From the earliest times navies and armies have been used to support the diplomatic policies of countries.
The necessity of men to unite in tribes, clans and nations for mutual protection and the defence of their common interests, was recognized even in barbarous days. The protection sought, and the power required, came by means of men armed with the weapons of the age. Because of the difficulty of transportation, the various bodies of men dealt only with other bodies not far away, and with them the intercourse was but casual and slight.
As time went on, as means of transportation improved and weapons increased in accuracy and range, the power of armies became greater, tribes and national organizations increased in size, inter-communication became more frequent and more intimate, and the use of ambassadors became gradually established.
The use of ambassadors, ministers, and other diplomatic agents began in the early stages of civilization and continues to the present day; but the quickness and sureness of communication, brought about by electrical and mechanical inventions, has put ambassadors and ministers much more under the immediate control of their home governments than before, with the result that their power and responsibility have decreased.
Ambassadors and other diplomatic agents act as mediums of communication between governments. Of themselves they can exert no force. They cannot now sign treaties except on terms dictated by their governments. They may persuade, they may even threaten, but that is all. An ambassador acts under the authority of the sovereign through the foreign office; but he cannot perform any act of war, or of himself commit his government to any war, or to any other act or policy.
So long as the relations between two powers remain friendly, so long as their interests and policies do not conflict, the use, or show, of armed force by either is not needed. But behind each ambassador is, and must be, the armed force of his country, or, in some cases, the armed force of some other country. Unless this armed force exists, the arguments and persuasions and threatenings of an ambassador are without influence or effect.
Among the continental countries of Europe in modern times and among most countries in the past, armies have been the fundamental means by which governments have exerted pressure on each other; but among countries separated by the sea, navies are increasingly used for this purpose, and during the last two centuries they have been used with great effect.
So long as the relations between two maritime powers have been friendly, so long as the situations have been easy to manage, navies have not been used, or even explicitly suggested. But the moment that the situation has become difficult, ships of war have been demanded: and ships of war have usually been sent.
It would require too much time and space to specify times, incidents and places. But Paullin's "Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers" which describes, of course the negotiations of only one navy, shows what an intimate and, important relation navies have borne to diplomacy—intimate and important, yet unrecognized.
A careful perusal of this book will prove that not only has the diplomatic character of navies, especially the United States Navy, been a fact, but that in many diplomatic questions of real difficulty and real importance, the navy has exercised a most potent function, and sometimes the most potent function, in reaching the final result attained. And not only this, but in a very large proportion of the cases, the navy officer in command, though usually of a rank far below that of the accredited diplomat, has shown a grasp and diplomatic skill at least equal to that of the accredited diplomat; who has sometimes been a man possessed of little diplomatic knowledge or experience.
To realize this fact, it must be borne in mind that the naval officer has always had to act on his own individual responsibility, never under the diplomatic officer, but only in co-operation with him, under orders from the Navy Department, which from the very nature of each case, have had to be of the most general description.
Paullin's book brings down our naval diplomatic history to 1883. Since that time, the use of war ships in diplomacy has increased. The commanders of our ships, especially in Asia, the West Indies, Mexico, Central America and South America, have handled delicate diplomatic questions continually, and always with success. Possibly this truth has been exemplified in San Domingo more often than in any other country; for there the circumstances have been such that in numerous cases, the final application, or threatening, of actual force has had to be made by the naval officer; often under circumstances so urgent that he did not have time to communicate with the Navy Department, or even with the minister.
One of our most important successes was that gained by Rear Admiral Benham in Rio in 1894. Still another occurred in Manila in 1898. Admiral Dewey there found himself confronted with a situation which for complexity and possibility of disaster had no superior in our history. Fortunately he was great in peace as well as war; with the result that for more than a year he handled a succession of difficult problems with a diplomatic insight, foresight and ability that no civilian American statesman has surpassed.
In the popular mind, navies are associated with armies; but the events of the past few years have given navies more and more a diplomatic character, and thrown them more and more into intimate relationship with the diplomatic service, and less and less into intimate relationship with armies. This statement is true of all navies, but is especially true of the navies of two countries isolated from others by the sea, Great Britain and the United States.
One cause of this change is the enormously greater power of modern navies relatively to modern armies, due to the increased size of ships and the armaments they carry. Another cause is the increasing ease and quickness with which warships can be despatched to distant places, to support the policies of diplomacy. Another cause is the stabilizing effect on international relations of the modern practice of maintaining navies in a state of constant readiness for war.
In all great maritime countries, the relations of the navy and the Foreign Affairs Department are always of the closest kind, both in war and peace. In the United States, not a day passes without the exchange of letters and verbal messages between the State and Navy Departments concerning matters of great importance. But, except in time of war, the army and navy rarely act in concert, and their officers meet officially on rare occasions only.
Among certain nations, during the last half century, the rise of civilization has reached a point far beyond the imagination of even the more recent past. Coincident with this rise in civilization has been an increase in the comforts and luxuries of living. This has brought about an increasing distaste for hardship, an increasing horror of pain, and an increasing disinclination to take part in war. This disinclination is more marked in some countries than in others, and is especially marked in the United States.
The fact that any country is markedly disinclined to war makes that country extremely responsive to pressure exerted by a country which is not so disinclined. This necessitates a greater navy than would otherwise be required, in order to overcome the diplomatic handicap produced.
For this reason, and for the further reason that our present navy would be inadequate even if we were not disinclined to war, the position of the United States is one of real danger; and this danger is combined with another danger, caused by the fact that, though our consular service is beginning to have a certain continuity, our diplomatic service has no such continuity, except in the lower ranks, and therefore our diplomats cannot acquire the training that would best fit them to cope with the highly trained diplomats of foreign powers.
This unfortunate combination puts a grave responsibility on us; for, although our profession is primarily military, it is diplomatic as well, and we are the only body of men in the United States who combine diplomatic training with continuous existence, and on whom the country must continuously rely.