Incident to a serious naval demonstration against the United States is the possibility that exposed points may be selected for sudden attacks, of which the object is rather (a) the destruction of ships either close to the coast or in port, or (b) damage to structures on shore with the alternative of heavy indemnity, than the winning of any military advantage. Such operations are, moreover, not restricted to occasions when a superior supporting force is in the neighborhood, but may be, as they have been, undertaken by solitary cruisers from a remote base. In discussing the aspects of raiding, it will conduce to brevity and clearness to separate the cases described and to take up first the simpler of the two. Our proposition may then be thus stated: "Given a reasonably complete command of our own water approaches, are such isolated raids to be apprehended, and, if so, how may they be best guarded against?"
Of the illustrations and precedents available, those are naturally the more valuable which relate to our own shores and, in point of time, lie within the period of steam propulsion. A study of such precedents will prove helpful in indications as to what should be done under somewhat similar circumstances, and may make clear certain principles applicable even when we are unreservedly on the defensive.
The literature of the raids by Confederate cruisers along our Northern seaboard is so full that we experience difficulty only in selecting what is most pertinent. In the following extracts attention is called to the mental side of the question, as reflected in the alarms of the mercantile community; the pressure brought to bear upon the Government to appease these alarms; the real damage done; the measures adopted to put a stop to the damage.
As early as May, 1861, the Governor of New Jersey writes to President Lincoln that "The citizens of New Jersey residing in the southwestern part of the State and on the Delaware Bay feel some anxiety on account of their defenseless condition and exposure to annoyance from privateers."
In July of that year the Jeff Davis, privateer brig, created a panic in the coastwise trade by her captures of vessels off Nantucket Shoals and Cape Hatteras. The Navy Department was inundated with reports of her activity, and requests for vessels to go in chase poured in from underwriters, private individuals and others. Such naval ships as were available were dispatched in pursuit, and private steamers were also engaged for this service. One telegram will suffice to show the Department's methods:
July 12, 1861.
Send any vessel you can find or hire after the privateer reported southeast of Nantucket.
Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy.
To Captain Breese, Navy Yard, New York.
In all, some eight or ten vessels were dispatched in pursuit, but without success. The Jeff Davis got safely back into the Confederacy after capturing four coasters.
Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts, addressed, on July 16, 1861, a long letter to the Navy Department upon the necessity of cruisers to protect coastwise commerce. Being typical of many others of like import from many sources, I quote some of its expressions in extenso:
In view of the exploits of Southern privateers within the past few days off our coast, a feeling of apprehension has come to pervade our mercantile community, surpassing anything which it has experienced during the progress of hostilities thus far. There is serious trouble among all our insurance companies, caused by the actual presence of a danger which they had confided in our naval efficiency to avert, and there exists throughout every branch of trade which is connected with our shipping an uneasiness which finds vent in anxious looks and words and expressions of indignation that the most stringent measures are not adopted to strengthen the blockade and to scour any privateer from our seas.
The Confederate privateer steamers Gordon and Mariner, about the same time captured the first the brig Wm. McGilvery and schooner Protector off Hatteras, the latter the schooner Nathaniel Chase off Ocracoke Inlet. The privateer York took the brig B. T. Martin. These events brought to the Navy Department letters from the marine insurance companies of Philadelphia, beseeching more activity and better protection.
On the 12th of November, 1862, the Board of Trade of Boston addressed a communication to the Secretary of the Navy calling his attention to the defenseless state of that harbor and pointing out its liability to raiding by the Alabama, lately reported as not far distant, or by one of the rams then building in England for the Confederacy. They say: "It is believed by practical men that through Broad Sound (one of the two principal entrances to this harbor) a reckless and daring piratical ironclad steamer might enter without serious injury and lay our city under contribution…In view of the foregoing facts, we beg respectfully to suggest that the new ironclad steamer Nahant (of the monitor class) now nearly completed by Mr. Loring, be allowed to remain in this harbor for its defense, at least till the necessary guns are placed in the several fortifications of this harbor and the pirate Alabama has been either captured or destroyed."
The following correspondence accentuates the pressure brought to bear on the Navy Department for local needs:
Albany, N. Y., September 16, 1862, 5.30 p. m.
(Received Washington, 6.30 p. m.)
Sir:—If there is anything in the statement of the New York World this morning in reference to rebel vessels, and I have information from a respectable source which goes to corroborate it, I am sure that the new ironclad Government steamer can be put to no use more important for all interested than by placing her at once in New York harbor, which I earnestly request. E. D. Morgan, Governor of New York.
Hon. Gideon Welles.
Navy Department, September 17, 1861.
The steamer referred to is probably the New Ironsides, now at Philadelphia, where her presence is most earnestly requested by Governor Curtis.
The Galena and Monitor are guarding the entrance of the James River in anticipation of Merrimack No. 2. Under these circumstances it would seem to be impossible to comply with your request.
Gideon Welles.
On November 8, 1862, Governor Morgan writes the Secretary of the Navy urging that the Savannah be stationed in the North river ,and that an ironclad be sent to New York.
November 12, 1862, the Boston Board of Trade wrote the Secretary of the Navy that the Nahant, just completing at Loring's yard, should be kept in Boston harbor, to protect if against the incursions of the Alabama or other rebel vessels—the forts being but indifferently armed with 153 out of 475 guns allotted.
This letter was endorsed:
There is always some naval force at Boston, while other places on the coast, with the exception of Portsmouth, are not so favored. Were a cruiser to enter the harbor of Boston, which is very improbable, there is always a force to see to her. It can hardly be supposed that an armored vessel prepared for operations elsewhere should be detained at Boston and the expedition broken up under a remote apprehension that a hostile vessel might attempt to visit that place. G. W.
Albany, November 17, 1862.
I had just been informed that Rear Admiral Paulding was satisfied that the Savannah was unsuitable for the service specified. Accordingly you wisely determined that the Roanoke should be placed at the disposal of the Rear Admiral immediately on her completion as an ironclad. In the meantime you directed that one of the present ironclads be left to the harbor until the Roanoke is completed.
E. D. Morgan, Governor.
Hon. Gideon Welles.
Boston, November 18, 1862, the Boston Marine Society repeats the wish of the Board of Trade for an ironclad at Boston:
Telegram.
New York, November 20, 1862.
We respectfully request that the Passaic remain for the defense of this harbor until the Montauk is ready for that service.
E. D. Morgan, Governor.
Henry Barney, Collector.
Hon. Gideon Welles.
Telegram.
Boston, 2.40 p. m., February 2, 1863.
From last reports concerning the Alabama the intelligent Boston merchants believe it is not improbable that Semmes may make a descent on the Massachusetts coast, say at Provincetown, which is wholly unprotected, and suggest that an armed Federal vessel should be stationed there.
Jno. A. Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts.
Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Executive Department, Boston, April 27, 1863.
Sir.—I beg to request you to consider the importance of detailing immediately an ironclad vessel of war for the exclusive duty of protecting the harbors of the Massachusetts coast, and particularly the harbor of Boston.
(Here follows arguments as to extent and value of property exposed, etc.)
Not a single Federal vessel of war cruises in Massachusetts Bay for the protection of its coast and commerce, nor has the Federal commander at Fort Warren any authority to detain and examine suspicious vessels, or any steamer or cutter with which to execute such authority if it should be conferred on him; and the same want of protection is true of the southern Massachusetts coast, where through the Vineyard Sound 90,000 vessels have been counted as passing Gay Head in the course of twelve months.
…with those channels (Boston harbor) open to the commerce of the world, a daring commander of a single swift ironclad steamer like the Alabama, can undertake with a fair prospect of success, to suddenly run past the forts and appear before the city.
…With our forts, therefore, so inadequately armed, the only efficient protection Boston harbor can have against the possible incursion of a single swift rebel steamer is by stationing here a Federal ironclad vessel which would be able to attack and sink such a rebel steamer when it should have entered the port.
…I most respectfully but firmly urge upon your attention as a matter of right that such a vessel may at once be assigned to this duty. If it is a question of pecuniary consideration to the Federal government, I am ready and hereby offer to buy such a vessel from the United States and to pay for it immediately in cash.
The anxiety of the whole community for protection from sudden incursion by sea, the vast material interests at stake, and my own consciousness of the reasonable character of my request unite to induce me to ask an early reply to this communication.
John A. Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts.
The President of the United States.
The following day Governor Andrew addressed a letter of similar import to the Secretary of the Navy, in which he says:
I am after many days of careful exploration compelled to the conclusion that the only act of possible of immediate utility and likely to impart early relief to the public mind is to procure the assignment of an ironclad steam vessel, with its complete armament ready for any service to the separate defense of our principal harbor.
The same day he wrote to Senator Sumner to urge the Department to equip and station the Ohio at the mouth of the harbor at once, pending the arrival of the ironclad.
Navy Department, May 2, 1863.
Sir.—…Among the suggestions urged by you on the consideration of the Federal Government is one for an ironclad steamer to be stationed at Boston. We have not, however, a vessel of this description that can be spared from other duty and appropriated to that object at this time. Nor, with due deference, do I think that such a vessel is the best adapted to the coast defense of Massachusetts and New England, although it might be more useful, perhaps, in the harbor of Boston, should a roving privateer or pirate make its appearance at that port. But the turreted vessels which we have, while admirably adapted for harbor defense and operations on the coast, are not vessels of speed, and therefore would not be efficient, except at a single point. It has appeared to me that to guard against the improbable but possible contingency of a hasty descent by one or more of these rovers upon some unprepared place upon the coast, it might be a wise precaution to have a fast cruiser stationed at Boston and always prepared for service. Such a vessel besides affording security for Boston and its immediate vicinity, would, on receiving intelligence from any place on the coast by telegraph or otherwise, proceed at once to the scene of the danger, and with a probability of capturing the invader.
For the extensive coast of New England such a vessel would be more efficient than one of the ironclads. We can at this time ill spare one of the fast cruisers for such a service, but it may be a wise and advisable precaution demanded by the great population and interests involved. The Department will therefore make it a point to have a cruiser stationed at Boston.
Your suggestions, made through Senator Sumner, that a battery be placed on the Ohio shall have immediate attention, and though we cannot fit her for cruising, she will afford additional security to Boston…Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy.
His Excellency John A. Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts.
June 19, 1863, the New York Harbor and Frontier defense
Commission passed resolutions relating to New York harbor,
sent to Secretary of the Navy through Senator Morgan.
Navy Department, June 26, 1863.
Sir.—In reply I would say that there are no ironclads at present available for service in New York Harbor. All now in condition for active operations are needed on our blockading stations, which are threatened from both without and within. The Roanoke is under orders to Hampton Roads, where her presence is deemed of importance.
Gideon Welles.
Hon. E. D. Morgan, New York.
On May 4th Governor Andrew renewed his request for an ironclad, and on May 7th Secretary Welles replied, "there is no vessel of that class at this time available."
It is impossible, in reading the letters and telegrams quoted above, not to admire the wisdom and firmness displayed by the Secretary of the Navy. A weaker man could not have withstood the popular clamor arising in every seaboard town for local protection, but would have divided our too scanty forces and have made the less important points secure at the sacrifice of the larger, the vital interests at stake. Mr. Welles' contention was, in effect, that the harbors of New York and Boston were guarded by the vessels of the blockading fleet which stretched from Cape Henry to the Rio Grande, a surprisingly broad and sound strategic view, from which he appears never to have wavered. This view, the very essence of correct coast defense, stood successfully the test of years of war. Given fresh conditions not too unlike the old, it will still prevail. Yet to-day we hear on all sides a noisy demand for harbor-defense vessels and batteries of 16-inch guns on every salient.
That Mr. Welles should have consented to the placing of a cruiser in Boston and a monitor in New York must not be regarded as a surrender on his part of the military principles for which he did battle, but rather as a proof of the magnitude and volume of the cry for help from those who were in a position to somewhat dictate the form this help should assume. It was like the bending to the blast which saves the tree from destruction.
Whether, in the event of war in these days, a Secretary of the Navy can possibly be as independent in his action as was Mr. Welles, it is difficult to say. The question is of great importance to us, although it hangs rather upon the sociological development of the country than upon naval policy. Personally, I am disposed to fear that the powers of the press and the politician will, together, overbear the future Secretary and force him into abandoning, not the true faith itself, but its practice. It is incumbent upon all who seriously discuss the naval problems of the future to recognize the possibilities for evil which may, and doubtless will, flow from the source so clearly defined in these extracts from the history of the past.
I purpose illustrating by an example drawn from an event of the Rebellion the method of apprehending a raider, which it will be our duty to avoid, and thus incidentally and per contra, to point out the measures which seem better adapted to the end in view.
The Tacony Episode.
The summer of 1863 was characterized by a raid which for boldness and success must long remain notable in naval annals. The narrative, most interesting and instructive, will first be briefly given, and then the lessons it contains will be pointed out with reference to the general question with which we began the study of this species of warfare.
In May of that year the C. S. S. Florida was preying on American commerce off Cape San Roque, Brazil, in the fair way through which must pass all sailing vessels crossing the equator in the Atlantic ocean. It may be remarked, parenthetically, that this point might with propriety have been guarded by one or more of our own ships. On the 6th she took the American brig Clarence. Second Lieutenant C. W. Read, of the Florida, then made a suggestion to his commanding officer in these words, "I propose to take the brig which we have just captured, and with a crew of twenty men to proceed to Hampton Roads and cut out a gunboat or steamer of the enemy.
"As I would be in possession of the brig's papers and as the crew would not be large enough to excite suspicion, there can be no doubt of my passing Fortress Monroe successfully. Once in the roads, I would be prepared to avail myself of any circumstance which might present for gaining the deck of an enemy's vessel. If it was found impossible to board a gunboat or a merchant steamer, it would be possible to fire the shipping at Baltimore."
This proposition was approved, and Read, placed in command of the Clarence, immediately sailed for the Chesapeake. He had but one gun on board—a howitzer. Arriving off the Carolina coast a month later he burned or bonded three American vessels. In the meantime he had become dissatisfied with the Clarence's sailing qualities. From his prizes he learned that a rigid examination was made of all craft approaching Hampton Roads, and that none were permitted to pass Fortress Monroe except those freighted on Government account. His scheme being therefore impracticable, he "then determined to cruise along the coast and to try to intercept a transport for Fortress Monroe and with her to endeavor to carry out the orders of Commander Maffitt, and in the meantime to do all the possible injury to the enemy's commerce."
On the morning of June 12th, when about fifty miles east of Cape Henry, he captured the bark Tacony, by hoisting false signals of distress that brought her within hail, transferred his crew and howitzer to her as being the faster vessel, and burned the Clarence. At the same time he burnt one schooner, the Shindler, and bonded a brig and a schooner. The latter was made into a cartel. She brought the Clarence's prisoners into Philadelphia, as well as the news of the Tacony's conversion into and presence as a privateer.
The Tacony then stood off shore into the track of the homeward-bound West India trade. On the 15th, being about 250 miles east of Cape Charles, she burned a brig. Thence she went toward Nantucket, where, on the 20th and 21st, that island being about northwest and sixty miles distant, she burnt a clipper ship, from London to New York, a bark and a Liverpool packet on the 22d in 41° 3' N., 69° 15' W. Until the 23d she seems to have remained in the neighborhood of George's Bank, burning fishing vessels to the number of eight. On June 24th she had reached to the northward into the track of vessels bound into Boston from Europe, where she bonded an emigrant ship and took the fishing schooner Archer, Portland, bearing west by north no miles.
Read says: "As there were now a number of the enemy's gunboats in search of the Tacony, and our howitzer ammunition being all expended, I concluded to destroy the Tacony and with the schooner Archer to proceed along the coast with the view of burning the shipping at some exposed harbor or of cutting out a steamer. Accordingly, on the morning of the 25th of June we set fire to the Tacony, and with the Archer stood in for the coast."
Learning that the revenue cutter Caleb Cushing was in Portland and that a staunch, swift propeller would remain there during the night he determined to run in and seize both. He entered the harbor unchallenged at sunset June 26th. His engineer expressing doubts as to his ability to start the engines of the steamer, and the enterprise demanding successful results before daylight, he abandoned the notion of taking the steamer, resolved to capture the cutter, and after getting from under the guns of the forts, to return and burn the shipping. Easily and quietly he boarded the Caleb Cushing and with her stood out to sea. The wind, however, failed him toward morning of the 27th, so that he was readily overhauled by two large steamers and three tugs with United States troops on board sent out in pursuit. He set fire to the Gushing, took to his boats and at 11.30 surrendered to the Forest City.
On the other side we have a record of alarms seldom paralleled in our history. The telegrams to the Department began to arrive on June 13th, the day after the capture of the Tacony off Cape Henry, and poured in with little cessation during the succeeding fortnight.
The Secretary of the Navy telegraphed the commandants at Boston, Philadelphia and New York: "Charter or seize half a dozen moderate-sized, fast vessels; put on board an officer, a dozen men and one or two howitzers; send them out in various directions. Take any vessel that can be sent to sea within the next forty-eight hours." To Rear Admiral Lee, at Hampton Roads: "Send out anything you have available." Again, on June 24th, the Department telegraphed to the commandant, Boston: "Charter more steamers and send them out after the Tacony; all that can be sent in forty-eight hours. G.W." Phenomenal activity reigned in naval circles and every suitable vessel that could be had in any way was dispatched on the track of the Tacony.
The chase after the Tacony can best de described graphically.
The markings on the charts give the positions of the Tacony and of each of the vessels sent in chase at noon of each day. A sharp distinction must be drawn between those positions which are of official record and those which are only estimated. The former are beyond controversy. The latter must be taken as merely the best guesses made after careful study of the orders governing the movement of the vessels concerned and the cruising reports returned. The log-books of regular United States cruisers are alone available at this time. The reports of chartered vessels are generally devoid of all statements as to latitude and longitude. An occasional reference to the speaking of another ship affords the only check on the guessing. My readers must be content to take such estimates under the qualification mentioned. I feel confident that in most cases they are not very far wrong. Some vessels sent in pursuit I have omitted altogether from these charts, not feeling justified in hazarding my opinion as to their whereabouts. For the table of noon positions of the naval vessels I am indebted to the courtesy of Lieutenant-Commander Rush.
It seems incredible that a sailing craft of only average speed should have cruised against our coastwise traffic in so successful a manner, and have enjoyed from first to last, a period of two weeks, complete freedom from interruption by the forty odd vessels, most of them steamers, sent in pursuit. The fact demonstrates afresh the difficulty of finding a ship on the ocean when her course and destination are unknown, and emphasizes the necessity, if practicable, of arresting her at the place of exit. The inference from the occurrence itself, supported by the evidence of the track charts, shows a misuse of the force employed in patrol. At times the Tacony must have been perilously close to her pursuers.
The Blackstone reported that she had twice been near the Tacony, but that the two vessels were concealed from each other, in one instance by the darkness of the night and in the other by the obscurity of fog. Thick weather prevailed. This episode answers affirmatively the first query of our opening, as to whether such raids are to be apprehended. It would be equally valid in the face of a hundred cases tending to prove the contrary.
To consider the individual instructions issued to the cruising vessels would consume too much time and bear little fruit, but a hasty glance over them reveals the lack of a well-defined scheme calculated to cover the ground in a thorough and efficient manner. Admiral Lee was restricted to the waters south of the Capes of the Chesapeake, but the commandants at Boston, New York and Philadelphia were apparently unhampered, for they sent vessels in any and all directions. In consequence, the ships cruised in a haphazard manner, large gaps were left in the patrol line, while at other points there was an undue accumulation of force. As a result, the Tacony was not apprehended. Had the task of searching been divided between the four bodies of ships, each with its own allotted ground to examine and protect, and had a central authority directed the movements of all, it is yet possible that failure would have occurred, still the chances of success would undoubtedly have been increased. That Read's party was finally captured is no excuse for her continued immunity from detection. The ships sent out rushed madly in all quarters, burnt up their fuel with all possible dispatch, broke down their engines and had to put back to port for coal and repairs. Less activity in the fire-room and more expenditure, of brain tissue in devising a consistent and simple scheme of patrol, assigning to each ship its geographical square to cover under reduced speed, or her due place in scouting line would have probably yielded better results. One is free to recognize the parallelism between this episode and the chase after the Confederate cruisers Alabama, Florida, etc. We were invariably sending ships after the latter and to the ports they had just quitted, and we were, of course, always just too late to catch the bird that had flown. The records show that no plan of guarding certain strategic points—where the streams of ocean commerce mingle or cross, and there affording protection to the sailing ships that must, of necessity pass through them—yet it is at these very points our merchant vessels were mostly captured and destroyed. Each captain went largely on his own judgment and measured the success of his cruise by the number of miles travelled.
Nothing is more clearly demonstrated by the Tacony's cruise than the need of some central control. And had the Government profited by the warning it thus received and established some such off-shore guard to its coastwise trade, the careers of the Florida and Tallahassee in the following year would have been marked by fewer burnings of American ships, while they might, indeed, have been brought to a sudden close. The Florida passed rapidly along our shores, did what damage she could, and then stretched over to the Azores. Some of us remember the excitement she aroused and our own share in the wild-goose chase after her. The Tallahassee in ten days burned, scuttled and bonded thirty-one vessels, and returned to Wilmington after an absence of twenty days consumed in the dash along the coast to Halifax and back.
Taking up the second of our initial queries, "How may such raids be best guarded against?" we must rely upon the principles already deduced as governing the operations of scouting, for they are equally applicable to the problem which now concerns us. The postulate, it is to be remembered, is our own reasonably complete control of our water approaches. The rules we have evolved call for scouts steaming at convenient speed in two lines, an outer and inner, separated by a distance equivalent to that traversed by an average vessel in twelve hours, so that the raider must cross one zone of daylight within sight of one or other of the patrol lines.
In this way our coasting trade would be hedged in and protected as effectively as possible, the occasional movements of the scouts to coaling and signal stations serving to guard the space included between the patrol lines and the beach. In addition, small cruisers might be placed at points, of which Provincetown is the type, ready to move in any direction on telegraphic summons to the relief of a threatened port.
How Guard Against Raids?
II.
The problem assumes a very different guise, however, when, the postulate being changed, we are thrown wholly on the defensive. In this case, our coasting vessels will have been withdrawn from the seas and our duty have been restricted to the attempt at warding off the attacks of single cruisers upon isolated and exposed points deficient in local defense. The question evidently hinges upon the completeness of the enemy's investment. If he be present in such overwhelming force as to contain our main fleet and in addition to establish an adequate watch over our fortified harbors, we shall be powerless on the water, at least, to oppose effectual resistance to the blows contemplated. Such points must then look to the army for shore works that will keep the enemy's lighter vessels off at harmless distance. These works need not be elaborate or heavily armed. Hasty earthworks and a few six-inch modern rifles, for example, wall abundantly serve. As against landing parties, the regular or State troops will suffice. It is simply a question of the most profitable use of the means at hand. All points cannot be protected; some must be left exposed. The army must incur the obligation of selecting the sacrificial lamb.
Between the two extremes we have considered comes the quite probable mean, which may be thus defined: "Given to the enemy a great but not overwhelming naval superiority, how can we best guard against raiding?"
It will be wisest, in my opinion, to throw this burden upon the army entirely, for it will be difficult to spare any of our ships from their more important duties. Such a measure, however, would not be approved by public opinion, which, after all, rules in our land. The Navy Department would be unable to resist the appeals from governors, mayors, chambers of commerce, boards of trade, insurance companies, and the politicians, who never lead and direct the general sentiment, but follow it at a short distance astern. In this world it is the expedient which control men's actions, not the intrinsically desirable—and popular clamor must and will be appeased.
In apportioning the means to the end, the first consideration is the size of vessels that the enemy can employ on raiding duty. This will be determined by the depth of the water approaches. If the towns are exposed, like Galveston, or if the harbors are deep and roomy, the cruisers of the enemy may be of the larger type. If the water be not deep, if the harbors be narrow and limited, or the towns back from the coast, the cruisers will be of the smaller type. Our admiral must select for his guard ships cruisers not less in power than those likely to be sent in by the enemy, assigning each to a certain district or division of the coast line. A sine qua non is a safe refuge behind stout shore works. Lacking this refuge, he may lose his ships by a descent in force. If each section of the line to be guarded were provided with two or more such shelters, the security of the patrol ship would be greatly increased, as it would always have one point within easy reach. Local conditions will govern, of course. The ideal combination is a swift cruiser of adequate force, a short patrol line, a central station, and harbors of refuge on each flank. In practice, much that is desirable will be lacking, and the best must be made of the actual circumstances. The possession on our part of an efficient system of lookout and signal stations connected by telegraph and telephone with the central post of the patrol will enable the latter to watch a comparatively wide stretch of coast.
Vigilance and prompt action may prevent such raids as are contemplated, or catch the raider red-handed. More complete means of prevention and protection are barred by the conditions of the problem. When we shall have quickly detected the presence of the raider and have started at once on his tracks we shall have done all that our scanty resources in ships have rendered practicable. Success may not crown our efforts, and popular dissatisfaction will then be aroused against the Navy. Our indifferent reward will be found in the reflection that we have done the best we could and have failed because no other result was attainable.