Motto: "When a strong mom armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace."—St. Luke, xi: 21.
The President, our commander-in-chief, in a recent address at the Naval War College, clearly refuted the idea of having a navy merely for coast defence. Nothing could have been more opportune than the definite statement of the real relationship of the navy to the coast defence. He said: "For the protection of our coasts we need fortifications. We need to have these fortifications, not merely to protect the salient points of our possessions, but we need them so that our navy can be foot-loose."
The navy consists of fleets of battleships, cruisers and destroyers, with auxiliaries and naval bases. The object of the navy is to protect our country, necessarily including our country's honor, from all foreign enemies by aggressive defensive operations. It is not adapted for service against domestic foes, and when the navy is called upon in emergency to act against domestic foes, it only co-operates with the army, and this is especially true in regard to the navy's coadjuting corps of marines. Foreign enemies are, therefore, to be engaged by the navy, and the controlling principle governing the efficiency of the navy must be its adequacy to attack and defeat any foreign foe.
If our navy is adequate for this purpose, the fact must be established and known, so that no one will dare to dispute it, unless, blinded by hate or prejudice, he should ignore or doubt this preparedness.
Mere possession of fleets of battleships, cruisers and destroyers, with auxiliaries and naval bases, is, however, not sufficient to deter an aggressive enemy. It is much more vitally important to know how to use these components of the navy. They must be handled efficiently, and foreigners, who might become possible enemies, must be convinced that our navy is handled efficiently. The cruise of the Atlantic battle fleet around the world is a demonstration of our efficiency in regard to this fleet. Our superiority in target practice is well established, but much still remains to be done, not only to keep up to the high standard of efficiency already attained, but to enlarge our potentialities and develop the other components of the navy.
The cruisers are efficient in themselves, but the development of their efficiency to the present standard is only a step beyond that which our cruisers have attained since the Civil War. For the greater part of this period we had nothing but cruisers, and we need not feel ashamed of them. The navy did well with the cruisers, and their efficiency for searching the seas is recognized. But definite plans must be formulated and studied to arrive at the proper organization of cruisers with a fleet, or in scouting squadrons, for the great object of deterring foreign nations from going to war with us, by the conviction that we can command the seas efficiently, and no foe could elude the efficient scouting cruisers that would bring a formidable battle fleet to crush him at the very outbreak of war.
The torpedo craft form a weak spot in our service, and though our destroyers made the cruise to the Pacific coast, it is evident that their operations are limited to within range of reliable wireless communication with the fleet and naval base, or the naval coast patrol. A new and larger type of destroyers is now being built, and this larger type will constitute the destroyer force of each battle fleet. Our present destroyers will be replaced by these new and more efficient vessels, and the old destroyers will be classed with the torpedo boats and not be assigned as a part of the battle fleet.
The auxiliaries form an important part of the battle fleet. These cruising auxiliaries include the colliers, supply ships, repair ships, transports and hospital ships, which are necessary parts of a well organized battle fleet. The efficiency of these auxiliaries is being developed to the highest standard by actual experience with the fleets.
There are other necessary naval auxiliaries besides those which accompany the battle fleet; these are Navy-Coast-Defenders, including torpedo boats, submarines, mine-laying vessels, tugs, monitors, and old and obsolete battleships and cruisers that may be still serviceable for the protection of the naval bases or important strategic channels, such as the Straits of Florida, the Panama canal, Puget Sound, and the Philippine waters.
The naval bases are the navy yards and naval stations, both at home and in our possessions. At these points the Navy-Coast-Defenders must co-operate with the army coast defence, in order that the fighting fleets of battleships, cruisers and destroyers can be "foot-loose" and obtain supplies, coal, repairs, etc. These bases must be protected, and, necessarily, the Navy-Coast-Defenders will co-operate with the army. The fighting fleet has no part in coast defence; it operates against the enemy's fleet. The fleet must command the sea, and if it is efficient our coast will not be attacked. In the Russo-Japanese War the coast of Japan needed no protection against the formidable Russian fleet, because the Japanese first sought complete command of the sea. They kept their superiority over the poorly trained, inexperienced Russians, who had never left the Baltic before the war. The destruction of the Russian fleet rendered Japanese coast defences unnecessary.
In the war with Spain the United States' coasts were not attacked, because Sampson cruised on Key West's strategic line of force to Porto Rico and commanded the approaches to our coasts. In both of these most recent wars the naval victories alone compelled peace.
Our main reliance for coast defence consists of the battle fleets in position, either off the enemy's ports, or disposed to intercept and attack the enemy's fleet on any possible route of approach. In these days of submarine cables and wireless telegraphy there is no place in any sea where any considerable force could play a game of hide-and-seek. Nelson's search for the French fleet from Europe to the West Indies and back could not be repeated in the face of our present facilities for obtaining information.
To protect the country our navy must command four different spheres: the Atlantic, Pacific, West Indies and Philippines. Command of the sea in these four spheres is essential, and it can only be attained by an adequate naval force.
The Atlantic and West Indies may be grouped, but a battle fleet is necessary for each, because one of these two fleets may be required to reinforce the Pacific fleet, via the Panama canal, and the Atlantic could not long be safely left without any battle fleet. Similarly, the Pacific and Philippine fleets could be grouped, but two fleets are required in case one of them should be needed elsewhere. For the sake of economy, it may be urged that it would be safe to have but three fleets, one for the Atlantic and the West Indies, and the other two for the Pacific and the Philippines, with a fourth fleet in reserve at the Atlantic naval base. A fleet in reserve sounds well from an economical point of view, but it is an element of weakness rather than of additional strength. Vessels in reserve are practically useless for the fighting fleet, as they can not be kept in the most efficient condition while in reserve at a navy yard, with reduced crews. These crews simply take care of the ship. They are not keyed up by constant training and drill, which is only possible when cruising, and should such vessels be suddenly called on to go into action, manifestly a high degree of efficiency could not be expected of them. When a reserve ship is assigned to a fleet it reduces the average fighting efficiency of the fleet by that of the reserve ship, to some extent in the same manner that the speed of a fleet is only that of the slowest ship in the fleet. A reserve ship must, necessarily, be slower, be less efficiently handled by inexperienced officers and men, and less accurate in hitting hard than the trained ships of the fleet. "Better not hit at all if you cannot hit hard."—President Roosevelt.
The Austrian navy has 'developed the principle of a reserve navy far beyond that which would be possible with us. For urgent financial reasons the Austrian naval budget is limited, and the cruises of the fighting ships are restricted to brief periods in the Adriatic. At Pola, the entire navy is kept moored in various categories of reserve. Strenuous work is required of officers and men when the reserves are frequently sent out, but with all it is impossible to attain the highest degree of efficiency without constant practice at sea. New developments are constantly arising, and that which was thought good yesterday is to-day displaced by a better method evolved in the actual school of experience. Naval proficiency cannot be attained from printed volumes; actual experience only can develop the highest efficiency.
The situation must be met squarely, and a reserve fleet must be considered as the device of an enemy. To be thoroughly prepared for war, we should avoid having fighting battleships in reserve at navy yards as we would avoid a contagious disease.
Some years ago the writer was enthusiastic in his praise of the efficiency of the reserve of the German navy. Each ship of the German navy has its own station, its own storehouse, and all the stores of that particular ship, whether of the first, second or third category of reserve, are kept ready for emergency. Non-perishable stores, including coal and oil fuel, are kept on board. Everything is kept in readiness for immediate departure of the first category of reserve for mobilization and activity with the fleet. All of the officers and men of these ships in reserve are always available, though but a small percentage are kept on board. The officers and men go to their homes and are called out by telegraph, when each and every one immediately goes back to the identical position he had when the ship was placed in reserve. Surely such vessels kept in such a condition of reserve may render good service, but, manifestly, not as good as one that is and has been constantly cruising and drilling with the fleet.
The compulsory military and naval service in Germany makes this scheme of reserve much more practicable than would be possible with us. We could not put a battleship in reserve and have 80 per cent of her officers and men at home pursuing other vocations, ready to muster on board by telegraph. The expense of maintaining a battleship in reserve under such conditions would be but little less than that if in commission, except the expense of steaming, which is more than repaid by the experience attained, and by the better efficiency of the machinery by being in use.
The voyage of the Atlantic fleet to the Pacific demonstrated that, upon the arrival of the fleet at San Francisco, all the vessels were in much more efficient condition than when they had left.
When German naval officers were praised for the efficiency of the German naval reserve, it was observed that they laid no stress upon this as especially noteworthy. The reserve ships are all right to comply with the letter of the law of compulsory military service, but the best ships are never put in reserve; they are kept in full commission. It is only when undergoing extensive repairs that a modern, up-to-date German battleship is placed in reserve. They cannot afford to lose any opportunity for training and drill with any one of their battleships, nor can we.
The real fighting force of battleship fleets must be kept up to the highest state of efficiency. Individual ships must each be the best of their type, and any deficiency in any one will to that extent weaken the force. Obsolete battleships must not be grouped with the most efficient.
Rapid changes in design and construction must, necessarily, make it impossible to have four fleets composed of only the most modern types. With 16 battleships in a fleet, it is doubtful if we could hope to have more than one fleet of 16 battleships all about four years old. It is good work to get a first-class battleship in commission, with a trained personnel, within four years from the date of her authorization, or even after her keel shall have been laid. Compromise is necessary, but the ideal standard must always be kept in mind. The age limit is the best guide, and the rule to regard 15 years as the limit of age in fighting efficiency of a battleship is the only logical conclusion. Battleships of 15 years of age must not be put in the fleet with new ships. Each fleet should be composed of one or two squadrons of two divisions each, and each division should consist of four homogeneous ships of the same age. Our four fleets should thus each have divisions of approximately homogeneous units. The divisions in each fleet may be unequal, but the fleet should have no ship over 15 years old. Battleships over 15 years old should be assigned as Navy-Coast-Defenders, where they will still be serviceable at least 10 years longer.
DISPOSITION OF THE FLEET.
The Atlantic fleet must have command of the north Atlantic ocean, and it must be ready to attack an enemy in any part of that ocean. This fleet should generally cruise on a strategic line of force extending from beyond Nantucket Light Ship towards Hatteras. On this line the fleet will be sufficiently near its bases (Norfolk, Philadelphia and New York, including Newport and Boston) to be fully prepared to proceed to attack an enemy in the Atlantic. Scouts and cruisers of the Atlantic fleet should be spread out fan-wise to cover, by wireless, the entire sphere, especially west of the fiftieth meridian and beyond to the eastward in advance of the fleet when crossing the Atlantic.
The object of war is to destroy the enemy's fleet, and in time of peace every effort should be made that when the time comes the fleet shall be able to proceed with its maximum strength to overcome the enemy's fleet, by attacking him with a relatively superior force.
The Atlantic fleet should not be allowed to stay in port at the bases, but should be kept cruising in formation and maneuvering for the best possible results. Long drill periods along the strategic lines of force cannot be constantly maintained, as vessels of the fleet must frequently return to the bases, and occasional weekend visits will be desirable. The fleet would then assemble and maneuver from Tuesdays until Fridays on the strategic lines of force during periods of such occasional week-end visits.
The West Indian fleet is the reserve of the Atlantic fleet, and, vice versa, the Atlantic fleet, under some conditions, especially after the completion of the Panama canal, will be the reserve of the West Indian fleet. No other reserves can be provided for the fighting fleets. Each fleet will have a reserve by uniting with the fleet in its adjacent sphere. The West Indian fleet when cruising on the Key West-Porto Rico strategic line of force should, at the very outbreak of war, follow up the Atlantic fleet enroute across the Atlantic, to reinforce the Atlantic fleet and unite in crushing the enemy's fleet with an overwhelming relative superiority.
A thoroughly well organized and highly trained efficient fighting fleet should be capable of crossing the Atlantic from its strategic line of force to meet the enemy's fleet with such relative superiority that he must sue for peace.
Before the recent cruise of the Atlantic fleet to the Pacific and Australia, an attack on the enemy's fleet on the other side of the Atlantic would have been regarded as rather venturesome, but this cruise demonstrates its feasibility. If we can not go with a foot-loose fleet to attack the enemy's fleet, the enemy will come and attack us, and with relative superiority, at such point of attack as he may choose.
With a foot-loose Atlantic fleet, that has been kept constantly cruising and drilling on the Atlantic strategic lines of force, much better results will be attained by attacking the enemy than by waiting for the enemy to attack us. In proceeding to the attack we prove that we have command of the sea, and the thorough preparation necessary to start will be one-half of the victory, and the chances are that the enemy will hasten to make peace before the enemy's fleet is met.
THE STRATEGIC LINES OF FORCE.
To provide for command of the sea in our four spheres of naval operations the fleets in each sphere must have some definite position of departure, and not at any one base, but at sea on a strategic line of force; that is, at a convenient rendezvous from one or more naval bases, and from which the battle fleet can best command approaches and proceed to attack the enemy in the shortest time.
The line extending from beyond Nantucket to Hatteras is well adapted for the Atlantic fleet, with many advantages for starting across the Atlantic with favorable winds and currents. It is also in position to readily take up the Key West-Porto Rico strategic line of force and command the Gulf, Caribbean and approaches to the Panama canal, should the canal be threatened.
The West Indian fleet would have the Key West-Porto Rico strategic line for cruising, alternating with the direct line from Guantanamo to Colon until after the Panama canal shall have been completed when the West Indian fleet should also cruise on a strategic line in the Pacific, a line extending from latitude 2° north, longitude 81° west, to latitude 10° north, longitude 90° west; that is, a line parallel with the Central American coast, blocking approaches to Panama. From this Panama strategic line of force, the West Indian fleet is in position to go and reinforce the Pacific fleet, if the theatre of war is confined to the Pacific. Or, the Pacific fleet may relieve the West Indian fleet on its Panama or Key West strategic line of force while the West Indian fleet goes to reinforce the Atlantic fleet, if the theatre of war is confined to the Atlantic.
The Pacific fleet should have a strategic line of force off the northern Pacific coast and parallel therewith, extending between the two routes Honolulu to San Francisco and Honolulu to Puget Sound. In this position the Pacific fleet will be convenient to its bases and in the best position to proceed west, north or south, as may be required.
The Hawaiian strategic line of force would be on a line either parallel with the Hawaiian Islands, about 200 miles from Honolulu, or on a line running north and south.
The Philippine strategic line of force would be in the China sea off the coast of Luzon, with various positions for the best command against any enemy that may appear in this sphere.
SCOUTING.
The fleets in our four spheres being established on their respective strategic lines of force, the command of the sea will be exerted through the scouts in each sphere. These scouts should be spread out fan-wise, as mentioned for the Atlantic fleet. Until the completion of the Panama canal the scouts for the West Indian fleet will serve for both the Atlantic and the West Indian fleets; but after the completion of the canal, with the occupation of the Panama strategic line of force, the West Indian scouting force must extend over the central Pacific ocean. The scouts should cover the approaches to Panama from the southern Pacific, and keep in wireless communication with Samoa, Honolulu and San Diego, as well as in touch with the scouts of the Pacific fleet and on the Pacific lines of force. The scouts of the Pacific fleet will have an immense area to cover, even by assigning a large portion to the West Indian fleet.
The Pacific fleet must evidently have a much larger force of scouts than the other fleets, and, in addition to this largely increased force of scouts, there should also be a fleet of armored cruisers, which may be designated as the Hawaiian flying fleet. This fleet should cruise over the Pacific and develop a perfect system of scouting, to give absolute command of the entire Pacific ocean; it should be in touch with the Pacific fleet on one side and the Philippine fleet on the other. This powerful fleet of first-class armored cruisers, with divisions of homogeneous units, will insure the command of the Pacific, and it will be relatively stronger than an enemy's fleet that may not be composed of such homogeneous units.
The Philippine scouts will cover the western part of the Pacific, around the Philippine Islands to Guam, and keep in touch with the fleet on its strategic line of force, and also with the wireless stations in the Pacific at Guam, Midway and Wake Island, to be established, or cable communication wherever possible.
With this explanation of what is required for us to command in our four spheres, it is necessary to determine what must be the strength of each fleet in order to be adequate for us to have a relatively stronger force than that of any enemy in that sphere.
The United States navy is proud of its achievements in the past, and our naval victories justify our claim to superiority, but in every case victory has only been obtained by a relatively superior force. We have won victories over superior forces, but we were superior at the point of contact; relatively superior over a part of the enemy, and, therefore, we defeated him. Lessons from history—the battle of the Nile, Trafalgar, etc.—show that Nelson was relatively superior at the point of contact, and to be victorious we must plan to give our fleets relative superiority in each sphere. (See "War on the Sea," by Capt. Gabriel Darrieus, translated by Prof. P. R. Alger, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE.)
From Brassey's Naval Annual, 1908, the following tables show the naval strength of the principal powers; and there is no guesswork about this list, no secrecy whatever in regard to the actual fighting strength of all the navies of the world. This certain knowledge of the available naval forces possessed by each nation is one of the most potent factors in the preservation of peace.
But, as previously stated, the fact that this available naval force possessed by each nation can be handled effectively must also be thoroughly established and well known to insure peace. It takes from two to four years to build a battleship, and at least one year more before the personnel of that ship can be trained to handle such an instrument of precision effectively. Demonstrations of efficiency are also necessary to convince the world that the naval strength is all that is claimed for it.
The policy of making long cruises not only develops the effectiveness of the naval force, but gives the strongest argument for not going to war against a well prepared navy.
Therefore, studying the fleets of the world as we find them to-day, our naval forces should be so organized in fleets and squadrons that we may soon command the seas in each and all of our four spheres.
These tables show that the United States had 25 battleships built and building, with 4 older battleships, making 29 in all, While the other principal navies had the following battleships built and building: England, 60; Germany, 28; France, 24; and Japan, 16, on January 1, 1908.
As our fleet must operate in two oceans, and as we have but 29 battleships available, 16 may be assigned to the Pacific and 13 to the Atlantic. In this case the Atlantic should have the older battleships that will be replaced; and, because our ship-building resources on the Atlantic are greater than those on the Pacific, the Pacific fleet should contain the 16 newest vessels. Accordingly, as new ships are built they would go to the Atlantic fleet to replace the obsolete vessels and to complete the organization of a fleet of 16 battleships. Our naval force is not sufficient to give four fleets, but it is urgently necessary that we should build four battleships a year, in order that we may, in the course of seven years, have three fleets of 16 battleships each.
By building four battleships yearly we shall add every year one division of homogeneous units to our fleet. In the course of these seven years we shall have substitutes for the four older battleships, and with a yearly program of four battleships we may gradually substitute the battleships launched in 1898. The Wisconsin, Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, and Kearsarge must all be replaced in the fighting fleet, as well as the Indiana, Oregon, Massachusetts and Iowa.
During the next five years we cannot have a West Indian fleet nor a Philippine fleet. We have one squadron of homogeneous armored cruisers, which will serve as the Hawaiian flying fleet until eight more first-class armored cruisers shall have been built to form another squadron of that fleet.
After having obtained 32 battleships, that is, 16 for the Pacific and 16 for the Atlantic fleet, our ship-building policy should provide for the battleships of the Philippine fleet, and, finally, for the 16 battleships of the West Indian fleet. Our present condition, with but 29 battleships built and building, prevents us from having a relative superiority in number of battleships in any one of our four spheres. It will be a difficult task for us so to maneuver that we may have relative superiority at a point of contact in any one or other of our spheres, and the risk would be considerable, Our policy should be to develop our present force to its utmost and build four battleships a year, so as to give us such superiority that the maintenance of peace will be absolutely certain.
SCOUTS.
For scouts we have 15 first-class or armored cruisers, 3 second-class and 14 third-class, or 32 in all. The 15 first-class include, however, the Charleston, St. Louis and Milwaukee, and the New York and Brooklyn. We have 8 armored cruisers in the Pacific fleet, which, as stated, should be the Hawaiian flying fleet. We thus have 24 first-, second- and third-class cruisers, which are available for scouts in the fleets in two oceans, or 12 in each fleet, which is, manifestly, not sufficient.
The scouts of the Atlantic must patrol all that part of the north Atlantic west of the fiftieth meridian, or, roughly speaking, an area defined by radii of 1000 miles from the Atlantic strategic line of force. Twelve scouts spread out fan-wise over the Atlantic, with wireless communication, and in advance of that fleet, and still further advanced to the eastward as the fleet crosses the Atlantic, are all that are available for the Atlantic fleet.
There is a great problem to be solved by the scouting forces of the fleet, who are to patrol over the entire sphere of action. The range of wireless is an uncertain factor, therefore plans for the distribution of the scouts cannot be definitely established. The best organization for covering the largest area in the shortest time must all be worked out by actual experience, that the best Plan may be adopted. The number of scouts necessary can then only be fixed. From a casual study of the scouting area for our Atlantic and Pacific fleet it is estimated that one scout will be required for each battleship in the Atlantic, and two for each battleship in the Pacific fleet. With the development of aeronautics, balloons, aeroplanes, etc., may assist scouting.
The Philippine fleet and the West Indian fleet, when established, will also require one scout for each battleship.
In each fleet there should be at least two armored cruisers for scouts, as it may be necessary to drive off an enemy's scouts, and an armored cruiser would be a relatively superior scouting force, and would probably discover the enemy's weak point by which he could be overpowered. Our available scouts can be reenforced to a slight extent by converting merchant steamers in time of war. Such vessels have rendered good service as scouts, and will always be called on in the future; but at best they are makeshifts, and no dependence should be placed upon them in any plans, unless they are in time of peace kept available with gun platforms, equipment and an organized personnel, ready to arm and equip as scouts during war. Such merchant vessels practically belong to the navy at all times, though in the merchant service during times of peace.
The necessity for building more scouts is urgent, though exactly how many scouts should be required is problematical. We must have the fleet of battleships on its strategic lines and ascertain from actual experience and practice what will be required for an adequate scouting force in time of war.
DESTROYERS.
Destroyer flotillas are necessary parts of a battle fleet, and there should be one flotilla for each fleet. We have fifteen of the newest type of destroyers now building, which will provide one flotilla for each of the three fleets. The policy is to build five at a time, and these five large destroyers of exactly the same type should be in the same fleet, making each flotilla homogeneous. The value of destroyers to a fleet was exemplified at the battle of Tsushima, where the Japanese flotilla went in to attack the scattered Russian fleet, after the Russian fleet had been practically defeated.
Our torpedo boats and the destroyers now in service are not well adapted for operating with the fleet, and in case of the Atlantic fleet crossing the Atlantic they would have to be towed by the fleet auxiliaries, which may thereby be prevented from keeping up with the battle fleet. Actual experience with towing torpedo destroyers will throw more light on this subject.
AUXILIARIES.
Each fleet should have a definite number of auxiliaries, which would probably consist of two colliers, one supply ship, one repair ship, one ammunition ship and one hospital ship. Considerable experience has been obtained by the cruise of the Atlantic fleet to the Pacific and Australia, and this valuable experience will definitely decide exactly what auxiliaries are necessary for a fleet.
The foregoing consideration shows that our fighting naval force should consist of three fleets of sixteen battleships, with cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries, for the immediate future, with a fourth fleet to be established after the completion of the Panama canal. Besides these, we should have the Hawaiian flying fleet of sixteen armored cruisers.
Forty-eight battleships are, therefore, clearly necessary for us to have command of the seas in our four spheres. We probably cannot get a West Indian fleet until four years after the Panama canal shall have been opened, but during that period the Atlantic, Pacific and Philippine fleets will periodically change stations. The Atlantic fleet would go to the Pacific via the Panama canal, while the Pacific fleet would proceed to the Atlantic via the canal, and then the Atlantic fleet would relieve the Philippine fleet. Thus the three fleets would alternate on the different stations for different periods of time, and occupy the West Indian sphere while in transit.
We cannot expect to command in any one of our four spheres without having these three fleets of sixteen battleships, but by having them we shall be able, at short notice, to reenforce any one sphere which may be the theatre of war with a thoroughly efficient, well trained additional fleet of sixteen battleships from one of the other spheres.
The fighting fleets should be: Hawaiian
Atlantic. Pacific. Philippine. Flying Fleet. Total.
Battleships 16 16 16 .. 48
Armored cruisers 2 2 2 16 22
Scouts 16 32 16 .. 64
Destroyers 5 5 5 .. 15
Colliers 2 2 2 2 fast 8
Supply ships 1 1 1 .. 3
Repair ships 1 1 1 .. 3
Ammunition ships 1 1 1 .. 3
Hospital ships 1 1 1 .. 3
With our present fleet we must each year build 4 battleships, 2 armored cruisers, 4 scouts and 2 auxiliaries to have the requisite strength to give us command of the sea in our four spheres.
After the Panama canal shall have been opened we will need the West Indian fleet of 16 battleships, 2 armored cruisers, 16 scouts, 5 destroyers and 6 auxiliaries in addition to the above.
We must have this ship-building policy for building up our fleet by American labor, in American ship-yards. We are debarred by our policy from purchasing from European ship-yards. We see other nations having battleships built in foreign private yards and disposing of them to other nations at a critical time, but we want American-built ships for our navy, and with them our personnel will maintain its glorious record of victories.
NAVAL BASES.
The naval bases are the navy yards where our battleships can obtain coal, supplies, repairs and equipment to maintain them at the highest standard of fighting efficiency. The naval base of New York, including the navy yards at Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Newport and Boston, is the chief Atlantic base. The navy yard at Norfolk, with that of the gun factory at Washington, is the second Atlantic naval base. These two bases (New York and Norfolk) are easily accessible from the Atlantic strategic line of force (Nantucket to Hatteras). The navy yard at Key West is the naval base for the Gulf of Mexico and West Indies, having Guantanamo and Porto Rico as a part of its range. Key West, Guantanamo and San Juan are accessible to the Key West-Porto Rico strategic line of force controlling approaches to the Gulf and Caribbean.
For the protection of the Panama canal, a naval base should be established at Chiriqui Lagoon, which is admirably situated about 120 miles from Colon. It has, beyond all question, the largest and finest harbor in the world, which is capable of harboring all the navies of the world, and, at the same time, it is easily defended by fortifications, so that the navy would be foot-loose with its use as a naval base for the protection of the Panama canal.
The naval base at Puget Sound is admirably situated for the northern base of the Pacific fleet. San Francisco, with Mare Island, is the southern base for the Pacific fleet.
Honolulu, with Pearl Harbor, is the base for the Hawaiian flying fleet, and Manila and Olongapo the bases for the Philippine fleet.
Besides the above-mentioned navy yards and naval stations we have a number which are not suitable as naval bases, and which, therefore, should be abandoned. New Orleans, Pensacola, Charleston, Port Royal, Portsmouth, N. H., and Culebra are not suitable for naval bases. Much of the equipment and machinery plant of these navy yards, not suitable as bases, should be transferred to the other navy yards which are in need of development, such as Guantanamo, Key West, Chiriqui Lagoon and Pearl Harbor. The cost of maintaining the foregoing yards is an unnecessary expense, and, by abandoning them, the other necessary naval bases may be built up without much expense. The navy yards at New Orleans and Pensacola are remote from the scene of action, since the Gulf of Mexico is practically an inland American lake. The independent Republic of Cuba is under American protection, and cannot harbor a foreign fleet hostile to the United States. When Cuba belonged to Spain there was a necessity for having yards at Pensacola and New Orleans, but this necessity no longer exists.
The navy yard at Charleston, S. C., has no advantages as a strategic site, it is not a salient point, and it has no special resources as to skilled labor, industries and transportation facilities to commend it for a site as naval base. There are no advantages by which the fleet could be benefited in its operations to command the Atlantic. The Atlantic fleet would always be nearer Norfolk on the one hand, or Key West on the other, than to Charleston, and, therefore, in this respect, Charleston has no advantages as a base at a salient point to make our navy foot-loose.
Portsmouth, N. H., has some advantages, but it is not on a strategic site; it is too near the navy yard at Boston. However, its deep harbor and docking facilities make its retention necessary until ample docking facilities shall have been provided at other bases.
THE COAST DEFENCES.
The object of coast defences is to protect the coast from a foreign naval force. Our coast fortifications must engage the enemy's vessels. Manifestly these should be located where the enemy's fleet might come. Coast fortifications remote from the sea are, therefore, of no use--such as Fort McHenry, Fort Monroe, Fort Schuyler, and many others which are now garrisoned by the coast artillery. We need fortifications to protect the salient points, and to make our navy foot-loose.
Fortifications, therefore, are needed to protect the approaches to our naval bases. We need fortifications at the approaches to New York harbor, in Long Island and Vinyard Sounds, in Massachusetts bay, in the entrance to Delaware bay, and to command the approaches to the entrance to Chesapeake bay, which fortifications should be adequate to protect the bases of the Atlantic fleet.
The Straits of Florida should be absolutely commanded by fortifications and Navy-Coast-Defenders to completely close the Straits. Fortifications along the north shore of the Straits of Florida should be built on the outer reefs, seven miles south of the Florida Keys, extending at intervals from Miami to Tortugas, with Key West as the center. Fort Taylor, at Key West, does not command the approaches to Key West harbor. The armament at Fort Taylor should be transferred to fortifications to be built along the outer reefs. These forts and batteries will command the route close to the reefs that west-bound vessels in the Straits must take to avoid the strong currents of the Gulf Stream.
Fortifications are needed at Guantanamo, at San Juan, at Porto Rico, and, especially, at Chiriqui Lagoon, for the protection of those bases.
Fortifications elsewhere on the coast, that do not protect approaches to bases, are not needed. Such fortifications will not be attacked. It would not pay an enemy to risk an attack on any of our present fortifications not at the enumerated naval bases, because the effect of any such attack would have no influence upon the fleet. As long as our fleet has command of the sea the enemy's fleet dare not venture to attack minor places before encountering our fleet. It will be perfectly safe to dispense with coast fortifications at all points except those which have been enumerated as necessary to protect the approaches to our naval bases.
The fortifications at Gulf ports, such as Galveston, New Orleans, Pensacola, Mobile and Tampa, are of no use, provided the fortifications and Navy-Coast-Defenders completely command and block the Straits of Florida and the Yucatan channel. An enemy would obtain no advantage by attempting to enter the Gulf of Mexico. Such an attempt could never be made without the knowledge of the Atlantic fleet, and adequate defences at the Straits of Florida and the Yucatan channel, with available Navy-Coast-Defenders, would invariably give us relative superiority, when reenforced by the Atlantic fleet, should such an attack be attempted. There would be too little for any enemy to gain for him to send a formidable fleet to attack our Gulf ports, while the risk of his defeat would be enormous. The Gulf ports can, therefore, be safely left to the defences at Key West and the Navy-Coast-Defenders in the Yucatan channel and Straits of Florida.
We need coast defences at Puget Sound, San Diego, and the Golden Gate. These Pacific coast fortifications should be of the most formidable character, and should extend as far to seaward as possible, to command approaches. We need fortifications for the naval base at Honolulu, and, also, elaborate fortifications at the approaches to Manila bay, at Olongapo, at the terminal of the railroad at the north end of the Island of Luzon, and at San Barnardino Straits.
NAVY-COAST-DEFENDERS.
Besides the fighting fleet, the navy has a considerable force of other vessels: torpedo boats, gun boats, cruisers and converted vessels which are not suitable as scouts, monitors, obsolete and older battleships, and submarines. The perfection of submarines is as yet problematical, and so long as it is problematical they cannot be depended upon as one of the reliable components of the fighting force of the navy. Submarines are, therefore, to be used with the Navy-Coast-Defenders, co-operating with the coast artillery and marines, in the defence of our naval bases. The marines having been separated from service afloat in the fighting fleet and assigned to duty at naval bases, form an available trained force to co-operate with the coast artillery corps and the Navy-Coast-Defenders in the coast defence.
BUREAU OF COAST DEFENCES.
Co-operation of the navy, marines and coast artillery, three different organizations under both the War and Navy Departments, necessitates much closer relations between them than we have had hitherto. A separate bureau of coast defences should be established to take full control of the coast defences. The bureau should be endowed with all administrative authority over the three branches of the service assigned to it. The personnel of officers and men belonging to the army, navy and marine corps detached to service in coast defences and in the Navy-Coast-Defenders, should be under the exclusive orders of the bureau of coast defences until detached from such service by either the War or Navy Department with the knowledge and consent of the bureau of coast defences.
The materiel of the coast defences and Navy-Coast-Defenders, and all that pertains to supplies and accounts, etc., must, however, remain, as at present, under the direction of the War and Navy Departments, respectively, for the maintenance and repair and preservation of this materiel. The bureau of coast defences should have full control of all the coast defences, and should apportion the available forces in different districts and possessions as may be deemed advantageous. The bureau of coast defences should be composed of the chief of the coast artillery corps, a flag officer of the navy, and the major-general-commandant of the marine corps. The bureau should distribute the available forces in the different districts and detail the officer to command each coast defence district The district commander should be an officer of rank of either the navy, coast artillery, or marine corps. Where fortifications constitute the chief feature of the defence, the commandant should be an officer of the coast artillery; and where the Navy-Coast-Defenders have the principal role, with accessory coast defence work, a naval officer should command; and where considerable inland protection is necessary, a marine officer should command. For example, it would be desirable for a coast artillery officer to command the coast defence district of New York, while a naval officer would command at Key West, to control the Straits of Florida and the Yucatan channel, and a marine officer would be best suited to command on the Isthmus of Panama. The commanding officer in each coast defence district should have three aides, one from each of the three branches of the service, and through whom he would transmit special orders to the detachment of that branch of the service to which that aide should respectively belong.
The prescribed limits of this essay will not permit of a categorical description of the needs of each naval base, but the assignment of a portion to each of our four spheres of action will indicate a good use for the available Navy-Coast-Defenders.
It will be possible to assign the following to the naval bases in each of our four spheres:
The number of vessels available is, therefore, not adequate for all demands. Perfect command of the Straits of Florida, Yucatan channel, and the base at Chiriqui Lagoon will require at least double the number of older battleships, but this number will be increased during the next ten years by acquisition of battleships that become 15 years old in that time.
The other components of the force of Navy-Coast-Defenders will, likewise, be increased from time to time as cruisers, scouts, etc., become unsuitable for service with the fighting fleet, while still serviceable for ten or more years as Navy-Coast-Defenders.
No vessels should be built for Navy-Coast-Defenders. All new vessels must be designed and built for the fighting fleet. Indeed, perfect command of the sea obviates all necessity for any coast defence. If we command the sea, no foreign naval force can attack our coasts.
But, inasmuch as the game of war may require temporary absence of the fleet from the strategic lines of force, it is well to have some protection, that our fleet may not return to find its base closed at a critical time, when scarcity of fuel, ammunition, etc., would cripple the fleet.
The Atlantic coast between Hatteras and Key West needs no defences beyond those now existing. The importance of our inland coast waterways and canals, which are being developed to give a continuous inland water route from Key West to New York and Boston, cannot be over-estimated. The inland route between Norfolk and Boston will be very valuable for the concentration of light draft Navy-Coast-Defenders at any particular point along the coast where they may be needed to protect the approaches to our naval bases. South of Norfolk along to Miami, no defences are needed, because that coast will never be attacked, except by a weak raiding force that will easily be repelled by Navy-Coast-Defenders that could be sent by the inland water route to any threatened point.
It is simply a waste of public money to build any elaborate fortifications anywhere on the Atlantic coast between Norfolk and Miami, because no enemy could ever find it an advantage to attack any part of that coast, especially if the Atlantic fleet was able to attack him, and more especially if the Atlantic fleet had been destroyed and driven to shelter at its bases, in which case the enemy's attack would certainly be directed upon the approaches to the Atlantic bases: Chesapeake bay, Delaware bay, New York harbor, Long Island Sound, etc., where their successful effort would have a decisive effect for the enemy's cause.
Our bases and their approaches must be protected. We can not have perfect command of the sea without having, at the same time, an absolute certainty that our fleet can have free access to our naval bases. Perfect command of the approaches to our bases is an essential element of the proposition to have perfect command of the sea. All other coast fortifications are unnecessary.
In all other departments of human effort we have found it necessary to change our plans and views; and old fortifications that were built years and years ago, to meet the circumstances of that time, though modernized, do not answer at present, because of their locations. We have changed the armament, and now that the Gulf of Mexico has become an inland lake, and the ports in Chesapeake bay and Delaware bay are no longer exposed to an attack by an enemy's fleet, there is no necessity for any fortifications in the Gulf and within these bays; they are only necessary at their entrances and approaches.
All unnecessary existing coast fortifications should be sold or turned over to the militia of the several states in which they are located. The coast artillery corps should be stationed at the necessary sea-coast defences where there is a possibility of an attack by a foreign naval force. The defences at approaches to all our bases must be greatly enlarged and strengthened, as enumerated. The personnel strength of the coast artillery corps is inadequate to properly man the necessary coast defences.
The assignment of the marine corps to duty at the naval bases will afford considerable improvement in the personnel strength, but that is inadequate for properly training and maintaining the necessary coast defences, even after the withdrawal of garrisons from old forts where no hostile ship would ever come. The coast artillery corps must be drilled in time of peace to be prepared for proper defence in time of war, when it would be reenforced by at least double the number of untrained volunteers.
There must be no idle reserve, unless the militia and volunteers, to be called out in time of war, can be considered as such. No vessels of the navy should ever be placed in reserve. All must belong to the fighting fleet as long as suitable to serve therewith, or to the Navy-Coast-Defenders. Vessels not adapted to either should be sold, unless still serviceable for duty as receiving ships, or for naval militia. Naval training should be given in efficient ships of the fleet or Navy-Coast-Defenders. Men should be trained in efficient ships, and not be obliged to learn that which has been discarded.
Efficient coast defence is assured by intimate co-operation of the coast artillery corps, the navy and marines at the naval bases. This intimate co-operation will be most strikingly manifested at the great military and naval base commanding the Straits of Florida. Elaborate fortifications on the outer reefs, south of the Florida Keys, will cover the entire inland channel from Miami to Tortugas-150 miles, with a width of from 5 to 7 miles—affording protected anchorages for fleets of battleships and cruisers, torpedo flotillas and schools of submarines to operate and command in the Straits of Florida and Yucatan channel, thereby completely closing all approaches to the Gulf of Mexico, which becomes a protected inland American lake, that needs no fortifications at any of its ports.
THE PERSONNEL.
An adequate force of officers and men must be provided for this fleet of fighting ships, the naval bases and Navy-Coast-Defenders. To ascertain the requisite number of officers and men, it will be proper to assign flag and commanding officers for the respective fleets, bases and ships, and from the existing proportion of staff and junior officers determine the number by which the entire navy must be officered.
The senior officer of the navy should be the admiral of the navy, who should direct its operations through the general board: or, in case that is not conceded, the chief of the bureau of navigation, acting for the Secretary of the Navy, should command with the rank of vice-admiral. The chief of the bureau of navigation is now the chief of the navy personnel, and directs the movements of ships and the personnel. His orders, as those of the Secretary of the Navy, are given in accordance with the existing policy and plans of campaign, assisted by the advice of the general board, of which he should be a member.
The commander-in-chief of each of the three fleets of battleships, and, also, of the Hawaiian flying fleet, should have the rank of vice-admiral. This rank is essential to the organization of a fleet. It is the proper title for the commander of such a force, and necessary for the exercise of naval command. It might be possible to designate the commander of a company of infantry as an ensign, but it is not customary; he has always been called a captain, and always will be so designated. We have rear-admirals to command squadrons and divisions, and it is just as necessary to have a distinction in rank between the commander of a fleet and the commander of a division as it is in the army between commanders of armies and commanders of brigades. If we need fleets, the necessity for officers of proper rank to command the fleets is equally urgent. Rear-admirals Evans, Thomas and Sperry performed the duties of vice-admirals and should have had the title. The lack of the title did not lessen their authority, nor impair their efficiency, except that it was an imputation that the American people did not want to do justice to faithful servants. The fact is, that our people have not fully realized that the commander of a real fleet does the duty of a vice-admiral, or they would have no objection to designating him by a title descriptive of his duty. Only recently have we had a real fleet, and now that it is necessary to have the duties of a vice-admiral performed it is only just to claim that the officer charged with the duty of a vice-admiral shall have the rank.
The following officers are required:
Admirals 1
Vice-admirals 5
Rear-admirals:
To command 4 divisions of 3 fleets of battleships 12
To command 4divisions of Hawaiian flying fleet 4
For chiefs of bureaus of ordnance, steam engineering and equipment 3
For commandant of navy yards at New York, Boston, Philadelphia,
Norfolk, Washington, Key West, Mare Island, Puget Sound,
Honolulu, Cavite and Olongapo 11
Superintendent of the Naval Academy 1
President of the War College 1
Examining and retiring boards 2
Boards of inspection 2
Lighthouse board 1
Superintendent of the Naval Observatory 1
Bureau of coast defences, or joint army and navy board 1
Chief intelligence officer 1
Commandant of naval training station, Great Lakes 1
Commandant of naval training station, Newport, R.I. 1
Total 42
Captains:
To command 48 battleships 48
To command 22 armored cruisers 22
As chief of staff in 4 fleets 4
To command 10 battleships (naval coast defenders) 10
Captain of yard at New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Key West
Mare Island, Puget Sound, Honolulu, Cavite and Olongapo 10
To command torpedo station, Newport, R. I. 1
To command receiving ships at stations 8
General inspector of ordnance 1
General inspector of equipment 1
General inspector of steam engineering 1
Commandant of Guantanamo 1
Commandant of San Juan, Porto Rico 1
Commandant of Guam 1
Commandant of Samoa 1
Commandant at naval training station, San Francisco 1
Commandant at Chiriqui Lagoon 1
As assistants to chiefs of bureau of navigation, ordnance, steam
engineering and equipment 4
Member of general board 1
Members of two boards of inspection 2
Member of lighthouse board 1
Judge advocate general of the navy 1
Naval attachés abroad 5
Commandant midshipmen Naval Academy 1
Bureau of coast defences, or joint army and navy board 1
Members of examining and retiring boards 2
One inspector of ordnance at the navy yards at New York, Boston,
Philadelphia, Norfolk, Key West, Puget Sound, Mare Island,
Honolulu, Cavite and Olangapo 10
One equipment officer at each of the above yards 10
One head of department of steam engineering at each of the
above yards 10
Total 160
Commanders:
To command 64 scouts 64
To command 20 fleet auxiliaries 20
To command 10 monitors (Navy-Coast-Defenders) 10
To command 20 of the largest gunboats and converted yachts 20
As executive officer of 48 battleships 48
As fleet ordnance officer in 4 fleets 4
As fleet engineer in 4 fleets 4
As chief of staff to 8 squadron commanders 8
Adjutant to the Secretary of the Navy 1
Adjutant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 1
Office of the judge advocate general 3
Bureau of equipment 4
Inspection under bureau of equipment at private establishments 3
Naval Observatory 1
Hydrographic office 1
Bureau of navigation 2
Recruiting duty 3
Naval Academy 7
Examining board 1
Bureau of ordnance 2
Inspectors of ordnance at 10 private establishments 10
Total 217
The duties required in all the above stations must be performed by officers of flag and command rank. Efficiency cannot be obtained unless the duties are performed by officers having the requisite qualifications, experience and rank. The naval organization requires that officers designated to perform the duties of the above stations must have the requisite authority that pertains to the rank of flag officer and commanding officer respectively.
For junior officers, it is not necessary to go into elaborate details of each and every assignment. The number of junior officers bears a relative proportion to those of flag and command rank, and from this the strength of the line officers should be:
Admirals 1
Vice-admirals 5
Rear-admirals 42
Captains 160
Commanders 217
Lieut.-commanders (the sum of captains and commanders) 377
Lieutenants 600
Lieutenants, junior grade 700
Ensigns 800
Total 2902
As the navy is established for the purpose of fighting foreign naval enemies, its adequacy for contending against such a foe suggests a comparison of the personnel sea strength. The following table, published by the Office of Naval Intelligence, shows the personnel strength of the principal naval powers January 1, 1908, to which there is prefixed the warship tonnage or such naval powers for comparison.
United
England. France. Germany. Japan. States.
Warship tonnage 1,821610 836,112 680,660 451,320 771,758
Rank.
Flag officers 96 45 34 55 18
Captains & Commanders 618 360 299 245 182
Other line officers
& engineers 3,289 1,874 1,732 1,571 751
Total line officers 4,003 2,279 2,065 1,871 951
Medical officers 521 409 234 306 282
Pay officers 537 187 189 263 210
Warrant officers 2,007 1,484 2,033 1,064 638
Enlisted men 98,973 51,926 42,400 41,070 34,062
Total navy personnel 106,041 56,285 46,921 44,574 36,143
Marine officers 490 -- 86 -- 277
Enlisted men (marines) 17,526 -- 1,230 -- 8,147
The table shows, that while we have nearly one-half the warship tonnage of England, the number of our line officers is less than one-fourth that of the English navy. England has more than twice as many line officers per warship tonnage. The total strength of our navy personnel of officers and men is only one-third that of the British navy. These facts show that it is absolutely necessary to increase our personnel strength for the present materiel, and absolutely necessary to more than double it for the materiel herein shown to be necessary. With such inferiority in the strength of our navy personnel it will almost be a miracle for us to have relative superiority in any case.
It also appears that we have more medical and pay officers than Germany; and if the numbers in these corps be doubled, the number will suffice. In order, therefore, to be as conservative as possible, the following strength of the navy personnel is necessary for the proposed materiel:
Flag officers 48
Captains and commanders 377
Other line officers 2,477
Medical officers 564
Pay officers 420
Warrant officers 1,276
Enlisted men 68,124
Marine officers 554
Enlisted men (marines) 16,294
the numbers of all in the above list, except the line officers, being double the number at the present time.
The shortage of officers, even with our present force of battleships, is a tremendous handicap to our efficiency. For lack of officers, many ships are laid up in reserve; all are short of officers, and all officers are obliged to do double duty. Line officers, especially, are subjected to arduous work, one often being called on to do the duties of three officers, as executive, navigator and chief engineer, of a ship, because no more officers are available to be detailed to that ship.
Fortunately, our officers are competent as line officers and engineers, a condition that does not exist in any other navy, and which is evidence of individual superiority. These qualifications of our officers, however, cannot supply all the deficiencies in this shortage, and the conservative increase outlined is absolutely necessary.
In addition to this increase in the personnel to be authorized now, Congress should hereafter provide that whenever a new ship is built the additional personnel of officers and men for the complement of this ship shall likewise be authorized.
Considering our present and the proposed strength of personnel, it is apparent that it will be impossible to fill all the grades with experienced officers immediately. It will be necessary to proceed gradually, in order to preserve a proper balance and relative strength in each grade.
Promotion to all grades above that of lieutenant should be limited, so that there shall be the same percentage of vacancies in the list of lieutenants as in the list of lieutenant-commanders, and the same rule should apply to all higher grades.
The authorized number of naval constructors, civil engineers, professors of mathematics, and chaplains, must also be doubled to provide the best materiel and trained personnel for this proposed naval strength. Their services are absolutely necessary, and their present numbers are certainly inadequate for any increase in the navy. Their number should, likewise, be increased gradually, leaving the same percentage of vacancies in each grade, to avoid having the higher grades filled by young men, who would block deserved promotion in the future.
Our present laws for retirement should be modified, and especially in regard to the retiring age of 62. It is difficult to understand why naval officers must retire when 62 years old, while the army officers retire at 64 years. We have lost many of our most brilliant officers by forcing them to retire while capable of rendering most valuable service. Now, while the personnel is to be so largely increased, is the time to rectify this, and to change the law to retire at 64 years. This should apply to all flag officers, or, at least, to the grade of vice-admiral.
The shortage of officers requires the services of retired officers, whose employment on active duty is permitted until 1912 only. The services of retired officers will be needed long after that period, and all retired officers with less than 40 years' active service should be obliged to serve on active duty as long as they are physically and professionally qualified, and those with 40 or more years' service should be permitted to continue on active duty as long as they desire and are still qualified. Under the Personnel Act of 1899 many officers have been retired who are still capable of rendering good service, and their services are needed.
There is no private industry nor profession the pursuit of which will qualify any one for the duties of a line officer of the navy. All line officers must be graduated from the Naval Academy, or be promoted from the enlisted men of the navy when qualified. The necessity of educating very large classes of midshipmen at the Naval Academy is urgent to supply the number required for the navy, as herein shown. We need 300 graduates every year for this largely increased strength of personnel, and as the same proportion of vacancies by death, resignation, etc., will prevail, the actual number recruiting from the Naval Academy must be greater to maintain this strength.
The navy and coast defence herein demonstrated to be necessary is not advocated to wage war over the world. This force is only that which is urgently necessary for our defence. The fact that our fleets must be able to cross the ocean is not to be regarded as any indication of such a policy. Indeed, American policy is utterly opposed to conquest of any territory beyond the seas. The acquisition of the Philippines is sincerely regretted by the American people, but its possession involves the duty to provide for its protection, and having expended millions of wealth and sacrificed the lives of thousands of our citizens we can not shirk our responsibility to protect these islands until they can protect themselves.
These fleets are not a menace, but solely for protection. In any defensive campaign, sorties are necessary, and so our fleets must be capable of carrying out offensive-defensive operations, or sorties across the sea if necessary, in order to command the seas in our four spheres with relative superiority at the point of contact.
The three fleets of battleships and the Hawaiian flying fleet, with all appertaining to these four fleets, must be supplemented by the West Indian fleet of battleships after the Panama canal is opened, for its protection.
The building and maintenance of these fleets will require large appropriations; but this will not be greater than the ordinary cost of insurance which it provides. The expense of building these fleets will be largely covered by the sale of the land, buildings. and other property of the five navy yards that should be abandoned, while the sale of the territory of many of the old forts in and near large cities will provide an additional reduction in the expense required to provide an efficient navy and proper coast defence.
The world must know that we have these fleets and such a thorough protection. This knowledge must not be merely printed reports, but positive facts, repeatedly demonstrated by actual exhibition of the fleets in all parts of the world.
Secrecy in regard to preparedness for war is impracticable, since war materiel must be handled to train personnel. Efforts to conceal facts about materiel indicate consciousness of weakness and tend to defeat our only object, viz: That our preparedness for war shall deter nations from making war against us. Preparedness for war insures peace. The police of New York City frequently parade to deter disturbance of the peace, and, exactly on the same principle, our fleets must be seen, that international peace may not be disturbed.
Everything can not be adjusted by arbitration. Is it just to exclude Asiatics and demand admission in Asia for American missionaries? Yet we must spread the gospel in Asia, and, also, protect our labor. Will Americans submit to any decree of the Hague Court that would decide that we must either admit Asiatics or exclude American missionaries from China? Such questions, and many others of similar character, are constantly arising, and we must be properly and efficiently armed to keep our palace and goods in peace.
Peace societies defeat their own object when they demand disarmament. It is the law of nature, that the strong man must be armed to have peace, and our Savior still further teaches in the verse of Holy Scripture which follows that used as the motto of this essay, that he must be stronger than his foe to maintain peace.
DISCUSSION.
REAR-ADMIRAL C. H. STOCKTON, U. S. NAVY.—This is an interesting paper upon a live subject, and whether intended or not is a sad satire upon our system, or rather, want of system, of establishing navy yards and naval stations. This procedure in the locating of navy yards is an evidence of the strength of sectionalism vs. patriotism.
A strong and active member of Congress, or an energetic and capable naval officer in charge of a naval station, often originates and establishes a navy yard or keeps alive by an unnecessary expenditure of money a station which ought not to be established, or if established should be allowed to die out and be abandoned.
Nowhere is this matter more strongly exemplified than in the Gulf of Mexico and its adjacent waters. Pensacola, the Dry Tortugas, New Orleans and Key West, each in turn has had its day and predominance and now to-day all drain alike from the public's treasury and increase the expenditure unnecessarily under the head of the Naval Appropriation Act.
I do not intend by this statement to impugn the sincerity or intelligence of the extremely conscientious and honest officer who has written the essay which is the subject of these remarks. Much that he says in favor of Key West, especially with respect to its stragetic position, is true; much that he says as to the uselessness of New Orleans and Pensacola is also true, but the subject of the Gulf should be treated as a whole, definitely regulated by the General Board, as a whole, in connection with the naval Policy of the United States of America.
Key West is a point that cannot be ignored; every war has forced IT into a position of utility and value; but the inherent defects of the place as a harbor, as almost impossible of defence, have also become evident and made known its limitations. Its position as an advanced base has been strengthened by its future railway possibilities, but the weakness of this thread of communication, the great difficulty of preserving it intact in face of an active and strong navy shows also the limitation in that respect. Year by year the place becomes less valuable as a deep water harbor and as a place where prolonged repairs can be effected with that safety from attack and disturbance which is so essential in modern times.
The Dry Tortugas appears also in the paper of Commodore Beehler and has been a subject in the past of much useless expenditure of money in the way of fortifications and coaling plant. Let us hope that there will be no successful attempt to revive it as a station and place for expenditure. It is not necessary for our own navy and as a base and station for an enemy it can be eliminated if we have the sea power which will give control of these waters to our own forces. Without that sea power in these days of colliers, and oil as a fuel, the Tortugas is only one of several points that can be used for renewing the necessary fuel in the Gulf of Mexico.
With the exemption of unfortified harbors from bombardment and attack, with the rapidity of movement and attack possible from the supremacy of a war lord and his general staff, with the adoption of oil as main or auxiliary fuel, with the increased speed and self-reliance of battleships, with their attendant auxiliaries and with the growing concentration of the great navies in the hands of a few powers, or a few, very few, groups of powers, I think the whole naval policy of the United States needs a thorough and systematic study and development. Let us hope that such study and development is under way and can be made effective.
Arbitration, as the author of this paper suggests, has its limitations. No State will relinquish or ought to be asked to relinquish its national vitality and independence to a central governing body to which it must tamely submit, no matter how wide its range or how vital its decisions may be with regard to the nationality, the independence or the interests of the States concerned. I cannot think, however, that the future will bring an emasculation of nationalities, men without countries, the extinction of patriotism, or a resultant single dominant ruler of the world, as in the days of the Roman Empire.
Until this occurs, strong navies, and strong navies alone, are in order. For weak navies, no reason or excuse exists, except as auxiliaries to dominant allies.
FIRST LIEUTENANT PAUL D. BUNKER, U. S. COAST ARTILLERY—Commodore Beehler's solution of the problem of coast defence, proper, does not seem to be as good as the one now in force. The subject cannot be dismissed in a few paragraphs, nor even pages. The scheme now entertained by those in authority involves the fighting of the guns of the fort by its garrison, aided if possible by national guard coast artillery companies, and also the land defence of the forts by national guard troops from the vicinity. Here there is no division of authority, with its resulting evils. The district commander knows what is expected of him, he has full control over his district, and is responsible directly to the chief of coast artillery. If the enemy has landed and is not attempting a serious attack with his ships, he sends part of the coast artillery troops to aid in the land defence.
Division never produces strength. It is better to have one man responsible for a thing than several. Hence let us have one man, not three, responsible for the proper fighting of our forts. I am strongly of the "one man" idea, as contrasted with the idea of control by a board. There can be no division of authority if efficiency in results is demanded. The "Bureau of Coast Defences" would not work, would not produce efficient results. The navy, marines and coast artillery all have their separate and distinct work, and efficiency would not be attained by any attempt to combine their functions. The attack upon the enemy's ships, whether by our battle fleet or by "navy-coast-defenders," should be under the command of a naval officer, and he should not be a fortress commander. Similarly, the defence of a coast fort should in all cases be intrusted to an officer of the coast artillery, not a naval or marine officer.
Now it is not contemplated to keep the coast artillery tied down to its heavy guns, regardless of the fortunes of war. The artillery is trained to take the field, and circumstances can easily be imagined where this will be highly important.
We cannot assume that we shall always have the command of the sea, for if we did, there would be little use for the army at all. Supposing that the enemy had succeeded in making a landing on our shores, it would be essential to concentrate all available troops against him in the least possible time. This is where the coast artillery would have to partially abandon their forts, which would have necessarily decreased in value, and take the field, either as infantry or to handle heavy movable guns. It would also be one point where the Bureau of Coast Defences would break down. The War Department must have absolute control over all land forces, and must be able to move troops at will, without being hampered by a "Bureau of Coast Defences." This should be as apparent a fact as that the Navy Department should have control over all war ships, whether used for harbor defence, or as parts of the battle fleet.
The idea of delegating to the corps of marines the duty of providing for the land defence of our forts is a good one. They have an enviable reputation for being ready at any hour of the night for duty in any part of the globe. Being stationed at our seacoast forts, it would be very easy for an expeditionary fleet to embark them for any sudden duty that unforeseen trouble demanded in ordinary times of "peace." Also, a well-trained body of men like this would be ideal as a land defence for the forts. However, the whole strength of the marine corps would be but a drop in the bucket, when it comes to provide a land defence for the most essential bases, to say nothing of the number that would be required elsewhere. Hence, if the marine corps has not sufficient personnel, why fritter away their strength by scattering them in this fashion?
Now there are several fundamental propositions concerning the functions of the coast defence that must be always kept in mind. One of these is: a coast fort has completely fulfilled its functions when it has made an enemy abandon a direct attack by sea, and compelled him to adopt either a land attack or a combination. That is, when it has made the enemy land his forces. It is not necessary for the fort to have inflicted any damage upon the ships of the enemy. In fact, it seems to be fairly well understood that a direct attack by ships on a modern seacoast fort will be a very rare occurrence, especially if it is known that the fort possesses an efficient mining system. Hence it is only reasonable to suppose that the enemy will attempt to land, as quickly as possible, and as near some strategic point as possible. As we must not assume that we shall always have command of the sea, it is seen that these possible landing places of the enemy must be protected. It is for this reason, partly, that all of our harbors, that would be useful to an enemy for this purpose, are fortified to a greater or less extent. Now it is entirely possible that our enemy, relying on the weaknesses of a popular government, would attempt to land near, and operate against some of our great commercial centers, thus producing in the masses a clamorous demand for peace. This same course of action, in our Civil War, was not without effect, and if our navy should temporarily or locally lose command of the sea, it is doubtful what would result from a powerful attack of this kind. Hence it is seen that the locations of some of the forts that Commodore Beehler condemns, are not altogether bad. Naval bases are about the most important thing we can protect, but we must also prevent the enemy from occupying a good harbor, with railroad and docking facilities, where he can establish a base of operations, should our sea supremacy temporarily fail. (The piers at Dalny were of inestimable advantage to the Japanese in their operations against Port Arthur.)
Fort Monroe, for instance, is of very great importance, and until "The Capes" are fortified, it is the sole protecting barrier to the navy yard at Norfolk and the dry-docks at Newport News, to say nothing of the great railroad systems lying but a short distance away.
Thus we must remember that this is a government "by the people," and if war should break out, every seacoast city would put up such a clamor for protection that very important operations might be endangered, were not every harbor of importance fairly well protected.
The advantages gained by fortifying the outer Florida Reef would hardly seem to warrant the necessary expenditure. Key West itself is strongly fortified, and with a little additional expense would be impregnable. With the judicious use of mines, it is extremely doubtful if any naval commander would attempt a direct attack. No more than this could be obtained by fortifying the whole line of keys.
Key West forms a "point d'appui" for the operations in the whole Gulf of Mexico, and if we had another at Chiriqui Lagoon, fulfilling the same function at the other approach to the Gulf (the Yucatan Channel), there would be little to fear from an enemy operating in this direction, for to pass either base would be to expose his lines of retreat and of communications to destruction. However, of course, the harbor at Key West would have to be properly "improved" before this most desirable result could be obtained. Yet even if these two bases were put into splendid condition, it would seem only proper to protect the great artery of the Mississippi as a second line of defence.