THE ORGANIZATION, TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE OF THE NAVY PERSONNEL AS VIEWED FROM THE SHIP.
BY LIEUT. W. F. FULLAM, U. S. N. (See No. 77.)
P. A. Engineer WALTER F. WORTHINGTON, U. S. N.—I have read the essay under consideration with great interest, and think it fortunate for the service that discussions of this kind should take place before the Naval Institute rather than in the public prints.
The author is to be congratulated on handling this subject in such a calm and dispassionate manner, and the conclusions he arrives at agree closely with my own in a number of particulars. His frankness and plain-spoken manner encourage me to believe that a similar frank criticism on points where we differ will not be taken amiss.
With regard to promotion by selection, it is generally admitted to be desirable if practicable. It would be wholly practicable to have the selection done by a board of senior officers. These would not be influenced by personal feelings if there was a general system of holding each senior officer strictly responsible for the work of his junior. Self-interest would compel him to select for promotion those found most successful in accomplishing the work assigned them. That system works well in the selection of enlisted men for promotions to positions as petty officers. Petty officers so selected on one ship are generally found to give satisfaction on other ships.
With regard to the statement that "there are too many line officers afloat," he says that it has proceeded from careless consideration, ignorance or malice. I maintain that the statement may have been made after careful consideration, in perfect good faith and with the best of motives. In the first place, the English ships, class for class, carry fewer line officers than ours and are well organized and efficient. In the second place, there are many line officers in our Navy who freely state that the deck watches in port and many minor drills and duties now performed by commissioned officers could be performed by warrant officers, as they are in the English navy. Thirdly, if enlisted men could hope to do more responsible duties they would be encouraged and more likely to reach that higher state of efficiency which the essayist himself justly says is so desirable.
It may well be that the presence of so many line officers on shipboard leaves too little duty to be entrusted to the petty officers. The constant presence of a commissioned officer on deck may make the petty officer feel that he is not trusted. To this cause more than to the presence of the marine sentry may be due that feeling of irresponsibility which we all deplore in our petty officers.
With regard to the necessity for so many officers to control the guns in different compartments, we who spend half our lives at sea know very well that the working of a modern gun is quite within the comprehension of a warrant officer, and the thought that by working it well in action he could get a commission would, in my opinion, be a sufficient stimulus to the patriotism which warrant officers possess as well as others.
It would be a bad system to maintain in time of peace a large force of officers to supply the needs of war. The Navy for the last twenty years has had an excessive number of officers compared with the number of ships, and we all know, and have all heard officers acknowledge, how rusty they get for lack of sufficient sea service. The enlisted men must be trained up to fill vacancies caused by war, and the naval militia developed to the utmost for the same purpose.
The essayist appears to me to confound two problems: one, to work a ship with the present inefficient petty officers, and the other, to work a ship with efficient petty officers.
The real function of the highly trained and educated officers graduated from the Naval Academy is to act as instructors and directors of the work of the higher grades of petty officers, who in turn should be required to instruct and control those below them, and so on. It is a waste of good material to have educated officers teaching the rudiments of ship's duties to landsmen and to personally supervise such work as sweeping decks. It is a singular thing that all this did not occur to the essayist, who has given so much thought to the subject of reducing the number of staff officers. If the system of turning over the bulk of the duties of the ship to petty and warrant officers was found efficient and advantageous, it would undoubtedly be adopted in the engine department, for the conditions are closely analogous.
Under existing conditions the system would be more likely to succeed with the line branch of the service than in the engine department, for the reason that in the former branch a large proportion of the petty officers have had years of training in naval vessels, whereas in the engine department by far the larger proportion of the higher grades of petty officers are taken in directly from civil life. For example, one ship was recently commissioned and sent immediately out to a foreign station. Three-fourths of the machinists provided to take charge of engine-room watches had never done such duty or served in the Navy before, and two-thirds of the water-tenders assigned to take charge of the watches in the fire-room had never been to sea before. This state of affairs prevails to such an extent in the engine departments of our ships that it is daily becoming more common for chief engineers, men of high standing for professional ability, to be punished for neglect of duty or sent directly from their ships to hospitals.
In the general shaking up which would be caused by these changes we must not forget that the highly educated and trained graduate of the Naval Academy, line or engine division, needs some additional practical training on shipboard, and must have one cruise at least as officer of the deck or engineer of the watch.
The essayist's general idea of increasing the number of enlisted men who can reach the grade of warrant officer is good, and commissioned officers should make up their minds to accept a smaller proportion of the living space of a ship.
The idea of rewarding deserving men by giving them tours of shore duty at navy-yards is excellent. It would also have a fine effect on the enlisted men if they could think that the officers of a ship were going to look out for their welfare after the cruise was over. All the different grades of men in the engineer's force could be employed in work at the navy-yards, with advantage to the Government as well as to the men.
The principal objection urged against the marines is that they are not available to swell the numbers when all hands are called upon for special work, such as coaling ship, cleaning up after coaling, scraping bottom in dock, etc.
Outside of the United States the usual system is to pay for the coal to be delivered at the bunker scuttles. The coal merchants are always able to supply any number of laborers at a low cost. This system can be perfectly well adopted in the United States.
The best way to hoist coal aboard is with steam winches. Where on small ships they are not already fitted, they could be provided at little expense. The deck force then would have only the work of shoveling coal into the bunkers. This they can easily do faster than the engineer's force can stow it. Any dry dock can supply laborers to scrape the ship's bottom, and it would be cheaper to hire them twice a year for this purpose than to carry seamen whose wages would be double that of marines. With regard to cleaning ship, the deck force ought to be willing to do the whole of it, since their other duties have been so much lightened by the habitual use of steam launches in place of pulling boats, steam capstan, winches, etc., and the total abolition of all sail and spar drill and work about the sails and rigging. Merchant passenger steamers are kept clean with a much smaller force than is available on naval vessels.
Taking the foregoing facts into consideration, it would be a wasteful expenditure of money to hire seamen to do the duty now done well by marines and at one-half the cost. The marine officer is the logical consequence of the marine. Men develop best under officers who are not opposed to their presence on shipboard. If a marine officer is not fully occupied it is not because there is lack of work on a ship which he is quite competent to do.
Taking a general survey of the whole field, it is manifest that the system in the Navy for years past has been to avoid giving work to staff officers which they are perfectly competent to do, and to continually increase the duties of line officers, then to argue that the former are not needed and the latter overworked. It is always better to accomplish ends by a change of administration than a change of organization.
Having already trespassed so much on the space in the Journal, these remarks must be brought to a close without touching on many other interesting points brought out by the essayist. I hope my silence will not be construed to mean either assent or dissent in these cases.
Lieutenant W. F. FULLAM, U. S. N.—The statements that the essayist—" a young man of no experience "—has been "unjust and unfair," has not been "honest," has shown " ignorance " and "an absolute lack of logic," and has appealed to "perverted facts" in treating the subject of naval reorganization "as viewed from the ship," may well be passed over with a good-natured smile in view of the many favorable comments by officers whose rank and experience entitle them, at least, to respect and courtesy in the discussion of a professional subject. And many personal letters from officers of all grades from admiral down, who for certain reasons preferred not to express their opinions publicly, might be offered by the essayist in further support of his arguments.
It is not surprising that some officers of limited opportunities for observation should fail to realize how small is the available working force in a modern ship's complement owing to absentees, vacancies, berth-deck cooks, the sick, and other causes. Such officers should not insinuate, however, that the executive excuses men who ought to work; and still less ought they to treat the matter with contempt and advocate that petty officers ranking with sergeants in the Army shall shovel coal while privates remain idle. When certain graduates of the Naval Academy state that the bluejacket has "barely enough drill and routine work to keep him from growling," and that we now have quite enough men to coal and clean ship, as shown by the fact that six of the "slowest and laziest men on board a merchant ship hoisted in, wheeled forward, and dumped into the bunkers 70 tons of coal in six hours," it is demonstrated that line officers of the Navy must treat the subject of the working force more seriously, because somebody is badly mistaken.
If extra sentries are needed now in coaling ship, it can be stated that no sentries whatever would be needed if the petty officers of the Navy were given the status of non-commissioned officers in the Army. Cases are known where the marine guard was sent ashore for target practice while the ship was being coaled, because the commander did not deem its presence necessary, and perhaps an officer who suggests the necessity of extra sentries in coaling ship may remember such an instance in his own experience.
It will be perfectly fair to regard the ship as a "floating fort" if we apply to the enlisted men on board the same rules as regards trustworthiness and military discipline and development that obtain in a fort that does not float, and if we put on board the kind of men who are most useful in a fort that really does float—the men who can best keep it afloat.
Conduct, court-martials and desertions should not be urged against the bluejacket, because in these particulars he shows up better than the marine. During a recent year the percentage of marines court-martialed was six times as great as that of bluejackets. During ten years, from 1882 to 18g1 inclusive, twenty-six per cent of the entire marine corps deserted annually, and the total number of casualties was so great that the average term of service was less than two and one-half years.
It is not fair to the bluejacket to say that "naval history demonstrates the statement" that marines are necessary as a " rallying point in case of temporary break or disaster." Such was not the case at Fort Fisher. nor at other places where bluejackets have faced the enemy on shore. The latter, with the line officers, have always been well to the front— they have not been dependent upon the marines as regards " strategy " and "fire discipline."
To say that a "good sailor would be spoiled in making a poor marine" would be less correct than to say that a good marine would be Spoiled in the vain attempt to make a good all-around man-of-war's man. The marine must be taught at least ten times as much as the bluejacket to bring him to the same condition of usefulness afloat. In some respects little is gained in the attempt to extend the field of the marine. For instance, the latter may be exercised in pulling boats, but the bluejacket usually hoists the boat in and out of its cradle and is given extra work in order that the marine may get an exercise, which, so far as it affects the efficiency of the ship, amounts to little more than play.
To say that the marine officer performs all the duties of a line officer. "except standing watch." may provoke a smile. The watch duty amounts to about five hours a day—it goes on like the brook, forever, night and day. But it is safe to say that, counting Saturdays and Sundays, the daily routine duties of a marine officer as "quartermaster," "ordnance officer," "officer of the guard," and "in charge of government property," do not occupy him more than two hours a day, and usually not more than one.
Foreign navies furnish more arguments against than in favor of marines afloat. England is about the only country that maintains a distinct and differently uniformed marine corps afloat. Her extensive foreign possessions make such a plan more reasonable. Many other nations have no marines at all, and the French "fusiliers" are seamen, uniformed and trained as such, who are given a little extra musketry instruction on shore. They are far more like our bluejackets than like our marines, and the officers in charge of them are line officers of the navy. It is ventured that they are in no sense superior to our bluejackets with the rifle nor at infantry drill. The French navy cannot be cited in support of the plan of maintaining soldiers on board ship.
And one of the English officers who is quoted by our marine officers speaks as follows: "My idea is that our marines should be analogous to this corps (the French fusiliers), and the officers take similar duties. Their naval training would also enable them to be utilized for other work on hoard. Instructed in navigation, and having taken part in the general routine of a ship, they would be qualified to take charge of a watch. Their uniform should he adapted to the distinctively naval functions they would assume. It is now purely military, an innovation 'which is comparatively modern.''
Plainly this officer advocates the French system, in which the marines have practically become bluejackets. And still another distinguished English captain states: " There is now no reason at all for employing on board ship men brought up and instructed as land forces, and yet such is the result of the present system of the training and discipline of the marines." In this we see in the English navy, as in all others, a decided tendency toward that " homogeneity " which a graduate of the Naval Academy declares to be a "snare and a delusion"! The proposition, therefore, to give the bluejackets and petty officers all military responsibilities and duties afloat is not only in accordance with the practice in most foreign navies, but it is only a short step in advance of the policy proposed by the most progressive officers of the English navy. Our own admirals and captains are fast reaching the same conclusion. An admiral writes: "It is now as absurd to employ marines afloat as to employ bluejackets as a guard in a marine barracks." A captain who did not take part in this discussion says: " I formerly advocated marines, but my experience in this ship convinces me that they are now entirely out of place in a modern fighting ship." This is a result of a practical study of ship efficiency.
In concluding the discussion of the marine question, the writer regrets, sincerely, that there should be any ill-feeling engendered. But it is a matter of grave importance. No other so seriously affects the discipline and development of the bluejacket. Nothing so hinders the elevation of the man-of-war's man and tends so directly to keep the profession of a seaman beneath that of a soldier. The most bothersome incidents in daily ship routine and discipline, from the time "all hands" are called in the morning—at work, at drill, when boats are called away, and when the ship is cleared for action—are usually traceable to the direct, the indirect, or the moral effects of employing marines on board an American man-of-war. It is not a fad nor a fancy; it is an ever present influence which an officer who carefully studies the men cannot fail to recognize. And it is only from a feeling of duty to his men and to the ship, and after an intelligent consideration of the conditions existing, and the conditions that are to be desired in the United States Navy, that line officers have been gradually forced to the conclusion that efficiency in time of peace and in time of war would be greatly increased by making the fighting force afloat perfectly homogeneous.
Mr. Worthington's criticisms are so courteous as to merit acknowledgment, and they may well be regarded as a model. In carefully avoiding personalities, his arguments come with additional force, and a rejoinder will be required to upset them.
Granting, most willingly, that Mr. Worthington, at least, is actuated by the "best of motives" in saying that we have "too many line officers afloat," it is submitted that statistics of our own and foreign navies, and considerations of war efficiency, will not sustain him in this opinion.
Counting available ships, there are ten line officers per ship in the United States Navy. The computation for the navies of England, France, Russia, Italy, Austria, and Germany shows an average of seven sea-going line officers per ship. In addition to these sea-going line officers, however, there are, in these navies, 2890 officers employed on shore at naval schools, naval stations, and in hydrographic coast survey and other work which is performed by the line officers of the United States Navy. Taking these into account, there are ten officers per ship—as many as in our Navy—employed in doing line officer's work in foreign navies.
Now, even if we regard the line officers employed in naval work on shore as a reserve, it may be shown that such a reserve, of all others, is vitally necessary in our case. With the addition of the proper number of torpedo-boats to our Navy—which is sure to come in the near future—and the assignment of one line officer to each of them, we would not have in time of war, when auxiliary cruisers are commissioned, more than five line officers per ship to meet an enemy! This will be too few, when we consider the work involved in quickly training a large number of recruits and in preparing to defend an extensive coast with scant material. With fewer ships, more raw recruits, and a more extensive coast than our probable enemy, we must not be caught with fewer trained officers. Economy, and every consideration based upon an intelligent study of the necessities of war, demand that the United States Navy should have at all times a surplus of line officers. A competent "general staff" assigned to the duty of preparing this country for the emergency of war would be sure to arrive at such a conclusion. At present the surplus, if such it may be called, is very small. If all the ships of the regular Navy were now commissioned, 75 per cent, of the line would be at sea. In time of war the officers of the retired list could do most of the shore duty; but, making all allowance for them and for available graduates of the Naval Academy now in civil life, the Navy would be hard up for line officers in the event of war.
England has fewer line officers than most other navies—too few in the opinion of many of the best authorities in England, one of whom speaks as follows:
"The want of fully trained lieutenants and sub-lieutenants is a fatal one. The whole greatness of a navy, all probability of success in war depends on a sufficiency of young officers of the highest class, and yet we have allowed ourselves to look forward with complacency to picking up a sufficiency anyhow. The thing has grown on us so gradually that we are unable to realize the condition. We cannot see the absurdity of the very high and expensive training we give to a small number of lieutenants, when, if war breaks out, we must place them side by side with officers of no training at all ! Even for peace manoeuvres we are seen to run immediately short, and we are placing warrant officers who may be fathers of families in charge of torpedo-boats. Without any disparagement, it must still be said that torpedo-boat service is not for warrant officers. If this weapon is to do what is expected of it, it can only be when it is in the hands of the young and the daring. There are a great number of ships which ought for the sake of efficiency to carry considerable numbers of sub-lieutenants, and which do not carry one."
This picture of the conditions existing in the British navy, where the number of line officers is admittedly too small, should be a warning to us.
I think Mr. Worthington is wrong in arguing that we should reduce the number of line officers in order to develop the petty officer, and I cannot admit that he and others have found an inconsistency in the essay regarding its treatment of this subject. The petty officer can be developed by giving him, without reservation, the exact status of a noncommissioned officer—" only this and nothing more." To deprive him of this status, and then seek his improvement by reducing the number of line officers, would be as absurd as to give a corporal the duty of a commissioned officer in the Army while denying his ability to act as sergeant of the guard. Instead, therefore, of withdrawing line officers from ships and depriving the Navy of those officers who would be most vitally necessary in time of war, we should withdraw other individuals who are not needed, and remove other obstacles that prevent the development of the petty officer in his own legitimate field.
Line officers will not complain of watch duty if they are freed from the duties that are usually assigned to the non-commissioned officers in an army.
Executive and watch officers, who have the best opportunities for observation, will not agree with Mr. Worthington that steam winches, steam cutters, and the abolition of sails and spars have lessened the burden of ship-work.
From this it will be seen that the deck force of the Wabash was greater than the total complement of the Philadelphia. The deck force of the Philadelphia is considerably less than one-half that of the Wabash. Line officers who compare the new ships with the old, and who remember their experience in directing ship-work, know that, regardless of steam winches, etc., the burden of drudgery and coaling ship is far heavier upon the individual man than in former days. There are many more drills and exercises, and the line officer and bluejacket are kept far busier now than in the days of the "old Navy."
It is true that the "working of a modern gun is quite within the comprehension of a warrant officer "—or even of a petty officer, if we consider the mechanical question simply—and we may grant that these subordinate officers are equally patriotic also. But there are other than mechanical questions involved in the control of guns and in deciding whether commissioned, warrant, or petty officers shall be in sole charge in battle. If the commissioned officer can be dispensed with in some of the turrets and in some divisions without loss of fighting efficiency, he can, for similar reasons, be dispensed with in all. As stated by the English authority, it is absurd to have officers of a very "high and expensive training" working side by side with officers of no scientific training at all. One or the other must be more efficient in control of the battery. Let us consider two exactly similar ships going into action, one in which highly trained line officers have charge of the gun divisions and torpedoes, and the other in which warrant or petty officers have charge. Which would have the best chance of success? If the latter, then the Naval Academy may be abolished with little loss to the Navy.
If the control and direction of guns and torpedoes against an enemy were purely a mechanical question, like the control of an engine for instance, it is admitted that practical men like warrant or petty officers could do the work as well as commissioned officers and graduates of the Naval Academy. But there are tactical and military principles involved which require the presence of commissioned, highly trained officers in each turret and gun division, for the same reason that such officers are required in a company and platoon of infantry. The presence of such officers does not prevent the development of their non-commissioned subordinates. With the utmost good nature it is submitted that, to use his own expression, Mr. Worthington "appears to confound two problems "—one to work a ship and develop efficient petty officers by withdrawing line officers from ships, and the other to work a ship and develop efficient petty officers without depriving the ship and the Navy of the officers who are most necessary to fighting efficiency in time of war.
Mr. Worthington criticises the proposition to reduce the number of staff officers and replace them by line officers when practicable, and advocates instead an extension of the duties of staff officers. It would appear that the former proposition simply takes account of ship efficiency—naval efficiency—and that the latter takes account, primarily, of the individual. Now which is wisest and most economical from a naval point of view—to employ on board ship officers of no naval training and restricted usefulness, or officers of naval training and general usefulness? Which system would give the best results in time of war? All this did occur to the essayist when he proposed to replace officers and men of little or no naval training by others who are carefully trained. No offense was intended, no individual was to be injured—the "change of organization" was to be gradual, but it is absolutely necessary to the efficiency of the ship in time of war.
It is not easy to see that the plan of trusting petty officers on deck and withdrawing line officers would be more successful than to trust petty officers in the engine-room and reduce the number of scientific engineers, though Mr. Worthington seems to think so. It is submitted that the presence of so many commissioned engineers has prevented the petty officers in the engine-room from getting warrant rank. If petty officers and machinists in the engine-room have less service in the Navy than petty officers in the line, may it not be for the reason that they have less prospect for a warrant? Taking the five principal navies of Europe, we find that the average is 1.8 engineers per ship, while in our Navy the present number is 2.7 per ship, or as 2 to 3. We have, therefore, as large a surplus of engineers in our Navy as of line officers, in comparison with foreign navies. Is this surplus as necessary in the case of engineers as in the case of line officers? Cannot the former be recruited from men in civil life more easily than the latter? Is it as difficult to find men who are acquainted with steam machinery as it is to find men who are acquainted with guns, torpedoes, naval tactics, etc.? There is nothing offensive in these questions, nor in the statement that the care and management of steam machinery does not require a distinctively naval training. It is only fair to say that the officers who run the engines of Atlantic liners and merchant steamers generally can run the engines of a man-of-war. Is it fair to say that the deck officers of a merchant steamer are competent to handle and direct guns, torpedoes and ships in a naval battle? Does not this duty require strictly naval training?
The same principles apply to petty officers--those who are to be efficient with guns and torpedoes must have naval training, while a machinist may be perfectly competent, as such, who has never seen a man-of-war. The same rule applies to engineers and machinists as to surgeons and apothecaries—all may be easily recruited from men in civil life.
It is to be regretted that Mr. Worthington did not give more space to the discussion of the engine-room personnel. It would be interesting to know if he advocates the increase of the engineer corps to 303, the assignment of engineers to colleges, and the appropriation of money to provide engineering plants for technological schools throughout the country in order that these institutions, probably thirty or more in number, might furnish about seven cadets annually for the Navy! Would it not be better to expend all this money and talent upon the Naval Academy course, where there is already a modern ship and some facilities for practical instruction, instead of attempting to build up thirty or forty schools of naval engineering? The writer believes that there are at least a few naval engineers who object to an increase of the corps which would sentence them to do the duty of a machinist for years, and that they would prefer a system in which the engine-room watch is stood by warrant officers and chief machinists, while the scientific engineers, few in number afloat, superintend the machinery. Line officers do not urge this plan on personal or corps grounds, or by reason of any feeling of jealousy or enmity. They, as the officers who must command the whole ship, believe that with the promise of warrant rank, shore service after a term of service afloat, and the retired list, a corps of most efficient mechanical engineers could be formed, thus relieving the college bred engineer from the performance of duties that will always be uncongenial to him.
In conclusion, the writer insists that the essay was written with but one idea in view—to advocate what is best for the ship as a man-of-war. So far from being actuated by selfish motives, it is ventured that the watch officers of the Navy would, as a body, prefer to remain such all their lives rather than accept promotion as a result of compromises or measures that sacrifice the Navy as a military organization, and the ship as a fighting machine, in order to promote the interests of corps or individuals. We will continue to "plank the deck" and attend to every detail in ship routine rather than purchase advancement at such a cost. Standing watch is an excellent thing in many ways; it keeps the "young" line officer in good physical trim and prevents his getting soft and flabby! In time of war he must have endurance. In time of peace he must prepare for war. Relieve him from a non-commissioned officer's duty and the line officer will attend to the watch and the legitimate duties of a commissioned officer.
The necessity for naval reorganization is pressing. It is annoying, to say the least, that the admirals commanding our most powerful squadrons, and the captains commanding our modern ships—even those within easy reach on the home coast—should not even be consulted in framing measures affecting naval efficiency! These officers, who study the whole problem of fighting efficiency—the only officers who do study it, the only ones who know about it—and who have kept these ships ready for war for months past, are ignored! The ship and the man who commands it are forgotten while "bills " are being framed in Washington! But the ship and the man who commands it always decide the issue of battle. They are not forgotten then. They should not be forgotten before the battle begins. If the Navy is to be reorganized in a manner to increase, not lessen, the chances of victory, Congress must think of the ship and respect the advice of the man in command, otherwise our Navy will be ruined by legislation.
SPEED CONTROL IN MODERN STEAMERS. (See No. 77.)
R. H. THURSTON, Director Sibley College.—The general idea of Lieutenant Wood, as a matter of engineering, is. I have no doubt, perfectly feasible. I think that there is no serious difficulty in securing control of the speed, and of the operation of the engines, of a ship at any point on the vessel at which it may seem desirable. Difficulties will undoubtedly arise in the practical application of that scheme; but they will be overcome, it may be safely assumed, by a little ingenuity and skill in designing. In fact, the plan has been frequently proposed in the management of steam ferry-boats; where, if anywhere, that promptness of action and celerity of adaptation of the speed to the exigencies of the moment, which is important in the case of a naval steamer in battle, is most generally illustrated. There can be no question that the power of handling the ship and of adjusting her speed, as well as her course, from a point directly under the eye, and within reach of the voice, of the officer conning the ship, when in action, can hardly be overvalued. The real question and the fatal difficulties, if such exist, come in the actual employment of the device, which, as matter of engineering construction, may be, as we will assume, a perfect success. I am inclined to think, however, that it will be practicable to overcome all difficulties if the right sort of a designing engineer should take them in hand, and that none will prove fatal.
In the regular working of the engine, once started, and in simple adjustment of speed within ordinary ranges of working, I see no reason why it should not be perfectly practicable to secure the desired changes from the pilot-house; always provided the proposed changes of speed are not too great and too sudden to be met, with similar promptness, in the boiler-room, and when no danger is incurred of provoking heavy priming, such as is liable to endanger the engines and disable the ship. The real obstacles lie in the facts that, as ordinarily handled, the engines and the boilers are under the eye and hand of people stationed where they can see every variation of the steam-gauge, every change of water level, and every symptom of derangement at the boilers, as well as every indication of the presence of water at the engines, and who can, at all times and instantly, secure communication between engine and boiler rooms and give any required premonitory message in case of trouble or danger arising in either engine or boiler-room. To make the plan here suggested a working and a safe arrangement, it must include a system of, probably oral, communication to and from the engine and boiler rooms which will permit the commanding officer to give ample warning of intended evolutions, and which will permit the officers in the engine and the boiler-rooms to freely communicate both with each other and with the officer at the conning point. It will also involve the arrangement of a prompt-working provision for detaching the reversing gear of the engines from the control of the distant operator of the apparatus, so that, in an instant, if priming or other accident threatens, the men at the engines or the boilers may instantly meet the emergency by shutting off steam or momentarily slowing the engines, and thus avoid what might otherwise prove to be the cause of disability or of the destruction of the ship.
Throwing open the throttle-valve and giving the engines full steam at full stroke is not always certain to give the ship full speed; instant closing of throttle and shutting off steam completely will stop the engines, but it may not secure the appropriate synchronous action of the boilers. The ship's engines being stopped, the opening of the throttle is not always the only action demanded to start them, and it may destroy them the instant starting occurs. Starting heavy engines is always a matter of serious danger if intelligent caution does not preside on the occasion. Bringing engines to speed must be cautiously done, and any considerable and sudden increase of speed is liable to introduce danger of disablement at the engines, at the boilers, or at both. Overspeed, whatever the occasion, involves the same dangers. Sudden stopping usually involves no special danger in the engine-room; it may produce serious, even fatal, results in the fire-room when no provision is made for ample warning. The occurrence of a hot journal in the engine-room, if no provision is made for the officer there in charge instantly taking control on the arising of threatening emergencies of these kinds, may result in loss of the ship, and is very likely, in any event, to cause serious injury to the machinery, if not to destroy its efficiency for the time.
These are illustrations of the kinds of difficulty which may be experienced in the endeavor to reach the result aimed at by Lieut. Wood. It is very possible that they may delay the employment of his and other devices of this nature; but I have myself no doubt that, if found by experience desirable, they will come into use.
As to mechanism, that has been already provided, and substantially as here proposed, many years. The steam steering-engine of Frederick Sickels, now more than a generation in use for that purpose, was also, in principle, applied by him to the handling of the valve-gearing of heavy engines, stopping, starting and adjusting speed as required, and at a date but little later than that of his first patent on that apparatus. It has precisely the same principles of construction in either case, has very similar duties, and may be relied upon without apprehension to supply the means of application of the system here discussed in every case. It has been employed in fact in all very large engines from his time to ours, and when embodying the essential features of the original invention, the plan is always found satisfactory. The connection of its operating valve with the conning-point is, to the engineer, hardly more difficult than running bell-wires. It is just such a bit of work. There is no more difficulty in connecting the steam reversing-gear than the steam steering-gear; the two machines are, kinematically, identical, and are simply slightly different applications of the same invention, substantially as proposed by that inventor. No serious uncertainty exists on this score. Lieut. Wood's remark about its practicability, and the illustration by reference to the locomotive, are perfectly correct. In fact, the P. R. R. used a steam reversing-gear under the hand of the engineman for large engines a long time ago. I am under the impression that the essential details of the scheme have been long since invented and patented, but I have not had time to investigate that matter.
Regarding the conclusions of this paper—the avoiding of accidents resulting from misunderstandings; the substitution of a better system for bells; the quick working of the engines and prompt adaptation of speeds to momentary requirements and emergencies; the control of the engines when minor accidents drive the people out of the engine-room; the adaptability to any form of engine; the easy transfer from the old to the new system, and the reverse; and minor advantages—all these advantages may, I think, be fairly claimed for a successful installation of this sort.
The quicker working of the main engines brings with it, as has been seen, some new and resultant risks. The relief of the engine-room officers from their present steady strain is perhaps likely to prove less than is anticipated. They must be ready at any instant, not perhaps to act in response to signals, but to detect those dangers which are entirely beyond the ken of the man at the distant operating point, and to jump at any instant to the reversing-gear for the purpose of disengaging the "automatic" action and checking priming or meeting other suddenly perceived dangers—dangers which would not be usually likely to arise under the present system, when the engines are handled by men whose eyes, and especially whose ears, are ready to warn them when they are approaching the limit of safe operation. I am not sure but that on this point the advantages lie with the existing system; but I do not think these advantages likely to control.
All things considered, as stated at the opening of this commentary, from the standpoint of the designing engineer, the problem seems to me simple, and in fact practically long since solved. It is about as easy to arrange for the handling of the engines, however heavy, from any point on deck as from the engine-room platform itself. The real difficulties will be found elsewhere. Sickels solved the engineering problem thirty or forty years ago.
HORACE SEE.—No question has ever been raised as to the possibility of devising some way to reverse the propeller engine and to regulate its throttle-valve at the bridge or in the pilot-house of a steam vessel. There is no doubt it can be effected in a number of ways with moderate success, but there are obstacles which, with our present knowledge, seem unsurmountable.
The reversing of the engine and the regulation of the throttle-valve are not one and the same thing. They are different functions which cannot be very satisfactorily performed at the same time by one instrument. If this could have been done it would no doubt have been adopted long ago in the engine-room.
The reference to the locomotive as an example is an unfortunate one. The engine-master of the locomotive of to-day does not have to move a massive lever in the cab. It is only necessary for him to move a small lever, and the reversing engine, as in the case of modern steamship engine, does the hard work. The regulation of the throttle-valve is also a separate operation. It will be found that the engine-master has one hand on the reversing lever whilst the other hand is on the throttle valve. It will also be found that he does not move each at the same time, also that the speed of movement is not always the same. If such is the manner of governing an engine with the drains and other appliances convenient to the operator, how does it seem likely that a much more complicated piece of mechanism can be operated by a single lever located at a point where its movements cannot be seen and where the drains and other conveniences cannot be handled to suit the conditions which come tinder the varying pressures of steam, revolutions of engine, etc.?
When the engines are controlled at the bridge or in the pilot-house it will have to be in a manner very similar to that now employed in the engine-room.