SHIPPING AND SHIPBUILDING IN THE UNITED STATES.
By JAMES W. ROSS.
Notwithstanding restrictions, shipping continued to grow in spite of all efforts on the part of mother country to the contrary, and at the time of the outbreak of the Revolution shipbuilding was the leading industry in New England. During the eight years from 1788 to 1797 shipping increased three hundred and eighty-four per cent, but this remarkable increase was exceptional, and was due to the almost universal state of war existing in Europe at that time which threw the carrying trade of the world into our hands. From 1807 to 1837 was a period of decrease in our shipping, and was followed by a second great rising period culminating in 1861, when the maximum tonnage of the United States at any one time in its history was reached, being at that time 5,539,843 tons, while that of Great Britain was 5,895,369, and the combined tonnage of all other nations, at that time, amounted to 5,800,967 tons. The aggregate tonnage of the United States in 1861 was, therefore, but little smaller than that belonging to Great Britain, and being less than 300,000 tons smaller than that of the rest of the world.
The following table, taken from the report of the Commissioners of Navigation and the records of the Treasury Department shows the rise and fall of American shipping during the last one hundred years:
Year. Tons. Per Cent.
1790 346,254 40.5
1795 529,471 90.0
1800 657,107 89.0
1805 744,224 91.0
1810 981,019 91.5
1815 854,295 74.0
1825 665,409 92.3
1835 588,173 84.5
1845 904,476 81.7
1855 2,348,358 75.6
1865 1,518,350 27.7
1875 1,515,598 26.1
1885 1,262,814 15.3
1895 822,347 11.7
The above statistics show to what a great extent our shipping has fallen off, particularly since 1861, when our foreign tonnage reached its highest point, until, in 1895, it was but little more than one-third as great as in 1861, and over 150,000 tons less than it was eighty-five years before, or in 1810. This startling decline is shown still more clearly when we compare the percent of imports and exports carried by our vessels. Our ships having carried 91.5 per cent of our foreign trade in 1810, and but 11.7 per cent in 1895, or a falling off of about 80 per cent. While that of Great Britain, in 1880, was 6,574,513 tons registered. The aggregate British tonnage being somewhat over 16,000,000.
Our entire tonnage, both sail and steam, decreased from 5,539,813 tons, in 1861, to 4,057,734, in 1881, and 4,769,020, in 1897, showing a considerable fall for the first twenty years, followed by a slight increase thereafter. Iron steam vessels having slightly increased in total tonnage since 1861, while there has been a slight decrease in the aggregate tonnage in sailing ships for the same period.
The vessels built in the United States since 1880, in tons, are as follows:
Year. Tons.
1855 583,450
1860 233,194
1880 157,409
1882 282,269
1886 95,453
1891 369,302
1895 111,602
1897 232,232
In 1856, the tonnage built in Great Britain was 935,000 tons, and in 1880 it had reached 7,903,000 tons, or nearly nine times as great as in 1856, while that of the United States for the same period was but little more than one-fourth as great as in 1855. The tonnage of iron vessels built in the United States from 1876 to 1881 was 127,298 tons, that of Great Britain over 2,000,000 tons. Of the tonnage built in 1897, 124,394 were of iron and steel.
The total tonnage of all vessels, foreign and domestic, entering our ports in 1870 was 6,270,198 tons, and in 1897 had increased to 20,002,639 tons, of which but 3,611,176 tons were American. These figures, of course, do not include our tonnage on the lakes and rivers of the United States, but merely those vessels engaged in ocean commerce.
The total tonnage built on the Great Lakes since 1880 was:
Year. Tons.
1880 22,899
1881 73,504
1886 20,400
1891 11,856
1895 36,353
1896 108,782
1897 116,937
Of the total carrying-power of the world, 3.4 per cent is carried in American ships, while British ships carry 56.6 per cent. The newspapers of Hamburg, the third largest commercial port in the world, said, in 1897, that thirty years had elapsed since that port had seen the stars and stripes at a masthead. No merchant ship flying the United States flag passed through the Straits of Gibraltar or the Suez Canal in 1895 or 1898.
It is only in the deep sea navigation, across the ocean or to South American ports below the Orinoco, that our shipping interests are weak. American ships carry now about one-half of the total sea commerce between the United States and neighboring foreign countries, as Canada, the West Indies, Mexico, Central America, and the northern coast of South America. Our domestic water commerce, coastwise, Great Lakes, rivers and canals, is by far the largest in the world and is two and one-half times greater than that of the United Kingdom, second on the list.
The primary cause of the decay of shipping and shipbuilding may be termed a natural one, the result of the progress of civilization; namely, the substitution of iron and steel for wood, and steam for sail as a means of propulsion. So long as ships were built of wood we had an advantage over other nations, in the cost of material and in the skill and working of the same, and also in the skill of managing wooden sailing ships; when, however, steam was substituted for sail and iron for wood, these advantages were in a great measure neutralized or wholly swept away.
Another cause put forth for the falling off of American shipping and shipbuilding is the duties on shipbuilding material in the United States and the navigation laws. It is true that the navigation laws were enforced at the time of our greatest importance in the shipping world during the early part of the present century, but at the same time all other maritime nations had similar codes, which have since been repealed or greatly modified, except in the case of the United States. From 1816 to 1840, the shipping of Great Britain remained almost stationary, but when duties were removed it increased immediately, and still more so when the navigation laws were repealed in 1849. Another cause for the decline in shipping is said to be the excessive fees charged ships entering the United States ports for pilotage, health fees, tonnage duties, etc., which amount to a great part of their revenues.
On the other hand, there are those who take the opposite view of the case and argue that the navigation laws and duties on ship materials were the very cause of our prosperous shipping trade at the beginning of the present century, and that as soon as these were all modified, as in the case of the reciprocity laws, our trade fell off. On the whole, though, it seems more probable that the falling off in our shipping was not greatly affected by these measures, either one way or the other, and that the chief causes of the decline were the changes that took place in shipbuilding, thus throwing the advantage of skill and cheapness of production into the hands of the British, who were better able to use the new materials than we were.
For over a century and a half shipbuilding in the United States was limited to the construction of wooden vessels, and their sole means of propulsion was by the use of sails. But the beginning of the nineteenth century was destined to make the first great change in shipbuilding in this country, for with its coming came the introduction of the steam engine as a new means of propulsion. This new and wonderful motive power was first successfully applied to ships in this country by Robert Fulton, whose Claremont, built in 1807, was the first successful steamboat in the world. The Claremont was a side-wheel steamer, 133 feet long, and it is said to have attained a speed of five miles per hour on her trial trip from New York to Albany. The following years were marked by the building of a number of other steamboats of a similar type, most of which were employed on the Hudson River, between New York and Albany. In 1814 appeared the first steam warship ever constructed. This vessel, built by Robert Fulton, and known as the Demologos, was constructed in 1814, and consisted of two hulls joined together with a canal in the center for the paddle-wheel, and is said to have steamed at the rate of five miles and a half per hour. The Demologos was never used in battle and her value as a fighting ship was, therefore, never ascertained.
The first steamship to cross the Atlantic was the Savannah, built in New York in 1819, and crossing from Savannah to Liverpool in twenty-five days. This trip, however, was not accomplished entirely by the use of steam, for the Savannah was also fitted with sails and the paddle-wheels were so arranged as to be folded on deck during favorable winds and the sails used, so that steam was employed only during weather unfavorable for the use of sails.
The great drawback at this time for the use of steam as the sole motive power was the great amount of fuel necessary to carry a vessel across the Atlantic, it having been estimated that more than four times as much coal was necessary to each horse-power as is required now; for this reason it was many years before steamships were sufficiently perfected to make it possible for them to cross the ocean under steam power alone. The Great Western, a British ship, making the first trip in 1878, from Bristol to New York, in fifteen days.
American steam shipping, however, did not assume any great proportion until 1848, but from that time it increased so rapidly that in 1851 it was practically equal to that of Great Britain. In 1850, the first American line of steamships to compete in the transatlantic trade known as the Collins' Line was established. Four ships were built, the Arctic, Baltic, Atlantic and Pacific, being larger and swifter than any other ships afloat and having vertical bows, the first of the kind ever built. For a time this line was the finest in the world, but disaster seemed to follow the company, two of their ships being sunk, one of which was never heard of again after starting on her trip across the Atlantic. Some few years later the company failed.
Meanwhile other great changes had come about in the construction of ships; namely, the use of iron instead of wood. In 1834, the John Randolph, built in England for a Savannah man, was the first iron ship ever seen in the United States, although the first vessel to be constructed of this material is said to have been built in Great Britain in 1818. The first large vessel to be constructed of iron was the British ship Great Britain, built in 1843, and was also fitted with a screw propeller, being the first ship of large size in which the screw had ever been used, although first introduced by John Ericsson in 1836.
The next important change in shipbuilding came with the introduction of the compound engine or the old-fashioned low-pressure jet-injecting type. With the old form of engine the great drawback to high speed was the great amount of coal required per horse-power, and the impossibility of high pressure. The compound engine, to a great extent, changed these conditions, and together with the advancement in boiler-making, made a much higher pressure possible, with a great saving in the amount of coal required per horse-power; it having been said that but 2 1/2 pounds were now required for each horse-power where 4 had been necessary with the old form of engine, the compound engine was used in 1862, by the Cunard Line of steamships, and came into general use in 1874, when it was introduced into the ships of the Inman and White Star companies.
But at about the same time the compound engine came into general use, a still greater improvement made its appearance in the triple-expansion engine. This new type was first used in 1874, but did not come to be generally adopted until about 1885. With its introduction came a still greater development of speed in steamships, owing to the higher pressure and to the further saving of coal, which was said to be as much as 20 to 25 per cent less than the compound engine required. This wonderful improvement was followed a few years later by the quadruple-expansion engine, making a still greater saving in the consumption of coal, at the same time making higher pressure possible, and, hence, greater speed. The St. Louis and St. Paul, our two fast liners, are fitted with these engines, the first large ships to which the new principle has been applied.
Steel came to be used in ship-construction about 1880, although not very generally adopted until some years later. Its introduction brought about a still greater improvement in shipbuilding, owing to the fact of its greater strength than is possessed by iron, hence a ship may, by its use, be made lighter and at the same time stronger than by the use of iron. Steel has not been used until within the last few years for the construction of merchant ships, but has been used almost from the time of its adoption, in 1880, in the construction of our ships of war.
Twin screws first carne into general use in 1887, when the City of New York and the City of Paris were built for the Inman Line Steamship Company, and soon after the same principle was applied successfully to the White Star Line steamships Teutonic and Majestic.
The system of multiple screws was still further enlarged upon about three years later, with the introduction of the third screw. This arrangement has been successfully carried out in the Columbia and the Minneapolis, our two fast cruisers, and driven by three 3-cylinder vertical inverted, triple-expansion engines, attain speeds of 22.81 and 23.073 knots per hour respectively on four-hour runs. The fastest time ever made by a cruiser.
The special advantage of triple screws are, smaller size of the separate parts of the machinery, enabling higher rotative speeds to be employed with safety, and greater economy than ordinary cruising when one engine working up to about its natural draft full power will give a fair cruising speed with economy of fuel. It is far from economical to run large twin-screw engines designed for nineteen knots and upward at speeds of nine and ten knots. Engine friction alone forms such a large percentage of the power developed, to say nothing of the increased cylinder condensation due to the slower rotative speed, that the economic performance, as measured by coal per horse-power, is very low. The total horse-power being divided between three shafts also vastly decreases the chances of the total disablement of the ship.
In 1892 a bill was passed by Congress, at the proposal of Dr. Griscom, president of the International Navigation Company, admitting the New York and Paris to American registry on the understanding that two other ships of at least equal tonnage would be built in the United States. The two ships built according to the provision of this act, the St. Louis and St. Paul, were launched in 1895. A short description of them may serve to show the state of advancement in shipbuilding in the United States, and further as an illustration of the most recent improvements in ship-construction.
St. Louis and St. Paul are the largest ships ever built in the United States, and, with but few exceptions, the largest and most powerful of any ships in existence. These vessels are sister ships, 545 feet in length, 62 feet and 9 inches beam, and 42 feet and 4 inches deep, with a light displacement of 10,700 tons. The motive power is furnished by a pair of vertical inverted quadruple-expansion engines actuating twin screws, to carry a working steam pressure of two hundred pounds, and capable of developing 20,000 indicated horse-power. The ships themselves are built of steel, and every bit of material used in them is of domestic production. They are of American model and design, and were built by American skill and muscle.
When the act of admitting the New York and Paris to American registry, on condition of building two ships of equal tonnage in American shipyards, was passed, the British press ridiculed the idea. "Such ships could not be built in the States," they said; later certain naval architects from Great Britain visited our shipyards and saw such ships actually in process of construction. Now the British newspapers admit that our yards are capable of turning out ships equal to the product of any shipyard in the world.
St. Louis and St. Paul have proved to be all that was expected of them; safe, commodious, comfortable, luxurious and fast; free from vibration and among the stanchest and ablest sea-boats afloat. A striking incident of the latter quality occurred in a recent passage, when the St. Louis and Campania, being abreast in a gale heavy enough to buffet and knock down the speed of the latter, the St. Louis plunged through it at nearly full speed without the slightest distress or discomfort.
The St. Louis and St. Paul have taken the passage record from New York to Southampton, St. Paul holding the westward record of six days thirty-one minutes, and the St. Louis the eastern record in six days ten hours and ten minutes.
Having thus proven our ability to compete in the construction of passenger vessels with our British cousins across the Atlantic, let us now see how our ships of war compare with theirs. It has been but a few years since what is known as the reconstruction of our navy began. In 1882, the first of our present new navy, the Atlanta, Boston, Chicago and Dophin were, by Congress, authorized to be constructed. Since that time we have added over forty vessels of modern type, and with but few exceptions built of American material and by American workmen, and from American designs. We have now reached a point where we are able to compete successfully with any nation in the world, and, in fact, our ships are said by many to be superior to those built in British shipyards.
An eminent English naval authority, in an article published in The Fortnightly Review, July, 1894, compares our battleships of the Indiana class with similar ships in the British and French navies, and, after noting the size, speed and armor, says:
"It will be observed that the Indiana and Iowa compare unfavorably in speed with both Renown and the Jaureguiberry, but in almost every respect they seem to be immensely, nay, crushingly superior; and I do not regard great speed of supreme importance in a battleship. What, for example, could be the value in practice of the Renown's superior speed as against the Indiana's? It might, it is true, enable our ship to force an action, but with an opponent so greatly superior in gun-fire our ship could scarcely hope, other things being equal, to achieve success.
"If the two ships, engaged bow to bow, stern to stern, or bow to stern, the United States ships could give blows much more numerous than those of the British ship, and in the aggregate nearly thrice as heavy; even if they engaged broadside to broadside the aggregate energy of the American fire would be much more than double that of the British. Put our huge Royal Sovereign or our coming Prince George, as our champion instead of our Renown, and we will not fare much better, for the Americans distribute their guns much more advantageously than we do, and their battleships, which I have sighted, represent more sensible compromise of the rival claims of speed, radius of action, gun-power and armor than any of ours. If our battleships be unequal to the task of engaging another battleship of inferior displacement, superior speed will avail the former little, unless to enable her to run out of danger; yet, is not the main object of a battleship after all to fight? In the war of 1812 we were obliged, much against our will, to take lessons from the United States on the subject of the proper way of gunning frigates. We might do worse now than take lessons from the United States on the subject of the proper way of gunning battleships; and, also, of gunning cruisers, for the American cruisers are as superior to ours as the American battleships are."
The chief cause, as we have seen, of the decline of our shipbuilding industry was the change from wooden to iron ships, thus throwing whatever advantage there had been in our favor into the hands of Great Britain, owing to the fact that the latter country was better able, at that time, to produce iron, and could do so more cheaply than was possible in the United States. But we have made such rapid progress in the iron industry during the last few years that we are no longer at a disadvantage in this respect, but, in fact, are able to produce iron and steel cheaper than it can be produced in Great Britain. We have not yet reached our maximum power in the production of iron. Our furnaces are much larger than those in Great Britain and of a more modern type, and with the vast amount of iron to be found in the United States, and the large amount of capital which may be employed in the iron industry, there seems to be no reason why we should not continue to produce iron and steel at the same, if not at lower, rates than is possible in Great Britain. Another advantage we have is the cheapness of fuel. American coal is the cheapest in the world. The cost of production has generally decreased during the last few years. In 1880, the average annual output per employee was 190 tons; it is now about 550 tons. In 1882, the output of pig iron was 4,623,323 tons, and of finished iron and steel 3,500,500 tons. In 1887, these figures had reached 6,417,148 and 5,250,000 tons respectively, while in 1897 these figures were 9,652,680 and 7,000,000 tons.
American steel rails are now being supplied on contracts to British India, Russian Asia, and the West Indies, Canada, South Africa, Hawaii, and even to Ireland. In one month last year the two largest steel rail companies are said to have booked between them no less than a half-million tons, the largest proportion of which was for export. Nor is this surprising, for the prices have steadily fallen during the last few years; thus, in 1896, the price of steel rails was $24.25 a ton in the United States, $26.80 in Germany, and $23.75 in Great Britain.
In 1898, the prices were $19.00 in the United States, and $28.75 in Germany, and $22.50 in Great Britain. In 1898, the exports of iron and steel from the United States amounted to $70,367,527 as against $57,497,872 in the previous year.
The London Statist, one of the principal financial journals of England, published not long ago, an article entitled "American Ships, Iron and Steel," in which, after dwelling at some length upon the rapid development of our iron industries during the last few years and making some prophecies in regard to our future position in the shipping world, the following statement was made:
"The point we have sought to bring out is that America has now so developed her iron and steel industries that she must find fresh outlets for her products. Such outlets she is finding, as we believe, with profit in foreign markets, for certain products. For other products, however, she will need to create a new shipbuilding industry of her own, and what has been done, or is being done in that direction, we must reserve for future examination. No thoughtful man, acquainted with the American character, who considers the situation, can fail to perceive that the greatest competition to be faced by British industry and enterprise in the future is that of American shipbuilding. It may be deferred a few years, but it is bound to come." —Scientific American Supplement.
BRITISH SHIPBUILDING.
From an address before the Institution of Naval Architects.
This has been a year that will never be forgotten in the annals of the mercantile marine of Great Britain. Her Majesty's government, on the outbreak of the war in South Africa, found themselves compelled to rely solely upon the merchant steamers of the country, in order to transport to the scene of operations the largest military force that has ever been sent across the seas by any state in the world's history. It is satisfactory to learn, on the authority of the First Lord of the Admiralty, that the work has been admirably performed. As far back as February 17, 181 transports and freight ships had already been employed to carry over 132,000 officers and men, together with 50,000 horses and mules, and the stores and material for this large force. These figures are exclusive of the troops, horses, etc., conveyed from India and the colonies. Though the distance traversed was 6000 miles, not a single life has been lost during the operation, and the few mishaps that have befallen the steamers have been due to the risks of navigation. Since the date of the First Lord's speech, the figures mentioned above have been very considerably increased; but, nevertheless, the immunity from accident continues. The fact that it has been found possible to confide, with perfect security, the safety of its principal fighting force to the ships of private owners entitles me to congratulate them, as well as the builders and the registration societies which framed the rules under which most of the vessels and engines were constructed, upon having created a mercantile fleet of such efficiency that the state was enabled to make full use of it in its hour of need. We have always been accustomed to reckon the mercantile marine as one of the greatest of our commercial assets, but I doubt if the people of this country have hitherto been aware that they also possessed in it a military factor of the first importance. It is, therefore, on national, as well as on commercial grounds, that I am able to congratulate our ship-builders upon the fact that, in the year 1899 they have again broken all records with an output of mercantile shipping amounting to 1,416,791 tons, a figure which exceeds the total of the previous year by 49,000. In addition, warships having a total displacement of 168,590 tons were launched in British yards, of which about two-thirds were built in private establishments. The orders now in hand, it is true, show a slight diminution when compared with the figures of the corresponding period last year. The latest returns prove that 1,306,751 tons are now under construction, as against 1,400,000 tons a year ago; but this falling off will hardly occasion surprise when we consider how intensely active the shipbuilding industry has been since the termination of the great labor dispute in 1897. The returns bear witness to the continually increasing size of merchant steamers, for no less than sixteen vessels of 10,000 tons and upwards were being built, of which eight were launched during the year, exclusive of the Oceanic, to which I referred in my last annual address. Of these, the largest was the Ivernia, of 13,900 tons, which we had the advantage of inspecting, thanks to the kindness of C. S. Swan and Hunter, on the occasion of our visit to Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
The sale of British vessels to foreign owners appears to be going on at an increasing rate. During the last year no less than 609,589 tons were transferred to foreign flags, this being the largest figure on record. Nevertheless, the net additions to the British register were considerable, having amounted to 399,865 tons. The number of ships on the register, however, shows a diminution of 195, in consequence of large removals of sailing vessels from the lists.
Our foreign friends, who are such active supporters of this Institution, have, I am glad to say, fully shared in the prosperity of the shipbuilding industry. In France 90,000 tons of mercantile vessels and warships, of 65,000 tons displacement, were launched. The construction of sailing ships, almost abandoned elsewhere, continues to flourish under the French bounty laws. The returns include two such vessels, the Ville de Mulhouse and the Ville de Havre, each of 3214 tons.
The returns for the United States, Germany, and Italy all show considerable increases over even the noteworthy figures of the previous year. About one-third of the tonnage launched in the States was for service on the Great Lakes. It may give an idea of the importance of the water-borne commerce of these inland seas if I mention that eleven steamers of upwards of 4000 tons, and two sailing barges of over 5000 tons each were launched last year for the lake trade.
The Germans have again distinguished themselves by the construction of several steamers of very large size. These include the Patricia, of 13,292 tons; the Grosser Kurfürst, of 12,500 tons; and shortly after the close of the year they launched the Deutschland, of about 15,500 tons, which, next to the Oceanic, is now the largest vessel afloat.
Turning to the Royal navy, the new shipbuilding programme appears at first sight to be a somewhat modest one. In the coming financial year it is proposed to lay down two battleships, six first-class armored cruisers, one second-class cruiser, and six small vessels. It must not, however, be forgotten that we have already under construction a large number of armored and unarmored vessels. In the course of the coming year there will be building or completing the following ships: Seventeen battleships, twenty armored cruisers, one first-class protected cruiser, one third-class cruiser, and thirty-six other vessels of various classes; a very tolerable-sized fleet in themselves. I cannot, however, refrain from expressing the regret which I share with the naval authorities that, owing to a variety of circumstances, such as the non-delivery of material, the rapidity of construction, of which we have in the past been so justly proud, has not during the last two or three years been fully maintained. So far as I have been informed, the chief causes of delay have been owing to restricted output of the best class of propelling machinery and of armor-plate. The situation has been described by the First Lord of the Admiralty as one of some difficulty. In my opinion it might resolve itself into one of some gravity, or even danger. I cannot myself believe that we have reached the limit of our producing power in these two directions, or that we are straining our unrivalled resources. The difficulty of procuring armor-plate seems to be the more acute of these two questions. I venture, with the utmost respect, to suggest that two courses are open to the government. Either to extend by means of orders guaranteed over a series of years, the number of firms capable of supplying armor-plate; or for the state itself to undertake its manufacture. I am aware that this latter course is open to serious objections, which I need not particularize, but I am confident that the people of this country are so fully alive to the absolute necessity of possessing an all-powerful fleet that they will not consent, year after year, to see money which they cheerfully grant for constructive purposes, either allowed to lapse, or else devoted to purposes other than those which their representatives intended it for.
It must be satisfactory to all those who closely study the conditions of efficiency and mobility of a fleet to learn that the Admiralty are giving their earnest attention to the question of fleet auxiliaries. While it is highly desirable that every warship should be, to the greatest possible extent, self-contained, no modern squadron can be considered independent unless accompanied by specially fitted colliers, repairing-ships, magazine-ships, hospital-ships, and distilling-ships. Looking to the extreme rapidity with which modern naval warfare is likely to develop, it is to be hoped that too great reliance will not be placed upon vessels improvised at the last moment to fulfil these purposes.
Another question, which might become a burning one, is the restriction upon the employment of wood in all fighting ships. Many foreign nations are, I believe, entirely abandoning the use of wooden decks and wood fittings in their military marines. If we are not following their example as closely as some might wish, it is because our ships have to keep the sea for longer periods than do those of our neighbors, and we are bound, therefore, to give greater consideration to their habitability; but, while we do not lose sight of this important factor in the health and efficiency of our ships' companies, it is earnestly to be hoped that all inflammable material will be cut down to the narrowest possible limits, and be made easily removable when clearing ships for action. —The Engineer.
THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY.*
*Institution of Naval Architects, April, 1900.
By Rear-Admiral C. C. P. FITZGERALD, Associate.
The first real start made by Japan in the production of a modern navy seems to have been the purchase of the ironclad Stonewall Jackson from the United States government in 1866. She was a small ship of only 1300 tons burden, but she carried a 10-ton gun, besides some smaller ones, and was a powerful ship of her day; she was re-named the Adzuma. The first ship built in England for the Japanese government was the Foo-So. She was built at Poplar by Samuda, from designs by Sir Edward Reed, and was launched in April, 1877. She was a broadside central-battery ship, bark rigged, 220 feet long, 48 feet beam, 3718 tons, double screw, speed 13 knots, engines by Penn. This ship was followed by the Kon-go, Hi-yei, and Rin-jo, all small ironclads not exceeding 2300 tons, but carrying powerful armaments for their size. There were also about half a dozen unarmored ships of little fighting value. This was the state of the Japanese navy in 1880. Five years later—1885—Japan had only added one small ironclad to this list; but there were "built and building" for her several fast and powerful cruisers, armed with Krupp and Armstrong guns. The ironclads, with the exception of the Foo-So, were built of wood. Five years later—1890—she had again only added one ironclad to her list, in the shape of an armored gunboat; but she had by this time provided herself with a considerable squadron of fast and well-armed cruisers, built in various foreign countries. By 1895, although she had not actually added to her list of armored ships, there were building for her in England two battleships of the most powerful type, exceeding 12,000 tons displacement, and with a proposed speed of 18 knots; she had also added considerably to her list of fast cruisers. One of these, the Yoshino, built at Elswick, had a measured-mile speed of 22.5 knots.
There can be no doubt that the Chino-Japanese war gave an immense impetus to the development of the Japanese navy; not only were ships captured from the Chinese, some of which were repaired and are now in commission, but large orders were placed abroad for warships of all classes, including torpedo craft, and the Japanese also set to work to build ships in their own dockyards. The Japanese navy now stands as follows, eliminating ships which appear to be of insignificant fighting value, but including those which are expected to be ready during the current year:
Battleships.
Fuji Thames Iron Works.
Yashima Elswick.
Shikishima Thames Iron Works.
Asahi John Brown and Co.
Hatsusi Elswick.
Mikása Vickers and Co.
These are first-class battleships in the fullest sense of the term, ranging in tonnage from the 12,300 of the Yashima to the 15,000 of the Asahi, Hatsusi, and Mikása. Their speeds are all at least 18 knots, and they are armed with the most powerful modern guns, and considerable areas of their sides are protected by the latest and most up-to-date face-hardened armor. Four of the six carry more armor and more guns than British first-class battleships, but less coal. There is also the Chinyen-late Chin Yuen-captured from the Chinese, German built. I have seen her quite lately. She has been thoroughly repaired, and is now in commission, and although she cannot be classed as a first-class battleship, being of only 7220 tons, and 14 knots speed, she is a powerful ship of her class. There are also three small ironclads-Fuso, Hi-yei, and Kon-go-built in England in the seventies, before alluded to, and the Hei Yen, captured from the Chinese; they are of very small fighting value, and three of them are used as training-ships.
Armored cruisers.-Although Japan won the battle of Yalu with second-class cruisers fighting against armored ships, her statesmen are not under the delusion that second-class cruisers will be sufficient to meet the growing needs of their rapidly expanding empire, and they are, therefore, adding to the fleet six very powerful armored cruisers of about 9800 tons displacement and about 20 knots speed:
These are all Elswick ships, designed by Mr. Philip Watts. The Tokiwa and Asama are completed, the Idzuma will be delivered about the middle of this year, the Iwate towards the close of it. The Idzuma, of 9436 tons, but the same armament, and 20 knots speed, is building at St. Nazaire, by the Société de la Loire, and is to be ready this year. The Yakuma, of 9850 tons, and the same speed and armament as the Idzuma, is building at the Vulcan Works, Stettin, and I am informed she is to be ready this year. The above ships constitute a squadron of six extremely powerful
vessels, call them what you will, battleships or cruisers; at any rate not a few of the so-called "naval experts" think such ships are fit to "lie in the line" and take their place amongst battleships. They are at least as powerful vessels as some that are classed as second-class battleships in our own and some foreign navies, and they have a great advantage in speed. Japan owns another armored cruiser, the Chiyoda, built in Glasgow in 1890, with a nominal speed of 19 knots; she is a small ship of only 2450 tons, and she cannot be assigned a very high fighting value in the present day, though she took part in the battle of Yalu.
The two former ships were built in France in 1889; the latter in Japan two years later. Such an armament appears to be out of place in a cruiser, and a nominal speed of 16 knots to be inadequate. It does not appear that this type is likely to be repeated.
Third-class cruisers and small craft.-Japan possesses several third-class cruisers of good speed, capable of acting as scouts. She has also a considerable number of small vessels of low speed and but little fighting value, which it would be waste of time to describe. But there are six gunboats of the Chinto class, captured from the Chinese, carrying one 11-inch gun. These might be useful as coast-defenders.
Torpedo flotilla.-The peculiar nature of the Japanese coast-line, with its numerous harbors, and the Inland Sea with its archipelago of islands, are physical features in Japan which offer special advantages for the use of torpedo-boats; and she is, therefore, providing herself with a powerful torpedo flotilla of the most modern type of vessels. Messrs. Yarrow, Thornycroft, Normand, and Schichau are all building either torpedo-boats or destroyers for the Japanese government, and some are also being built in Japan. A torpedo transport on the plan of our own Vulcan and the French Foudre is projected, but my information does not enable me to state whether the order has actually been placed or not. Yarrow and Co. have just completed six destroyers of 31 knots' speed and upwards, and the same firm has now in course of construction ten first-class torpedo-boats for the Japanese government. Thornycroft and Co. have also just completed six destroyers of about 50 tons less displacement than the Yarrow boats, and with speeds of 30 knots and over. Japan already has in commission and in reserve, a considerable number of first and second-class torpedo-boats, some of these being constantly used for exercise. It is interesting to note that an armor-plated torpedo-boat named the Katoka 166 feet long, with 9 feet 6 inches beam, built for the Japanese government by Yarrow and Co., in 1885, led the torpedo attack both at Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei. It seems that the Japanese not only know how to order a good article, but to use it when they get it.
Dockyards.-There are three Imperial dockyards in Japan-Yokosuko, Kuré, and Sassebo. They are all capable of being effectually defended. A fourth, Maisuru, on the northwest coast of the main island, is also in course of construction. Sassebo can only be approached through narrow and tortuous channels, and from its natural position, may be considered absolutely unattackable from the sea. Kuré is in the Inland Sea, and its position also is naturally a very strong one; the islands around it are being strongly fortified, and it will shortly be impregnable to sea attack. It is, moreover, to be remarked that with the powerful torpedo flotilla Japan has already got, and is still further increasing, hostile ships operating in the Inland Sea would be likely to have a bad time. Yokosuko is in the gulf of Yeddo, and very favorably placed for defense. The heights around are already fortified, and the works now in progress at the entrance to the gulf will protect not only Yokosuko, but also Tokyo and Yokohama, and forbid this large stretch of enclosed water to any hostile squadron. Nagasaki, where there is a private shipbuilding yard that turns out large merchant steamers, and where there is one first and one second-class dock, is being strongly fortified; and from its position it is a place of strategic importance. At Hakodati, in the North Island of Japan, the harbor is being artificially improved, and, although there is no dockyard here, the port is being fortified as a harbor of refuge. This place bears a striking resemblance to Gibraltar. At Oterrani, also in the North Island, extensive harbor works are in progress, an interesting description of which was lately given in Engineering.
Up to the present the Japanese dockyards have not undertaken to build a battleship, and the largest cruiser they have built is the Hashidaté, of 4200 tons and 16 knots speed; but they hope soon to be able to build first-class cruisers at Yokosuko, and eventually battleships. At this dock-yard there is a first-class modern dock, in which one of the heaviest battleships of the British navy-the Victorious-was lately docked for cleaning purposes, and I never saw a similar operation more quickly, more quietly, nor more methodically performed in any English dockyard. In the Jiji Shimpo (Times of Japan), of February, 1899, Mr. S. Sassow, Chief Director of Naval Construction, writes as follows concerning Yokosuko dockyard: "This dockyard was established during the Tokugawa regency by the Shogunate in 1866. French officers, comprising naval constructors and engineers-Mons. Verner being the chief director-were engaged, together with a considerable number of leading workmen, for originating the work and for instructing Japanese workmen; several wooden ships have been built here. In 1875 the services of the greater part of the French employees were dispensed with, and the administration passed entirely into our own hands .... We are now building entirely of steel. Our artisans in all branches of shipbuilding and engineering have now attained to a considerable skill. ... Hitherto the limit of size at Yokosuko has been 5000 tons; but it is intended to enlarge the dockyard so as to be able to build cruisers of all classes; and in course of time we expect to be able to build battleships. All materials have to be purchased abroad, even for building cruisers."
With regard to steel armor-plate manufacture, Mr. Sassow says: "Should such be established in Japan, it would hardly be able to manufacture plates within six years from starting. With the experience of six years even they will probably find that it will be only after many years of further experience they are able to turn out plates of uniform thickness." Under these circumstances, the armor-plate manufacturers of Great Britain need not feel any immediate alarm of dangerous competition from Japan. —The Engineer.
THE UNITED STATES CRUISERS OF THE DENVER CLASS.
The Denver is one of a class of six that were provided for in the Naval Appropriation Bill for the fiscal year ending June 30 next. The vessels were first known as protected cruisers 14 to 19, but have since been named the Denver, Des Moines, Chattanooga, Galveston, Tacoma, and Cleveland.
The vessels are, of course, to be twin-screw, the propelling engines being right and left-handed; they are of the inverted, direct-acting, four-crank, triple-expansion type. There is one piston-valve for the high-pressure cylinder, and two for each intermediate-pressure cylinder, and one flat slide valve for each low-pressure cylinder.
Diameter of high-pressure cylinder 18 in.
Diameter of intermediate-pressure cylinder 29 in.
Diameter of low-pressure cylinders 35 1/2 in.
Stroke 30 in.
Revolutions at full power per minute 172
Steam pressure in boilers 275 lbs.
Steam pressure at engine 250 lbs.
Diameter of crankshaft 9 1/4 in.
Diameter of crankpin 9 1/4 in.
Length of crankpin 11 in.
Diameter of axial hole in shaft 5 in.
Diameter of piston valves 11 in.
The sequence of cranks in turning centers is in order as follows: High-pressure, intermediate-pressure, forward low-pressure, and after low-pressure. The order of the cylinders is forward low-pressure, high-pressure, intermediate-pressure, and after low-pressure. The collective indicated horse-power of the propelling and circulating pump engines was originally designed to be 4500, with the main engine making about 172 revolutions per minute at the steam-pressure named; viz., 250 pounds at the engine. The engine bedplate is of cast-steel. The crankshaft for each engine is forged in two pieces, the shaft for the forward low-pressure, and the high-pressure cylinder, forms one piece, whilst that for the intermediate-pressure cylinder and the after low-pressure cylinder are formed of another piece. All crank, thrust and propeller shafts are hollow. The shafts, piston-rods, connecting-rods, valve-rods, eccentric-rods, and working parts generally are of forged nickel-steel. There is in the design a single-acting air-pump worked from the crosshead of the forward low-pressure cylinder.
There will be one separate cylindrical main condenser to each set of engines, placed in the wings of the engine-room, as usual with an arrangement of machinery of this nature. The total cooling surface of each, as designed, is about 3000 feet, or 6000 feet in all. Each main condenser will have one centrifugal circulating pump. There will be two auxiliary condensers, each with a cooling surface of about 450 feet, and these condensers will have combined air and circulating pumps. The auxiliary condensers are of the cylindrical type and are placed athwartships against the after engine-room bulkhead. The propellers are of bronze and are right and left-handed, turning from the ship.
According to the original design, it was specified that the boilers should be six in number and of the water-tube type, giving steam for an aggregate of 4700 indicated horse-power. The total grate surface was at least to be 300 square feet, and the total heating surface about 13,200 square feet. The boilers were to be in two compartments with fire-rooms athwartships, and there were to be two smoke-pipes for all the six boilers. "The forced-draft system," it is stated in the proposals, "will consist of three boilers discharging into airtight fire-rooms. The air for combustion will be heated by the hot gases circulating among or through tubes arranged in the uptakes or in the upper part of the boiler casing, and will be conveyed through ducts fitted with dampers to closed ashpits." In addition, the following engines are to be supplied and worked by steam, viz.: Steering engine, capstan engine, four deck winches, two ash hoists from each fire-room, dense air machine with capacity of 1 ton of ice per day, engine for machine tools, and evaporating and distilling plant in two units, each having a capacity of 4000 gallons per day. The following auxiliary machinery is to be electrically operated: Blowers for hull ventilation, and two winches for hoisting ammunition.
The main elements, according to the latest ad vices, may be here added:
Length on water line 292 ft.
Beam at water line 44 ft.
Trial displacement 3200 tons
Greatest draft, full load 16 ft. 11 in.
Total bunker capacity, not less than 700 tons
Coal on trial 470 tons
Feed-water, trial 40 tons
Speed on trial, at least 16 1/2 knots
Full load displacement 3500 tons
The above particulars are taken from the Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers. We are also indebted to the same valuable publication for the following interesting details of weights which are taken from the United States Naval Department's design:
Tons.
Guns, mounts, shields, &c., about 98
Ammunition, ordnance, stores, and outfit, about 155
Machinery, complete, about 405
Engineers’ stores, about 22
Fresh water for steaming purposes 40
Total coal 700
Boats and outfits 13
Masts and spars 14
Electric plan and electric outfit 29
Equipment, including anchors, chains, rigging, &c. 72
Officers, crew, and outfit 37
Miscellaneous and provisions, and clothing stores 92
As previously stated, the tenders, or bids, for these six cruisers have been lately received, and it will be interesting to consider them in connection with the proposals put forward by the United States government, more especially as the procedure followed in America differs somewhat from our own. The Naval Appropriation Bill providing for these ships was that which dealt with the provision of vessels for the United States navy up to the end of the present fiscal year, which terminates on June 30 next. There were authorized to be constructed by contract, three sea-going coast-line battleships, three armored cruisers, and these six protected cruisers. The general particulars of the ships were laid down in the bill, and they are each to cost, exclusive of armament, not more than $1,140,800. The Secretary of the Navy was directed to award the contract to the "lowest responsible bidder, having in view the best results and the most expeditious delivery." Not more than two of the seagoing battleships, and not more than two of the protected cruisers, were to be built in one yard or by one contracting party. It was further provided "that one and not more than one of the seagoing battleships, and one and not more than one of the armored cruisers shall be built on or near the coast of the Pacific Ocean." The President was, however, allowed to exercise his discretion in regard to the latter provision if it was found that the vessels could not be built on the Pacific side at a cost not exceeding 4 per cent. above the lowest accepted bid for the other ships.
There is a good deal that is interesting in the provisions of this bill, especially when considered in conjunction with the armor-plate questions in which the United States Congress has recently thought fit to interfere with not very fortunate results. No doubt a wise discretion is exercised in fostering shipbuilding enterprise on both ocean coast-lines of the country, as thereby the naval strength of the nation is increased, although a cynically inclined American citizen might be apt to attribute the procedure to the influence of Pacific coast votes. But in any case it would be more satisfactory, we should think, to have these matters left to the Secretary of the United States Navy and his professional advisers; as, in this country, they would be left to the First Lord of the Admiralty. Unfortunately these wider questions of national policy are the kind of things our First Lords never seem to consider; because, it may be presumed, they are subordinate to the Treasury-which never recognizes anything more imperial than the lowest tender-and also because they are afraid of questions in the House. The "awards" for the six cruisers were made on November 27 last, as follows: Galveston, Wm. R. Trigg & . Co., 24 months, $1,027,000; Chattanooga, Lewis Nixon, 30 months, $1,039,966; Cleveland, Bath Iron Works, 30 months, $1,041,650; Tacoma, Union Iron works, 27 months, $1,041,900; Des Moines, Fore River Engineering Company, 30 months, $1,065,000; Denver, Neafie & Levy, S. and E. B. Company, 30 months, $1,080,000.
These contracts are for the department's designs with a speed of 16 1/2 knots. There was offered by one firm a lower price than any of those named, namely, $954,500, but their tender was not accepted. There were also three bids somewhat higher. The closeness of some of the tenders is quite a coincidence, and indicates how very well the estimating department is managed in some of the works.
Contractors were invited to submit tenders on modified designs at higher speeds, but the American Board of Construction decided to recommend acceptance only of the department plans. It will, however, be interesting to give some of the tenders made by contractors on their own plans. The firm who gave the lowest price, not accepted, for the department design, made a bid of $1,059,500 for a 17 1/2-knot ship, or only $105,000 for the extra knot. For an 18-knot ship with Thornycroft boilers, Messrs. W. R. Trigg & Co. bid $1,041,000, or only $14,000 for the extra speed, say 28ool. for a knot and a half. That appears surprisingly cheap, but the Fore River Engine Company were even more liberal and offered the knot and a half for nothing, being willing to take $1,065,OOO, whether the vessel steamed 16 1/2, or 18 knots. It must be remembered however, that the latter speed was to be obtained on their own designs: a circumstance that makes a good deal of difference when dealing with governments. For an 18 1/2-knot ship the Fore River Company asked $1,100,000; and for a 19-knot ship with Thornycroft boilers, Messrs. W. R. Trigg & Co. asked $1,079,000, or only $52,000 over their 16 1/2-knot price. Most of the firms offered lower prices if awarded two ships.
It would seem from these figures-for we may presume that the contractors did not offer unserviceable or absurd designs-that the United States authorities do not set an inordinately high value on speed; as our own naval authorities have been accused of doing. Admiral Hichborn who corresponds to our Sir William White, being head of the United States Construction Department, has expressed his disapprobation of "show vessels" and "fancy results." Probably his department look on excessive speed as one of the "fancy" or "showy" attributes. The value to be attached to such qualities, however, is a matter for seagoing naval officers, who will fight the ships, to decide. It is easy to understand how a naval constructor may go in a direction quite contrary to that of Admiral Hichborn, and be carried a little too far in his estimate of the value of speed, for in times of peace it is often the only quality-putting aside, of course, price-by which the general public judge of the success of a warship. Nevertheless, experience has shown that speed has a high fighting value in steamship actions.
What boilers are actually to be put in the different ships by various builders we are not aware. They are, however, to be of the water-tube type. —Engineering.
THE HAMBURG-AMERICAN ATLANTIC LINER DEUTSCHLAND.
This vessel has been built by the Stettiner Maschinenbau Actien-Gesell-schaft Vulcan, at Bredow, near Stettin, where also the North German Lloyd steamer Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse was constructed and engined. The latter has attained a speed on the Atlantic of 22 1/2, knots, and has thus excelled all previous performances; and the new ship is expected to make 23 knots in service, and is equipped with engines to develop 33,000 indicated horse-power, the greatest power fitted in any ship up to the present time. The fastest of our British Atlantic liners are the Campania and Lucania, and they have a displacement tonnage of about 17,000 tons, their length between perpendiculars being 600 feet; the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse is 625 feet long and of 19,800 tons displacement; and the Deutschland 662 feet 9 inches long and 23,000 tons displacement. The British ship may be put at quite 22-knot speed, and it is interesting to note that the power has not increased at the ratio one would expect in view of displacement and speed, a fact due probably to the greater length of the hull. The Deutschland is to leave on the first voyage to New York on June 17, and her performance will be watched with interest. In this connection it may be noted that she is to leave Hamburg every three weeks instead of every fourth week, as has been the case with the Atlantic liners hitherto. This practice has also been adopted by the American line, and secures the advantage of a greater amount of work from the ship within a given time, experience having shown that those high-speed liners are, as a rule, superseded by faster boats before they have done a full share of work.
The Deutschland is 662 feet 9 inches long between perpendiculars and 686 feet over all, 38 feet longer than the Kaiser William der Grosse. Her beam is 67 feet, 1 foot more, and moulded depth 44 feet, also 1 foot greater. The gross tonnage is 16,000, and the displacement 23,000 tons.
The machinery differs from the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, which has four-cylinder, triple-expansion engines; the Deutschland has six-cylinder, quadruple-expansion engines, and thus, notwithstanding the increase of power and quadrupling, the low-pressure cylinders are only 106.3 inches, not by any means a maximum, as compared with 96.4 inches. The two low-pressure cylinders are in the center, with the two high-pressure cylinders over them, and at the forward end is the first intermediate and at the after end the second intermediate. The two first cranks, set opposite each other, have thus the intermediate in the one case, and a high-pressure and low-pressure cylinder in the other, and the after pair of cranks, a high pressure and a low pressure in the one case, and the intermediate on the other crank. The cylinders are placed close together, the valves being on the outside, and there is a separate valve gear for each cylinder, i.e., six sets for the six cylinders of each engine. The end cylinders have their valve boxes on the outside, and owing to the great diameter there are two spindles, a system adopted in the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse. The diameters of the cylinders are as follow:
Two high-pressure cylinders 30.6 in.
One intermediate-pressure cylinder (I.) 73.6 in.
One intermediate-pressure cylinder (II.) 103.9 in.
Two low-pressure cylinders 106.3 in.
Common stroke 72.8 in.
Together the engines are to indicate 33,000 horse-power, when running at about 76 revolutions per minute. The cooling surface of the two surface condensers total 42,630 square feet.
There are twelve double-ended and four single-ended boilers, divided equally into four sets for four boiler compartments. —Engineering.
SUBMARINE BOATS.
Interest has again been revived in the subject of submarine boats, owing to the report that France has decided upon the construction of a large fleet, 100 being given as the number, while the United States navy authorities have come at last to the conclusion to purchase the Holland boat after many trials. This uncertainty of opinion is shared by all governments, excepting only that of France, in which country the conditions of a naval war are such as to justify the undertaking of the risks more or less inseparable from the submersibility of such craft.
Although it would not be quite accurate to say that there has not been advancement towards the solution of the inherent difficulties to submarine navigation, a glance at the successive experiments is not by any means encouraging.
The first submarine boat did not drown anybody; but whether or not the great Cornelis van Drebbel actually submerged the boat which he exhibited before James I. on the Thames in 1624, is not quite clear. Day did go down at Yarmouth in 1660, and when he repeated his experiment, boat and crew failed to reappear. Fulton was more successful: he kept four hours under water in 1801, and exploded a mine at Brest from his boat. Phillips' wooden boat was crushed by the water pressure on Lake Erie, and the same fate befell Bauer's iron boat in 1850 at Kiel; he and his two men had a marvellous escape, being carried by the huge compressed air-bubble. The boat of McClintock and Howgate, constructed in 1863 for the Confederates in the American civil war, sank four times, and each time killed its volunteer crew, 32 men in all. All these craft had less than 30 tons displacement, employed water ballast and manual propelling power, and resembled plumply-built fish in their shape.
With the same year, 1863, began the days of the cigar-shaped boats of considerably larger tonnage, fitted with steam, pneumatic, petroleum, or electric power, and sometimes with two separate sets of motors, for motion on the surface and under water. Noteworthy among these are Nordenfelt's four boats, which burned fuel when on the surface, and relied on the heat stored in the boiler when under water. During the last fifteen years another type has come to the front: boats which keep just under the water-line, and which are to dive under only in extreme cases. To this class belong the boats of Hovgaard, of Peral, and the several craft which Admiral Aube had constructed: the two boats of Goubet, Zédé's Gymnote, and the Gustave Zédé. France has been most persevering in these endeavors. Last summer, Romazotti's Morse was launched at Cherbourg; she is to have two sisters, the Francais, and the Algerien; and there is finally Laubert's Narval, also launched at Cherbourg in October last, fitted with petroleum and electric motors and accumulators, whilst the other French boats mentioned depend entirely upon accumulators. Giorli's boat of 1893 is distinguished by three horizontal rudders, one of which is automatically adjusted by a pendulum. Finally, there are the six Holland boats, the last of which is entirely of Mr. Holland's own design.
The flooded boats, which keep awash, just under the water surface, look like torpedo-boats. They are spacious enough not to need any compressed air stores for breathing; and the tube projecting above the water-level, provided with a mirror at an angle of 45 deg., is a help to the man at the helm-not much of a help, though, for the elevation is too small to give a proper field of view. In stability these craft are superior to the totally submerged boats, but they suffer from many of the drawbacks of submarine boats which are regarded as serious, notably by such an expert as Professor Busley. He is acting president of the newly formed Schiffbautechnische Gesellschaft, a German naval constructors' institution whose inauguration recently was attended with so much éclat, due to the presence of the German Emperor to hear the professor's contribution on this important subject of submarine boats.
Amongst those serious inherent difficulties, Professor Busley places first the low stability of submarine boats. Some people still seem to forget that the displacement center of gravity of a totally submerged boat is simply the mass center of the water displaced, and does not alter its position whatever inclination the boat may assume. There is no buoyancy. Yet transverse stability and prevention of rolling, are not so difficult to obtain, provided the section of the boat is like that of an egg, poised on its point. If we use ballast, the center of gravity of the system will be low down, and the displacement center high up. The low longitudinal stability, the tendency to pitching, is the trouble. A man need only step forward to send the nose of the boat down. For this reason the Plongeur of Bourgeois failed, and the length of boats has been reduced again. Goubet has gone furthest in this direction, and his two men always sit in the middle of the boat. Bauer tried to apply counterpoises, Holland automatic pumps, to restore longitudinal equilibrium. Nordenfelt did not deprive his boat of all buoyancy and counteracted its effect by a submerging propeller. The flooded boats are better off in this respect. But even in their case we notice a reduction in length; the Zédé had a length of 45 meters, the Morse of 36 meters, the Narval of 34 meters. It has, on the other hand, been pointed out that they are not good seagoing boats, hardly fit for rough weather; and their own designers have proposed to give them a little freeboard. If we do that, we lose the chief advantage of the submarine boat, the immunity against projectiles; and we may argue whether we had not better return to ordinary boats, in which we are not tied down to small space and small speed, and all sorts of undesirable conditions.
Submarine boats remain dangerous to manage. On the average, perhaps, we may construct them strong enough to descend to a depth of 100 feet. Supposing a boat, moving at the usual speed under water, 8 knots, is to discharge a torpedo. Two men are sent forward; the boat at once inclines 15 deg., and within half a minute it will have arrived in its critical depth. If there is any delay or any fault in the steering gear or in the application of safety weights, etc., every second will seriously increase the pressure of the water outside. Trials made with the Gymnote, moreover, indicate that submarine boats do not obey their horizontal helms with sufficient rapidity. The Gymnote always overshot her mark, and would not keep on a straight course, but described a succession of curves. Professor Busley tried to pull a submarine boat under water; it could not be done when the speed exceeded 4 knots. That all operations near the coast or in shallow water are exceedingly dangerous, need not be emphasized. Campbell's boat managed to wriggle herself out of the Thames mud again in 1886; the accident testified to the nerve and skill of Lord Charles Beresford, and also to his good luck.
These dangers are increased by the exceedingly limited range of sight under water. Light emanating from a focus under water will, at a distance of 100 yards, not have the ten-millionth part of its intensity; and not much of the daylight penetrates into the water as it is. On a clear day, a diver 20 feet below the surface, is hardly able to see further than 25 feet. Searchlights would be of little good, and would, moreover, betray the position of the craft. Hence the boat must approach the ship it wishes to attack very closely; and if the ship is moving, the case is almost hopeless. So far, we hardly know of submarine boats doing more than 8 knots. The slow speed is largely due to the weight of the batteries, which for a journey of five or six hours would weigh about 6 cwt. per indicated horse-power; and we appear as far as ever removed from materially diminishing the weight of electric accumulators.
This low speed, and the short period during which such a boat can be kept in motion without replenishing its charge, limit the range of action of the submarine boats badly. The Gymnote could make a run of 45 miles at 10 knots, it has been said; most submarine boats have not accomplished so much as that. The submarine boat thus can merely be utilized for the defense of a port, and it is a very expensive means of defense. The Narval is stated to have cost about 30,000l. Adding a third to this sum, we could construct a torpedo-boat destroyer of four-fold speed and three-fold displacement which may achieve something. Whether a submarine boat would ever escape from a successful attack is a very doubtful question. Professor Busley does not dwell upon that point. But if the boat almost has to feel its way up to the object of attack, because it cannot see to any distance, the chances of escape are decidedly poor. —Engineering.
AMERICAN FREIGHT LOCOMOTIVES AND THE ENGINES OF THE OCEANIC—A COMPARISON OF HORSE-POWER
We are told that "comparisons are odious," and the statement would seem to be based upon a fairly correct estimate of human nature; but as soon as we get outside of the range of human susceptibilities and apply our comparisons to insensate things, comparisons become not only extremely interesting, but at times a valuable means of increasing our general knowledge and our sense of the proper relative proportion of things.
In addition to the usual information as to dimensions and construction, Mr. R. Wells, the superintendent of the Rogers Locomotive Works, has favored us with particulars of some novel experiments which he carried out to determine the exact location of the center of gravity of this locomotive above the rails. He has also given us particulars of its horse-power and freight-hauling capacity on a level road, and it occurs to us that a comparison of the relative power of one of these engines when working up to its maximum indicated horse-power with the maximum indicated horse-power of the Oceanic, the largest steamship in the world, will be attractive to that section of our readers that likes to have its facts enlivened occasionally with a touch of the fanciful and curious.
The locomotive was designed to haul trains of a maximum weight of 2000 tons over grades of 38 feet to the mile. The cylinders are 23 inches in diameter, by 30 inches stroke; the drivers are 57 inches in diameter and they carry 198,000 pounds weight of the locomotive out of a total weight of 218,000 pounds. The boiler, which is of the Belpaire type, is 80 inches in diameter at the smoke-box; the fire-box measures 42 inches by 132 inches, and there are 417 2-inch tubes which are 13 feet 8 inches in length. There are 252 square feet of heating surface in the fire-box, and 2951 square feet in the tubes, making a total heating surface of 3203 square feet. The tender is exceptionally large, the capacity of the tank being 5000 gallons, while the coal space has a capacity of 10 tons.
The increase in the diameter of locomotive boilers which has taken place of late years has necessitated their being carried above the tops of the wheels, with the result that the center of the boiler is in some recent locomotives as much as 9 feet above the rails. To the uninitiated these immense machines have an exceedingly top-heavy appearance, and it looks as though their stability would be endangered, especially when they are running at high speed around a curve. Before sending this engine out of the shops, the Rogers Locomotive Company made an experimental test to determine the exact location of its center of gravity. The result is certainly surprising, for although the top of the boiler is fully 9 feet above the rails, the center of gravity was found to be only 50 1/2 inches above the top of the rails, that is to say, about 6 1/2, inches below the top of the driving wheels. As a matter of fact, the great bulk of the boiler is very deceptive to the eye, and one is liable to forget that the greatest concentration of weight lies in the heavy frame, the wheels, the axles, cranks and running gear, and the heavy saddle and cylinder castings. The test was made by suspending the engine on the upper surface of two 3-inch steel pins or journals as pivots, the one at the front being located 6 inches in front of the cylinder saddle, and the one at the rear, 6 inches back of the boiler, both pivots being, of course, the same distance above the rails and on the vertical center line of the engine. After several trials, points of suspension were found which were in line with the center of gravity, which, as thus determined, was found to be 50 1/2, inches above the top of the rail. As the bearing points of the drivers on the rails are about 56 inches apart, the base on which the engine runs must be 1.1 times as wide as the height of the center of gravity of the engine above the rails. It is evident from this test that the center of gravity of such a locomotive could be raised still higher without endangering the stability of the engine under the ordinary conditions of service.
A COMPARISON OF MARINE-ENGINE AND LOCOMOTIVE HORSE-POWER.
In order to secure a basis for comparison of the power of a modern freight locomotive with that of a modern steamship, we have chosen the greatest vessel of them all, the Oceanic. This truly gigantic ship, which exceeds the Great Eastern in length and in displacement, is 704 feet in length, and on a draft of 32 1/2, feet displaces 28,500 tons. As the depth of water in the entrance channels to New York harbor will not accommodate a vessel drawing that amount, for the purpose of this comparison we will suppose that the Oceanic is drawing 30 feet, at which draft she would displace about 26,000 tons. On this displacement her engines will indicate about 28,000 horse-power when driving the vessel at a speed of 22 land-miles an hour.
Now, it is estimated that the big Rogers Consolidation could haul about 3250 tons weight of train at a speed of 22 miles an hour, on the level, and that while doing this work it would indicate about 1760 horse-power. Here then we have a basis of comparison, and we may apply it in two ways. Either we may ask how many of these locomotives would have to be crowded into the hold of the Oceanic, and coupled to her main shafts, in order to drive her through the water at 22 miles an hour, or we may determine how many of these locomotives it would take to haul the Oceanic if she were placed upon a movable cradle of the kind designed by Captain Eads for his Tehuantepec Ship Railway. In the first case, we know that when the main shafts of the Oceanic are making about go turns a minute, the engines are indicating about 28,000 horse-power, which is their maximum capacity. On the other hand, we know that when the drivers of one of these locomotives are making about 150 turns a minute, and the maximum tractive effort is being exerted at the periphery of the wheels, it is indicating about 1760 horse-power, which represents its possible maximum indication at that speed. If now the sixteen necessary locomotives (the number being found by dividing the horse-power of the ship by the horse-power of the locomotive) were arranged in two lines, one above each main shaft, and the tractive effort of the drivers transmitted by means of friction wheels to the shafts, the speed of the rotation being reduced by intermediate gearing, in the ratio of 150 to 90, we should have the conditions required. —Scientific American.
STEAM ELECTRIC LIGHTSHIP FOR CAPE HATTERAS.
A few miles off the shore of Cape Hatteras are the justly dreaded Diamond Shoals, on which futile attempts have been made to erect a lighthouse. Something over a decade ago the contract was let to a large and experienced contracting firm in this city for the sinking of a huge caisson into the sandy bed of the shore upon which to carry the proposed structure. The caisson, however, was wrecked and the failure seems to have discouraged any further effort. It would seem as though the only practicable way to protect shipping is to moor a lightship above the shoals and this has been attempted. The last vessel to be placed there was recently torn from its moorings during a heavy gale, and it became evident that a ship of special design was necessary to meet the exceedingly trying local conditions. Such a vessel has been designed and is now nearing completion at the yards of the Fore River Engine Company, of Massachusetts. She will be steam-propelled and electric-lighted, and when completed she will be one of the first, if not the only one, of her kind ever launched. The government contract calls for a vessel 112 feet between perpendiculars, with a molded beam of 28 feet 6 inches, and a depth of 14 feet 10 1/2, inches measured from the main deck beams to the top of the keel amidships.
The vessel will have three decks, the main and spar decks running full length of the ship, while the lower deck is broken by the forward coal-bunker and the after bulkhead of the engine-room. The hull will be divided by water-tight steel bulkheads into five compartments, and the quarters and storerooms are so arranged as to meet all requirements of safety and comfort. The dynamos and engines for the electric-light plant will be located on the main deck, as shown, and within the engine and boiler casing. The accommodations for the crew are forward on the main deck. There will be two hollow steel masts, through which the wiring for the masthead flashlights is to run. These lights, three in number on each mast, are to be adapted for electricity or for oil lamps. The cluster mast headlights will be 59 feet above the water-line, the measurement being taken from the 12-foot water-line to the focus of the lamps.
The electric plant will be driven by two non-condensing, double-cylinder-engines, running under a steam pressure of 80 pounds to the square inch. The vessel will be lighted by eighty 16-candle-power 100-volt lamps, which will be placed where necessary throughout the ship. The masthead cluster will consist of six 100-candle-power 100-volt lamps, and these lights will be controlled by an automatic flashing device. It is driven by means of a belt from the dynamo shaft, and a worm and worm-wheel which serve to give the proper rotary speed to a circuit-breaker. The lightship will be propelled by an inverted, surface-condensing, single-cylinder engine of 250 indicated horse-power, with a cylinder 23 inches in diameter by 22-inch stroke, driving a cast-iron propeller 7 feet 3 inches in diameter. Steam will be supplied by two straight, cylindrical, tubular boilers, 9 feet by 16 feet 7 1/2 inches, with a working pressure of 100 pounds to the square inch. The deck fittings of the vessel are flush, with a view to presenting as little surface as possible to the action of wind and water.
When No. 72 is on her station off the treacherous Hatteras shoals her mooring tackle will consist of a heavy mushroom anchor, shackled to a chain which leads through the main hawser hole in the stem of the ship to a steam windlass. In addition to this mooring tackle, the vessel will have a 2000-pound harbor anchor, a kedge weighing 340 pounds and 120 fathoms of 1 1/8-inch stud-link chain, with a breaking strength of 79,100 pounds. Amidships, on either beam, will be swung two whale-boats of about 26 feet length and 6 feet beam. The spar deck is protected by a gradually rising steel waist, which starts flush a little forward of abreast the foremast, flaring somewhat at the knightheads until at the stem proper it has a depth of 5 feet. In addition to the steam whistle, the lightship is provided with a steam siren which is fitted just forward of the smokestack for use in thick and foggy weather. —Scientific American.
THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE BATTLESHIP ASAHI.
Although she differs considerably from the Shikishima in appearance, the Asahi is practically a sister ship, the sole points of difference being (1) funnels; (2) distribution of the 20-pounders; (3) absence of a bow torpedo-tube; and (4) mounting of the big guns. There are, of course, certain minor structural differences-such, for instance, as the fact that the Asahi has a slightly larger ward-room, and that this ward-room is a trifle further aft-but, generally speaking, for fighting purposes they are identical save for the points of difference noted above. There are unseen differences of detail also, such as the thickness of the armor deck, but none of these affect the fighting value. There is a difference, too, in the coal carried, but coal capacity does not show to the eye.
The details of the Asahi, with those of the Shikishima and the British Formidable, are as follows:
Asahi. Shikishima. Formidable.
Displacement 15,200 14,850 15,000
Material of hull steel steel steel
Length, feet 400 400 400
Beam, feet 75 1/6 75 1/2 75
Draft, feet 27 1/2 27 1/4 26 3/4
Guns—12 in. Four 12 in. Mark IX. for all
6 in. 14 14 12
3 in. 20 20 16
Smaller 6 3-pdr. 6 3-pdr. 12 3-pdr.
6 2 1/2 pdr. 6 2 1/2 pdr. 8 Maxims
8 Maxims 8 Maxims
Torpedo tubes, submerged 4 4 4
Torpedo tubes, above water 0 1 0
Armor belt, inches 9 9 9
Armor at ends, inches 4 1/2 4 1/2 3
Armor deck, inches 4 5 3
Lower deck, inches 6 6 9
Casemates, inches 6 6 6
Barbettes, inches 14 14 12
Bulkheads, inches 14 14 12
Armor material Harvey nickel, all three
I. H. P., forced 15,000 14,500 15,000
Boilers Belleville, all three
Speed (contract) 18 18.5 18
Coal (normal) (?)1,400 700 900
Screws Two in all three
There is some doubt about the Asahi's coal, 1400 tons may be the maximum and 700 the normal. Japanese ships do not need to carry much coal, being designed to operate in waters where friendly coal stations are numerous. True, ships thus kept short are likely to be out of action because they are coaling, about once a week, but on the other hand, as they get two extra 6-inch quick-firers, and four 12-pounders for this sacrifice, they are rather envied by our naval officers. After all, the primary duty of a battleship is to hit the enemy hard, and an extra 6-inch in the broadside is no mean advantage. There are other incidental advantages too-a single 6-inch shell would put all the eight 12-pounders out of action on the upper deck of the Formidable, while, thanks to the casemates acting as screens, the Asahi could only lose two of her 3-inch by a single shell. In the placing of her 3-inch guns she is altogether better off than the Formidable, as a comparison of the plans will indicate, the sole point in which the British ship is better off being the four guns carried on the main deck forward. The Formidable can fight all these on the broadsides, it is doubtful if the Asahi could, because of the blast from the big guns firing above them. But per contra she has her other 3-inch quick-firers much better placed; they are more distributed. The positions of these are: Four on the main deck forward; four on the main deck aft; four on the upper deck amidships; two on top of the forward upper deck casemates; two beside the fore conning-tower; and four beside the after conning-tower; a total of twenty. Those of the Shikishima are placed in exactly the same fashion. Those of the Formidable are: Four on main deck forward (extreme bow); four on main deck aft; and eight on upper deck amidships; a total of sixteen. Three units instead of six; or, to put it another way, work for only three shells instead of six shells. The Asahi is an improvement on the Shikishima in the matter of the 2 1/2-pounders, a very small detail. In the Shikishima these are grouped on top of the amidship upper casemates; in the Asahi only two are over these casemates, the other four being distributed, a couple on each bridge. Two theories are at work here, and it will need a war to say which is the better. In the Shikishima it is easy to concentrate three 2 1/2-pounders on a single torpedo-boat or portion of a big enemy, while, as a price for this, they are at the mercy of a single shell. Those of the Asahi are not thus at the mercy of one shell, but it will be far less easy to concentrate them.
The next point of difference between the Shikishima and the Asahi is that the former carries a bow above-water torpedo-tube, with 6-inch Harvey nickel protection to it. This tube, similarly protected, is in the Fuji, Yashima, Asama, Tokiwa and Yakumo. After some experiments and practice the Japanese authorities decided that this tube was of no use practically, and decreed its abolition. That of the Shikishima had, however, already been built in, so this ship has it. It is absent also on the Hatsuse, a sister, and in the Iwate and Idzumo.
Under certain circumstances such a tube might be of great use in action; for instance, approaching an enemy who presented his broadside while the ship possessing the tube wished to make a feint to ram. But to use it, it would be necessary to slow down or reverse engines-both things that might be awkward to do in an action. Still the real objection does not lie there, so much as in the trouble with sea that a bow tube causes. Bow guns, even high up, are always liable to get "washed out," a bow torpedo-tube is still more likely to be so. In addition to this, it raises an unnecessarily large bow wave.
In comparison with the Formidable, the Asahi and Shikishima have, beside the 6-inch and 3-inch guns, other points of distinct difference. They have: (1) Complete instead of partial belts; (2) 6-inch instead of 9-inch armor protecting the lower deck; (3) much higher barbettes; and (4) quite differently shaped hoods to the big guns.
Of these differences the armor one is of no immediate moment at present. The Asahi, in the matter of armor, is practically a Majestic with 3 inches stripped off the lower deck amidships and disposed on the ends plus some extra armor paid for in the weight of coal carried. Now, the 6-inch lower deck armor of the Asahi is proof against any 6-inch projectile at any range; and though a steel-pointed 9.2-inch common shell has been through 6-inch Harvey nickel at Whale Island, this is probably an isolated proving-ground case, and nothing but an armor-piercing shell of large caliber is ever likely to get through such armor in actual warfare; and it is at least doubtful whether such a shell would do more harm than a solid shot, and against a 12-inch solid shot 9-inch armor is no more protection than 6-inch. In either case the shot will go through and dance about inside, and it is this "dancing about" that makes shot dangerous, and all armor save the very best a snare and a delusion so far as solid projectiles are concerned. However, medium armor is imperatively needed to keep off shells, for it is good-bye to any ship inside of which a big common shell is comfortably planted. The Admiral class, for instance, would do no more fighting once a big common shell got them amidships.
As for the complete belt, the Formidable, of course, has something on the bow, and this may be considered proof against 6-inch shell in action, save at short range. It is, at any rate, proof against the deadly little shell from 12-pounders and the like. As for any 6-inch shot-well, very few 6-inch shot are carried in any ship, and holes made by them are easily plugged. The real gain of the Asahi is the extra gun power, but since it is held essential that British ships shall have a large coal supply, it is useless to decry the Formidable over the two missing 6-inch guns. The defect of the Formidable, and one that might have been remedied, is the position of the 12-pounders. These could and should have been either more distributed, or else placed right up above everything and clear of everything, much as the French place their 4-inch quick-firers. Such a gun is extremely unlikely to be actually hit, whereas if it is crowded about with bulwarks, boats, and so on, a shell coming anywhere near is bound to burst with devastating effect.
In appearance it is difficult to tell the Asahi from our Canopus class, save for color. A critical eye could detect the much higher barbettes of the Japanese vessel and their different shape, but that is about all, for the extra casemate would hardly be visible at any appreciable distance. Like the Canopus class, the Asahi has the huge after funnel, and the resemblance is increased by the tautness of her masts. The sign manual of a British man-of-war is the rake forward of the top masts, in the smartest Channel fleet ships this is most noticeable; but the Asahi also is taut.
The Asahi has a slight sheer forward, like all our new ships, in consequence of which, though both pairs of guns are at the same height above the water, the after barbette looks a good deal higher than the fore one.
The shields are peculiar-sloping fronts but straight sides. The British pattern slopes all round, and is generally more squat, and of the two is more favorably regarded afloat. If by any off-chance a big shot hit the side of the Asahi shield it would get through, from the inclined sides of the British pattern it would rebound at any range. However, a shot is very unlikely to hit the sides of the shield, and probably the mere shock of a big projectile would effectually displace everything and put the turret out of action. Wherever a big projectile hits it must do some harm, whether it gets through or not, and the old American idea of battering in preference to penetration is not so unsound as many folk are now disposed to regard it. Especially must this be so with certain foreign-built ships-the least little thing wrong and the colossal blow will find it out.
The guns and mountings of the Asahi are from Elswick. They embody some slight improvements upon those of the Shikishima, but are on exactly the same general principle. The 12-inch can easily do a round a minute, and should be able to do a round every two minutes in action. The rate of the 12.5-inch Canet gun at Yalu was one round per sixty minutes, but there were special circumstances involved. Still there is no doubt that big guns have made enormous strides towards quick-fire in the last year or two, and two of the Asahi or Formidable 12-inch are equal to three of those in the Majestic probably.
The Asahi is fitted with the Barr and Stroud transmitters, each casemate having an indicator, in English and Japanese, to give the range automatically from the conning-tower. The official British view is against these transmitters, on the ground that action will derange them; but there is no getting away from the fact that, even so, till deranged they will be exceedingly useful. Our methods of passing the range are cumbersome, and, in addition, by the time it is passed it has probably altered. Moreover, gunnery is not so much a matter of good shooting as knowing the range; the wrong range given accounts for most misses, at any rate in the British navy.
All the hoists in the Asahi are electrical, with auxiliary hand-power in case of need. —The Engineer.
JAPANESE TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS.
Length, 210 feet; beam, 19 feet 6 inches; draft, 7 feet; engines, 5700 I. H. P.; speed, 30 knots.
Six of these vessels are of steel throughout, building at Thornycroft's Works.
The propelling machinery consists of two complete sets of engines of the type invented and patented by Mr. Thornycroft, driving twin-screw propellers, each set having one high-pressure, one intermediate and two low-pressure cylinders, supported on steel columns somewhat out of the perpendicular, and so arranged that the thrusts of the rods simultaneously act on the cranks from opposite directions, in order to obviate vibration in working. In addition to the propelling machinery with condensers, circulating pumps and engines, air and feed pumps, there are fitted the blowing engines, steam steering engine, air-compressing machinery, electric-light machinery, and distilling machinery. Three of Mr. Thornycroft's patent water-tube boilers are fitted in each vessel, which give ample steam, and are remarkably efficient in respect of its rapid generation. These boilers are fitted respectively with automatic feed regulating gear, which regulates the supply of feed water (a steel float fitted in the upper barrel of the boiler automatically opening or closing the valve through which the boiler is filled). Each boiler is capable of being worked independently, and adapted for a working pressure of 220 pounds per square inch. The armament of each vessel consists of one 12-pounder 40-caliber quick-firing gun, and five 57-millimeter quick-firing guns, also torpedo gear, consisting of two revolving tubes placed on deck aft, arranged for discharging 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes.
The full complement of each vessel of all ranks is 54 men, and the accommodation provided for them is: One commander's cabin, one ward-room, two petty officers' cabins, three compartments for crew.
The six Yarrow boats are 1O feet longer, 1 foot more beam, and about 1 knot more speed than the above. —Engineeirng.
JAPANESE FIRST-CLASS TORPEDO-BOATS.
The Japanese government, having determined to increase their torpedo-boat flotilla, after considering the various designs submitted, decided upon adopting the one proposed by Yarrow & Co., Limited, and they placed an order for 10 first-class torpedo-boats with this firm last year. These vessels are 152 feet 6 inches in length by 15 feet 3 inches beam. They are single-screw boats. The contract speed is "not less than 27 knots with a 20-ton load," and a probable speed of 25 knots with the full load of 44 tons.
The vessels are built of mild steel, each being divided into ten compartments, which compartments are devoted to the machinery and crew space, as customary in this class of vessel, there now being little difference in the system adopted by various naval powers as regards the distribution of the load. The turtle deck extends from the bow for some length aft.
There are two boilers of the Yarrow straight-tube type, designed for a working pressure of 220 pounds per square inch, and capable of supplying steam for 2000 indicated horse-power, with an air pressure in the stokehold of about 1 1/4 inches. The main propelling engines are of the three-cylinder, triple-expansion type, balanced on the Yarrow system, to minimize the vibration. The cylinders are 18 inches, 26 inches and 39 1/2 inches in diameter, with a stroke of 18 inches, and designed to run up to 400 revolutions per minute.
The vessels are lighted throughout by electricity.
The coal-bunkers hold 32 tons, which is sufficient to take a vessel of this size across the Atlantic, two sister ships having navigated from London to Valparaiso.
The armament consists of one 14-inch Whitehead torpedo-tube built into the bow above the water; one revolving torpedo-tube on deck, about one-third of the length of the vessel aft of the stem. This tube revolves about an axis in the middle line of the boat, so that the tube can be discharged over either side. A similar 14-inch torpedo-tube is provided aft. There is a water-tight torpedo-room under the forward crew space suitable for carrying three reserve torpedo bodies, the war-heads being stowed in a separate magazine. The reserve torpedoes are lifted either direct to the bow tube or transferred on a small trolley along a tramway on the deck arranged in such a way that the torpedo can be placed in either of the central tubes. There is a 2 1/2-pounder quick-firing gun right aft with an almost all-round radius of fire.
The searchlight is placed on the conning-tower.
Although the armament above described was adopted after careful consideration by the Japanese authorities, it is by no means the limit for a vessel of this class, a much heavier armament having been carried on five similar boats recently constructed by Messrs. Yarrow & Co., for the Austrian navy, i.e., two 18-inch Whitehead torpedo-tubes, one on each gunwale abaft the conning-tower forward, and one 18-inch torpedo-tube aft, two reserve torpedoes in the torpedo-room, and two 47-millimeter quick-firing guns, one on each side of the conning-tower. —Engineering.
There was launched on March 29, from the Elswick Shipyard of Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., the Japanese first-class armored cruiser Iwate. The Iwate is a sister ship of the Asama, which was launched from the same yard some time ago. The principal dimensions of the vessel are: Length between perpendiculars, 400 feet; breadth, 68 feet 6 inches; depth, 41 feet; draft, 24 feet 3 inches; displacement, 9750 tons. The armament consists of four 8-inch breech-loading guns twin mounted in barbettes; fourteen 6-inch quick-firing guns in 10-inch case-mates, six on the main deck and four on the upper deck, the remaining four being on the upper deck protected by shields; twelve 12-pounder quick-firing guns; and eight 2 1/2-pounder quick-firing guns. There are four submerged torpedo-tubes, two forward and two aft. The vessel has a complete water-line belt of Harveyed nickel-steel armor, 7 inches thick, amidships and reduced at the ends. Above this there is a citadel of 5-inch Harveyed nickel-steel armor enclosing the bases of the barbettes and carried from the top of the water-line belt to the main deck. The barbettes are of Harveyed nickel-steel 6 inches thick. The casemates are of nickel-steel 6 inches thick. The conning-tower is Harveyed nickel-steel 14 inches thick. The machinery is of the twin-screw vertical triple-expansion type, and is to develop 14,500 indicated horse-power. The speed guaranteed is 20 3/4 knots, and the boilers are of the Belleville latest type. The vessel has a bunker capacity for about 1600 tons of coal. Accommodation is provided for an admiral, 52 officers, and 430 petty officers and men. —Engineering.
SHIPS' ARMOR.
Lord Hopetoun says that two courses are open to the government. "Either to extend by means of orders guaranteed over a series of years, the number of firms capable of supplying armor-plate; or for the state itself to undertake its manufacture." He goes on to say that "the latter course is open to serious objections," an opinion to which nearly all who have studied the subject will subscribe; and we think that had Lord Hopetoun realized how very serious the objections are, he would hardly have put forward the proposal of a state armor factory, even as a remotely possible alternative; so long, that is, as there are private makers willing to lay down the plant needed for any possible need of the fleet. Our Admiralty investigated this question of state supply many years ago and decided in favor of private manufacture.
It will be interesting to look abroad and see what has been done in countries where the possibilities of private supply are far below our own. The question was well considered in the United States three or four years ago; for, as is well known, the American government authorities have had a good deal of trouble in getting their armor supplies, and, indeed, recently came to a complete deadlock.
In the official report of the Chief of the (United States) Bureau of Ordnance for 1897, the question is dealt with very completely, and the opinion is definitely expressed "that the (United States) government can purchase armor more cheaply than it can manufacture it." The Ordnance Bureau rightly regarded "the making of armor as a proper adjunct to a great commercial steel plant .... Should the department acquire a plant of its own, the chances are that it would be at a great cost, and that it would lie idle a large part of the time, and thus suffer deterioration, and that the expense and difficulty of operating it when needed would more than offset any advantage gained by such ownership."
In a publication issued by the American Iron and Steel Association, it is stated that "every naval power of Europe has, at different periods since the advent of the armor-clad ship, contemplated government manufacture of armor. The government factory erected by the Russian government near St. Petersburg is, we believe, the only establishment of the kind belonging to any naval power. The plant is said to be still incomplete, and has cost from four to five millions sterling. It is conceded that armor can never be made there at as low a price as it could be purchased from abroad; a statement no one will be likely to question." The measure was, however, but a part of a policy that the Russians have always pursued; namely, to make the nation as self-contained as possible in regard to warlike supplies. As a matter of fact, the Russians are still large customers to foreign armor-plate makers, the American makers having profited largely by their custom, and the vast expense of the Kolpino factory is excused on the score of it being a reserve establishment to be brought into play upon the outbreak of war when foreign supplies might be cut off. The explanation is somewhat lame. The nation that trusts to laying down ships and making armor when war has been declared, would be pursuing a course far more foolish than the shrewd Russians are likely to contemplate. The real point of interest for us at present is whether the Russians might not have better encouraged home industry and strengthened the military resources of the country more effectually at the same time by spending an equivalent, or a far smaller sum, in guaranteeing a continuance of orders to private firms.
Some interesting figures relating to the assumed cost of an armor-plate factory were given in a letter of the Secretary of the United States Navy in 1897, quoting the opinion of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. The sum of 300,000l. had been estimated as the price of a plant needed for the purpose. This is described as "quite inadequate"; and the obvious fact is pointed out that a plant for armor-making must comprise a steel-making equipment also. To obtain the necessary stock of material for working on a large scale, and for the unavoidable experimental work in the beginning, 600,000l. would be required. The Carnegie armor plant was at that time said to have cost that amount, and it has increased since then.
This country, however, stands on quite a different basis to either the United States or Russia, but whatever arguments are to be advanced in favor of private manufacture with those, or, indeed, any other nations, are of considerably more weight in regard to Great Britain. We are far from agreeing with those perhaps somewhat short-sighted enthusiasts who say "the navy must have the very best of everything, no matter what it cost"; for cost is necessarily a very ruling factor, not only in a naval programme, but in the design of ships. In this case, however, cost is a minor consideration, and if private makers were not to be trusted to make the best kind of armor, we would be prepared to advocate considerable pecuniary sacrifice. There is, however, hardly a shadow of doubt that the result would be quite in the opposite direction. No doubt a government factory would produce in a leisurely manner excellent armor of ten or fifteen years' antiquity, and we should see the private firms of the country supplying plates for foreign ships that would be far more resistant to shot and shell than those being placed on the sides of the ships of the Royal navy.
We say we should see our private firms supplying armor to foreign powers, but the statement needs perhaps some consideration. Some of the foreign powers are making very rapid strides not only in armor-plate making, but in other branches of steel manufacture. England once held the palm in this field both for inventive ingenuity and boldness in carrying inventions to a practical issue. That former activity has placed us in the position we yet occupy in this field. But we are, it must be confessed, somewhat trading on the past, and no longer hold our old undisputed supremacy. Compound armor was an English invention; it inaugurated the principle upon which all modern armor is made, of a hard and, therefore, comparatively brittle face to resist penetration, in conjunction with a tough and softer backing to hold the mass together and prevent breaking up. Since then, however, further advances have been due to the inventors of other countries, and our armor-plate firms have been dependent on their labors. The Harvey process came to us from America, and now we have the further improvement introduced by Krupp.
It may be said that this being the case, there is little reason for encouraging the private firms. They have not made advances, therefore a government department could not be more stationary; for, of course, no one expects government factories to inaugurate improvement. That would be mortgaging the future, and, as a matter of fact, the English makers have made improvements, though they have not of late effected a quite new departure. But, beyond this, that notable advances have been made abroad is a very cogent reason why a government factory should not be trusted with the supply of armor. Governments are influenced by political considerations, and for a public department to adopt a foreign invention is to bring down on it an amount of hostile criticism which few governments would be courageous enough to withstand.
We have had notable instances of this in the past; but to those who are acquainted with the manner in which government factories are managed, it needs no recital of examples to show that they move out of established grooves only under the influence of great external pressure. With the incentive towards gain, the proprietors of private works are ready to adopt suggestions that will place them ahead of their rivals; and, therefore, putting aside the labors of the proprietors of the establishment themselves, a member of the staff, or an outside person, bringing forward a promising suggestion, is eagerly welcomed; that is, of course, supposing there is sufficient competition, as there always should be, in the case of government supplies. On the other hand, the energetic or ambitious subordinate in a government factory knows very well that if he has fresh ideas that will entail thought, hard work, and some responsibility in their working out and adoption, he had better keep them to himself, even if the jealousy of those over him be left out of account.
There is in England no need for a government armor-plate factory. The private firms are quite willing to find all the money and enterprise needed for keeping up the supply, if they are given reasonable encouragement. It is well known that one at least of these firms made an offer some time ago to the Admiralty of increasing their plant to any desired extent, if they were insured a continuance of orders for a very moderate period of time; and other firms, we believe, were quite ready to go on the same lines. Whether it was Treasury obstructiveness, or whether it was some other cause, only those in the confidence of the government could state; but at any rate this reasonable proposal was not entertained. Of late we have been doing better. Vickers's have added a third firm to the big Sheffield armor-plate makers, and Armstrong's have nearly completed a splendid new plant at Openshaw. This will enable the powerful northern firm to make the protective plates for the ships they build with such success at Elswick. At Glasgow, Bardmore's are also capable of turning out certain descriptions of armor.
That these companies should receive encouragement is a matter of national importance. As we have said, there are foreign rivals in the field, and it is, above all, desirable that all fair encouragement should be given to our home makers, to enable them to hold their own. A full volume of trade is the greatest source of strength in the case of a manufacture entailing the laying down of such immensely costly plant, and the employment of highly specialized and exceedingly well-paid labor. The foreign trade we do in ships, guns, and, indeed, all war material is one of our chief sources of military strength, and all legitimate encouragement should be given by the government to this branch of industry, without thought whether the things produced may or may not be turned against us at some future time.
We have said that English makers of armor-plates have made improvements of late, and this fact is well brought out in a paper read last week before the Royal United Service Institution by so good an authority as Captain Orde-Browne. He made reference to the Krupp process, which he says "is no doubt subject to variation, and since it has been adopted in this country, each maker has improved and modified it." As is well known, the English makers, as well as the Americans and French, have all taken licenses from the firm of Krupp. In a table given by Captain Orde-Browne in his paper, results of firing trials at various plates made on the Krupp system are given. From these is seen how notable has been the success of John Brown & Co., the founder of which firm made the first armor-plates in this country, and of the American Carnegie Company. These two firms, which practically are equal, have a better figure of merit for their plates than is credited even to those made by Krupp.
The features of the process are secret, and the secret is well kept, though in so many hands. According to Captain Orde-Browne-although he speaks not without reservation-the process "consists mainly in the use of chromium to such an extent that great brittleness and hardness might be expected. Sudden cooling is carried out in a way that might be expected to ruin the metal, but the result is great toughness. It must be understood, however, that nickel is also used, and nickel has long been known to give toughness in a remarkable degree." —Engineering.
THE NAVY ESTIMATES.
The total net estimates for the coming year reach the imposing figure of 27,522,600l.; which is nearly a million more than the estimates for the present year. We give in the table below an abstract of the net estimates on the different votes for the present and preceding five years. This shows very clearly the growth of naval expenditure. It will, of course, be understood that the differences between gross and net estimates are represented by appropriations in aid, and we have, therefore, not considered it necessary to give the gross estimates in our table.
The new programme of shipbuilding provides that there shall be laid down during the coming year two battleships, six first-class armored cruisers, one second-class cruiser, two sloops, two light-draft gunboats, and two torpedo-boats. Of these, the two battleships, two of the armored cruisers, the second-class cruiser, and the two sloops, will be built in the dockyards; so that, putting aside the four boats, only four cruisers are to be given out to contract. Considering the failure of contractors to meet the programme, it was to be expected, and, indeed, inevitable, that the major part of the new construction should be carried out by government establishments. On the whole programme, however, the value of work to be done under vote 8 is almost equally divided between the dock-yards and the contractors, the former being allotted construction which is to cost 6,596,000l., while there is to be spent on contract work 6,329,000l. The full list of ships that will be in hand is one of considerable magnitude, consisting of no less than 77 vessels of various sizes, of which 17 are battleships and 20 armored cruisers. The other 40 are made up by one first-class protected cruiser, two second-class protected cruisers, one third-class cruiser, eight sloops, two light-draft gunboats, four torpedo-boats, 21 torpedo-boat destroyers, and one Royal yacht. The whole forms a list that would be a respectable navy for most foreign powers; but it is not a ship too many.
As will be seen by our table, five years ago, when the present government came in, the total amount of the navy estimates was 18,700,000l. The next year there was an advance of over three millions, next year about half a million, the next year nearly one and a half million, the next year-the present, 2,800,000, and for the coming year the advance, as stated, is not quite a million. If, therefore, we consider the political outlook of the present moment, the estimates now brought forward are certainly moderate, unless those of the past few years have been altogether extravagant. No one considers, excepting a few peace-at-any-price fanatics, that the naval estimates have been excessive. Probably the spending of these extra millions has been the most economical step the nation has ever taken. Large as is the cost of a navy in peace, it is a trifle to that in war.
It will be seen that the largest increase in the estimates is for personnel, the votes for which absorb not far from half the total excess. The number of officers, seamen, boys, coastguard, and royal marines for the coming year are 114,880; as compared to 110,640 of the present year. With the resources of the country in shipbuilding and engine construction employed to their fullest extent, the question of manning such ships as we have naturally comes to the front. In former years, when the navy was more the shuttlecock of party than at present, personnel received but small attention at the hands of the parliamentarians who ruled in the councils of the nation. The reason was that a big programme of new ships was taken as the criterion of naval progress, no matter whether the vessels were to be manned and gunned or not. The public are better instructed now and have learnt to look more critically at the naval programme. —Engineering.
OUR NEW GUNS AND AMMUNITION.
Our manufacture of guns goes on satisfactorily, especially that the new 9.2-inch and 7.5-inch guns will soon be completed, the former for issue, the latter for trial; and further, that the conversion of our 6-inch guns into quick-firers will soon be completed in all ships that are considered worth the expense, and for reserve batteries and drill ships, and that their supply of cordite will be complete at the end of the present year. This is fairly satisfactory. The new guns are very powerful of their type, representing an extreme development of length of bore and high muzzle velocity, and great power of penetration through armor. This type has been developing for many years. England is well represented by these pieces, and England alone has actually in the service any number of guns of wire construction, Russia and America having apparently ceased their efforts in this direction. It will probably seem barbarous and retrograde to object to the form of development which our new type of guns have taken. Without going so far as this, we think that we should guard against being drawn into false directions. These individual guns may be needed; in fact, the 7.5-inch gun is, we think, a necessity in more than one way. That is to say, not only shall we soon need a quick-firing broadside gun of greater power than our 6-inch guns, but the piece must be one of somewhat the actual proportions assigned to the 7.5-inch gun. It must, in fact, have considerably greater penetration than the present 6-inch gun if it is to perforate 6-inch hard-faced armor, while, at the same time, the weight of the projectile must be kept down as much as possible if we are to load and fire quickly. This shuts us up to a small bore, and the gun must be a long one, with high muzzle velocity. We understand that about 3000 foot-seconds is talked of; this, with a 200-pound projectile, gives a muzzle energy of 12,480 foot-tons, with a perforation through 32 inches of iron. This is an enormous result, but we have no hesitation in saying that while the gun is right, so far as it can go, that any one who expects this to be realized on service will be entirely disappointed, because while this velocity may be got perhaps with a new gun, it will rapidly fall with the range, and because the bore of the gun will very soon wear, and thus the muzzle velocity will drop very considerably.
Lieut. Meigs, of Bethlehem, has recently raised the question whether these small bores with high velocities are not an unprofitable form of energy, and we are forced to agree with him. That is to say, velocity in a shot resembles speed in a ship in the fact that we pay very heavily for it in more than one way. On paper, such a gun as this appears admirable. Considered as a 7.5-inch piece, the results are, indeed, splendid; but this way of taking the calibers as the standard of comparison is misleading. The gun, we are told, will weigh 17 tons, and we have always maintained that the weight of metal represents the capital invested, as it were, and the possible work is proportionate to it. The heaviest 8-inch gun of new type weighs only 15 tons. The old obsolete 10-inch muzzle-loader weighed but 18 tons, with a projectile of more than double the weight of that of the 7.5-inch gun, namely, 410 pounds. The energy was only 5408 foot-tons, but the same metal could now be employed much better with slow-burning powder, and a much better ballistic result obtained. The comparison of what we have in this new 7.5-inch gun with what might be got with a larger projectile, and a muzzle velocity of, perhaps, 2000 foot-seconds, would, be believe, show the latter to be much more profitable and trustworthy, both range and continued firing telling much less against the gun. We may say at once that the alternative is not allowable in this instance, because the larger projectile could not be loaded so fast nor penetrate so much, and we require all the perforating power we can get; 32 inches of iron sounds enormous, but this would not mean more than 10 inches of Krupp process armor and an angle of impact of 30 degrees from the direct line, and the fall of velocity from wear of bore and range would leave us even less margin than we could wish against 6-inch Krupp armor. The fact is that our guns must be made with a view to what we want them to do. As we have repeatedly said, 6-inch hard-faced steel is a most manageable thickness of plate as will be much used in future. The Colon and ships of similar class have been practically covered with such armor, and clearly we must have secondary armaments capable of perforating it even at some sacrifice. This condition does not apply to larger guns. A projectile which cannot perforate the secondary parts of an armor-clad enemy is useless, but the perforation of her belt is quite another matter. A powerful armor-piercing shell in the upper structure might often do more harm than a shot perforating the belt. Lieut. Meigs has recently been engaged in designing and constructing a heavy gun of large bore-namely, an 18-inch gun-whose weight does not differ much from that of our 12-inch wire gun. This piece would have the advantages of preserving its muzzle velocity, which is, we believe, about 2000 foot-seconds as to range, and the bore would wear much less. The bursting charge would be enormous. Against this we have to put the inconveniences of increased weight and bulk of projectiles, both in storage and loading. We need to see this interesting question practically worked out to form any real opinion, and our present point is only to emphasize the fact that our special needs as to perforation have driven our guns to take a wasteful form of energy, and we should be on the watch for any opening to take a profitable departure in a new direction, the possibility of which seems at present confined to our larger guns, and we should think specially the larger guns of our cruisers.
The conversion of all our secondary armament guns to quick-fire action is of great importance, and a good system of conversion having been arrived at, it is satisfactory to know that it will be completely carried out before long. Cordite is a special element in our system; it may be questioned if it is very satisfactory in the face of the tremendous rate at which our guns wear out. A few weeks since, we noticed the fact of our steel being slightly softer than that generally used on the continent. A much more important matter is the nature of our powder. All smokeless
powders consist largely of guncotton, on which account we ought to pay a passing tribute to Austria and Baron Lenk. Guncotton requires the addition of an oxidizing ingredient-nitroglycerine being used by Germany, ourselves and others; and nitrate of baryta by Russia and the United States. The former offers the advantage of complete action, the whole of the products of combustion being gas. The latter is only semi-smokeless, and its incomplete action prevents the full development of power, but it is said to injure the bore very much less than the nitroglycerine powders, especially cordite, which contains much the largest proportion. We state the case as it is put; we are not aware of any trustworthy results obtained by comparative trials of powders. It is claimed for cordite that its erosion is remarkably even, and we know that much can be done to prevent it by special gas checks. The whole matter, however, cannot be said to be satisfactorily worked out, and it is well that we should recognize it and keep our eyes open.
As regards projectiles, in the present state of things, a good armor-piercing shell is the projectile most needed, and we may congratulate ourselves on having one. Ships will probably depend more on their heavy quick-firing batteries than on other guns; while we have 6 inches of hard-faced armor in front of the secondary armaments in our strongest ships, nearly all foreign ships have very inferior protection, so that, on the whole, we have much upon which to congratulate ourselves at the present time. —The Engineer.
BRITISH AND FRENCH GUNS.
Sir Charles Dilke's question in the House as to the relative powers of British and French guns has served to stimulate the misgivings which many feel as to the condition of our ordnance, though the question is here raised in a new form, since it is our heavy guns that are declared to be inferior to those of France. We fear that the First Lord's answer was calculated to foster uneasiness. When a question is asked with proper notice, a definite reply is expected. Sir C. Dilke said that "the figures quoted with regard to the French guns went to show their superiority over our own guns at every period of the shot." "Mr. Goschen thought that this was doubtful." Consequently, at best, any one fully accepting his statement can only "think doubtfully" with him. Now we are not prepared to say that a very exactly certain answer can be given, but, at all events, it is desirable to show that the scope of uncertainty is narrow, and that if there exist elements that need to be improved, improvement is not difficult of achievement, and this, we think, can be shown. Indeed, we may say at once that while we think that serious attention ought to be given to the ballistic conditions of our heavy guns and their charges, there is nothing wrong that cannot be rectified, and that in some essentials British guns are the very best. We have dealt with some elements in this question lately, but it may be well to review the matter again briefly. First, let us deal with the actuals guns themselves. The proportions of guns have been calculated for so many years, that little new can be put forward. The French certainly keep the details of their new guns as secret as possible, nevertheless no uneasiness need be felt where no surprise is conceivable. Guns achieve higher velocity as years go by, because they are made longer and heavier in proportion to their caliber. The chamber may vary in size to suit special charges, but in actual proportions the possibilities are mainly limited to obtaining an increase of velocity if we like to pay for it in the shape of increased length and weight.
The result, however, is sometimes proved to be undesirable. A few years since, very long guns for coast service were advocated by M. Canet. In the table in the Naval Annual for 1899 may be seen pieces 80 calibers in length. We happen to know that these have disappeared from the tables of Schneider-Canet guns for the coming number, so that this clearly illustrates our point, namely, that there is no magic in the metal structure of a gun; that any good maker can produce a gun of increased power by giving it increased length and weight; but, like our own 111-ton gun, it may be a white elephant, whose room is preferable to its company. When we say that all metal is the same, we are not speaking absolutely correctly; there is a little, although very little, difference between one and another gun steel; and much more, there is a substantial advantage which we claim in the wire or riband construction. This might be sufficient to take seriously into account, were it not that owing to reasons to be noticed presently, we are unable to avail ourselves of it. On the whole, our readers may be satisfied that as regards the actual metal the guns themselves are good, and that no surprises can await us and show us that we need new pieces. This is, at all events, satisfactory, as it means that our main provision in the way of ordnance is sound.
We must next pass on to the elements of power and projectile. For more complete comparison we give herewith a short table of the three pairs of British and French guns that seem the best and fairest representatives, namely, those of 12-inch, 9.2 inch and 9.45-inch, and lastly 6-inch and 6.46-inch caliber. We admit, as we have said, that there may be newer French designs, but these are the best available. It will be seen that our 12-inch guns are the same length. Ours weighs 50 tons and the French gun 45.9 tons. Our muzzle velocity is given as about 2600, and the French as 2625 foot-seconds. Now both these velocities are estimates, and in such estimates 25 foot-seconds difference is accidental, the fact being that the numbers are round in each case, and the French 800 meters which is given for each French gun in this table happens to be equivalent to 2625 feet in British units. Several French guns may be seen estimated to the same round number, 800 meters, in fact, all the three in these tables. The first comment to be made is that our guns appear to be unnecessarily heavy, but this is explained by the weight of projectile; ours weigh 850 pounds, and the French only 643.8 pounds, so that our gun has a muzzle energy of 33,020 against 30,750 foot-tons in the French gun. As the range increases the weight tells more, so that at 2000 yards it may be seen our projectile has 29,860, and the French one only 21,020 foot-tons energy, so that our superiority has increased from about 10 per cent to 42 per cent. The same difference is seen throughout. In each case the British guns and projectile are the heavier, and the French muzzle velocity the higher. At the muzzle, the energy per ton of gun is greater in the French shot, but at 2000 yards our projectiles have overtaken them; thus, with the 12-inch we have 597 against the French 458. In short, judging from the British and French guns in this table alone, we should say that we have no cause for complaint, and that however diffidently expressed, Mr. Goschen was right in his statement that we had the advantage at the end of the trajectory, while Sir Charles Dilke was wrong in saying that any attainable figures go to "show superiority at every period." Even at the muzzle, our shot have greater energy, so that Sir Charles Dilke's statement is literally the reverse of the truth, unless he takes the less weight of the French guns into account, which is a different question. Even so, all that can be said is that the French get rather more work per ton of gun at the muzzle, but lose this advantage even at a short range.
Having thus made out, we think, a fair case for our guns, we shall perhaps surprise our readers by saying that it is by no means the whole case, and that elements exist which force us to the conclusion that we need seriously to reconsider certain matters, though they are points not touched on in the House. It may be seen that at the foot of the table we have added a United States 12-inch gun of new design. It is not found in existing tables, but we have the figures on the best authority, that is, from the United States Bureau of Ordnance. In some respects this gun should be satisfactory to us. It may well have been copied from our own. The length is the same, so is the weight of projectile. The gun is two tons heavier. Possibly ours being of wire construction, may be as strong, so that in the actual metal there may be little to choose, or rather we may have the advantage. But now comes the point. The American gun claims 2800 foot-seconds velocity, against our 2600 foot-seconds, and this opens the question that we think calls for inquiry-the question of powder. In tables generally foreign guns will be seen claiming higher velocities than ours. There might not be much stress to be laid on this, because new guns always have high velocities, and we have already pointed out that in many cases they are estimated velocities only. Unfortunately many of us are aware that whatever foreign guns do, our own wear at a rate which causes the velocity to fall shockingly fast. As has before been said, our heavy guns go to sea with a supply of ammunition which, limited though it is, could not be fired away without the velocity and shooting of the piece falling off seriously. We doubt if all the devices in the way of gas-checks and augmenting strips of copper would carry some guns satisfactorily through 100 rounds. We are met by the statement, and we believe it is true, that no nation, except perhaps the United States, fire their guns much in peace time, consequently it is argued that their guns are not forcing this said fact of wear on their owners, simply because wear is not taking place. Nevertheless it is surely mad to assume that because we experience an evil, our neighbors, whose conditions differ substantially from ours, must necessarily suffer the same evil and to the same extent. All we know is that they do not own to it. Let us consider how we stand in the matter of powder and wear of bore. The wear has been classified under two heads, "erosion" and "wash." Erosion is the eating out of the surface of the bore by the charge pure and simple. Wash is the rush of gas between two surfaces, that is, between projectile and bore, whenever a space is found. Erosion is due to gas moving rapidly at a very high temperature, and, of course, under pressure, although the latter need not be high. Thus, erosion is not found to be serious in the powder chamber, because, although the temperature is high, the gas is not in rapid motion. It is not serious in the forward part of the bore, because, although in rapid motion, the temperature has become considerably reduced. About the seat of the shot and a few calibers beyond it the action is, we repeat it, frightful. Wash can be remedied to a great extent by means of tight-fitting gas-checks, and, as the bore gets enlarged, by augmenting strips of copper. The evil is serious enough, but erosion is the parent of wash, and erosion is the evil to be specially grappled with. It will be found that we use powder of a very different character from other nations, that is, cordite. Surely, matters standing as they do, we ought to put cordite on its trial again, not necessarily as to its behavior in small pieces, but certainly it should be brought up on the charge of wearing out the bores of our heavy guns in an unprecedented manner. If the same thing is going on with our neighbors' powder, we may consider it eventually a necessary evil besetting the use of smokeless powder to obtain very high velocities; but we ought to make sure that this is so before we "sit down" under such a conclusion. We have said that we use very different powder from other nations. Let us see how the matter stands.
We have all adopted powder more or less smokeless, and the foundation of such powder is, we believe, in every case guncotton. This requires an oxidizing agent to consume it completely, and the one that most readily does so is nitroglycerine. Some, however, not unnaturally prefer to avoid the use of nitroglycerine-partly, perhaps, because, unless completely taken up in a stable compound, it is excessively dangerous. This evil, however, appears to have been got over. It has, further, the reputation of causing great erosion. Consequently Russia and the United States have hitherto vetoed it altogether, using nitrate of barium, or other substitute, with guncotton. The result is said to be that their powder is only semi-smokeless, and the products of combustion are not all gaseous, so that there is waste of energy in discharging them. France uses powder of somewhat the same kind. Germany uses, we believe, about 25 per cent. of nitroglycerine. We use cordite containing, according to the official book, 58.3 per cent of nitroglycerine. Before adopting cordite, we subjected it to severe trial, and found that it bore the changes of temperature and exposure to the climatic influences that England, most of all powers, has to contemplate. There is also much to recommend it as to practical convenience. Nevertheless, we think that a prima facie case exists for trial in comparison with other powders for charges of heavy guns.
In writing this, we feel that it is quite possible that cordite may turn out to be no worse than its rivals. Sir Andrew Noble, whose opinion should carry more weight than that of any one we could name in this country, has always thought well of cordite, and manufacturers seem to like it. Nevertheless, we would in conclusion repeat the gist of the question as it appears to us. We know that our heavy guns wear so intolerably fast that we cannot reckon on the velocities we assign to them for any considerable number of rounds. We know that their shooting falls off rapidly. We use charges that bear no relation to the strength of our wire guns, at all events in many cases. We knew also that other nations will not contemplate cordite, but use powders of widely different character, and do not complain of wear of bore to the same extent as ourselves. We, therefore, think that we ought to test our cordite carefully in comparison with other powders, especially having our heavy guns in view-guns in which, it may be observed the absence of smoke is of less and less importance as the gun increases in size and its rate of firing becomes less. —The Engineer.
THE MARCONI WIRELESS TELEGRAPH INSTALLATION ON BOARD THE NORTH GERMAN LLOYD’S S. S. KAISER WILHELM DER GROSSE.
This, the first merchant steamer to receive a permanent equipment of wireless telegraph, sailed from Bremenhaven February 28, 1900, on her regular trip, touched at Southampton and Cherbourg on the first of March, and arrived at New York on the 7th, instant.
The apparatus is almost an exact reproduction of those tested by the bureau last fall on the U. S. S. New York, Massachusetts and Porter, and described in the report of the Marconi board.
The choking coils and cells of the local battery are enclosed in neat wooden boxes.
Various binding posts and fittings are solidly constructed and neatly finished.
The connections to the back-stop of the key for automatically connecting up the receiver are substantially made and are used right along.
The vertical wire is double; i.e., a bight is triced up to the sprit-end and one leg is spliced into the other just before it passes through the top of the deck-house.
An umbrella-shaped sheet of ebonite protects the tube through which the wire is led into this operating-room.
An improved form of cylindrical ebonite insulator is used, having a small strand of seizing wire cemented in each end.
Two substantial wooden posts secured to the forward corners of the deck-house take the strain of the wire which is led midway between them.
No wooden topmast is used, the sprit, about 20 feet long, hoisting to the truck of the steel pole mast, giving an effective height of vertical wire of about 100 feet.
The shore station on the Isle of Borkum, off the mouth of the river Ems, had a vertical wire of 150 feet height.
Messages were received on board the ship 40 miles from this station, and were received at the shore station when the ship was 50 miles away.
An outfit had been sent on board the Borkum Lightship, but owing to the heavy weather the wooden topmast had not yet been secured aloft when the Kaiser Wilhelm passed. This lightship is to have a vertical wire of 130 feet height.
The Marconi operator left the ship at Southampton and is to board her there on her return. In the meantime, an operator in the employ of the steamship company is taking care of the apparatus and learning to operate it. The first officer of the Kaiser Wilhelm Der Grosse stated that the apparatus had worked without a hitch and communication was not interrupted while the ship was in range of the shore station.
THE DESTROYER BAT.
A serious mishap, fortunately unaccompanied with loss of life, took place on board the torpedo-destroyer Bat on February 21. She was engaged on instructional class duty. The instructional classes have a course of four weeks, the first three weeks consisting of runs at gradually increasing speeds, culminating in one hour's run at top speed. In the case of the Bat, this full-power run was in course of being carried out. Everything was apparently going well, the hour was nearly up, the engines were making 360 revolutions and the boat was travelling at 28 knots. A loud noise was then heard, followed by an escape of steam. Steam was promptly cut off and the eight occupants of the engine-room at the time succeeded in getting on deck without injury. The starboard engine was found to be badly damaged, and the Bat returned to Devonport with the port engine only. On further examination, it is stated that the prime cause can be traced to the cap of the low-pressure crosshead brasses, which fractured across one of the bolt holes. This fracture freed the connecting-rod, which knocked against, and badly bent, the crosshead guide, and made a bulge in the condenser. The piston being also free, was forced up and broke the cylinder cover, at the same time badly cracking the cylinder. It is certainly wonderful, seeing what happened, that no injuries were sustained by any of the men in the engine-room. As it was, there was a rush of steam, which promptness on the part of someone stopped by closing the main steam valve. Had it been in connection with the high-pressure cylinder, one trembles to think what might have happened. We know what took place in connection with the Bullfinch. We understand that an inquiry is to be instituted into the cause of the accident, and we therefore, for the present, refrain from commenting upon it. —The Engineer.
A terrible accident, says the Army and Navy Gazette, has taken place in the French torpedo-boat No. 228, under command of Lieutenant Pioger. She is a new boat built by the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, and was under trial at the time. A great part of the programme had been gone through at Cherbourg, a speed of 25 1/2, knots having been attained, and the engineers were full of satisfaction, for the French Admiralty was to give a bounty of 20,000f. for every half-knot above the contract speed. All at once there was a violent shock, and the stokehold and boiler-room were filled with steam. A piston-rod had broken and the cylinder cover had given way. Five men were very seriously scalded and many in lesser degree.
The deepest ocean temperatures which have been recorded were taken by the United States steamer Nero, which is sounding for the cable between Guam and the Midway Islands. At a depth of 30,420 feet the water had a temperature of 35.9 degrees Fahr., and at 9060 feet it was 36 degrees Fahr.
At the present moment the Bat is laid up. Half her consorts are in the same plight, owing to one having broken adrift in a gale and smashed into the others. The Teaser, at Portsmouth, has 6 inches nipped off her bow. The Hunter, which had her bow neatly doubled back some months ago, is still in basin at Portsmouth in that condition. It has, so far, not been deemed worth while to repair her. —The Engineer.
In the matter of coaling, the French Admiralty is in marked contrast to our own. Every British ship of size carries a Temperley, but the matter pretty well ends there; there are rarely winches to work them properly, so that the ship is dependent on the collier, and often has to resort to hand-power from lack of means to properly use its Temperleys. This is notably so in the Royal Sovereign class: but the commanders and engineer officers of the Majestic class have vainly asked for extra winches for years. Of course, our principle of always doing a thing by hand-power if possible, is very fine in its way; but like all good things, it can be abused. And in war time every extra minute spent in coaling ships would be important, possibly of deadly moment. Moreover, seeing the strain that watching for torpedo-boats will cause every night, it is imperative that labor when in harbor should be reduced to the absolute minimum. Consequently in peace time everything should be done to facilitate coaling by the most expeditious and least laborious means, for it is very certain that such cannot be extemporized in war time, and the theory that the dockyard people will do the coaling is all theory. They will be far too busy over repairs, nor will there be any spare men at the depots. Yet, despite all this, we proceed in a most casual fashion, and the whip is the real mainstay of coaling. —The Engineer.