"OUR NEW BATTLESHIPS AND ARMORED CRUISERS." See No. 96.
Rear Admiral R. D. EVANS, U. S. N.
The questions propounded by Naval Constructor Taylor are the most serious and important ever put to the sea-going officers of our service, and we owe him not only our thanks for asking them, but our earnest professional opinion in answering them.
For me, the answer is an easy one. I say unhesitatingly that we are making a serious blunder in building ships so much alike as the battleship Virginia and the armored cruiser Maryland, and the sooner we stop the practice and get back to sound military principles the better it will be for us when battle shall give us the only real test.
In the days of wooden ships our superiority was entirely owing to the heavier batteries we carried, and when we became the builders of steel battleships our first efforts were splendidly successful because we stuck to the same principle. I say battleships, but it was equally true of all classes. In our cruisers we added also the quality of speed, because we recognized the fact that speed to a certain extent was the controlling factor in the vessel intended for scouting work and not intended for the line of battle.
Gradually a change came, and somebody with sufficient influence to dominate the Navy Department began to undo the good work of our constructors, until today we find thin armor and light guns the rule in our projected ships of the line of battle.
I am surprised that Mr. Taylor does not see the cause of all this, or does not, if he sees it, come out squarely and condemn it and suggest the remedy. To my mind the craze after speed in a battleship is at the bottom of it all. The desire for a thing that is absolutely of no value after you get it has compelled the thinning of the armor and the reduction in caliber of guns, two of the vital things in battleship construction. In order to obtain 19, or, worse still, 21 knots' speed, we must sacrifice the things that make a battleship, and having attained this speed on the trial trip, we can never hope to reach it again because we can never realize the same conditions in actual service. In other words, we must carry around during the entire life of the ship a lot of dead weight in the shape of machinery which should have been put on the outside in armor, and in the battery in armor-piercing guns. Cut the speed of our battleships down to sixteen knots sea speed, and then on a displacement of 15,000 tons give us all the protection you can, and a steaming radius as great as possible.
Battleships are not intended to do the work of cruisers; they are intended to fight, and for that purpose alone they are built. If others choose to thin their armor in order to get speed let them do it, and when the day of battle comes they can run away or get whipped just as they prefer; they amount to the same thing when you consider the objects of a naval campaign. Make the distinction between the battleship and the cruiser clear and distinct. Heavy armor, heavy guns, and moderate speed, with great maneuvering qualities, the features of one; great speed and coal endurance the features of the other, with as much armor and battery as possible; but above all things stick to the moderate speed for the battleship, because it is the attempt to get away from it that makes of her an indifferent armored cruiser.
The craze for rapid fire in armor-piercing guns has had its share also in the retrograde movement in our later battleships. I do not for a moment doubt or discount the value of rapid fire up to a certain point, but beyond that point it has absolutely no value and will only deafen men and overheat the guns. A well-sustained, accurate fire of moderate rapidity will win over the unevenly sustained and inaccurate fire that must follow the effort to fire with the greatest possible rapidity.
It would have been only reasonable to expect that, as armor was made more perfect and more difficult to penetrate, we would find more armor-piercing guns in our new ships, but such is not the case. On the contrary, we find the 12-inch instead of the 13-inch, and the number of 8-inch reduced, as in the case of the Alabama and Illinois, in favor of the rapid-fire 6-inch, a purely cruiser gun, in my opinion, and one that certainly cannot pierce the armor now being generally put on foreign battleships outside torpedo range.
In conclusion, let us come back to the sound principles as shown in our first battleship—a few more guns and a little more armor than others have. Let our constructors bend their minds and energies to giving us a ship of about 15,000 tons with armor protection for the entire ship; speed sixteen knots sustained at sea, and the following battery as near as may be:
Four 13-inch guns, in turrets, forward and aft.
Twelve 8-inch guns in broadside, with sufficient splinter protection but no turrets. Four of these guns to be capable of firing directly ahead and four astern, and all so arranged that they may be worked entirely by hand in case of necessity.
Twenty-five to thirty 50-caliber 14-pounders, and such smaller guns for torpedo defense as can be properly installed.
We can have such a ship, I am sure, if we are willing to take her with a speed of sixteen knots.
Lieutenant-Commander J. B. MURDOCK, U. S. N.
The very pertinent questions with which Mr. Taylor closes his article open up the whole question of armored ships. The status of the battleship is becoming fixed. Naval opinion the world over seems to be settling towards the adoption of the twelve-inch gun as the maximum caliber. These are supported by a broadside battery of six-inch, generally in a casemate. After building several ships of this type, we have reverted to the eight-inch gun in turrets in addition to the two other calibers. I think this change as outlined in the new battleships is most satisfactory to the service. The eight-inch has always been a favorite in our navy, and since the. Spanish war is more of one than ever. The battery design of the Virginia is formidable, and the ship, from our point of view, is fully able to carry her guns. The type to me seems most satisfactory, not excelled, in fact, by any afloat.
The armored cruiser is more the result of compromise between conflicting conditions than any other class of ship, and as a result there are numberless very different types in existence in different navies. Standard there is none, but it is all essential that the vessels designed for any navy should be adapted to its necessities. In our methods of construction we are more in touch with the British than with any other nation, and many of our ships, the Maryland perhaps among others, have been designed as improvements on British types. This is wise or not, just as the needs of our service may agree with or differ from those of the British navy, and it is as well that we should study the whole world of naval construction. Thus the Italian built Colon has been greatly admired in our service as an admirable type of armored cruiser, combining apparently all necessary qualities on very small displacement.
In 1898 Great Britain laid down ten armored cruisers of a size and speed greatly superior to any existing. There were six of the Cressy Class of about 12,000 tons and four of the Drake class of 14,000. The two types were designed for 21 and 23 knots respectively, and their evolution is largely due to the construction of fast French armored cruisers built as commerce-destroyers. British trade has already been a favorite object of French naval attack, and if war should ever arise between the two powers, the ancient practice of commerce-destroying would be again brought forward under the fancy that it was war.
If France builds men-of-war for any such purpose, the possibilities arising therefrom must of course be considered by the Admiralty. Hence the cruisers of 1898.
It does not seem to me to be sound policy for us to follow any other nation in our construction. While it may be a source of gratification to our designers to improve on a type which is recognized by everyone as very good, or to the nation at large to know that it possesses the biggest or fastest man-of-war afloat, it is unquestionable that these laudable ambitions may load our navy list with freaks and frauds—ships absolutely lacking in naval efficiency. Let us rather study our necessities and act accordingly. First and foremost are the demands liable to be made on the navy by the country. Apart from the vital importance of keeping an enemy away from our coast, we are entering as a world power on complications undreamed of ten years ago, and the possibility of hostilities in any or all parts of the world shows that the work of the navy will be arduous if war should arise with any first-class power. The loss of the command of the sea may involve the loss of any of our outlying possessions, and communication can be kept up only by having a powerful naval force at any and every threatened point. The best of officers can do nothing without ships, and he must have not only enough, but they must be of the right kind as well.
If we glance over the world, examining the numerous places at which we may come in contact with other naval powers, and then analyze each case, we will find everywhere the demands are practically the same. We will need, when war comes, good honest fighting ships—ships that not only show the flag, but can uphold it in a general fleet action. Auxiliaries, scouts, cruisers, torpedo-boat destroyers and torpedo-boats will all have their places, but no one, nor all together, can decide a naval campaign. That must be done by the fighting ship par excellence. As we have no commerce to protect and have outgrown the aberration which induced us to build the Columbia and Minneapolis, we have no call to build any vessel for patrolling our trade routes or attacking an enemy's.
To my mind, this is so clear that any armored vessel built for our navy appears as useless if she is not a fighting vessel. Instead of armored cruiser, I prefer to use the term "battle cruiser," to represent a vessel having the speed of a cruiser, but yet so designed as to be able to take a place in the line of battle in a fleet action and give a good account of herself. She must have speed, and by providing small vessels of this class—fast second-class battleships if you will—an unwilling enemy could be chased, harassed and very probably detained until he could be brought to action. A "battle cruiser" of this type would have a greatly increased radius of action over the heavy battleship, and could do a thousand things much better. The work of the New York in the Spanish war is a justification to us for the "battle cruiser" beyond any argument.
If this reasoning is correct, our "battle cruiser" must possess the following main qualifications: First, speed, at present set at 22 knots; second, sufficient gun power to be able to give heavy blows against battleships in action, and third, enough armored protection to give the ship a chance for life even when opposed to much more powerful foes. Small guns and thin armor must be shunned, as unfitting the ship for actual battle. As in the old days, 90- and 74-gun ships fought in the same battle-line, so today there is nothing inconceivable in having battleships and "battle cruisers" similarly associated, provided the latter are built for the purpose. I see no reason why we should not adopt the rule that every ship on which armor is placed should be designed to fight in company with battleships, and am sure that in this way we can secure the best return to the nation for its money. Can we afford to spend millions on a ship that cannot fight?
With these general ideas in my mind, I am not enamored with the Maryland type. They are powerful vessels and possess great offensive and defensive strength, but not to my mind as much as they should, or as much as could be given them. A solid citadel of five-inch Krupp steel covering all gun positions is admirable, and is much stronger than that possessed by most battleships now in service for their broadside battery. The Maryland, however, is not only liable to meet ships now in commission but others building, as well as many not yet laid down, and her design should have every possible improvement to forestall, as far as may be, future advances in construction and ordnance. Now, as a fact, we find that the Italians and Japanese are designing their latest vessels with six-inch plates. A still worse feature of contemporary foreign design is the fact that other nations are using heavier guns behind their thicker armor. The Maryland's six-inch guns are powerful weapons, but are weak against the six-inch armor we find on foreign ships, while their eight- or nine-inch guns would penetrate hers with comparative ease. A ship must not be not only inherently good, but must rank high among her contemporaries.
In order to fairly test the Maryland, let us compare her directly with ships either existing or laid down. Many of the former have Harvey steel instead of Krupp, and, in the comparisons made, will be credited with Krupp in order to bring them up to the same date as the Maryland. The data given in the report of the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance for 1899 will be used as a basis. He gives the following perforations of Krupp armor in inches by our latest type of guns:
At 1000 yards. At 2000 yards. At 3000 yards.
8-inch, Mark V 10.44 9.34 8.25
6-iinch Mark VI 7.28 6.14 5.3
One of the best of recent ships is the Asama of the Japanese navy. Giving her the Krupp armor that is actually going on later ships of her class, we find that she has the same speed and armament as the Maryland, while her gun positions are protected by six-inch armor instead of five. Four six-inch guns are without armor, and her battery power is thus brought below that of the Maryland. At 3000 yards, however, she has fourteen protected guns that could penetrate the latter's armor, while her own armor is liable to injury only from the four eight-inch guns of the Maryland. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Asama is the better fighting ship, yet she is of 4000 tons less displacement and probably cost a million dollars less.
In comparison with the latest German cruiser, the Prinz Heinrich, there is some uncertainty as to whether the six-inch guns of the latter have four- or six-inch armor. Assuming the latter to be the case, we find the same state of affairs existing as with the Asama. At 3000 yards the German has twelve guns that can pierce his adversary's armor as against four of the latter that can injure him. As the Maryland has the advantage of a knot and a half speed, she could close to a range where her battery would become effective, but as her great length makes her unhandy in maneuvering as compared with her adversary, the latter might succeed in torpedoing her. In this case the issue between the two ships is by no means certain, but the Maryland is 4500 tons the largest and cost at least a million dollars more.
Coming to ships still on paper, we find the Amalfi class in Italy. The scheme of development of this class is to obtain 22 knots, with six-inch armor protection and eight-inch guns on moderate displacement. There is some doubt as to the exact form the type will finally develop, but let us assume that given in the Naval Intelligence Annual for 1900, as it is not impossible. Here we find our adversary as having the same speed as the Maryland and with a battery of twelve eight-inch guns, capable of piercing all her armor at any practical fighting range, while our ship can use only four guns with any effect beyond 2000 yards. To accomplish anything it will be necessary to close, but our smaller and equally fast antagonist can easily out-maneuver us and choose his own position. As before, we find the Maryland struggling unsuccessfully with a smaller antagonist.
The British Drake and Cressy classes have light armor over their six-inch guns, but carry two 9.2 guns apiece. The former is probably more powerful than the Maryland as having a knot more speed. It is noticeable that both of them have been criticized in Great Britain as lacking fighting power.
It may be gratifying to know that our new type of cruisers could probably defeat the New York and Brooklyn at once, but they are not of her date. What we should seek is the greatest fighting efficiency (this includes speed and handiness, as well as battery and armor) on a given displacement. Has this problem been solved in the Maryland? Let us take her sister ship, the Colorado, and modify her as follows: Shorten the citadel about one-fourth so as to allow it to have six inches of armor throughout. Remove two of the six-inch guns on the gun deck. Replace the four six-inch guns on the main deck by eight-inch and give them six inches of armor protection; change nothing else. We have slightly increased the weight but imperceptibly, and the two ships would have the same speed. We have now:
Maryland. Colorado.
Speed, displacement, stores,
armor belt, etc The same in both.
Battery 4 8-inch. 8 8-inch.
14 6-inch. 8 6-inch.
Armor over 8-inch guns 6-1/2 6-1/2
Armor over 6-inch guns 5 6
The Colorado, by keeping outside 2000 yards, would have comparative immunity from the Maryland's six-inch guns, while all of her own would be effective against the latter's citadel up to 3000. I think this Colorado by far the better ship of the two, and strong enough to meet foreign ships.
To come down to Mr. Taylor's questions. I would not build any more Maryland’s at all. Powerful as they are, they are too cumbersome for maneuvering, and not strong enough either offensively or defensively for the line of battle. They would, moreover, be a nuisance in a squadron from their clumsiness. Recognizing their unquestionably good points as I do, they do not seem to conform to the requirements of our service for practical fighting ships.
I believe that our latest type battleships are fast enough and big enough to answer all demands. There is, as already stated, an ever-existent demand to build something bigger, and, hence, more powerful than anything in existence, and although the British Admiralty is conservative in its policy of construction, we read of its laying down 18,000-ton battleships. Let us resist the temptation to improve on this type. We are getting a long distance away from the idea of handiness, and yet good maneuvering power is one of the essentials in a fleet action, as important perhaps as speed. In the long naval wars of the Napoleonic era, Great Britain left big ships to her adversaries, and did most of her fighting with her 74's. This class won at the Nile, St. Vincent and Trafalgar, and British officers of the day laughed at the unwieldiness of the Santissima Trinidad, Orient and other leviathans. Is there not a lesson here for us to bear in mind?
Although outside the discussion proposed by Mr. Taylor, it is noticeable that every criticism I have suggested against the Maryland class applies with still more force to the St. Louis. The latter has four-inch armor and no gun larger than a six-inch. It is no argument, however true it may be, to say that the new six-inch is as powerful as the old eight-inch. We should not arm our new ships to compete with old types, but ought to make them fit adversaries for any of their date and displacement in the world. The St. Louis would have a poor chance in a combat with the Asama or Amalfi of the same size, as they could riddle her at a range of 3000 yards, while their own armor would defy her six-inch guns. It would be almost like fighting a wooden ship against an armor-clad. I believe that the St. Louis could be easily modified on her present displacement to carry eight eight-inch and four six-inch all behind six-inch armor. Would she not be a vastly more efficient ship for our navy? Under this construction she could take her place in the line of battle and penetrate the casemates of any existing battleship at ranges up to 5000 yards, or the turrets of half of them at 2000. To be sure she might suffer herself, but it would take the main battery, twelve- or thirteen-inch guns, of any but the most recent battleships, to do her serious injury.
My answer to Mr. Taylor's questions is, therefore, a compromise. I would build nothing larger or faster than the Virginia, but would develop a smaller and handy battle cruiser of about 9500 tons. If the money for eight Virginia’s were put at my disposition, I believe the demands of our national policy would be better met at present by five Virginia’s and five St. Louis, modified as above. This would give us ten fighting ships, every one available for battle, and five as well adapted for ordinary service as the New York and Brooklyn have shown themselves to be.
Mr. Taylor would call this a revision to an old type, but it is, I believe, the true policy for us to follow.
Captain CASPAR F. GOODRICH, U. S. N.
In my judgment, no more important article than this has ever been published in the PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAVAL INSTITUTE. I have but one regret in connection with it—that it was not written and printed several years ago. That it will prove epoch-making I have no hesitation in predicting.
My answers to the questions with which Mr. Taylor concludes his interesting and instructive exhibit of facts are as follows:
To the first, emphatically, "No; we are not warranted in continuing to build at the same [or any] time vessels of so nearly the same size and cost, and differing so widely in other respects, as the Maryland and Virginia."
To the second, emphatically, "No; it is neither consistent nor logical to increase again the speed of our battleships to, say, 21 knots."
To the alternate form of his question I answer emphatically that it would not be well to build either four Virginia’s and five Maryland’s, or eight Virginia’s or seven Virginia’s of 21 knots' trial speed. "Of two evils, choose—neither"—so spoke a wise old lady of Puritan stock.
Let us endeavor to put the case on a war footing. Admiral Blank commands our fleet, with which he has to meet the powerful squadrons of our adversary, the Emperor of the Antipodes. He is given by the conventional fairy the fulfillment of a wish. He may call for such ships, in type and number, as he thinks best suited to his wants, provided, however, they do not cost more in the aggregate than the amounts allotted for shipbuilding in the annual appropriations of the past few years. What form will his wish take? How will he ask that these vast sums had been spent? Having this superhuman power, will he create such a fleet as we have been preparing for him? If we can guess these riddles, we shall be in a position to reply intelligently to Mr. Taylor's queries.
In the Maine class, the displacement of our battleships took on a notable increase, and this growth has steadily continued in later designs, while the armored cruisers have jumped from the Brooklyn's 9200 tons to the astonishing figure of 14,000 tons in the Maryland. Admiral Blank, knowing these things, does a little mental arithmetic, which shows him that by keeping to the dimensions of the Iowa, for example, he would have saved on the five classes of armored vessels represented by the Maine, Georgia, Virginia, California and Maryland, no less than 35,740 tons, enough to add three Illinois to his command. He would, moreover, have a homogeneous fleet composed of units practically identical in dimensions, in battery power and battery distribution (even with the widest latitude for variations in details) and, most important of all, absolutely identical in tactical qualities. By the plan we have followed, Admiral Blank has lost three good ships, carrying 54 or more guns in their main batteries. And what has he gained in their stead? A knot or two more speed in the later vessels and some hermaphrodite affairs, called armored cruisers, for which he can find no place in his line of battle, and this at a time when he needs all the fighting craft available and more too. If Admiral Blank is a good American, he has surely studied Captain Mahan's essays, and he has read that numbers are needed to crush—numbers of ships, numbers of guns, numbers of men. He will find nowhere in the writings of that eminent authority any suggestion that especially high speed is essential in a battleship. What is decided by speed is a race—not a fight. If fleet A is stronger than fleet B, the latter gets behind forts and barricades the harbor entrance. If it is caught outside by fleet A, I grant, cheerfully, that it will rejoice in the advantage of an extra knot or two on its part, but as I understand the matter, battleships were constructed for a very different purpose—to meet, not to run away from, the enemy. When they seek refuge in flight they confess defeat.
I grant, also, the value of high speed in strategical movements, but of what earthly use is it to make the tremendous sacrifices which we have, unquestionably, made in numbers of ships and in equality of tactical features in order to gain a couple of knots for certain individual members of the fleet, when, as is axiomatic, the squadron's rate is that of the slowest, not the fastest ship?
No one doubts for a second the intrinsic merits of the more recent additions to our list of battleships. If they were destined to roam the seas each on its own account, then would it be well, perhaps, to secure greater speed, greater powers of offence, greater protection, greater coal endurance, without regard to harmony of action, but the case with which Admiral Blank has to deal is a very different affair indeed. It is the last expression of our most serious needs; our existence as a nation may lie trembling in the balance. After but little deliberation, he says: "The speed of the Oregon at Santiago is speed enough for me. I wish the money appropriated for armored ships to have been expended on battleships, all reasonably similar in design and having the speed and tactical qualities of the Iowa, that I may have three additional ships with which to meet the enemy, even if none of them can steam over seventeen knots."
If the Emperor of the Antipodes means business, Admiral Blank can not have too many guns with which to receive him. If he does not mean business, then superior speed will not avail to force an action. I have always been of the opinion that we can pay too dearly for that extra knot or so. Trial trip reports, with their glowing accounts of a fraction of a knot achieved over previous records, may appeal to the public ear, but they can not possibly have great weight with the tactician who reads, between the lines, that a new type or pattern of ship has been added to our already bewildering multiplicity. No one, I hold, has any right to entertain or express an opinion on types of fighting ships who has not carefully studied the chapter in Colomb's Naval Warfare, which treats of the gradual development of the 74-gun ship as the rational outcome of a century's warfare and a century's search for what, taking all things into consideration, was the best unit in the line of battle.
May a strong believer in the torpedo be permitted to suggest that the times are ripe for omitting that weapon from the armament of a battleship? Keep the item, 4 torpedo-tubes, on the navy list, but calmly leave the things themselves on shore and don't burden the line-of-battleship with their heavy and useless fittings.
Mr. Taylor pertinently asks, why build more armored cruisers? Rather, I say, why have built any at all? The first two, the New York and the Brooklyn, were laid down, I fancy, simply because similar ships appeared in certain European navies; so, of course, we must have them too. The logic is very clear, it will be perceived, and it has proved convincing, but a defender of the type on purely tactical grounds has never, so far as I know, stepped into the arena to champion their cause. I wish he had. In 1895, in a lecture at the Naval War College, I used these words:
"Of the armored cruiser, I confess, with deep regret, my inability to treat. I can find no logical place for her in the fleet. She is less than a battleship and more than a cruiser. She is a compromise, with all the disadvantages which compromises present. Her speed is immense, true, but that follows from her displacement and horse-power, not from her military features which are largely sacrificed to speed."
No tactical study of the type has come to my notice, and nothing has happened since the time those words were written to remove my grave doubts as to the merits of the armored cruiser.
If anything at all was demonstrated beyond peradventure at Santiago, it was the helpless, hopeless inferiority of the armored cruiser to the battleship, yet six more of the type, all as big as battleships and costing practically as much money, have been designed and contracted for since the treaty of peace with Spain. I can not understand such obstinate clinging to a class discredited in actual warfare, and I regret, beyond measure, the diversion of so much money from the paramount aim of a navy—strength in its line of battle.
Mr. Taylor has done the navy a lasting and a notable service in suggesting that we pull up and do a little thinking before plunging in too deeply. Personally, I am confident that the fear he hints at rather than expresses will be realized, and that we shall all be sorry for having run to an extreme. No one will appreciate this error more than Admiral Blank, for, unhappily, the good fairy of fiction will not appear at the critical moment to rescue him from his embarrassment by turning his job lot of ships, each of which is freely admitted to be admirable in itself, into what alone he needs so urgently—a homogeneous fleet. While Admiral Blank will do the best he can with the tools at hand, he will roundly anathematize those who, having the means and the opportunity, failed to provide him with properly equalized units, and if he thrashes his opponent, as we fondly hope he will, it will be in spite of, rather than on account of, our erratic building program.
Commander RICHARD WAINWRIGHT, U. S. N.
Naval Constructor Taylor's paper is most valuable from the clear manner in which he has presented the facts. It will prove far more valuable if it aids in settling the types of vessels to be built, according to some tactical rules.
Since the new chief constructor has come into office the fallacy of sheathing battleships has been killed, and we may hope for the burial of "fire-proof " wood. A still greater victory for sound knowledge, both of theory and practice, will be the designing of ships for certain tactical uses within reasonably definite limits.
For many years we have been designing new vessels, each one being more or less superior to its predecessor of the same type, and this superiority has been largely made possible by increased displacement. Better guns, better armor, better engines and better forms have not been sufficient, but greater displacement has been required. I believe we have reached the limit of size, if we have not passed it. Our future improvements should not be in the line of increased displacement.
I do not believe we would be warranted in continuing to build more Maryland’s, and I do not believe we would be warranted in building larger Virginia’s. It is not very difficult to show the strategical and tactical advantages of high speed. To me the need for armored cruisers is as apparent, although the reasons for holding this belief are not so easily pointed out. Nothing is so clear as the strategic advantages of speed. The tactical advantage of being able to force your enemy to fight is also apparent. But there is an additional tactical advantage in superior speed, in fleet actions or in single combat, of being able to concentrate a greater number of guns on a given point than your enemy. In a single ship with greater speed you can present beam fire to your opponent's end fire, and in a fleet you can present beam fire of a number of ships to the end fire of a few of your opponent's ships. Certainly you can make too great a sacrifice for speed. There will be little use in bringing the guns of a greater number of ships to bear on the enemy if it still leaves you with fewer guns and less well defended.
All will admit that it is necessary to have some type of vessel that will bear the same relation to the modern battleship that the frigate did to the old line of battleship. The divergence of opinion arises when an attempt is made to outline the type. I believe that the armored cruiser should take the place of the frigate. Many give this place to the protected cruiser, not the most recent protected cruisers which are armored, but to those protected by armored decks alone. Some will go further than this and use the auxiliary vessel for that purpose, where none of the displacement is sacrificed for protection and very little for armament. These latter are admirably adapted for a portion of the work allotted to a frigate, as they have a very large steaming radius. The objection to both auxiliaries and to protected cruisers is their want of sufficient protection to enable them to run necessary risks with reasonable chance of success. Armored cruisers should have sufficient protection to encounter the fire of one or more battleships at long range, and their own class at short range, with some chance of getting away with the information gained. To be able to close in with an enemy's vessels so as to gain accurate information and to tow a damaged battleship out of action, they should have slightly superior speed to battleships of the same date and a larger steaming radius. An improved Colon, with battery as in the San Martin, particularly if the oil jet for high speed is a success, about fits my idea of an armored cruiser.
While certain individual vessels may prove wonderfully successful in unusual circumstances, the sound general rule for war vessels would be never to build vessels of a type such as must run away from smaller vessels; Maryland’s to run away from Oregon’s, or Columbia’s to run away from a Texas. The feet of the army are most important to the general, but battles will never be won by showing the enemy your heels. To carry out this rule, protected vessels, if built, should not be above six thousand tons displacement, armored cruisers not above eight thousand; after that, all should be battleships. The more nearly these latter can be made of the same tactical qualities the stronger they will be when grouped together.
Captain Walker, in the September number of the PROCEEDINGS, says, speaking of the modern armored cruiser: "Her role in a nation's fleet is assumed to be that of a vessel possessing in a high degree offensive and defensive qualities, with the capacity of delivering her attack at points far distant from her base in the least space of time." The latest armored cruisers do not possess in a high degree offensive or defensive qualities, and the only justification for the sacrifices made to speed would be to insure that the enemy was weak where the attack was to be delivered.
A study of naval tactics justifies the existence of torpedo-boats, destroyers, light-draft gunboats, small armored cruisers, and battleships. Uses can be found for other types, but they can only be justified by exceptional circumstances and not by the ordinary course of events in time of war.
Prof. P. R. ALGER, U. S. N.
Mr. Taylor's paper is a challenge to show cause for a belief in the supremacy of speed among the factors whose combination measures the offensive and defensive power of warships. Is the possession of two, or even three, knots greater speed an advantage sufficient to balance an overwhelming superiority of gun power and of armor protection? Certainly in the crucial test of battle, superiority of speed would count for almost nothing in comparison with superiority of armament. The Maryland, with full bunkers and full ammunition supply, will have a displacement of 14,875 tons, and is a much larger ship than any we have thus far built. What would the country and the world at large think of her commanding officer if he should decline combat with any single hostile ship he might meet? Public opinion will demand, and rightly, too, an ability to fight commensurate with size and cost. And yet what chance would the Maryland have if he met a hostile Virginia, and of what possible advantage would her greater speed be to her excepting as enabling her to escape certain defeat and destruction by flight. It is true that more Maryland’s than Virginia’s can be built for a given sum—Mr. Taylor says 5 of the former as against 4 of the latter type—but supposing a squadron of 5 Maryland’s to engage a squadron of 4 Virginia’s, can anyone doubt the result? Only under exceptionally fortuitous circumstances could any projectile fired by the Maryland pierce a vital part of the Virginia, while every hit of one of the latter's 12-inch guns would do serious damage. In fact, a vessel like the Virginia, if her armor were distributed with a special view to contend with vessels like the Maryland, might remain for a long period under the fire of a whole squadron of Maryland’s without suffering any serious diminution of offensive or defensive powers. As the ships stand, in my opinion, five or even six Maryland’s would have no chance whatever in action with four Virginia’s. Are there, then, in other fields than that of actual combat, any advantages of superior speed sufficient to counterbalance this great inferiority in fighting power? I can only say for myself that I am unable to find them.
Lieutenant S. E. W. KITTELLE, U. S. N.
In answer to the questions asked in Naval Constructor Taylor's article, I am of the belief, for a given expenditure of money, and we shall probably always be thus limited by Congress, that it would be the wisest policy to build seven enlarged Virginia’s of 21 knots trial speed, or eight of the present Virginia type, rather than a combination of four Virginia’s and five Maryland’s.
Our building policy, if we had one, should be based upon the strength of possible antagonists, with a view to providing a preponderance of strength in our favor. Conditions seem to preclude hostilities with Great Britain at any time. Setting aside sentiment and considering only facts and monied interests, it will be seen that of England's annual consumption of breadstuffs, she produces only 22 per cent and imports 78 per cent, of which 50 per cent comes from the United States, the remaining 28 per cent from Russia and Argentina. This takes no account of the large shipments of beef imported from the United States. Vast sums of English capital are invested here and much American money is being used to develop English underground railroads and other enterprises. These conditions, coupled with a common language and a similarity of interests in many ways, should be enough to make both nations avoid hostilities.
A navy is needed to protect commerce and defend the sea coast and foreign possessions, consequently the greater these interests are the greater the navy needed to defend them. As a measure of commerce, the value of exports may be fairly taken, as it is the export trade that is sought after. The export statistics are as follows:
Great Britain $2,648,711,578
United States 1,255,494,358
France 926,979,000
Germany 906,335,478
Russia 362,674,000
From the above alone it may be argued that we should have the second largest navy, but taking into consideration the exposed sea coast and large distant colonies of France, and the vast empire of Russia, with so few seaports that without a powerful navy she would be liable to a close blockade, it is believed that France and Russia will, during the next five years, continue to hold the second and third places respectively. The present sea interests of the United States make it necessary that we should hold not lower than fourth place in the maritime strength of nations, which place is at present held by Germany.
In order to attain fourth place it will be necessary to consider what strength Germany will have and to arrange our building program so as to give us a somewhat greater strength. The law governing the building program of Germany provides by 1916 38 battleships and 20 armored cruisers, but the wording of the law permits this large fleet to be constructed by 1908, and it is a constructive possibility to complete it in 1906, if an emergency should require.
Our navy, therefore, by 1908 should, in the line of battle, be stronger than that of Germany. We now have 17 battleships and 11 armored cruisers, built and building. We should, by 1908, have at least 38 battleships and 20 armored cruisers. As Congress failed to authorize any ships this year, we have only seven years in which to build 21 battleships and 9 armored cruisers, or at the rate of 3 battleships and 1-2/7 armored cruisers per year. Under ordinary conditions, Congress will generally be willing to authorize four armored ships a year, and as our armored cruisers are at present more powerful than those of Germany, we can afford to ignore the question of armored cruisers for a period of five years and build instead four battleships annually. In this way we would, in 1906, have 37 battleships built and building, a force of sufficient strength to enable us to pause to reconsider our building program, and in the next two years, if conditions then require, build one battleship and three armored cruisers yearly, giving us by 1908, 39 battleships and 17 armored cruisers, built and building. This leaves the United States one battleship in excess and three armored cruisers in arrears of Germany, but in each type our ships are of superior size and offensive power, insuring us fourth place in the list of naval powers.
Lieutenant JOHN M. ELLICOTT, U. S. N.
My views upon the subject of this paper will appear at length in the pages of the PROCEEDINGS in an article on "Warship Design from a Tactical Standpoint." They were more briefly stated in an essay on "The Composition of the Fleet," published in the PROCEEDINGS in 1896 (Vol. XXII., No. 3, p. 541, last paragraph).
For tactical purposes we need two or three different elements in a fighting force on the sea just as we do on land. Unfortunately (from a professional standpoint) we have had no great fleet actions between modern warships which fully demonstrate in what characteristics the elements should differ, yet such fleet engagements as recent history records illustrate unmistakably, to my mind, the special value of armored cruisers. If the Japanese had had such vessels in the battle of the Yalu, one can scarcely believe that they would have allowed the crippled Chinese warships to get into Port Arthur. Again, granting equal morale and efficiency to the personnel on both sides at Santiago, the Colon would certainly have outstripped the Oregon, and no other vessels but the New York and Brooklyn could have prevented her from escaping. A Virginia, in a fleet engagement, might with probability have her battery and guns' crews placed hors de combat, and still be able to retire from action with unimpaired speed. While in such a condition, however, a Maryland from the reserve could pursue her and force her to surrender.
I am a firm believer in the comparative method of studying land and sea campaigns, for the principles upon which each must be based are identical. The only extensive land campaign with up-to-date weapons and conditions is that which the British are now terminating in South Africa. Most instructive comments on that campaign are now to be found in the pages of foreign military periodicals. Such men as Captain Trimmel of the Austrian General Staff, Count Sternberg of the Austrian Army and Major Callwell of the British Army, all of them present in South Africa, point out with emphasis that no real progress was made against the Boers until the British organized and employed mounted infantry. Prior to that they sometimes won a battle at great sacrifice, but the elusive enemy, after a brief recuperation, was as ready as ever for combat. As I have tried to show, I believe that just such an analogous condition will be found to exist in future naval campaigns, and that we will find in our armored cruisers a much-needed mounted infantry of the sea.
In modern war, mounted infantry cannot be dispensed with unless soldiers had the swiftness and endurance of horses; armored cruisers cannot be dispensed with unless battleships can have the highest warship radius and speed.
Lieutenant A. A. ACKERMAN, U. S. N.
Although authoritative views have been specifically invited to this discussion, no presumption is intended in offering the remarks here set down; they must stand or fall according to their own merits.
In past discussions, when the present development of neither battleship nor armored cruiser was foretold, and when, least of all, did they appear as rival claimants for naval appropriations, the writer favored the building of both. It was the habit then to compare the armored with the unarmored cruiser, and in that light the reason for the former's being was clear and strong. It had much of the protection of the battleship and had lost not overmuch of the mobility and economic advantages of the cruiser. They were to be marauders, a type of commerce-destroyer, capable of blocking trade routes despite the convoying cruisers; able to make sudden descents on unprotected ports without suffering great hurt to themselves.
Our ideas as to the duty of the navy in time of war have greatly changed since that time. A war to be carried to a speedy and successful ending must be fought out. If our naval strength is to be frittered away in chasing the enemy's commerce from the seas, the war may last indefinitely. Such a program, too, presupposes a mean opponent; he is expected to humble his pride and sue for peace in order to continue trading, when it very probably may have been contentions over that trade which caused the war. Judging from the past, when it has been our trade which suffered through this method of warfare, the result tends chiefly to exasperate without impairing the naval strength in any marked degree. In fact, it turns peaceful merchantmen into fighting bluejackets.
If the enemy is to be brought to a condition in which he may with honor sue for peace, or relinquish the claims made against us, it is either because his fighting strength is impaired or because he finds that he cannot impair ours; not because he finds that he is losing money through the more or less desultory capture of his merchantmen. This is especially true of those powers to whom the mere state of war means an immense loss of trade with us.
A nation aroused and in arms will not be sordid; even though leaders may doubt the wisdom of continuing a war, the people, as a people, once committed to a course they believe to be just will continue in it, and the only way to peace lies through loss of fighting strength whether the dollars have influence afterwards or not.
The opinion has grown to a certainty that the first duty of the navy in time of war is to fight. And in carrying out that duty, whether to await the enemy at our own threshold or to seek him out wherever he may be found, depends upon circumstances. However that may be, the idea that our battleships are to be relegated to the defense of harbors cannot be tolerated. They are not as good for the purpose as the much less costly and practically invulnerable forts; their special qualities, only obtained at vast expense, are thrown away; besides that, there never will be a sufficient number of them to distribute among even a few of our greatest ports to be able to meet such forces as an enemy could concentrate against them. The conclusion is irresistible that the navy in war must operate on a grand plan; ships and fleets must work in unison. For such work those ships are the best which are most able to carry out their part of the general plan; that are able to go where they are sent and to stay where they are put in spite of the efforts of the enemy.
We now insist that our battleships shall cruise, and they do so, almost at the same speed and in most cases as economically, or even more so, than the equally large but weaker types to which the armored cruisers have grown. The demand is for a cruising battleship, not an armored cruiser, and for this reason the latter has sought constantly to ape the former, and with such success that the only characteristics of the cruiser left her are the latter's weakness in battery and a comparative unprotection. It is true that she still retains an excess of speed of three knots over the battleship; that will be lost, however, as soon as it is decided to slightly lengthen the latter. On the other hand, the cruiser has gained as complicated an organization, a more numerous crew and as great a cost for maintenance as the heavier ship.
Taking the matter less generally, the question of cost may be discussed first. Our people as a rule do not object to a particular type of ship primarily on account of its cost so long as they feel that they are getting their money's worth. That is, that the ship will do what it is intended to do, is the best of its class and that the portion of the appropriation going into profits is not unreasonably large. It is not believed that Congress would hesitate at the difference in first cost between a battleship and an armored cruiser if convinced that the country needed the former more than the latter. There are uses for all types from tugs to battleships, but the work of the last is superlatively important and direct, while that of all others is subordinate and indirect or desultory and indecisive.
It must be evident to all that, however liberal within probable grounds the plan of increase of the navy may come to be, the country's needs for such a defense are increasing at a far more rapid rate. The type of ship most certain to be found too few in our next war is the battleship. It is the one type which cannot be extemporized; the one type for which there is no substitute.
The question has been put whether to build four battleships or five armored cruisers with the same money. If our country needs sturdy fighters, able to give and take punishment, then the relative values of the two types as fighters should govern our decision. All other considerations are of minor importance and serve only to obscure the qualities which will be depended upon to bring the war to a successful close.
Naval Constructor Taylor has already explained that the steaming radii of the two types will be practically the same, but even if there was a greater difference in favor of the cruiser, the demand for more coal could not be greatly postponed, and so long as we lack coaling stations, it must be met in either case by slow-moving colliers. In fact, the real differences between the two types are that one has three knots more speed than the other, which has greater powers of offense and defense.
The armored cruiser is avowedly made inferior as a fighting ship to the battleships of the same date. In other words, every naval power with whom we might go to war possesses a number of ships which it would be folly for our armored cruisers to face. That means that they cannot go where they are sent, nor dare they stay where they are put if the enemy objects. The cruiser's speed may save her, although Naval Constructor Taylor points out how readily a battleship her equal in that respect could be designed; moreover, in war time not much dependence will be placed on those ships whose chief recommendation lies in their ability to run away from the enemy's line of battle.
The fact is, however, in war our armored cruisers, though unfit, will be expected to fight as battleships. Let us consider a duel between vessels of the two types. Both have a numerous battery of light guns, which, as they are of no avail against the casemates at battle range, will be left out of consideration; the same reason of range excludes the torpedoes which balance each other in any case. The battleship of the Virginia class has a one-inch thicker casemate than the Maryland, covering approximately one-third greater area. It would be most extravagant to regard the extra 6-inch gun in the broadside of the Maryland as neutralizing this great difference in protection. Let us suppose it, however, and also that the belt of the battleship, which is impenetrable to the cruiser's guns, is offset by the heavier protective deck on the latter. The two ships have then opposed in broadside, 4 8-inch and 7 6-inch guns equally protected. If this reasoning is as liberal as it seems to be, the battleship could fight a cruiser on each beam on equal terms and yet hold her 4 12-inch guns in reserve for the coup de grace.
There is another view to be taken of the armored cruiser in action, should they elect not to attack battleships even when two to one. Their armor is penetrable under favorable conditions by guns of calibers carried not only by their own class but by many protected cruisers. Let the result of a fight with one of these vessels be, however, victorious, the disabling of one of the casemate guns means the loss of a considerable portion of her offensive powers. This is not the case with the battleship, which could continue on duty almost as formidable as ever, even though great havoc had been made in her casemates. The armored cruiser, after a fight even with inferior ships which had resisted with spirit, would doubtless have lost considerable of her fighting strength and be greatly in need of repairs.
It is evident that for some time the two types have been approaching each other and may ultimately coincide. Let us hope that this will soon occur, and when it does that it is brought about rather by increasing the protection and caliber of the cruiser's guns than by further reducing those of the battleship.
It seems almost axiomatic that if, no matter what the rest of the world is doing, it can be expected that our ships will be able to go where they are sent and stay where they are put, the art of waging war will become much more simple.
Lieutenant JOHN HOOD, U. S. N.
Nothing could be more timely or more directly to the point than the question raised by Mr. Taylor in his article on our new battleships and armored cruisers in the PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAVAL INSTITUTE for January, 1901.
Stated fairly, the question is, that the time has come for the adoption of a fixed naval policy in the construction of our fleet, and the selection of the best type or types of vessels that the fleet constructed with the many available shall be, on the whole, the most perfect fighting machine in existence, providing in the largest measure for a given expenditure, the best known means of offense and defense, in naval warfare, and how all this shall be done.
The question is so broad, including, as it does, not only the naval policy of the country, but strategy and tactics as well, that it is difficult to discuss it intelligently in a limited space, and only a few of the most important points suggested by Mr. Taylor's question will be touched on here as they occur to the mind of the writer.
Notwithstanding ingenious theories in regard to other weapons, changes of design in ships and armaments due to the advance of science, and new inventions of various kinds, the final arbiter of naval battles is and remains the gun and the man, just as it was in the days of Nelson and Collingwood, and the ship that can put into action the greatest number and weight of guns, fired with the greatest rapidity and accuracy, will prove the victor in naval conflicts to the end of time. The most perfect type of gun-carrier yet designed by human ingenuity, and the one that can keep the sea and be ready to meet any enemy at all times and under all conditions is the modern battleship, and since to meet and destroy the enemy's ships is the first and primary duty of the fleet, it is an indisputable fact that the battleship is, and will always remain, the basis of any properly organized navy worthy of the name.
In any future naval conflicts, it is to our fleet of battleships that we must look for final victory and success; for all other components of the fleet are auxiliary only, however necessary and important they may be, and should be designed to the sole end of increasing the efficiency of and supplementing the usefulness of the battle fleet, rather than on any false ideas of a possibility of their replacing it.
Any true system of naval operations, either offensive or defensive, contemplates meeting and destroying the enemy at sea, or at least so crippling him that his operations will be frustrated, and not in waiting supinely to meet him on our own coasts, trusting to ingenious devices and strange weapons of very limited ranges of action to destroy him after he has gained the mastery of the sea. To accomplish this requires sea-going and sea-keeping ships of the highest powers of offense and the greatest fighting endurance, that are capable of meeting any enemy in battle, and this type is represented by the battleship only.
The battleship has, however, its limitations in that its size must not be unreasonably large, or we sacrifice its maneuvering and tactical qualities, which are absolutely essential to concerted fleet actions, not to mention the enormous increase in cost. This limitation in size imposes a corresponding sacrifice in speed to retain the full measure of fighting efficiency necessary, and to supply this loss the battleship must be supplemented by auxiliaries of greater speed and less cost, whose duty it is to discover and keep in touch with the enemy, destroy his auxiliaries when opportunities occur, and provide the battle fleet with the information necessary to meet and engage the enemy.
Some remarks on the subject of battleship speed will be made further on, but it may be stated here that, in the opinion of the writer, the limit to both size and speed for battleships for efficiency, has been reached in the designs for the Virginia and her class, and it is a question if their value would not have been increased by dropping a knot, or perhaps a knot and a half in speed, and putting the corresponding weight saved in coal and armament.
If the ideas suggested above of a battleship organization, with accompanying auxiliaries, be accepted, the adoption of a fixed policy of naval development should be easy of attainment, though there will probably be considerable differences of opinion as to the exact character and number of the battleships needed, as well as of the necessary auxiliary complements. It will, however, hardly be disputed by any one who has given any study to naval tactics and warfare that one of the first and chief requisites for efficiency in the fleet is homogeneity of the units of each of the components, and one of next importance is that the number of the components should be limited to the smallest number required by naval warfare that money and effort may not be wasted and every member of the fleet be fitted to fulfill its designs. In other words, only such classes of vessels should be built as are required by the most approved thought on naval war, and the vessels of each class should be of the same general types and sizes. Otherwise the maneuvering and tactical qualities of the fleet are sacrificed, the power of concentration and concerted action impaired, and much money wasted in the production of freaks and vessels of little value.
All this is extending the question somewhat further than Mr. Taylor states it in his very admirable article; but it would be as well to include the whole fleet in the discussion, as it appears to the writer there has heretofore been as little plan and system in the development of the lesser branches of the fleet as in that of the greater, and the adoption of a plan of naval construction should embrace all types necessary to and desirable for an efficient navy.
In determining what types of vessels are necessary to an efficient navy, it is well to keep always in view the purposes for which a navy is created:
1. First and foremost, to rush, fight, destroy or capture the enemy's fleet, and gain the mastery of the sea.
2. To defend our own coasts and outlying possessions.
3. To destroy and interrupt the enemy's commerce and communications and protect our own.
4. To police the ocean, afford help and protection to our citizens and commerce in disturbed countries, and maintain the honor and dignity of the flag and nation.
The nature of these duties clearly defines the types of vessels needed within very narrow limits.
For the first, as has been already indicated, are needed sea-going battleships of large coal capacity and of the greatest fighting powers attainable, with the necessary attendant cruisers of great speed and even greater coal endurance. Attached to this first fighting line, though there would arise cases when they must be left behind, should be the sea-going destroyers, whose size might profitably be increased to about 800 tons displacement, that they might be rendered truly sea-going and sea-keeping.
For coast defense proper, beyond that supplied by the battle fleet, are required torpedo-boats and submarine boats of the best design, that promise in the near future to prove the most efficient coast protectors yet designed. The construction of monitors and like craft for coast defense or other purposes seems to be a waste of good money that might far more profitably be applied to the battle fleet.
For the destruction of the enemy's commerce and protection of our own are required cruisers of the same type as those attendant on the battle fleet.
For the police of the ocean and protection of our citizens and flag in foreign countries, in places the battle fleet cannot reach, are required gunboats. Of these not more than two types are needed, cruising gun-boats of about 1500 tons displacement, and smaller gunboats of about 500 tons displacement for river and inland water work.
Considering these suggestions, it seems to the writer that the following types of vessels, and no others, should be included in a well-conceived plan of progressive naval construction, and on them, in the proportion that will be discussed later, should be expended all the money available for naval construction purposes:
1. First-class battleships of the general type of the Virginia.
2. Armored cruisers of two classes—(a) a limited number of the general type of the Maryland, and (b) the cruiser fleet proper of the general type of the Brooklyn.
3. Torpedo destroyers or cruisers of about 800 tons displacement.
4. Torpedo-boats of a uniform type of about 150 tons displacement.
5. Submarine boats of the latest designs.
6. Gunboats of two classes—(a) cruising gunboats of a general uniform type of about 1500 tons displacement, and (b) river and inland water gunboats of about 500 tons displacement.
We have, of course, at the present time a large number of intermediate cruisers of types almost as variable as their number, and these should be used to the best advantage as long as they last. But in planning for the future, it would hardly seem that any of them are worthy of repetition, for their minor duties can be equally well and far more economically performed by the cruising gunboat class, and their higher duties would be infinitely better performed by a lesser number of the larger cruisers of the class (b) type suggested above, and the battle line much strengthened at the same time. Similarly, we have on hand or building a variegated conglomeration of torpedo crafts, many of them of undoubtedly excellent design that will prove very valuable additions to the coast defense of the country. They would prove far more valuable still, from the increased efficiency of their crews when formed, had all of them been of standard pattern. The rule for their construction in the future should be unity of design with the best type selected as a model.
As before stated, the battleship is the foundation on which all future naval projects must rest. Its characteristics should be fighting power enough to overcome and speed enough to join combat with any enemy's vessel of its class. Its first requisite, however, is the power of fighting and resistance, and, its second, speed; and the first should never be sacrificed for the second. In the vessels of the Virginia class, it would seem that this question of battleship speed had reached the limit of its usefulness, and any further increase would cause either a great and unnecessary increase of cost, accompanied by unwieldiness of size and loss of maneuvering and tactical powers, or an unwarrantable loss of fighting power. For, as so clearly shown in Mr. Taylor's contrast of the battleship and armored cruiser, it is all a question of weights or cost or both. For a vessel of given size, all that goes into extra speed is just so much deducted from armor, armaments, coal or other essentials, and it would scarcely be called wise to sacrifice the main object for which the ship was designed to attain an extra knot or two of speed that a couple of months of marine growth on the bottom will destroy, and that the vessel will rarely, if ever, be called on to make. Battles will never be fought at nineteen knots, and such speed is only needed by battleships to bring an unwilling enemy to action. Nineteen knots, or even a little less, is sufficient for that purpose in the case of any enemy's battleships we are likely to encounter, and the task of overhauling his fastest cruisers must be left to our vessels of the same class. The limitations of nature, and of human nature as well, are contrary to the combination of the battleship and cruiser in one, and any attempt to do so will prove a failure, both from its great cost, and from the lack of maneuvering and tactical qualities in the enormous vessel the combination would produce.
In regard to the two classes of cruisers advocated in the above list, both are necessary under existing conditions, though both cost and tactical considerations would point to one only. For the ordinary purposes for which cruisers are used, class (b) alone would be sufficient and desirable. But since all the leading navies of the world have, or are building, vessels of the type of class (a), necessity compels us to be provided with a limited number of the same type to be able to meet them on equal terms, or else run the risk of having our other scouts and cruisers fall an easy prey to a superior enemy. The number of these vessels should, however, in the opinion of the writer, be limited to the necessities imposed on us by our possible adversaries, and our chief care should be the increase of the line of battle and fleet of scouting cruisers of class (b).
Turning to the subject of torpedo-boats and destroyers or torpedo-cruisers, it is quite thoroughly recognized now by all authorities that the field of usefulness of the torpedo-boat proper lies in coast and harbor defense when the boat acts from a base.
But the larger field of the destroyer and torpedo-cruiser is still an unsettled question. It is the opinion of the writer that by increasing the size of the destroyer somewhat, it can be made sea-going and sea-keeping for a long enough time to be a most valuable adjunct to the sea-going battle fleet. There would undoubtedly be some expeditions on which even the enlarged destroyer would be a hindrance rather than a source of strength to the battle fleet, but in much of the work, and on many occasions, they would be most efficient scouts, and could take advantage of favorable nights for torpedo attacks on the high seas, while their great speed would always enable them to avoid a superior enemy by day. The size of 800 tons suggested above may not meet with the approval of the best authorities, but the subject is a matter well worthy of consideration in formulating a plan for naval development.
Summing up the foregoing remarks in an answer to the question, somewhat broadened, propounded by Mr. Taylor, the writer would say that he is of the opinion that a definite naval policy should be adopted, and with it a settled plan of naval construction founded in a fleet of so many battleships, the number being the key to both policy and plan.
He would, himself, suggest at least 30 battleships in active service at the end of a period of 10 years, this to be increased by 10 more at the end of another period of 5 years, by which time some of the older ones would be in reserve.
For every two battleships built he would recommend one (1) armored cruiser equal or superior to the most powerful cruiser built in any navy at the time.
For every battleship built, he would build one armored cruiser of the class (b) noted above, one enlarged destroyer or torpedo-cruiser and two torpedo-boats.
For every three battleships built he would build one (1) submarine boat of the latest design.
The number of gunboats of the two classes needed would be regulated by the exigencies and conditions of the times. For the present, the number of gunboats and small unarmored cruisers we already have, or are building, will serve the purpose, and they need not be considered, and all the money available devoted to the construction of the other branches of the fleet on the lines laid down above.
In the construction of this fleet, the most excellent design of each of the types of vessels recommended should be selected as a model, and the design be adhered to, only varying it in detail in the case of some important new discovery, so that each class will be practically uniform and homogeneous.
Having made the plans, designs and estimates for the scheme of construction recommended, and found that less money would be available in the time than the plans called for, the proportion of the various classes should be preserved and the construction extended over a longer period of years, though delay may prove fatal in the present condition of the navies of the world and the political aspect of affairs in the East, for our next enemy will not be Spain, nor will a converted yacht, a tug, and a gunboat prove an efficient line of battle in the next war.
Lieutenant E. W. EBERLE, U. S. N.
I have read with much interest the valuable paper on "Our New Battleships and Armored Cruisers," by Naval Constructor D. W. Taylor, U. S. N., and it merits very careful thought and study. If the line officers of the navy will study this subject and give their candid opinions in future numbers of the PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAVAL INSTITUTE they will not only fulfill the object of Mr. Taylor's excellent paper, but at the same time they will render the navy a great service, because the opinions of the tactical officers are of the highest value in the development of a sound building policy.
I fail to see either wisdom or plausible theory in a policy that requires the building of armored cruisers of 12,000 or 14,000 tons displacement. Even the ardent admirers of large unwieldy Maryland’s cannot claim offensive, defensive, or tactical merit of very high order for those vessels. At two thousand yards' range the Maryland's guns give her no offensive merit, her armor gives her no defensive merit, and although she is credited with very high speed, her maneuvering qualities in the line of battle at the above range is seriously compromised by her great length and enormous displacement. Compare a Maryland with the Argentina's San Martin (and improved Colon), a vessel of about 7000 tons displacement, and judge from their offensive, defensive and maneuvering qualities, you would quickly choose the smaller vessel as the winner in a "stand-up" fight. I will admit that a Maryland could decline a challenge to fight by taking advantage of her phenomenal speed, but it would be very demoralizing to the spirit of the crew, and would rudely shock the high moral enthusiasm of the country, to have the large 14,000-ton Maryland’s run away from vessels one-half their size.
Why do the friends of the Maryland class cling so persistently to their favorite argument that the speed of these vessels will enable them to decline a fight and escape? History proves that battles never have been won by running away, and I feel safe in asserting that battles never will be won by such tactics. Let the enthusiastic defendants of these large unwieldy armored cruisers, whose main defense and greatest merit lie in their escaping qualities, take to heart that wise quotation: "For he who fights and runs away, may live to fight another day." During hostilities, the time will come when these vessels will be forced to fight, and they should be given the offensive and defensive qualities that will enable them to make a hard fight for vessels of the armored cruiser class.
Why not take an improved Colon as our armored cruiser type, and limit the displacement to 9000 tons. This displacement should enable us to build a vessel carrying armor of moderate thickness and a heavy battery, and at the same time possessing high speed and good maneuvering qualities. Such vessels would make efficient scouts for the battle-fleet and would occupy important places in the line of battle.
For distance scouting duty we can find nothing superior to our fast transatlantic liners. Armored cruisers should be selected, invariably, as scouts for the battle-fleet, because, after locating the enemy, it may devolve upon them to bring on the engagement; or in the case of a retreating enemy their duty may be to harass and detain the enemy until the battle-fleet arrives to give the crushing blow.
The statement that armored cruisers should form a part of the battle-fleet cannot be contested, and, therefore, they should be designed for that service and be able to deliver and receive "hard knocks," and to maneuver with great celerity. Battleships will constitute always the main line of battle, and we must look to them to bear the burden of the offensive and defensive work. For this reason we should devote all our energies to building powerful and efficient battleships, not battleships which are the equals of those of other countries, but which are superior in gun-fire, in endurance, and in armored protection. Why should we sacrifice armor, armament and endurance to higher speed. Build a battleship with complete armor protection, carrying a heavy battery and capable of maintaining a sea-speed of eighteen knots, and we shall have the ideal vessel. A sea-speed of eighteen knots will not require a sacrifice either of armor or armament, but if we strive to obtain a higher speed in a battleship, the fighting qualities must suffer necessarily.
To my mind, the batteries of our battleships should be increased, and I will repeat here what I stated in a paper published in the PROCEEDINGS in March, 1898:
"The most important subjects in battleships are the armament, armor and ammunition supply; and all else, excepting the engineering department, must be sacrificed for these three main fighting qualities.
"When the United States Government commenced building a navy, the policy was to have her ships armed with more guns and with guns of greater range than were carried by the war vessels of other nations. That policy was carried out in our early wars, and history records the splendid victories, and these victories were made possible by the large number of long-range guns carried by our ships.
"Up to the time of designing the battleships that are now on the stocks, our uninterrupted policy had been to build ships that excelled in battery all foreign ships of the same class, and our Oregon class maintain this policy, as their eight-inch guns far outclass the six-inch guns of foreign battleships. The Kearsarge and Kentucky are somewhat doubtful about maintaining our cherished policy, as many look upon their superimposed turrets with a skeptical eye. However, in our latest battleships we have completely abandoned the policy that we had held to for a century, as these ships are designed to be the equals of foreign battleships in armament, gun for gun, and not superior to them. We have abandoned the splendid eight-inch guns which made our Oregon class superior in armament to any ship afloat, and now we have nothing but six-inch guns to back up the thirteen-inch. I think this is a very unwise departure from the policy that always brought us victory in our past wars; and should our Alabama class engage with ships of the same class I fear that the victory would hang in the balance, while it would be insured had our ships been given the eight-inch guns. I consider the forty-caliber eight-inch gun a superb piece of ordnance, and one that we can ill afford to dispense with in our battleships, although I do not commend the eight-inch turret mounts in the Oregon class. Those turrets simply invite disaster, as they are perched high in the air, with only a four-inch armored ammunition tube underneath them for protection.
"It appears that the tendency in the British navy, and I regret to say in our navy, is to reduce the number of guns and to increase their arcs of fire, and also to have no guns above six-inch caliber for supporting the twelve- or thirteen-inch. This method of decreasing the number and caliber of guns is an ideal theory for reducing weights; but ships are built to carry guns and to fight, and it would seem better to reduce weights elsewhere than in the battery and ammunition. A comparatively small number of guns are thus placed on board our new battleships, and each gun commands a large arc of fire; but the theorist does not consider the fact that one shot may disable a gun, and then a large arc is without a gun to cover it. I believe in a large number of guns with reduced arcs of fire, for then you will have more guns in proportion at all stages of the battle, and, if necessary, the ship can be maneuvered to bring the last guns to bear. If every gun in the ship's armament is to have an extensive arc of fire, then it is impossible to carry many guns, and when these few are disabled the ship is defeated. I do not see how a battleship can have too many guns, even if they are placed side by side; and to me it seems a sin to build a great battleship of 12,000 tons like the Alabama and give her a main battery of only four thirteen-inch and fourteen six-inch rifles.
"In the present age, when heavy fighting ships cruise in fleets, naval engagements between single ships will be rare; consequently, during battle, each ship of a fleet will have no trouble in finding enough of the enemy's ships to serve as targets for all the guns of her battery, and there need be no fear of some guns not bearing on the enemy's vessels. Therefore, I claim that the ship that mounts a large number of guns with small arcs of fire will be superior to the ship with fewer guns and large arcs of fire. The former vessel will be able to deliver many more pounds of metal against the enemy's various ships; and contests between fleets of battleships will be decided by the weight of shell thrown by guns of 6-inch caliber and above. Consequently, when we abandon the 8-inch guns in our new battleships we surrender the great advantage that we have always maintained over foreign ships, and we reduce our armament to the same plane as theirs. We should endeavor to retain the 8-inch guns in our broadside, because, like the past, the naval engagements of the future will be fought with broadside fire and not with a fore and aft fire.
"In an engagement between battleships of similar armor and displacement, which one will probably be the victor? There can be but one answer; for it will be the one that effectively delivers the greater amount of steel against the other ship. Give us guns galore, for the time will come when each gun will give a good account of itself, and our terrific broadsides will bring us victories as they have in the past.
"Let us hope that our battleships of the future will have complete armor protection; that the armor-belt will be in the right place when in war-time cruising trim; that they will not be burdened with so many boats and other peace-time encumbrances; that the 12-inch or 13-inch guns will be supported by 8-inch guns en barbette; that the rapid-fire battery of 3-inch guns will be increased, and that reserve forces of men and officers will be assigned to each ship, for then we shall possess ships which we can truly call battleships, as they will be able to stand up and give battle to anything that sails the seas under all conditions of wind and wave.
"In time of war the officers of the ship, and not her designer or builder, are the ones to be held strictly accountable for the fighting condition of the ship and for the result of battle, and it will be too late then to attempt to excuse defeat by attributing it to errors in the design, in the armament, in the ammunition supply, or in the practical equipment of the ship. Therefore, I believe that healthy criticisms and practical suggestions by the sea-going officers who man our battleships and fight the guns should be very acceptable to those in authority who create our naval policy; and also to those who are entrusted with the work of designing and constructing our great national defenders, and who have not the opportunity of observing the practical behavior of these ships at sea."
Consider seriously the recently designed battleships of the Italian navy, which carry three 12-inch and twelve 8-inch guns in the main battery, on a displacement of 12,600 tons. What a superb and homogeneous battery we would have in our battleships of 15,000 tons, if we should give them four 12-inch, fourteen 8-inch, and twenty 3-inch rifles. A fleet of such ships would prove, in its power and homogeneity, invulnerable and superior to any fleet in the world.
As a final answer to Mr. Taylor's questions, my building policy would be as follows:
Build a moderate number of destroyers and torpedo-boats, and do not put torpedo-tubes in any other class of vessels. Build a large number of light-draft gunboats; do not build any protected cruisers; do not build any Maryland’s, but build a few armored cruisers (about one to every four battleships) of 9000 tons or less displacement, and carrying 8-inch and 3-inch rifles; build a large fleet of battleships and devote our main energies to building them, but let our Virginia’s be thickly and completely armored, carry four 12-inch, fourteen 8-inch, and twenty 3-inch rifles, have eighteen knots sea-speed, and have large coal and ammunition capacity. Man a fleet of such battleships with the personnel of our navy, and the Government may feel well assured of success.
Further discussion is invited.
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REPLY TO DISCUSSIONS IN No. 96, ON PAPER ENTITLED "TORPEDO
OPERATIONS IN NAVAL WARFARE," PUBLISHED IN No. 95.
Lieutenant L. H. CHANDLER, U. S. N.
It had been my original intention not to reply to criticism, fearing to weary the INSTITUTE'S readers, but owing to the fact that considerable new matter has been presented in the discussion, I cannot refrain from expressing my opinions in regard to certain parts of it. While I appreciate highly the attention that has been given to the lecture, I cannot attempt at this time to reply to everything that was presented in the discussion, but will devote myself in the main to three principal points brought out by Captain Goodrich, Lieutenant-Commander Chambers, and Lieutenants Ellicott and Hood. In so doing I wish to thank all for the courtesy with which they have treated my efforts and for the useful and interesting ideas that have been advanced. My not replying to all of them is due to lack of opportunity and not lack of inclination. I may say to all, though, that I hope the time will soon come when we will be allowed to work out our differences together upon the water instead of on paper. Until that happy time, I know of no more instructive pastime than these present discussions.
The three principal points in the discussion to which I have already referred as being of the greatest interest are as follows:
(a) The question of torpedo fire at a pursuing vessel from tubes aboard a heavy ship, as suggested by Lieutenant-Commander Chambers.
(b) The question of the coast district system as raised by Captain Goodrich.
(c) The theory of section attack as against "dispersion for search; concentration for attack," as criticized by Lieutenants Ellicott and Hood and epigrammatically characterized by the former.
These three topics will be touched upon in the order named.
(a)Torpedo Fire at a Pursuing Vessel from Tubes Aboard a Heavy Ship.
I am free to confess that Lieutenant-Commander Chambers has furnished me with a number of ideas that had not occurred to me before, several of which I am very glad to incorporate as a foundation for a change in one of my beliefs. I have found in these remarks a valuable use for the torpedo from big ships that had not before held a place in my mind.
I wish to say, first, that I quite agree that a shop adjustment of the gyroscope is mechanically possible and will no doubt be reached before long, and that when it is reached the usefulness of the weapon will be greatly increased. While this will render the torpedo far more formidable, especially as used from heavy ships, at the same time I do not believe that it will very greatly extend the radius of action of torpedo vessels, and that such craft will always have to work from some sort of base, fixed or movable, but in any event said base must be in still water.
As far as the question of setting tubes and gyroscopes aboard boats is concerned, I am of the opinion that the setting proposed by Lieutenant-Commander Chambers would not be so good as that proposed in my lecture. It seems to me that we can at least assume an ability on the part of each boat to head for an enemy long enough to discharge the three torpedoes, and by Lieutenant-Commander Chambers' setting the use of one torpedo is practically sacrificed to the idea that the target cannot be held for a time on a right ahead bearing. For any kind of retreat, either by passing or by turning immediately after fire, it seems to me that to bring the enemy right ahead until the fire is delivered is the only possible manner of getting the best results.
It will be noted in Section 27 of my lecture that, although not specifically mentioning the retreat by passing the enemy, I leave that question as a doubtful one. This whole matter is one that only practical experience can decide, and I look forward with eagerness to the time when we will be able to do tactical boat work under the guidance of officers who have had both theoretical and practical education in torpedo warfare prior to any maneuvers which may be undertaken to prove or disprove the theories that I have set forth. The maneuvers at Newport, last summer, to which I shall refer later, were carried on by men who had practically none of them ever done any such work before, as I think I am safe in saying that there is hardly an officer or man in the Navy who had had up to that time much experience of the kind. I include myself among the number of inexperienced ones most unreservedly. I therefore claim that the work became almost entirely an instruction to individuals, and much was learned from it. We all discovered how prone a torpedo-boat officer would be to mistake his distance and fire when far outside of torpedo range, etc. Of course all these points were of the utmost value to us, but I claim, and I think I will be upheld in the claim by the service at large, that in order to prove or disprove tactical theories, the maneuvers must be conducted by men who are already adepts in these A, B, C matters which came as surprises to us all at Newport. In other words, the work done there was excellent for purposes of elementary instruction, and a number of nights of it would make torpedo-boat officers sufficiently familiar with surrounding conditions to enable them to go ahead and develop theories in regard to the tactics of attack and retreat. I hope we may soon have the chance to do this.
Lieutenant-Commander Chambers makes one statement that I must take exception to, and that is where he says of the gyroscope adjustment that "the adjustment is simple and can be made almost instantly at the side of the tube, etc. . . ." This I challenge. Mr. Chambers is thinking of the above-water tube, which is now practically abolished, and, I believe, properly so, from heavy ships. With the submerged tube no such method of setting has as yet been designed, and its accomplishment is surrounded by many difficulties. So, for the present, I cannot accept the above statement relative to this point, for I consider the discussion of above-water tubes for heavy ships as practically useless, and so confined myself in the lecture to the new Maine class of ships with submerged tubes only.
Passing from these somewhat discursive matters to the question at issue—that of torpedo fire at a pursuing ship—I must admit that I am thoroughly in accord with all that Lieutenant-Commander Chambers says. The approach from astern by a faster ship that desires to ram is very apt to occur, and can, of course, be always brought about by the attacked ship.
If, therefore, the attacked ship causes her pursuer to follow directly after her, the stadimeter may be used to determine the exact speed of the pursuer, as well as her distance at any given moment.
The foregoing table could, therefore, be used to determine with the utmost accuracy the proper elements of fire for a style of defense that would make the pursuer very unhappy.
From this table will be seen how vastly this method of fire increases the effective range of the torpedo, by allowing the pursuing ship to cover part of the intervening distance herself. It will also be seen that the greater the tactical diameter of the torpedo and the less its speed the further apart the two ships could be at the moment of fire and still score a hit. Thus we see qualities that are ordinarily classed as disadvantages in the torpedo, slow speed and great tactical diameter, are here qualities of positive value. The limit would of course be that the run must be made quickly enough to prevent the enemy from seeing and avoiding the torpedo. Unless the sea is dead smooth, however, it is very hard to follow the track of an approaching torpedo, and with a double fire from the foremost ship resulting in a torpedo approaching on each side, dodging would be a very hard matter.
In this connection, I am much impressed by the facility with which this method of torpedo attack could be used in conjunction with the system of concentration of gun fire, recommended by Professor Alger in his treatise on the " Errors of Gun Fire at Sea." A ship which follows his method of steaming in a spiral in order to keep an enemy in his zone of maximum gun fire, could readily resort to this method of torpedo warfare if desired. To bring the enemy astern long enough to deliver the torpedo fire by the use of the above table would be very easy, and perhaps a similar table for torpedo fire while still on the spiral might be prepared also. This would of course be preferable, and while the preparation of the table would seem at first blush to call for an application of more than simple mathematics, at the same time such a table, if it can be prepared, would be about as simple to use after it is once prepared as the one given above. As yet I have not had time to inquire into this point very fully, but promise myself to do so at the first opportunity.
To fit torpedoes for use with this table, there will have to be furnished with each torpedo a tabular statement of the number of turns of the regulator to secure any one of the given speeds on the semi-circumference of the circle; also some arrangement must be made for securing the desired tactical diameter. To do this I believe two sets of vertical rudders could be filled, capable of being readily inserted in the tail blades or removed from them as desired. The larger set could be used for a 300-yard diameter, and the smaller one for a 600-yard one. These two points present no difficulties that could not be readily overcome at the torpedo station.
(b) The Coast District System.
In replying to Captain Goodrich's objections to my system of coast districts, I wish to state, first, that it has never been my idea to free the torpedo sections from the control of the commander-in-chief or senior officer present in time of war, as I of course realize the foolishness of any such proposition. My only idea in regard to protecting the sections from commanders-in-chief and casual senior officers present in time of peace, was to enable the torpedo-boat officers to continue their proper work without having their boats called upon at the pleasure of any passer-by to run errands, carry dispatches, transport wash-clothes and marketing, etc. That the danger of this improper diverting of boats from their true duties is no imaginary one is proved by the fact that they have always been used for such purposes far too freely, even during the Spanish war, and I fancy no one will doubt what would be their fate in the matter in time of peace unless amply protected by departmental orders.
Captain Goodrich in his criticism, as well as in a previous one on my essay of January I, 1900, objects to my coastwise district system as a division of force to be deprecated. The comparison of my scheme with the Jeffersonian gunboats is, in my opinion, not a fair one, for the gunboat scheme was to have those small vessels in the various ports and no other naval force anywhere. I certainly have never advocated the coast torpedo-boat system to the exclusion of all other force afloat.
The coast system as I devised it was to furnish at any point a well trained force of torpedo vessels, with officers thoroughly familiar with the locality, upon which the commander-in-chief of the fleet in being could freely call for whatever war service they could render him. With our tremendous length of coast-line, I can see no other way in which this can be done.
Captain Goodrich criticizes my system because it divides the force. True, and I am the first to admit that a smaller force with the fleet would answer every purpose, provided such force could be kept in efficient condition and still cruise with the fleet. His criticism is a tearing down of the system which I evolved, and the reasons given for it have much weight, even in my own mind, but I am constrained to advance the point that while Captain Goodrich has torn down my structure, he has not, in either of his criticisms, erected anything in its place. I should be more than glad to hear what his ideas on the subject are, and exactly how he thinks the boats should be kept in being.
If any inference can be justly drawn from his remarks, it is that the boats should serve with the fleet regularly, as a component part thereof. I leave the possibility of this to the judgment of individuals. Personally, I am confident that were it attempted we would have boat after boat left behind for repairs, with officers and men played out and machinery broken down, until the smaller force that Captain Goodrich considers all that is necessary would have accomplished a more thorough dispersion than any dreamed of in my system, and with this difference, that his fewer boats and men would be broken down, while my greater number of boats would be in prime condition, with officers and men physically sound and keen for the encounter.
That my system will demand more vessels is true, and my table gives 231 as a maximum. With far less coast-line than our own, England has 96 destroyers and 163 boats, making 261 in all, with 13 more boats owned by her colonies; France has 31 destroyers and 277 boats, making 308 in all, with to submarines besides; and Germany has 154 in all. These figures are taken from the only edition of Clowes' Naval Pocketbook that I have at hand, that corrected to February I, 1899, and must undoubtedly be considerably increased to bring them up to date. Considering these figures, with relation to the comparative needs for defense of these countries and our own, I am content to leave the question as to whether or not my figures are excessive to those who read.
(c) The Theory of Section Attack as against "Dispersion for Search; Concentration for Attack."
The question of group search and dispersed attack is one to be solved by practical work alone. This I admit. I long to see officers and boats given a chance to work it out under proper conditions.
I am well aware that if the boats could be given "dispersion for search" and "concentration for attack," to quote Lieutenant Ellicott's final words, the maximum efficiency would be obtained, but does his method as proposed accomplish it?
As I understand it, his idea is to take the force at his command, say two sections, fourteen boats, and turn them loose separately, each boat to be at a certain place somewhere out on the water in the dark, at a certain time. There will be no means for a man in command of a boat to tell when he is in his place, except it be so close to the shore as to enable him to recognize the land, for certainly light-houses, etc., will not be available.
Then the boats, each being in a supposed place (fourteen watches to coincide, and no mistake made in estimate of time to reach a given unmarked spot), they are all to steam in at slow speed towards another supposed spot, and in case any one boat sees anything, she is to trust to luck to get more boats to help her concentrate on it. When done, the victim will more than likely prove a friend also. With the experience born of one night's prowling, I am willing to stake my reputation on the difficulty of telling whether a certain dark mass in view at night is an enemy's battleship or a friend's torpedo-boat.
I believe that no greater confusion worse confounded could be secured than by the method recommended in these two criticisms.
The idea of going out and annihilating an enemy's whole fleet in one night is attractive, but, to me, chimerical.
The time element must be eliminated to the utmost degree Possible. One boat alone has very little chance with a battleship even under the best of circumstances. These are axioms to me.
To avoid depending on the time element, and to ensure that more than one boat shall attack the enemy at the same instant, the officer in command must hold his boats together until the last moment. This the wedge formation accomplishes, and while it does render finding the enemy more difficult, it may be said that if an enemy cannot be found in that way, in say a week, it would seem to me that his blockade must be rather a farce.
So that while I admit that all Lieutenant Ellicott urges against the group search in his (a), (b) and (c) is true (boats must go slowly when in vicinity of the enemy to minimize (b)), at the same time I dissent utterly from his finding on the premises. The disadvantages that he urges, must be submitted to in order to accomplish anything. I am confident that the haphazard concentration he suggests would, if relied upon, simply result in the destruction of the boats in detail. Remember, they must avoid or run over pickets, etc. Seven boats, or even five, if they can get anywhere in the vicinity of a ship, can, in my opinion, run through the best picket force available, and while some of them are drawing the enemy's fire the rest can get a chance to fire their torpedoes. In other words, one battleship and her pickets could probably hold up one, two or three boats before any of them could deliver their torpedo fire, but if five, six or seven go in together, I do not believe that any human power could stop them all outside of torpedo range.
Although doing so will perhaps furnish my opponents with arguments against what I have just set forth and in favor of the dispersed search idea, I nevertheless desire to give an account of the conclusions I drew from the Newport maneuvers of last summer.
These maneuvers were originally intended to cover a week's time, but were from various causes cut down to two nights. Then, in order not to wear men out, the operations on those nights were all ordered to be terminated by midnight the first night and by eleven o'clock the second. As torpedo work depends to an exceedingly large degree on the nervous strain and physical exhaustion under which the enemy is kept for perhaps many nights prior to the real attack, and upon the element of surprise, it will be seen at once that the orders just quoted at once deprived the torpedo-boats of practically all the natural advantages that would ordinarily militate in their favor. Please keep these conditions in mind in reading what follows, and allow for the tremendous loss of efficiency that necessarily resulted to the boats from their enforcement.
The first night of the maneuvers was given up to a spectacular passage of the Newport forts by a squadron of battleships, prior to which the torpedo-boats had been sent in to attack the inside ships. This was ordered to be done between eight and twelve at night, and on a particular night. Naturally the boats were discovered and mostly put out of action. They had orders to steam in anyhow, to save time, regardless of whether they were discovered or not, so that if a torpedo-boat officer discovered that his foes were on the alert at a particular point, instead of turning and trying another, as a man would do in time of war, he was forced by order to push ahead and sacrifice himself under the guns of forts and ships in order that the crews of the battleships could be allowed to get to sleep at midnight. Certainly true tactical considerations never dictated these conditions. As it was, one boat, the Stiletto, got in and torpedoed the Massachusetts. The Holland was not allowed to participate in this night's work, the reasons for which I do not know.
On the second night the boats from inside were to go out and attack a blockading fleet. My claim is that the sensible thing to do in war time would have been to send the boats out together (there were but five, and a fine miscellaneous collection at that) and be content to get one of the enemy's heavy ships in a single night, and to leave the rest for another time, rather than to risk having the boats cut off in detail while skurrying around separately and before they could accomplish anything.
However, torpedo stock has been at a low ebb for some time in our navy, and at these maneuvers it would have been a fatal blow to the torpedo service had five boats only succeeded in getting one battleship on this occasion. Officers of the navy and the newspapers of the country would have joined together in crying out at the failure of the boats. I therefore believe that it was a wise comprehension of what I may call the politics of the occasion, and not any tactical consideration, that caused the attack to be delivered as it was.
Commander N. E. Mason dictated the method of attack, and I am confident that in time of war he would have carried out what I state to be the correct tactical method, but as it was in response, I believe, to the political considerations indicated only, he wisely abandoned sound war tactics and separated his boats.
The general plan of operations was laid down by the battleship officers again, and compelled the boats to finish their work by eleven o'clock in the evening, and on one fixed evening at that. These limitations themselves seemed almost enough to prevent the boats from doing anything. Being bound down in regard to time as he was, Commander Mason very shrewdly sent the boats out at dusk, and before the five ships outside were expecting an attack the Vicksburg and Scorpion (rated battleships for the occasion) were declared sunk and sent into port.
The Holland was out that night also. Personally, I was aboard the Porter.
The search for the Kearsarge, Indiana and Texas was then continued. I believe that one of the boats (the Dahlgren, I think) found the Indiana and claimed to have sunk her, but that next day the umpires decided that the Indiana had sunk the boat. Nobody else saw the Indiana that I am aware of, and, as far as I know, she was so far to the eastward as to be of no use in a blockade of Newport.
At about 8:30 the Porter sighted a ship (the Kearsarge) and made for her, but before our attack could be made another boat (the Dahlgren) attempted her and was successful. Not knowing the result of this, the Porter made sure by continuing her effort and succeeded. At about the same moment the Holland attacked and also scored a success. Captain Folger answered the Porter's hail by saying that he had been successfully attacked, and turned on his lights and steamed in to an anchorage. The decision of the next day in regard to this engagement was that as the Dahlgren had been previously sunk by the Indiana she therefore did not sink the Kearsarge, and that as the Kearsarge considered herself sunk by the Dahlgren, therefore the successful attacks of the Porter and the Holland did not count. There is no question, and none was ever raised, that three successful attacks on the Kearsarge were made almost simultaneously by these three boats, and under every rule of justice she should have been declared sunk, as her commanding officer thought her to be, but the Indiana-Dahlgren controversy was allowed to render invalid the just claims of the Porter and Holland.
These operations for the moment disposed of three out of the five ships of the blockading force, during which maneuvers and prior to the attempts on the Kearsarge above related, the Gwin and another boat were put out of action, I believe, by the Kearsarge. The Dahlgren supposed she had put out the Indiana, but nothing more was seen of that vessel by any one until after the time limit expired.
After leaving the Kearsarge, an effort was made by the Porter to find the Indiana and Texas, and we are confident at its end that neither of these vessels was in such a position as to cover Newport harbor. The Fall River boat, a blaze of light, came out of Newport just after the Kearsarge incident, and the Porter steamed out to sea on a course parallel to hers and about four miles east of her, knowing that if there were a battleship anywhere between the steamer and herself an eclipse of the steamer's lights must ensue. There was no such eclipse, and after steaming down almost to Point Judith buoy that effort was given up.
Having but a half-hour left, the Porter steamed to the fairway, outside Brenton's Reef, and lay still in the channel, waiting for one of the two ships to come in, hoping they would do it before eleven o'clock. At about 10:40 the Texas was sighted heading directly for the Porter, and had time served we had but to lie still until she was within torpedo range, for, with the boat still in the water as she was, she was quite invisible, and the Texas was not using her search-lights.
However, the short time available prevented our doing this, so we steamed slowly towards her, and were just in position to make the rush when she struck six bells and turned on her running lights.
The net actual results of the night were three out of five ships sunk, with a loss of two out of five boats. The umpire's decision next day lost the Dahlgren and saved the Kearsarge. The two remaining ships of the blockading force had gone so far to sea as to render them of little value to the blockade.
It will doubtless be maintained that these results are arguments for the scattered search principle as against my own, but I believe that the single-boat attacks which succeeded here would have resulted in disaster in real service. The inner ships were to have sent in picket-boats, but the torpedo-boats got out before this was done and caught the inner ships unawares. This would hardly be done in warfare. And with proper pickets to designate the direction and time of approach of a boat I do not believe that a single boat would be able to get far, whereas the seven, scattering upon alarm by the pickets, would create such a flurry from so many directions, that success would be more than likely in spite of the pickets.
Like David Harum I am always willing to give the other fellow a show, and under these circumstances if I could trade off two or three boats for one battleship, I would be content to call it a good night's work and to leave the enemy a few stray vessels here and there for a future occasion, instead of devastating his entire fleet in one fatal attack by pitting single boats against single battleships.
The fact that the Dahlgren, Porter and Holland all tried for the Kearsarge at about the same moment looks at first blush like a support of the accidental concentration theory of Lieutenant Ellicott, but when the facts are all borne in mind I hardly believe this will be accepted as true. There were no pickets out, two of the blockaders had gone into port over an hour before as sunk, two others had gone so far away that there was no possibility of finding them within the time limit, with a result that the Kearsarge was left alone in her glory to bear the whole brunt of attack. Part of the boats had gone out to the westward and worked to the eastward, and the rest went out to the eastward and worked to the westward. That we three met the Kearsarge at the same time in the middle is no wonder, and proves nothing to me.
In other words, I claim that as far as torpedo work was concerned, these maneuvers gave us all some fine elementary instruction that we sadly needed, but that as far as proving or disproving any tactical theories was concerned they were of the very slightest value. If persisted in much will eventually be learned by such exercises, but to be of value absurd time limitations must be done away with, day-time drills must be abolished for the time being, the elements of fatigue and surprise must be allowed to play their full part, and all night work and all day sleep must be the rule. All hands on deck from eight to eleven and then "Hurrah for our hammocks" is a wonderfully poor assimilation to war conditions, and if we are to learn anything from maneuvers that cry must be done away with once and for all.