From little spark may burst a mighty flame.--Dante.
The officers who have been detailed by the Navy Department to report on the efficiency of the different naval militia organizations have rendered practically an unanimous report as to the great value of this new factor in our national defense. Though in many cases there is a wide divergence of opinion as to the proper field of action for these new organizations, yet the opinion is universal among officers who have had actual experience with the naval militia, that their field is a wide and important one, and their value great enough to justify some systematic course of instruction, that the existing organizations may be made the genesis of a thoroughly practical and reliable force of trained men, to whose care may be safely entrusted the lesser problems of the naval defense of the nation.
With the variances of view of the three generally accepted schools of opinion we have nothing to do, it will be sufficient to say that the ideal organization should be capable alike of deep sea and great gun service; of the suppression of the various local and State disorders; should possess the greatest possible knowledge of local waters and harbors, together with the means for their naval defense, and in the preparation and manning of the auxiliaries of the fleet; though it is very likely that their greatest field of usefulness may be found to be in the direction of the last named.
A careful review of the reports of all officers who have been detailed since 1892 on naval militia inspection duty shows that they unite in stating that the men of the naval militia, as a class, are readily amenable to discipline, are above the average physically and mentally, and are actuated by a high degree of patriotism and enthusiasm.
Doctors, lawyers, professors and other men of learning and distinction in civil life are found among the members; nor will this distinction as civilians be any more of a barrier to the loyal performance of their military duty, whatever or wherever it may be, than is was to the thousands of their brethren who shouldered their muskets and marched to the front in '61.
The plan of action that has been most generally approved by the officers who have given the matter any thought contemplates the thorough training of the naval militia in infantry and artillery tactics; in boat drill and general longshore work; in torpedo work and mining; in the handling of such ordnance as is best adapted to the arming of the auxiliary navy; in signaling; in the preparation of such maps, charts and topographical information in regard to their respective localities as will best facilitate the solving of the problems of coast defense; in the preparation of the necessary plans for the speedy mobilization of the auxiliary fleet, etc.
We are then, probably, practically assured of the proper scope of these organizations; but how they may be best trained and thoroughly fitted for the manifold duties that will be required of them is another, and as yet unsolved problem. It is true that the Naval War College and the Association of the Officers of the Naval Militia have done much towards systematizing the present methods of instruction, and the Navy Department towards securing uniform legislation in the various States; the wonder is that they have accomplished so much with so little to work upon.
It is practically true to-day, however, that the exact status of the naval militia has yet to be established and a uniform system of instruction formulated.
There exists at present in several of the States, notably Iowa, a very complete system of instruction for the use of the National Guard, and these systems are in practical and successful operation.
The manifold, complex, and, in many cases, unaccustomed duties required of the naval militia organizations require for their successful teaching to the personnel, a degree of technical knowledge and special training in their instructors that can be acquired only by actual practice, and which we cannot expect to find outside of the ranks of the officers of the regular navy.
It has been my good fortune during the past few years to have some personal knowledge of the naval militia organizations of several of the different States, and in many cases I have inquired of the members what they expected their duties to be in case of a possible war. Almost without exception there was a general vagueness and haziness of reply that betokened a woeful lack of a definite direction in their instruction. It is true that this was no fault of either officers or men, for even now the fog that has enshrouded all naval militia matters is only beginning to lift.
If the naval militia is of any value, and there seems to be no question on this point, it is certainly time that some concerted effort be made to clear up the general uncertainty and vagueness that hangs over the whole matter and give the organizations a fair chance. They cannot be expected to properly fit themselves to perform duties in the event of a possible war if they do not know beforehand what these duties are to be.
Let a board be appointed, to consist of say three officers of the regular service and two of the most experienced of the officers of the naval militia, officers who understand alike the limitations and the capabilities of their men and know just about what to expect of them.
Let this board act in conjunction with the War College. Let them carefully weigh all evidence and suggestions, and then, after due deliberation, formulate some plan of action, some systematic and adequate system of instruction that will send the men to the front, if their services are ever needed, with a clear conception of what is required of them.
It seems to me that there is only one way to accomplish this end, and that is, after some such board as that suggested has finally settled upon a system, to establish a bureau composed of a small detail of officers of the regular service, whose duty it shall be to deliver lectures and such other practical and theoretical instructions to the various organizations as may be considered advisable. It will probably be objected by some that almost all of the younger officers of the navy are afloat and that those of advanced rank and age would not care to accept the hardships of travel incident to such service, and that therefore it would be impossible to secure such a detail; and much of this is probably correct. But if the proper training of a reserve force or 3000 or 4000 men is not of sufficient importance to secure the detail by the Government of three or four officers to properly instruct them, it is high time that the naval militia organizations were disbanded, as useless barnacles on the hull of the ship of state.
The outline of a course based upon this proposed system of instruction is appended herewith. As will be noticed, the instruction of all officers of commanding rank is preferably given at the War College, and, failing in this, under the care of an officer detailed from or under the direction of said college.
If all of our naval militia officers were millionaires, with ample leisure time at their disposal, it perhaps would not be necessary to look further into the project, for the problem would be solved.
Officers so situated could devote a summer to the course at the War College, and then be amply qualified to give all necessary instruction to the subordinates of their respective commands, for as a rule the officers of commanding rank are ex-officers of the Navy and therefore need but a little brushing up now and then to keep fully up to the requirements of the times. However, it is sad, but unfortunately true, that the commanding officers have neither unlimited time nor unlimited cash at their disposal, and generally a thorough course at the War College is an impossibility; but granting the time and the necessary cash, there still remains the further objection that the administrative and executive duties required of the commander are often of a nature to interfere seriously with the careful consideration of the problems of naval warfare, whose study would be a necessity to one who was about to act as an instructor to others.
If it were possible to fully instill into the minds of the officers commanding the mass of information necessary to make them capable instructors, and furnish them with sufficient material to demonstrate practically, there is no reason why the very excellent plan of Iowa's School of Instruction for Officers of the National Guard could not be adopted with great profit by our naval militia organizations. However, modern naval warfare has introduced such a variety of complicated machinery, such a mass of technical detail to be mastered before one can be fully competent to instruct others, that I doubt seriously whether we have any officers in the naval militia, who have business affairs of any consequence to look after, who are competent to fulfill the requirements, able men as most of them are. They simply cannot afford to give the time necessary. As it is, many of them allow their administrative duties alone to make serious inroads upon time that should be devoted to business.
The course of instruction, as laid down in the appended chart, is intended merely as a suggestion and as showing briefly the general method proposed to be followed.
Instruction at Naval War College, or by Lecturers from Navy Department.
Captain, Commander, and Lieutenant-Commander in States having a Commander for Naval Brigade Chief.—Course. Practical mobilization, Naval strategy, International law, Fleet evolutions, Battle tactics and precautions, Problems of coast defense, Problems of coast defense applied to his special district, including study of transportation and supply facilities and resources, and the local topography, etc.
Instruction by Lecturers from the Navy Department.
Captain, Commander, Lieutenant-Commander, Lieutenant, Lieutenant junior grade, and Ensign.—Course. Maintenance of discipline, Ordnance problems, including care of the battery, direction of fire, torpedo instruction, etc., Infantry and artillery tactics, Boat and other guards, Practices and precautions of actual war, etc., Signaling, Navigation, Shore and boat exercises, Precautions to be observed in case of fire, etc., Proper provisioning and care of men on boat and shore expeditions, etc., Practical mobilization, Naval strategy, International law.
Instruction by Commissioned Officers of Division or Battalion.
Master at Arms, Boatswain's Mate, Gunner's Mate, Quartermaster, Coxswain, Bugler, Electrician.—Course. Infantry, artillery and boat drill, Use and care of small arms and ordnance, including direction of fire at vulnerable points of the enemy, etc., Naval ceremonies and salutes, Signaling, Familiarity with various apparatus found on shipboard, and in such other lines as may suggest themselves to the officer in charge.
Instruction by Commissioned or Petty Officers of Division or Battalion.
Seamen of the 1st class, Seamen of the 2nd class, Seamen of the 3rd class, Artificers, Yeomen, etc.—Course. Whatever may be considered proper by officer in command. Instruction in each and all of these classes shall be progressive, and promotion shall in all cases be largely governed by the proficiency attained in the various branches of study, in the relative order of their importance.
As stated before, wherever possible, it is the intention to have all officers of commanding rank, such as captains, commanders and lieutenant-commanders, take a thorough course at the War College; where this is impracticable, a special course for commanding officers will be prepared, embracing naval strategy, international law, fleet evolutions, problems of coast defense, including the problem as applied to his own special district, with enough knowledge of the general plan of defense to enable him to render efficient service beyond the immediate limits of his own district in case his services should be needed elsewhere.
It will probably be objected, and with reason, that the preparation of a special plan of defense for the individual district of each commander of the naval militia would be a tremendous and well-nigh impossible task, even with every facility at hand, and so it would be. But that is not the intention. It is not in any way the intention to prepare these plans at the War College, or elsewhere, and then say to the local commander, commit them.
It would be like memorizing the demonstration of one of Euclid's theorems and quite as productive of results. We do not want mere parrot-like learning. What we do want is to have the War College, Lecture Staff, or some other constituted authority, supply the general outline and let the derails themselves be the work of the local commanders, under the direction, of course, of the above. Let them acquire such a familiarity with the resources of their respective localities and commands that if a contingency should arise that should necessitate the abandonment of all previously prepared plans of operation, that they would be prepared to think and act for themselves.
Admirable as is perfect discipline and necessary as is machinelike obedience to orders to the success of any military organization, they cannot always supply the place of brains. The mere fact of our extended coast line, our constantly increasing tendency as the years roll by to become involved in foreign complications, and the relatively insignificant size of our army and navy, point constantly to the probability that some day a foreign war will be upon us, that heavy drafts will have to be made upon the nation to fill up the ranks of our regiments and man the guns of our navy.
The fortunes and casualties of war will inevitably place heavy burdens and responsibilities temporarily upon the shoulders of men not now in the regular service. What these will be it is of course impossible to tell, but there is no reason to doubt that these things will happen—they cannot but help happen in war prolonged for any considerable period. We cannot expect the officers upon whose shoulders these responsibilities may fall, to give a good account of themselves unless they have been properly prepared in advance to assume the duties we have reason to believe may be required of them. They cannot inspire confidence in others if they have no confidence in themselves, and this confidence only comes with a familiarity with the subject in hand born of practice or thorough study. No man can successfully cope with the responsibilities of naval command, involving the possibilities of the attack with its attendant risks, or of retreat at an inopportune time when perhaps victory was trembling in the balance and just within his grasp, or yet of passive inactivity at a time when vigorous initiative was imperative—no man can afford to take this risk, nor can the nation afford to let him take it—unless he has, by a proper course of preliminary training, proved himself worthy.
The commanding officer should be possessed not only of a fair knowledge of naval strategy, international law, and the general problems of the defense of the coast, but his knowledge of his own particular section of it should be so comprehensive as to cover all the items covered in the General Information Circular issued by the Department for the use of the naval militia last spring, and much in addition to that. He should endeavor, wherever possible, to secure the enlistment in each of his battalions, of competent draughtsmen, civil and mechanical engineers, designers and so on, in addition to the artisans generally required by law.
By so doing, not only can he obtain excellent charts of the adjacent waters, but can secure maps giving the salient points of the local topography. Further than this, he will be enabled to secure, in many cases, the structural designs of many, if not all, of the vessels that visit his territory which are suitable for conversion into auxiliaries of the fleet.
During the long winter evenings working drawings can be made for all structural changes, deck and other bracings for gun mounts, protection of machinery, construction of magazines, etc., and should include full descriptions of all machinery, boilers, etc., found on each vessel. These plans should be made and duly numbered in the case of each vessel, in sets of four, one each for the Navy Department, office of the Adjutant General of the State, Commander of State Naval Brigade, and the commander of the local battalion, where the organization of the brigade and the battalion is not identical, in which case the extra set of plans should be filed at the Navy Department. Examination of the vessels and the condition of their machinery should be made at least yearly, and such reports are to be made in the same number and manner as the plans, and should be filed with the said plans, at each of their several places of keeping.
Under the head of each vessel, in addition to the number of guns she can mount, bunker and magazine capacity, etc., should be entered the number and names of each harbor she can safely enter in the district; where coal in sufficient quantities can be obtained (the character of the coal as to steaming qualities, etc., should be noted in addition); what the loading facilities are in each place so mentioned, and the average time required to fill bunkers: the number of establishments capable of making repairs to hull, boilers and machinery—the character of such repairs and probable time required to complete same; the facilities offered for obtaining provisions and other ship supplies, including an estimate for the time required to install battery, supply magazine, provision ship, etc ready for active service. All this and such other information as is obtainable in relation to the individual ship should be entered in two small duplicate books, said books to be filed with the Navy Department. The books should be marked with the number of the ship, which in every case should be known by number only, until such time as the mobilization of our auxiliary fleet would be required, when one copy should be forwarded to the ship's commander, who will cause same to be placed with the ship's private signal book and treated accordingly.
That the full value of this system be brought out, the whole of the nation’s coast line should be apportioned into as many divisions as there are States having either sea or lake frontage, this being done to facilitate the work of the different State naval militia organizations now in existence and of those that are yet to be authorized.
Each State in turn is to be subdivided into sections of, say, 25 miles each, the State being considered as a unit containing so many sections of the standard size.
That there may be no confusion arising from the duplication of numbers in so many different States, each section shall bear a number and be known by it regardless of the State in which the section is found. For instance, let us take the most eastern portion of the coast of Maine as a starting point. Measuring towards the west, we follow the line of the shore for 25 miles, which constitutes section one, the second 25 miles so measured in the same direction constitutes section two, and so on until the complete round of the water-bearing frontier of the nation is completed.
Roughly speaking, the coast of the State of Maine would be known as sections 1 to 14, constituting Division of Maine; that of New Hampshire as sections 15 to 17, constituting Division of New Hampshire; that of Massachusetts as sections 18 to 20, constituting Division of Massachusetts, and so on, until the round is completed. Texas might be known as sections 158 to 181, constituting Division of Texas, and Indiana as sections 200 to 204, constituting Lake Division of Indiana, prefixing Lake to such divisions as lie along the borders of our great lakes, to distinguish them from their salt water brethren.
A section or more would be assigned as the year's work of each division of a battalion, but this allotment should never be arbitrarily fixed, but, on the contrary, should be governed entirely by the difficulty of the task.
Some sections could be thoroughly covered and all needed information secured in a few days' time, while others again would require the work of months. It is understood, of course, that the sections would not be studied consecutively, but in the order of their relative value, great centers of trade and important strategic points being naturally considered first.
However, it is beyond doubt that if this system be properly adopted and its details systematically and carefully followed out, that it will furnish us with practically all the detailed information necessary for the solution of many of the problems presented by the naval defense of our coasts, in a half-score of years or less, or at least so much of the necessary information as can be obtained by the careful study of the coast line, and is within the scope of a purely volunteer organization, with limited opportunities for actual service in many cases.
To what extent the Navy Department has recognized the value in this line of work of the Naval Militia is shown by the following extract from Secretary Herbert's report for 1895:
"The information collected by the first battalion of the Naval Militia of New York during the past summer relative to the shore line of Long Island is of such value that the Department unhesitatingly indorses the proposition to engage this corps in the study of our entire coast line. Every battalion, with proper help and direction from the Department, can, as shown by the admirable work done on Long Island Sound last summer, acquire information as to its contiguous coast that would be invaluable in case of invasion."
That the Department has recognized the value of the naval militia sufficiently to consider some uniform plan of instruction will be seen from the following from Secretary Herbert's report for 1896: "To more thoroughly instruct the Naval Militia in the duties which will be required of them in case of mobilization or of war, it is the intention of the Department to communicate to them as soon as practicable that portion of the plan of general mobilization and defense which relates to the several States to which they belong, what vessels are to be used, what positions not embraced in the military defense must be mined and protected by batteries, what signal stations must be maintained, and, in general, everything that must be done to utilize all possible resources for the local defense.
"This will be the work of years, but it is believed that by intelligent co-operation between the officers of the Department and the Naval Militia, a thoroughly digested plan of mobilization and subsequent operations may be gradually effected, which will be of inestimable value to the country."
With this in view, the Department granted permission to the officers of the Naval Militia to attend the War College and Torpedo School. Six officers followed a portion of the War College course and nineteen were instructed at the Torpedo Station during the past summer, but the very considerable expense attached to this service obviously renders impossible the attendance of many worthy officers who are so unfortunate as to reside at a great distance from Newport.
To successfully inaugurate a system of instruction by a traveling corps of lecturers would not, I feel confident, necessitate the detail of more than four officers from their regular duties, to cover the whole of the country, including the Pacific Coast States. If the Pacific slope and possibly Texas are omitted, two officers on a properly arranged schedule can deliver four lectures apiece at each battalion headquarters within the district named during the eight months from October 1st to June 1st. This will give one lecture a month at each point, the lecturers alternating.
The proper preparation for these lectures can be arranged for by the creation of a number of small but select traveling libraries, equal in number to the points at which lectures will be delivered during the course. The libraries will be loaned by the Government to the different organizations and retained by them until the completion of the course for the year.
The composition of these libraries should be decided upon by the War College at the time of the determination of the proposed course for the current year, and should consist of such works as will enable the officers of the Naval Militia to make proper preparation prior to the delivery of each lecture. Each officer, where practicable, should be furnished with a synopsis of every lecture at least ten days prior to its delivery, and said synopsis should contain a list of the authorities to be consulted, as many of which should be embodied in the traveling library as possible, ever bearing in mind the fact that the consultation of multitudinous references is confusing to the lay reader, and for this reason the library should be very compact, containing nothing but the essential authorities on the subject-matter in hand.
Such a course of eight lectures might be made up as follows: one lecture on the general principles of naval warfare; one lecture on international law; one lecture on conduct of landing parties and general shore operations; one lecture on signaling, seeking, if possible, to secure a practical knowledge of both the army and navy codes, that the Naval Militia might act as an efficient intermediary in case of need; two lectures on the problems of mobilization, and two lectures on torpedoing and mining, illustrated by working models of reduced size, if possible. The mere fact that promotion should be made largely dependent upon the proficiency in the various branches in the relative order of their importance would act as a powerful incentive to close application, if there were no other reasons.
It seems to me that the thorough consideration and study of such courses as this each year cannot help but largely increase the effectiveness of the Naval Militia, and when we stop a moment to think and realize the heavy burdens that must of necessity fall upon the shoulders of these men in case of a war with a first-rate naval power, we should consider very carefully before rejecting any suggestion that tends to increase the efficiency of our naval defenses.
Nowhere is the importance of the early and systematic training of the Naval Militia of more moment than in any consideration of the defense of our great lakes and in the conduct of any military operations directed against the Dominion of Canada. It is patent to any one that the construction of the various canals passing through territory under Canadian control by which vessels from the Atlantic can have untrammeled entrance to the lakes, has practically nullified, so far as Great Britain is concerned, the provisions of the well known treaty of 1817. Great as is the excess of American tonnage on the bosom of the lakes, it will be a source of weakness rather than of strength, if we are not prepared at an instant's notice to convert our peaceful merchantmen into powerfully armed and thoroughly equipped cruisers of the auxiliary fleet, capable of blockading the Canadian canals and preventing thereby the entrance into the lakes of the British squadron; or at least capable of rendering a good account of themselves in any conflicts that might occur for the supremacy. A summer's campaign in Canada would be practically impossible without the control of the lakes by our navy, and the hordes of men that are prepared at a week's notice to overrun Canada, that we hear of so often during the periodical twistings of the British Lion's tail by our zealous jingoists, we fear would suffer an unpleasant awakening from their pleasant dreams of easy conquest and cheaply won glory.
It is true that joy over the probable conclusion of a five years treaty of arbitration between the two great English-speaking nations of the world is echoing and re-echoing over England and America at this Christmastide, and far as it is from any true lover and well-wisher of either nation to wish for anything else than the early consummation of a bond of amity between the two nations that shall forever render war between them a thing improbable if not actually impossible.
Yet we would be blind to the dictates of military prudence if we did not carefully consider the possibility of the proper defense of the nation against attacks from every quarter, regardless of present state of existing friendships. The great preponderance of the naval power of Great Britain, our long and unprotected Canadian frontier, including the defenseless cities of the great lakes, render the consideration of the possibility of attack from this direction of the most vital importance, and into any intelligent consideration of this problem, the part to be taken by the Naval Militia of the lakes is bound to be a factor of great importance.
When so much may depend on the efficiency of the Naval Militia organizations, is it not the part of prudence and wisdom to afford them every possible aid in their efforts to properly fit themselves to assist in the defense of the nation?
DISCUSSION.
Lieut.-Commander Richard Wainwright, U. S. N.—I have read the paper of Mr. Dohrman with great interest, and agree with him thoroughly as to the value of the naval militia organizations and the necessity for a systematic course of instruction and training.
As Mr. Dohrman states, there appears to be a wide divergence of opinion as to the proper field of action for the naval militia, and this has led not only to some uncertainty as to the proper course of training, but also served to somewhat discourage the organization. In order that the officers and men should take real interest in their work the course of instruction must be made interesting, and, above all, they must see plainly before them the useful results intended to be reached by the work. They are patriotic, and desire to see some real position of value to be occupied by them in time of war, at which their training in time of peace has been directly aimed.
The navy has no reserve personnel unless the naval militia is trained so as to form such reserve. All the great naval powers have large reserves upon which they can draw when it becomes necessary to mobilize their fleets. At the present time this difficulty is avoided by us, as we keep all our ships in active service; but it is manifest that this cannot continue when we have a number of vessels more nearly adequate to the needs of the country. Then a proportion of the vessels must be placed in reserve, with small crews sufficient to keep the vessels in every way ready for immediate service. But vessels in reserve will be useless without men in reserve, for modern men-of-war require well-trained men to handle them efficiently. To furnish this reserve is, in my opinion, the most important field of action for the naval militia, and the one that they can fill most efficiently with the training possible under the conditions of their organization.
The naval militia can be trained, if reasonable facilities are offered, in the use of modern guns and how to care for them. Much of their training can be carried out ashore, so that with some little training afloat both officers and men can become competent to man the batteries of our war-ships. With a proportion of our ships in reserve, there should be a sufficient number of men to fully man the armored fleet and some of the larger cruisers and to furnish a nucleus of a crew for the remaining cruisers. To each of these cruisers a certain number of naval militia should be assigned sufficient to man all the guns, leaving the different organizations intact as far as possible. The regular crew would perform all the special seaman's duties and handle the engines, etc. When it is desirable to exercise any portion of the naval militia it should be done on the cruiser to which it is assigned. If this cruiser is in the active fleet, its shifting crew should be sent to the corresponding vessel in the reserve. If it is in reserve, it would only be necessary to march the naval militia organization on board, fill up the fire-room force and go to sea.
The next most important field that can be occupied by the naval militia in time of war is that of manning the batteries of such auxiliary cruisers as may be armed by the government. For this the same training is needed as for manning the guns of the regular cruisers.
Beyond doubt there are many other duties that may be performed in time of war by the naval militia organizations, requiring other kinds of training, some of which may prove more amusing if not as useful. There are many duties that might be pointed out pertaining to purely local defense and longshore work, some of which are pointed out by Mr. Dohrman; but such duties should be left to those organizations that are unwilling to leave their own ports or that join the organization for amusement. I much mistake the spirit that animates the present organizations which form our naval militia if they have many such men in their ranks. I believe that as a body they have formed and joined these organizations with the patriotic motive of serving their country in time of war in such positions as will be most useful. All that they require is that the proper field of action, and the training necessary to fill it properly, be pointed out to them and that it is a dignified and naval position.
Courses in strategy, tactics, coast defense, international law and navigation may all prove interesting and can do little harm if they are taken up purely as a mental stimulus without neglecting to occupy the time necessary to acquire a good knowledge of naval ordnance and gunnery. It is possible for those whose life work is in a profession or trade on shore to become good gunnery officers or good gunners by systematic training. But it is impossible for them to become even tolerable seamen or navigators, or to acquire the skill necessary to handle a modern warship, much less to handle a fleet. Infantry drill is good discipline; some signaling knowledge would be advantageous; but the main study of the naval militia should be gunnery, and their principal exercise should be with the great guns.
While I have differed broadly from the ideas set forth by Mr. Dohrman, I believe we both have the same object, that is, to point out the honorable and useful position that should be filled in time of war by the naval militia, and the systematic course of training necessary to fit the organizations to fill this position.
There will always be many functions that can be performed in time of war by auxiliaries to the regular naval force, unless we should be more thoroughly prepared for war than seems at all likely, and some field of usefulness would be found for an organization however trained; but the most useful, the most honorable and worthy of the combined efforts of the naval militia is that of trained gunners.
Col. J.L. Carter, Assistant Inspector-General, State of Massachusetts.—It is a very gratifying sensation to feel that there are intelligent minds studying the subject of the national defense, and in no quarter is there more room for study than in the problem of the functions and scope of the new branch of our service, the naval militia. The paper under discussion—"A proposed uniform course of instruction for the naval militia"—by H. G. Dohrman, is a valuable contribution to the growing literature on this subject, and while I do not concur fully in all of the propositions which it contains, I find a great deal which is valuable and which should receive serious consideration by those to whom the operations of the naval militia are committed.
I believe that there should be a board detailed, as the paper suggests, to formulate a system of instruction and a plan of action, and that the work so formulated should be limited to the simplest possible duties consistent with proper effectiveness, because the time at the disposal of both the officers and enlisted men of the militia is very brief.
There is, I fear, too great a tendency to spend valuable summer-time work in taking down small details of coast topography which are amply covered now by the coast survey charts. Certain data are needed, it is true, connected with strategic plans, and what these are can be best determined by the Naval War College, whose calls for information should be forwarded by the Navy Department to such of the naval militia organizations as are best situated to furnish them. To this extent I concur with the essayist in his recommendation about a study of the coast.
The plan of keeping informed about the available merchant vessels for hasty conversion into armed auxiliaries I heartily endorse. In fact, I believe the manning of these vessels, especially as to their armament, is one of the duties which will be most urgently demanded of the naval militia in case of war. There are plenty of seamen in civil life who can volunteer and man these vessels, but they would not know gunnery and could not be taught to handle the modern breech-loading rifle guns soon enough to be of use. Modern wars come quickly, and the fire burns briskly while it lasts. There is no time to teach gunnery, so let that be learned in time of peace by the naval militia, and have the men and the guns ready to place quickly aboard of our fine coastwise merchant steamers.
The suggestion that lectures be delivered by officers detailed for the purpose, though good in theory, would, I think, be of little benefit in practice. Lectures go in at one ear and out at the other, unless, as at college, one is studying text-books on the subject under treatment and is attending a systematic course throughout a whole season.
The written lectures put into print and distributed would be valuable. The more literature we have on this subject the better; there may be much chaff, but there will also be many rich kernels of grain when the winnowing is done, as the paper now under discussion shows.
Lieut. J. H. Gibbons, U. S. N.—With the principal proposition laid down by the essayist, viz. that the naval militia must be an important factor in our national defense, and that it stands in sore need of a systematic course of instruction, every one can agree. When it comes, however, to the question of the best means to this very desirable end, the essayist seemingly ignores the "spark" and battles with the "mighty flame" of his motto.
A glance at his proposed course of instruction on page 215, especially that for commanding officers, will convince any naval officer that the ground to be gone over would take much more time than business and professional men would be able to give to such work. If a naval officer wished to become a lawyer he would not qualify by simply attending sessions of the Supreme Court. The statement that ex-officers need but a little "brushing up" to keep fully abreast of the requirements of the times will not, I am sure, be borne out by the testimony of those for whom the claim is made. I quote from the remarks of the commander of the Massachusetts Naval Militia:—"We have found that there are limits to the work that a business man can put in, in a military sense…We have been asked the question, What do you think you are for?...There must be a naval militia and a naval reserve, and the navy must look to the naval militia as its reserve and as a second line of defense…I am not in favor myself of going on board ships which would go to sea for fighting purposes."
The Naval War College has also marked out the province of the naval militia. "The wars for which we must plan, at least for the next few years, are defensive on our part and to be waged against enemies probably superior to us on the sea. This throws upon us, as a principal role, the defense of our coast and the supplementing of our small sea-going navy by a formidable flotilla of small craft, which, when thoroughly organized and drilled, shall dominate our channels, sounds and bays, and make their comfortable or permanent occupation by hostile fleets an impossibility." (Letter from the president of the War College upon the subject of the naval militia.)
Dismissing then the idea that the naval militia may be depended upon to supply the navy with deep-sea sailors, and granting that its true field is the line of inner defense, the problem of systematic instruction is greatly simplified. Discipline cannot be taught by traveling lecturers; efficient organizers are born, not made. These small beginnings must not be overlooked in the vague longing to tackle some "tremendous and well-nigh impossible task." To produce a well-drilled boat's crew does not need a knowledge of "international law," and if instead of wrestling with "fleet evolutions," "battle tactics" and "naval strategy," attention is given to such primary subjects as handling cutters under oars and sail, heaving the lead, boxing the compass, knotting and splicing, small-arm and boat-gun target practice, etc., the result will be a certain alertness, handiness and self-reliance that will enable the militiaman to be a useful factor when the government calls for his services. For the "habit of the sea," upon which the naval authorities of all nations lay so much stress, should be substituted "the habit of the harbors, rivers and inland waters." Too much credit cannot be given to the naval militia of New York for their work in this direction, and at the same time it must be borne in mind that the initiative came from the State.
Expedients and devices for keeping the men interested in their work make the duties of naval militia officers very onerous. In this the navy cannot be of any material aid; it is a local issue. The plan of having an annual meeting of naval militia officers from the several States, where they can discuss matters of interest to them, bids fair to give excellent results. When the States can agree among themselves as to what they consider their most crying needs, it will be time for the navy to pass judgment. They still seem to be far apart on such questions as uniform, organization, and federal relations, but are practically unanimous as to what their relations to the State should be. The navy can only suggest; it has no authority in the premises. Encouragement always comes from an expression of good-will and sympathy. This has been freely given, and while a process of coercion might in some cases be beneficial, it would surely result in the formation of a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to the Naval Militia.
The War College has indicated the general lines on which the naval militia ought to expand. The initiative must come from the several States, and the commander that can keep his men on these lines will render the best service to the general government; at the same time, however, he must satisfy his own particular State that his work is also in their interests, and he must be able to so direct the efforts of his men that serious work takes the guise of a diversion. That there are such commanders, experience has already proved. There is no royal road to the naval profession, and the naval militia must be content with its minor phases so long as the commercial spirit of the age forbids, on economical grounds, any large number of our citizens giving a great amount of time to what Captain Mahan calls preparedness for war. The enrolling, under national auspices, of a true naval reserve made up from the seafaring classes should be the next step in the organization of a volunteer naval force, but this can hardly be accomplished until legislative stimulation revives our deep-sea merchant shipping.
Lieut. A. P. Niblack, U. S. N.—Mr. Dohrman has been practically the pioneer of the naval militia movement in the Middle West. To his energy and interest the present organization in Ohio is largely due. It is through such patriotic citizens that we can hope to make our readiness for war bear some trifling proportion to our confidence as a nation in our invincibility. The narrow spirit present in all military organizations has given way in our small navy to a cordial recognition of the possibilities of the naval militia. If they have done nothing else, the members of the naval militia organizations have helped us in Congress and with the people. But they have done something else. They have helped stir up the navy itself to a large and broader conception of its own possibilities. That admirable organization, the Naval War College, has been the first to seize upon and utilize the naval militia as an auxiliary to its great work in the preparation for the national defense. As to what shall be the direction the general training of the naval militia shall take that should no longer be an open question. There is danger of making it too diffuse. As the Hon. Wm. McAdoo has often said, " There are so many fields of usefulness for the naval militia in case of war that the difficulty would not be to find work for them, but to select among the many that in which they could serve the country best."
Being State organizations, local laws often limit the field of expansion of the naval militia, but the Navy Department has in the past endeavored to study local conditions in helping the naval militia, but has avoided direct suggestion. As a matter of fact, they want and appreciate direct suggestions.
The present administration is not likely to prove wanting in "directive force," and as the naval militia has arrived at a point where it needs it just now, the movement in general will likely receive a new impulse. Mr. Dohrman's suggestions merit careful consideration in any definite scheme. The navy, the Naval Institute and the naval militia all owe him much for his valuable services.
Lieut.-Commander Arthur B. Denny, Massachusetts Naval Brigade.—Mr. Dohrman's paper is of great value to naval militiamen, since it emphasizes some of the hindrances to their development and points out a remedy.
The present uncertainty of the range of usefulness of the naval militia is a damper on the enthusiasm of both officers and men. While the part which the naval militia has to play in assisting the suppression of domestic order is pretty clearly defined, so that an officer can be moderately sure where it is best to direct his efforts in preparing for emergencies, it is not so clear what would be the function of any particular unit in case of war.
As Captain Taylor has said in a most admirable letter to the Navy Department, special duties must be assigned to each State organization, and "no general plan for all alike can be drawn up." The problem for each commanding officer is not only "for what would it be well that my command be prepared," but also "what is the most valuable part of the whole for which I shall begin to prepare in the limited time which can be given."
In solving this problem it is desirable that this preparatory work, whether it be much or little, be directed by a considerable professional oversight, so that those taking part in it would be assured that their efforts were being made where the results would best fit into a general scheme. Then, too, the proposed lecture staff would get an intimate knowledge of just how far and in what lines each organization could be depended on for service, and this knowledge could hardly fail to be of more value to the Navy Department than the rather indefinite information which it now necessarily has.
Mr. Dohrman's scheme for winter work errs, if at all, in being too broad. Such part of the men's leisure time as can be given to military work is pretty well taken up now with drill and unavoidable routine. Undoubtedly a certain amount of information could be and has been obtained, but the many plans and working drawings with recommendations for structural and other changes would require more men with both technical skill and a command of time than many organizations would be able to furnish.
I agree most thoroughly with the author's recommendation to have systematic and progressive instruction given by a lecture staff working on a large general plan modified to meet the case in hand, and I hope the idea will be carried out by the proper authorities.
Lieutenant James Otis Porter, Massachusetts Naval Brigade.—That a uniform course of instruction for the naval militia is necessary all are undoubtedly agreed, and the essayist suggests an excellent plan for such instruction.
His recommendation that a board be appointed to formulate a system, and that a bureau of instruction be created, should be carried out, but it must be remembered that most of the officers and men of the naval militia are in business and that their time is necessarily somewhat limited. Too much, therefore, should not be attempted.
The reconnaissance work, so admirably begun and carried out by the New York battalion, should be systematically taken up by all, and the work should be under the direction of the navigating officers of the several organizations.
A list of vessels for the auxiliary fleet should be made and data collected as to size, tonnage, speed, indicated horse-power. When such vessels are yachts, the places where they are laid up in the winter should be kept track of in order that they may be brought to their ports of fitting out as suggested by Captain H. C. Taylor; but to obtain the information and to make the drawings that the essayist recommends would, to my mind, be impracticable. So much time would be consumed in work of this kind that no opportunity would be had for the actual drill and instruction of the men.
I would suggest that instead of the creation of small traveling libraries, each State should buy all the books required and issue them to its naval militia.
Systematic instruction and guidance by the Navy Department is what the naval militia needs, but it must not attempt too much.
Commander J. W. Miller, 1st Naval Battalion, N. Y.—The argument presented by Mr. Dohrman is so entirely in accord with the views of the New York naval militia, and with the work of its battalion during the past four years, that little room is left for criticism, and the discussion would be unnecessarily prolonged if I should give even a synopsis of the correspondence and articles written by the various officers of this State upon the lines laid down by the lecturer. I would, however, call the attention of those interested in the naval militia and its development as a coast defense, to the Forum of October, 1891, April, 1896, to reports to the Adjutant-General of New York, 1891 to 1897, to the Journal of the U. S. Artillery, Vol. IV, No. 3, and to the Proceedings of the Association of the Naval Militias of the United States, 1895 and 1896. The article in those Proceedings, entitled "Information and Boat Reconnaissance Work," by Lieut. Wm. H. Stayton, is especially worthy of notice.
If the lecturer has found a "vagueness and haziness" among members of organizations as to what their duties would be in time of war, the reason for such uncertainty lies not in the fact that the officers of the naval militia have not had a definite scheme, but that lack of facilities has prevented them from developing their ideas, and that, unfortunately, they have had to devote the first few years to overcoming local antagonism, as well as prejudice in certain quarters of the navy. The regular service, with its years of training, can scarcely understand the difficulties which surround the development of a new force with a divided allegiance to state and government. The laudable enthusiasm of recruits desirous of gaining a sailor's experience had to be guided in order to turn them from the more congenial work at sea towards the immediate and important duty of coast protection. The natural desire of the citizen-sailor is for tours of duty on board the new men-of-war. This desire should not be altogether thwarted if the country wishes to enlarge the naval militia to a force proportionate to its true importance. It is also essential that the enlisted men should have a rudimentary knowledge of naval customs and exercises, which is only to be gained by an occasional cruise in a government vessel; but such cruisers must be secondary to the main object for which the naval militia is formed, that object being the defense of the coast line and the waters of the State. It cannot be too often reiterated that the distinct purpose of the organizations is to develop them both in discipline and numbers as a portion of the "second line of coast defense." As the marine policy of the country becomes more definite there will be added to this "second line of defense" a national reserve under the direct auspices of the General Government. The creation of such a naval reserve will naturally follow the development of the naval militia, and from the reserve the navy will be enabled to draw its war complement of officers and men. It is most reasonable to suppose that if we once created a naval militia of even a few hundred men in each State it would concentrate around it the seafaring interests of the various ports. The question, therefore, presents itself, how can the four thousand men now in the naval militia be instructed, not only to perform their legitimate duties, but to increase the small number to a force commensurate to the needs of the country? The fulfillment of this object is not at all difficult if the service will do its share. The responsibility as to whether the navy shall keep the militia closely under its fostering aid or permit it to drift away to the army is most weighty.
A special office should at once be created at Washington under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, to be called that of the "Naval Reserve and Naval Militia"; it should have at its head an officer of high rank, and under his exclusive control a moderate-sized man-of-war; this vessel should make the rounds of the ports for the purpose of instruction and inspection. A large number of the new torpedo-boats should also be under the orders of this officer, one or two of them being stationed in each of the harbors where a properly organized naval militia exists. During nine months of the year these boats should be actively engaged in teaching individual militia crews the use of torpedoes and mines, the officers commanding them to work jointly and in harmony with the State forces. The man-of-war and torpedo-boats should be assembled during the summer months for different tours of duty with each of the battalions or with those in contiguous districts. A squadron of this nature, under the command of navy officers trained to the work of obtaining military information, will result in a similar and definite course of instruction, the details developing themselves quickly. Sufficient data have already been given by the lecturer, and notably by Captain Taylor in his letter to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy dated December 12th, 1896. My experience goes to prove that the scope of work for proper coast defense is so great that the difficulty will be in concentrating it, and that the navy itself has much to learn concerning the interior waters of the country. There is no service which will help the education of the regular officers more than that gained by commanding torpedo-boats. In addition to this active fleet, the reserve fleet of the navy, instead of being laid up at one navy yard, should be distributed to each of the larger ports, provided the State authorities will give them wharf accommodations free of charge. It is difficult for the writer to understand why the Department should think seriously of placing all the reserve fleet at one yard, when, by distribution along the coast, the present naval militia could be at once increased from four thousand to at least treble that number. The argument for docking the ships in fresh water amounts to little compared to the instant development of a personnel for the navy. Our minds have run too much to materiel, and it is high time that patriotism, enthusiasm and local knowledge should be fostered and assisted in every locality from Maine to Texas and on the Pacific coast. With the reserve vessels laid up in different harbors, having on board a skeleton crew and commanded by younger officers thoroughly alive to the necessity of recruiting the naval militia, with the battalions drilling on board the ships during the winter months, we will shortly have a force which, in addition to its local information, has gained a fair knowledge of the intricacies of the modern man-of-war. These laid-up vessels will also be a focus around which a national naval reserve will be formed under conditions outlined by the writer on various occasions. The plan is perfectly feasible and only needs the co-operation of the regular service. The expense is trivial, the result will be immediate.
Replies to Criticism of Essay on Torpedo-Boat Policy.
[See No. 81.]
Lieut. R. C. Smith, U. S. Navy.—I find I have not been sufficiently explicit on one or two points. The word policy has been used in the title in a perhaps limited sense to indicate building policy. This technical meaning seems to have passed current to a certain extent since the report of the so-called "Policy Board" on ship construction a number of years ago. With this understanding, it is apparent that torpedo-boat tactics could not have been discussed at any length in the space assigned, which proved no more than sufficient for the subject proper.
Another point in which I have been somewhat misunderstood is my advocacy of strengthening the bow for ramming. I did not intend to go as far as recommending ramming as a prime object. I do not believe that opportunities for ramming should be sought, but that if occasion arises, as in the sudden discovery of a vedette launch or torpedo-boat of not too large a size directly in the path, the option of ramming may prove of great value. Of scarcely less value is the added security in case of accidental collision bows-on. Many accidents attest the great weakness of the boats in this regard. With the strengthening I advocate, and the straight knife bow, I am confident that a vedette launch could be cut in two without material injury to the rammer, and that the weak side of an ordinary torpedo-boat could be laid open with every possibility of escaping fatal injury on the part of the attacking boat; and in torpedo warfare these are greater odds than are usually demanded.
My estimate of 5 to 10 pounds for every ton of displacement is based on an interior 18-inch (in width) belt of wood and steel applied to the Cushing's bow on either side for 15 feet abaft the stem, the total weight of which was 600 pounds. The knife edge for 18 inches abaft the stem was poured in solid with resin. This weight corresponds with the lower estimate of 5 pounds. By using 10 pounds per ton and all steel instead of wood, the strength could be doubled or trebled. This is all the more possible now that the bow tube is abandoned in torpedo-boats.
This interior water-line belt was suggested as the result of an experience of the Cushing's in the upper Delaware river in December, 1895, when she came near being frozen in for the winter. Ice of two to three inches thickness had been broken up in a thaw and then caked solid to a maximum thickness of five or six inches in a sudden freeze. Without any protection and with steam that in clear water would have given 15 knots, she passed through 20 miles of this ice. The result was a few frames bent and one or two cracked, and the plates of one-eighth inch steel bent in between the frames. No rivets were started and no plate was punctured. There was no injury beyond the second bulkhead at 15 feet from the stem. The interior belting subsequently applied was located in wake of the maximum bending of the plates and frames and securely braced from side to side. The details were approved by the Bureau of Construction. I understand that during the past winter the Cushing encountered ice in large cakes of three inches thickness in Narragansett Bay and Providence river which she cut through with absolutely no injury to herself and with steam that would have given 16 knots in the open. Is not this a great thing for a light torpedo-boat to be able to do, and at the expense of the weight of less than one torpedo? I hope that our other boats may all eventually be equipped with the same or a similar contrivance.
In conversations on this subject I have frequently heard the argument that it would be better to employ a tug to go ahead, or to rig a temporary ice plow over the bow. In time of war both of these means would usually be out of the question. Even in peace times boats might be caught, as the Cushing was, with no tug or carpenters available and the ice rapidly getting thicker. Then in case of a collision, accidental or otherwise, there would obviously be no time for preparations. I think this matter of added strength in the bow is a little like the Texan's revolver; he did not want it often, but when he did he had quite a positive need for it.
I shall now take up a few of the criticisms individually.
Lieutenant Eberle (page 56) suggests lashing the target across an old sailing launch. Of course it was contemplated to use a boat for the target, as otherwise towing at speed would be an impossibility. This was in fact Captain Evans' original suggestion. Mr. Eberle's plan of requiring the torpedo-boat to discharge her torpedoes at the same time is a good one. With dummy heads, the ship herself could be the target.
With regard to his discussion of torpedoes in battle-ships (page 57), I doubt if they can be given up by any nation as long as the ships of other nations carry them. Of course the submerged positions are the safest in every way. Then it must not be lost sight of that the range, speed, accuracy and safety in handling of torpedoes are constantly improving, and that there is less reason now than ever for dispensing with them. If other nations could be brought to discard them it would be all the more reason for us to retain them. In a discussion of Lieutenant Niblack's prize essay of last year I gave my views on this point at some length.
The statement (page 58) that I believe vessels of the Yorktown class would make efficient scouts does not convey my meaning. Our Yorktowns are altogether too slow, but there are some foreign vessels of the class that make 23 knots.
I cannot agree with Assistant Naval Constructor Dashiell (page 63) that the 1-pounder is a suitable gun for the smaller type of boat. The principal use of the vedette launch is to give warning of the approach of torpedo-boats. She might by a lucky shot disable one of them. On the other hand, I believe that the torpedo-boat should not pay the least attention to her. Run over them if they get in the way, but do not answer their fire; it will only create more confusion. Even when the vedette launches open fire and discharge rockets it may be some time before the ship picks up the torpedo-boat. If the latter joins in the firing she only hastens her own discovery. Her best plan is to keep right on in silence as long as there is the shadow of a chance of reaching the main object, hauling off only when positively discovered at some distance outside of torpedo range.
The object of the gun armament in torpedo-boats is, to my mind, to afford a weapon for use against other boats. A boat, if unarmed, might be destroyed by her inferior in respect to torpedo armament. It is an object then to carry weapons that could be used effectively in circumstances similar to these. Automatic 3-pounders, as has been shown, can be carried on the weights allowed, and they have therefore been recommended.
As to the remarks about the destroyers (page 63), I believe that destroyers should be met by destroyers and not by gunboats and cruisers. All experience as far as peace maneuvers go has proved the latter course delusive. And I think we should have a type fit to send anywhere with the fleet, which of course points to the large boat.
Mr. Dashiell and Mr. Eberle are in accord as to the undesirability of installing torpedoes in large ships. It would certainly simplify matters to leave them out, but that is not a good argument. Nothing now is simple. The side that has the intelligence to use the most destructive and most complicated weapons with the greatest skill will win.
I am in most hearty accord with Mr. Dashiell's remarks as to naming the boats (page 65). Foreign nations name powerful battle-ships after great admirals. It is belittling our great names to give them to torpedo-boats. The stock of young heroes will last for a long time. I myself am in favor of employing names of insects, fishes and animals. The only drawback is that the English have largely depleted the available supply.
Assistant Naval Constructor Gillmor's remarks (page 153) are rather difficult to reply to. He finds nothing to commend in the essay, but he does not make clear what types he would substitute for those he condemns. I gather by inference that he is an advocate of the Forban. If he is, I can understand that we are scarcely in accord. But as the Forban has been improved on and practically abandoned by her builder, notwithstanding the splendid performance of her machinery, it is not necessary to attach any great importance to Mr. Gillmor's advocacy.
The reply to the argument at the top of page 154 as to the 30-knot boat and the 26-knot boat is obviously that if the former is able through excellence of design of hull and machinery to command a greater proportional economical endurance, then by a reduction of machinery weights to the amount required for 26 knots the endurance will be still greater for the same coal; and by applying the saving in machinery weights to additional coal there will be yet another gain. From the very fact as stated by Mr. Gillmor that the economical speed varies so greatly in different boats it is obvious that there can be no comparison except at full speed; and I am of opinion, moreover, that this is just the comparison that is most needed.
His argument in the next paragraph does not hold for the reason that there is no object in building boats with a lower speed than 22J4 knots. In fact I have shown that all the required features, such as armament, endurance, sea-worthiness and the rest, for the objects sought can be obtained in a 24-knot boat. Then what is to be gained by going lower? If all these features could be assured in a 30-knot boat, then so much the better; but it is something that has not yet been done. It is true as he says that naming does not appear until the maximum power is approached; but of course the water disturbance depends only on the model and actual speed, and has nothing to do with the maximum horsepower it may have been decided to put in the boat.
It is to be noticed that in all of this he is opposing my argument for a moderate speed and is himself advocating a high speed, necessarily at the expense of other features. I shall refer to this again.
Next follows an argument as to speed in a sea-way (page 154), which, if it means anything, is to the effect that because under certain weather conditions a small boat may do as well as or better than a large one, it is the part of policy always to build small boats. Of course boats like ships have their periods, and they do not always strike them together; but everybody knows that generally speaking greater size means greater possible speed, endurance, comfort, sea-worthiness and carrying capacity; and it is on account of the very different duties required, as shown in the essay, that it is thought desirable to make such a marked difference in the two types.
Bearing in mind Mr. Gillmor's criticism of my boat of moderate speed, attention is asked to this extract from his remarks (page 156):—" Expressed in a few words, the author's conclusion is that we should start in this mad race for torpedo-boat speed about where England now is and accept their latest type in one case, and in the other almost a duplicate of the last thing which the English newspapers chose [sic] to call a torpedo-boat." This is certainly quite opposed to my whole discussion of the speed question, and taken in connection with his previous criticism of my advocacy of moderate speed, puts me at a loss as to his meaning.
Lieutenant Niblack (page 157) does not think I have taken enough account of tactics as affecting the design of boats. Has he not possibly lost sight of the difference between torpedo-boats and ships? Ships must maneuver together and fight in conformity with tactics, and hence tactics will exert a great influence on their type and homogeneity, both of battery and hull. Torpedo-boats may also cruise together and engage other boats in conformity with tactics; but when it comes to the supreme object of their existence, the attack of ships, tactics in the sense that Mr. Niblack apparently takes it, that is the art of maneuvering together, amounts to very little. The only tactics I have seen advocated with any show of reason is to separate and make a concerted attack from different quarters under cover of darkness or mist.
If the different features are determined for this purpose alone, the boats will be nearly enough alike to engage in the German close maneuvers at full speed, which are useful for training the eye and developing the nerve, but could not possibly be used in action. I believe at the maneuvers some years ago they had a division of torpedo-boats steaming along shore by day in close order at high speed and shelling a troop of cavalry on the beach. This was pretty, no doubt, and it required some sort of tactics to carry it out, but it had nothing to do with torpedoes.
I have tried to show in the essay that the scheme of division boats presents few desirable features from our standpoint. I may not be sufficiently acquainted with it. While Mr. Niblack is abroad he will have opportunities of looking into both these questions, and if there is really much of value in the German system and tactics I for one shall be glad to hear what he may have to say about them.
I am very much in favor of any exercises that will give officers skill and confidence in handling their boats, and I think any risks should be taken that do not involve the probable loss of the boat or lives of the crew. If these risks are not taken in time of peace, officers will not know how to take them in time of war. Consequently every opportunity should be utilized, such as navigating narrow waters without a pilot, going alongside of docks at speed in various weathers, making attacks under the search-light on dark nights, and maneuvering about a vessel under way.