The urgency of providing an adequate naval reserve personnel is forcibly set forth in a report of the navy general board dated November 17, 1914, wherein it is pointed out that the strength of fleets is usually measured in the public mind by the number and tonnage of the material units, whereas the real strength of a fleet lies in the combination of material with another and more important element too often neglected in making provision for our navy, namely, an adequate trained personnel. The report continues to explain that no nation in time of peace keeps all the ships of its navy fully manned and in full commission; but all leading nations except ourselves provide an active list sufficient to keep the best of their fleet ready for war, and in addition a trained reserve of officers and men sufficient to man every serviceable ship of their navies. Thus, every nation with whom conflict is possible is prepared to mobilize its entire navy, by order, with officers and men trained for the service. The general board states that we alone of the naval powers are unable to man quickly with trained crews the ships of the navy serviceable for war, because we lack a trained reserve.
What constitutes an adequate naval reserve is a debatable question. Without arousing conflict of opinion on this point, however, an approximate estimate may be based upon a consideration of our war requirements in the circumstance of our enemy being one of the first-class naval powers. In doing this it will be attempted to follow the course of our normal naval policy.
Upon the imminence of hostilities one of the first steps to be taken would be the summoning of all naval reservists to the colors, and the mobilization of all effective fighting ships. Inasmuch as those reservists needed in the initial fighting line would have to be better organized and better trained than those who may expect the advantage of a period of training after mobilization, it is convenient to divide reservists into two classes, A and B: class A to comprise those required to man all effective ships, to man the coastal and harbor establishments as may be necessary for carrying out coast patrol duties and enforcing war-time harbor regulations, and also those required to release for sea duty a certain number of active service ranks and ratings now on duty in shore establishments; class B to include reservists held in readiness for after-mobilization duties, such as manning additional armed vessels and auxiliaries from the merchant fleet, manning United States ships nearing completion and foreign warships building in private yards taken over as a war measure, and providing relief crews for submarines, destroyers, torpedo-boats, and other vessels required to perform duties involving exceptional strain upon the crews. (No mention is made of the possible need for replacing casualties, because it may be assumed that the wastage of ships will equal, if not exceed, the wastage of crews.)
Upon mobilization under the normal policy, active service ratings would provide for manning the ships already in full commission, for making up nucleus complements of other effective ships to be mobilized, and for supplying a nucleus proportion of the officers and men required to man the various shore naval establishments. A part of the personnel required to perform the after-mobilization duties enumerated above for the class B naval reserves would also have to be drawn from active service ratings.
As a concrete example of how the above principles governing war requirements would apply in practice should this country to-day become involved in a war with a powerful enemy, the needs for trained naval reservists to supplement the 52,667 active service ratings may lie briefly and roughly estimated as follows:
- To man ships of military value now in reserve or in ordinary 20,000
- To man United States ships nearing completion.........5,000
- To man ships (war and merchant) building at private yards for foreign countries, taken over as a war measure .........3,000
- To man coastal and harbor establishments—including aeroplane and motorboat scouts, mine sweepers, pilot and police craft necessary to assist coast guard in enforcing war-time harbor regulations, and a system of signal stations (for the most part radio) to transmit information gained by the air and water scouts.........25,000
- To man ships of mercantile marine purchased or hired for use as colliers, transports, repair ships, ammunition ships, provision ships, hospital ships, etc..........3,000
- To perform additional war-time duties in shore naval establishments.........5,000
Total .................................................................................... 61,000
A Personnel Reserve for the Naval Service 1591
In the Civil War the personnel of the navy was increased from 7000 to 51,000, while in the Spanish-American War our regular naval force of 12,000, at the beginning of hostilities, was almost immediately doubled. At the outbreak of the present European War. Great Britain’s navy numbered 120,000 active service ratings and about 100,000 reservists, 53,000 of whom were trained reservists ready for immediate duty. England’s active navy now has a personnel of about 340,000. Judging from the experience of our past wars and in light of the lessors to be inferred from the present war, the above estimate of 61,000 reservists appears conservative rather than extravagant. The organized and trained naval reservists available to meet the above demands comprise:
State naval militias...................................................... 8,000
Coast guard and other reservists................................ 1,900
Totaling............................................................. 9,900
And leaving a deficit of ............................................... 51,100
Until enough reserves can be provided to perform at least all the mobilization duties enumerated for the class A reservists, the only alternative is to supply the deficiency by additional active service ratings, a temporary measure involving great expense not likely to be looked upon with favor in Congress. It is. therefore, a question of imperative urgency to devise ways and means of organizing and training an adequate naval reserve personnel. But while stressing the need of doing this, it must be borne in mind that it would be inconsistent with efficiency to try to reduce the number of active service ratings by providing larger numbers of reserves in substitution.
The minimum peace-time active service personnel consistent with maintaining the navy in a proper state of preparedness may lie said to comprise those ranks and ratings needed to man ships in commission,[1] to supply nucleus crews of about one-fourth full complement[2] for care and maintenance of effective fighting ships held in reserve, to man the administrative machinery of naval shore establishments, to provide instructors for service schools and naval volunteer organizations such as the state naval militias, to keep in attendance at the various service and training schools sufficient numbers of officers and recruits to supply the needs of the fleet, to man recruiting stations, and to provide a due number of officers and men to allow for those on passage to foreign stations, sick, on leave, etc.
It is to be noted that the total of these peace-time needs for an active service personnel approximate the war-time requirements. Moreover, when the active service men required for peace needs are insufficient, bad effects are seen in failure properly to care for and maintain the fighting ships in reserve, resulting in deterioration of material far more costly than the saving in wages. Insufficiency in active service ratings also has a bad effect on morale and training which, though less tangible than the deterioration in material, is none the less important. It would, therefore, appear contrary to principles of both efficiency and economy to reduce this active service personnel, either by increasing those ships on the reserve list, or by other expedient, such as substituting reservists for active service ratings. It is, however, consistent with these principles of economy and efficiency, and necessary in conforming to them, that the additional naval ratings needed in time of war be made up from trained reservists.
The need of trained naval reservists having been demonstrated, and their numbers and qualifications indicated in a general way. the question now resolves itself into—How can this need best be supplied? Since the uses for naval reservists are various, it is well, in so far as may l>e practicable, to recruit these men from the various civil occupations best fitting them for their respective naval duties. Also it may prove convenient for organization and administration to divide them into groups according to the naval duties for which they are to be trained. Our naval reserves at present may be considered as comprising three groups: First, a naval reserve from men who have served in the active fleet; second, the coast guard service; third, the naval militias of 23 states. In addition to these, there has been talk of a motor-boat and an aeronautic reserve corps as well as a few rather sporadic efforts to establish some kind of a national volunteer organization.
There seems to be a place for an additional volunteer organization, and also for a mercantile marine reserve. The purpose of the following discussion is to suggest a tentative framework for a well-rounded reserve. For the sake of clearness, all reservists have been divided into five groups. The organization and training of each group will be considered separately and in turn under the following five headings:
- Fleet naval reserve.
- Coast guard reserve.
- State naval militias.
- Mercantile marine naval reserve.
- Naval volunteer reserve.
Fleet Naval Reserve
The fleet naval reserve group comprises men who have served one or more four-year enlistments in the regular service. The chief merit of this group lies in the fact that its members are all trained men, a condition making for efficiency. This efficiency, a matter of greater importance than numbers, is grounded in skill and discipline. With naval volunteers, the latter of these two factors usually presents the greater difficulty. Many civil employments train in skill for the various ratings aboard ship, but there are no shore employments which give satisfactory training in the requirements of man-of-war discipline. “The units of a force may personally possess every necessary quality, but to render those units, when massed together, reliable, there should be a cohesion and solidarity in the force in order that it may be inspired with that justifiable confidence and unity of action which go so far to ensure success.”[3] This cohesion and solidarity depend upon knowledge of and readiness to fulfil the requirements of ship discipline. It is logical, therefore, to place first reliance in reservists trained on board United States men-of-war.
In utilizing the active fleet, however, in the peace-time training of reservists, it should be remembered that continuous service men are most useful aboard ship, both as regulars and as reservists; thus it is important to guard against injuring the efficiency of the active fleet by discouraging continuous service in order to build up the fleet reserve. This point has been considered in the recent naval reserve bill, which aims at encouraging re-enlistments and at the same time attracting both short- and long-service men to join the reserves. In accordance with this new law, men receiving an honorable discharge may join the naval reserve with a rate of pay corresponding to their length of service, or they may re-enlist with a view to transferring to the reserve later on-with a still greater rate of pay. These fleet reservists are divided into two parts; those who have held active service ratings 12 years or less comprise one part, and those who have had 16 or more years of active service the other.
At present this fleet reserve numbers only 274 men, but it is only one year old, and of such a character as to require time for growth. One reason so few men have enrolled is that the provisions of the present law have failed to attract non-continuous service men who have left the navy in years past. But if it is particularly desired to enroll these men, amendments can probably be hit upon which will induce them to join.
The war-time employment of these fleet reservists will depend largely upon the training and experience of the individuals. Men of more recent and more thorough training would properly be assigned to the class A reservists to join first line fighting ships upon mobilization. They would prove particularly useful in manning reserve destroyers, torpedo-boats and submarines; also in supplying relief crews for these and other types of vessels which may be called upon to perform duties involving excessive hardship on the crews. Those who are less available because of remote residence, or less up-to-date in training, would be assigned to the class B reservists for employment after mobilization in manning United States men-of-war nearing completion, foreign men-of- war nearing completion in United States private yards and taken over by the government as a war measure, ships purchased for auxiliary purposes, and to replace the wastage of personnel should it exceed the wastage in ships. Older men physically unfit for active duty would relieve a proportion of the regulars on duty in shore establishments, thereby making them available for sea duty. (In doing this, however, it would appear wise to go slow, as the effectiveness of the fleet may depend to a great extent upon the up-to-date 'efficiency of the navy yards and other shore establishments.)
Coast Guard Reserve
In 1914 the life saving service and the revenue cutter service were united to form the coast guard, under peace-time control of the Treasury Department. In time of war, or when war is imminent, the law provides that by executive order the coast guard service may become part of the navy, under the control of the Navy Department.
The revenue cutter service was organized in 1790 to patrol the coasts and enforce custom laws. It constituted the original naval force of the country as there was no regular naval establishment at that time. Since then this valuable little service has grown up with the country until now, consolidated with the life saving service and changed in name to the coast guard, it constitutes a compact and efficient organization—an emergency service—specializing in the performance of governmental maritime duties, but well trained for naval work by a rigid system of military discipline.
The peace-time duties of the coast guard service include the following: Assistance of vessels in distress; destruction of derelicts and other menaces to navigation; protection of customs revenue; enforcement of laws governing the merchant marine in matters of neutrality, navigation, anchorage, quarantine, immigration, and the like; suppression of mutinies on board merchant vessels; the policing of seal and other fisheries; and life saving service which embraces 285 stations for picketing the ocean and lake coasts. This small but capable naval reserve has a personnel strength of about 1300 officers and men. The coast guard ships number 20 of the first class (1600 tons to 740 tons), six of the second class (670 tons to 400 tons), and 19 third-class vessels and launches.
It is obvious that in war time the present duties of the coast guard will be increased rather than diminished, and it may be exacted that the enforcement of war-time harbor and coast regulations will make it advisable either to employ naval vessels to assist the coast guard or to organize and train a reserve of motor- boats, tugs, yachts, and other craft for this important work. If possible, it is better to relieve regular naval ships of this duty so that they may be employed in other naval work, and it would therefore appear a wise plan to organize and train a coast guard reserve.
State Naval Militias
Massachusetts organized the first naval militia in 1890 as part of the organized militia of that state. Other coastal states, one by one, followed the example of Massachusetts. At the time of the Spanish-American War the naval militias of the various states had grown to a strength of about 4000. Both officers and men performed important service during this war. Some went direct to the fighting ships of the fleet, while others served in the coast guard and signal corps. An auxiliary force of 10 monitors, 10 yachts and 41 other vessels to patrol the coasts was manned largely by naval militia.
The year following the war this service numbered about 7000 officers and men. From then up to the present time there has been slight increase. On July 1, 1915, 22 states and the District of Columbia had naval militia organizations totaling a strength of 8312 officers and enlisted men. (New organizations are being formed in Texas and Hawaii.) Each year since 1891 Congress has appropriated money for arming and equipping naval militia. As this reserve has developed in usefulness, the federal government has increased its encouragement and support, until this year the Navy Department has a total of $450,000 to spend on the naval militia. In addition, the states continue to appropriate funds for their respective establishments.
Federal money is used to purchase small arms and ammunition, loading machines, and other mechanical contrivances to be rigged in armories for training the men for duties at the big guns on board ship. The department also provides for each state organization an annual cruise lasting about two weeks on board a United States man-of-war. During this cruise officers and men receive the same compensation that is paid to men of corresponding ranks and ratings in the regular navy. Many states have, moreover, vessels regularly assigned to them for use throughout the year for drill and week-end trips. The Navy Department keeps these ships in good condition and the organizations so favored usually make their annual cruises on these regularly assigned vessels, if they are big enough to accommodate all hands at once.
Advancement in this auxiliary naval branch is anticipated under the operation of a law of February 16, 1914, to promote the efficiency of the naval militia. This act places control, to a great extent, under the supervision of the Navy Department, thereby permitting a standardization of all state naval militias as to organization, administration and training. To assist the department in meeting the provisions of this law, a national naval militia board composed of five naval militia officers, representing the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Pacific, and Great Lake regions, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy on June 2, 1914, and is convened in Washington as often as may be necessary for consultation on important naval militia matters. This board, in conjunction with a board of naval officers appointed for the purpose, has formulated examinations for officers and enlisted men of all the state organizations, thus standardizing the qualifications for the various militia ranks and ratings. The law, which virtually federalizes the naval militia, closely concerns the active service, because, if an emergency should arise, it is provided that the naval militia automatically will become a part of the navy.
Naval militia officers at present are encouraged to apply for assignment to cruising ships for short periods of training at such time as may suit the convenience of the applicant. This feature of peace-time training should prove both popular and valuable. Not only officers, but also enlisted men, petty officers especially, might profit by tours of duty lasting from two weeks to two months on board ships in active commission. The service schools for gunners, electricians, radio men, yeomen, and the like, might also be thrown open to deserving reservists, provision being made whereby the status of a naval militiaman, while taking a course in one of these schools, would be the same as though he were assigned to a cruising ship; that is, he would get the pay and compensation of his corresponding active service rating.
It would appear that the naval militia, as it exists to-day, supplies a foundation for a valuable reserve. The older battleships and cruisers might be assigned to the various states with the understanding that upon mobilization their respective naval militia organizations would perform the important duty of filling out the nucleus active service complements of these reserve fighting ships.
Objection may be raised to such a policy on the grounds that the organizations are inadequate both as to numbers and training. This is true, but they are growing in numerical strength and increasing in efficiency. The progress already made under the stimulus of the new law supplies evidence that if the Navy Department asked the various states for naval militia forces to man effective ships now in reserve or in ordinary, they would be found ready to do their part in building up adequate organizations. It has been announced that Massachusetts, the founder of the naval militia, has again taken an important initial step by accepting the assignment of the reserve battleship Kentucky, apparently with the understanding that her organization will see to it that this unit is well manned in an emergency.
The naval militiamen of Massachusetts are thus faced with a definite task. The knowledge that they are drilling on board the same ship in which they will serve in war produces reality, a potent spur to intelligent training. The assignment of a definite task, besides giving reality and stimulating interest by making clear to reservists exactly what their war-time usefulness will be, also permits the application of the principle of specialization in peacetime training. The proper performance of duties on board a modern man-of-war requires special skill, and it is a condition to be reckoned with that the average naval militiaman is a workingman with his paramount interests outside the navy and with comparatively little time to devote to naval work. In order to make peace-time training effective, it is necessary to assign individual duties as specifically as possible in accordance with natural inclination and adaptability. This can readily be done if ships in reserve are assigned, both for peace-time training and war-time work, to the various states possessing naval militia organizations.
The point may be raised that fleet reservists might better be employed to man reserve battleships and cruisers. This is a matter open to argument, but it would appear that, as has already been said in discussing the war-time employment of fleet reservists, they might better be used in the reserve destroyers, submarines, and in the performance of other duties, of which there will be plenty, leaving the manning of the larger ships in reserve to the state organizations. The state naval militias are more available as units, and also possess a certain amount of cohesion and solidarity, elements which, as has previously been pointed out, are essential to naval efficiency.
The policy illustrated in the assignment of the reserve battleship Kentucky to the State of Massachusetts appears, therefore, to be a good one to extend to other states as fast as their respective organizations evidence ability to fill out promptly and efficiently the nucleus active service complements regularly assigned capital ships in reserve. (The ships already detailed to the various states are for the most part small. It may be expected that organizations assigned battleships or large cruisers will wish to retain the smaller craft for week-end trips.)
Mercantile Marine Naval Reserve
In the war now in progress Great Britain is employing about 3000 ships of her mercantile marine in naval duties. Reckoning in terms of tonnage, this is more than the total of ships under the United States flag on August 1, 1914. While it may be argued as unlikely that the United States, as a belligerent, would have need to lean so heavily on her merchant navy, it is, nevertheless, generally admitted that greater security would be felt if our navy were backed by a strong mercantile marine. It is, therefore, from a naval standpoint, a matter of satisfaction to hear that on December 1, 1915, the ships under the American flag totalled to a tonnage of 8,444,258; also that many big vessels are being built, including H colliers, 47 oil vessels, 34 general freight vessels, and 6 passenger and freight vessels. The prospects for a United States merchant navy are bright, but it would be a policy of doubtful wisdom to regard this prospective mercantile marine as a source from which to draw large numbers of reservists for men-of-war.
One of the chief duties of the navy is to make the seas safe for our trade ships, and it would not appear desirable, unless all other measures fail, to man reserve warships at the cost of laying up trade ships. Even if a state-subsidized and state-regulated merchant service were established, it would not be wise to rely mainly thereon for naval reservists, unless, perhaps, an additional wartime merchant reserve were provided to take the place of naval reservists withdrawn from the trade ships. On the other hand, it is desirable to recruit reservists from trade ships to provide a large part of the crews for such vessels as may be diverted in war time from commercial to naval uses, such as armed auxiliaries, colliers, transports, supply ships, hospital ships, repair ships, and the like.
Should the necessary federal support be authorized, the question of organizing and training this reserve branch would be largely a matter of arrangement between the Navy Department and the various shipping companies. The details might be worked out by a conference committee composed of sea-going officers, both naval and merchant, together with representatives of the leading transportation companies and shipowners.
Naval Volunteer Reserve
The sources of the groups already discussed are in a way restricted. The fleet reserve is open only to ex-service men; the coast guard is a maritime establishment of the government; the naval militia comprises a number of special state organizations to a certain degree local and necessarily bound by limitations respecting both numerical strength and qualifications; while the mercantile marine reserve is for the personnel of the merchant navy. Since the navy is our first line of defence, it seems strange that there should be so few localities—embracing not even all our seaports—where a citizen can, without leaving home, volunteer and train for naval duties. This is not the case with our land forces. The experience of the army, with its numerous volunteer organizations to be found in almost every town, indicates that, in present times especially, there are many citizens who take pride in helping safeguard national security by fitting themselves to be of war-time use to their country. Some of these have predilections for naval training, but are forced to join an army reserve because no naval volunteer organization is within their reach. This is unnatural and, in view of our pressing need for naval reservists, wasteful. Recruits hurriedly picked in haphazard fashion at the outbreak of war have done very well in the old-time navies, but the modern man-of-warsman is not like the sailor of the past. There is little doubt but that a force of picked volunteers, who have undergone some naval training, to the majority of whom ship routine and discipline are somewhat familiar, would be a better source from which to draw naval reservists than recruits enlisted at random. Desirable recruits for such a naval reserve may be; said to include skilled mechanics and artisans whose ship duties would be similar in nature to the work they do in following their peace-time trades; also yachtsmen, motor-boat men, radio and telegraph operators, signal men, aeronauts, and other civilians who have an aptitude for the sea.
In order to attract sufficient numbers, it would seem well to have an organization with different kinds of subdivisions varying in requirements so that it may be, to some extent, optional with the individual as to how much and what kind of training he will volunteer for. By this it is not meant to tolerate slackness of any sort, because the right kind of reservist seeks a smart organization, strict in discipline and thorough in whatever work is undertaken; but it is meant rather to encourage thoroughness by assigning a task practicable of accomplishment in the time the volunteer has to devote to it. Of course, the more training he gets the better, but it would not seem a wise plan to debar a good man because his regular employment will not allow him to devote very much time to naval training. Such men might be put in a subdivision together, so as not to retard those who are able to devote more time to drill and instruction. The war employment of reservists will, of course, depend upon the amount and kind of peace-time training undergone, but men of both class A and class B are needed, and it would not appear impracticable to so organize this volunteer group as to include both of these classes and give appropriate training to each.
In conclusion, it may be added that in attempting to present a brief survey of a very large subject, it has been thought wise to limit the scope to considerations of a general character. No complete plan has been built, but it is hoped that the ground broken, however roughly, may help a little in the work of constructing such a plan—a work which might best be undertaken by a committee composed of both naval officers and civilians officially appointed for that purpose by the government.
What is desired is to establish a principle and policy respecting reservists which may be applicable to any future increase of the fleet.
Note.—This paper was written in January, 1916.
[1] The ships recommended for full commission by the general board include all battleships under 15 years of age from date of authorization, all destroyers and submarines under 12 years of age from authorization, half of the cruisers, all gunboats, and all auxiliaries necessary to the active fleet.
[2] The general board has recently recommended nucleus crews of one- half full complement. This appears to be an emergency measure forced because of a lack of trained reservists.
[3] From Admiral Tryon's Committee Report of 1892.