This article was written in 1914, before any of the naval actions of the present war.
GENERAL
Tactics is defined in the U. S. Naval Instructions, 1913, as follows:
“Tactics applies to all naval movements and operations made after contact with the enemy’s forces. The term ‘contact’ being employed in a broad sense, meaning such proximity to the enemy as affects fleet formation and renders a battle imminent.” Writers on tactics and the art of war have defined tactics in various ways. Clausewitz called it the use of troops in battle; and Jomini, the art of fighting on the field of battle; while Von Moltke said that tactics was the method of using the different arms in fighting, telling how one ought to fight. General Bonnal, a French writer, considers tactics as the science of executing.
The various movements and evolutions made by the ships of a fleet at drill are often called tactics. This seems to be a very narrow definition, since it does not include the relations which the different types of ships making up the fleet should bear to each other. During the wars of the sailing ship period, after the fire-ships had been relegated to the scrap-heap, these movements and evolutions were practically the whole of tactics. In the war of the future the tactics of battle will be composed of more than the simple evolutions of the fleet of battleships. The commander- in-chief, in the next war, will have to handle, besides the main battle-fleet, the flotillas of destroyers and submarines, the fast wing, and possibly aeroplanes. And the successful leader will be he who knows the part which each of these types of ships must play; he who knows their limitations, their strength and weakness; and who can handle them in battle so as to get the best out of them. “The tactics of battle,” says Daveluy, “are composed only of incomplete and scattered elements. They exist only for that day when the maneuver will have an exact meaning and will make answer to a well-defined aim on the part of the enemy.”
Weapons govern tactics and modify methods, but, from the days of the Armada to those of Tsushima, the gun has proved itself to be the only weapon by which decisive victories can be won. There is no reason to suppose that this condition will be changed in the near future. We may, therefore, safely lay down as a law of naval warfare that tactics must now, as always, be directed toward bringing the greatest number of effective guns to bear upon the enemy at effective ranges in the shortest time.
The object of tactics is the same now that it was in the days of Nelson—the destruction of the enemy’s fleet and the winning of the command of the sea. Men and methods change, but the object remains the same, and that nation which enters upon a war without that object must give up all hope of ultimate success. History gives too many examples of the influence of sea-power upon the results of war for this point to need any argument.
The tactics of battle should possess both speed and simplicity. They demand simplicity because there will be no time for any complicated or intricate evolution. Furthermore, there will be too much going on close at hand for captains, or division commanders, to give the proper amount of attention to any extensive maneuvers. Speed is required in order that the movement may be completed in the shortest possible time; that the enemy may not see the object aimed at too soon, or reap any benefit from his movement to which our movement may be an answer. Also, that the volume of fire may be decreased as little as possible. Both conditions must be fulfilled in order that the fire-control may be affected as little as possible.
The factors which go to make up battle tactics are morale, initiative, coordination, mobility, and fire-power.
Morale includes the state of discipline on board ship, the degree of training to which the men have attained, and the spirit which actuates them. Confidence in their own powers and in their officers is, by far, the greater part of morale. Professor Bakewell, in a lecture before the Naval War College, said, “It needs no argument to prove that victories are won, not by greater numbers or by possession of superior engines of war, but rather by the character and training of the men. It requires no argument to prove that the desired military virtues tend to spread from officers to men by a sort of contagion, whenever the commander, having already acquired respect for his wisdom and practical knowledge of warfare, vividly embodies in his own person the spirit of resolute bearing, self-confidence, and the determination to win. Doubts dissolve and obstacles vanish when he appears, and the impossible happens. These things we may take for granted. Every great general bears witness to their truth; every war has written the demonstration in letters of blood.”
A study of the life of Nelson will show how true is that quotation. Time and again we see him exhibiting all the virtues which Professor Bakewell ascribes to the commander, and just as often we see him leading his fleet to victory against almost overwhelming numbers. Truly a good example for all to follow.
Initiative—the ability and willingness to act upon one’s own responsibility, to do what the occasion demands without waiting for orders—is another factor of the utmost importance in battle tactics. There are two kinds of initiative—trained and untrained. Untrained initiative is worse than none at all for the exercise of this type of initiative may, and in most cases would, cause untold disaster. The subordinate commanders must be trained in the exercise of their initiative, just as the gun crews are trained in the handling of the gun. History furnishes an excellent example of trained initiative in the action of Nelson at the battle of St. Vincent, where, without orders, he left the line and prevented the two detachments of the Spanish fleet from uniting.
In order that subordinate commanders may exercise their initiative intelligently they must be informed of, and thoroughly conversant with, the plans of the commander. They must understand the object for which the commander is striving, and know exactly the part which they are to play in attaining that object. After learning the ideas and plans of the commander, they should be left free to carry out their part of the plan in their own manner. Success can hardly be hoped for when initiative is killed by too explicit orders, or is discouraged by those in authority. On the other hand, we must never be afraid of ordering plainly and distinctly all that which is really necessary. But no subordinate commander must be left in the dark as to what is to be done.
Lack of initiative was responsible for many defeats in the Boer war; while one of the best examples of the result of lack of initiative occurred during the Russo-Japanese War, at the battle of Liao-Yang. A Russian commander, hard pressed, and out-numbered by the Japanese, sent a request to the officer in command of a cavalry regiment stationed nearby for assistance. The request was refused on the ground that the cavalry commander had no orders to send any men to help him. Yet that body of cavalry took no part whatever in the battle.
The next factor is coordination—the power of acting together, or the power of combination. The various units composing the battle line must be drilled and trained until they work together like the parts of a machine. The officers and men must have worked with each other until every individual of a fleet knows to what extent he can rely upon the other members of the organization. Each must forget himself in striving for the success of the fleet as a whole, just as the various members of a football team are required to work for the good of the team.
The other two factors—mobility and fire-power—are so self- evident that nothing need be said concerning them. Mobility, however, includes flexibility. Our battle tactics must not be rigid. We must not allow ourselves to be bound down by any hard and fast rules, regulations, or ideas as was the case when naval men first took up the study of tactics. Until Nelson proved conclusively that tactical rules could, and should, be broken at times, naval officers were tied hand and foot by rules which they broke only at their peril.
This was particularly true of the French, who were so obsessed with the ideas of certain formations that any commander who violated the regulations concerning them was punished with death. Villeneuve, hampered by the tactical rules of his day, was unable to do anything to free himself from the position in which he found himself at Trafalgar. He was considered the best tactician of his day in the French Navy, yet, when he saw his predicament he could only cry out, “ Je n’ai ni moyen ni les temps d’adopter une autre tactique avec les commandants auxquels sont confies les vaisseaux des deux marines.” There are two kinds of tactics—offensive and defensive. Much has been written concerning these two forms of tactics; but military writers are almost unanimous concerning the superiority of the offensive. Clausewitz, alone, seems to be an advocate of the defensive. There is much to be said about each kind of tactics and, theoretically, the defensive is the stronger; yet history teaches us that it is the offensive which is nearly always victorious.
The best examples of the results of offensive and defensive tactics are found in the history of the wars between the French and the English. The French, nearly always assuming the defensive, awaited the attacks of the English with the resignation of martyrs, and merely accepted the battle which the English forced upon them. The shining exception to this general rule is found in the campaign of Suffren, in India. Decisive victories cannot be won by the defensive. As a writer in the London Times recently remarked, “Victories must still be won by the offensive—tactical and strategical—and defensive ideals are futile and dangerous.” Improvements in armor and the development of shell-power have in no way affected the truth so firmly grasped by Nelson and so forcibly stated by Farragut, “The best protection against an enemy’s fire, is a well-directed fire from our own guns.”
“Fortunate the soldier,” says Von der Goltz, “to whom destiny assigns the role of assailant. To make war is to attack.” All the advantages are with the offensive. Knowing where he intends to strike, the commander is not beset with a thousand doubts and worries as to where the blow will fall. The role of the assailant increases the morale of the attacking forces, and lowers that of the attacked. In this connection, Montesquieu once said, “The nature of defensive warfare is discouraging, it gives to the enemy the advantage of the courage and energy of attack: It would be better to risk something by an offensive war than to depress minds by keeping them in suspense.”
And history bears out the truth of that statement most emphatically. The French, almost always on the defensive, followed a policy of “no risk,” endeavoring to save their ships in the hope of achieving some ulterior object. Little did they realize-that the defeat of the enemy’s fleet would make certain the accomplishment of their strategic plans. Neither can the offensive be undertaken with a policy of “no risks.” The commander must throw his entire force into the battle and stake everything on the issue. He cannot win victories who is afraid of spilling blood, or who is afraid of losing ships. “ In war,” said Napoleon, “men are nothing, but a man is everything.”
HISTORICAL
The history of naval tactics does not show so many changes as are found in the tactics of war on land. Up to the end of the seventeenth century the main object of each captain was to put his ship alongside one of his adversaries and to take him by boarding. Since that time, whenever two fleets have met, the fighting has been at longer ranges, as a general thing. And, with the advent of high- powered guns and armored vessels, the range has continued to increase until it has reached the long range of the present day.
The tactics of the galley period were more exact than those of the early days of the sailing-ship. With practically only one weapon of offense, the galleys were restricted to certain formations in order to obtain the greatest advantage from that weapon. To use the ram to the best advantage, the galleys were obliged to maneuver in line. This formation allowed each ship to use its ram with the greatest of freedom and also provided mutual protection for the weak sides of the galleys. Being propelled by oars, the galleys, like the steam vessel of to-day, were able to take any course they wished and were not restricted in their choice like the sailing ship.
The theory of the ram has followed down almost to the present day. It is only a few years since the great powers began building ships without rams. With but one isolated example upon which to found their theory (the battle of Lissa), many tacticians hailed the ram as the main weapon of offense in battle. Since then the ram has disappeared, as it was bound to do as soon as scientific thought was put upon it.
Following the ram and the galley tactics came the early sailing ships. With no effort to keep any formation, fleet actions were merely large melees in which each captain endeavored to take his adversary by boarding.
Toward the end of this period, noted for its lack of tactics, the fire-ship made its first appearance. This little vessel, the forerunner of the torpedo craft of a later day, first became a part of the battle fleets in 1636. Manned by a small crew, it was its duty to drift down into the fight and, if possible, to get alongside one of the enemy’s vessels and to set it on fire. In this it were often times an equal menace to both friend and foe; for changing winds and uncertain currents made it anything but certain in its attack.
Later on, in 1704, it is found in the plan of the battle of Malaga in the position advocated by Paul Hoste—in the second line, half a league on the unengaged side. Owing to its lack of speed and the complication of tactics, it soon disappeared from the fleets of that day.
Tactics, or the use of some formation in battle and the adhering to it, are first found in the battle of the Texel in 1673. Here the column formation was used for the first time and efforts were made to bring all ships into action at the same time. This was often prevented when the fleet bore down in line of bearing upon the enemy. In most cases the line was broken soon after opening fire.
Since that time the formation of the fleet in battle has been more and more strictly adhered to by naval tacticians. As has already been said, tacticians became so obsessed with importance of battle formation that he who left the formation was punished with death.
With the introduction of steam it became easier to maintain formation and so avoid the confusion found in the tactics of the sailing-ship. The introduction of the long range gun has made the keeping of formation more of a necessity than ever before, in order that ships may obtain the maximum fire-power.
DISCUSSION
1. Formations and Evolutions.—In taking up this subject it must not be supposed that it is possible to find some one formation or evolution which will, of itself, give victory. While there are many examples in history of victories being won because of some maneuver, there are none to lead us to believe that there is any particular formation which will prove the “ open seaman ” to victory. No absolute rule can be laid down as to what formation must be used to insure success. Many theorists have contended that the line of bearing used by the Austrians at the battle of Lissa was the cause of their victory; yet, at the battle of Yalu, the Chinese, whose fleet was in double line of bearing, were defeated.* In the first case the vanquished were in column; while in the second, it was the victor whose ships were in column.
At Trafalgar, Nelson took his fleet into action in a double column—a line of squadrons—and won a most decisive victory over the French who were in single column and “capping” the Englist fleet. A similar situation is found at Tsushima; yet in this case, it is the line of squadrons which is defeated and the single column which is victorious.
From these examples it is plainly evident that we must look elsewhere for the causes of victory. These we find in the energetic attack of the victors, the morale of the attacking fleets, and the advantages given the victor by the inefficiency and lack of training in the defeated fleets. As it was with Nelson, Suffren, Tegethoff, and Togo, so will it be in the future, that victory will rest with the side that understands and takes advantage of all the factors that work for the end in view—the destruction of the enemy’s fleet and the command of the sea.
The four victories of Trafalgar, Lissa, Yalu and Tsushima are very much alike in that we find, on the one side, energy, determination, discipline, excellent morale, and initiative; while the defeated side is noted for its lack of all these qualities. In discussing this subject Darrieus says, “ This observation (speaking of the battle of Lissa) strengthens the impression already received from the study of history, that it would be vain to seek for the formula of some one formation applicable to all cases and sure to give victory.”
Then what formation shall we adopt when going into battle? Evidently there are certain conditions which must be fulfilled, the first and greatest of which is fire-power. No sane commander-in- chief would lead his fleet into battle in such a way as to lose any of his fire-power. It is certainly clear that the formation which allows the maximum fire-power is the column, or a line of bearing approaching the column. The column answers to another one of our requirements in that it is simple. But can we say that it fulfills the third condition—that of flexibility?
Under one condition, and only one, will the column be flexible enough to answer to our requirements. When the subordinate commanders are fully acquainted, in every detail, with the plan of the commander-in-chief; are fully indoctrinated with his tactical ideas; are working in thorough harmony with him; and are allowed to exercise their initiative in carrying out their parts of the battle plan; then, and then only will the column be flexible enough to fulfill all conditions. It is out of the question for any commander-in-chief, at the head of a column of sixteen ships or more, to be fully acquainted with all that may be taking place at the tail of the column. Powder gases, the splashes of the enemy’s shells, and the interference of ships will all combine to prevent his seeing all that is going on in the rear divisions. The commander of the rear division, on the other hand, knowing all the conditions in his division; knowing the plan of battle; should be so trained and thoroughly imbued with the ideas of the commander-in-chief that he can be trusted to do the right thing at the right time, without waiting for orders from the flagship. These were the conditions under which the column won at Tsushima.
The question of the column as a battle formation has already been most ably discussed in the Proceedings by Lieut. Commander Knox, so it will not be necessary to go again into all the faults and weaknesses of the “ follow the leader ” plan of battle. That some semblance of column is necessary in order to derive full benefit from previous gunnery training is almost axiomatic; but to tie all the ships to a single column is to bind the hands of the division and squadron commanders. The so-called group column, with the group commanders properly trained in the exercise of their initiative, gives much more flexibility than the long single column and does not reduce the fire-power of the fleet.
The group column has been advocated before, and just recently Bernotti has brought it up again. Besides adding to the flexibility of the battle formation, it relieves, to a certain extent, the group commanders from the necessity of blindly following in the wake of the commander-in-chief. It leaves to each subordinate commander the responsibility of handling his group in all of the ever- varying situations arising in battle in accordance with battle tactics and the plans of the commander-in-chief.
That the value of group control and the intelligent use of initiative by the group and ship commanders was fully appreciated by Nelson is seen by studying his battles, particularly the Nile and Trafalgar. It is shown most conclusively in his famous Memorandum—“ The second in command will, after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his line to make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.” That sentence expresses, in a nutshell, the entire theory of the group formation—to leave to each group commander the entire conduct of his group in general accordance with the previously expressed plans of the commander-in-chief.
Another point which comes up under this subject of formations is that concerning the order of the fleet for steaming. What this formation should be is so self-evident that only a word need be said about it. No one will deny that, at the time mentioned in our definition of tactics-contact with the enemy, it should be the order of fighting. Failure to realize this basic principle was largely the cause of the Russian defeat at Tsushima, where they were caught in a formation which bore no resemblance whatever to a battle formation. And yet, this principle was most clearly enunciated by Nelson when he said, in his Memorandum, “ Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the line into a line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive, I have, therefore, made up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing (with the exception of the first and second in command) that the order of sailing is to be the order of battle ”
To sum up then, the fleet should steam in the order of battle, or at least, in such order that battle order may be quickly assumed upon contact with the enemy. From the moment of contact the group commanders should exercise full control over their respective groups, handling them in such manner as the conditions encountered, and the plans of the commander-in-chief, will permit.
Coming now to the evolutions to be performed upon the field of battle we can only say that they must be those most suited to the conditions at that time. Each group commander must perform those evolutions which will tend to the accomplishment of the end in view. Conditions, like weapons, govern tactics, and-no one can predict what his adversary’s next move will be. These conditions include the state of the sea and weather; the discipline and morale of both fleets; and the condition of material in both fleets. A movement condemned by theory as reckless and foolhardy, may be used with impunity against an enemy whose fleet is in a state of moral and material demoralization. The maneuver of Nelson, at Trafalgar, was one which could hardly have been used against an enemy as well trained and as well commanded as the English.
The evolutions performed in battle should, besides working for the success of the plans of the commander-in-chief, tend, wherever possible, toward the fulfillment of the greatest principle of tactics —concentration upon some portion of the enemy’s line. It is highly probable that the plans of the leader will contemplate concentration and be based upon securing it sometime during the action. This principle is as old as naval warfare itself, and was practiced by Nelson in nearly all of his battles, particularly Aboukir Bay and Trafalgar. It was used by Tegethoff at Lissa; by the Japanese at Yalu and Tsushima; and it will be used in the battle of to-morrow.
Darrieus has summed up the movements to be used on the field of battle in a very few words as follows: “ The best movements to make upon the field of battle necessarily depend upon those of the enemy, upon his activity, his initiative, his morale. Such a movement, dangerous against a resolute opponent, will be perfectly proper and will make complete success easy against another who is demoralized.”
- Position of the Commander-in-Chief.—Looking back through history we find that the position of the commander-in-chief has varied; sometimes he was at the head of the column, and sometimes in the center. For a short time after the battle of Ushant, the commander-in-chief was placed on the unengaged side of the line. In general, however, his position was in the center of the line. In one case, that of Farragut at Mobile Bay, the leader took the second place. This was done at the earnest solicitation of some of Farragut’s officers and he expressed great regret, after the battle, at having yielded to them. This was the only battle in which Farragut did not lead.
It was the common custom in the days of Nelson for the commander-in-chief to place himself in the center of the line. It is true that both Nelson and Collingwood led their respective columns at Trafalgar; but, at both Copenhagen and the Nile, Nelson took his position in the center of the line. He did this on account of his lack of knowledge of the ground, and the desire on his part to avoid having the flagship run aground. In practically every other battle of that time we find the commander-in-chief in the center of the line.
The position on the unengaged side of the line was adopted by the French after the battle of Ushant in 1778. It so happened during this battle that a signal to the van was either misunderstood or ignored, and the movement was not made in accordance with the wishes of the commander-in-chief. As a result of this the French placed their commander-in-chief in a frigate stationed on the unengaged side of the line of battle. Their example was followed soon after by the English, although it was later discontinued by both nations.
Of late years this question has been the subject of a great many arguments in which the following positions have been discussed:
- At the head of the line.
- In the center of the line.
- On the unengaged side of the line.
The advocates of the position at the head of the line claim that this will obviate, to a large extent, the use of signals in the handling of the fleet in battle, and will do away with them entirely when making a simple change in course. Other advantages are the ability of the commander-in-chief to reply to any movement of the enemy at the earliest possible moment without losing any time in making signals, and that the rest of the fleet simply follow in the wake of the flagship. It is upon this theory that the “follow the leader” plan of battle is founded.
The disadvantages of the leading position are that the commander-in-chief is unable to see everything that is going on in the column; that it ties all the ships to the course of the flagship, thereby stifling, to a large extent, the initiative of the division commanders; that it increases the time necessary for the proper understanding of any signal, and increases the chance of its being misunderstood; and that, should the flagship suddenly sheer out due to the breaking down of its engines or steering gear, after the signal apparatus had been shot away, it might cause disaster. Furthermore, this position is not compatible with the system of group column mentioned in the preceding section.
The position in the center of the line is not much better, if any. While the conditions for signalling may be slightly improved, it, like the position at the head of the line, ties the commander-in-chief to one place, which is a condition that should be avoided as much as possible. It sacrifices the greatest advantage of the position at the head of the line—the power to initiate changes of course without the necessity of signalling. Under the ever-changing conditions of the modern battle, the commander-in-chief should not be restricted to any one position, but left free to go wherever he thinks his presence is necessary.
Placing the flagship on the unengaged side of the line is the best possible place, in that it enables the commander-in-chief to see all that is going on in the line; to proceed to any part of the field of battle as may be necessary without being compelled to make any signals to prevent other ships from following him; and to use all the various weapons at his command to the best advantage without being distracted by the necessity of initiating all the different changes of course. He can tell when the proper time arrives to make the torpedo-boat attack, or when to use his submarines. With group commanders thoroughly trained in battle tactics, and fully informed concerning the plan of battle, the commander-in-chief may safely assume the position on the unengaged side. From this position he can more easily observe the working of the plan of battle and the manner in which the group commanders exercise their initiative. Under these conditions there should be little use for signals, and those which are made can be more easily understood. Furthermore, in taking this position the commander- in-chief is in a position to correct any errors made by the group commanders in carrying out the plan of battle.
The critics of this position have said that this method takes a capital ship from the line of battle, where every ship is needed. They also claim that the commander-in-chief will not be able to see so well as at the head of the line on account of the powder gases and the interference of ships; and that he must make signals for any maneuver which he wishes to perform.
Napoleon once said, “ When you wish to fight a battle, assemble all your forces; do not neglect any; one battalion sometimes decides the fate of a day.” This might well read, “ One ship sometimes decides the fate of a day.” Granted, that in placing the commander-in-chief on the unengaged side of the line, we have taken a ship from the main battle-line. But is it not to our advantage to do so?
The ship has been so placed that it may be taken, with the least amount of trouble, to any part of the field of battle, thereby playing the part of a reserve, in addition to the moral aid given by the presence of the commander-in-chief. Its weight, thrown into the scale at the critical point of the engagement, may be enough to decide the victory. Reserves, as such, are not to be thought of in a naval battle, and that is not the primary reason for placing the commander-in-chief in the position advocated. This position fits in well with our system of group control and gives the commander-in-chief an opportunity to watch the progress of the battle with much better results than if his ship were in the thick of the fight.
So far as the other objections are concerned, the answers are obvious. He can see as well from this position as he can from the head of the line and with much less to distract his attention. As regards signals, as has already been said, there will be very little use for them once our group commanders are properly trained and indoctrinated with the tactical views of the commander-in-chief.
To sum up, it would seem that the choice lies between the position at the head of the line and the one on the unengaged side. In the lead, the commander-in-chief is able to incite everyone by his example, which, of course, has its advantages; but, with the enemy concentrating upon the flagship, it might be only a short time before the fleet lost its leader. In the other position the fleet could retain its leader for a longer time, and it is not necessary to lose the effect of the example of the commander-in-chief, for, at the critical point in the fight, the flagship can easily go to that group requiring assistance.
All the advantages rest with the position on the unengaged side of the line and, although we are unable to give the naval commander all the advantages possessed by the general of an army, let us give him all we can.
- Torpedo Craft.—The role to be played by torpedo craft in the battle of to-day is, in the main, theoretical. History furnishes us with no data upon which to base our use of these craft. The only vessel, in any way comparable with the modern destroyer, was the fire-ship which has already been mentioned. From the time of the disappearance of the fire-ship from the sea-going fleet, in the early part of the eighteenth century, there was nothing to take its place until the advent of the small torpedo boat, toward the end of the nineteenth century. Small, with poor sea-keeping qualities, and lacking speed, they were not destined to remain long a part of the fleet. In 1889 Mahan prophesied their disappearance, and it was very soon after that they ceased to be a part of the battle fleet.
That the large sea-going destroyer of the present time should have become a most necessary adjunct of the battle fleet is simply a natural evolution of the torpedo boat. The small torpedo boat of the early nineties was driven from the battle fleet by its inability to keep the sea, and it has been succeeded by the large destroyer whose ability to stay at sea, under all conditions, has been most conclusively demonstrated. What their part will be in the next great sea fight is a matter of conjecture, and the results from well thought-out exercises. As Tsushima, the state of the sea prevented the use of torpedo boats during the fight itself, although they were able to put to sea along towards the evening and to assist in “finishing” the Russians.
The uses of the destroyer in battle may be placed under the following heads:
- Attacking the head of the enemy’s column.
- Attacking the rear, or some other portion, of the enemy’s formation.
- Repelling attacks of the enemy’s destroyers.
- Sinking the enemy’s submarines after the aeroplanes have found them.
- Assisting in the destruction of the enemy’s fleet after the battle has been decided.
Of these various uses the first two are very much alike. In each case the boats will do much to demoralize an enemy, and to throw him into confusion, but in the first case they will usually compel him to maneuver under fire from the main battle fleet.
The value of destroyers in turning the head of a column was most aptly shown on August 10, 1904, when the Russian fleet attempted to escape to Vladivostok. With an excellent opportunity to strike a telling blow at the Japanese navy, they became panic-stricken at the sight of the flotilla of destroyers which the Japanese threw across their course. Filled with an over-whelming fear of this cloud of wasps, they turned and fled back to Port Arthur, there to remain until the fall of that port. Also, during the French maneuvers in the summer of 1912, the destroyers were repeatedly signalled to charge, the head of the column.
In addition to forcing the enemy to maneuver under fire, an attack by destroyers demoralizes him, disconcerts his fire-control, and throws him into confusion, as already stated. Forced to divert his attention from the main battle, and momentarily expecting the blow of the torpedo, the morale of the enemy is bound to suffer severely.
The question now arises as to the best way in which to ward off a destroyer attack. The best method would seem to be that of using a flotilla of destroyers. Seeing the attack coming, the commander of the flotilla would proceed to meet it, holding it in check until the arrival of aid, or driving them off entirely, if strong enough to do so. In this way the fire-control would be disturbed as little as possible, and the morale would not be affected so seriously.
During the battle, then, the destroyer would have a double duty to perform—to prevent the enemy’s destroyers from attacking the column, particularly the head, thereby obviating the necessity for maneuvering while under fire; and to attack the head of the enemy’s line, driving their attack home through the defending destroyers and forcing him to maneuver under fire.
The only other use of destroyers in battle would be to find and sink any of the enemy’s submarines. In this duty they would have to act in concert with the aeroplanes. An instance of this occurred during the British maneuvers in 1912, when a submarine, first sighted by an aeroplane, was located and sunk by a destroyer.
The work of the destroyers in assisting in the destruction of the enemy’s fleet after the battle has been decided is not properly a part of battle tactics, and needs no explanation here.
The other type of torpedo craft now coming into prominence is the submarine, which is passing through the same conditions as applied to the destroyer. A purely defensive weapon at first, its increasing size, speed, and cruising radius are rapidly making it an offensive weapon. For this reason it is only a question of time until the submarines will become a part of the cruising fleet. Even now the “F” class of British submarines, of 1200 tons displacement, are reported to be able to make twenty knots on the surface, and sixteen knots when submerged. The following quotation from the Army & Navy Gazette shows the trend of thought in this connection; “From a coastal weapon of doubtful utility it has grown into an ocean going vessel, #and the defensive ideas associated with it have given place to a recognition of its potentialities as a weapon of offense.”
In the Institute Proceedings for December, 1912, Lieutenant Nimitz discussed the subject of submarine attacks. In his article, he suggests maneuvering the enemy into the zone covered by the submarines. All very good, but why wait for that? If the enemy refuses to maneuver into the submarine zone, the submarine will be compelled to go after him, so nothing will be gained by waiting.
Submarines can be used in very much the same manner during the battle as the destroyers. With the increasing speed of the submarines they can easily proceed to any part of the field of battle, and attack any part of the enemy’s formation. In this, of course, they are greatly aided by their invisibility. Throwing them across the course of the enemy’s fleet will certainly cause the enemy to do some maneuvering, and should give the side whose submarines are making the attack a considerable advantage.
In all cases of submarine attack, the effect on the morale must be considered. And the effect on the morale, of a submarine attack, will be much greater than that caused by destroyer attack, on account of the invisibility of the submarine. For instance, knowing the conditions in the Port Arthur fleet on August 10, when they sighted the torpedo boats across their course, try to imagine what it would have been had the Russians sighted the periscopes of a group of submarines instead of the destroyers. Reasoning from what actually did happen, the result would have been worse than chaos.
What is the best way to repel a submarine attack? The very difficulty of repelling the attack, the advantage which the submarine has over the battleship, are the reasons for the great moral effect of the submarine attack. The battleship is practically defenseless against the submarine and can escape, with certainty, only by running away. Even then, as Lieutenant Nimitz points out, it may be running into another group of submarines. Can the submarine be sunk by gun-fire? The same writer says that an anchored submarine, submerged to a depth of ten feet, has been sunk by heavy gun fire at comparatively short range.
There are, then, three methods of meeting the submarine attack, one of which is meeting it in a negative manner; (1) running away from the submarines: (2) heavy gun-fire, using main battery guns for better effect, and (3) the use of aeroplanes and destroyers, as mentioned in discussing the use of destroyers.
After considering these methods we find that the first two will give the enemy a decided advantage, as in both cases our fire slackens or ceases altogether, giving him a breathing spell, and allowing him to continue his fire undisturbed. The third method, obviously, cannot be used when the submarines are between the two battle fleets, since it would be fool-hardy to send the destroyers in after them. What, then, should we do ? Apparently it is a case of selecting the lesser evil, and in this selection, the conditions must be considered. Each group commander will have to decide for himself as to what it is best to do. At one stage of the battle he might endeavor to sink the submarines; while at another he could safely run away from them. Outside the zone of fire, the destroyers and aeroplanes could be used with safety.
- Fast Wing. The question of speed in ships of the battle line is one which has been discussed many times, so it is entirely unnecessary to go over it again. In order to obtain a high speed in a battleship something must be sacrificed, either armor or armament, and the true worth of the sacrifice will be known definitely only after it has stood the test of battle. “ Speed,” says Daveluy, “should be the principal element of scouts which are not built with a view to fighting, or of torpedo boats upon which it is closely allied with the use of the torpedo, but for fighting ships it should be subordinated to the destructive power which is the raison d’etre of a ship.” And yet, at least four of the first seven leading naval powers are building the so-called battle-cruiser, of twenty-five knots or more. Three of the four powers referred to are giving their cruisers from twenty-eight to thirty knots. The building of these ships would seem to indicate that it was expected to make some use of this high speed in the battles of the future. How then, are they to be used?
Armed with the large guns of a battleship, and protected with from nine to twelve inches of armor, they are too heavy for mere commerce destroying. Built, apparently, with a view to fighting, they are too powerful for scouting purposes only. Strong enough to drive off all but battleships, and well able to cope with them, they may be used in the screen until the day of battle, when they will join the main line as a fast wing. As a fast wing they may be put to one of the following uses:
- To win an advantageous position with regard to the enemy’s line.
- To prevent the cap.
- To pursue the enemy’s ships after the battle and capture or destroy them.
The first of these uses may be further sub-divided.
- To cap the enemy’s fleet.
- To attack weak portions of the enemy’s line.
By far the most important use of the fast wing will be that of capping, or attacking, the head of the enemy’s formation. An attack of this kind will be very apt to have the same effect as a similar attack by destroyers; it will force the enemy to maneuver under fire. It will not, however, have an effect upon the morale equal to that of a destroyer or submarine attack. The fast wing division can be used to cross and enfilade the tail of the formation, but it will have a much more decisive effect when attacking the head of the line.
The advantages of a fast wing were brought out most strikingly during the French maneuvers in 1912, which have been referred to before. On one occasion they used some cruisers, representing battle cruisers, to cap the opposing fleet and at the same time made a destroyer attack. The next day the Red Fleet concentrated upon the head of the Blue Fleet while the fast wing attacked the rear of the formation. One of the signals most frequently used during these exercises was, “ Cruisers T the enemy.”
Under the present conditions our interest is centered in the manner in which a fast wing attack is to be repelled. And it is plainly impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule for the accomplishment of this. The method, or maneuver, to be used must be governed by circumstances. If the fast wing attacks the head of the formation, we do one thing; if it attacks the tail, another. In either case we must not allow ourselves to be restricted to any one maneuver, but must do that which will most readily attain the desired object.
The number of ships in each fleet has a bearing on the proper evolution, also. Let us suppose that the number of ships in the main battle-line of each fleet is the same, but that the enemy has a fast wing division in addition. Except under the most advantageous conditions, it would hardly do to send one division to contain the fast wing. On the other hand, with the total numbers equal, one division might be used to repel the battle-cruisers. Again, it might be advantageous to turn and endeavor to concentrate upon the tail of the enemy’s fleet, thereby gaining an advantage which might offset the fast wing attack and allow us to meet the attack under more favorable conditions.
To attempt to go into this subject in detail in a paper of this scope would require too much space and time, and each one will have to work out the details for himself; just as each commander- in-chief will have to solve the problem, with all its various combinations, as it is placed before him.
- Aeroplanes. The uses to which aeroplanes may be put in battle, at the present time, are extremely limited. As a weapon of offense they are practically useless. Most writers on the subject of aircraft in battle are agreed that the principal use of these machines will be found in the carrying of information; the locating of enemy’s submarines; their use by spotters; and, possibly, dropping bombs, as well as their use for scouting purposes.
For distinctly offensive work they are confined to attacks on the enemy’s air-fleet, and the last use just mentioned above—dropping bombs. At its best, dropping bombs, especially upon a target the size of a ship, will be very inaccurate. Then, too, it is not, at present, possible to carry a sufficient number of the required size. There is also the attendant risk to the aviator when carrying bombs. Bomb dropping, for the reasons mentioned above, was abandoned by the Italians after trying it in Tripoli. So this may, it would seem, be safely omitted from our calculations at the present time.
Their, use in locating submarines and mines has already been mentioned, and need not be gone into again.
To be used by spotters with anything approaching good results, the machines must be fitted with an efficient wireless set of short range, say five miles. A longer range would, of course, be an added advantage to this type of craft when engaged in scouting. While experiments have been, and are being, made with regard to a wireless installation for air-craft, the writer has no definite information at hand regarding the results attained; although it is said that the problem has practically been solved, there being a few minor points left to be cleared up.
For spotting work, the advantages of the aeroplane, due to its height above the sea and closer proximity to the enemy, are obvious. But, can its results be acted upon as quickly as those obtained by the spotters on board ship? Will its use result in a decreased rate of fire? Will the transmission of spotting information by wireless be entirely free from error?
Undoubtedly the radio operators engaged in this work will have to be of the best, but there is always a possibility of the signal being lost entirely or misunderstood through the interference set up by the enemy’s operators. These questions, like many others in tactics, will have to be answered by experience; by the carrying out of a well-devised scheme of tactical drills which simulate, as closely as possible, the conditions of battle.
CONCLUSION . Briefly, the following are the points brought out:
- That no absolute rule can be laid down with regard to the formations and evolutions necessary to win victory.
- That a system of group control, or column—either by divisions or squadrons—is better than the single column, as it allows the group commanders to exercise their initiative more freely, and does not confine them to the “ Follow the leader ” plan of battle. It will permit group commanders to seize opportunities which might otherwise be lost.
- That the commander-in-chief should not be restricted to any one position, but free to go where necessity dictates; and should be, at least in the beginning, on the unengaged side of the formation.
- That torpedo craft-destroyers and submarines—should be used to charge the enemy’s fleet, in order to create confusion and loss of morale.
- That battle-cruisers will have a duty to perform in the next great naval battle, in compelling the enemy to maneuver under fire, or holding him in a disadvantageous position.
- That the most important duty of aeroplanes, during battle, will be locating the enemy’s submarines and for spotting.
It may be said that this paper is too general; that it does not go into the details of battle tactics. To go into all the details of the various movements necessary to win a battle would be an endless task. Each battle presents its own problem, and it must be solved under the terms of that problem. It would, of course, be comparatively easy to select some hypothetical conditions and then work out an answer; but the result would not hold, in its entirety, for the next set of conditions. Some of the operations and principles involved in the first solution could be used in the second; while others would, perforce, have to be abandoned and others substituted. Under other conditions some principles could be violated with impunity.
“ A principle,” says Bernhardi, “ must never become a rule, a schematic form, which kills the spirit and becomes a trammel to action, and a mannerism in the art; for all so-called principles and principal measures in war are subject to a higher general law— namely, to that of expediency, and can only be recognized as actual principles in so far as they are expedient.”
And yet there is one principle towards the fulfillment of which our tactics must tend—namely, to bringing the greatest number of effective guns to bear upon the enemy at effective ranges in the shortest time, or, in one word, concentration. This principle of warfare has been recognized and practised since man first began to fight his fellow man, and it will be practised until the day of universal peace. History abounds in examples of concentration in battle. One can hardly read the history of any battle without finding that the victor concentrated upon the weak portion of the enemy’s formation.
No effort has been made to lay down any new principles of naval warfare—theoretical or otherwise—but simply to place together some of the factors and conditions which must be confronted and studied when going into battle with the various types of ships which go to make up the modern fleet.
Books have been written upon tactics in general, and articles upon the tactics of battleships, destroyers, submarines, and the uses of aeroplanes, and this paper is merely an attempt at combining, in a general way, the tactics of the various parts of our battle line. Just as the general of an army must know how to use his infantry, cavalry and artillery in battle, so must we know how to use our different types of ships.
And studied they must be, for no man is born a genius. The genius differs from other men in that he is continually learning new principles; new applications for old principles; that he does not allow himself to be bound by any principle but knows when to reject all established methods and to do the unexpected. Commander Schofield clearly characterized the difference between the genius and the ordinary man when he said, “ The genius differs from other men in this, that he may soon dispense with his guide and become in turn a creator, to leap forward in his career, like the eagle which soars confidently forth after its first fluttering attempts. But the true genius never ceases to work on that greatest and most wonderful of physical things, the human mind. Always he is building it up by the untiring efforts of a will that has an end in view.”
On the other hand, it must not be supposed that battles can be won by study alone. Granted, that the more knowledge concerning the art of warfare possessed by the commander, the better his chances for success. But he must possess other qualities besides that of knowledge. He must be energetic, bold, courageous; must possess tact and ability to handle men, to make them work together cheerfully for the end in view. He must be able to recognize the psychological moment when it arrives, and know just what to do at that time; just as the commander of an army recognizes the proper moment to order the counter-charge. For, as Bernhardi says, “It is on the free application of what is fundamental under the constantly changing conditions and purposes of action that the art of conducting war is founded.”
The ill-fated Admiral Makaroff has expressed this point in fewer words: “A man instructed in all the rules of war may prove very much out of place in the matter of commanding in battle, but a talented man who has never studied the subject in any way is also as fully out of place. It is only by union of talent with moral force, knowledge, and wisdom that the needs of war can be supplied.”
So we must study, not only the history of the past, learning the principles and methods applicable to the ships and weapons of that day, and the principles which may, or can be made to, apply to the weapons of to-day, but also the art of command. And for this part of our study we can find no better example to follow than that of Nelson. But woe be to that nation whose fleet goes into battle commanded by men who have not done their utmost to master the art of warfare in all its branches.