The year 1898 saw the English-speaking peoples engaged in warlike operations in regions widely separated. The conditions of the contests differed organically; but the objects were essentially similar. In both cases, strikingly complete success was attained, and while the disappearance of the remnants of the colonial empire of Spain is fraught with far greater consequences to the world than the overthrow of Dervish rule in the Eastern Sudan, the principal result is to increase the responsibilities of nations owning a common origin and upholding a common standard of progress and of liberty. This fact alone suffices to invest the wars of 1898 with peculiar significance, and to render their lessons specially important to the two English-speaking peoples.
From the days of the Armada, it has been the ill fate of Spain to be frequently brought into collision with the British Navy. This has been caused directly by the struggle for colonial dominion which, beginning in the days of Elizabeth, assumed great dimensions in the wars of the 18th century, and indirectly by French alliance, voluntary or enforced, which have entailed nothing except loss of territory and naval disasters upon Spain.
The conquest of Jamaica by Penn* and Venable in 1655 marked the dawn of the expansion of England. It is an exceedingly interesting historical development that the over-sea expansion of the great nation which owes its birth to England should have followed similar lines. The events of 1898 offer another analogy with the older Spanish wars. The story of Jenkyns's ear was probably a fable; but it is clear that accounts of Spanish cruelties and especially of the enormities alleged against the Inquisition which Spain imported into her colonies powerfully impressed the imagination of the British people and aroused their strong resentment. The spectacle of hopeless misrule of Spain in Cuba, with the wanton destruction of life and property which it entailed, forcibly appealed to the humanitarian instincts of the American people. A great nation cannot continue to contemplate with equanimity chronic disorder in closely adjacent territory with which its interests are closely involved, and intervention sooner or later was obviously inevitable when the destruction of the Maine, lying at anchor under the protection of the Spanish authorities, precipitated the issue. No government could resist the popular will in such a case and on April 21, Congress declared war.
*Father of the founder of Pennsylvania.
The theatre of operations by sea and land is classic in British history. The West India Islands and the waters of the Caribbean Sea had been the scenes of innumerable military and naval conflicts. Manila, San Juan, Havana and Santiago had all been attacked, and Santiago alone had escaped British occupation. Almost exactly 301 years before Admiral Sampson's squadron arrived off San Juan, the place was captured by the Earl of Cumberland after operations closely resembling those recently carried to success at Santiago. San Juan, in 1597, is described as being "very much bigger than all Portsmouth within the fortifications and in sight much fairer." Its defenses were reported "to the sea very strong and fitted with goodly ordnance, and bestowed for the most advantage to annoy an enemy that can possibly be devised." The ships, therefore, made no attempt to enter the harbor, and success turned upon the land attack. The Spaniards, said the British commander, "will make a great show, and perhaps endure one brunt; but, if they do any more, tear me to pieces." After the occupation of the town, the garrison of the Morro accepted the following terms of capitulation:
A resolution which you may trust to. I am content to give yourself and all your people their lives; yourself with your captains and officers to pass with your arms; all the rest of your soldiers with their rapiers and daggers only. You shall all stay here with me till I give you passage from the island, which shall be within thirty days.
This arrangement of 1597 finds a close parallel in 1898. In 1757 and again in 1762, Manila was taken by a British force. On the latter occasion, 10 ships of war under Rear-Admiral Cornish and a landing force of 2300 men under Colonel Draper were employed. The town itself was ransomed for four million dollars, of which the Spaniards only paid half. The Filipinos of this date, armed with bows and spears, are said to have displayed great fighting qualities on the Spanish side and to have "boldly rushed on the very muzzles of our pieces." About the middle of the 18th century the possession of Cuba seems to have been ardently desired in England. "Take and hold, is the cry," wrote William Pulteney to Admiral Vernon in 1740, "this plainly points to Cuba, and if the people of England were to give you instructions, I may venture to say, ninety-nine in a hundred would be for the attacking of that island." The combined expedition under Vernon and General Wentworth, after failing in an attempt to take Cartagena, was directed against Santiago, in July, 1741, in defiance of sound principles. A considerable Spanish squadron lay at Havana which was watched by cruisers. The landing was effected in Guantanamo Bay and a hundred American troops were the first to be put on shore. The military forces remained for three months in the neighborhood of Santiago; but nothing was accomplished, and after mutual recriminations between the admiral and the general, the expedition was ignominiously withdrawn. The Spanish squadron at Havana maintained a masterly inactivity and there is little doubt that Santiago could have been taken; but the conquest would have been unimportant. In April, 1748, Santiago was again attacked by Rear-Admiral Knowles with eight ships fresh from the capture of Port Louis. Captain Dent of the Plymouth, 60-gun ship, led in towards the harbor, but the Spaniards had blocked the channel with a boom, and after a fruitless engagement with the forts, the squadron withdrew. For this failure Captain Dent was tried by court-martial and acquitted. In June, 1762, Havana was attacked by Admiral Sir G. Pocock and an expeditionary force of 10,000 men under the Earl of Albemarle. American troops from New York arrived later* and took part in the siege of the Morro. On July 1, the Cambridge (80), Dragon (74) and Marlborough (70) engaged the defenses for seven hours and were withdrawn much damaged with a loss of 176 men. On July 30, the Morro was stormed and on August 13, Havana, with nine ships of the line, capitulated. By the Treaty of Paris in the following year, Cuba and the Philippine Islands were handed back to Spain in exchange for Florida and the right of cutting logs in Honduras. Destiny, foiled in 1763, has now reasserted itself, and the future of Cuba and of the Philippines rests with the English-speaking peoples. The American troops who landed in Guantanamo Bay in July, 1741, were the precursors of the marines who disembarked on the same shore on June 10, 1898.
*The American contingent "came very seasonably and was of great service." —Annual Register.
The primary conditions on the outbreak of the war of 1898, were comparatively simple. Foreign complications could be safely ignored in view of the attitude of Great Britain and of the extreme reluctance of European powers, harboring pro-Spanish sympathies or designs upon Spanish territory, to take any step which might lead to a British naval demonstration. This, however, was not at the time realized in the United States. The objects of the war demanded intervention in Cuba. Havana, the center of Spanish power, was therefore, as in 1762 and as ought to have been the case in 1741, the primary objective. Until the naval situation was assured, however, nothing could be attempted on Cuban soil, nor could the maintenance of an effective commercial blockade be counted upon. Such is the plain teaching of all history. The Spanish ships of war in Cuban ports could be safely disregarded, and the main question, therefore, was as to the measure of naval strength which Spain could bring to bear. in West Indian waters from her home ports, 4000 miles across the Atlantic. Accurate information of the state of the Spanish Navy was unquestionably available at Washington, although the hopeless unpreparedness since revealed may not have been fully realized. If the Spanish fleet had approximated in reality to its paper strength, the task of contending with the American Navy in its own waters would have been difficult. In the actual conditions, that task was impossible; but an inferior fleet well found and well handled is capable, until defeated or closely blockaded, of preventing such operations as the United States were called upon to undertake in Cuba. Was this minor task possible to the Spaniards?
At the moment when war was declared, Admiral Cervera's squadron of four armored cruisers, three destroyers and three torpedo-boats lay at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. The Spanish government had apparently already decided that it was necessary, for political reasons, to send a naval force to Cuba; but this was not known to the admiral, who wrote on April 22:
It is impossible for me to give an idea of the surprise and astonishment experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise is well justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralizing return; when here in Spain it might be the safeguard of the nation.*
The state of the squadron amply justified this forecast, which was perfectly accurate except that a "demoralizing return" was exceedingly improbable. Even ships so little fit for purposes of war as those of Admiral Cervera would have been of value in protecting the coast-line of Spain from a raid across the Atlantic such as naturally presented itself to the minds of instructed Spanish officers. After a delay of eight days, which told its tale to cool observers, the Cape Verde squadron went to sea.
In the United States, the most exaggerated fears found expression. The Atlantic seaboard was assumed to be in danger and panic measures were adopted. Writing in 1897,‡ Captain C. F. Goodrich, U. S. N., gave specimens of the flood of excited telegrams which invaded Washington in 1861-63, and drew attention to "the wisdom and firmness displayed by the Secretary of the Navy . . . Mr. Welles's contention was, in effect, that the harbors of New York and Boston were guarded by the vessels of the blockading fleet which stretched from Cape Henry to the Rio Grande, a surprisingly broad and sound strategic view, from which he appears never to have wavered." At the same time, Captain Goodrich expressed a doubt "whether, in the event of war in these days, a Secretary of the Navy can possibly be as independent in his action as was Mr. Welles." By far the most important lesson of the war—to the United States and to Great Britain—is the danger that uninstructed public opinion may usurp the direction of naval policy. At the beginning of this century the people of England had learned by experience many of the principles of naval war; but tendencies, such as were manifested in 1898, had not been wholly extinguished. "Only think," wrote Reppel to Saumarez, "what alarms we shall have and how much our cruising will be interrupted if any more invasions are trumped up, which they will be in the winter, so that their (the French) Martinico ships may pass safe." Similarly, Lord St. Vincent significantly complained of the influence exerted by "the fears of the old women of both sexes." In 1898, public opinion, not strategic principles, determined the preliminary naval proceedings of the United States in the Atlantic. Governments, like those of Russia and Germany, which are not accessible to the influence of a popular outcry, have an undoubted advantage in conducting operations of war.
* Papers translated in the office of Naval Intelligence.
‡ Naval Raids. Proceedings U. S. Naval Institute.
At the end of April, the naval attitude of the powerful belligerent was one of anxious and passive expectation, while its weak and ill-prepared opponent was undertaking what appeared to be an offensive movement into far distant waters. At the same time popular opinion in the United States, though powerfully impressed with the idea that New York, Boston and Philadelphia were in imminent danger, demanded an immediate invasion of Cuba, and 5000 picked regular troops were prepared for embarkation. If the naval situation had really been such as to imperil the Atlantic coast-line, it would have been madness to have undertaken over-sea operations, and the project of sending the first expeditionary force to sea on May 4 was abandoned.
It is abundantly clear that American naval officers were not in the least imbued with the prevailing alarms, and as early as April 9, Admiral Sampson, with the true instincts of the sailor, wrote to the Secretary of the Navy:
I sympathize with all you say about guarding our big ships against a possibly serious loss while the enemy's fleet is still intact. At the same time, I regard it as very important to strike quickly and strike hard as soon as hostilities commence.
Popular theories of the potentialities of the Spanish fleet, however, forbade any strong naval measures, and in deference to these theories the United States force was divided, the Flying Squadron being retained at Hampton Roads in the hope of allaying the fears of the press and the people. The genesis of the Flying Squadron may in fact be traced to an uninstructed outcry. On April 29, Admiral Cervera sailed, and with an ocean speed of 10 knots only could have reached San Juan on the 9th of May. On this date, Admiral Sampson was proceeding slowly to Puerto Rico much hampered by the monitors Terror and Amphitrite. Commodore Schley was at Hampton Roads and a weak blockade of Havana and part of the Cuban coast-line existed. The object of Admiral Cervera was merely to evade the United States Navy and to reach a Cuban port. He, therefore, avoided San Juan and steamed straight to Martinique, arriving off the south side of this island on May 12 and, after communicating with Fort de France and leaving there the destroyer Terror, he proceeded to Curacoa. Here he missed a collier which had been directed to meet him and steaming northwest arrived at Santiago on the morning of May 19. His squadron was sighted off Martinique by Lieut. Kane of the U. S. S. Harvard, and reported by telegraph. Its arrival at Curacoa was notified by an American passenger on board a British steamer. Important news was thus obtained mainly by good fortune. The evident want of system in the scouting operations was doubtless due to the fact that they were not controlled by the commander-in-chief alone. If a mixed control had not been substituted for unity of command, Admiral Cervera's squadron would probably have been sighted before it reached Santiago. Meanwhile, on May 12, when Cervera was nearing Martinique, Admiral Sampson was bombarding the defenses of San Juan. Neither reason nor the experience of war justified any hope of effective results and, if the Spanish gunners had known their trade, the United States ships would unquestionably have suffered injuries which might have proved exceedingly inconvenient. As it was, the admiral withdrew after a large expenditure of ammunition and reported "the United States fleet in great need of repairs," while the Spaniards were enabled to claim a victory. If the squadron had been well to the eastward when war was declared and had struck at San Juan on April 23, when the Spanish preparations were in a backward state, a success, which would have had definite strategic significance, was perhaps possible.
The important news from Martinique and Curacoa caused a rapid change in the situation. The Flying Squadron could at length be moved south, and after coaling at Key West, it sailed for Cienfuegos on May 19, at the very moment when Cervera was entering Santiago, and was followed next day by a reinforcement consisting of the Iowa and Castine with the collier Merrimac. Admiral Sampson's force, which had returned to Key West, sailed on May 21 to join the Havana blockade, receiving news on the 22d that the Spaniards were at Santiago on the previous day. On May 23, the squadron steamed eastward and cruised in the Nicholas Channel in order to cover the approach to Havana, returning to Key West on May 28. Meanwhile, Commodore Schley remained off Cienfuegos from the 22d to the 24th, and then proceeding eastward executed some complicated manoeuvres off Santiago, ultimately approaching the harbor on the 29th and at length sighting the Spanish squadron inside.* Admiral Sampson arrived on June 1, and, the Oregon having previously completed her fine voyage, the battle fleet of the United States was now massed off Santiago.
The naval situation between May 16, when the Spaniards left Curacoa, and June 1, when the close blockade of Santiago was established, is extremely interesting and instructive. If Cervera had made for Cienfuegos, he would have encountered the Flying Squadron. If he had steamed for Havana by the Yucatan Passage, he would have arrived without meeting any serious opposition, and the later proceedings would have been widely different. Cervera, however, short of coal and painfully conscious of the grave defects of his force, simply sought the nearest Cuban harbor. His entry into Santiago was at once reported; but nine days elapsed before any hostile squadron approached within 30 miles of the port, and on May 28, Commodore Schley reported, "Much to be regretted, cannot obey orders of Department. Have striven earnestly; forced to proceed for coal to Key West." At Santiago, on the other hand, there were 3500 tons of coal,‡ and although appliances for putting it on board were deficient, a more energetic people than the Spaniards would doubtless have found means of filling the bunkers of the cruisers and getting them to sea several days before the United States Navy was in a position to blockade. The dominating influence of coal-supply upon naval operations received a striking illustration.
Another point is well worth notice. In times of peace we are wont to assign strategic importance to various positions in accordance with academic considerations. In naval war, the position of supreme importance is that of the enemy's fleet. Thus Santiago, previously unconsidered, became on May 19 the crux of the naval and military situation, and such was the irony of events that Cervera's movement from Cape Verde Islands, which had caused panic on the Atlantic seaboard, turned absolutely to the advantage of the United States.
*Admiral Sampson seems never to have doubted the information that the Spanish squadron was at Santiago.
‡Lieut. Müller y Tejeiro.
Much has been written about the difficulties of modern blockades, and doubtless with a view to mitigate the harassing strain upon the fleet, Admiral Sampson on May 27* determined to obstruct the channel leading into Santiago harbor. On the night of June 3, the attempt was made by Naval Constructor Hobson and seven volunteers. It was a gallant act, worthy to rank with the highest deeds recorded in naval history; but the failure to sink the Merrimac in the fair-way was most fortunate. If the Spanish squadron had been imprisoned, its whole resources, like those of the Russian Black Sea fleet in 1854, would have been available for the land defense, and the subsequent difficulties of the military expedition would have been immensely aggravated. The Merrimac plan conflicted with the teaching of naval history and its failure was an unqualified gain.
*On this day the New Orleans was ordered to Santiago with the collier Sterling, which was to be used for this purpose.
The navy having established its blockade, it was necessary, as in all such cases, for the army to act, and Admiral Sampson at once asked for 10,000 men to take the works commanding the entrance to the harbor. The expedition was to have embarked on June 8, when a rumor arrived that an armored cruiser had been sighted by the Eagle off the north coast of Cuba. Admiral Sampson "placed no confidence whatever in this information"; but a delay of several days, which he justly characterized as "most unfortunate," was entailed, and the incident is vastly significant. Reluctance to send a military expedition to sea, when a possibility of encountering an enemy's ships existed, was always manifested in sailing days and is now far more than ever justified. A most improbable rumor has, however, rarely proved so potent as in this case. While the expedition was being held back, Admiral Sampson, strictly following the precedent of 1741, occupied Guantanamo Bay and landed a battalion of marines. Few harbors could be more easy to blockade than Santiago, where the channel of exit is narrow and tortuous while the coast batteries were wretchedly made and the gunners hopelessly incompetent. Yet, as Captain F. E. Chadwick shows,* the possession of a neighboring harbor was almost absolutely essential for the work which had to be carried out by the powerful American fleet. A finer body of troops than the 13,000 regulars who formed the bulk of the expedition has rarely landed on a hostile shore; but, like the British force which invaded the Crimea in September, 1854, it was an aggregate of brave men rather than an army. Admiral Sampson's plan, which offered few difficulties, was now unaccountably abandoned, and while the military commander-in-chief remained on board ship, his troops moved inland to the attack of the town of Santiago. Transport, adequate artillery, and organization were alike wanting. From the technical point of view, the severe fighting of July 1, like the battle of Inkerman, invites facile criticism. The storming of the positions of El Caney and San Juan, however, showed the qualities of the American infantry in the brightest light, and as has frequently happened in the history of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, conspicuous personal gallantry triumphed amidst difficulties which might have involved disaster. But the cost was heavy and, exhausted after their great efforts, the troops could only entrench themselves in the positions occupied. The intention to assault the town at daybreak on July 2 was, therefore, abandoned and a momentary wave of depression passed over the United States. At Havana, however, the crisis was considered to have arrived and Admiral Cervera, whom the Spanish government with inexcusable folly had placed under the order of the military commander, was directed by telegraph to go to sea within twelve hours. Good gunnery—the best defense of a ship as Farragut insisted—and high speed could alone provide a chance of escape. The Spanish squadron was deficient in both, and within four hours it met with the "total destruction" which its admiral had anticipated. The running fight of July 3 strongly resembles that of Sir John Duckworth with the squadron of Admiral Leissegnes off San Domingo on February 6, 1806, when two French ships of the line were driven ashore and three captured; but modern conditions hastened and gave a tragic completeness to the issue.
*Scribner's Magazine, Nov., 1898.
The minor technical lessons of the action have been frequently pointed out; but the most striking feature was the intense eagerness displayed by all the American captains to bring their ships into action. Here was the true naval instinct which was conferred victory in far more serious contests. The performance of the Oregon is remarkable as showing clearly the effect of the experience and training of the engine-room staff gained in the long voyage from the Pacific.
The navy had brilliantly discharged its task; but the land Operations were involved in difficulties daily increasing, and General Shafter telegraphed that "it will be impossible to carry" Santiago "by storm with my present force." That front attacks on prepared positions are precarious, especially when unsupported by a powerful artillery, was abundantly proved during the Civil War before the era of the magazine rifle. This may perhaps have been forgotten and the want of transport and camp equipment seems to suggest that an easy success was anticipated. The troops were now beginning to suffer severely from exposure and insufficient supplies. The experience of the Crimea was repeated on a smaller scale, and in face of an interprising and energetic enemy, the situation would have been serious. The Spaniards, however, remained true to their traditions of not attacking, and were evidently unaware of the critical state of their opponents. The conditions of 1741 were thus almost exactly reproduced, and, to complete the parallel, a marked divergence of naval and military opinion asserted itself. Already, on July 2, Major-General Shafter had urged the admiral to force an entrance into the harbor.
I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance in order to avoid future losses among my men, which are already very heavy. You can operate with less loss of life than I can.
The admiral, however, held steadfastly to his original plan and replied at once:
Impossible to force entrance until we can clear channel of mines, a work of some time after forts are taken possession of by your troops.
In a letter of the same date, the admiral dealt with the question in more detail and clearly explained the position. At the same time, he expressed his absolute willingness to cooperate as far as naval considerations permitted.
If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance, I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in the attempt.
After the destruction of the Spanish fleet, pressure seems to have been brought to bear at Washington, and the Secretary of the Navy telegraphed as follows on July 13:
The Commanding General of the Army urges and Secretary of War urgently requests, that Navy force harbor; confer with Commander of Army. Wishing to do all that is reasonably possible to ensure the surrender of the enemy, I leave the matter to your discretion, except that the United States armored vessels must not be risked.
Such differences of view are common in the history of war. Admiral Vernon and General Wentworth had a somewhat violent altercation before Santiago in 1741. Nelson, in the Mediterranean, was obliged to point out to British generals that the powers of ships had limitations. On the other hand, our greatest admiral proposed in 1795 an Austrian occupation of San Remo in circumstances which to most thoughtful soldiers appear prohibitive. Napoleon, who had no time to study naval war, frequently demanded impossibilities of his fleets, and ordered the Allies out of Cadiz to meet destruction at Nelson's hands, precisely as Marshal Blanco dictated to Admiral Cervera, a movement which the latter rightly judged to be hopeless. Wellington in the Peninsula complained bitterly of the want of naval cooperation, ignoring elementary naval considerations as completely as his great antagonist. In 1870, it seems to have been expected that the French northern squadron could effectively attack the Prussian Baltic coast-line, and instances of this kind might be indefinitely multiplied. Officers of the naval and military service are trained in different schools of thought. Neither class can perfectly understand the functions of the other, and military men are peculiarly prone to ignore naval conditions. The United States naval officers had evidently a much clearer conception of the powers and the limitations of naval cooperation than their military comrades. The battle of the Nile is, for all time, an object-lesson of the danger of sacrificing naval considerations to those of military expediency. In free countries, therefore, it may fall to politicians, ignorant of naval and military affairs alike, to adjudicate between the conflicting views of the services. This was fortunately unnecessary in the case of Santiago. On July 11, General Miles arrived and at once proposed to land forces to take the harbor forts; but negotiations were already in progress, and on the 17th Santiago, which had twice defied a British force, surrendered to the United States. In view of the painful position of the gallant troops entrenched before the town, the fall of Santiago was a welcome release from anxiety. The Spaniards might certainly have prolonged their resistance for a short time; but the moral effect of the military surrender following two great naval disasters told heavily at Madrid. Although General Miles with a force of volunteers began his admirably-managed operations in Puerto Rico, the end of the war was at hand, and Santiago, thanks to the squadron of Cervera, proved the decisive point.
Technical lessons are generally far more easily learned and more surely applied than great principles. That inflammable woodwork creates grave danger on board a ship in action we fully recognize. The want of fresh water was most seriously felt by the United States ships* some of which were crippled on this account. "Make up" water must either be carried in the double bottoms of vessels required to keep the sea for a long time, or distilling ships must accompany a fleet. The predilection of the United States for monitors, arising out of the peculiar conditions of the Civil War, will be mitigated now that these craft have proved absolutely unsuited for work at sea. Seagoing and sea-keeping qualities are unquestionably of the first importance in war. Torpedo-boats, in spite of "careful nursing,"‡ at Guantanamo speedily broke down in carrying on the duties of the blockade of Santiago, and their limitations will be duly noted. If, however, they were previously used in some cases for towing coal barges at Key West, the breakdown is partly explained. In their proper role they were not tried; but it is permissible to believe that men as gallant as the crew of the Merrimac would not—if the opportunity had been given to them—have taken torpedo-boats into Santiago harbor with effect.
*But for difficulties thus arising, the Iowa would have been well to the fore in the chase of the Colon.
‡ Captain F. E. Chadwick, U. S. N.
The disparity of naval conditions arising from the incompetent administration, the political weakness and the poverty of resources of Spain deprived the war of 1898 of the teaching which might otherwise have been forthcoming. The Spanish Navy was as ill-prepared for a campaign as the French Army in 1870. Thus many of the questions which of late have been eagerly discussed received no elucidation. We may say with certainty that rapid and accurate fire is now, as in old days, the decisive factor in naval warfare. It is significant that a single shell from the armed liner St. Paul put the destroyer Terror out of action at about ten times the effective range of her torpedoes, while the four 6-pounders and four 3-pounders of the yacht Gloucester sufficed to complete the total destruction of the Furor and Pluton.* It is clear that the three destroyers proved a heavy incubus to Cervera's squadron in its passage from St. Vincent. The use of the destroyer, however, is solely in the attack and we have yet to see whether its offensive power will compensate for fragility, and whether it can claim a wider sphere of action than the hunting of the torpedo-boat.
*These two destroyers, however, undoubtedly received punishment from the secondary armaments of some of the heavy ships.
The grave mistake of placing transports under military authority will hardly be repeated. The supervision of the large number of mercantile steamers which were employed to convey the expeditionary force to Cuba was not the business of soldiers, and many evils would have been avoided by entrusting it to naval officers as is the practice in Great Britain. The proper functions of the soldier end at the shore-line, and when he is permitted, as in 1898, to lay his mines in navigation channels and to flash searchlights at his sweet will, he becomes a public danger. There are special cases in which submarine mines in army hands may be justified; but such cases, in the harbors of great maritime nations like the United States and Great Britain, are exceedingly rare. The mines laid at New York and elsewhere proved an unmitigated nuisance, as might have been confidently expected.
One other lesson may be learned with advantage. The modern craze for coaling stations needs to be abated. The proceedings of the United States Navy in 1898 have clearly shown us that the superior fleet can largely dispense with these luxuries. Guantanamo harbor served its purpose quite as well as if it had been an expensively fortified port in the hands of the United States. Now, as in the old sailing days, bases can generally be extemporized in accordance with requirements. It is upon the effective management of colliers rather than upon coaling stations that a great naval power will depend in war.
The great principles which the war of 1898 exemplified are old; but they have been frequently forgotten in the past. That the intermixture of politics with naval and military affairs is invariably detrimental and may be disastrous, history has plainly shown. Popular fears and popular fallacies must not be permitted to influence the conduct of warlike operations. Success in war by sea and land is obtained by sea-going and sea-keeping ships, and by organized field forces. The various adjuncts which usurp attention in peace time are of relatively small account. A maritime nation possessed of a large shipping can now as formerly supplement its fleet by vessels which for certain purposes are very valuable; but an expeditionary force with all its manifold requirements is not easily improvised even when the best material is available. Nor can the greatest energy on the outbreak of war atone for want of an organization which is essentially the product of careful study in time of peace. In regard to coast defense, the rich experience of the past has been strikingly reaffirmed. San Juan and Santiago, like Alexandria in 1882, and a hundred other cases, show that ships cannot seriously injure guns on shore. Now, as always, ports containing essential naval resources, or required for the protection of a commercial marine, require defense against naval raids; but the real protection of a coast-line must continue to depend on the mobile navy. The sum which a nation can spare for naval and military purposes is practically limited, and all superfluous expenditure upon coast defense entails loss upon the sea-going fleet and the field army which are the real arbiters of war. This ancient lesson has not yet been wholly assimilated in England where, in recent years, we have seen the fleet starved at a time when superfluous fixed defenses were being liberally created. Americans who have marked the vigor and the initiation, the skill and the daring displayed by their navy in the recent war, cannot fail to understand where lies the true defense of their coast-line.