THE BOARD OF NAVY COMMISSIONERS.
COMMISSIONERS FOR EXECUTING THE OFFICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES.
By Rear-Admiral S.B. Luce, U. S. Navy (Retired).
Among the most important and responsible duties which can devolve upon the naval officer is that of principal adviser of the Secretary of the Navy on all professional questions. The office comes to him, or should come to him, when his judgment has been ripened by the varied experience of more active employment, and a knowledge enriched by an intimate acquaintance with the needs and all the practical details of the service afloat. The prestige which comes with high rank and the command of a fleet will always prove a valuable asset. Such, in the main, were the Navy Commissioners from 1815 to 1842. They had never commanded fleets, for the simple reason that it was not the policy of the government of that day to create fleets; but they brought to the office the rich experience gained in war—the War of 1812. Such were Commodores John Rodgers, David Porter, Stephen Decatur, William Bainbridge, Charles Morris, Lewis Warrington and others. Three Post Captains, the highest rank of that day, constituted the Board of Navy Commissioners, with the Secretary of the Navy at the head. It is conceded that the navy has never been in such a high state of efficiency as when under the Navy Commissioners (see Annual Report of Secretary of Navy, 1885, page XXVII). In abolishing this board and substituting independent bureaus, it was argued that it was only a change of name from Navy Commissioner to Chief of Bureau, and that the Secretary of the Navy would still have the advice and assistance of the same class of experienced officers. Thus the Board of Navy Commissioners of 1841 was composed of Commodores Charles Morris, Lewis Warrington and John B. Nicolson. The following year, 1842, we find, under the new law, Commodore Lewis Warrington, late Navy Commissioner, now Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks; Commodore William M. Crane, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography; and Commodore David Conner, Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Equipment. This colossal mistake of stripping the secretariat of all but one civilian cost the navy millions upon millions of dollars without anything approaching adequate returns; and, what is far worse, it cost the country the naval prestige won in the War of 1812. For while it is true that the several chiefs of bureaus were taken from the same class of experienced officers as those who had made up the Board of Navy Commissioners, yet they were now assigned to duties which separated them from the secretariat, leaving the civilian Secretary of the Navy in a state of complete isolation. Each separate chief of bureau was taken up with the affairs of his own bureau, leaving the general management of the navy at large to a civilian totally unfamiliar with naval or military affairs. Moreover each Navy Commissioner, when transferred from his military and executive office to his civil office, carried with him by the operation of the law the executive attributes which belong to the secretariat alone. This was a violation of a fundamental military principle, the granting to a subordinate executive powers equal to those of his superior in rank. It is as if a lawyer were put at the head of some great business enterprise for which he has neither training nor aptitude (such as the American line or trans-Atlantic steamers), and the board of directors should be suddenly wiped out, leaving the lawyer president of the company, the sole occupant of his office! Under such conditions it would not be long before the whole business would go into the hands of a receiver. That was the case of the navy from 1842 to and including the year 1889, during which time there was a gradual but sure decadence. The truth of this statement is amply borne out by the annual reports of successive Secretaries of the Navy.
In the annual report of the Secretary of the Navy of November 30, 1889, a table is given of eleven naval powers, showing the total tonnage and other particulars of each. The list does not include the United States. Following the table is the statement of the Secretary that: "the table shows that even when the present building programme is completed the United States cannot take rank as a naval power." Too true! Towards the last of the "old navy" the decline had been so rapid that under the baneful influence of bureaucracy we had, in 1889, actually ceased to be a naval power! No stronger argument against our present system could be advanced than this one fact!
In 1881 a few far-sighted officers sowed the seed in good ground which germinated, and, in time, brought forth the abundant harvest of a fleet of battle-ships, the first in our history. The question is now as to the necessity of bringing the old navy department up to the requirements of the "new navy," so called.
It has been asserted, and with some show of reason, that a naval officer of rank and experience should be placed at the head of the navy. President Madison offered the position of Secretary of the Navy to Commodore Rodgers, who declined the honor again in 1818 the office was offered him, and again declined, President Tyler offered the secretary ship to Captain Robert F. Stockton, U. S. N., who declined it. The practice of the English Navy in this respect has been pointed to as an example that might well be followed. This position is wholly untenable. The First Lord of the English Admiralty, equivalent to our Secretary of the Navy, is taken from civil life; but whereas the former has a seat n Parliament and can advocate in person on the floor of the House the adoption of a given naval policy, the latter has to communicate with Congress in writing which very few read. The English Admirals who a century ago became First Lords were, for distinguished services, elevated to the peerage, and in consequence took their seats in the House of Lords, or were elected by their constituents to the House of Commons. This gave them valuable experience in public affairs and an intimate acquaintance with the leading men who controlled the foreign policy of the state, advantages denied American naval officers. Of this class were Admirals Lord Anson, Sir Charles Saunders, Sir Edward Hawke, Lord Keppel, Lord Howe, the Earl of St. Vincent, Lord Barham and others. Each and all had been created peers for distinguished services in their profession before being called upon to preside over the affairs of the English navy as a Minister of State; or had a seat in the House of Commons. But naval officers are not fitted by training or habits of thought for making good Ministers of State. This is well illustrated by the experience in England. Following the execution of Byng, March 14, 1757, Pitt during a heated debate severely criticized Admiral Lord Anson, "the late First Commissioner of the Admiralty." But later, when the storm of passion had subsided, he spoke of him as "the greatest and most respectable naval authority that ever existed in this country…To his wisdom, to his experience and care the nation owes the glorious naval successes of the last war. The facts laid before Parliament in the year 1756 so entirely convinced me of the injustice done to his character that in spite of the popular clamors raised against him…I replaced him at the head of the Admiralty, and I thank God I had the resolution to do so."
Coming, as it did, after mature reflection, and considering if; source, this is certainly high praise. But "Chatham's posthumous eulogy," according to Captain Montagu Burrows, R. N., "is more than offset by the opinion of a sensible man like Lord Waldegrave." "Lord Anson," said he, "was in reality a good sea officer, but nature had not endowed him with those extraordinary abilities which had been so liberally granted him by the whole nation." This judgment, observes the author of the "Life of Lord Hawke," has been confirmed by the great authority of Lord Stanhope.
The Earl of St. Vincent, in a letter to Lord Keith announcing his (the Earl's) appointment as First Lord of the Admiralty, writes: "How I shall succeed remains to be proved; I have known many a good Admiral make a wretched First Lord of the Admiralty": and it is supposed, and with reason, that he alluded to his predecessors whose names we have given. St. Vincent himself proved no exception to the rule. Sir James Graham, a civilian, who had served in two administrations as First Lord of the Admiralty and who was evidently partial to naval officers in general, said: "I regard Lord St. Vincent as one of the greatest of our naval heroes, and, in his own element, almost unrivaled in history. I have read the debate, when Lord St. Vincent was First Lord of the Admiralty, in which Mr. Pitt, after the peace of Amiens, discussed the naval preparations and defences generally of this country, and made a motion for inquiry which Mr. Fox supported, and I find that by almost universal consent at that time Lord St. Vincent's administration at the Admiralty was condemned, he being certainly in his own element one of the greatest of naval commanders.'"
And yet, notwithstanding all the animadversions, it may be truthfully affirmed that the improvements inaugurated by Lord St. Vincent when First Lord of the Admiralty in 1801-4 laid the foundation of the triumphs of Lord Nelson in 1805. "Lord St. Vincent, whose ideas on naval strategy were clear and sound, though he did not use the technical terms of the art, discerned and provided against the very purpose entertained by Bonaparte of a concentration before Boulogne by ships drawn from the Atlantic and Mediterranean."
Of Admiral Lord Keppel it was said that, when First Lord of the Admiralty, he allowed his personal animosity to Lord Rodney to get the better of him so far that he recalled Rodnev from the command in the West Indies in " a manner the least considerate and most summary that can well be imagined." It so happened that the order for his recall from the West Indies crossed the despatch bearing Lord Rodney's account of his victory of April 12, 1782, over the French under de Grasse. It is assumed that such professional jealousy would be out of the question with a civilian First Lord. However that may be, it is conceded that in the English navy, at least, the weight of evidence is decidedly in favor of a civilian to preside over the navy; but it stands to reason that such civilians must have professional counsellors. Sir John Barrow, Secretary of the Admiralty during many years, and author of the lives of Lords Anson and Howe, in treating with great ability the question whether naval men or civilians make the best First Lords, finds in favor of civilians, and Captain Burrows, R. N. in his "Life of Hawke," asserts that: "It will not be found easy to dispute his position": but he adds the proviso: "If you can get the right kind of naval man for First Lord, put him in." Sir John Barrow sustains his views in favor of a civilian First Lord, first in the certainty that naval First Lords will show a partiality to those who have served under them, and secondly, their want of the general knowledge necessary for a mixed position, half naval, half civil. The civilian First Lord assisted by naval men is his ideal; and the custom of successive administrations has followed that direction. He might have added that naval First Lords are not always above wreaking their vengeance on their enemies of the profession, as in the case of Admiral Lord Keppel.
The question of having a naval officer for Secretary of the Navy may be dismissed forever from the public mind.
From the experience of the greatest naval power of the day we are led to conclude that a civilian Secretary of the Navy assisted by a board of naval officers is the main point in a naval administration that will stand the test of a great war; all the rest being subsidiary.
It is the duty of the Commander-in-Chief afloat to do the best possible, under instructions from headquarters, with the forces and facilities given him; but it is the duty of the naval administrator (the Secretary and his advisers) to see that that force is adequate to any occasion that may arise. On him devolves the duty of utilizing the resources of the country to the best advantage; of keeping the fleet well supplied at all times with men, provisions, and supplies of all kinds and munitions of war; and of devising such military measures as may most directly tend to the successful termination of a war. As in time of war there may be, and probably will be two or more fleets or squadrons operating in different spheres of the theatre of war, not only their general management but their concert of action demand that at the directorate there shall be professional abilities of the highest order. The Trafalgar campaign may be cited once more, not, as on former occasions, for its lessons in strategy; but this time, as an example of the vast and responsible duties which, in war, tax to the utmost the efficiency and resources of a given form of naval government. The problem presented to the English Admiralty was to prevent the invasion of England by Napoleon. To this end Admiral Lord Keith with eleven ships of the line was stationed, at one stage of the campaign, in the Downs to watch the Texel and the Straits of Dover. Cornwallis, blockading off Brest with from twenty to twenty-four ships, formed the center of the British line. Pellew, off Ferrol with eight ships, watched the combined fleet of fifteen. Collingwood was off Cadiz with eight ships. Nelson was off Toulon with twelve ships. In the West Indies were four ships of the line. All these varied stations were linked together by a chain of from one hundred to one hundred and fifty smaller vessels. The positions and strength of these various detachments were changed from time to time as the exigencies of the war required.
The blockade off Brest won the admiration of the world for its rigidity and constancy. As to supplies, Admiral Pellew wrote: "I can assert with confidence that our navy was never better found, that it was never better supplied, and that our men were never better fed or better clothed." Here we have an ample evidence that the commissariat—the civil branch of the Admiralty —was thoroughly efficient, and the successful issue of the campaign, due to the skilful disposition of the ships, furnishes abundant proof that the military branch was equally efficient; and further, that the two parts worked in harmony, as one well-organized body. In short, the British Admiralty stood the test of a great war. It is a wonderful and instructive story of efficient naval administration—this Trafalgar campaign.
The readiness and the ability to devise a strategic plan of operations in advance of hostilities is one of the first essentials of a sound system of naval administration. An able military writer of our own day, in advocating a close study of war as a science, remarks that:
We want to know, not only the best means and methods of conducting all the various operations of war, including the preparations therefore, but also, as far as possible, to clearly perceive all the conditions of the problem of war; to be able to analyze and combine those conditions; to estimate the character of the work to be done and the means necessary to attain that end; to measure, accurately, the means at our disposal, the best practicable method of combining them, and the results that we may reasonably expect to accomplish. In short, we want to be able to determine whether a given war problem is susceptible of solution by any means at our disposal; or, given the problem, to determine what are the means necessary to accomplish the desired end, and in what manner they must be used.
The study of such problems belongs to the naval administration, the Secretary of the Navy, assisted by his staff of thoroughly trained naval experts. On his efforts in making timely preparations depends largely the final success in war. A very striking illustration of the evils flowing from a want of such knowledge on the part of the administration, of the incapacity to determine whether or not a given war problem is susceptible of solution, is furnished by the case of the attacks on Charleston, S. C, ordered by the navy department during the Civil War. A competent naval administration would have seen that the problem, viz., the capture of Charleston by the Monitors alone, was insoluble with the means at hand, and hence would not have demanded the impossible.
In these days of "scientific management" it is assumed, as a matter of course, that hereafter no officer will be assigned to duty as a military and naval adviser to the Secretary of the Navy who has not enjoyed the advantages of special training at the Naval War College for that particular kind of service.
From the foregoing it is clear that naval administration includes two separate and distinct parts, each one indispensable to the other: the military and the civil. The "employment of vessels of war," to quote the language of the Act of 1798, establishing the Department of the Navy, comes under the military head: the "construction, armament and equipment of vessels of war" belong to the civil branch.
"My brief experience in this department," to quote from the Secretary of the Navy's report of Nov. 30, 1885, "has satisfied me that, whatever changes in its organization may be desired, it is of the first necessity to separate, as much as practicable, the work of direction and deliberation from the details of execution; in other words that there should be in the construction of the navy, as in every other kind of business, a proper distribution of labor."
Failure to understand these simple truths in the past is the cause of the miscarriage of the several efforts to organize the navy department on sound military and business principles.
Having explained and illustrated the objects and aims of naval administration, we may now give a summary of the efforts of Congress to devise a suitable form for the government of the navy of the United States.
- The Act of Congress of October 13, 1775, established a "Marine Committee" composed of members of Congress.
- November. 1776, Congress established a "Continental Navy Board."
- The Act of October 28, 1770 established a "Board of Admiralty."
- February 7, 1781, General Alexander McDougall was made "Secretary of Marine" to take the place of the Board of Admiralty.
- The Act of August, 1781, provided for an "Agent of Marine" to supersede all former committees. This duty subsequently devolved upon the "Superintendent of Finance."
- August 7, 1789, the navy was placed under the Secretary of War, where it remained nine years. During this period the famous forty-four-gun frigates. Constitution and United States. and the six-and-thirties Constellation and Chesapeake, were designed, built and launched.
- The Act of April 30, 1798, established a navy department, but in name only.
- Act of February 7, 1815, established Board of Navy Commissioners.
- Act of August 31, 1842, abolished the Hoard of Navy Commissioners, abolished the military and executive branch, for which the Navy Commissioners stood, and established the industrial branch represented by bureaus, practically as they exist to-day.
The Act of April 30, 1798, establishing the Department of the Navy, provided for a "chief officer to be called the Secretary of the Navy," "whose duty it shall be to execute such orders as he shall receive from the President relative to the procurement of naval stores and materials: and the construction, armament, equipment and employment of vessels of war, as well as other matters connected with the naval establishment of the United States." He was to have "a principal clerk, and such other clerks as he shall think necessary…" No one could have thought for a moment that the head of one of the great executive departments of the government, a member of the President's cabinet, could concern himself personally with the "construction, armament and equipment of vessels of war,'' or their "employment"; and yet from the meagre details of this very rudimentary form of naval government that duty must have devolved upon the Secretary himself or upon his civilian clerks—as no others were provided for.
The War of 1812 exposed the fatuity of having the navy managed by a civilian unassisted by professional advisers, or even the means of carrying on the duties of his office.
With little experience of our own in such matters we naturally turned to England for enlightenment. The division of our State powers into executive, legislative, and judicial was taken from England: we adopted the English common law, and our "Rules for the Better Government of the Navy," commonly known as the "Articles of War," were taken in the main from those of England, with certain necessary changes of phraseology. It was inevitable, therefore, that we should look to England for a sound system of naval administration. Congress attempted to do this when by the Act of February 7, 1815, the appointment of three Navy Commissioners was authorized.
To obtain a full understanding of the origin and nature of the office of Navy Commissioner we must go back to the early history of the English navy. On his accession to the throne in 1685 Janus II declared himself, in council, Lord High Admiral and Lord General, titles subsequently confirmed by Parliament. And well might King James assume those offices. He combined in his own person the characters of an accomplished seaman and soldier. He was a man of business and of industrious habits. He did much for the improvement of the English navy. But he was false to his great trust as sovereign of a free people. He was in the pay of Louis XIV, his country's bitter enemy. This was the most critical period in English history. It was essential to the cause of civil and religious liberty that the English fleet should dominate the "narrow seas." It was an imperative necessity, therefore, that the question of the government of the English navy should be treated with the gravest consideration. Hence the Acts of Parliament: the one first quoted, and those to be referred to presently. Those acts have come down to our own times. They are no more antiquated to-day than are the fundamental truths on which is based a popular form of government such as that of the United States. These high offices, were by our federal constitution conferred on the President of the United States, under the simple designation of "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."
Soon after the Revolution of 1688 Parliament declared that: "All the powers rested in the Lord High Admiral of England may be exercised by the Commissioners for executing the office of High Admiral of England for the time being, according to their commissions." When, therefore, Congress authorized the " appointment of three officers of the navy who shall constitute a Board of Commissioners for the Navy of the United States," and that "the board so constituted shall be attached to the office of the Secretary of the Navy, and, under his superintendence, shall discharge all the ministerial duties of said office," it is clear that the intention was that the Commissioners, in conjunction with the Secretary, should "execute the office" of the constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the navy.
It will be seen from this that the term "Navy Commissioner" defines with precision the exact nature of the office. It was particularly well chosen by Congress.
The relations between the Supreme Executive Magistrate of England and the English navy in 1688, and those of the Chief Executive Magistrate of the United States and the United States navy to-day, are analogous. We have therefore a precedent of over two hundred years of continuous practice, with few intermissions, as a model for our study.
The conditions on this question to-day remain the same as when the English Parliament in 1688 resolved to constitute a "Commission of Admiralty of such persons as are of known experience in maritime affairs, that for the future all orders for the management of the fleet do pass through the Admiralty that shall be so constituted."
The eighth attempt to place the navy on a sound basis was made in the right direction; but, unfortunately, it did not go far enough. It took one-half, only, of the English plan of organization—the military; but left out the civil offices entirely. It granted the right arm of the military body; but withheld the left arm.
Section 1 of the Act of February 7, 1815, provided that: "The President of the United States be, and he is hereby authorized, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint three officers of the navy, whose rank shall not be below a Post Captain" (at that time the highest rank in the navy), who shall constitute a Board of Commissioners for the Navy of the United States, and shall have power to adopt such rules and regulations for the government of their meetings as they may judge expedient; and the board so constituted shall be attached to the office of the Secretary of the Navy, and, under his superintendence, shall discharge all the ministerial duties of said office, relative to the procurement of naval stores and materials, and the 'construction, armament, equipment and employment of vessels of war,' as well as all other matters connected with the naval establishment of the United States."
The language of the two acts, Act of 1798 and of 1815, it will he observed, prescribes the same duties for the Secretary and for his advisers, the Navy Commissioners. And it was proper that the prescribed duties should be the same inasmuch as the three commissioners were made part of the Secretary's office. Together they formed the executive and military branch of the department—the branch responsible for the conduct of war. They were to assist the Secretary by their counsel in the "employment of vessels of war" and to "execute such orders as the Secretary shall receive from the President." But it left out, as already observed, the civil branch consisting of offices for the "procurement of naval stores, and the construction, armament and equipment of vessels of war," duties which should have been provided for.
It is obvious from the very wording of the Act that the principles on which naval administration are based had not been fully considered, for while it provided for the military branch it failed to provide for the civil and industrial branch. The "procurement of naval stores and materials" should not have been assigned, as already observed, as part of the duties of the Secretary of the Navy and his Board of Navy Commissioners, still less the "construction, armament and equipment of vessels of war." These latter duties belong to the civil and industrial branch, and it was a fatal mistake to mix up and confound them with the military branch.
The system broke clown, as might have been expected. The remedy for the defects was sought in the Act of August 31, 1842.
If the secretariat—the Secretary and the three Navy Commissioners—had been left intact, and the civil branch for the "procurement of naval stores," etc., had been added, we should have had a form of naval administration based on sound military and economic principles. From one extreme we now went to the other, and applied a remedy that was worse than the disease.
The navy department is the head of a military organization. The sole object of its being is the conduct of war, or the prevention of war as far as practicable through timely preparation for it. To deprive the head of a military organization of its military functions by leaving the military office vacant was to emasculate the entire system and defeat the very object contemplated by Congress in the establishment of the navy department. Nor was this the worst of it. The mistake in abolishing outright the military branch was aggravated by investing the civil branch with executive authority. When the Navy Commissioners changed from the secretariat—the military and executive branch— to the civil branch as chiefs of bureaus, they would naturally leave behind them their military and executive functions to assume their civil and industrial duties. But the Act of August 31, 1842, authorized the carrying with them to their civil offices their former executive powers, thus invading the prerogatives of the Commander-in-Chief. The net results have been prodigality of expenditures, wastefulness and efficiency. It insured the decadence of the navy.
Our earlier failures to organize a Department of the Navy proceeded from sheer indifference. Up to the time of the War of 1812 the navy was so unpopular that it seemed doubtful at one time if we should have any navy at all.
The Act of 1815 authorizing the appointment of three Navy Commissioners was a wise measure, as we have shown; but it was misunderstood from the first, and by no less a person than the Secretary of the Navy himself, whose hands it was intended to strengthen.
B. W. Crowninshield, Secretary of the Navy from 1814 to 1818, decided that all military functions belong to the Secretary exclusively, and that the duties of the Navy Commissioners were of a civil character and had to do with materiel only, or such 3S were subsequently assigned to the several bureaus. This false conception of the character of the navy board gave rise to much friction. It seriously impaired its usefulness, brought it into popular disfavor, and led to the repeal of the Act.
We are indebted for much valuable information on this point to Mr. Charles Oscar Paullin, who has given us a full and interesting account of the Hoard of Navy Commissioners. He sums up with the remark that: "Unfortunately many of the problems that the board, by reason of its professional information, was best able to solve, did not fall to it, but to the Secretary of the Navy."
This is a very just conclusion on the part of Mr. Paullin and accounts for the failure of the measure. It was not understood.
The arguments in favor of an Act of Congress giving to the Secretary of the Navy responsible military advisers, such as furnished by the Board of Navy Commissioners, w.ere forcibly presented to the Naval Committee of the House, April 11. 1904. b; the Secretary of the Navy of that day, the Hon. Win. H. Moody. They may be reproduced here as more exigent to-day than when delivered in person to the committee.
Some Body to Give Responsible Military Advice
[Said Secretary Moody:] Gentlemen: In my last annual report I invited attention to the importance to our naval organization of the existence of some body—call it what you please—charged with the duty of giving responsible advice upon military affairs. I said then: "The organization which lacks this feature is defective in a vital part."
As you will recall, I declined to make a specific recommendation at that time and contented myself with urging the earnest attention of Congress to the subject. I believe it to be my duty now to take another step and to make a specific recommendation.
I desire to say that the recommendation which I am about to make is not one which will supplant the present organization of the navy department. It is rather one which supplements that organization. I do not think we can afford to remain content with the existing conditions if we can see any way in which they can be improved. The navy has grown and is growing rapidly. Naval expenditures have grown so that they are, roughly speaking. $100,000,000 a year, and they are not likely to diminish in the future. With our widely scattered possessions, and a coast line that exceeds that of any other nation except one, and with an intense desire for peace, our people have become convinced of the desirability, of the necessity, of an adequate and efficient navy.
Efficiency Through Honest, Economical Administration
A large navy—large in ships and personnel—even with the addition of brave and skillful and devoted officers and men, does not necessarily mean an efficient navy. Efficiency comes only through such administration as expends honestly and economically the abundant appropriations given by Congress, and so employs the officers and men and ships as to develop their full capacity for effective use.
Head of Navy Always Will Be Civilian
Clearing the way a little, I think we can say with certainty that, in conformity with the fundamental ideas which our people hold in common with at least one other nation, the official head of the navy under the direction of the President, who is the Commander-in-Chief, is and always will be a civilian. He is responsible not only to the President, hut to Congress and to the country for the administration of the naval establishment. If there comes to be inefficiency and dishonesty and waste, and if there comes to be any great blunder, he alone is going to be held responsible. It will not be of any use for him to say, "I did the best I could." The country is not going to hold some unknown naval officer responsible. It is going to hold the civilian head of the navy to a just accountability for its present efficiency.
I think, therefore, it is just to him as well as essential to the national interests that there should be placed at his disposal such instrumentalities as will best enable him to perform the high functions which are committed to him by law.
Secretary Cannot Make War Plans
Of course he must always be lacking in technical military knowledge. It would be unfortunate if he ever entertained the idea that he was a military man and that he could judge of military questions as well as a man who had made a lifelong study of such questions. He cannot make plans for war or for important operations in peace. He cannot know best how to provide for the needs of the fleet, or by what methods the men may be best trained, or how the capacities of officers may be best developed and utilized. As to all these subjects and those cognate to them he must rely upon the best military advice. It is not enough that there should be plenty of officers ready to give him advice when he seeks it. There should be those charged expressly with the duty of studying military questions and of giving advice for which they can be held responsible.
If I have a question of ship construction to pass upon, and I have many; if I have a question relating to armor or armament, and I have many, the present organization of the department provides me with a responsible officer, upon whose advice I have the right to rely. I have the right to rely, in questions of shipbuilding, upon the chief constructor of the navy. If I took his advice upon a technical question of construction, I should make him responsible to the country. If there is a question of armor or armament, I have provided for me, by the present organization, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. I am entitled to rely upon his advice.
Responsible Advice
Contrast the difference between taking the advice of a responsible officer and taking the advice of one who is irresponsible. Suppose a great mistake occurred in ordnance. It would not be an excuse to me that I had been advised by Admiral Taylor or Admiral Barker or Admiral Higginson, or any other officer whom I might name, because they are not charged with the duty of considering and giving advice on ordnance; but if I said "I have had the advice of Admiral Converse," who is placed at the head of the ordnance of the navy, then I could safely say I have met my responsibility.
Now, a body such as I have referred to has been quite often called a general staff, but I think the names are not important. The realities are the important things.
Some Body of Men Should Be Recognized by Law
By whatever name you choose to call it, or however you may choose to constitute it, it is my deliberate opinion that some body of men, charged with the duty I have attempted to describe, should be recognized by law.
It may be said that the Secretary already has the chiefs of bureaus as advisers. At the heads of those bureaus which you have now established by law there are and will be competent officers with adequate technical and military information. They are abundantly able to give safe counsel on the important duties with which their respective bureaus are charged, but they are engrossed with the duties of the administration of their bureaus. They have no responsibility for the consideration of these military questions to which I have referred, nor any duty to give advice upon them: and the world's experience has shown that no advice is good except that for which advisers are held responsible. The volunteer adviser is not usually of much assistance. Much as I have profited by the advice of the bureau chiefs, I know by practical experience that it is impossible fur them to take from their administrative duties the time which will enable them to consider these questions with such deliberation as would render them willing to accept responsibility for advice.
No Body Should Be Created Which Would Usurp Secretary’s Power
There is another side to the question. On the other side I deem it of the greatest importance that no body should be created which would usurp the powers of the Secretary and make him its mere mouthpiece, or reduce him to a mere figurehead in naval organization. 1 believe that i» not only of importance to the country, but of equal importance to the navy itself. It is the Secretary alone who can bring effective influence to bear upon the national administration, or, in conference with the representatives of the legislative part of our government, carry such weight that proper measures will be enacted by Congress and proper supplies afforded. Of course, it is ultimately upon the action of Congress that all naval efficiency must depend. I do not care how efficient a general staff may be, or any body called by another name, however well that body may understand the needs of the navy: they can never, in my opinion, except in times of great emergency, wield that influence which brings into harmonious cooperation the national administration, the military power, and the authority of Congress which governs us all.
In proposing this legislation to you, therefore, I have had in mind the importance on the one hand of affording to the Secretary such skill and intelligence as will render him indispensable aid, and on the other hand the importance of preserving the civilian authority, so that there may he harmony between the legislative, executive, and military functions.
These views of Secretary Moody were fully indorsed by former Secretaries of the Navy, Hon. Win. E. Chandler, sometime member of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, and General B. F. Tracy.
This Act supplied the left arm of the militant body; but cut off the right arm.
It will be seen from what has preceded that during the past 132 years Congress has made nine ineffectual attempts to create a form of naval administration worthy of the name. This is all the more remarkable when it is considered that nineteen years before the passage of the Act of 1798, establishing a Department of the Navy (consisting of one civilian and some clerks), Congress, as already stated, created a Board of Admiralty, to wit: In Congress, October 28, 1779; "Resolved. That a Board of Admiralty be established to superintend the naval and marine affairs of these United States, to consist of three commissioners, not members of Congress, and two members of Congress," etc.
The disposal of the question of naval administration is of such vital importance as to claim precedence over all others connected with the naval establishment. The principal points to be considered are few and obvious.
First, the Secretary of the Navy must be chosen from civil life; that goes without saying.
Secondly, there must be a board of naval officers authorized by law to act as advisers of the Secretary of the Navy on all questions relating to the "employment of vessels of war" (to quote the Act of 1798), "as well as all other matters connected with the naval establishment of the United States." This provides for the executive and military branch of the Department of the Navy; it is the first and most important step towards bringing the old navy department up to the requirements of the so-called "new navy."
The duties of the civil branch should be distributed, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy (as now provided for by the Act of August 31, 1842), among such bureaus as may be retained, but with the pernicious clause of that Act repealed. That clause runs as follows: The " orders of a chief of bureau shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary of the Navy, and shall have full force and effect as such." This clause authorizes an infringement upon the prerogatives of the Secretary—a fatal defect in the law.
Attention has been repeatedly called to the fact that this provision of the Act has the effect, in practice, of creating nine Secretaries of the Navy, each one, in his own particular sphere, clothed with executive authority equal to that of the constitutional Commander-in-Chief. This it is that has created the dire confusion, duplication of work, extravagance and irresponsibility which, according to several Secretaries of the Navy in the past, have characterized the business methods of the navy department for the last sixty years. And this clause, moreover, exposes the fallacy of the contention that, under existing law, the Secretary of the Navy has ample authority, by a redistribution of the business of the bureaus, to correct the many and serious evils of the system now complained of. The source of the trouble is in the law itself.
Any proposition for the organization of the navy department hat seeks to impair or restrict in any degree the powers and responsibilities of the Secretary of the Navy, or share with others :hose powers and responsibilities, as at present, is unworthy of a moment's consideration.
These essential points conceded, all the various details must be worked out by a board of experts convened for the purpose.
It will be seen from the foregoing that there have been adopted. at different periods, two half-measures, each looking to the reorganization of the Department of the Navy, each half excellent in itself, but lacking in balance. It is only necessary to unite these two halves in an amended form in order to obtain a well balanced measure complete in itself.
Thus the Act of February 7, 1815, furnished the military and executive half; the Act of August 31, 1842, supplied the other half—the civil branch. Now let the former be re-enacted in substance but in better shape, and combine it with the Act of 1842, also amended so as to conform to the change, and the result would be a scheme of naval administration based on sound military and business principles. We should then have both right arm and left arm. In other words we should have an office for deliberation and direction, and offices charged with the details of execution.
General Principles Governing Naval Organization
The Commission on "Certain Needs of the Navy," appointed January 27, 1909, by President Roosevelt, and of which Justice Wm. H. Moody was presiding officer, reported on "General Principles Governing Naval Organization," as follows:
1. The office of the Secretary of the Navy being executive in character, nothing should be admitted into an organization of the department which would qualify his authority or diminish his ultimate responsibility. He has been in the past, and in the future should be, a civilian. He is the representative of the President, the constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, under whose direction his authority is exercised.
2. The duties in charge of the Secretary divide under the principal heads, closely related but generically distinct: civil and military.
The civil duties embrace the provision or preparation of all the material of war. This is the function of the present bureaus.
The military duties concern the use of that material, whether in war or in such exercises as conduce to fitness for operations of war. For the direction of these military duties, no subordinate provision corresponding to the bureaus on the civil side exists in the present organization established by statute.
3. The discharge of both these classes of duty involves a multitude of activities, quite beyond the immediate personal knowledge and supervision of a single man. This necessitates a subdivision of the duties, by which means the supervision of the Secretary is exerted through the medium of responsible subordinates. In this subdivision the principle of undivided responsibility, within the appointed field of subordinate supervision, should obtain, as it docs in the superior office of the Secretary.
The bureau system, as now established by law for the civil activities of the department, insures for each bureau this undivided responsibility, qualified only by the authority of the Secretary, which, if exerted, does not divide the responsibility, but transfers it to the Secretary himself. Independent authority, with undivided responsibility, though in principle proper, suffers historically from intrinsic inability to cooperate, where a number of such independent units are present. The marshals of the first Napoleon —especially in Spain—in the absence of the Emperor, offer a familiar illustration. The bureau system as at present constituted by law contain no remedy for this inherent defect.
4. The coordinating power is in the Secretary's authority; but, owing to the shortness of tenure in orifice, and to the inevitable unfamiliarity with naval conditions with which an incumbent begins, authority, though adequate in principle, is not so in effect. This inadequacy consists in lack of personal familiarity with the subjects before him, not merely severally, but in their collective relations; in short, lack of specific knowledge and experience. The organization should provide him with such knowledge and experience, digested formally, so as to facilitate his personal acquirement. In short, an advisory body, equipped not with advice merely, but with reasons. In order to avoid the interruption of continuity attending each new administration, entailing the recurrent temporary unfamiliarity of each new Secretary, it is expedient that this advisory body be composed of several persons, but while this provision would insure the continuity which inheres in a corporate body (in this case continuity of knowledge and of progress), the principle of undivided responsibility would dictate that one only of them should be responsible for the advice given to the common superior—the Secretary.
5. As regards the composition of the advisory body, the principles to e regarded are two: (a) The end dictates the means; (b) responsibility must be individual, in advice as well as in executive action.
(a.) The end is efficiency for war. The agents in war are the military naval officers. Their profession qualifies them best to pronounce upon the character of the preparations for war of every kind, including not only cherries of campaign and tactical systems, but the classes, sizes, qualities, ml armaments of ships of war.
What the Secretary needs, specifically and above all, is a clear understanding and firm grasp of leading military considerations. Possessed of these, he may without great difficulty weigh the recommendations of his technical assistants, decide for himself, and depend upon them for technical execution of that which he approves.
However constituted in detail, the advisory body should be taken entirely from the class to which belongs the conduct of war, and upon whom will fall, in war, the responsibility for the use of the instruments and for the results of the measures which they recommend.
(b) As regards individual responsibility for advice, it is suggested that the Secretary of the Navy nominate to the President the officer whom he deems best fitted to command the great fleet in case of war arising; and that this officer, irrespective of his seniority, should be head of the advisory body. He alone should be the responsible adviser of the Secretary.
The provision of a responsible adviser does not compel the Secretary to accept his advice, nor prevent his consulting whomsoever else he will. The provision suggested does not limit the authority of the Secretary: but it does provide him with the weightiest and most instructed counsel, and it lays upon the prospective Commander-in-Chief the solemn charge that in all he recommends he is sowing for a future which he himself may have to reap.
An essential principle in the constitution of such an advisory body is that the majority of the members should be on the active list and should go afloat at not infrequent intervals; and. specifically, the head of the body, the prospective Commander-in-Chief, should during the summer months take command of the concentrated battle-ship force for maneuvers, target firing, and practice of every kind. This will insure also his sustained familiarity with the administrative routine of the fleet and other practical matters.
6. In the two principal classes into which the duties of the Secretary of the Navy divide, civil and military, as enunciated in Section 2 above, the word "civil" corresponds largely to the activities known as technical; and there is no reason apparent why the same principle of undivided immediate responsibility should not be realized in the navy department in two chief subordinates, responsible, the one for military supervision, the other for technical supervision, and for all information and advice given to the Secretary under these two heads. It is of course apparent that a perfectly suitable Secretary may come to his office with as little previous knowledge of the kind called technical as he has of military; nay, he may be perfectly efficient, and yet not acquire in his four years of office either the technical or the military knowledge presumable in men whose lives have been given to the two professions. Under the most favorable conditions, every superior must take decisions largely on advice; which means not accepting another's opinions blindly, but accepting statements of facts and weighing reasons.
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The principle of the Secretary's ultimate individual responsibility dictates that he be at liberty to consult as many advisers as he thinks necessary; but the principle of the individual responsibility of two chief advisers, for the advice given, tends to insure the most exhaustive consideration on the part of men selected for their special competency. Careful consideration with special competency give the best guarantees for advice, and a Secretary overruling it would do so under the weightiest sense of personal responsibility.
As a matter of detail, but yet so broad in bearing as to amount to a principle, it may be noted that while the adjective "military" is somewhat narrow in application, "technical" is extensive in scope. Naval construction, ordnance, and steam engineering are all technical professions. The selection of a chief technical assistant to the Secretary might therefore be made from the recognized technical experts of the navy, under any of the three heads named, or a competent civilian engineer and naval architect may be appointed as Second Assistant Secretary of the Navy, under whom the four technical bureaus may be coordinated.
7. In conclusion, it should be distinctly laid down as a cardinal principle that no scheme of naval organization can possibly be effective which does not recognize that the requirement of war is the true standard of efficiency in an administrative military system; that success in war and victory- in battle can be assured only by that constant preparedness and that superior fighting efficiency which logically result from placing the control and responsibility in time of peace upon the same individuals and the same agencies that must control in time of war. There should be no shock or change of method in expanding from a state of peace to a state of war This is not militarism; it is a simple business principle based upon the fact that success in war is the only return the people and the nation can get from the investment of many millions in the building and maintenance of a great navy.
(See 60th Congress, 2d session. Senate. Document No. 740.)
The proposed acts would, with the exception of a change of name, and a slight amendment of the Act of 1842, give the sanction of law to the organization of the Department of the Navy as it now tentatively exists.
It will be seen from what has preceded that the Act of August 31, 1842, abolishing the Board of Navy Commissioners, is still in force. With the abolishing of the Board of Navy Commissioners was abolished the body "charged with the duty of giving responsible advice upon military affairs." "The organization which lacks this feature," it has been explained, "is defective in a vital part."
With the abolishing of the Board of Navy Commissioners was abolished the military head of our military marine.
With the abolishing of the Board of Navy Commissioners was abolished the office charged with the conduct of war.
It must be plain to the dullest understanding that in this respect our naval organization is no more prepared for war to-day than it was sixty-nine years ago. And this, too, notwithstanding the lessons of two wars and the urgent appeals of successive administrations to Congress to remedy this grave defect—successive administrations representing each one of our great political parties.
In a former article—North American Review of April—we said: "In building up a navy the public mind seems to be centered on ships alone. Tables are published from time to time showing the comparative strength of navies as measured by the number of battleships of each country together with their tonnage and gun-power."
This is misleading as far as our own navy is concerned, in that it takes no account of all the various accessories essential to a fleet of the present day, such as naval bases, personnel, etc. In contemplating with pardonable pride our fleet of battleships we have lost sight of the fact that in abolishing the Board of Navy Commissioners in 1842 Congress has never substituted any office to supply its place: We have fashioned the instrument—the fleet; but have failed to provide the power to wield it as a weapon of war.