Motto: “What right have I to write on Prudence whereof I have little and that of the negative sort?”
In military matters America has arrived at the parting of the ways. She is now an onlooker in the only real war the world has ever had. The other wars have been mere skirmishes. In the days of that great genius of warfare, Napoleon, when 100,000 men were engaged on a side the battles were called great battles. He won his laurels in the first Italian campaign, where at no time did he command more than 45,000 men. In the battles in Europe during the present war the number of combatants on each side is reckoned in millions.
We of America have viewed this great conflict from afar, and we are afraid—not afraid in a cowardly sense—but we are afraid of such keen suffering and such terrible destruction as have come to Belgium, Poland and Serbia.
Being afraid that in some way the dire distress of the warring European countries may be brought home to us, the people all over the country are beginning to think and talk of ways and means to avoid the havoc which is at present the curse of the Old World.
On every hand one hears such questions as: "Who will win the war and how will it affect America?” “Is there any possibility of a practicable, permanent peace?” “How can the United States best prepare itself for possible trouble?” and hundreds of other questions, all bearing on peace or war. The weather as a topic of conversation has taken a back seat. The President of the United States, in the most important message delivered to Congress since the Civil War, gave all his time to a discussion of preparedness and the national danger due to lack of patriotism in our own citizens.
In studying the probability of a permanent peace, one must take cognizance of human history and human nature. Science is causing rapid changes in the mode of living and improved means of communication tend to prevent misunderstanding. Before long one will be able to telephone from Portland to Peking, but it is pertinent to ask ourselves the question, “Has human nature changed materially?”
There have always been “wars and rumors of wars.” Sometimes the Lord even took a hand in the war Himself. He instructed Joshua how to take Jericho, Gideon how to overcome the Midianites, and Samson how to slay a thousand men with the jawbone of an ass. Even the birth of Christ, that greatest event in the world’s history, heralded with “peace on earth and good will to men,” did not succeed in stopping war.
Since the Christian era began there have been just 451 wars, or an average of a real man-sized war every four and two-tenths years. During the nineteenth century, according to Haydn’s Dictionary of Dates, a great battle was fought every year—barring seven!
In connection with the study of the probability of peace or war for the United States, there must be taken into account the natural causes of war for this country. What are they?
- The Monroe Doctrine.
- The Open Door.
- Trade jealousy.
- Racial jealousy.
- Disposition of the Philippine Islands.
- Immigration questions.
Trade jealousy was probably the cause of the present war in Europe; with us—a generation from now—it will no doubt overshadow all other causes. Heretofore our manufacturers have had all they could do to supply our own population. This will not be true 20 years hence. We must reach out for a market. The market for our surplus will not be in Europe or in European- owned Africa. It must be created in South America, Asia and Polynesia. There will, of course, be an intense competition for the above mentioned trade. The United States must have this trade—will we have to fight for it? The question of whether America must fight for the trade that all know she must obtain in order that her manufactories may continue to run is one that must be decided by those who shape American policy. While trade jealousy looms largest amongst probable causes for war, the other five of the six causes mentioned above remain with us, and all must be studied by American statesmen in deciding whether we can safely assume that the country will remain at peace or whether it is good “horse sense” to prepare to meet any possible adversary. In order to be sure of peace, it is certain that the causes of war must be eliminated—for effect has a habit of following cause. In addition, human nature must be changed, and it is the duty of the adherents of pacificism and the supporters of preparedness to decide—and that very soon—whether the causes for war can be adjusted with fairness to all nations and whether human nature has changed sufficiently to insure us that there is no possibility of the United States having to go to war. It takes a long term of years to prepare for a successful war—Germany has been engaged in preparation since the days of Scharnhorst and Queen Louise, and we must not make the mistaken assumption that we can prepare in one or two or five years.
The whole question of American preparedness boils down to two general propositions:
- Can a permanent international peace be arranged so the United States can avoid the expense of preparedness, and will the nation feel so secure in the international treaty that it will dare remain unarmed?
- If the country at large is afraid of (a), then it must prepare to fight probable enemies or a combination of them, and prepare to “pay the fiddler.” Armament is costly—not one one-hundredth as costly as would be a war in which we meet defeat, but far more costly than our present program of preparedness.
The question of whether the country wants preparedness is not one for the naval officer to aid in deciding—his business is to obey orders and do the best he can with the tools furnished him. Ordinarily the naval officer does not even vote, and the voter and taxpayer, through their national representatives, are the ones who provide the sinews of war.
It seems likely, from present indications in Congress and from the trend of public opinion, in so far as it can be read and evaluated, that the United States intends to have a try at preparedness.
If it be so decided, then the talent of the army and navy will be called upon to advise on how to prepare most efficiently and at least cost.
The Matter of Preparedness
There are some who think America can never prepare efficiently for a war that may be thrust upon her. It is claimed that politics enters too strongly; that the country is too loosely governed; that the various sections are not willing to make the necessary sacrifices for the general good; and that the tenure of office is too short to allow our officials to get more than a grasp of what is needed before they are relieved by a change of administration. Some of the claims savor of truth. If it takes a graduate of the Naval Academy five years to learn how to get the best work from a turret’s crew, how can a Congressman of one year’s experience know how many torpedoes and mines we should appropriate for? If after 30 or 40 years of service naval officers differ on whether the country should build battleships or battle-cruisers, how can the Senator in his first term be expected to know which to vote for?
We are novices in the business of preparedness, but there is a certain amount of fundamental knowledge upon which we can draw, and certain recognized general principles which can be applied.
- Party politics and sectionalism must be absolutely forgotten.
- If the country is to be forced into preparedness, it must “go the limit.” Half-hearted measures will only open the road to quarrels with our international neighbors.
- We must do the thing along business lines.
When our country is forced to really prepare for defence it will undoubtedly be done according to the traditional American “horse sense.” The American mind is as keen as any other. Both the army and the navy are examples of “big business,” and no one can imagine smoother running machines than the U. S. Steel Corporation or the Pennsylvania Railroad. We have in our country hundreds of men capable of taking charge of preparedness and running it along economical business lines.
The writer has never had the pleasure of reading a paper more “chock-a-block” with common sense than the one written last August by Mr. Martin J. Gillen, president of the Mitchell Wagon Works of Racine, Wis. It is called “A plan which will organize the nation for defence on broad and comprehensive lines, taking full advantage of the existing factors which have made this country what it is to-day.” He proposes to have a general advisory board of experts to “use their creative power and business ability” to help the government. He proposes also that we “in time of peace prepare for war.” Mr. Gillen evidently does not believe in waiting till the gale strikes the ship before shortening sail.
The plan is so full of patriotism and efficiency, and would save the government so much money, that Mr. Gillen’s permission has been obtained to quote from the paper to show how the “group” from one industry works:
Take the wagon group; appoint eight representatives; a representative from the International Harvester Corporation; the Studebaker Corporation; the John Deere Wagon Co.; the Mitchell Wagon Company; the Mandt Wagon Company; the Bain Wagon Co.; the Peter Schuttler Co., and the Kentucky Wagon Co. These men shall be known as the Advisory “Wagon Group,” and this group shall elect one member from its board who shall become its member of the General Advisory Board above named. No compensation shall be paid to any member of the General Advisory Board or any of the Advisory Groups during times of peace, but their actual disbursements shall be certified to under oath and allowed; in times of war they should be allowed the pay that their army commission carries.
The government shall present to the “Wagon Group” plans and specifications of all forms of wagon conveyances used or required by the government. This group shall then examine these plans and specifications and report to the government within 30 days such changes in the plans and specifications of the present army equipment which cannot be readily manufactured in our wagon factories, either because of the present factory equipment or because of raw material stock. In a word, standardize the different types of army wagons to the factory equipment and raw material available in this country.
Plans and specifications should be immediately corrected and each wagon manufacturer in America should then be provided with the new plans and specifications, and a sample wagon should be built by each wagon manufacturer, and at least four sets of dies should be manufactured by the government for the irons used in the manufacture of these wagons. The samples and the dies should be paid for by the government and should be the property of the government. The sample wagons should be kept at the factories and the dies at one of the factories where they can instantly be used for all the wagon manufacturers of the United States desiring to build. The right shall be in the government to examine the books, records and costs of each manufacturer or supplier of war materials and under oath any person whether officer, agent or employee of the supplier as to any and all transactions, concerning war supplies and publish such information as the War Department deems wise, in the weekly periodical (as provided hereinafter) as will enable the government to get better prices and deliveries. Thus a stop be put to manufacturers or suppliers getting extraordinary profits from the government while it is helpless and fighting for its very existence. It certainly would be a fine spectacle in this country, during war, to see certain war stocks on the stock market soar sky-high from extraordinary profits while the government might be struggling to sell or place its securities, at a discount even with increased interest rates.
The Wagon Group should investigate and report in writing to the government, (a) the capacity of every wagon factory in this country; (b) the names of the wagon manufacturers who will build samples under government specifications, and (c) the delivery that can be had within 90 days from each of these factories on the samples provided. This education of each of the wagon manufacturers in the plans and specifications that will be used by the government will prevent all confusion, save weeks of time, and will enable this government to get good competitive prices from the industry, and at the same time almost unheard of deliveries. Within 30 days of the placing of an order this government will begin to receive initial deliveries, and within 60 days thereafter it would receive from 50,000 to 60.000 wagons, which should be about the requirements for one million war troops. The War Department should determine its points of mobilization of troops, so that when the initial order is placed no delay will occur in shipping to points of mobilization in the United States.
The government should call for bids on its war needs from each of the group every six months for enough, say of wagons, to supply from one-half to a million of troops. Upon receiving bids the War Department shall immediately make contracts with the wagon manufacturers for the full amount needed; this to be done every six months, and in event of war all that would be necessary would be for the Secretary of War to notify the manufacturers through the public press or otherwise, to start their factories going the next day, on the contracts. In a word, within a very few days after war was declared large supplies would uniformly be coming into the new camps for troops beyond our standing army almost as fast as they could be taken out of government warehouses. The trouble with the Allies to-day in getting supplies in this country and the terrific prices they are paying, with slow deliveries and confusion, is due in a great measure to the fact that the materials ordered are not easily made by the tools and equipment of American manufacturers and from the raw materials stock available, and to the fact that all the manufacturers in the different groups are not able to get the plans and specifications in sufficient time to acquaint themselves with the actual cost to them of manufacturing the goods, prior to making their bid. To my personal knowledge, a number of manufacturers have made 50 per cent over the cost that they had figured, in order to “play safe” on the orders contracted for.
This plan can be worked out within the different groups of manufacturers supplying war materials, and where, as in the supply of shells, firearms and explosives there is in this country to-day a very limited group of manufacturers, the War Department, working with the Central Advisory Board, can devise ways and means to interest manufacturers so that they can produce. There should be a registry of factories which can be adapted and diverted to the manufacture of needed articles and the government should have the right to commandeer those factories in the event that the owners do not produce for the government. The Central Advisory Board, with the War Department, should make close investigation of the materials that go into explosives, and the government should then control under law the raw materials that go into explosives, and should lay plans to get as soon as possible large stores of these raw materials so that they are available at once to the government for manufacturing purposes. After one year of war we find that the Allies have induced one manufacturer after another to make war materials in his factory along lines he never dreamed of.
Papers like the one from which the above quotations are taken show that there are in the United States men capable of grasping the situation and of handling it with the greatest efficiency and at the least cost. To insure any degree of success, however, in our preparedness business, the national mind must be made up about what sized army and what sized navy are needed, and then the nation must trust such a man or such a group of men to carry out the details. More permanency is needed. Our army and navy officers in the top grade remain in that grade only a short while. It must take the heads of the Army and Navy Departments nearly two years to become reasonably familiar with their business, and by that time they are almost ready to “call their reliefs.” It may not agree exactly with our ideals of democracy and representative government, but if the government has to go into preparedness as a business it surely wants to do it efficiently, and efficiency demands that when we get a good head for the War or Navy Departments we should hold on to him for dear life.
Our Sins of Omission
Navy needs have been set forth many times. They will probably have to be set forth a thousand times and more_ before the fleet is well equipped and well manned and ready to sail forth on the proper course to the successful issue the nation expects. On account of our peculiar form of government, it becomes a matter of education to obtain the legislation on which the navy is dependent. The questions must somehow or other clarify themselves in the mind of the Congressman, and to best reach him it would probably be best to build from the bottom up and begin by educating the voter.
In Germany, which has a most efficient organization for war, the government has power to act when it sees a need. In America the active agents are the voters, and it is probable that a countrywide education as to navy needs will be found absolutely necessary before we arrive at the proper stage of preparedness.
SIN NO. 1. LACK OF A NATIONAL COUNCIL OF DEFENCE
The necessity for some such body has been preached for years. The reason for its need is that naval strategy must be governed by national policy. It will take a certain force based on certain ports to defend the Monroe Doctrine, and another kind of force based on other ports to exert the influence we cannot avoid exerting in the Pacific. The council lays down the policies we must uphold, and gradually the rest of the world acknowledges these policies, and the chances are ten to one that by having the policies well understood we shall save ourselves the trouble and expense of having to fight for them.
The council should have at its head the President of the United States, and have as members men in whom the country has confidence. Some degree of permanency in membership would be a great aid to efficiency and economy. When such a body has decided on its policies, it will not be a difficult matter for the army and navy general staffs to advise the council what is needed in the way of men and armament to enforce the policies laid down. During the past few years it has seemed easy for Congress to turn down the recommendations of the navy general board and of the Secretary of the Navy. It would be a far graver matter to fail to carry out the recommendations of the Council of Defence headed by the President of the United States. As far as the policies of the nation are concerned, if there be fear that we should become removed from the principles of representative government, then the policies might be put to a national vote or put to a Congressional vote. In any case, to beget a successful, well-rounded navy, on which the country is beginning to rely, the national policies must be laid down before we lay the keels of our ships. The latter is utterly dependent on the former. It is impossible to plan with any degree of common sense unless it is known what we are to plan for, and it is not possible that this nation will go on year after year with such a hit or miss system as we now have.
After all, what is the objection to stating our policies? Ours is a grown-up nation—we are “free, white and twenty-one.” Whether we wish it or not, we cannot avoid our national responsibilities. American trade will eventually see to it that American interests in the Pacific are at least equal to the interests of any other nation, and the longer we put off stating our platform on these and kindred subjects, the greater the shock will be to our neighbors. A firm attitude is a great breeder of respect.
SIN NO. 2. LACK OF A NAVY GENERAL STAFF
A navy general staff has also been recommended by many naval officers who have been close students of history. The National Council of Defence lays down the national policies, calls on the general staff for technical knowledge as to navy needs in order to enforce the policies and makes recommendations to Congress concerning the naval legislation. The whole plan is so sensible that Congress, which, after all, is patriotic, could not fail to carry out the recommendations of the council.
For several years the general board has done some of the duty that should belong to a general staff. For instance, it has recommended a certain building program each year. Sometimes the Secretary of the Navy has made the cut in the number of ships recommended by the general board; sometimes the naval committee has made the cut, and sometimes Congress itself has done the pruning. In broad terms, the duty of the general staff is to prepare the navy for war and keep it prepared, and to make plans for the conduct of operations. The function of the war college is to educate officers to fit them for duty on the general staff. As a matter of fact, the war college would be under control of the general staff. The general staff, working year after year, would round out the navy and get it well balanced. There would be proper numbers of battleships, battle-cruisers, destroyers, submarines, auxiliaries and other war craft. Every detail would be worked out and filed away, ready to start the great fleet on its war mission. Every eventuality, big and little, would be so well thought out that the thousand and one wheels would be well oiled, ready for turning, and, what is more, they would mesh. In the Spanish War we lost thousands of lives and millions of money because the details were not worked out ahead of time; in other words, because we had no general staff to do the job. There was lack of foresight, with its resultant confusion, and a total absence of military prudence. Since that time the army has obtained a general staff, but it is still a sin of omission as far as the navy is concerned— one of the greatest sins. In 1870 the German general staff had used so much foresight that all that was necessary to do to start the campaign was to look in a certain pigeon-hole, give the signals, and the army, perfectly equipped, was on the move. The same was doubtless true in 1914. The Germans give an example of perfect military prudence. By planning ahead we can save time and money and lives, and more yet—national honor!
SIN NO. 3. LACK OF NAVAL BASES
Eighteen years ago, when the United States was at war with Spain, plans were made to send a squadron to the Spanish coast, partly with the idea of forcing Admiral Camara to. give up his cruise to the Philippines, and partly on account of the pressure of the newspapers for the navy to do something to end the war. Fortunately for America, the peace protocol was signed before the squadron set sail. Where we would have based such a squadron the Lord only knows.
In the present day of the submarine and the mine, without great preponderance in war craft over that of the enemy, an attack on his defended coasts would be suicidal. Witness the Ally ships destroyed at the Dardanelles. Along the North Sea the English are blockading the enemy’s coast and keeping his warships bottled up, it is true, but it must also be borne in mind that the British harbors are handy by. English ships are far superior numerically to the Germans, and they can run into their own nearby bases, repair, coal and refit, and rejoin the blockade lines. The nearby base gives them the requisite breathing spell.
Nine years ago President Roosevelt sent 16 battleships on a cruise around the world. The United States was at peace with all nations, and yet it was with great difficulty that the fleet was kept in repair and kept supplied with fuel. Foreign nations were all helping instead of fighting 11s, foreign bottoms were available as coal carriers, and all the ports in the world were available as bases for our fleet.
By and by, when our trade reaches out to the west and south, as it must do unless our manufactories close down, it will of necessity follow that American interests must at least remain on an equality with the interests of other nations in the Pacific Ocean. Temporize as we will, the influence of the fleet must follow the channels of trade. Kipling expresses the main idea in—
“The liner she’s a lady by the paint upon ’er face.
An’ if she meets an accident they call it sore disgrace;
The Man-o’-War’s ’er ’usband an’ ’e’s always ’andy by—
But, oh, the little cargo-boats! they’ve got to load or die.”
The fleet is, of course, a protection to American shores, but the surest way to protect American shores is to defeat the fleet of the enemy. History shows that aggressive campaigns have usually been the successful ones. When the trade has reached far out across the Pacific, and when the fleet influence must follow to protect the trade, the trader and the flag, how will the naval strategist find it practicable to repair the ships and feed the furnaces? At present, as we have no bases, there is only one way, the one of having a large and unwieldy train of vessels go in company with the fleet. This harasses the commander-in-chief and gives him a sense of insecurity as far as giving battle is concerned. Pie cannot keep his train under the protection of the guns of the fleet, and yet if some fast enemy cruisers “run amuck” in the undefended train, it leaves the commander-in-chief helpless. Rojesventsky had an unwieldy train with his fleet and loaded his fighting ships down to the guards with coal. He had the welfare of his auxiliaries on his mind all the time, and what was the result? There has never been such a disastrous campaign in naval history as the one that ended in the Straits of Tsu-Shima.
For years the senior officers of the American Navy have told the naval committee that a fleet cannot go too far from its base, but the trouble is .that the talks have not been sufficiently convincing. The day of John Paul Jones, when the ship could sail gaily away with six months’ supplies aboard, ready to harry the enemy coast, is past. Nowadays the fleet must go into port and repair and take on board provisions and coal and oil—then it can steam out and meet the enemy, hut it must have a port somewhere under its lee and within steaming radius.
Bases must be independent of fleet protection and impregnable in their own defensive power. The fleet must not be called away from its proper duty—destruction of the enemy fleet. And the commander-in-chief, in order to carry no handicap in an aggressive campaign, must know that he has a secure base to fall back on when he needs fuel or when he needs to repair before or after an action with the enemy.
The United States can get no naval bases in Asia, South America, Europe or European-owned Africa. The chances of war, however, put into American hands certain ports in the Pacific that are ideally situated from a geographical standpoint—the Philippines, Samoa, Guam, Honolulu and Panama. The writer has never had the opportunity to go deeply into logistics, but it can be roughly stated that by careful seamanship and proper scouting our fleet can safely take aboard enough fuel and food to steam 2000 miles away from its base, fight an action and, if successful, return to its base. With this idea in mind, and taking as centers Unalaska, Honolulu, Panama, Samoa and Guam, circles have been drawn, using a 2000 mile radius. These circles may be thought of as the circles of influence of the American fleet. It can be seen from the chart that the circles practically cover the entire Pacific Ocean.
No point in the Philippine Islands has been used as the center of one of these circles of influence, for several reasons, any one of which is sufficient in itself. First, it is the expressed American policy of both main political parties that we are to give up the Philippines as soon as the natives are capable of self-government. Second, holding a base there would mean too large an army of defence, making the cost prohibitive. The first reason alone would, of course, make it foolish to spend any large sum of money in preparation of a naval base in the Philippines.
Outside of the Philippines, the two most important bases are Guam and Samoa. By a study of the chart one can readily see how they increase the area of influence of the American fleet. We have owned both Guam and Samoa for a generation, and we have done nothing toward their defence. Each of these places could be made into a strong naval base at the cost of not more than two battleships. Military prudence demands the fortification of Guam and Samoa, and Congress is taking a great responsibility when it knowingly places on the shoulders of the naval commander-inchief the added weight of not preparing these bases from which he can operate. In any campaign in the Pacific, fortified bases at Guam and Samoa are worth to the commander-in-chief far more than a division of dreadnoughts.
In addition to aiding the navy in its own proper work, one great value of fortifying Guam and Samoa is frequently lost sight of, i. e., the added protection such preparation offers in defence of Honolulu and the west coast of the United States. It does not take a deep study of strategy to learn the importance of protecting the flank. As school boys, in our history lessons we read of the general having to retreat because his flank was threatened—even then we understood the term of “outflanking the enemy” and “taking the enemy on his flank.” With the expenditure of a few millions on Guam and Samoa, they can be made so strong that no enemy fleet can afford to attack them. The United States had a short lesson in attacking shore fortifications at Santiago which had, to the best of my memory, only a couple of modern guns of major caliber. We learned from the lesson that the fleet must not be used to attack shore batteries—at least not until the enemy fleet is put out of action.
If, therefore, the United States would securely protect Guam and Samoa and base a few fast cruisers there, no enemy from the southwest or west could afford to pass by them in order to attack Honolulu, Panama, or the Pacific coast. His transport line, consisting of hundreds of vessels, would be so vulnerable that no intelligent enemy, unless he had great preponderance of fighting ships, would risk the attempt before these bases had been reduced.
There is a further argument for the fortification of Guam, dependent on American policy concerning the Philippine Islands, if we are to retain control of them, or if we intend to prevent other nations from obtaining control, the preparation of a base at Guam greatly strengthens our position in the islands to the westward. From a look at the chart it will be seen that the whole Philippine Archipelago comes well within the influence of our American fleet based on Guam.
Naturally an enemy, even from Europe, will attack us in our weak spot, and our weak spot at present is most assuredly the Philippine Islands. Any enemy nation must hesitate a long time before sending a fleet of vulnerable transports to attack these islands when it is known that the United States has nearby a strong naval base from which our fighting ships and submarines may sally forth to destroy his practically undefended transport columns. We need these naval bases badly—worse than can ever be made clear to Congress or to the naval committee; Guam and Samoa we need especially. Without Guam and Samoa our battle fleet will be practically tied to our own coasts. Assuming our Congressmen to be patriotic, it is better to tell them this now than to tell them when it is too late. Furthermore, American public opinion in a future war will have something to say as to whether our fleet shall remain tied to the United States coast. Public opinion will most assuredly help to write the order, “Seek and destroy the enemy fleet,” and may the Lord help the commander- in-chief who has to protect an unwieldy train while he is trying to carry out the order, unless, through proper foresight, the commander-in-chief has been supplied with a fleet superior to the enemy and consisting of numbers and types well designed for the difficult work in hand. We can prepare the defence of these two islands with a small expenditure of actual money, and each island, being small, can be defended with a force reasonable in number. If we prepare them in time we shall at least be on a fair footing in the Pacific, where we shall have to protect our trade; lack of them might easily be responsible for national naval disaster.
SIN NO. 4. LACK OF BATTLE-CRUISERS
The naval advisers to Congress have no doubt brought up this navy need many times, yet we have no battle-cruisers. Other nations have them, built or building, as follows: England, 9; Germany, 7; Russia, 4; Japan, 8. Congress may appropriate for some this session, but the fact remains that other nations have them already and that they can build battle-cruisers as fast as we can build them.
Once again there is no need for a profound insight into naval strategy to see the value of battle-cruisers. They are as fast as destroyers, have a large radius of action, and are heavily armed. They could, therefore, put the enemy’s scouts out of action. This means that the commander-in-chief who has a sufficient force of battle-cruisers could gain information from the enemy concerning his force, formation, course and speed. It means further that information could be denied the enemy. It means more yet—that, having destroyed the enemy’s screen and found out where he will be at a certain time, there is an excellent chance of taking the enemy at a tactical disadvantage or driving home an attack with submarines and destroyers. It might easily mean that one force could destroy many capital ships of the other without even risking his own major fighting units!
By providing battle-cruisers, we are at least assured of a fair fight. The mercy of battle is no more. The politesse of “Gentlemen of the guard fire first” is a bygone. Nowadays every advantage is taken of the unpreparedness of the enemy. The countries that will win the wars of the future will be the ones that spend years planning and building against the evil day. In time of war the navy can get all the money it asks for, but battle-cruisers cannot be built in a month or a year.
SIN NO. 5. NATIONAL EXTRAVAGANCE
This is not a sin of omission; it is a sin of commission. We are the most extravagant nation on the face of the earth, and seem to be proud of it. The working girl who is paid $6 a week will spend $2 of it for a pair of silk stockings. The man on a small salary will mortgage his home to buy an automobile, and is not ashamed of it. In defence matters the nation is just as bad. We spend more money than any other country for our navy except England, and yet we are not second in naval strength. We spend more on the army than most of the others and, compared to European nations, we have no army at all!
It is high time that the army and navy learned to get value received for every dollar appropriated by Congress. Take, for instance, the fortification of Samoa and Guam, what do we need from Congress in actual money? We need guns, cement, blasting powder—the enlisted force can do the rest.
The writer has been shipmates with the job of doing work with very little money. The marines in Guam built military roads, built gun emplacements, mounted guns, and dredged channels ; they did it cheerfully under a hot tropical sun; they saw the value of their labor and took pride in doing it. Perhaps they had an idea they were helping to keep the Star Spangled Banner waving a little longer. In any case, their military spirit was not hurt in the least; in fact, there is no doubt but that the actual manual labor they performed on these works of defence made better fighting men of them—it made them part owners, it gave them the pride of accomplishment. This principle can be used in preparing the defence of Samoa and Guam. By using our own men we can save millions for the purchase of those things which do require the actual expenditure of money. The army and navy has a chance to help Congress just as much as Congress can help them, and they can do this by saving every dollar for the government they can possibly save.
The writer does not feel qualified to speak for the army, but why pay out huge sums for a volunteer force? In any war of magnitude we must call on “all hands” for defence anyway. This is merely a matter of history. In the Civil War we were forced to conscription. “We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more,” was not sung entirely by volunteers—some of the singers were conscripts. England has spent a year begging her able-bodied men to enlist, and tardy enlistment has cost her over 200,000 lives. Why not “take the bull by the horns”? The larger force we oppose to the enemy, the quicker and less costly will be the victory.
Switzerland calls on all her people to learn enough about war to defend the country. Some of the experts of her army she must, of course, employ all the time, and in consequence she must pay them a living wage. Those who serve only a certain length of time each year undoubtedly get very little, for the Swiss Army is comparatively large and the cost of it is certainly very little. In the end, nations engaged in great wars are driven to compulsory service, so why take money out of the pocket of the citizen to pay back to him for his service as a soldier? Where it means life service, of course, the matter assumes a different aspect.
We are the richest nation on earth, but there is a limit to expense of armament beyond which we dare not go, and it is the plainest duty of the military advisers of the government to learn strict economy.
The Decision
On our national journey we have arrived at a crossroads—on the one hand lies international peace with disarmament and its consequent economy; on the other, preparedness with its enormous cost. It is not for those in the military service of the United States to advise as to the safest road to travel. We do know, however, that if we cannot be absolutely sure of a permanent peace we must, and I can think of no stronger way to express it than in Cockney slang, be “bloody well” prepared for war.
To prepare for war as far as the navy is concerned, there are certain things we must do, i. e.:
- Lay down our national policies, for we must build our ships to fit them.
- Provide for a general staff and accept its recommendations, for it is only such a body that can cover the thousand and one details which have to be covered in order to get ready for war along common-sense lines.
- Prepare the proper naval bases in the territory of our future spheres of influence, for otherwise we shall have to endure the disgrace of finding our navy tied to our own coast.
- The enemy has too much sense to wait for us to prepare for war, and it takes three years to build a ship and many more years to build a fleet. It is far cheaper to spend a half billion dollars to build a fleet than to spend ten billions as a war indemnity. Furthermore, by proper preparedness we may save the national honor.
Let us, therefore, build a properly balanced fleet, and begin now!
Note.—Written in November, 1915.