the day of final reckoning and intensify the bitterness felt by the people. When the revolt that the government at Berlin must eventually meet comes it will be the more determined for any severities that may now be practiced.
There is great encouragement for the Allies in the fact that this first protest on a large scale against the German military program has gone so far and involved such a large number of workers. It indicates that the leaven of free thought is working in the lump. Doubtless this is a direct result of the negotiations with Russia and the opening of the gates to the infusion of Bolshevik ideas into Germany. Russia may still be Germany's Nemesis.—Evening Star, 1/2.
Submarine War.—To the Editor of Engineering. Sir.—The interesting charts supplied by the naval authorities, published on page 670 of your issue of December 21, showing the losses by enemy action of merchant tonnage (British, allied, and neutral) and the German submarines sunk during each quarter, are shown together in Fig. 1. The former is the full line and the latter is the dotted line.
Although the scales of the ordinates in both cases are not marked yet, assuming that they are to scale, the ratios of the ordinates of German submarines sunk to those for merchant shipping losses are attainable. These are shown in the dot-dash line and indicate that the best relative results have been obtained in the last quarter.
By adding the ordinates for each quarter the gross totals to the end of each quarter have been obtained. These are shown in Fig. 2, and indicate that the merchant tonnage losses have been increasing iii a decreasing ratio since the June, 1917, quarter, while the German submarines sunk have been increasing in an increasing ratio since September, 1916.
The ratio curve indicates that the general trend from June, 1916, to June, 1917, was against us, but has now been reduced to about that of September, 1916.
Yours faithfully,
Henry G. Lloyd, M. Inst. C. E.
44 Guilford avenue, Surbiton, December 24, 1917. —Engineering, 4/1.
Lookouts in the Submarine Zone.—A recent Admiralty order requires that all British merchant vessels of 2500 tons gross and upwards shall include in their crew four men, specially engaged, who are to act as lookouts at the mastheads. In the submarine zone, these men are to be employed solely on their special duty, keeping watch in four watches, each to be of not more than two hours' duration. They must obtain a Board of Trade certificate as to their eyesight; and they will receive extra pay whilst in the submarine zone.—Scientific American, 9/2.
Austria and the Allies Exchange Prisoners.—The first exchange of prisoners of war between Austria and the Allies has taken place near the Austrian frontier at Buchs. Three hundred and twenty-four of these exchanged prisoners have arrived at Geneva. They include two American volunteers, one English officer and 70 British colonials, all of whom were captured on the Turkish and Bulgarian fronts. The others were largely English and Scotch. Seventeen of the exchanged men were carried from the train on stretchers.—Evening Star, 14/2.
Ends German Pay Roll.—U. S. Acts When Boches Fail to Reply on Officer's Salary.—Germany has failed to reply to the proposal of the United States that German commissioned officers, held prisoners here, receive the pay of their grade in return for similar privileges being accorded American officers held in Germany. So the War Department has cut off the payments which were being made to German officers.—Evening Star, 29/1.
The War Situation.—The Secretary of War has authorized the publication of the following review of the military operations for the week ending February 9:
At dusk on the evening of February 5 off the Irish coast a torpedo launched from an enemy submarine struck the convoyed liner Tuscania, having on board American troops. Our loss at the latest report appears to be approximately 113 men.
The fine discipline of the men and the efficient handling of a difficult situation by those in command contributed to account for these relatively slight casualties.
At the same time, we must express our profound appreciation for the splendid work of the British Navy in rescuing our forces.
Notwithstanding the fact that hostile submarines were lurking in the vicinity, the British destroyers rendered every assistance and remained on the scene, succoring our men until all survivors were brought safely ashore.
At the small ports of Ireland and Scotland where our troops were landed they met with a most warmhearted reception on the part of the people, who did all in their power to administer every comfort and care.
The sector in Lorraine where our forces are in contact with the enemy continued relatively active throughout the week. Artillery duels took place intermittently, but fog and heavy rains prevented infantry engagements. The Germans attempted no further raids and settled down to systematic sniping and bombing of our positions.
Our sharpshooters gave a good account of themselves, keeping the enemy parapets well cleared of Germans.
One stretch of our line is very close up to the German position. Here bombing and a frequent exchange of hand grenades occurred.
German aeroplanes made repeated attempts to push their reconnoitering sallies over our lines, but were invariably met with a hot fire from our anti-aircraft guns.
Our forces engaged have shown themselves well fitted for their tasks in the trenches and are rapidly becoming accustomed to the routine of trench warfare. The welfare of our troops, whether in the trenches or in rest depots, is the object of the immediate personal concern of all our commanders. The rations for the men in the trenches, in spite of the enemy's attempts to break up our transport columns, have been regularly assured. The care of the wounded at our field dressing stations, as well as at our base hospitals, is being carried on with efficiency and scientific skill.
Here in America at our cantonments the training of our new armies is proceeding methodically.
The arrival in the western theater of additional German forces coming originally from the Russian front are noted. Further Austrian divisions have also been detached from other zones of operations and are being concentrated in reserve behind the German lines in the west.
Much dissatisfaction is expressed throughout Austria-Hungary at the policy of dispatching their troops to fight Germany's battles along the western front.
The desire for peace is increasing daily in the Dual Monarchy, and it is only natural that the Austrians should resent sacrificing their forces on distant battlefields in the furtherance of German ambitions alien to their interests.
Flanders was again the scene of numerous minor engagements, particularly the region of the Ypres-Staden Railway, where such fierce fighting took place last autumn. Here the British drove a sharp raid into the enemy territory, inflicting casualties and taking prisoners. The British also raided the German lines successfully southwest of Armentieres as well as east of Hargicourt and elsewhere.
The Germans pushed forward repeated reconnoitering thrusts against British positions northeast of Poelcapelle, in the Cambrai salient, and at a number of other points.
Heavy fighting took place along the entire front. Though no actions of more than local character were recorded, it would appear that the long-deferred offensive may develop simultaneously at different points of the line as an outcome of these engagements.
Hostile artillery were busily engaged, and a number of heavy bombardments, in all probability practice barrages, were put down at various points in front of and to the south of the Cambrai sector.
The British took full measure of the enemy in these various undertakings and had the situation well in hand.
The French front was also the scene of much lively fighting. The Germans drove a number of powerful assaults against the French lines in Lorraine, in the region north of Craonne, as well as along the east bank of the Meuse.
In the area bordering the North Sea the French also attempted a blow against the German positions in front of Nieuport. In the neighborhood of Rheims the French penetrated the enemy's lines and took a number of prisoners. In the region of Ailette the French were again successful and captured the entire detachment of a German outpost. North of the Chemin des Dames and near Flirey the enemy drove forward raiding parties, but achieved no results.
Artillery bombardments took place over an extended front and, while less violent than in the British areas, nevertheless were of greater magnitude than during the preceding week. Hostile fire was particularly intense along the east bank of the Meuse and in upper Alsace.
The French and British carried out a series of very effective air raids; the French dropping many tons of high explosives on munition plants in Alsace, while the British concentrated their energies on bombing the submarine nests at Ostend and Zeebrugge and hostile aerodomes in the zone of operations.
In the Italian theater no important operations took place. The Austrians were busy rearranging their dispositions of units along the front, and the Italians kept up a continuous harassing bombardment of the entire enemy line. Italian patrols were alert in the region of the headwaters of the Brenta. Northeast of the Monte Grappa minor encounters took place.
The enemy unsuccessfully attempted to explode mines in the Monte Pasubio sector. In the Val Lagarina, and especially along the Lower Piave, artillery duels were very lively.
Austrians are continuing their policy of bombing the open towns of the Venetian Plain. The priceless art treasures of Padua, Bassano, Treviso, etc., religiously respected through all other campaigns in Italy, were during the week the targets of Austrian aviators.
The British in Palestine have advanced their lines slightly north of Jerusalem.—Army and Navy Register, 16/2.