"Le temps de guerre est arrivé."
Europe, from the beginning of its history, has been the world's great battlefield.
Few of its generations have passed without engaging in wars of the first magnitude; possession of its soil and predominance in its affairs have ever been contested by rival races and rival nations; but never, in all its belligerent history, has there been, as now, such an accumulation of the forces of war.
A bitterness now exists between the principal western nations that has but few parallels in all history, and never has invasion been so formidable as now, when the Slavonic wave of mountain-like proportion is sweeping westward. Never before has there been such promise of war.
The present generation has grown old, has expended its life in preparation. With the revolutions in the material of war and in the methods of expanding the personnel, time has been necessary for preparation. It has required long and laborious years to evolve the existing engines of war, to organize into armies and exercise under arms all the able-bodied men of entire nations, to perfect the weapons and means of defense, to improve the old and develop the new; but it may be said roughly that now preparation is complete (except with Russia, whose unlimited resources for war, checked only by want of wealth, may be considered as having no limit), for the entire nations are organized into armies, and the uses of the new agents have become more or less defined. Further preparation will be principally in increasing population and increasing wealth. Certainly improvements will continue as always, but they will be, in all probability, essentially improvements, not radical changes like those of recent years.
What may be termed the present order of things military and naval, which is such a vast advance over the old order of things so recently gone out, is now fully established, and will in all probability remain till the test of war.
On the whole, the nations of Europe are prepared, and though Russia is not prepared as she would like to be, to the extent that her population would permit, yet, as will be seen below, she finds an opportunity, a discord in the western family, which gives her an ally, produces an alliance which is not only prepared to accept, but also soon to offer war. There no longer exists the great retarding force of apprehension about the readiness for war. Further, the objects and policies of the nations have become established and clearly defined, except in the case of Italy, to be considered later, and the preliminary alliances have been formed. It only remains with diplomatic strategy to decide on the moment. No fact is so universally accepted abroad as the imminence, the very presence of war. It is a living actuality; not only every man in the armies and navies of the great powers expects to take part personally, but every individual with any hold on life expects to be a witness.
This imminent war bids fair to involve all of the six great nations of Europe, a population of about 324,000,000, of which about 74,000,000 are capable of bearing arms, possessing over 2,000,000 tons of war vessels afloat. In all this population there is burning a strong fire of patriotism, and efforts for putting forth entire strength will be aroused by all the great passions, ambition, hate, revenge, and fear of extermination. The war will be on a scale incomparably greater than any in the world's history.
The issues will be of a twofold nature, in determining the historic rivalry of the western nations and the equally historic Russian march toward ascendency. The Franco-German struggle promises to culminate by irreparable disaster to the vanquished, as does also the French-English rivalry in African and Asiatic colonization.
The English and Russian rivalry in Asia will be decided forever in case of British defeat, and will be determined for many years to come in case of Russian defeat.
But there is a more far-reaching issue than that of the rivalry of nations. The Slavonic race, the last Aryan race that has arisen in Asia and Eastern Europe, is surging westward. This wave is relatively many fold more formidable than any of the Aryan waves of the past, all of which have ultimately succeeded in supplanting the waves that had gone before and in overthrowing a higher but less rugged civilization.
Recent foresight has led the Russian to cultivate the friendship of France, and has culminated in alliance.
Dissension among the western nations has been taken advantage of, and Russia proposes to drive her wedge home at the moment when France also attacks the other nations. The wedge would be driven home indeed by Franco-Russian victory, for France left alone would be powerless before the surging Russian wave.
So the issue involves not only the perpetuation or the overthrow of the vast British Empire and of the central continental powers, but also the heritage of European soil.
It will determine whether the western civilization, like the high civilizations of the past, has lost the ruggedness adapted to and necessary in this rugged world of ours.
The study of this imminent war of such colossal proportions, which may alter radically the course of events of the world, is of greatest universal interest. But in addition, for those whose profession is the preparation and prosecution of war the interest is particular and vital, for then will come the first crucial test of the features of the new order of things, military and naval.
Smaller wars in distant lands may throw some light on the conditions of actual battle with modern material, but the conclusive lessons are to be learned only when vast masses of similar material are hurled against each other. In the shock of coming battle alone, when powerful weapons attack strong defense, will the anxious professional eye perceive the relative value and importance of the methods thus far adopted of disposing modern material of attack and defense; from the results of these engagements alone will the tactician be able to deduce the best methods of conducting modern material in battle. Thus, while the universal war will hold the partial fate of mankind at stake, it will at the same time solve the professional problems, insoluble in peace, that the new order of things has thrown out to those whose profession is war, and, above all, to those assigned to naval war.
To the United States before all will these lessons be of greatest importance, for if she has sufficient power afloat during the war to enforce respect for her rights as a neutral, she will become enriched by the expenditures of all the belligerent parties, will fall heir to vast shipping tonnage and world-wide commerce, and will be in a position to begin immediately on her ultimate national and naval policy.
The moment of relative weakness and impoverishment of the other nations will be a rare and vital one for the United States to forge to the front and initiate her natural strong foreign policy, and her naval strength being the means, her naval officers should be instantaneous in deriving the vital lessons for the new order of things to follow.
The coming war, which will give needed and necessary data for every branch of naval science, should thus be made the subject of special study by every officer of the United States Navy. From his own professional standpoint every officer should be prepared, should study the probable conditions, should see the needs and anticipate and, as far as possible, study beforehand the lessons to be learned in his own particular branch.
A necessary introduction to the intelligent study of any particular branch is a general knowledge of the whole subject of which the branch is a part, and he who expects to study a specialty in the coming war should first get a general and comprehensive idea of the war along its broad lines; he should have a general idea of international politics, should understand the sociological forces at work, the historic march and trend of the nations and races involved, should know the attitude of the powers toward each other, the actual alliances and antagonisms that are in existence at the present moment and those that the sociological forces are tending to produce; he should have an estimate of the relative forces, naval and military, present and prospective, of the two sides, with the existing alliances and with those toward which the forces are tending, and thence deduce the probable and possible course of events, the probable and possible times and characters of war, and the probable issue in each case.
Thus alone can he have the satisfaction that broad and comprehensive knowledge brings, thus alone will he be beyond surprise, prepared for any event; thus alone can he most intelligently and with best results pursue the preparatory study in his own specialty and be ready to learn the lessons of the war, to grasp instantaneously the solutions of the problems in his special branch and to have them ready for the immediate use of his country.
Thus every one who proposes to make a particular study of the coming war should first get a general idea of the situation and outlook in Europe, and a similar idea should be sought by all who take an interest in what is going on in the world, and who wish to look on with intelligence when the coming struggle comes.
A Summary of the Situation and Outlook in Europe.
I.
The development of the means of communication, freedom of speech, and the development of the press in recent years have widely disseminated among the masses of all the civilized nations a knowledge of what is going on in the world. As this knowledge increases, and as the masses realize more and more their power and possibilities, they assume a larger share in regulating the policies of government, foreign as well as domestic. The more the nation rules the greater is seen to become the importance of national interests in deciding questions of foreign policy. The great motor, self-interest, universal in nature, exalted in the masses, is translating itself directly into the councils of government. "Interests" are coming more and more to exclude sentiment, and are fast supplanting the ambition and caprices of rulers and dynasties. Though the forms of government have not greatly changed, the rulers have been coerced, in order to remain a force, into shaping their ambition to the lines of national interest and aspiration.
Where interest rules, power is the sole arbiter. In the councils of nations national power has become the coefficient of national importance, causing all the nations to tax heavily their resources for the increase of power. Along with the spread of knowledge among the masses there has been a growth of race feeling, consolidation, which has greatly extended the possibilities of the increase of national power. Indeed, national power, the strength of armies and fleets, has come to be measured by the population and wealth. The result has been that the small, poor nations are practically excluded from the councils, since poor nations cannot create and maintain great fleets, and small nations cannot have great armies, so that now the affairs of Europe are regulated by the six great nations alone.
The increase of strength, and its consequent advantages, due to concerted action, applies to the family of nations as to the household of a single nation, and consequently the nations tend to group themselves and combines are formed for mutual benefit.
Thus the advent of "interests" has caused the affairs of Europe to be regulated by only the few great nations, and has caused these few to divide into groups, while it has largely eliminated the uncertain elements depending on the personal traits of rulers, causing thus a great simplification in the study of international politics, with a promise of fruitfulness hitherto impossible. In the grouping of nations, coincidence or similarity of interests is the great natural regulator, tending toward becoming exclusive as "interests" tend more and more to dominate.
National interests are: (1) commercial advantage; (2) ambition for extension of sway, for expansion of territory and colonies; (3) sentimental interests, chiefly passions, the chief among which is hatred, race and national hatred (with Russians there is an additional religious sentiment or fanaticism); (4) self-defense. Ambition and passion are integrals or summations of the aspirations and animosities of the nation down its historic march.
In general terms, all of the nations have more or less conflicting aspirations in African colonization, particularly Great Britain, Germany, and France.
For commercial advantages, all the nations would tend to combine against Great Britain, the monopolist. But commercial advantage, though steadily growing in importance, has not been and still is not the dominant factor, at least in the grave questions of war and peace. Ambition and self-defense against ambition control where national life is at stake, as it will be in the coming war.
Two nations of the six are ambitious, the other four arc not. Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy are contented with the present boundaries in Europe. France and Russia are discontented and wish to change them. Ambition and lack of ambition thus divide them into two groups. Self-defense against ambition gives the same grouping, with the exception that Italy, who has no fear of immediate aggression (though she should have for ultimate aggression), would, from her geographical position, become a spectator.
In general terms, the nations without ambition have had their passions as well as their ambitions satisfied in modern history, and wish to perpetuate peace to afford opportunity for internal development, to allow free competition for the markets of distant lands, to have amicable understanding about the colonization of unoccupied countries, while the two ambitious nations have had their ambitions thwarted or find them still unsatisfied, and have had their passions fanned by recent defeat. Thus the discontented and ambitious nations are essentially aggressive, while the contented nations without ambition are essentially passive.
Russia, with her great ambition for expansion, is checked in southeastern Europe and in Asia by Great Britain. French ambition in North Africa and in Asia is likewise checked by Great Britain, while all down history British expansion has steadily been largely at the expense of French colonies, and the French race, peculiarly susceptible to passion, has inherited toward Great Britain an accumulated hatred, profound, uncompromising, radical, that has no parallel except in Rome and Carthage.
The Russian frontier presses hard on Germany and Austria-Hungary. The German frontier presses hard against France, whose ambition has been trodden on. Toward the German, and in particular toward the Prussian, the Frenchman has a bitter, inherited hatred, fanned to white heat by shame at recent defeat. Thus Russia, with insatiable ambition, and France with ambition and passion, are in complete accord and form a natural alliance for aggression against Great Britain and Germany, who would be naturally allied in defense.
Peril from Russia causes Austria-Hungary to seek alliance with Germany, though this alliance involves France as an enemy, from whom there is ordinarily no fear of aggression, while France willingly accepts Austria-Hungary as an enemy while it secures a stronger alliance with Russia.
The natural alliances for Europe would thus be Russia and France for aggression. Great Britain, Germany and Austria-Hungary for self-defense against aggression.
Italy's ambition and passion have been satisfied in modern history, though she has naturally desires for Austrian territory and territory in Northern Africa, and, it may be, for some French territory also; yet on the whole she is contented while the process of unification is working within. Her geographical position and freedom from real danger of immediate aggression combine to mark her a spectator.
Thus Europe, in its natural condition, would present the six nations, five in two alliances, the sixth a spectator. This would be the aspect for sub-serving immediate interests, and toward it all the forces are at present tending.
If, however, ultimate interests were consulted the scene would change. Five nations would flow together and enlist all their weaker neighbors, to offer one undivided front of self-defense against Russia, whose ambition, read from facts and in history, does not stop short of two continents.
But causes have countervened the natural grouping, not only in view of ultimate interest, still but vaguely foreshadowed, but also in view of immediate interests. It is only very recently that "interests" have come to be dominant. Great Britain is not allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary, and Italy does not hold the position of a spectator.
Austria-Hungary and Germany, early realizing a common danger from Russia, formed in 1879 a secret alliance of defense. When France had rallied from defeat, the extraordinary measures for increasing her. national strength were taken in Italy to be a menace, and upon the French occupation of Tunis, frightened at the representation that France had unfriendly designs, Italy joined Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance of defense, with the object of maintaining peace in Europe. This alliance was proposed in 1881 and adopted in 1882, signed in 1887 and renewed for six years in 1891.
France and Russia have only recently fully recognized their remarkable community of interests in Asia and in Africa, as well as in Europe. Only as recently as the Crimean War, France through sentiment joined a natural enemy against Russia, her natural ally, but Cronstadt and Toulon mark their coming together in the strong bonds of common interests. The Dual Alliance, a stable and natural one, is now a universally recognized fact in European politics.
Great Britain is pre-eminently the power whose foreign policy has been steadily directed by national interests, without a tinge of sentiment. Looking over the earth, she early perceived the rich fields beyond Europe, and set her ambition on colonial expansion, with an eye to the commercial advantages that colonies offer the mother-country. A steady, unswerving colonial policy, command of the sea and race aptitude have so far furthered commercial enterprise that she has outstripped all the other nations in the race for foreign markets, and, owning the bulk of the world's shipping, stands without a rival the great commercial monopolist. Having kept a naval force sufficient to overwhelm the force of any probable enemy, and knowing that her islands are free from invasion as long as she controls the sea, she has naturally, being sufficient unto herself, adopted a policy of isolation with respect to continental politics, except where her colonies and commerce are concerned, and has been able to spare herself the heavy burden of standing armies that weighs down the continental powers, devoting her energies and her vast wealth exclusively to the maintenance of her power by sea. Thus isolation has been her natural policy, notwithstanding her community of interest for defense with the central continental powers, even where she considered the possibility of an alliance against her. Even now, facing the formidable Dual Alliance, she sees her power superior to theirs combined. However, on account of differences and coincidences in the shipbuilding programs of the three countries, an inevitable moment is fast approaching when the strength of the allied enemies will be greater than her own, when she cannot longer lay reasonable claim to the control of the sea. Her enemies being aggressive, this moment will be one of supreme danger. Isolation then, as far as reason can be applied to probabilities, would be fatal; its voluntary continuation would be rash madness; its advantages, hitherto unaccompanied by danger, will be subordinated to self-defense, which will then be paramount to all other interests. Moreover, this moment of weakness will coincide with the time for the renewal of the Triple Alliance. Italy's interests are setting heavily against such renewal, and a powerful motive against her continued adherence will be the danger of sharing in defeat. If Great Britain joined, this danger would be removed. She would find refuge, and, at the same time, would save Italy, who, after withdrawing, would not improbably go over to the other side. As the day approaches, forces will set stronger and stronger toward her joining, but as yet the indications are slight, and Europe now presents the spectacle of the Dual Alliance of France and Russia drawn up for aggression before two distinct enemies, Great Britain and the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.
II.
What should be looked for from such a situation in Europe? When should war be expected? From what quarter will it probably come, and what will be its probable course? The aggressor of course is studying all the possible plans of attack. He will naturally choose, having the choice, the time, method and circumstances most advantageous to himself. The key to the future thus lies with the Dual Alliance, in the study of the best plans for it to adopt.
The best way to attack two enemies is to attack them in turn. The best way to begin an attack on a compound enemy is to disintegrate him. Can the Dual Alliance attack either enemy without the participation of the other? Can the Triple Alliance be disintegrated? The probable events to come are contained in the answers.
Russia is casting glances over the territory south of her frontier along its whole extent. She longingly covets that portion shutting her off from the Mediterranean, and long since would have possessed it had not the western powers interfered. Frightened at the thought, they have steadily opposed, in council and in war, the conquest of Turkey. If now Russia, with France come over to her side, were victorious in continental war, no sea power, no power under the sun, could prevent the immediate conquest of Turkey; and France, with the same object of striking a blow at the English occupation of India and Egypt, would aid Russia in an invasion of Asia Minor, Persia and Syria. Nothing could prevent the Russian frontier from pushing southward over Romania, Servia and Bulgaria, over Turkey in Europe and Greece, from crossing into Asia Minor to girdle the Black Sea and sweep down through Syria to circle the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, from pushing down from the Caucasus to spread around the base of the Caspian Sea and reinforce the wedge pointing and already entered toward India. Egypt would fall from the hands of the English and India would follow at a not distant day. With the central powers defeated, all the prodigies of English valor would be powerless to prevent this Franco-Russian conquest. Great Britain, therefore, would never remain a spectator to Franco-Russian victory on the Continent. Consequently, in attempting to defeat the Triple Alliance first, the Dual Alliance would have to engage Great Britain also. To attack the continental enemy would be to attack both enemies.
But if the insular enemy were first attacked, would the continental enemy enter? It would be suicidal indeed in the Triple Alliance to remain spectator and see the Dual Alliance come into control of the sea. Italy, with her long coast lines, would withdraw post-haste and put in a plea to the enemy; but even if she remained, the power of the enemy, already preponderant, would soon become irresistible. The defeat of Great Britain would thus be fraught with the greatest dangers, yet the probability is that the Triple Alliance would remain spectator, for the treaty compact is essentially one for defense only. If, during the conflict between the Dual Alliance and Great Britain, the tide began to set in favor of the former, Italy certainly would not consent to go to war; self-defense should cause Germany and Austria-Hungary to enter without her, but the indications point to their remaining aloof. The Triple Alliance acknowledges no obligations to Great Britain, and there are even elements blind enough to relish being spectators to the defeat of the power which rivals and interferes in their colonization and commercial enterprises, and which has steadily considered itself self-sufficient enough to decline all overtures from the Alliance. Further, the Czar (now the late Czar) is undertaking to draw closer the frontier powers, particularly Germany, the directing head of the Alliance, by commercial concessions, to increase the commercial relations between them and Russia, which, when vast and important, form the best of guarantees against a rupture of peaceful relations; and these overtures are being favorably received and reciprocated, notwithstanding the fact that their unquestionable motive is to draw bonds around the continental enemy to hold him fast while the insular enemy is being disposed of. The probabilities thus point to the non-interference of the Triple Alliance.
Furthermore, there are decided advantages for the postponement of the conquest of the Continent. There are growing elements of disintegration and of internal disaffection at work in their enemies, and an entire accord and unity of purpose within themselves, and it would be surer to engage Great Britain before Italy withdraws, for this withdrawal would open the eyes of the English, and it is not improbable that Great Britain would thereupon join panic-stricken Germany and Austria-Hungary in a new consolidated Triple Alliance, which would offer a formidable front of resistance to attempted aggression.
After the overthrow of Great Britain and the disintegration of the Triple Alliance by the withdrawal of Italy that would follow, the conquest of Germany and Austria-Hungary by the armies whose strength would remain unimpaired by the sea struggle, would be an easy task, whether Italy joined in the conquest or remained neutral, or even if, as is against all probability, she renewed the Triple Alliance.
Egypt and India would then fall like ripened fruit, almost without struggle, and Europe, Asia and Africa would be at the feet of the conquerors.
Thus the best plan for the Dual Alliance to accomplish its schemes of universal conquest is, to first overthrow the British power by sea, then to conquer the central continental powers.
The invasion of the British Isles from the Continent is impossible while the British -fleet controls the approaches. It was impossible for the great Napoleon himself, who found in this fact his bitterest experiences. The presence of the central powers, all equipped on the frontiers of France and Russia, would prevent the dispatch of troops against Egypt and India. The struggle, consequently, will be essentially by sea, while the integrity of the armies destined for the continental powers will remain intact.
When will the issue probably take place? At the time most advantageous for the aggressor.
In the days of sail power and wooden hulls, before the differentiation of types, when all vessels were on an equal footing for defense, and, when sizes were not too disproportionate, for offense also, naval strength was fairly estimated by aggregate tonnage, or even by numbers of vessels, admitting, as is always necessary in investigations on this subject, that unknown elements of personnel are equal. At the present day, however, the protection and destruction of defenseless shipping and commerce is assigned to vessels whose powers of combat are small. Consequently, a large portion of the tonnage and a still larger proportion of the numbers of vessels, particularly for the commercial powers, cannot enter the combats that will decide the issue of struggle by sea. Being outside of the sphere for which they are built, with inadequate protection and inferior powers of offense, they would, if they entered, meet wasteful destruction, without inflicting appreciable injury. It can be assumed that unarmored tonnage will not appear in decisive combat except in an auxiliary role.
The life of vessels built of metal is long, being about one and a half times as long again as the average life of man, and the development in naval construction is rapid, being without a parallel in the encyclopedia of progress. Navy lists are consequently swelled with the names of vessels in a good state of preservation, now obsolete, of inferior value, which cannot enter a rational estimate on an equal footing with vessels of recent date.
In broad lines, sufficient for the present purpose, the armored tonnage, on which the issue of naval engagements will depend, can be classified as standard armored tonnage and armored tonnage of inferior quality. Inferior tonnage will avoid engaging standard tonnage for the same reasons that unarmored tonnage will avoid engaging armored tonnage. Consequently, the first series of engagements, those on which the nations' hopes will be centered, will be between fleets of standard tonnage. The standard tonnage that survives will be of enhanced value, if repairs are sufficiently prompt to enable it to enter the subsequent engagements between inferior tonnage. Inferior tonnage has its greatest value where standard tonnage is equally matched with the probability of mutual destruction.
Armored cruisers, a type of recent, wide development, are included in the estimates of inferior armored tonnage, for, though destined in the first instance to engage inferior cruising tonnage, they could figure well in the subsequent fleet engagements between inferior armored tonnage, and, with the choice of time, of position, and of method of attack insured by superior speed, could, in certain instances, find advantageous employment in the destruction of inferior battle-ship tonnage.
Coast defense vessels of recent date are entered in the class of standard tonnage, as the probabilities are that the engagements will take place within their radius of action.
The relative naval strength of Great Britain is advancing by oscillations. The present moment finds it at the upper limit of a swing, caused by the completion of the program of the great Naval Defense Act of 1889. It will begin an immediate descent on account of the failure to lay down new vessels during the execution of this program. The descent will be sharp and sure, the lowest point being reached in 1896 and early in 1897, before which date, practically no addition will be made to armored tonnage, the bulwark of naval strength. On the other hand, the naval strength of both France and Russia is on a rising curve, whose rise is steady, rapid, sure, and presents no point of inflection.
At the present moment the British naval force musters 261,690 standard armored tons; the Dual Alliance musters 215,952 tons, 144,470 French and 71,482 Russian. The British estimate includes the Royal Oak, Revenge, Repulse, and Barfleur, of the Naval Defense Act. The French estimate includes the Brennus and the Jemmapes. The Russian estimate includes the Navarin and Gangut. The line for standard tonnage is drawn in the British estimate at the Colossus and Edinburgh, launched in 1882, the Conqueror and Hero, of date of 1881; in the French estimate, at the Caiman class, the earliest of which, the Terrible, was launched in 1881; while all the vessels in the Russian estimate are subsequent to 1886.
In inferior armored tonnage the British force is now 350,590 tons, while the force of the Dual Alliance is 245,812 tons, 155,186 French and 90,626 Russian. The British estimate includes 52,930 tons of coast defense vessels. 253,730 tons, including ail the coast defense vessels except the Rupert, carry muzzle-loading guns. Of the total, 56,000 tons are armored cruisers, the Aurora class, the Imperieuse and the Warspite. The French estimate includes 43,146 tons, and the Russian estimate 36,836 tons of coast defense vessels, a total of 79,982 tons. This coast defense tonnage includes modern armored gunboats, 8 French of 11,327 tons total, and 2 Russian of 2984 tons total. All the guns carried are breech-loaders; but, on the other hand, 75,615 tons of the French contingent have wooden hulls, placing them somewhat at a disadvantage of defense on account of shattering and splinters and fire. Of the total, 19,900 tons are armored cruisers, 6200 French (the Dupuy de Lome) and 13,700 Russian.
The coast defense vessels included in this estimate are mostly of old date, having a very small radius of action. The probability is that the engagements between the fleets of inferior tonnage will take place beyond this radius of action. The comparison of forces will consequently be more accurate by the elimination of coast defense vessels from both sides. The British inferior armored tonnage, without coast defense vessels, is 297,660; that of the Dual Alliance is 165,830, 112,040 French and 53,790 Russian.
The mean date of launch of the British standard armored tonnage is 1888, while that of the Dual Alliance is 1886, that for France being 1885 and that for Russia 1889. The average British standard ton is two and a half years (two years and four months) more recent than the average ton of the Dual Alliance. This lapse in an epoch where development and improvement have been so rapid guarantees a marked superiority in quality.
The mean average date of launch of British inferior armored tonnage is 1873, while that of the Dual Alliance is 1876, that of France being 1877 and that of Russia 1874. The average inferior armored ton of the Dual Alliance is three years more recent than the average ton of Great Britain (the dates do not change whether coast defense vessels enter or are eliminated). Progress was less rapid at this epoch. Three years insure a superiority of quality, but not so marked as the same lapse would insure at a more recent date.
All the armored cruisers are of recent date and of high speed and great coal endurance, and, having great resulting strategic superiority, would be at a marked premium over the average inferior battle-ship for the subsequent engagements. Here, in armored cruiser tonnage, Great Britain preponderates by 36,100 tons.
Thus, at the present moment, Great Britain has for the first series of engagements with the Dual Alliance a superiority of 45,738 standard armored tons, the average ton being of a superiority of quality guaranteed by two and a half years of rapid progress. For the subsequent series of engagements she has a gross superiority of 104,778 inferior armored tons. Eliminating coast defense tonnage, she has a superiority of 131,830 tons, though the quality of the average ton is inferior by three years of progress at the epoch of twenty years ago, though this inferiority, due to later date of average launch, is offset by a superiority due to an excess of 36,100 tons of British armored cruisers.
Thus at the present moment British force by sea preponderates over that of the Dual Alliance for the first series of decisive engagements in the proportion of 1.21 to 1, and is of marked superiority of quality, while for the subsequent series of engagements the proportion is 1.79 to 1 (coast defense tonnage being eliminated).
It would be folly for Russia and France to precipitate the conflict now. Immediate war need not be expected.
What are the prospects for the future? Will the Dual Alliance find a more advantageous moment when its force will equal or preponderate over that of its enemy? What will be the additions to the strength of both parties? What will be their relative strength when British force passes down from its present maximum to its coming minimum in 1896-97?
The first battle-ships to be added to the British fleets are the Renown, Magnificent, and Majestic. The first of these to be added, the Renown, would go in commission early in 1896, in the ordinary course of events; the other two would come later. Supposing that construction is hastened, and that the Renown can be added by the autumn of 1896, the addition would be 12,350 standard armored tons. The Magnificent and Majestic cannot be hoped for before late in 1897. In the meantime, France will add the Trehouart, Bouvines and Valmy, the Jaureguiberry, Charles Martel, and Lazare-Carnot, and, by accelerating construction, the Massena, and, possibly, the Bouvet, an addition of 78,356 standard armored tons; and Russia will add the George the Victorious, the Three Saints, and, by accelerating construction, the Sevastopol, Petropolovsk, Poltava, Admiral Senyavin, Admiral Ushakoff, and the Cisoi-Velikie, an addition of 72,802 standard armored tons, making a total addition for the Dual Alliance of 151,158 tons. The strength of the two parties in standard armored tonnage will then be: Great Britain 274,040, the Dual Alliance 367,110; 222,826 French and 144,284 Russian.
In inferior armored tonnage Great Britain will make no additions. Russia will add the armored gunboat Otvajuy, of 1492 tons, and France will add the four armored cruisers of the Charner class, 18,696 tons, of most efficient quality.
Admitting that the Renown will be launched in 1895, and that the average date for the vessels to be added to the force of the Dual Alliance will be 1894, the mean launching date of British standard armored tonnage in 1896 will still be 1888, while that of the Dual Alliance will become 1889, that of France being 1888 and that of Russia 1891. The mean date of launch of British inferior armored tonnage will remain 1873, while that for the Dual Alliance will become 1878. Thus, toward the close of 1896 and early in 1897 the Dual Alliance will have for the first series of engagements with Great Britain a superiority of 93,070 standard armored tons, while its average ton will be of more recent date (about ten months) than the average British ton. The British inferior armored tonnage will still be superior by 111,642 tons (coast defense vessels being eliminated as before), though its average date of launch will be four years and two months earlier than that of the Dual Alliance, and its value will depreciate from the fact that the probability points to the survival of a considerable force of the standard armored tonnage of the enemy after the first engagements.
Thus, though the British force now preponderates over the force of the Dual Alliance for the first series of decisive engagements in the proportion of 1.21 to 1, it will witness in 1896-7 a preponderance of the enemy in the proportion of 1.34 to 1. At present the British inferior armored tonnage would find the seas clear of hostile standard armored tonnage after the first series of engagements, and could throw in to advantage in the subsequent series of engagements its heavy preponderance in the proportion of 1.79 to 1; but in 1896-7 the first engagements would leave hostile standard armored tonnage to impede and overcome the British inferior tonnage preponderating in the proportion of 1.6 to 1. The average British standard ton, which is now two years and four months more recent than the average standard ton of the Dual Alliance, will in 1896-7 be ten months older. The average British inferior ton, which is now three years and one month older, will in 1896-7 be four years and two months older.
Thus both preponderance in quantity and superiority of quality, which now belong to the British fleets, will pass over by 1896-7 to the fleets of the Dual Alliance.
This situation will be inevitable. No armored tonnage resulting from the scare and crusade of last fall and winter can enter in line before late in 1897, no matter how great the urgency, and the Majestic and Magnificent, as mentioned above, a total of 29,800 tons, will come too late for the moment of relative weakness. Great Britain will inevitably see a preponderance against her of 93,070 standard tons, more than one-third of her entire standard armored tonnage.
Every indication points to her enemy's seizing this unhappy moment to make the attack. It should be made, as stated above, before the expiration of the treaty compact of the Triple Alliance in 1897, in order to insure Great Britain's being left alone. There is no doubt that France and Russia both appreciate the situation. The extraordinary activity in the shipyards of both countries has undoubtedly one common concerted object, to enable the Alliance to seize the rare opportunity which both powers have vainly longed for, but which no nation has yet had since Nelson bequeathed to Great Britain the control of the sea.
The non-interference of the Triple Alliance being guaranteed, the odds will be heavily in favor of the Dual Alliance, notwithstanding the traditional valor and skill of British officers and seamen, and notwithstanding the preponderance still of British inferior armored tonnage, for defeat in decisive engagements of the first series, between standard armored tonnage, with hostile standard tonnage still surviving, can never be redeemed afterwards by inferior tonnage.
After the defeat of Great Britain, the next step in the plans of the Dual Alliance will be the conquest of the central powers. The first step toward this conquest will be the disintegration of the Triple Alliance. To effect this, Italy's burden under the alliance is being made as heavy as possible by French financial policy. Italy will be threatened against remaining, will be allured to withdraw, and tempted to cast her lot in with the Dual Alliance. There can be little doubt, as will be seen further, that she will decline to renew the treaty alliance on its expiration in 1897, were Europe to remain as it is. If, in addition, the fall of the British Empire precedes, the imminent danger from the threatening victor would do away with any hesitation. She would certainly withdraw to isolation. France and Russia would then make overtures for her joining them, requiring a light burden, guaranteeing certain victory, and offering rich rewards in the division of spoils, which would be the more acceptable that they would be largely at the expense of her old enemy.
Italy having withdrawn, the struggle with Germany and Austria-Hungary would be essentially on land. If Italy remained neutral, France and Russia would offer for invasion, at the present moment, 1,416,000 men on the peace footing and 6,630,000 on the war footing, against an opposing force of 856,400 men on the peace footing and 4,380,000 men on the war footing. This heavy superiority will be greater in 1897, for the aggressors have a population of 165,000,000 in entire accord to draw from, while Germany and Austria-Hungary have but 91,000,000, with dangerous elements of discord growing day by day. There would be no need of delaying for further weakening of the enemy, for the working of socialistic disaffection in Germany, and the race dissensions in Austria-Hungary, and the serious seeds of disloyalty sown by Slavic influence in the eastern divisions of the Austro-Hungarian army. The Dual Alliance could march to the conquest with entire assurance on the morrow of British defeat.
If Italy joined in the conquest, the unhappy powers would be invaded from the south as well as from the east and west by an additional force, numbering about 259,000 men on the peace footing and about 2,000,000 men on the war footing.
Should Italy, against all her interests, against all probability, remain with the Triple Alliance, the conquest would involve a fierce struggle by sea as well as by land. The fleets of the Dual Alliance would return shattered from the destruction of the British fleets. Time would have to elapse before they could be sufficiently reinforced. It would not require long, however, for the armies of the Triple Alliance are coming to absorb all the resources. The navies for new construction receive less than one-third of what the Dual Alliance now appropriates, and the disproportion will become greater and greater as Italy is ground down lower and lower under her financial burden, and as the elements of disaffection work in the German nation. The armies are now nearly balanced, with a slight preponderance on the side of the Dual Alliance. The preponderance, for the reasons already mentioned, will grow steadily larger each year. The inevitable conquest of all three central powers would follow not many years later. Nothing could save the Continent after the overthrow of British power by sea.
The next step in the plans of the Dual Alliance, the conquests beyond Europe, would be practically achieved. No serious opposition could be made. They could be taken possession of at leisure. The day France and Russia, after British overthrow, look up from the battlefields of Austro-German defeat, they will see their frontiers start on the march across southeastern Europe, into Africa, into Asia. There will be no serious obstacle in the way of this march toward the circumference of three continents, not even the walls of China or the deserts of Africa. The conquering powers would control the Eastern hemisphere.
Such are the best plans for realizing the highest possibilities opened up to France and Russia by their alliance, and the probability is that such, in the main, are the plans they have concertedly adopted. An unforeseen event might, however, precipitate a conflict between the Dual and the Triple Alliance against the wishes of the former. If it came at the present moment, the Dual Alliance on land would throw for the first wave 1,416,000 men against 1,115,000, and a total of 6,630,000 men against 6,380,000 men. On sea, it would send 215,952 standard armored tons to engage 218,749 standard armored tons, equal fleets, which would mutually destroy each other and clear the seas of standard tonnage. Then it would send 245,812 inferior armored tons to engulf 120,722 tons. Each year of postponement, for the reasons mentioned above, will mark a heavier and heavier preponderance for the Dual Alliance. For instance, in 1896, on the sea, the standard armored tonnage, at present about equal, will stand 367,110 tons for the Dual Alliance and 235,791 for the Triple Alliance, the inferior armored tonnage being 266,000 and 131,382 respectively.
The probability would thus point more and more strongly to Franco-Russian victory; but when the tide began to set this way, Great Britain, for the reasons stated above, would enter. Throwing into the struggle, at the present moment, 261,690 standard armored tons, in 1896 274,040 standard armored tons, without mentioning inferior armored tonnage and the armies to disembark on the Continent, she would turn the tide of victory to the other side.
If no such unforeseen event occurs, and if the Dual Alliance neglects to seize its opportunity of 1896, leaving events to take their ordinary peaceful course, Italy will in all probability decline to renew the Triple Alliance treaty in 1897.
Germany and Austria-Hungary should be indissolubly united by common danger, but Italy is held with them solely by the incorrect assumption that France has designs against her and that French preparations are a menace; whereas the advantage to France in her real designs on her eastern frontier, and to the Dual Alliance, accruing from not having to divert or immobilize an army corps on the south, would be so great that every guarantee would be given against aggression if Italy would withdraw. All of Italy's interests are set against her remaining. The burdens, the expenditures required, and the commercial and financial policy of France, are already causing ruinous financial distress, which is entirely unnecessary. It is her natural, geographical prerogative, not yet appreciated, to reap alone the incalculable benefits of neutrality in the event of general European war. Her natural policy is that of isolation. She has nothing real to fear from either of the parties to the war, and no interests of hers conflict with theirs. It is true, as stated above, she would not object to an accession of territory from Austria, her old enemy, though now her ally, or even from France, particularly in northern Africa, yet her ambition for the present is satisfied while the process of unification and amelioration continues within. Further, a black, ominous cloud has recently risen above the horizon. She joined Germany and Austria-Hungary sure of perpetuating peace, to form an alliance that France could not dream of attacking. Now, however, France has found an ally and the Triple Alliance no longer is a guarantee of peace, for the Dual Alliance musters a strength that already preponderates, particularly on the sea, where Italy is most exposed, and whose preponderance is advancing with enormous strides. While Italy remains in the Triple Alliance, without British assurance, she faces the grim specter of defeat She would never have joined, she will probably not remain, in a Triple Alliance which has the Dual Alliance for an enemy.
Deserted by Italy, Germany and Austria-Hungary would lie helpless. In 1897 their 113,786 standard armored tons and 82,293 inferior armored tons would disappear like a breath before the 367,110 standard armored tons and the 266,000 inferior armored tons of the Dual Alliance. Their sea-coast would be ravaged, cities bombarded and ports blockaded against any supplies from without, while the invading armies, the first wave 1,416,000 strong, the total 6,630,000 strong, entering from the east and from the west, would overwhelm the 856,400 men in the first line of opposition and the 4,380,000 total.
The two nations in despair would cry out for British aid, and their cry would probably be heard, for the eyes of the British would be opened; they could not help seeing that the French and Russian armies unrestrained after Austro-German defeat would march unobstructed from Europe to the conquest of Egypt and India, even admitting that the British fleet kept a preponderance of force on sea. On Italy's withdrawal, the probability points to the formation of a new Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, the natural alliance of defense against the natural Dual Alliance of aggression. This Triple Alliance, formed on the expiration of the old in 1897, would oppose 387,826 standard armored tons and 432,883 inferior armored tons, against 367,110 standard and 266,000 inferior tons, about an equality in standard armored tons and a heavy preponderance in inferior armored tons. Great Britain, with her resources, could probably maintain an equality, if not a preponderance, by sea, though it would be a sore burden, as she would have practically no assistance from her allies. But the situation on land would remain hopeless. Assuming that the British troops would be found on the battlefields, the alliance, if now formed, would oppose in the first wave of war 1,075,800 men against an invading force of 1,416,000 men, and a total of 5,035,000 men against 6,630,000. This heavy preponderance will become greater each year, and ultimately would inevitably become utterly overwhelming, for the population of the one, 129,000,000, is increasing at the mean annual rate of .88 per cent, while the 165,000,000 of the other is increasing at the mean rate of 1.33, and this latter vast population does not count a dissenting voice in taxing its vast resources to the utmost, while the lesser population contains dangerous internal elements of division and weakness.
The withdrawal of Italy and the formation of the new Triple Alliance nevertheless would not probably be a signal for immediate war, though, as seen above, equilibrium would not exist. The aggressors would wait to allow the weakening elements of the enemy to work their way, recognizing their own strengthening unity of purpose. Italy would be offered inducements that would outweigh the advantages of spectatorship and neutrality. As mentioned above, the Dual Alliance would require but a light burden and would offer rich rewards. In the certain partition of Germany and Austria-Hungary that would follow she would be promised vast tracts around the Adriatic which, in the hands of an old enemy, have long been looked on with covetous eyes, and France, with vast, gratifying accessions on the east, might offer the old provinces of Nizza and Savoy, and might, perhaps, allow her to take Tunis and Tripoli, being sure herself of getting Egypt. With a certainty of victory, and fear of displeasing the powers that would, without her even, be victorious, she would probably pass from isolation to alliance. Europe would then see the six nations in the two great natural Triple Alliances: France, Russia and Italy for aggression; Germany, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain for defense.
Impatient aggression would not then have occasion to wait longer for further weakness in the enemy, having a preponderance on the sea of more than 100,000 standard armored tons, and, taking the present condition as an index, though each year will make a greater preponderance, on land an excess of 600,000 men for the first wave and 3,600,000 men total excess. This preponderance would be overwhelming. Signing the new aggressive alliance would sound the bugle-call to war. Europe would be seized with convulsions. Three nations would be engulfed in one great upheaval. Germany and Austria-Hungary would no longer be seen on the map; the British Empire would belong to past history.
It is evident which nation of the three victors would claim the East and take the largest share of the West. After the wrangle, a new era would begin in Europe. Its duration and its termination are easily seen. A glance at the map of history and the march of events shows that Russian ambition does not stop short of two continents, and will not be satisfied till Russian territory has no boundaries but oceans. After their intoxication, France and Italy would awaken in a nightmare; they would rush to alliance, but too late, they would be as children against a giant. A glance at the populations and their rates of increase leaves no hope for western civilization in its birthplace. Its young offspring across the ocean would be left alone to contest the high seas and redeem in part this error of history.
If, however, against probability, Italy renews the Triple Alliance treaty in 1897, Great Britain having continued isolated and the Dual Alliance having neglected to seize the opportunity offered in 1896-7, continuing thus the present status, the goal of the two races will still be not far off. The race by land is already practically won. The Dual Alliance can maintain preponderating armies guaranteeing victory with comparative ease, while the larger part of the increase of tax on the resources of the two nations would be devoted to the great race with Great Britain for preponderance on the seas. As seen above, it will be ahead in the race in 1896-7, at which moment both races will be won if it has the hardihood to bring them to a finish; but in 1898-99 the British fleets will reap the harvest sown in the last scare. Adding the Magnificent and Majestic and the seven new nearly similar first-class battle-ships laid down this year, seven of the nine in 1898, the other two in 1899, a total tonnage of about 135,000, while the French add the Charlemagne, the St. Louis, and, by acceleration, the Henri IV., and a similar battle-ship not yet named, a total of 43,000 tons, and Russia adds one battleship similar to the Three Saints, and two similar to the Cisoi Velikie, a total of 30,250 tons (Russia will add two powerful armored cruisers similar to the Rurik, of more than 12,000 tons each, which will make a heavy addition to inferior armored tonnage not here considered, since no addition will be made by the other powers), making a total for the Dual Alliance of 73,450 tons, about 61,500 tons less than the British additions, reducing the preponderance held in 1896-7 of 93,000 tons to 31,500 tons. The Dual Alliance thus will then still be ahead, with the chances of victory on both elements.
After 1898-9, beyond which estimates cannot now be made, the probability points to the Dual Alliance maintaining the preponderance, notwithstanding the vast resources of Great Britain and the intention of the British to maintain their force on a par, for, judging from the appropriations which have become enormous in France and Russia (in 1892 France provided for nearly $200,000,000 to be expended on new construction within ten years), it is the intention to tax to the limit the combined resources of the two nations. Consequently, when next year the French and Russian naval strength catches up with the British strength, the two races may be considered won whether the winner chooses war then or later.
III.
The future is thus gloomy for the essentially passive powers, whether the Dual Alliance has the boldness to adopt the most favorable plan or whether it awaits the ordinary course of events, which would probably consolidate the enemy. Is there any escape from this gloomy situation? Are there any methods of thwarting these plans? What can the passive powers do?
The same methods will thwart both plans. The surest and most desirable, the best method, would be the formation of a quadruple alliance of the passive powers, to take the offensive without delay. The force of this new alliance would heavily preponderate; on sea it would engulf the enemy. To accomplish this method. Great Britain would have to renounce her policy of isolation, which she is loath to do, and the treaty would have to embrace an offensive element, which would in all probability meet strenuous opposition from all the signatories. This method may consequently be considered as practically impossible.
The second best method would be for the Triple Alliance, though feigning defense, to take the offensive without delay. As seen above, the force of the Dual Alliance preponderates, though by land the preponderance is small; but, in case of adversity, British aid could be depended on, and the war would become general, as it would by the first method. But the treaty compact of the Triple Alliance is essentially one of defense only, particularly as far as Italy is concerned; consequently voluntary offense cannot be hoped for. Only by some unforeseen happening, causing the Dual Alliance to take a premature offensive attitude, could this method be realized.
There was some hope afforded by the attitude of the German Emperor last year, in his determined efforts to strengthen without delay his own army, in his visiting both allies to review their forces, in his assembling his forces for their autumn maneuvers on the fields from which they will advance to battle, and in the tenor of all his utterances touching military affairs. It seemed that he recognized the situation, penetrated the future, saw the advantage, the necessity of action without delay, and was making preparation for bringing about the great issue. But subsequent events have dispelled this scanty hope, particularly the favorable reception of the Czar's overtures for commercial reciprocity.
The third best method would be for Great Britain to take the offensive without delay. The Dual Alliance would be loath to accept the engagement in view of the advantages of postponement, particularly cool, calculating Russia, and it might be difficult to find a pretext; but there is always the open Eastern Question, and, with France, the question of African colonization, while among the French nation there is an over-confidence caused by the vista opened up during the exultations of Cronstadt and Toulon, which could no doubt be turned to advantage.
It would of course be best for her to attack the enemies one at a time, or one only, if possible. The best method would be to attack France, endeavoring to secure assurances from the Triple Alliance, or at least from Germany and Austria-Hungary, of participation in the event of Russia joining. Then it is not improbable that crafty Russia would decline to enter, notwithstanding her professions of alliance, for, as seen above, the two allies combined would be overmatched by Great Britain alone. On the withdrawal of Russia there would be no reason for further execution of the war, for Great Britain has no fear from France except in her alliance with Russia. This move would effect the dissolution of the Dual Alliance. The eyes of the Frenchmen would be opened and they would renounce all idea of alliance with Russia.
The other method would be to attack Russia, seeking assurances from the Triple Alliance of participation in the event of France joining. There can be no doubt that France would be loyal and join. It is possible, on the other hand, if Russia is attacked on the Eastern Question, so important to Germany, so vital to Austria-Hungary, and then if she is joined by France, whom Italy is learning to hate and has brought herself to dread, that then the Triple Alliance might be induced to enter, notwithstanding the purely defensive nature of the alliance, and the general war so desirable might thus be brought about.
Great Britain stands toward Russia in standard armored tonnage in the ratio of about 3.66 to 1, and in inferior armored tonnage in the ratio of about 3.87 to 1; toward France she stands in standard armored tonnage in the ratio of about 1.81 to 1, and in inferior armored tonnage in the ratio of about 2.26 to 1. No doubt can be entertained as to the issue if either one alone is engaged. If the Triple Alliance joined Great Britain the combined force by sea of the four powers would stand toward the Dual Alliance in standard armored tonnage in the ratio of about 2.24 to 1, and in inferior armored tonnage in the ratio of about 1.92 to 1. The seas would be swept. On land, assuming that the British armies would be on the battlefields, a warranted assumption, since the seas would be clear and the troops would have allied soil to disembark on, the Quadruple Alliance would muster 1,335,000 men on the peace footing and 7,035,000 men on the war footing, while the Dual Alliance would muster 1,416,000 men on the peace footing, 6,630,000 men on the war footing. Considering the dispersion of the Russian army over a vast area and her separation from France, there is no doubt that the armies of the four allies would be found superior on the decisive battlefields.
If Great Britain attacked both parties to the Dual Alliance, a favorable opportunity would be offered the Triple Alliance for precipitating advantageously the inevitable conflict by land, and the probability points to the war being made general. But should the Triple Alliance decline to enter, and should Great Britain, in attacking one ally, be forced to engage both, even then, as seen above, the issue being essentially by sea, her unaided fleets would still throw a heavy preponderance against the allied fleets, in the proportion for standard armored tonnage, of about 1.22 to 1, and for inferior armored tonnage of about 1.43 to 1. Thus if Great Britain took the offensive without delay, the probability in all the events of war that could follow would mark her as victor, with an assured new lease of the sea and of the world's commerce.
Of the three desirable methods by which the war could be made general, while the passive powers preponderate in force and would act in unity, this one alone offers any grounds for hope. But this only hope is very scant, for Great Britain is loath to become a belligerent in European war and is slow to change her policies. With her vast commerce and shipping, she dreams of the riches which would come with neutrality when the Continent, hostile within, seeks its supplies from without, or of the choice of entering late in the conflict to decide its issue, bearing a small part of the burden and reaping a large part of the spoils. She realizes, too, that her daily bread comes over the water, that she would starve if its arrival were stopped for even a short while, and she sees the vast amount of her property that is on the high seas that would be exposed to a maritime enemy. She perceives that she has a monopoly already of the markets of distant lands, and that her colonial expansion continues to overshadow that of all the other nations. She enjoys prosperity and foresees its continuance with peace, and she looks with angry eye on any part that threatens to disturb peace where she might be involved. She would be loath, very loath, to take the offensive; she is slow, very slow, to discontinue her policy of isolation. The maxim has become general that she has all to lose by war. The maxim has not yet spread that she has all to save by war.
The fourth best method, the only one remaining, would be the formation of a defensive quadruple alliance, effected by Great Britain's joining the Triple Alliance without materially modifying the nature of the treaty stipulations.
The forces by land of the two alliances would not largely differ. The slight preponderance, as seen above, would now rest with the four allies. On the sea, the Quadruple Alliance now has 480,439 standard armored tons against 215,952 standard armored tons of the Dual Alliance, and 471,312 inferior armored tons against 245,812 tons. In the event of war, the fleets of the Dual Alliance would be annihilated and the sea-coasts laid bare and colonies exposed. France could not dream of permitting such a state of affairs, even if she were sure of victory on land. Consequently, offense from the aggressive alliance would be out of the question. Even in 1896-7, at the moment of Great Britain's weakness, the Quadruple Alliance would offer 509,831 standard armored tons against 367,110, and 481,972 inferior armored tons against 266,000. England would in all probability come to the financial relief of Italy, and with her untold wealth could probably maintain a preponderance of force by sea in favor of the Quadruple Alliance, while the continental powers strained their energies to keep the armies on a par. Peace would be insured for many years, and another generation might pass before the conflagration came.
The Dual Alliance, however, would not think of renouncing its passions and its schemes of conquest, and a pitiless, relentless peace struggle would begin on a scale undreamed of even in this day of crushing armaments. There is no doubt that the Quadruple Alliance could maintain a preponderance for many, many years, though in nothing like the present proportion, if all its members bent their energies in accord to that effect. But while m France and Russia there is but one national purpose, without an opposing voice from man, woman or child, in Germany there is a growing socialistic disaffection, in Austria-Hungary there is dangerous internal dissension among the heterogeneous population, and Italy is wailing in financial distress.
The 165,000,000 of souls, united in one purpose in France and Russia, are increasing at the mean annual rate of 1.33 per cent., the 39,000,000 French at the rate of .32 (the mean for 20 years, 1871-91), and the 126,000,000 Russians at the rate of 1.64 (the mean from 1867 to 1886), while the 160,000,000 souls with dissenting voices in the Quadruple Alliance are increasing at the mean annual rate of only .83 per cent., the 50,000,000 Germans at the rate of .98 (the mean from 1875 to 1890), the 41,000,000 of Austria-Hungary at the rate of .76 (the mean from 1870 to 1890), the 31,000,000 Italians at the rate of .62 (the rate in 1881), and the 38,000,000 British at the rate of .917 (the mean from 1871 to 1891). It is evident which alliance would win the race in growth of armies.
In sea power Austria-Hungary has not and will not figure. Italy is barely holding her own. For new construction her appropriation has passed from $6,500,000 for the year 1890-91 $5,600,000 for 1891-92, $4,900,000 for 1892-93, to $4,900,000 in 1893-94, while it is estimated at $4,900,000 for the current year 1894-95. Germany, straining every nerve for her armies, is neglecting her navy. Her appropriation for new construction has rapidly and steadily decreased from $8,500,000 in 1891-92, $6, 900,000 in 1892-93, to $4,600,000 in 1893-94, and it is estimated at $3,300,000 for the current year 1894-95. On the other hand both France and Russia are making steady, unparalleled additions. The French appropriation for new construction has risen from $11,600,000 in 1890-91, $13,600,000 in 1891-92, $13,600,000 in 1892-93, to $14,200,000 in 1893-94, and it is estimated at $14,800,000 for the current year 1894-95; and the Russian appropriation has risen from $7,500,000 in 1890-91, $9,500,000 in 1891-92, $10,400,000 in 1892-93, to $11,100,000 in 1893-94, and is estimated at $11,000,000 for the current year 1894-95.
The total appropriation of the Triple Alliance (not takings account of Austria-Hungary) for new construction in 1890-91 was $17,900,000, while that of the Dual Alliance was $19,100,000. For the current year the estimates for the Triple Alliance are $8,100,000, a falling off since 1890-91 of $9,800,000, and for the Dual Alliance they are $25,800,000, an increase since 1890-91 of $6,700,000. The excess for the Dual Alliance was $2,200,000 in 1890-91; to-day it is $17,700,000.
The British additions have fluctuated by reason of the oscillatory programs of construction. The mean annual appropriation for new construction since 1888-89 (the year previous to the Naval Defense Act) has been $21,700,000. For the current year it is estimated at $23,400,000.
Thus the total appropriation for new construction has been somewhat larger for the Quadruple Alliance, though it has been on a constant decrease, while that of the Dual Alliance has been steadily increasing. Preponderance, though in nothing like the present proportion, would no doubt be maintained as long as the alliance remained intact.
Thus the peace struggle would continue till Italy, for the reasons mentioned above, impoverished, if not utterly bankrupt, from the burden laid upon her, fearing the approach of the day of sharing defeat on land with her allies, threatened and allured by the menacing enemy, perceiving the prerogative of her position, withdraws, either to remain a spectator and reap the benefits of neutrality, or to join the Dual Alliance and share the spoils of victory. The day Italy withdrew, equilibrium would be broken, the balance would drop with a thud to the side of the aggressive party. The great war struggle would be at hand, with forlorn outlook.
At first sight this method of postponement might appear to offer an opportunity for allowing time to alter the sentiment in France, to open the eyes of Frenchmen and cause them to abandon the alliance with Russia, and join their brother nations in one united body, to throw out of Europe the universally threatening Slavic race, and restrict Russian ambition to Asia, to the hardy task of supplanting the stagnant races of the East, or of forming a barrier between Europe and those hordes that may some day become warlike, while in peaceful Europe, where a small common standing army could easily defend a single eastern frontier, the brotherhood of the higher nations of western civilization, reasonably adopting universal arbitration, could divert the national resources to the universal betterment of the conditions of life, to regulating the colonization by their own superior races of the unoccupied portions of the earth, and to arranging for humanely supplanting or exterminating, if it is impossible to elevate, the inferior races, to regulating, in sum, in the best way, the affairs of our planet.
But this dream of Utopia is inconsistent in our world of universal struggle, and cannot for a moment be indulged in broad daylight by any one acquainted with Frenchmen, nor to any one familiar with the domestic, scholastic and military education of the French could there be any hope for the coming generation which will not have seen the days of 1870-71. Besides, the alliance with Russia, which, to a spectator, seems so unnatural, is, as stated above, a most natural one to Frenchmen, whose shame and passion hide ultimate interests by immediate ones. There are no doubt moments of calm and reaction in many thoughtful French minds, when undefined questionings come as to what lies beyond the glorious vista; as to what real fellowship can exist between two types of races, occupying widely different rounds on the ladder of civilization; between two governments, one of freedom and one of despotism; that after all the affection displayed by Russia, she can care for them only as temporary instruments, coolly using their forces, their generosity, their passions for inexorable plans of conquest that would in next turn take in without hope of resistance their own lovely country, or else might, after the overthrow of Great Britain, principally by French fleets, and the accession of India, sufficient for temporary expansion, abandon France, with her strong passions and thirsts still unsatisfied, and leaving her thus with no rewards except a necessary opening for colonization, which is already larger than the requirements of the nation, weakened by conflict, to stand again alone against the central powers, while she, in her turn, prepared for the great game of European conquest, for the time when the dissenting western nations should cripple themselves and exhaust their forces in war with each other.
But these undefined misgivings or questionings are stifled and would never be uttered for fear of incurring the accusation of a want of patriotism, the most reproachful accusation that could be made in France. No, the only way to dissolve the Dual Alliance is to put Russia to the test of sharing defeat with France. Great Britain alone can apply this test.
It seems hard that France can be saved only by defeat. This great, brave, chivalric nation has suffered for humanity all down history. Defeat at the hands of an old enemy, and the renunciation of the bright hopes for revenge on the other old enemy, would be the severest of all the martyrdoms yet demanded of beautiful France; but the price even then would be small if it redeemed her, and saved her at the same time that it saved Europe from ultimate destruction at the hands of the too powerful young giant, standing club in hand, with threatening and determined brow, knocking at the door of higher western civilization. As seen above, however, there is little hope of this salvation. The hope is somewhat greater, though still small, that the fourth and least desirable method, the formation of a defensive Quadruple Alliance, may be realized. As seen above, the policy of isolation has been a natural one and is a stubborn one with Great Britain, yet the forces will set toward a renunciation as her relative weakness becomes more and more evident. If the nation could be familiarized with the real relative strength of fleets, estimated rationally by separating standard from inferior tonnage, at the present moment and during the years to come, there is no doubt refuge would be sought in the Triple Alliance, and there would even be a glimmer of hope for her taking the immediate offensive.
Thus, in conclusion, in studying the situation and outlook in Europe, the dominating fact, towering above all others, is the alliance of the two great aggressive nations, France and Russia, who count more than half of the entire population that regulates European affairs.
Though French aggression is principally from passion, strong, natural, inherited, injured, and only partially from ambition for expansion, while Russian aggression is almost wholly from ambition for expansion and but very slightly from passion and fanaticism, yet both aggressors aim at the same enemies. The overthrow of Great Britain and the conquest of Germany and Austria-Hungary would satiate even French passion, while the consequent opening up for expansion over central and southeastern Europe, over Asia and into Africa, would overflow the banks of even Russia's boundless ambition.
The natural designs of the alliance are stupendous, defying almost the imagination itself. Its possibilities are fairly boundless, covering a hemisphere. If fully realized, they will change utterly the face of three continents.
The feature of the alliance which most imposes itself on the mind of the observer is the formidable force it musters and the amazing rapidity with which this force has recently grown and continues to grow. In the two great factors necessary for great armaments, wealth and population, its resources are fairly inexhaustible, France having the wealth and a boundless generosity toward Russia, and Russia having the population. The powers of the Triple Alliance, on the other hand, which until recently increased their forces apace, have now lagged far behind. From 1890 to 1894 the entire standing armies of the three allies have been increased by only 71,000 men and the force on the war footing by 320,000 men, while the French and Russian standing armies have been increased by 139,400 men and the force on the war footing by the enormous figure of 1,330,000 men. The aggregate appropriations for additions to the naval forces of Germany and Italy (the small appropriations by Austria are not considered), during the last four years, amount to $43,600,000, while those for France and Russia amount to $98,200,000. Thus the total additions to the land forces have been in the proportion of 3.76 to 1, and the total appropriations for additions to the naval forces in the proportion of 2.25 to 1, and each successive year has seen the disproportion between the additions become greater. The additions to the strength of the Dual Alliance are steadily increasing, those of the Triple Alliance are steadily decreasing. The maximum strength of the latter has been reached, its resources are taxed to their limit. The maximum for the former is not yet in sight, and as far as can be seen has no limit. The stationary force has now already been passed by the one that continues to advance with great strides; each day sees the gap between them widen, increases the probability and the disaster of defeat.
Great Britain, during the last four years, has appropriated for new naval construction $87,200,000, $11,000,000 less than the Dual Alliance. She intends, no doubt, to maintain a force as far as possible equal to that of the two allies combined, but, as explained above, the different methods in the shipbuilding programs of the three countries and the coincidences, concerted or unconcerted, in the times for laying down new vessels, cause the British force to be now at a marked maximum of strength and to approach an inevitably low minimum in 1896-7.
On examining further into the internal condition of the two parties the sight becomes alarming. Distressing division exists among the passive powers and becomes more distressing each day. Great Britain is isolated, and Italy, in financial distress, tends strongly toward withdrawing from alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany is rent internally, and prevented from developing her whole strength by disaffection, identified more or less with socialistic growth, the outcome to a large extent of the burden imposed by a heavy armament where, after victory, there is not the offset of active incentive or burning passion. The military bill last summer was a symptom. It required the dissolution of the Reichstag and the use of all the influence of the sovereign over a most loyal nation to procure its passage. Austria-Hungary has internally, in the dissensions of its heterogeneous and widely different races, all the elements, indications and symptoms of dissolution, and Russian influence is undermining the loyalty of the Slavic element of the army as of the population. France and Russia are standing closely united before an almost hopelessly divided enemy. To darken still more the gloom of the horizon, the passive powers, dedicated to peace, oppose taking the offensive themselves and will allow the aggressor to choose his own time and method of attack. The present is supremely the opportune moment for the passive powers; a future time will be for the aggressors, who are now crying out peace, peace. This cry of peace means "Peace till my weapons are sharpened," while the passive powers appear blindly to think that it means enduring peace, a contradiction to the very nature of the two powers and their alliance.
Fate or forethought will have the Franco-Russian strength reach its maximum preponderance over British strength previous to the expiration of the treaty of the Triple Alliance. Italy will, in all probability, have decided not to renew the alliance though still being in it, which will prevent the shaking up of the powers and the formation of a new natural Triple Alliance, thus depriving Great Britain of the chances of having German and Austrian aid, while, in all probability, she would, on the verge of disastrous war, applying at the eleventh hour, be refused refuge in the Triple Alliance.
After Great Britain's overthrow and Italy's withdrawal following it, Germany and Austria-Hungary would be an easy conquest, whether Italy chose to join with the conquerors or not.
On examining further into the events to follow the fulfillment of the aggressors' stupendous designs, whether realized easily as just indicated or by one of the other probable ways previously discussed, the situation takes on an awful aspect.
How would the spoils of three continents be divided by France and Russia?
The population of France is less than 39,000,000; that of Russia more than 127,000,000. The French population has been increasing over a lapse of fifteen years (from 1876 to 1891) at the mean average annual rate of only .32 per cent.; the Russian population has been increasing over a lapse of twenty years (from 1867 to 1886) at the mean average annual rate of 1.64 per cent. The Russian population is thus nearly 3 ¼ times as large as the French, and is increasing four times as rapidly. (During the last fifteen years the rate of increase in France has been on a steady decrease; it had fallen from .500 in 1876 to .065 in 1891. At the latter rate Russian increase is twenty-three times as great.)
French temperament is and has long been strongly opposed to colonization. The Frenchmen who leave France usually return. France does not care for large increase of colonial territory, and would be content with but a small share of German territory, while Russia is steadily expanding at a rate not approached by Rome when she was advancing to her conquest of the world.
For the coming war, passion dominates in the bosom of the Frenchman, who is looking for revenge; ambition animates the Russian, who is looking to extension of Slavic sway.
Thus it is evident that to Russia would fall the vast territory on two if not on three continents.
If Italy should sit at the feast of victory, which she may do, she would be satisfied and well pleased with a comparatively meager morsel of the spoils, a modest part of the territory now belonging to Austria and some territory in Africa.
After the feast, France and Italy would perceive that they had waged the fratricidal war in the interests of a power, then ready, inevitably, after a short time, to swallow them also, both at a time or singly.
To check this somber, onward rush of events there are no means on which much hope can be placed. The great, best remedy, the dissolution of the Dual Alliance, does not permit hope. This alliance, founded on complete community of immediate interests, is come to stay, and is growing stronger and more indissoluble each day. Only disastrous war, realized or imminently threatening, can dissolve it. No combination in Europe without Great Britain's sea power could threaten or inflict such war. This sea power at the present moment could do so alone, but the opportunity is rapidly passing away. There is scarcely a shadow of hope that Great Britain will take the offensive; there is but the barest hope that she will throw her power into the Triple Alliance to save herself and it. This Alliance itself, from the very nature of its exclusively defensive compact, cannot, while the Dual Alliance cries peace, take the offensive and insure the later joining of the British sea power in the event of adversity.
Thus the entire responsibility rests with Great Britain, and the necessity is urgent for her immediate action. Each day sees the vessels building in France and Russia nearing completion. Fifteen months hence the preponderance of power will have passed over to the enemy; the Dual Alliance will be beyond the possibility of dissolution; the one opportunity for saving herself and Europe from the dread consequences of this alliance will have passed forever. Each day will then bring nearer the day of her greatest exposure to a stronger aggressive enemy; each day will render less probable her acceptance into the refuge of the Triple Alliance; each day will render more inevitable the desertion of Italy and her passing over to the enemy.
If self-sufficiency, or conservatism, or want of enlightenment, or of foresight, or lack of decision, or boldness, or all combined, cause Great Britain to neglect the call of duty from the crisis in her own and in the world's history; if she fails soon to throw her fleets against the enemy, neglecting to choose war while she is stronger and while the enemy could be disintegrated, leaving the enemy to choose it when he becomes the stronger and indissolubly united, and if she fails also to adopt the less desirable but only other alternative of seeking refuge in the Triple Alliance in time for acceptance and in time to save Italy, thus leaving the road clear for the plans of the great aggressive alliance, then may Heaven prepare to come down on earth to work miracles by the hands of men, may a host of guardian angels hover close over freedom and civilization as they tremble in the lands of their birth.
"LAGUERRE."
DISCUSSION.
Lord George Hamilton.—a perusal of the pamphlet entitled "An Introduction to the Study of Coming War" is very interesting to an Englishman, as giving the views and deductions of an outside authority upon the present and future strength of the British Navy relatively to that of France and Russia. The writer has treated the subject entirely from a statistical and arithmetical standpoint, arbitrarily dividing ships into two categories, "Standard armored tonnage" and "Inferior armored tonnage." He treats every ton of each class as an equal fighting unit and then makes up the totals of these units. On this assumption he draws wholesale conclusions very much to the disadvantage of Great Britain. In my judgment, this method of gauging the fighting power of a fleet is fallacious, even if the classification were sound. To take a large number of ships varying in size from 12,000 to 6,000 tons, and of every conceivable shape, some turret, some barbette, some high freeboard, some low, some heavily armored vertically, others relying on horizontal armor, and to assume that every individual ton of every different ship represents an equal fighting force is a self-evidently erroneous proposition. But the classification of what is "standard armored tonnage" and what is "inferior" is also faulty. If the age of a ship is to be the governing factor as to whether it is "standard tonnage" or "inferior tonnage," the age of a ship must date from the time she is laid down, and not from the date of her launch. British vessels are built and completed much more rapidly than foreign vessels, and this celerity of construction is as remarkable before launching as afterwards.
A vessel has merely to remain for a long period on the stocks unlaunched to become, according to the principle of classification adopted, a superior fighting ship to one laid down after her but launched before her. The method, both of classification and addition, adopted operates unfairly so far as the existing fighting power of the British fleet is concerned. As regards the future, the conclusions of the writer are based on inaccurate information as to the condition and progress of the big ships building in the different dockyards of Russia, France and Great Britain. It is assumed that by December, 1896, France will have added seven big battleships to her fleet—Russia eight. To divide these numbers by half is a more correct estimate of the probable state of the ships eighteen months hence from their known condition now. Whilst the two navies above mentioned have their additions greatly exaggerated, a corresponding depreciation is made of the reinforcements of the English navy during the same period. There are now 10 ships of far larger dimensions than are building in foreign yards, in various stages of construction. It is assumed that of these 10 the Renown only will be ready by December, 1896, and the Magnificent and Majestic by the end of 1897. The estimates presented to the House of Commons show that the Magnificent and Majestic will be completed by July, 1896, and the Renown shortly afterwards. If the acceleration of the remaining seven vessels became of real importance they would, one and all, be completed by the end of 1897.
The idea that Great Britain is in a trap for the next two years is an illusion. Whilst criticizing the general principle advanced in this pamphlet, the contentions entertained in it are very valuable to Naval Administrators, as evincing the necessity of a continuous and uninterrupted addition year by year to a fleet of those big fighting vessels upon whose numbers the supremacy of the sea alone depends
Captain H.C. Taylor. U.S.N.—It is not easy to discuss Mr. Hobson's essay in a brief or superficial manner.
He is very sweeping in his arguments, and they are so ably sustained as to deserve an amount of thought and study scarcely to be looked for in any ordinary criticism or discussion.
Logically Mr. Hobson is correct; the conditions he lays down are those that appear to exist in Europe at the present time, and the deductions he draws from their existence are accurate. Nor can we say with any positiveness that his forecast of the future situation may not be confirmed within the next quarter of a century.
The difficulty with such problems as these, which occupy so wide a field of thought, is that no matter how logical the reasoning may be the premises upon which our logic is based may themselves be defective, and for the reason that with ordinary human discernment we cannot recognize all the growing national influences now existing unless they have attracted our notice already by visible action and striking effects.
Among the students of modern history there are some who claim to perceive in southeastern Europe a nascent force which promises to be for centuries to come a thorn in the side of Muscovite dominion. The national spirit now stirring there, unnoticed save by a few, may include the states of Servia, Bulgaria, Romania and the adjacent principalities. The nation thus formed would be the natural heir of the Turk in Europe and of Austria-Hungary's eastern provinces, and its extension to the north and northwest would, in a measure, depend upon the degree of exhaustion of Russia and Austria in the next great European struggle.
This budding state would command the outlet of the Black Sea and dominate the Adriatic and Levant. Its youthful vigor would utilize to the fullest extent the great military and naval strength of the Balkan peninsula, whose strategic qualities have been almost forgotten by the decrepit government of the Sultan. The opportunity and signal for its birth would be the outbreak of those mighty conflicts which our essayist clearly discerns in the near future.
This empire of the Balkans, or by whatever name it shall be known in history, will be always on the flank of Russia's westerly advance across Europe. Its strategic position will compel her anxious attention in case of war. Something more than an army corps will be needed to contain or observe the army of the new state and to mask its influence in the theater of war. It must be attacked directly and by Russia's principal armies, which in so doing must expose their flank to western Europe. Its fleet will not be so easy to prepare as its armies, for the nucleus of the latter exists already. Its naval strength once developed, however, would be exerted from a position of great strategic value in the event of a determined contest between the Dual and Triple Alliances. Details are purposely avoided, for it is not claimed that immediate war would find this nationality sufficiently crystallized for action; but should some years elapse before the deciding blows are struck its influence will probably be felt. Our first answer to the essayist's question of what is left for the passive powers of Europe to do against the impending onrush of the Gaul and Muscovite would therefore be that England and the Triple Alliance should devote their skill in diplomacy to encouraging those southeastern states to prepare for union, independence and a strong army and navy, and to educating them to understand their future destiny as a factor in European affairs.
There is yet another latent force in Europe which, if developed into activity, would exert a powerful influence upon the situation as described by Mr. Hobson. This force is Spain, if it shall once awaken from its long sleep. The elements of greatness exist in Spain to-day. The national spirit has been at times subdued but never destroyed. Signs of its revival are apparent to those who examine closely. Commerce and industries begin to develop at Barcelona and elsewhere. It has already the nucleus of a respectable army and navy and is developing ambitions as to Morocco. Should this revival continue and prove to be solidly based we should soon have to take into consideration the excellent strategic situation of the Iberian peninsula.
Knowing that Spain is not dead, but only sleeping; recognizing her compact and isolated nationality, we ought always to expect a future renewal of her greatness. It is probable that such a renewal would be marked in its earlier stages by the absorption of Morocco, the strengthening of her posts in the Balearic Islands and by a rapid increase of army and fleet. We can easily imagine in such a contingency how strong would be the influence at sea of this reviving power in the western Mediterranean, and how hazardous it would be for French armies to undertake distant campaigns against the Triple Alliance while hostile Spanish columns awaited in the passes of the Pyrenees the signal to 8.dvance upon Bordeaux and Toulouse.
In further reply, therefore, to Mr. Hobson's inquiry as to what the passive powers can do, I suggest that they can encourage Spain to absorb Morocco and to strengthen her military and naval force. England can assist her finances, now much involved, and her industrial development.
Spain can in fact be put upon her feet by the passive powers and her developed strength and exceptional strategic position would weigh too heavily in the scale to be disregarded by any combination.
Spain then, can be made very quickly a powerful clog upon the wheels of the Dual Alliance, while with longer time for naval preparation the Balkan empire or republic might become an almost impassable obstacle in the path.
These suggestions are not put forward to controvert Mr. Hobson's arguments, but to introduce other elements in the discussion which perhaps have a place there and which may modify somewhat the conditions of his problem.
It is doubtful if in any case events would move as rapidly as the essayist believes. It takes much time to overcome the spirit of nationality, even after a nation is subdued and overrun. If the years in the essay were decades and decades were centuries it would seem to some members of the Institute a reasonable forecast; for when we think of the past history of these countries and note how irresistibly the waves of Eastern nations have moved westward across Europe until their force has been spent, it is natural to believe that in the future this phenomenon may be repeated.
Commander C.F. Goodrich, U.S.N —The writer has given, to help us, in speaking of the elements of naval force, some definitions which will doubtless meet with general acceptation, for they express tersely what would ordinarily require long verbal circumlocutions. His standard and inferior armored ton are indeed welcome terms. I could wish that he had suggested a similar happy measure for quality of armored tonnage. This is implied, but not so clearly stated as it must have been in his own mind.
I think this essay an ingenious speculation in European politics, although I am unable to accept its postulates or its conclusions. There is, so far as I know, no evidence of a wave of Slavonic invasion sweeping westward as argued. Indeed, the late Czar will be longest and best remembered for his steady and successful determination to preserve peace at all hazards. His successor's policy is not likely to be greatly different, for his attention will be largely compelled to internal questions.
The writer's apprehension of immediate war seems to be based on Russian desire for territorial aggrandizement, aided by French thirst for revenge. It is not improbable that cool heads in Russia have not yet forgotten how difficult and relatively fruitless was the war with Turkey in 1878. There is nothing in the history of that campaign to show the possibility of equipping and putting into the field a tithe of the total available force now borne on Russian paper. It is but fair to subject all similar estimates to equivalent reductions, leaving, of course, the relative numbers about as stated. The absolute numbers I am not in a position to verify, nor is their truth, which is not questioned, essential to the main contention.
That Russia covets Constantinople, and that she will eventually obtain it, is doubtless correct. But this indicates a specific, not a general, scheme of expansion. The same holds good for the eastern outlet which she seeks, with due pertinacity, in Korea. The invasion of India is a movement she cannot undertake at the same time with either of the other two; nor does it, at any moment, offer much chance of success against the large and well trained force in India of British Imperial and Indian troops. Personally I have never understood the fear expressed and felt by many Englishmen on that score. Judicious handling of the Afghans will secure an efficient buffer on the western frontier of India, while a glance at any good map will make clear the slight hope of victorious advance toward Peshawur from the northwest.
Egypt is not to be taken from England's grasp by any army however strong until her command of the sea is destroyed. Now naval warfare is not entirely a question of numerical contrast. Lord Nelson was always willing to fight the French even when they were slightly superior in numbers. And he was right, as the battles of St. Vincent, Aboukir and Trafalgar testify. There can be no doubt in the minds of disinterested critics that the sea habit of the English will always give them a decided advantage over the French, with tonnage, armor and guns equal. We can readily compare numbers, but to evaluate morale is no light matter. The persistent keeping of the sea, the constant, never ceasing drilling and maneuvering of squadrons have fitted the English to enter into their next naval war with a confidence born of practical familiarity with their weapons.
It is stated that in 1896-7 the Dual Alliance will have, in standard tonnage, 1.21 ton to England's 1.00. Apart from the difficulty which France and Russia would encounter in effecting a junction of their fleets, this proportion should occasion no paroxysm of alarm to Englishmen, who have fought and won against as heavy odds. After all, I feel confident that those who guide the destinies of Europe are well aware of the great possibility of defeat, even when somewhat numerically superior to England, and that they will be slow to risk a naval campaign on an equation where two and two do not necessarily make four. One matter is omitted from this very thoughtful essay which appears to me vital. Of course, such numbers as 1,416,000 to 856,400, to be followed by a total of 6,630,000 to 4,380,000, are not to be taken au pied de la lettre, but rather as indicating a rough proportion between what will, confessedly, be huge and opposing masses; but, after the most liberal allowance made for exaggeration in these estimates, there will remain armies of a magnitude almost inconceivable. The question at once arises, how and by whom shall these armies be supported and supplied? The days of living off invaded country have passed away, and so money for these suggested enterprises must be found. France might raise enough for her own needs by national subscription, although the interest charge in her annual budget is already appalling in size, and national schemes are less popular than before the days of Panama. But Russia is poor and must go to the Jews. Will they advance the requisite cash? Herein opinions may properly differ. Mine is that such a request would meet with a firm and final refusal.
It appears to me that the existence of a Russian wish to overrun Europe first and the rest of the Eastern hemisphere afterwards is stated rather than proved. Without the absolute certainty of Russian co-operation France will sigh in vain for revanche, Alsace and Lorraine, and probably our cousins across the water, while keeping a careful eye on the weather, can, for a time yet, sleep peacefully, undisturbed by dreams of universal war, and this notwithstanding the hatred of the Frenchman for the Englishman—far greater than that he bears towards the German—and notwithstanding, too, the menace to peace in the complications likely to spring out of the Simonoseki Treaty.
Mr. W. Laird Clowes.—With respect to the interesting paper of Mr. Richmond Pearson Hobson I should like to say that the author appears to take a far too pessimistic view of the situation in Europe. It is true that everything points to the probability that sooner or later the Triple Alliance must break up, and that we shall witness alliance and co-operation between those fellow-Latins and natural allies, France and Italy; but, on the other hand, I cannot admit that the unnatural pact between France and Russia is likely to continue. The fate eventually reserved for Russia seems to be isolation, in Europe at all events. Nor does the writer take a sufficiently rosy survey of the progress of the British naval preparations. He says that the Magnificent and Majestic, for example, cannot be hoped for before the end of 1897. I hope that we shall see both of them in commission before the end of the present year, and that the Renown and at least one of the still newer battle-ships will be ready next year. At the same time I grant that we are not going ahead as fast as considerations of prudence should dictate, and that unless we accelerate our rate of progress we stand in danger of sooner or later falling out of the race with the Dual Alliance. Yet, believe me, we shall put on the necessary spurt in time. We are not situated as you, our cousins, are. We have no large inland territories which can only with the greatest difficulty be induced to realize the value and importance of a strong navy. All our population is quite solid upon that one question if upon no other. We do care for that point; but I don't think that we care much for the European situation, save so far as it may directly affect or threaten our immediate interests. Nor do we, I think, dream of European alliances. There is only one alliance, a strictly anti-aggressive one, that would be really popular here, and that is an alliance, in the interests of general trade and peace, of the whole Anglo-Saxon race. Mr. Hobson does not touch upon such a consideration as a possible factor in the moulding of the world's future. It is nevertheless a consideration which is forcing itself before the attention of thoughtful men on both sides of the Atlantic. The man who, on your side, hasn't traveled fifty miles outside Hugginsville, and the man who on our side hasn't traveled fifty miles outside Little Peddlington, won't listen to a suggestion of such a consummation; but these are not the gentlemen who direct affairs, thank God! Every Englishman who spends a few months occasionally with his hospitable American cousins, and, I hope and believe, every American who either comes here or who travels a bit about the world and takes intelligent notice of what his race and ours has done and is doing, sees whither the common interests are drifting. You have cut loose from the home strings, and certainly no one here blames you for having done so; yet, although you have cut loose, you have the same ancestry and the same blood, and may heaven give you one day a part in the common inheritance, in defense of which I look to see all our kin ere I die stand together. Surely we can both observe and cherish our national allegiance without forgetting, in the stress of honorable rivalry, that we owe some racial allegiance as well. If only every Briton could see the United States, and every American could see the British Empire, the petty and passing jealousies of the two great branches of the family would be quickly swallowed up in a desire for co-operation and mutual help and in generous pride in the family prosperity.
Lieutenant C.N. Atwater, U.S.N—To those interested in the study of the world's politics from a military standpoint the vigorous and novel views set forth by the essayist are worthy of attention. Probably few officers will entirely agree with these views. It is safe to say that a majority will find that they are extreme. But a debt of gratitude is due the essayist for opening up, as a new subject of discussion for the Institute, the treatment, from a naval standpoint, of international politics. While articles of a character similar to this one abound in the British reviews, they are conspicuously absent from periodicals on this side of the Atlantic, and in breaking ground in what is for us a new field the essayist turns a furrow both broad and deep. It would seem to be a duty for the handful of commissioned officers of our army and navy—thirty-five hundred of the seventy millions of our population—to discuss and to keep discussing the war politics of the world. They are the nation's only trained technical students in military matters, and when questions vast enough to involve the welfare of the whole civilized world are at stake they should have opinions as to what the possible results may be.
The essayist refers to the rare opportunity the coming war will offer the United States to take her place among the world's carriers and attract wealth to herself instead of paying heavily to get her goods to foreign markets. Then, indeed, will she "be in a position to begin immediately on her ultimate naval policy…if she has sufficient power afloat during the war to enforce respect for her rights as a neutral." But is she likely to have such power when it is needed? Is she not more likely, if things move as usual, to be ready to get into difficulties at the moment when a decisive stand, backed by force, would secure her freedom to reap whatever benefits an armed neutrality might confer? Weakness may even force her to take part as a combatant in the struggle, for her children are not patient when put upon. As a foreign writer has recently said, "The Americans are known to act regardless of consequences." Admitting that the affairs of Europe are in a desperate condition, that condition may mean more of danger than of profit for us. We are not ready for war. We are rich and relatively defenseless. Why may not the overburdened Continent, laying aside its differences, create a diversion by attacking and despoiling us? We, like our European neighbors, are controlled by interest, and our interests clash with theirs to our betterment. They certainly do not love us enough to fight for us, and that some of them would enjoy seeing us humbled there can be but little doubt. The United States alone among the great nations can afford to consider military power as of secondary importance, but even she cannot safely assume that she may not be forced to fight. With her millions of aggressively patriotic citizens ready to cry war with a sure voice whenever there is a show of provocation, she should reflect, when she interferes in the affairs of the nations, whether her forty thousand soldiers and sailors are strong enough to enforce her demands and ensure her safety. If she cannot be content to stand modestly back from the front rank of the powers, she should lose no time in preparing for war by strengthening her fleet and the defenses of her waterways and coast cities.
The essayist has quite a startling array of figures marshaled in support of his views as to what may happen abroad, but it is questionable if the preponderance of the fleet of the Dual Alliance will be as great in 1896 as it is made to appear on paper. The value of other than battleships is not sufficiently emphasized, while such other factors as fortified coaling stations, torpedo fleets, merchant tonnage, the supply of trained seamen and the possession of great wealth are either not dwelt upon or not mentioned. If, indeed. Great Britain hesitates to ensure her sea power by spending upon it a larger proportion of her enormous wealth, at the same time that the Dual Alliance continues to advance in fleet building, it may be foreseen that she runs a risk of losing her sea power somewhere in the twentieth century; but that she will neglect to provide against the danger does not seem very probable. Those who have been expecting the outbreak of the "imminent" European war ever since Russia and Turkey came to blows over the Eastern Question have little faith in predictions as to when it will begin, what will cause it, or what sides will be taken by the nations concerned.
It seems to me that the essayist has allowed himself to make a bugbear of the Slavonic race. He is so earnest that he occupies the ground of those English Russophobes who find it necessary to alarm their countrymen in order to secure money for the defense of the empire, and he goes even farther than they do, for where they see menaced a single nation, and that their own, he regards the whole civilization of western Europe as in danger. He seems to see issuing from Russia's vast territory barbaric hordes, like unto those of Attila or Timour, which must inevitably flow over Europe to the destruction of the liberties, arts and sciences which go to make up our civilization. But modern Russia is not really a specter before whose unmeasured and superhuman power the West need tremble. Her barbarism is rapidly giving way to the western civilization she is supposed to threaten, and if she changes the present political boundaries of Europe it will not be to lay waste the nations with fire and sword.
As lookers-on we Americans have neither bitter animosity nor overheated affection for any outside nation. As the essayist points out, interest rather than sentiment controls modern policy. Among our naval officers Russia will find her champions as against England, France as against Germany, and the reverse is equally true. Individual officers may prefer one nation to another, but as a class we champion no power but our own.
Asst. Naval Constructor Hobson.—The paper above was prepared in the spring and early summer of '94. Since then an international event of the first magnitude has taken place: a war has been entered into, prosecuted and concluded.
History presents few cases of war—the gravest phenomenon that takes place on our planet—where the consequences promised to be more grave, more far-reaching. Apart from the vast economic, sociological and ethnical vistas opened up, in which speculation loses itself, the political situation and outlook in Europe have been profoundly influenced. A power has been added to the list of Russia's enemies, which acts with tremendous leverage on Europe.
Japan has finally closed the war under such circumstances that no fact is so universally recognized as the approach of an inevitable struggle with Russia; on this fact the eye of the nation is centered, and with it in view, the national policy will be shaped and the national resources plied.
Moreover, a strong fleet, being the first essential, will be the first aim of the policy. This fact is of capital importance to Europe, whose immediate destiny hangs over the sea, wrapt about by the British fleets; for henceforth Russia must maintain in the Pacific a squadron superior to the entire Japanese fleets.
Whether the additional vessels are furnished by Russia alone or by Russia and her allies together, the result is the same, they are so many vessels diverted from Europe, wholly lost to the possibility of action in European waters, where the great engagements are to take place.
The Chinese and Japanese fleets, now combined under the Japanese flag, will retain in the Pacific all the Russian and French vessels sent as reinforcements during the war; and during the accomplishment of the extensive program of construction entered on by Japan, as each new vessel hoists the Japanese flag, an equivalent must weigh anchor from Cronstadt, Brest or Toulon and bid farewell to Europe.
This loss has cut down seriously the possible preponderance of the available fleets of the Dual Alliance over those of Great Britain, and after a few years, when the English and Japanese harvests, now sown, are reaped, it will be practically impossible for the fleets of the Dual Alliance in Europe to maintain an equality with those of Great Britain.
The war has thus produced an effect equivalent to the addition of a new fleet to the British fleets, and the addition of a new nation with vast and willing resources to the British nation in the effort to create and maintain a naval superiority over the Dual Alliance.
As a consolation for the universal regret felt when European influence caused Japan to recede from her conquests only to clear the way for Russia, it should be borne in mind that the renunciation of continental territory and restriction to water-locked possessions will throw Japan's aspirations more toward naval affairs. The foundations are laid for a great naval power, which will be the greater for not having continental possessions to divide the national mind and national treasury. In consequence, the bulk of the war indemnity and of the price paid for the renunciation of territory, and the bulk of future appropriations, will flow to the creation of a new navy, as did the war indemnity from France to the creation of a new German army.
This result is far more advantageous to Europe. It is better for the present that Japan's resources should flow to naval power to call away Russian vessels than that they should flow to military power to divert Russian troops from Europe.
Those who were inclined to criticize the British non-interference in behalf of Japan will come to recognize that no break has been made in the wise counsel that has steadily guided British foreign policy.
Thus, in sum, the war in the East, the rise of Japan, has come at an opportune time to enter a lever under the scales of political Europe, to sustain them from toppling under the weight of the great aggressive alliance.
In order to enter with a preponderance of strength into the struggle for the first great object of their ambition, the overthrow of the British empire, France and Russia must now look to the result of their overtures to Italy, whose bond with the Triple Alliance will soon be loosed. If Great Britain, through the peculiar, substantial inducements that she could make with her wealth and her fleets, can secure and guarantee Italy's neutrality, or, if she enters an alliance with her, Europe will be guaranteed against Russian victory, and, as will be seen below, since Russia has more interest in waiting than in engaging in uncertain war, a new guarantee of peace would be given and impatient France would be doomed to longer waiting.
The creation of a naval power in the East, dedicated to enmity to Russia, has come to the rescue of Europe. The rise of Japan as a rival and aspiring power will call a larger share of Russian attention to Asia, where lies the great field of her legitimate ambition.
Russia has been held up to the gaze of the world, and the chances are somewhat better that all the nations may come to realize that she is the universal enemy. Such a realization might throw Russia into Asia, save Europe, and set our planet right again, leaving the great struggle of the races to be fought under fair conditions, which would end in the elevation or else in the extermination of the lower.
The criticisms in the interesting and valuable discussions above are of two kinds: technical, relating to the estimates of naval strength; and general, relating to what may be termed the Russian question. The first takes issue with the method employed for determining naval strength, and challenges the results; the second doubts the existence of a Slavic wave, or doubts the seriousness of the question, or sees the possibility of the growth of new modifying factors. Other criticisms are parts of or attach themselves to these.
A navy or a fleet, being made up, being the resultant of the combination of a number of vessels, any process that deals with the qualities of a fleet or navy must be a numerical process. The strength of a fleet or navy is derived from the strengths of the individual vessels. Though the strength attributable to any Vessel will vary with the combination of vessels, the strength of the combination is essentially distributed among the individual vessels, a loss of any one of which must entail a certain loss to the combination. The strength of a fleet or navy being thus essentially the aggregate of the quotas of strength of the individual vessels, any process or method for determining the strength of a fleet or navy must be essentially arithmetical.
The value of any element for prosecuting war lies in its capacity for inflicting injury. The measure of the value of a fleet or navy is its power to inflict injury. The power to inflict injury will depend on what may be termed the innate power of the agent and on the opportunity for the exercise or use of this power. This opportunity depends on the strategic conditions or circumstances resulting from three kinds of elements, from what may be termed the innate strategic elements, depending upon the relative innate powers, from what may be termed the natural strategic elements imposed by the necessary positions of advantage or disadvantage, and from what may be termed the human strategic elements. The human elements of strategy can never be determined beforehand, and even where previous experience or record gives grounds for presumptions, these should not enter into estimates similar to those proposed. The natural elements of strategy will have a profound influence in determining the results of the possible and probable sea struggles of the nations of Europe, and should be separately and specially considered in drawing ultimate conclusions. For the purposes of the paper and for the present purpose, the natural and human elements of strategy are eliminated by the assumption of equality, so that, whether it is a question of individual vessels, of fleets, or of navies, the second factor for determining the value or strength, the opportunity to use innate power, is assumed to depend only on innate powers themselves. Thus restricted, the problem of the estimation of naval strength resolves itself into two parts, the evaluation of innate power, and the opportunity of advantage or occasion of disadvantage resulting from the relative powers in the case in question.
The innate power of a vessel is composed of two elements, the power of her weapons, and her ability or power to use them. Moreover, these two elements enter as factors; either of them would be useless without the other. The final exponents of the two, however, are not the same, for the element of offense, in its silencing effect on the weapons of the enemy, enters as a part of the element of defense, and its final exponent will in consequence be greater.
Let a rapid mental process make a rough evaluation of the two elements or factors, offensive power and defensive power, for a typical vessel of each of the recent types, assuming-, as this does, that the vessels are within their radii of action; let the factors be held up apart, though with the multiplication sign between them, with unity as the exponent of each factor, if the imagination finds it difficult to picture an exponent greater than unity for offensive power, and let the products stand opposite. Examine the column of products. Passing down from the battleship to the coast-defense the difference is moderate, but from the coast-defense vessel to the armored cruiser the difference is enormous; the armored cruiser and the very large protected cruiser peculiar to the British navy do not differ largely, but between them and the ordinary cruiser there is another enormous gap; passing down through the cruisers to the gunboats and torpedo vessels and torpedo boats, the difference continues more or less regularly.
What do the two gaps in the column indicate? They indicate that the vessels on different sides are so different in power or force that a necessary assumption of equality in the human element of strategy will forbid them engaging each other, except where the conditions are such as to force the weaker. Moreover, this gap cannot be spanned by superior numbers. A vessel on the higher side engaging any number on the lower will always possess that strategic advantage of inflicting more injury than she suffers.
If the columns are divided by the tonnage of the vessels in each case, these gaps will be found to be even wider. There will be this difference, however, the very large British protected cruiser will pass over to the lower side of the gap. It is only by virtue of her great size that she can enter the list of the French armored cruisers of less than half her tonnage. If tonnage is the basis, she must go over to the ordinary cruiser side or else enter the other side with a heavy coefficient of reduction. Another noticeable fact is that now the armored gunboat rises up out of its rank and can be admitted even across the lower gap.
Take now the types of vessels of previous decades. The battleships and coast-defense vessels produce products that lie between the two gaps. The cruisers all drop well down below the lower gap.
Thus for all types of vessels, strategy has put up two essential barriers that classification for estimates cannot cross, one that shuts off unarmored tonnage, and one that divides armored tonnage into two parts. When control of the sea is the object of naval engagements, and where both sides possess considerable quantities above the upper gap, the role of the vessels below the lower gap must be considered as only auxiliary. These being the conditions of the coming engagements, it may be assumed, as stated in the paper, that unarmored vessels will not enter as deciding factors. Further, the upper strategic gap across the middle of armored tonnage indicates that vessels on the lower or inferior side will not engage voluntarily those on the upper side. It indicates that the first engagements will be between vessels on the upper side, and the subsequent engagements between vessels on the lower side and what vessels on the upper side as may have survived the first engagements.
Thus the classification used in the paper, which eliminates unarmored vessels and then divides armored vessels into standard and inferior armored vessels, according to fitness to figure in the first series of engagements or only in the subsequent series, this classification which in the discussion is spoken of as "faulty," is the one made by essential strategy, the only rational classification possible which can give an idea of what forces can be thrown into the successive engagements or what the actual naval strength of a nation is.
The classification being made, the next step in the determination of naval strength consists in the estimation of the power or force which the nation in question possesses in each of the three divisions, using these three kinds of power in making all comparisons and drawing all conclusions. In making such an estimate, the only plausible basis is that of tonnage, affected by a coefficient or factor of efficiency, furnishing the two factors quantity and quality. Any descriptive method whatsoever will be found laborious, lacking in comprehensiveness of application, and altogether inadequate. All the features of a vessel may be classified as elements of offense or elements of defense. Any one or any number of one or the other or both of these kinds of elements taken as a basis will be found utterly inadmissible on the slightest examination. The features of vessels classed together are too varied to admit of any descriptive method whatsoever. The varying features cited in the discussion criticizing the method of using tonnage show that the method of tonnage is the only plausible method. Since it was necessary to estimate the naval strengths, it may be interesting to know what other method may have been in the mind or could have been suggested by the author of the discussion in question.
The tonnage furnishing directly the factor of quantity, it remains to determine the factors of quality. There are two methods, which may be called the exact method and the approximate method. The exact method consists in the following parts: (1) The determination of the elements of offense and the elements of defense and the relative weight or value of each element and the nature of its relation to the whole. (2) The establishment of a standard in each division of the classification for each of the elements of offense and defense. (3) The determination for each vessel of sub-partial coefficients representing the degree or value of its various elements of offense and of its various elements of defense as compared with the standard elements. (4) To derive partial coefficients, one a coefficient of offense, and the other a coefficient of defense, by treating the sub-partial coefficients of offense and those of defense found in (3) by the values or weights found in (1) in accordance with their relation to the whole. (5) To derive the coefficient of reduction for the vessel by taking the simple product of the two partial coefficients, the coefficient of offense and the coefficient of defense. This coefficient of reduction will represent the quality, the equivalent tonnage, the quantity sought, will be the product of the actual tonnage by the coefficient of reduction. The sum of the equivalent tonnage for all the vessels of the nation in the division will represent the naval strength of the nation in that division. The divisions of the classification represent adaptability for the various kinds of engagements, and the results arrived at furnish all the elements needed for a comparison.
Moreover, a coefficient of reduction can be established for passing from one division to another, and the strength of the entire navy can be expressed in a single quantity in any of the divisions, expressing the nation's entire force available for any kind of engagements, engagements against unarmored tonnage, against inferior armored tonnage, or against standard armored tonnage. It could further be used to transfer one or more vessels from one division to the other, and would show the result or advantage of detailing it or them to perform one or the other duty. It would give an insight into the advantage of different combinations of vessels in a fleet, of the value under various conditions of a fleet of heterogeneous vessels, of the advisability of having any vessel or number of vessels detached or withdrawn in any engagement or during any portion of an engagement. Further applications need not be pointed out; they will be contained in a subsequent paper devoted to the exact or absolute method outlined.
In the approximate method the analysis of the features of the vessels is avoided by assuming that these features, reflecting the condition of progress of the time when they were produced, will have their general quality defined by this condition, and the method consists in finding the mean date of the tonnage of each division. In comparisons this method requires that cognizance should be taken of the relative degree of progress in each country at the time of the mean date, and of the degree of improvement which the interval between dates at the time would indicate. To make the results more accurate, general cognizance can be taken of the prominent features of design or construction influencing quality, which differ in the countries compared. For the purposes of the paper, it was sufficiently accurate to eliminate unarmored tonnage as not influencing primarily the result of the engagements for control of the sea, and to draw the line between standard and unarmored tonnage by judgment between the vessels considered fit and unfit to enter the first series of engagements. In placing this line, the vessels on both sides were analyzed summarily as to their elements of offense and defense and the decision made accordingly. Though to indicate in a few words the general character of the limiting vessels, reference was made to their date, it was not this date that determined the decision. It is not age, as erroneously concluded in the discussion, but fitness that determines whether by this method a vessel should be entered on one side or on the other of the dividing line. An armored cruiser just launched cannot enter the class of standard armored tonnage, though a battleship launched ten years ago can. Age is used in arriving at rough conclusions as to quality, but has no influence, except in so far as it influences fitness, in determining the class or division to which a vessel is assigned. In the first method, the principle of which is precisely the same, no use whatever is made of age.
It should be pointed out that in this approximate method the age of a vessel does virtually act as a coefficient of reduction, and that in fact every ton of every ship does not receive equal weight, as supposed in the discussion, for the age of each vessel, assumed to be an index of its quality, has its due proportional influence in determining the age of the whole, which is taken as the index of the quality of the whole.
As to the choice of the date to be assigned as the date of birth of a vessel from which to reckon her age, it should be borne in mind that the object sought is quality, and that the age should transport the mind to the date whose degree of progress is reflected or embodied in the vessel. Though the design of a vessel may not be changed during the course of her construction, though weights and dimensions may remain unaltered, the quality of the material, a quality ranking next to design in importance, changes during practically the whole course of construction. This is particularly important in the case of armor. Radical changes may have taken place in the quality of armor turned out when the vessel is laid down and the quality turned out when the armor is put on.
In consequence, of the three dates in the growth of a vessel, the date of laying down, the date of launch, and the date of completion, the middle date, the one employed in the paper, and not the first date, as advanced in the discussion, is the date whose degree of progress is more nearly embodied in the vessel, and which in consequence should be selected as the index of quality.
In the case of the two fleets, British and French, it should be pointed out that in England few changes, if any, are made in design, even in details, during the course of construction, which is rapid, while in France changes of a serious character are constantly made, such, for instance, as the moving of the torpedo tubes from above to positions below the water line, or even in the distribution of armor, modifications of the splinter deck, changes that have been recently made in consequence of the development of the rapid-fire gun and the use of high explosives for bursting charges, and the use of steel shell containing large charges of powder. Thus in France, where the construction is long, due in part to the changes referred to, changes which add to quality, an advantage which has been accepted to counterbalance in part the disadvantage of delay, the real date of a vessel is much farther from the date of laying down than in England; and, further, for the same reason, to use the date of launch for determining the age of a vessel in both cases is a discrimination to the disadvantage of France instead of a discrimination to the disadvantage of Great Britain, as advanced in the discussion.
It should be pointed out, also, that in the case of the British vessels of large tonnage it will be found on examination by a rough application of the exact method that the powers of offense and of defense are not as commensurate with their tonnage as they are in the case with contemporary French vessels. A greater quantity of coal adds but little to increase military superiority when the enemy has all the coal needed. It will be found on analysis that the battleships of the Royal Sovereign class outmatch very little for offense and defense the contemporary French battleships of more than two thousand tons less displacement, and, In consequence, the simple addition of tonnage is a discrimination to the disadvantage of France instead of the disadvantage of Great Britain, as advanced in the discussion.
It is not the author's intention to raise the question of the comparative value or worth of French and English construction, but the question of discrimination being up, he considers that in addition to the discriminations pointed out as disadvantageous to France, there is another of not less importance in the assumption that design in the two countries has been on an equality of advancement or progress. Not to mention such points as the perfection and adoption of water tubulous boilers, many years old in France but comparatively new in England, it will suffice to point out simply the lapse of several years that has intervened between the time of appreciation in the designs of the two countries of the necessity of the distribution of armor with a view to protection against projectiles carrying high explosives, and semi-armor-piercing shell with heavy powder charges, differences as indicated in France in the increase of area covered by light side armor, in the protection of medium caliber guns and the development of the splinter deck.
Thus, in sum, the method and classification employed in the paper for the estimation of naval strength, criticized in the discussion, are founded on and flow out of essential innate strategy. Though all of the intermediate elements that must necessarily be incident to an estimation of such a nature as that of naval strength are free and open to individual opinion or judgment, though the parts and details may vary, the author believes the method to be final, and combined with a separate consideration of natural strategy and mental estimate of human strategy, to be comprehensive and unassailable.
In the case of the approximate method, used for the purposes of the paper, the result instead of discriminating against Great Britain, as advanced in the discussion, discriminates incidentally against France.
For the comparison of the future naval forces, it will suffice to mention that the new vessels causing the changes are all enumerated, and that the dates set for their completion were derived a year ago in each case by conservative estimates based on the stages of advancement and taking due account of the time required for building in the different countries. If these times have changed or do change, they will modify only to that extent the result.
It should be borne in mind that in England, where of recent years rapidity of construction has taken the form of strong rivalry between the different yards, the terms date of laying down, date of completion do not mean what they do in France. For instance, in England at the date of laying down material, progress has been made in the preparation of material, which would correspond to a date some time later in France. In the case of the Magnificent and Majestic, put down as expecting to be completed before the Renown, in July, 1896, if these vessels are actually to be ready for commission at that date, a prodigy will have been performed even for England's remarkable rapidity of construction, and no adequate cause can be assigned other than an intense desire of the authorities to remedy to the utmost the inevitable condition pointed out in the paper.
Referring to the accuracy of numerical statements in the paper, occasion should be taken, in view of the equivocal use of the word "exaggeration" in a subsequent discussion, to mention at this point that they are from sources of the utmost reliability. The figures for strength of armies are from the Bureau of Information of the War Department, corrected by the Bureau up to the date of completion of the paper. The figures for naval expenditures and appropriations are from official returns in the budgets of the different countries. Those for populations and rates of increase are from statistical returns made in 1894. Those for vessels, tonnage, date of launch, material of hull, kind of guns, etc., do not admit question. The only possibility for variation from the statements lies, as pointed out, in the estimation of dates of completion of vessels now building, dates liable to be changed, and even here modifications can be but slight, and, where found, will be the results of abnormal conditions which cannot enter estimates.
History presents two forms of sociological wave. In one form, a race or nation or a religious sect has advanced across territory not its own in one or more pronounced directions. Such has been the case of the invasion of Europe by the Huns, the Saracens, the Mongols, and the Turks. In the other, a race or nation has expanded circumferentially like a wave of disturbance, as in the case of the Celts, Romans, and the Teutons in Europe and the Mongols in Asia. The former form of wave, which may be termed the wave of translation, has had its sources in sociological impulses beyond Europe. The waves have advanced across long distances in comparatively short times, receiving but slight reinforcements and expending their force till checked by sociological barriers, when they began to recede. The invaders have been of different race origin and have remained alienated from the native peoples, and recession, though slow, has been steady and sure.
The second form of wave, which may be termed the wave of radial expansion, has had its historic origin in each case in Europe itself. The sociological forces have been long and cumulative in their processes, the waves gathering new force as they advanced along radii or, as in the case of Rome, around the whole circumference. The races have all been of Aryan origin arid have spread over Aryan expanses. They have been mixed with the native peoples, have assimilated them, have been assimilated by them, and their influence has been profound and perpetual, exception being made of Rome in her outer circles, which reached far into the regions of the lower races.
It is to the second form of wave that the Slavic wave belongs. Starting from a nucleus in the central part of what is now European Russia, with an area of about 800,000 sq. miles, after the overthrow of the Tartars four centuries ago, it has extended radially in all directions by steady, unremitting strides, till it now compasses more than 8,500,000 sq. miles, about 1/6 of the entire land surface of the globe. This unprecedented expansion belittles Rome when she spread by successive steps in about the same length of time over Italy, then Carthage, Greece, and Macedonia, then Spain and Cisalpine Gaul, then Syria, Parthia, Egypt, and Transalpine Gaul. It overshadows the remarkable phenomenon of the Teutons setting forth from the German forests, tribe after tribe, Goths, Franks, Burgundians, Vandals, Angles, Saxons, Jutes, over one Roman province, then another, into Italy, over one part of Gaul, then another, into Spain, over to Africa, and across to Britain. The Romans assimilated the tribes of Italy, and later mixed with the inhabitants of Gaul and Spain, and everywhere exerted a profound influence; but in their outer dominions their rule was only military, the rulers remaining foreign to the ruled; the fatal characteristic of the wave of translation, foredestined to overthrow.
The Teutons went forth as separate tribes, and mixed with but did not assimilate the native tribes overrun. Their influence was everywhere profound, an exception being made of the Vandals; but it gave rise to new composite nations, the invaders gradually losing themselves in the new nations.
The Slavic expansion has been characterized by universal assimilation. Whether Slavic influence pre-existed or not, the moment the Russian frontier has swept around a section or country, an irresistible system of Russifying has set in. It is as though the Romans had assimilated the populations beyond Italy as well as those within Italy; as though the Teutons had been united instead of appearing in different tribes, and had assimilated as they advanced. The Slavic wave, advancing with an unbroken front, without any tendency to internal division, absorbing into itself new populations, grows stronger and more irresistible instead of dividing, weakening, or diluting its force, as did the Roman and Teutonic waves. Vast, wild expanses, that would have frightened back or swamped a less rugged race, have been leaped till already the northern and eastern boundaries are oceans of two continents. Sociological barriers have been as naught. An ostrich-like digestion has assimilated foreign sociological morsels hitherto utterly indigestible. No wave in history has had the proportions of the Slavic wave, and none offers even the suggestion of a parallel of the combination of elements that make up invincibility, irresistibility. Attention may be called at this point to the fact that no radius has been accepted in the advance along the whole circumference.
Referring to the discussion that advances the idea of specific, not general, expansion, it will suffice to point out that, taking a map and turning back only a few pages in history, starting in Finland at the Swedish boundary, continuing down through Europe, over to Asia, and across the sea to Corea, it will be found that every foot of Russia's endless frontier is under heavy tension, is pressing heavily outward. It may be added, also, that the simple reference made to Turkey, India, and Corea, in connection with the idea of specific expansion, is sufficient to show that the expansion is general.
Of the remarkable features of this wonderful sociological phenomenon, the most striking is the manner in which the Non-Aryan or Turanian races, as well as the Aryan races, one and all, are being assimilated. Though other and higher Aryan races may bear sway in Asia, no one gives promise of being able to assimilate the Asiatics. The rugged Slavic race alone gives promise of being equal to this giant's task of Aryanizing Asia.
Though the process of Russianizing or Slavonicizing elevates the lower races, and would infuse a wonderful new life into the stagnant blood of Asia, it drags down mercilessly the higher races; it would throw Europe back almost to the days of serfdom, with long, agonizing, but relentless pangs. The Russianization of Poland is a case of the process of this assimilation, though with the other nations, not having the preparations of similarity, of proclivities and temperament, the process would be far more severe. Though the sword, referred to in the discussion, would characterize only the first conquest and the suppression of subsequent rebellions, the ordeal involved in the extinction of native tongue, the destruction of individual liberty, of individuality itself, would be far more severe than "fire and sword." To show that, viewed from the westward, a dense darkness hovers over the Slavic wave, it need only be recalled that the mass of the Russian nation, the mass that makes up the wave and gives it the characteristics pointed out above, was only emancipated from serfdom in our own generation, and on the ladder of civilization in its great objective feature, higher standard of comfort and amelioration of the condition of individual life, stands on a round far down, centuries below the round occupied by western Europe.
Russia's representatives abroad, all of whom come from among the aristocracy, a class largely of Teutonic race origin, having had centuries of cosmopolitan association with western Europe, one of the most intelligent, highly educated classes in the world, produce false impressions as to the Russian race. Though they formulate the nation's ambitions, though they wield the great masses with unsurpassed sagacity, having the power to tax to any limit the resources offered by the countless number of stalwart men, seizing on all the improvements in weapons and in methods that western science devises, though peerless in diplomacy, though contributing the guidance of a high intelligence, and though to the greatest advantage wielding the great race with the incalculable power given by absolute obedience, innate courage, and unlimited powers of rugged endurance, they nevertheless form but one and one-half per cent, of the population. The process of assimilation, of transformation, wherever found, has always and must always come from the masses who stand immeasurably below.
Russian ambition, though true to the universality of its possibilities and neglecting no opportunity in Asia, is centered hard on Europe, where it takes the immediate definite form of seeking a southern waterway to the westward, having already a northern one, and gaining at the same time the gateway to the three converging continents. The strategic importance of the Balkans, recognized all down the centuries, cannot be overestimated. Its possession by a strong nation would have a profound, far-reaching effect on the Russian question, as pointed out in the discussion; but, on the other hand, its possession by Russia would be a death-knell to western Europe. Of such vital importance is this Balkan question that it may be assumed that Russia will not be allowed by the nations awakened to antagonism to occupy it without war, while it may be assumed with equal certainty that Russia will not peaceably allow it to be occupied by another strong nation. A strong Balkan nation can arise only by a new birth. It is out of the question that Austro-Hungaria, the only nation available, finding great and growing difficulty in containing the heterogeneous elements in its present borders, and having no expanding population, will attempt to occupy or could effectually occupy the peninsula.
What are the chances of the birth of a new nation? What are those signs in Southeastern Europe which in the discussion are taken to be signs of pregnancy?
The most marked sociological and political feature of contemporary history, referred to in the paper, is the tendency to consolidation in peoples of the same race and the tendency to separation in peoples of different race, though under the same government.
The total population of the Balkan peninsula, including the Hungarian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is about 20,000,000, exclusive of the Turks, who number about 1,700,000, whose occupancy is not permanent. Of this population about 5,000,000 are Romanians of mixed origin, about 3,300,000 are Bulgarians or Bulgars of Turanian origin, with Slavic admixture; about 2,000,000 are pure Slaves, and the remainder, 10,000,000, are made up of Greeks, Albanians, Armenians, Magyars, Circassians, Jews, and Gypsies. This heterogeneous population has shown no tendency to unite. The "signs" have been those of consolidation of the races emerging from the Turkish yoke, and of formation into separate small states or principalities. Growing antagonism and rivalry, not tendency to union, have been the characteristics of these small states in their relations with each other. Even the power of self-government is questionable, so deep have been the effects of the centuries of subjugation to the Turk. Of these contiguous races, no one has shown yet any particular capacity for assimilation. The Magyars of Hungary have shown themselves equally incapable. Though the influence of the western powers might effect a Balkan Confederation in the face of Russia, or Russia and France (the power to do which in the latter case will not be here discussed), yet all the indications point to the continued separation of the races. As far as can be seen now, these races will not flow together until they are all absorbed in their great assimilating neighbor. This destiny seems set apart by fate for all the small heterogeneous races found in Bohemia, Hungary, and Southeastern Europe, which are fast ripening under Russian influence, and for the rest of the races of Europe also, unless some unseen unifying process comes from below the horizon.
Occasion should be taken to point out here that sociological processes, particularly those embodying increase of population and assimilation, are slow, like all great, irresistible forces. It is, in consequence, beyond human knowledge to fix times for the accomplishment of the great phenomena foreshadowed above. It may be added that it is a superficial reading that classes the paper in the category of date fixing prophecies. More careful reading will show that the paper is an analysis of situations, certain, probable and possible, only in so far as they permit analysis, and that it attempts in no manner to determine the other indeterminable elements that enter to decide the times of the war.
As to the peninsula at the other end of Europe, that appeals so strongly to the strategist's eye, whose possession as the home of a great and powerful race would profoundly influence the destiny of Europe, it needs only to be called to mind that all indications point to continued decline in Spain, internal division, increased indebtedness and loss of credit, rebellion in colonies. Rejuvenation has not occurred in the history of Latin races grown rigid with age, and there is no nation in Europe, excepting the one in the East, that could spare population to infuse new blood into the Spaniard's veins. It may be added, further, that it could not be assumed that a new Spain would be with the passive powers. The immediate advantages of spectatorship or alliance with France and Russia would be even greater than those pointed out for Italy. Unless Spain, which is farthest from Russia, could be taught to see across immediate interests to see the final vision, it would be a dangerous experiment, if it were possible to make it, to put great power into her hands.
The picture of a great Iberian power, more even than the picture of a great and growing Balkan power, being allowed to rise from infancy to block the path of Giant Russia, a picture outlined from broad mental sweep and strategic grasp, is but a vision that vanishes under a steady gaze.
The conclusions arrived at are, in sum, as follows:
1. The rise of Japan exerts a stabilizing influence on Europe in restoring equilibrium on the sea, and this equilibrium promises to continue till Italy decides on her future policy, when the treaty of the Triple Alliance expires. It further raises a serious obstacle to Russian advance in the East, and will draw away from Europe a larger share of Russian strength, diverting more of Russia's attention to Asia, where lies her great mission. The events of the war in the East, particularly those connected with its conclusion, have drawn the gaze of the world to Russia, from which fruitful results will flow. These events have emphasized, in addition, two facts that should be signalized, namely, first, the solidity of Russia's alliance with France, a fact emphasized by every event of the past few years, an alliance which, as pointed out in the paper, can be dissolved only by disastrous war, threatened or inflicted, or by the game of waiting, a game advantageous to Russia, which might overtax French patience, or, if possible, might cause a change of sentiment in France; second, the ascendancy of Russian diplomacy, the consummate ability of its diplomats, and the tremendous vantage-ground that it holds while Western Europe is divided.
2. The naval estimates, questioned in the discussion, are based for method and classification on essential strategy, and in results are accurate within the degree of approximation suited to the present treatment, admitting of variations as pointed out, which are discriminations against France in the estimates of vessels completed, and from appearances against England in the estimates for the future in the slight deviation from the normal length of time that may be consumed in the completion of vessels under construction.
3. The situation in Europe, viewed in the light of history, presents the most remarkable phenomenon of sociological wave that the world has seen, a wave which, though still in its youth, has reached proportions hitherto unknown. Belonging to the irresistible class of radial expansion, this wave embodies all the elements of irresistibility found in previous examples, without any of the elements of weakness. Physical and sociological obstacles hitherto insurmountable vanish as naught. This wonderful phenomenon offers the grand prospect of Aryanizing Asia; but, on the other hand, it is a terrible menace to Europe, which would be thrown down centuries of progress; while the situation in Europe, before this menace, is nothing short of desperate.
The absorption of Southeastern and large additional portions of Central Europe appears inevitable. Whether Western Europe is to follow will depend on the capacity of the western nations for union.
The test of history is to be applied to our high western civilization, whether, with its ameliorated condition and higher life of the individual, it has lost, like the high civilizations of the past, the hardihood and elements of combination or association, which alone can guarantee existence in the face of a lower but more rugged race which uses all the weapons and all the methods of the higher race, while possessing greater endurance, if not greater courage, where the individual is lost in the unity of the whole.