Preparation in Peace and Success in War.
Translated from the Marine Rundschau.
By Commodore W.H. Beehler, U. S. Navy.
Our professional literature abounds more and more prominently with details of strategy and tactics. These are important factors, but it is possible to emphasize their importance too much. Our successors must not be taught that every victory is due solely to the superior tactics of the victorious admiral. In every battle— especially where one fleet was practically destroyed—the victorious commander took some steps that must be regarded as theoretically wrong. Such as Nelson's perpendicular attack upon the allied fleet at Trafalgar and Togo's evolution in the face of hostile fire.
As a rule the English understood that the object of studying strategy and tactics was that, the battle is the objective, or that the destruction of the enemy is the object of every measure— without confining themselves too closely to the tactical theories; but the French, though great tacticians, have not so understood it.
At the naval school one learns but little of naval history; this study is first taken up afterwards in the service, but whoever undertakes this study must thoroughly understand that the foundation of all success depends upon the internal efficiency. Herein they will be convinced of the great primary importance of preparation for war. For example, before considering the battles of Nelson's period, a comparison of the efficiency of the navies will demonstrate that a period marked by a Trafalgar was bound to come.
This article proposes to outline the development of the English and French navies at the close of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, to show that the final destruction of the French fleet was but the logical result of the circumstances. Details of the campaigns and battles are presumed to be familiar to the reader.
The French Navy at Close of the Eighteenth Century.
The Bourbons left France with a navy full of the glorious deeds of a Suffren. Its organization was the product of the genius of Colbert and fully met all requirements. The French naval officers were well selected and efficiently trained, the personnel of seamen and petty officers was then—as it is to-day—excellent and the navy fully justified the highest hopes of the country.
The revolution had its effect on both the army and navy, the older naval officers—suspected aristocrats—were, however, not supported by the revolutionary government in measures to enforce discipline. Soldiers and sailors alike were blinded by political partisanship and great changes were evolved by the confusion. The army revived in a remarkably short time and was fully rejuvenated. The government gave the military leaders full powers to establish an iron discipline and these leaders understood how to inspire officers and men with an enthusiastic zeal bordering on fanaticism such as was signally lacking among the hirelings of the opposing armies. The French army thus had the chief requisite for victory. The new generals of the Republic and their young soldiers broke with the old traditional tactical theories and success justified them in doing so. The allied coalition armies were defeated and the revolutionary contempt for ancient traditions triumphed.
Likewise they attempted to discard the ancient customs and regulations of the navy, but that which proved to be the saving genius of the army was madness for the navy. Unlike the army, the navy was not thereby rejuvenated, but on the contrary it was simply ruined. Consider how much the manual of arms and military parades contribute to discipline and yet may be neglected at times, whereas sail drills and evolutions in seamanship were indispensable and proficiency therein was absolutely necessary for proper use of naval guns in action.
It is incomprehensible how the French could have so misprized seamanship, or how they could have consented to abolish the corps of naval gunners merely because they were suspected aristocrats. But then it was even contemplated to have the French navy resort to the old Roman galleys and the boarding-bridges.
The effect of inadequate supplies operated differently in the army and navy. Bonaparte led his ragged and half famished troops to Italy to victory upon victory and fed and clothed them in the enemy's country. But it was impossible for Villaret Joyeuse to keep the sea without provisions, with foul and leaky ships whose masts and rigging were rotten and whose sailors had nothing wherewith to protect themselves in the icy December winds nor against the seas and drenching rain. (Expeditions of December, 1799.)
The old navy regulations could not be dispensed with and the French navy thereby lost the efficient corps of officers, its capable administration and the training of its personnel.
The gradually diminishing naval officers of the old French royal navy were replaced by bad, inefficient and numerically inadequate officers. It was difficult to get any officers at all. In 1794, eleven years before the battle of Trafalgar, a French admiral went to sea with 16 captains of ships of the line, of whom three years previously, three had been lieutenants in the Royal navy and the others were sub-lieutenants, merchant ship captains and enlisted men. The admiral himself had only reached the rank of lieutenant at that time. What could be expected of a fleet with such inexperienced commanders or how could they train a corps of officers to be efficient?
The administration of the navy fell into incompetent hands who had not the slightest idea of the needs of the navy. They considered "elan" would supply all deficiencies, if not, the admirals were traitors. The most responsible positions were given to visionaries whose only qualifications were that they had good intentions. After one of such officers had left the ministry— Jean Dalbarade—it was discovered that the list of ships of the French navy was so imperfect that orders were issued to fit out this and that ship which had long before been captured by the British.
This new inefficient corps of naval officers never realized their condition. Ignorance goes hand-in-hand with arrogant infatuation. Hoche wrote in 1796: "God preserve me from the navy. All kinds of insubordination and a cultivated lack of discipline prevail in this military organization. Combine ignorance with foolish vanity and you have the picture."
The effect of such an inefficient corps of officers was evident. Good men deserted and were either not replaced at all or were substituted by unwilling conscripts. M. Najac, Ordonnateur de la marine, at Toulon, wrote to the minister in 1798: "L’insubordination inveteree des gens de mer dans la plupart des quarters de l'ouest, leur aversion prononcee pour la service, rendent presque mil les efforts des commissaries de l'inscription maritime."
Under such circumstances the French navy carried on the wars of the Republic and Empire. It was not surprising that they could accomplish nothing and that their condition grew worse. The French fleets were blockaded in port and unlearned the little they had acquired, while the British gained experience cruising at sea. Whenever they put to sea and encountered bad weather they returned to port damaged while the leaders and even Napoleon himself believed that the ships were protected and more efficient by staying in port and that the British would be weakened and damaged by keeping the sea. Nelson wrote, March 13, 1805: "Bonaparte has often made his brags, that our fleet would be worn out by keeping the sea, that his was kept in order and increasing by staying in port; but he now finds, I fancy, if Emperors hear the truth, that his fleet suffers more in one night than ours in a year."
Single English ships hovered around and attacked a whole French squadron without suffering any damages while the French only gained few minor successes accidentally.
Fortune in the long run favored the efficient.
The Spanish Navy at the Close of the Eighteenth Century.
As the Spanish navy was allied with the French after 1796 its condition must also be considered. It suffices to refer to the long series of reverses that the Spanish navy suffered after the destruction of the Armada, to realize its inefficiency. The only good part of the Spanish navy was that which was furnished by their colonies. As the Spaniards had previously been allied with the English the condition of the Spanish navy was well known to the English officers.
The Allied Fleet of Villeneuve.
The destruction of the Franco-Spanish fleet was prepared during the period from after 1793 and was finally accomplished at Trafalgar. Villeneuve's fleet comprised the nucleus of all that carried the French and Spanish flags. The fleet was developed from the eleven ships of the line at Toulon. When Admiral Latouche Trouville, who was Villeneuve's predecessor, took command, in 1803, he found it deficient in every particular. There was no idea of anything to be done with the fleet. The officers were not even accustomed to sleep on board. (Jurien, de la Graviere.)
The energetic and competent Latouche tried his best to improve the navy. He began with drills and short cruises and slight skirmishes with the enemy improved the morale. In fact everything was progressing finely when all ceased by his sudden death August 2, 1804.
It is not clear how Villeneuve happened to be chosen to succeed him. Napoleon is said to have remarked that he had the best luck—he had escaped from the battle of the Nile. He was, however, a brave man and not incompetent. But the condition of the fleet was enough to make the most efficient commander doubtful. Villeneuve soon broke down under the task. The inefficiency of the fleet was evident to him and the correspondence of this unfortunate admiral gives a graphic view of its miserable condition. He wrote December 19, 1804: "Les commis aux vivres sont ordinairement des couquins qui embarquent le mains possible et qtte malheurpcusement la surveillance des officiers n'eclaire pas asses." Again to Decres on January 19, 1805, after the first sortie under Villeneuve he wrote: "Our squadron looks fine in the roads of Toulon. The crews are well clothed and drill well, but in bad weather things change, they are not accustomed to bad weather." Bad weather had compelled the squadron to return with damages to port.
With this deficiency in seamanship the artillery training was even worse. Jurien de la Graviere claims that many of the gun captains had never fired a gun before the battle of Trafalgar.
Many of these deficiencies would have been remedied by strict discipline. Surely with strict gunnery drills they could have obtained the same rapidity of gun-fire of which the British navy boasted. But at this period the French did not respect the old navy regulations. A French writer states that instead of sharp vigilance and systematic service they relied on exaggerated self-sacrifices and heroic intrepidity. The Admiral should have exerted pressure upon his captains but these were so deficient that he did not know where to begin.
When the fleet came in to anchor at Ferrol in August, 1805, the ships all collided with each other. Villeneuve then wrote of his captains: "I believed they would all keep position but none of them seemed able to act with decision."
With such a personnel it is unnecessary to consider any details concerning the materiel of the fleet. A bad, inefficient personnel cannot accomplish anything even with the best materiel.
The prevailing distress in the French ports was one great cause for the deficiencies in the equipment and supplies of the French fleet. Villeneuve's letters are full of complaints. But on the other hand it must be remembered that owing to excessive economy the British were not much better provided. In the French navy there was no Troubridge whose resources equaled the demands of a Culloden.
In this condition Villeneuve's fleet went to sea to fight. Villeneuve wrote: "The lack of seafaring experience of our officers and men and war experience of our captains combined with the great deficiencies in all requirements were such that even a slight disturbance at night threw everybody into confusion."
If the slightest accident at night could cause the admiral such anxiety what would not be dreaded on meeting the enemy? The battle with Calder, who attacked Villeneuve's fleet of 20 French and Spanish ships with but 15 British ships upon his return from the West Indies, July 22, 1805, and captured 2 Spanish ships of the line, gave him a foretaste of what to expect. Villeneuve wrote after this engagement "…we have bad masts, bad sails, bad rigging, bad officers and bad seamen. Sickness prevails among the crews. The enemy is aware of this and ventures to attack with very inferior forces. Our captains have had so little war experience and are so unaccustomed to maneuvers that they only know to follow the leader and thus we are ridiculed by all Europe." Several hundred invalids were landed at Vigo from Villeneuve's fleet upon his return from the West Indies.
At Trafalgar Villeneuve's fleet of 18 ships of the line was reinforced by 15 Spanish ships under the command of Admiral Gravina.
In 1795, when Spain decided to ally with France, Spain agreed in the treaty to provide 14 ships of the line and Nelson wrote: "I assume it to be certain that these ships will not be manned, for otherwise that would be the best way to get rid of them." Villeneuve's letters show that he entertained the same opinion. The ships material was in some respects very good—though much neglected. The worst complaints were in regard to the personnel. The Spanish crews were designated as a" racaille epotivantable" by General Beurnonville to Decres or as "gens sans feu ni lieu" by Jurien de la Graviere. Villeneuve said: "It is sad to see such handsome and powerful ships manned by herdsmen and beggar monks." A Spanish officer, who fought in the battle of Trafalgar, described the inefficiency of the crews with all kinds of expressions and the avowal that they were incapable of anything except to compromise the fleet (Escano). It must be confessed that these crews should have had a better military training and should have been drilled more. It was evident that in all maneuvers they were very slow and they were unable to make even the slightest repairs to the rigging.
Every naval officer will clearly understand the anxiety and worry of the coinmander-in-chief over the Spanish squadron during the cruise. Villeneuve wrote to Decres: "La division espagnole et I'Atlas me faisaient arriver tons les matins dc quatre lieues quoique la plupart des vaisseaux fussent la nuit sans voiles."
A part of the Spanish division joined the fleet just before the battle of Trafalgar. And as but little could be expected from the Spanish ships that had accompanied Villeneuve on the cruise to the West Indies and return, there was absolutely no dependence to be placed on the new ships. In a council of war before the battle it was established that "que plusiers de ces vaisseaujc n'avaient pu encore exercer leurmonde a la mer, ef que les vaisseaux a trois ponts, la Santa Ana, le Rayo, le San yusto, armes avec precipitation etc peine sortis de l'arsenal, pouvaient a fa risque appareiller avec l'armee, mats qu'ils n'etaicnt point en etat de rendre les services militaires dont ils scraient susceptibles, quand Us seraicnt coinpletement organises."
There is still another feature that diminished the value of the Spanish allies. The French fought for their country, while the Spanish fought for the French. They had but little interest in the cause. April 6, 1805 Admiral Salcedo refused to leave Carthegena with his six ships of the line to join Villeneuve. Under such circumstance everybody was inclined to ascribe all errors and accidents to their allies. The fact is reported that Admiral Gravina was the only Spanish naval officer who willingly supported Villeneuve. The engagement with Calder furnishes a good example. The Spaniards blamed the French for the loss of the two ships captured by Calder and claimed that the French had left these two Spanish ships in the lurch while the French held the Spaniards responsible for their loss. The controversy was so bitter that the intendant of the marine and artillery commandant at Cadiz refused to furnish the French with any provisions or ammunition without cash payment. The difficulty was only overcome through diplomacy. On July 21, 1805, Villeneuve wrote, even before the first engagement: "Would to God that the Spanish ships had not joined this fleet. These ships can only compromise us all."
In the foregoing attempt to explain the condition of Villeneuve's allied French and Spanish fleet and the causes that produced that condition exception will be claimed. It may be said that certain bad features have been deliberately selected and emphasized to show the inefficiency of the allied fleet. But no one can deny that with all these defects there were some good features in that fleet. At Trafalgar both the French and Spanish fought like lions. There was no Nebogatoff in that fleet. They did the best of which they were capable. But this lack of ability is the main point. The inferiority of the allied fleet was due to the lack of ability in the personnel that could not be replaced by any degree of zeal or bravery. It must be conceded that the average man in each fleet was equally brave and fought with equal courage since the average man is not a coward. There are, indeed, certain national virtues and vices that have a tendency to make a people apt to qualify as seamen but skill is the great requisite for efficiency in sea battle. The lack of skill in the personnel of Villeneuve's fleet was so great that nothing could be expected from it. Here and there individuals did prove efficient but the average decides, and the average skill in Villeneuve's fleet was so inferior that the greatest strategical genius and cleverest tactics were unavailing. It is not surprising that such a debauched fleet should have earned defeat, the wonder is that they were not sooner destroyed. Why was it necessary for a Nelson to appear? This can be answered by considering the condition of the British navy at this period.
The British Navy at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century.
While Mahan, in "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," describes the condition of the French navy after 1793 more fully than possible in this brief sketch, he gives very few details about the British navy. He briefly mentions deficiencies without laying sufficient stress upon the importance of these deficiencies and their effect upon the results.
The requirement to be always prepared for war, even when there was no urgent necessity apparent, is a much more recent policy of England. At all events they had not reached this standard in 1793 any more than in the war of American Independence, in 1773, nor in the American war of 1812. Preparedness for war requires that a strong fleet shall be kept constantly in commission. The strong plutocratic element in the British parliament found it difficult to provide the necessary appropriations for the navy, and the few ships that were kept in commission were so inadequately provided that subsequently they were obliged to expend twice as much in war.
The naval administration was corrupt. In 1801 Sir John Jervis designated the civil branch of the navy as an "Augean Stable." Corruption and neglect prevailed among the contractors and prize agents. Marryat's novels, though works of fiction, give a clear idea of the almost inconceivable corruption that prevailed in many British ships. The worst feature was that of the personnel. The sailor led a dog's life on board ship. With the greatest care it was difficult to get bare necessities and when, as frequently happened, the captains neglected their duty the conditions were unbearable. Brutality prevailed instead of strict discipline and immorality instead of virtuous examples. Very few volunteers would risk service in the British navy with brutal captains. They were obliged to resort to the press gang and men were given a choice to serve in the navy or go to prison. The character of a rabble recruited by such means can be imagined. In 1796 Collingwood wrote: "I have on board a motley crew from all countries: Germans, Austrians, Poles, Croatians and Hungarians." But certainly even such a personnel could be trained under proper leadership to accomplish something but the proper leadership was not always available, and, therefore, they had the great mutiny of 1797, when a sailor leader of the mutineers commanded the Thames and paralyzed the commerce of London. This experience was the fault of the bad element in the corps of officers. In their efforts to economize much had been overlooked.
These conditions clearly explain why the British navy in the wars with the republic were not as successful as might have been expected from the very first. Nothing can be accomplished with bad interior economy. The inferior officers will only reveal their inferiority in battle. On the glorious first of June many of the British captains were notoriously incompetent.
But there is no doubt that the nucleus of the British naval officers was efficient. This nucleus fully recognized their own deficiencies and labored to correct them. The wars displaced the inferior officers and produced good men from before the mast, among whom we find Admiral Jervis. Jervis was not the only reorganizer but he was the best and most successful. His work is mentioned as an example how to build up and develop an efficient navy, especially since the officers and men trained by Jervis formed the nucleus of the victorious fleet at Trafalgar.
Sir John Jervis relieved Hyde Parker in command of the Mediterranean fleet November 30, 1795. He had previously distinguished himself in battle but was better known for the manner in which he commanded his ship, for his iron discipline and thorough efficiency on board his ship.
Upon taking command of the squadron he introduced his system on board the ships of the fleet. He began by thoroughness in small details as with the much neglected uniform regulations. We now know how he beguiled the long uneventful period before the battle of St. Vincent. Jervis began his work by strong pressure upon his captains. He placed an entire staff under arrest whenever he had any occasion to be dissatisfied. He required his captains to exercise as much care for the welfare of their crews as he had done when he was a captain. In case of any lack of discipline the captain would not be permitted to sleep ashore. We recall that when Latouche Trouville took command of the French fleet at Toulon none of the officers were accustomed to sleep on board. The discipline of the officers insured the discipline of the men.
Jervis himself personally developed this discipline by requiring the most painstaking and thorough clothing inspections indicating that nothing was beneath his notice. He rewarded personal service, the family claims of those who had lost a father or brother in the service, and the very friendlessness of a dutiful man received his best patronage.
A crew that is being trained to the highest proficiency will be properly handled and they must learn something. Jervis found much to do. He it was who introduced ventilated hospitals on the gun deck. Also the regular routine of airing bedding that he required should be entered in the ship's log. The beneficent effect of these measures is illustrated by a comparison of the health of the British with that of the French crews.
In caring for his men he kept them busy. His hobby was the exercise of great guns and practical seamanship. He designated everything else as "frippery and gimcrack." He required daily gun drills. Consequently on the best British ships: Foudroyant, Dreadnought, etc., they fired one shot per gun per minute, while the French could only fire one shot per gun once every three minutes.
Jervis is described as a pedant. It is said that he always required every officer and man to salute him with raised hat and always to appear at flag parade in full uniform. But are not military forms the greatest aids for discipline? And was not the British admiral right in disciplining the British navy through little details? All these apparent trifles had an ennobling effect when used for such an objective rather than merely to gratify the personal vanity of an individual.
Jervis succeeded. He was rewarded by the honors that Nelson received through this Mediterranean fleet; since Nelson recognized his work. The majority of the captains must have felt as Nelson did, otherwise they would not have formed such a band of brothers.
The work of a preparer is not agreeable and he is subject to sharp criticism. St. Vincent's method of training were not English and even Mahan fails to give the old iron lord full credit for his work. The acute opposition he stirred up deceived the ear of his contemporaries and it was left for the future to properly estimate its value. Jervis was like Friedrich Wilhelm the First whose great work of preparation in peace has only recently been recognized as having made the great deeds of Frederick the Great possible. Genius requires the work of the ordinary man and spurs him on to faithfully perform his simple task with average ability without other consideration.
After the battle of the Nile, Nelson wrote to St. Vincent: "We owe you the victory at Aboukir.'' This was not a mere compliment but a recognition of the truth that does not belittle but enhances Nelson's genius. In the last analysis the British owe their victories at Aboukir and Trafalgar to the superior ability and this superior ability was due to their organization that Admiral Jervis had introduced.
Before this reorganization had been introduced the results of the battles could only be meagre notwithstanding the inferiority of the French fleets. Compare Lord Howe's fleet on June 1, 1794, with that of Jervis' at St. Vincent, in 1797. On the former neither signals nor maneuvers functioned as they should and the conduct of some of the captains was questionable—such as that of the leading ship Ceaser. In the latter, signals were not necessary because the leader knew the admiral's plans and the modest commander only had the highest praise for the closed formation that had been maintained during the previous night. On June i a better trained fleet than that of Lord Howe would have destroyed the numerically equal French fleet that was in no respect one whit better than the allied fleet at Trafalgar. Jervis attacked 27 French and Spanish ships with but 15 British ships at St. Vincent, but the political situation operated to prevent Jervis from using all his forces to make that victory more decisive.
But, besides, it was necessary for the British to have time in which to learn of the inferiority of the French fleet. The uncertainty of what the enemy might be able to do is often liable to cripple the decisions of a commander. A Nelson could naturally perceive this inferiority quicker than any other, and this perception encouraged him to operate as he did at Aboukir and Trafalgar. Nelson despised the enemy and relied upon his superior efficiency and the results justified him. The message Nelson sent to St. Vincent after the battle of the Nile proves that he recognized the true cause of the superior efficiency of the British fleet.
Nelson’s Fleet.
Nelson depended upon the work of his predecessor though he was far inferior in genius. It is difficult for many to recognize this fact but "the appearance of a prodigy like Nelson is not an isolated event, independent of antecedents. It is the result of a happy meeting of genius and opportunity. The hour has come and the man. Other men labored and the hero enters into their labors."
It was natural that officers and men almost deified Nelson while they despised Jervis. The pressure of the superiors was not as heavy with the former as with the latter. They did not need it because the new order that had been prepared by Jervis was in full operation. Thus Nelson could take another step in training his officers. He taught his captains to think as he did and succeeded so well that at Aboukir every captain distinguished himself, something which had never been known before that battle of the Nile. It is interesting to note that Nelson did not oppose St. Vincent's ideas and was not a stranger to his system. He was not one who merely impetuously fell upon his foe as many superficial readers claim. He who thoroughly studies the character of the great admiral will perceive that he thoroughly went into every detail of internal management and discipline as he had been taught by Jervis.
Nelson's painstaking, accurate personal observations of the barometer and his precautionary orders for stormy weather elicited the astonishment of a French writer…"le bouillant amiral menageait scs vergucs et ses voiles dans les circonstances ordinaires plus soigneusement, que son vaisseau ou son escadre dans les occasions decides." But as stated it was not so in the French fleet. Perfection in internal management and discipline cannot be obtained without a certain amount of pedantic thoroughness. But it was exactly the perfection of internal management of the British ships that justified Nelson in decisive moments to be bold and impetuous.
We find that Nelson followed in Jervis' footsteps. Mahan states that Howe, "the sailor's friend," did not provide for his people any better than Jervis did. Nelson did likewise. Nelson even justified the claims of the mutineers of 1797.
Nelson concerned himself personally in regard to the subsistence of his crews. The grand admiral did not think it beneath him to investigate the tests to which dried prunes and fresh and salted fish were subjected before being issued to the men.
We recall the words of Frederick the Great: "A soldier fights as he is fed." The private man must be conscious that his superior officers are concerned about his welfare. Work for the men must accompany working with men. Without both neither French —"elan"—nor British tenacity will avail.
The foregoing suffices to illustrate the condition of Nelson's fleet. Indeed, nothing was perfect and the British made many mistakes, but the average was capable and they knew their own efficiency as well as the incapability of the enemy. These conditions made them energetic and inspired them with a determination to win so that every British captain, officer and man was most anxious to " board the enemy." The fruit of Trafalgar was ripe.
It is only when the underlying reasons are clearly explained that we can understand why the destruction of the allied French and Spanish sea power was bound to come. On the one hand we have superior leadership and a far greater efficiency in the fleet while on the other hand an inferior leadership with a complete lack of efficiency.
History shows that occasionally a brilliant leader may accomplish something with a defective personnel but it is only temporary and will not last. Whereas, thorough training is much more likely to repair the errors of a leader; besides the navy which is efficient is much more likely to produce the man for the hour.
The foundations for success in war must be laid in daily service at sea in peace. The young officers serving at sea should be impressed with the importance of these facts. It is often difficult to appreciate the value of the endless drudgery of the daily routine.
There are many embryo Nelsons who even as young lieutenants are much more concerned with strategical studies than in clothing inspections but this does no harm. This article is not intended to depreciate those studies because there is much in common in the tactics of the old sailing ships with modern tactics. We can, however, emphasize the fact that our work in the navy to-day is very similar to that peace preparation for war of the old times and which laid the foundation for success in the wars. The ideal joy in the service is emphasized for the young officers when they clearly realize its importance from their historical studies.
(Signed) Gercke.