The study of military affairs should always be interesting to naval officers, for it has always been the pride of every navy that no mode of fighting could be altogether foreign either to its inclinations or abilities; but aside from this, military tactics may frequently throw great light on purely naval matters. For instance: many of the fire regulations and much of the fire tactics of field artillery are directly applicable in naval gunnery; and the experience of the German infantry in 1870-71 may even be applied to the subject of armor protection, since it was then observed that as the Germans advanced, the opening of their fire was attended by a large diminution of their own losses. Hence it follows that the gunnery skill of a ship's crew forms a part of her protection as well as of her offensive powers, and it does not seem a strained conclusion to say that, in proportion as a navy develops skill in gunnery above that of other nations, it may afford to diminish the amount of protection of its ships and apply the consequent saving of weight in other directions. And again, the employment of cavalry offers so many striking analogies with that of torpedo boats that naval tacticians cannot fail to find the study of cavalry operations very suggestive.
Duties and capabilities of the Naval Brigade.—Prior to all discussion of details we must form a clear idea of what the Brigade may be called upon to do and of what it is able to do. An examination of the services of the Brigades of this and other countries during the present century will show that when the officers have been acquainted with military principles and the men armed and drilled as the soldiers of the time, their operations have always been creditable and usually successful, as in Maryland in 1814,in the Franco-German war, and in Ashantee in 1873 before the arrival of troops; while on the other hand, failure to conform to recognized military principles has always been disastrous, as at Fort Fisher, and in Formosa in 1867. The actions in Formosa and Ashantee illustrate the necessity for the acquaintance of commanders-in-chief with military strategy the others, the necessity for the use of proper arms and tactics by the men and officers.
From a consideration of the operations of the Naval Brigade it is seen that it has been able to operate on shore for a long time only when with an army with complete transport, or when transport and supply were furnished by the local means at hand. Two or three days is the limit of time for which a Naval Brigade may be considered independent. The organization of the staff, however, should provide for transportation and supply for as long a time as necessary when with the army or with auxiliaries. In regard to equipment, the forces should be armed with soldiers' weapons, never with the naval cutlass and pistol, and the personal equipment should be as light as possible. In regard to operations, the Naval Brigade has been called upon to fight against civilized enemies equipped and armed in the most recent manner; against half-civilized and savage enemies imperfectly armed; and finally, it has been used in street fighting and to suppress civil disorder, so that its proper employment in all these cases should be considered.
FORCES AT OUR DISPOSAL.
The forces which we have on shipboard are seamen, marines, engineer's-force, and non-combatants. The number and prominence of non-combatants in our service is entirely too great, and it is impossible to have a thoroughly effective navy when the best offers and rewards are made to men who are never trained to the use of weapons.
The engineer's-force forms a large part of every complement, and will be larger in the new ships. As the seamen are expected to be seamen and combatants, so the engineer's-force should be trained to the use of weapons, and should form part of the landing force; for when operating on shore, it would usually be that part of the complement which could most easily be spared from the ship.
There seems to be a growing impression in the service at large that henceforward the principal distinction between seamen and marines should be in discipline and uniform, not in different capabilities and a division of duties. Already official reports speak of the entire efficiency of bluejackets as sentries and as infantry; and although the marines have always exercised at great guns, yet they must be made even more familiar with artillery, for they will no longer be able to stand on deck as riflemen opposed to the machine gun fire of modern ships. Fortunately they recognize this necessity and, as shown by their part in the discussion of a recent prize essay, they are ready to assume charge of the secondary battery and of submarine mining. It is evident that when marines and seamen can each undertake all combatant duties, the general efficiency of the service will be much increased.
REGULATIONS REGARDING LANDING FORCES.
There are no regulations or instructions in regard to the landing forces in our Navy. A commanding officer has perfect liberty with regard to the organization, drill, and tactics of his own force, and may equip it in any way he likes, using the weapons and stores furnished to his ship. It is true that Upton's Infantry Tactics are generally adopted throughout the service, but this is only because it is most convenient to conform to the usage of the marines; Mason's Artillery Tactics are simply "authorized for trial." In the Ordnance Instructions we find only "suggestions" which, however admirable in themselves, are as much out of place in such a book as suggestions would be on the part of a commanding officer under fire. If naval forces are to operate on shore it is essential for officers to have some knowledge of military affairs, and the Ordnance Instructions should indicate clearly and decisively what is required of a landing force in organization, equipment, drill, and tactics, and how much latitude in details is granted to commanding officers.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LANDING FORCES.
Any plans adopted with reference to the Naval Brigade should comply with the following conditions:
- The organization, equipment, instruction drill, and system of tactics on all ships should conform to a standard.
- The tactical and administrative units should be small and should correspond, as far as possible, with the divisions on shipboard. This enables men to be always under their own divisional officers.
- Permanent auxiliary bodies should be employed, as far as necessary, to prevent weakening the combatant units for non-combatant service. These auxiliary bodies should have training and exercise in their special duties.
- The organization should permit the ready combination of different landing forces, and should include about half the complement of the ship.
- The force should be able to carry three days' rations.
- The armament and equipment should be as much like that of the army as naval exigencies will allow; this applies particularly to ammunition.
- A certain proportion of stores and provisions on every ship should be made up in small packages suitable for issue to and transportation by small forces.
- Both officers and men should understand the tactical use of their weapons and have a clear idea of the performance of their duties, and in drill and instruction specified attainments should be required.
- Petty officers should be granted authority and responsibility and assured position such as non-commissioned officers of marines now have.
RELATIONS OF LANDING FORCES TO GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SHIP.
A large ship's complement is a necessary basis for an effective landing force. Four years of blockade against a much inferior enemy established the practice of undermanning our vessels; but as our new ships are masted and therefore presumably intended for general service, their complements should be large enough to provide against desertions and other losses and to admit of landing an effective force without destroying the efficiency of the ship herself. It is true that our ships have about the same complements as the English, but that service also has become accustomed to small crews by successes and by the necessity of maintaining the first fleet in the world with voluntary enlistments only. The complements of other nations are larger.
As the importance of the watch bill has been greatly diminished by the introduction of steam, it would seem advisable to make the quarter bill the basis of the organization of the ship's company. Officers and men after being once assigned to divisions should retain them permanently without regard to seniority or changes in the watch bill and officers should be granted the control of the internal organization of their divisions, and should fill out the details of the various bills in conformity with the general plans of the executive officer. The watch bill alone should be entirely in the hands of the executive. This plan would relieve the executive of much work and increase general efficiency.
The present system of messing is far from satisfactory, and when the landing force is disembarked the entire mess service is thrown into confusion. The system adopted on the training ships of issuing rations to the ship's company in bulk, and apportioning them when serving out, is much more economical, saves a number of mess cooks, and promotes cleanliness on the berth deck. It is as suitable to the requirements of the Naval Brigade as it is to those of the service in general.
One of the first requisites for an efficient landing force, as for an efficient man-of-war in general, is that no recruits should be allowed on board cruising men-of-war. Musketry instruction and field artillery exercises can only be carried out fully on shore; and it is strange that the system of training on shore which has given such good results for apprentices on the New Hampshire should not be adopted for all recruits in the service. This would require a longer term of enlistment to permit time for a cruise before discharge. To this long term of enlistment and training in barracks is greatly due the superior efficiency of the general body of marines on shipboard.
ORGANIZATION OF THE LANDING FORCE.
Hereafter, in this paper, the term "landing force" will be applied to the organization of the seamen and marines of a single ship for military duties on shore, "Naval Brigade" to a combination of landing forces, and "Brigadier" to brigade-commanders.
The unit of organization suggested in the present Ordnance Instructions is one which seems very suitable; it is small and may be readily divided into four parts, each of which is a convenient size for the command of a petty officer. The combatant unit should therefore consist of a company of 32 men, 4 petty officers, and either one or two commissioned officers, according to the ship's complement, but preferably the latter. This organization should act either as an infantry company or as a gun's crew, the men not required to man and drag the gun acting as its permanent escort and as a relief crew, according to the system of the Italian naval field artillery. The auxiliaries consist of the pioneers, cooks, medical force, signalmen, buglers, servants, and armorers. The pioneers should be drawn from the mechanics and torpedo men, and should be in number one more than the number of companies in the landing force of the ship; the cooks should be as many as the pioneers. The medical force should consist of surgeon, apothecary, and two stretchermen for each landing force of one or two companies, and two more stretchermen for every two additional companies in the force. Two signalmen should go with every landing force, and a bugler with landing forces of two companies, or two buglers for larger ones. One servant for officers should be allowed for every two companies in the landing force, and one armorer for each landing force. One officer should be assigned to the command of all the auxiliaries. The whole landing force should be under the command of the executive officer, who should have an aide and the master-at-arms with him.
It should be an object as far as possible to have the ships' guns' crews of such a size that whole crews might be readily combined to form landing companies while preserving their divisional organization, leaving other complete crews on board for the defense of the ship. Crews of ten men for the lighter guns and of twenty for the heavier ones would form half and quarter companies, with one or two supernumeraries to fill vacancies. Each company should if possible be drawn entirely from one division, and be under the officer of that division. In a ship with eight 6-inch guns and two great-gun divisions, the full. crews of four guns would form one company, and the other division would remain on board. The quarter companies would form convenient messes; all the members of each mess should be in the same watch.
In distributing the force among the boats, each half company of seamen and marines should have one boat with two boat-keepers assigned to it. The auxiliaries should have one or two boats each with two boat-keepers. Some of the launches carrying the guns will be large enough to take complete companies, but most of the artillery companies will be divided like the infantry.
The spare room remaining in the boats should be occupied as necessary by men intended to remain on the beach to throw up defenses and prepare for re-embarkation, giving an average of about twenty-five to thirty men to each boat. The boat-keepers and the other men to remain on the beach should belong to one company or platoon accustomed to act together under their divisional officer, who should be the beach-master.
NAVAL BRIGADE.
Infantry.—On forming a Naval Brigade out of several landing forces, the infantry should be formed into divisions of two companies each, under the senior of the two company officers, still preserving the company organization, and then into battalions of three divisions each (6 companies), each battalion under the command of the executive officer of a ship, who will be accompanied by his aide and the master-at-arms. The marine companies should be formed into battalions by themselves, but as for the rest, it should be the endeavor to associate companies from one ship in the same division, and divisions from one ship in the same battalion.
The auxiliaries should be divided among the battalions, and to that end each pioneer, cook, etc., should regard himself as attached to a certain company, so that on following it to its battalion he would find there the rest of the auxiliaries necessary to complete that battalion. In this way every battalion would be complete in itself, forming a force of 216 rank and file, 30 to 40 auxiliaries, and from 10 to 16 officers, preferably nearer the latter number (battalion chief, aide, surgeon, officer commanding auxiliaries, and 6 to 12 company officers). The auxiliaries would vary a little in number in the different battalions according to the way of combining the landing forces. If the battalions are numerous enough, they should be grouped together in fours, forming commands of about 1080 men. The total force out of the ships including boat-keepers and beach force would probably average about 318 men for each 6-company battalion.
Artillery.—The guns should be formed into divisions of two guns each, and then into batteries of 4 or 6 guns each, according to the total number. The machine guns should be kept separate from the field guns if there are enough in all to form two or more batteries. The batteries should have the same proportion of auxiliaries as the battalions, and a six-gun battery would therefore be of exactly the same strength as a battalion.
As battalions and batteries are fixed in organization and each is complete in equipment, their chiefs should relieve the brigadier of responsibility in many details and so facilitate despatch in preparing for service. On organizing landing forces into a brigade, the officers attached to them will always be numerous enough to furnish the necessary number for the higher commands and their respective staffs without recourse to additional officers.
The brigade staff should consist of an adjutant, a quartermaster and commissary, a surgeon and one or two aides. The adjutant should be the chief of staff, issuing necessary orders and making all details for guard duty, assignments to quarters or camping ground, etc. He should issue the orders for marches, and be responsible to the brigadier for the execution of all his directions. He should have a writer to receive and take charge of the daily battalion reports and to make out the daily brigade reports for the brigadier and to keep the brigade log. The quartermaster and commissary should have charge of all hired or impressed labor, of pack animals and teams, and of the purchase and transport of all stores and supplies except those carried by the force itself for immediate use. He should have under him an officer to assist him in issuing clothing and provisions, in paying the men, and in keeping the necessary accounts. He should be further aided in his duties by a detail of officers and petty officers, according to the size of the force and its probable length of service. The brigade surgeon should be entrusted with the general direction of the medical force and of sanitary regulations and inspections, and should be consulted as to the location of quarters and camping grounds.
If the stay on shore is to be for more than two or three days, it will be necessary to provide for a system of returns and accounts. For this purpose each company-chief should be provided with a suitable pocket blank-book, containing a few pages for the daily journal of his company, showing the work done by his force, its details, and casualties, and orders received and issued. Other pages should be for a daily report of effective strength to the battalion-chief, similar to the report of the marine guard daily submitted to the commanding officer on shipboard, and others still should be for requisitions. On landing for long periods, the pay account of each man should be furnished to his company-chief, who should draw on the quartermaster when he desires to pay off. All requisitions, as well, should be made out by company-chiefs and issued through them. All the requisitions should be presented to the battalion-chief, and upon approval, the quartermaster should issue to the company chiefs, who should make the distribution. Battalion and battery chiefs should have authority equal to that of commanding officers of ships in regard to the purchase and issue of stores.
Covering Force.—The organization of the covering force of ships and boats should be distinct from the brigade. No landing force should be sent from the covering ships, for if the object is not a distant one, their work will be very severe and require all hands. The artillery of the brigade will usually form the covering force of boats, but in case there is an abundance of boat artillery the covering boats should form a separate division.
EQUIPMENT.
Under this head will be discussed arms and combatant equipment, clothing and other personal equipment, and general supplies carried for the force. While the plan of organization may and should be the same on all occasions, supplies must vary greatly according to the probable duration and nature of the service, and the armament will depend somewhat upon the nature of the service.
ARMS.
Every enlisted man in the landing force should always be armed with the service rifle and bayonet. Cutlasses are fit only for mounted men; in most armies cavalry and artillery leave them on their horses when dismounting. Pistols and revolvers are too dangerous, and are worthless at any but the closest ranges.
Bayonet.—The bayonet is a great moral support in every action even if not actually used, for it is always the tactical object to come to close quarters and decide the matter. If a man has a side arm in whose use he is skilled he will attack more boldly and advance farther than if he were without it; our bluejackets, therefore, cannot afford to dispense with it.
Rifle.—The principal defect in our present service rifle is that it lacks flatness of trajectory. In modern naval combats, the range, after it has been ascertained, will vary so fast that when the sight is adjusted it will no longer be even approximately true, and a well aimed bullet will pass over or under the point aimed at. It is therefore very important to flatten the trajectory as much as practicable, causing it to coincide more nearly with the line of sight and thus increase the limits of range within which a well aimed shot with a given sight elevation will strike a target of a given height. With our present rifle, if the sight is adjusted for 400 yards and the enemy approaches upright and aim is taken at his feet, the bullet will never rise above the height of his head, so that he will certainly be hit by a good shot at any range under 400 yards. In the case of two charging ships it will be useless for riflemen to endeavor to pick off adversaries at greater ranges than this limiting one of 400 yards; for aiming would be the merest guess-work on account of the rapid change of range. It is possible, however, to flatten the trajectory so that at the 600 yards range the bullet will not rise above a man's height, and it is apparent that such a trajectory increases by 50 per cent the time available for small arm fire between two ships (if the aim is very good). The advantage of the flat trajectory is equally apparent on shore, for it is very difficult to cause men to pay attention to the sights at the close ranges, and the flat trajectory increases the limits of range within which the sights may be neglected, and at the greater ranges permits of an equally effective fire with less accuracy in the estimation of distances. The only practicable way of flattening the trajectory consistent with other requirements of a military small arm is by decreasing the calibre, and the nations of Europe are re-arming with reduced calibres or are experimenting in that direction. England was armed with 45 calibre and experimented down to 35, but adopted 40 for her re-armament, being led to sacrifice flatness for a small increase in accuracy of the larger calibre. The advantage in preferring this slight increase in accuracy is very doubtful, for the errors due to the imperfect estimation of ranges and the exhaustion and excitement of the marksman are proportionally so large that the shooting on service would not be perceptibly improved even if the rifle were absolutely free from deviation. A decrease in calibre entails a reduction in the weight of ammunition, thus enabling larger supplies to be carried.
It is a matter of some importance that the Army and Navy should use the same cartridge, and as it is said that the Army is considering the propriety of reducing the calibre of the Springfield rifle, it is to be hoped that the Navy may considerably reduce the calibre of its rifle and arrange with the Army to adopt the same cartridge. The adoption of the magazine rifle by the army of Germany and the army and navy of France, and the postponement of the English re-armament in order to adopt a magazine rifle, as well as our own experience, render it clear that the magazine rifle is better than the single loader both for military and naval use.
Artillery.—The field and machine guns employed should be such as are suitable for use on board ship as well. The three-inch howitzer is effective on account of its large calibre, but it is of too low a power in proportion to its weight and mount for present use, so I am inclined to choose between the revolver-cannon, the rapid-firing gun, and the small-arm calibre machine gun, all of which are ship's guns. For use on shore the revolver-cannon offers no advantages over the rapid-firing gun, for its faster discharge is of no importance, as time must be allowed to see the result of each shot. The rapid-fire gun and the small-arm calibre machine gun should form the artillery of our landing forces, and the circumstances of each expedition should decide which to employ or in what proportions. The artillery carriages should have large wheels with broad tires to diminish the drag when moving them, and should have shafts for use when animal transport can be procured. In selecting a field gun, the limit imposed is one of weight. As it is proposed to use half companies as gun's crews with the other half companies as escorts and reliefs after the Italian fashion, we have i8 men to man the drag rope. The French allow 167 pounds and the Germans 145 pounds to each man, and in tropical India the English have found that 190 pounds is not excessive. Taking the mean of these amounts we find that 3000 pounds is a full load for our crew of 18 men, and that the high powered 57-mm. (6-pounder) Hotchkiss gun with limber and 50 rounds, weighing in all 2422 pounds, is well within the power of a half company; but the objection to it is that the supply of ammunition is too small, and an extra box of ammunition, containing only 14 rounds, weighs 176 pounds. A limit of not much over 2000 pounds, however, would be more generally acceptable, and such a weight could be taken almost anywhere. As the gun should carry some of the arms and equipments of its crew, we thus have the choice between the high-powered 37-mm. Hotchkiss rapid-firing gun with limber and 80 rounds, weighing 1555 pounds (extra boxes with 24 rounds weigh 88 pounds), and the low-powered 47-mm. Hotchkiss rapid-firing gun with limber and 105 rounds, weighing 1405 pounds. The great advantage of a flat trajectory is certainly with the 37-mm. gun, but on the other hand, a large calibre is desirable for field guns rather than penetration; and besides, 47 mm. seems to be about the smallest calibre for effective shrapnel fire. For this reason, of the two, it would be better to select the low-powered 47-mm. gun, or perhaps even to exceed the 2000 pounds limit, and employ the high-powered 47-mm. gun with limber and 72 rounds, weighing 1975 pounds. If, however, animal transport can be obtained, the 57 mm. should always be used on account of its large projectile. The equipment for the rapid-firing guns should consist of a limber carrying the ammunition and the necessary racks and arrangements for carrying the arms and part of the equipment of the gun's crew (see Vol. 30, R. U.S. Inst.), as will be described under Personal Equipment.
Machine guns mounted according to the plan of Colonel Alt, of the Central London Rangers, can carry 5000 rounds with a steel shield, and the rifles of its crew, on a weight of 1120 pounds (see Vol. 30, Journal R. U.S. Inst.); by removing the steel shield and adding a limber of 400 pounds, a total of 8000 rounds may be carried on the same weight as that of the rapid-firing gun.
It is urged by Colonel Alt that the supply of 5000 rounds is sufficient, and the experience of the Soudan is cited where the maximum expenditure in a day of severe fighting was 1300 rounds. But against civilized forces the expenditure would be much greater, for the machine guns would probably be used as far as possible to replace the long range infantry fire, and the expenditure of ammunition would therefore be very large; and these guns would besides furnish the reserve ammunition for the infantry. Both rapid-firing and machine guns should each carry 1 hatchet, 2 bill hooks, 2 picks, 2 shovels, total weight 20 pounds, and a range finder to each two guns (or 2 pounds for each two guns). Each gun should also be provided with a prolonge, so that the crew may pass beyond bad ground and then haul the piece through.
Entrenching Tools.—Entrenching has become such a necessity for defense against modern fire that entrenching tools have reached the dignity of defensive weapons, and they should be issued to ships as a part of their equipment. It would not always be necessary to land them, but when this is done every man in the ranks should carry one and should never part with it under any circumstances. The Wallace entrenching tool, combining pick and spade, and weighing 2 pounds 6 ounces, has been thoroughly tried and has proved excellent. In regard to the amount of ammunition to be carried, 100 rounds for the infantry cannot be considered too much, for 120 to 150 rounds have frequently been expended in action, necessitating re-supply during battle. For the artillery and the rest of the force 40 rounds would be enough.
Personal Equipment.—The uniform for landing should be as ordered; blue flannel is best for general use. It is necessary to carry only articles for immediate use, for if the force is to remain ashore for a considerable time, transportation for clothing, food, and supplies must be found on shore. Besides his arms, each man of the landing force should carry with him half a shelter tent, a rubber blanket, a woolen blanket, ammunition belts, a water bottle, a knife, and a haversack containing cooked rations and fork, spoon, plate and cup, with little conveniences such as soap, tooth brush, needle and thread, etc. Leggings should be worn. The blankets, clothing, and tent should be rolled and secured on the back by straps like a knapsack, for the horse-collar roll is very uncomfortable. The weights carried by an infantry man are thus: clothes worn, 7 pounds 6 ounces rifle, 9 pounds; bayonet and scabbard, 1 pound 3 ½ ounces; ammunition (100 rounds), lo pounds ; waist belt and two ammunition cross belts, 132 ounces; water bottle filled (13 pints), 2 pounds 10 ounces; mess-tin, complete, 1 pound 9 ounces; haversack, 4 ounces; knife and lanyard, 6 ounces; hold-all containing housewife, comb, tooth brush, towel, fork, and spoon, 14 ounces; field dressing, 2 ounces; half shelter tent, 2 pounds (rifles answer for tent poles); rubber blanket, 2 pounds 8 ounces; blanket, 3 pounds 7 ounces entrenching tool, 2 pounds 6 ounces; 3 days' cooked rations, 8 pounds 4 ounces; total, 51 pounds 8 ounces. The overcoat will not always be needed on an expedition; its weight is 4 pounds 8 ounces, bringing the total when it is carried up to 56 pounds. For artillery men and all others the weights will be the same, except 40 instead of 100 rounds of ammunition, making the total 45 pounds 2 ounces, but when actually dragging a gun or carriage they will carry on the gun or carriage their rifles, bayonets, entrenching tools, tents, both blankets and rations; total, 28 pounds 14 ounces. The total weight carried on the gun for a crew of 18 men would thus be 520 pounds.
The mode of carrying the small arms on the carriage is clearly shown in the lecture on machine guns by Captain Armit (Vol. 30, Journal R. U. S. Inst.), and is an improvement on the beckets suggested in Par. 824, U.S.N. Ord. Inst. According to this plan gun racks were placed over the axles; the bayonets should be fixed. The tents and blankets weighing about 144 pounds, and the rations weighing as much more, could be carried underneath the axles of the limber and body where there would be plenty of room to place boxes containing them, making the total weight of the low-powered 47-mm. gun 1925 pounds, and of the high-powered 47-mm. gun 2495 pounds.
Officers' Equipment.—Officers on landing service should wear the service uniform; the undress frequently worn when the men are in marching order is very unsuitable. Their equipment should consist of a large calibre revolver loaded, with a spare round, or 12 cartridges in all; binoculars, small compass, note book, with pencil, watch, map of country, haversack containing three days' rations and hold-all with comb, tooth brush, soap, clothes brush, needles and thread; field dressing, matches, mess-tin with fork and spoon, knife with lanyard, water bottle, half shelter tent, rubber and woolen blankets, towel; total 35 pounds 11 ounces. Overcoat 6 pounds 8 ounces, making, if it is carried, a total of 42 pounds 3 ounces.
Transportation.—There should be a certain amount of transport for every battalion and battery, which should be provided in the form of a carriage composed of two limbers coupled together and manned by the auxiliaries of the battalion. Shafts for animal transport should be provided, and the carriages should be fitted for carrying the following articles:
Articles | Number | Weight (pounds) |
Axes | 6 | 35 |
Hatchets | 3 | 6 |
Bill-hooks | 5 | 10 |
Pinch-bars | 1 | 10 |
Picks | 10 | 38 |
Shovels | 10 | 28 |
Handsaws | 4 | 8 |
Small arm tools (set) | 1 | 4 |
Marlin spike | 1 |
10 |
Grease |
| |
Spun yarn |
| |
Soft iron wire (30 yards) |
| |
Box for above | 1 | 50 |
Gun cotton outfit including battery, wires, 50 pounds of g.c., detonators, and 3-inch auger |
| 90 |
Stretchers (3 pair) and Surgeon’s chest |
| 75 |
Signal kits | 2 | 20 |
Kits of dragmen | 18 | 520 |
Mess kettles (in nests) | 10 | 85 |
Range finder for infantry battalion | 1 | 2 |
Total |
| 991 |
Carriage (body and limber) | 1 | 800 |
Total |
| 1791 |
If thought necessary, two boxes of ammunition (2000 rounds) weighing 220 pounds might be added, making a total weight of 2011 pounds.
Transport.—Although the weight of 51 pounds is less than that carried by the infantry soldiers of most nations, it is worth considering whether, for sailors, it would not be well to furnish transport even on the shortest expeditions for a part of this personal equipment whenever it is required. Of course, no man should part with his arms, but his haversack, mess-tin, three days’ rations, half shelter tent, blanket, rubber blanket, and hold-all, amounting to about 19 pounds 4 ounces, might well be carried for him.
If this course should be adopted, limbers at the rate of one to each company would be sufficient. Each limber should have a keeper, and when coupled together each pair should weigh about 2500 pounds loaded, and should carry the arms of the men hauling it, besides the other baggage. In this way, a detail of three half companies from each battalion would haul all its baggage. The transport of the baggage of half the artillery has already been provided for, on the pieces, so that one limber for every two pieces would be enough; thus, in a six-gun battery at any one time there would be eight half companies at the drag and four as escort and relief. The baggage should be packed under its keepers whenever an action is expected. These keepers would raise the total of a battalion by six men. Of course horses should haul all the baggage whenever possible.
The equipment described is sufficient for a force entirely independent of external resources, but there are only three days' cooked rations and the camp kettles are only fit for making coffee. If the expedition is to be longer, it will be the duty of the quartermaster and commissary to estimate and provide the necessary amounts of stores and transportation according to the means at hand. The first necessity is food, which must be provided as required. Pots, kettles and boat-stores should also be provided. Then clothing and shelter should be thought of. The spare clothing of each man should be carried in a bag marked with his name, and the clothing of each company should be put in large company bags. Small stores and new clothing should also be transported when on long expeditions. Tentage should be provided only when a particular point is to be occupied for some time; when constantly moving, shelter tents carried by the men are enough. With the tentage should be carried a sufficient supply of brooms and rakes for keeping the camp grounds in order, and buck-saws for cutting firewood, and, above all, the reserve ammunition should be abundant. It is impossible to predetermine the nature of the transportation; it may be by bearers, pack animals, or teams.
TACTICS.
To secure efficiency in the duties of landing forces all recruits should be shipped in the United States and sent to barracks, where they should be divided into small groups under the care of petty officers, who should be responsible for their instruction and general behavior. In all instruction it should be the object to attain definite specified results, so that men acting together even for the first time would have the same knowledge and ideas regarding their duties but the methods of instruction should be largely in the hands of the officers in charge. Uniformity in the manual of arms and in the performance of maneuvers should be strictly enforced; it is too common to see officers point with complacency to changes they have introduced, which, however admirable they may be in themselves, prevent uniformity in exercises because they are in contravention to the custom of the service which has accepted the army infantry tactics as its standard.
It is greatly to be desired that the entire control of ships in commission should be committed to a single bureau which should issue full instructions on every point of drills and exercises, and enforce them by means of a staff of inspectors. As an example of such instructions maybe mentioned the English Rifle and Field Exercises and Musketry Instructions for H.M.'s Fleet, and the French Manuel du Marin-Fusilier, the latter a book of some 600 pages, of which half is devoted to the instruction, exercises arid duties of small-arm men in ship fighting, and the rest to the infantry of the landing force.
The recruit should be taught a soldier's duty progressively, as in the army. He should learn the school of the soldier, how to march and face, and the manual of arms. The manual of the English service is far more suitable for the unconfined habits of seamen than the one of our own army. It was adopted with one or two slight changes by the force at Panama in the spring of 1S85, and the results were very satisfactory. Bayonet exercise should be taught, for it is now more important than cutlass drill. The French employ riflemen boarders, and it is noticeable that in the majority of successful attacks (on shore) in recent years the result has been decided by actually crossing bayonets, except when the defenders' ammunition has been prematurely exhausted. With regard to maneuver tactics or the evolutions for transferring troops from point to point, Upton's tactics are perfectly satisfactory.
Target Practice.—When some proficiency in these exercises has been obtained, the rifle firing instruction should be commenced. In the army a certain sum per annum ($7.50) is allowed for each man's target practice, and careful company commanders can get as much as 1500 shots out of this amount. The army manual for rifle firing recently issued to the Navy is admirably fitted to secure good individual shooting. In following its course, the recruit begins with some theoretical and practical instruction in sighting; he next goes through position and aiming exercises to teach him control of himself and his muscles, and may then begin gallery target practice with reduced charges and spherical bullets. After all these preliminaries the pupil begins practice with service ammunition at short known ranges, for which longer ones are progressively substituted. During all this time the estimation of distances under varying circumstances of weather and locality is taught, and finally skirmish practice upon targets at unknown distances is undertaken, together with volley and file firing and with running or disappearing targets. To secure general interest in shooting, a series of competitions are annually held and prizes are awarded. The results of this system in increasing individual skill in matches with the service small-arm have been very great; but it seems to be assumed that the average of individual efficiency with fire-arms is the measure of the efficiency of the army in battle. In this assumption our army has followed the English, which has recently begun to waver in its belief; while for many years past this idea has been totally rejected by all the continental armies of Europe, and the weight of evidence is greatly in favor of their opinion. They state that with individual fire, it is directed upon so many objectives and the errors in estimating the ranges are so great that its useful effect is very small. In addition it has been found that with uncontrolled firing the excitement is so greatly increased, that once begun it is impossible to stop or even check the expenditure of ammunition until the last round has been fired; in the meantime no orders can be heard, the troops cannot be pushed forward, and so the ammunition is wasted at the least effective ranges. For these reasons continental nations regard individual target practice as merely preliminary, and further practice is directed towards obtaining good collective shooting, while maintaining the strictest control over the fire by permitting only volleys, or a small stated number of rounds in file firing. In this way opportunities are afforded for passing orders, for permitting the smoke to clear and for watching the effect of fire; the waste of ammunition is prevented, and when close quarters are reached and the men finally escape from control, they have still a reserve of ammunition and their individual fire is effective at the short ranges which have been reached. It is besides the object of continental target practice to furnish rules to the leaders so that they may have definite ideas as to the amount of ammunition which may be properly expended at any moment for the attainment of a given object, and also that they may know how to produce the best effect from a given expenditure.
Battle Firing.—The rules governing the employment of individual fire are based upon the accuracy of the knowledge of the range, upon the flatness of the trajectory of the rifle and upon its accuracy; or upon the size of the target which will catch all or any given proportion of the bullets fired at it at varying ranges.
To understand these rules, it is necessary to define the term "dangerous zone," which is understood to be the space at the end of the descending branch of the trajectory where the height of the bullet above the ground is less than the height of the target. The dangerous zone for a group of shots fired at the same point is somewhat greater, for it is increased by the dispersion of the group. It is therefore an object to have the trajectory as flat as possible in order to decrease the angle of drop and so increase the dangerous zone. The effect of the dispersion of bullets is to set a limit upon the range at which individual fire may be usefully employed. It has been found that with ranges exactly known a very good shot may put 22 per cent of shot in a standing man at 600 yards, and 27 per cent in a group of four men at 1 100 yards. It is thus apparent that in war, when results are estimated at one tenth of peace practice, the limit of range at which individual fire can be permitted is soon reached even when the ranges are exactly known.
When the ranges have to be estimated, as is usual in war, it has been found that the probable error in either direction in the mean of the estimates of several practiced observers is 1/8; that is, the probable error in both directions is ¼. It is readily seen that when the probable error, or ¼ the range, is greater than the dangerous zone of a group of shots for that range, it is not advisable to fire. This range for the service rifle of most countries is about 500 yards. At ranges of 400 yards and less, the trajectory never rises the height of a man above the line of sight, so that the entire space up to the muzzle is included in the dangerous zone; and the Germans therefore employ a sliding-leaf sight for long ranges, a flap sight set for 400 yards which requires no alteration for use against standing troops anywhere under 400 yards, and a fixed sight set for 300 yards which is good against a kneeling man at any less range. The advantage of this arrangement of sights is that it simplifies their adjustment and so improves the shooting in the great excitement of close ranges. To further improve the shooting, it is the custom abroad to aim at the foot of the target, because it affords the most distinct mark; because men are liable to fire high, and because many of the "short" shots will ricochet effectively, whereas "long" shots are wasted.
In determining the limits of range to be set for the use of collective fire, the change from the conditions of individual fire is in the accuracy or the size of the shot group. It has been found that in collective fire the area containing all the bullets fired at a given target is rather uncertain, but that half the bullets fall in a fairly constant depth which does not vary much from 100 yards at any range under 1500 yards, and is known as the "beaten zone." The width of ground beaten by a group of shot varies from about 15 feet at 550 yards to 120 feet at 2650 yards, and the rules for the use of collective fire are formulated with the idea of utilizing this best 50 per cent of shot. The efficacy of collective fire at any range evidently depends upon the width of the beaten zone and the depth of the "dangerous zone" of each bullet for that range, and it has been calculated that a collective fire directed at a small target at 500 yards is twenty-four times as efficacious as at 1700 yards. For this reason it is believed by most continental nations that collective aimed fire cannot give adequate results over 1300 yards. If, however, the supply of ammunition is superabundant, as with the Turks at Plevna, a very great expenditure by unaimed or "chance" fire may give important results.
When the range is such that the probable error in its estimation is greater than the depth of the beaten zone it is improbable that the fire would be effective, and two or more sights, differing from one another by the depth of the beaten zone (or 100 yards), should be employed in order to form a beaten zone large enough to cover the probable error in the estimated range. For this reason numerous range finders are necessary in order to decrease the errors in the range; for if estimation is relied upon, to be certain of striking the target at 1200 yards, the beaten zone should be 300 yards deep, requiring three sights, and so decreasing the efficacy of the fire at any given point; whereas if the range were ascertained within 1/12, a beaten zone of only 200 yards depth would be required at the same range to cover the error of 1/12 in either direction and so the fire would be greatly increased in efficacy.
The slope of the ground has a great influence upon the useful effect of fire, for the depth of the dangerous zone of each bullet, as well as of the beaten zone of the group of bullets, evidently depends upon the amount and direction of the slope; so that if troops are known to be concealed behind the crest of a hill, the fire against them may be more effective than if in plain sight in front of it. If troops are in close formation the slope of the ground is important, because it affects the virtual height of the target presented to the enemy.
CONTROL OF COLLECTIVE FIRE.
In order to retain the direction and rapidity of fire under the control of the leaders and officers of the firing line, it has been found best to fire by volleys. As the opposing lines approach each other the excitement causes the men to tend to escape from control, but it is still possible for skillful leaders to substitute file firing for not more than three rounds, with pauses in which sights can be readjusted and orders passed; finally, at the close ranges under about 400 yards the best disciplined troops escape from all control, and their fire becomes rapid and continuous until the supply is exhausted or the battle decided. At long ranges a single officer can direct the fire of a large body of men, but as the ranges decrease control becomes more difficult, and the company commanders turn over the direction of fire to the subalterns, and these again to the noncommissioned officers, who direct their little groups of fire-units or ten to fifteen men up to the very crisis of the action.
In the employment of this group system lies the essence of the battle tactics of the continental armies; it has also been adopted as the basis of the organization of French naval landing forces.
Group Formations.—If large bodies of troops are pushed to the front to reinforce other large bodies, the commands are intermingled and confusion ensues. The only way yet found to mitigate this confusion has been to push forward small complete groups in the intervals between other small groups, and to teach men separated from their commands to act with the nearest group, attaching themselves to rank rather than to personality; and it is on account of their responsibility as group leaders in battle that good non-commissioned officers are indispensable to good armies.
BATTLE FORMATIONS.
A close formation is the one which renders maneuvering most easy and gives to the leaders the best control over the fire; but it is too vulnerable, and as the enemy is approached it is necessary to open out more and more to avoid excessive loss. The system of attack adopted by the continental powers may be described as an extended line supported by successive lines of closed bodies of increasing size.
The following summary, from a pamphlet by Colonel Jayet, of the French army, will indicate with sufficient clearness the tactics of a small infantry force advancing to attack. It must be explained that the force in question, a French company of 200 men, is divided into four sections of four squads each, and the company column is a column of sections. The artillery having taken up a position 3300 yards from the hostile artillery, prepares the advance of the infantry; and when the enemy has been sufficiently shaken by the artillery, the infantry, which has been formed in its rear, advances in company columns, each company presenting a front of 25 files or 20 yards, and a depth of 13 yards. Artillery is able to place half its projectiles at a range of 3300 yards on a rectangle whose width is three yards, and each projectile gives 100 to 150 fragments; it will therefore be necessary to take the battle formation at 2750 yards at the very latest. The captain will throw forward the first section, and the other three will shelter themselves in its rear from the enemy's view. The front of the section being twenty yards it offers too large a target, and its officer will be obliged to divide it into squads, or the men will certainly do so without orders at the first shell which reaches them. The small size of the squads and rapid marching will enable the section to reach 2200 yards without deploying; but an examination of the results of target practice will convince any one that, except in specially favorable ground, it cannot go further without deployment. Infantry inflicts a loss of three per cent at 600 yards on a skirmish line with 5 ½ yards intervals, and it may be assumed that if it does not halt, a skirmish line deployed at 2200 yards, composed of good soldiers boldly led, may reach the distance of 1320 yards from the hostile artillery, or 660 yards from the hostile infantry, without great loss and in good spirits; but this zone can be crossed only on condition that the skirmish line does nothing but advance. Its object while in this zone must be to reach a position whence its fire may be embarrassing to the enemy, if not efficacious. It must not stop to fire; every moment of halt is time lost, which can only tend to demoralization the results of fire can be nothing, for distances are unknown; the enemy knows them, and is sheltered, and against a single section he opposes two or three.
As the interval in the skirmish line cannot be decreased without too great loss, it is apparent that so far there must be no reinforcements; on many grounds even this interval of 51 yards is much too small. When the skirmish line has reached this distance (660 yards from the hostile infantry) the reinforcement, sheltered by its fire and hidden by its smoke, may come up; it will now be useful in the firing line. The company cannot be hurried further; it must gain ground, but there is no fixed rule to follow; the line must advance firing and availing itself of the ground.
A captain who leads his company well will arrive within 330 or even 275 yards having engaged only two sections; with the third he may make another 110 yards. If he is fortunate he will get within 110 yards and assault with his company only, but this will be the exception; more frequently he will need the help of the battalion reserve.
The other three sections were left behind at 2750 yards from the enemy's artillery; they will advance sheltered by the skirmish line, and in favorable ground they will sometimes be able to help the latter by their fire. The column formation must be abandoned at 2750 yards from artillery, and the reinforcement composed of the second section grouped in squads will follow the skirmish line at 165 yards distance. In this formation this line may approach within 1100 yards of the hostile infantry, for its circumstances differ from those of the skirmish line; it must follow the latter, but it may choose the moments for advancing, and by rushes of 50 yards and kneeling it may move on without much loss. The ground must be favorable for this line to advance further than 1100 yards without deployment, as the fire of the hostile infantry is becoming serious. The reinforcement will therefore deploy at about 1100 yards and form a second skirmish line, and so can remain without demoralization until the first line commences firing, when it moves up and joins it. The other two sections (the support) on passing their artillery will form with an interval between them on the same line, and by the shelter of the two lines in front and by taking cover and kneeling this support may follow the second line at a distance of about 165 yards until it is about 2200 yards from the hostile artillery, when it will probably be compelled to form into grouped squads. It may thus reach a distance of 1 100 yards from the hostile infantry, when the leading line will become engaged; the fire and smoke will facilitate the advance of the rear lines, and will permit them to reinforce the first line when necessary without changing the squad formation. As the second and third lines join the firing line they push it forward by the impulse they communicate, and finally, when the firing line is near enough, it assaults with the bayonet.
BATTALION FORMATION.
In the French battalion formation, in which the battalion corresponds to the four-battalion organization above described for the Naval Brigade, two companies are usually deployed as above, and the other two form the reserve which follows the third line at about 165 yards distance, opening out as the enemy's fire requires it. When the supports have been absorbed in the firing line, the reserve is also sent forward until the line is dense enough to assault, or in case of a retreat it is deployed to oppose the enemy while the fighting line reforms behind it.
Battle Formation for Naval Brigade.—Upton's deployment of a fighting line by numbers was adopted in the U.S. Army (in 1867) before the recent great wars; it has never been tried in battle, and its unwieldiness and lack of cohesion are in complete opposition to the requirements which have been satisfied by the group formation described above. The group unit for the Naval Brigade should consist of a half company or 16 men and 2 petty officers, who should be kept together both when closed and when deployed. Each four should also be regarded as a permanent organization, the men always falling in the same order, and each vacancy should remain, the rear rank man stepping into the front rank, or should be filled by a new man from the company's gun division. Upton's company deployment by the flank is based upon the group formation, and is perfectly applicable to our naval companies thus organized. A naval battalion should be deployed and maneuvered similarly to the French company whose motions are described above. For instance, if a battalion is to take its fighting formation, two companies would form the skirmish line, two the reinforcement, and two the support. On arriving within range, the leading companies will take an interval sufficient for deployment, and later will separate into half companies the latter will finally deploy into the skirmish line as they advance, and will endeavor to keep in their original groups. The reinforcement and support will throw their half companies in groups into the skirmish line when the time arrives.
DEFENSE.
On the defense, fire is opened earlier than when attacking, in order to compel the early deployment of the assailants, whose advance is retarded and whose mistakes are less easily rectified when in open order. The formations are substantially the same as when attacking, except that the supporting lines are kept nearer the fighting line. The fighting line is gradually strengthened by the advance of the supports, until only a reserve remains in rear to deliver a counter assault and pursue the enemy or to cover the retreat as the case may be. The greatest losses usually occur during a retreat under fire.
MANEUVERING ADVANTAGES OF SMALL FORCES.
Small independent forces have much greater freedom on the battlefield than large ones. Small detachments are unembarrassed by forces on each side obliging them to move straight forward, so their rear lines can outflank the first line, thus making a flank attack on the battlefield; large forces can arrange for a flank attack only when off the battlefield. Artillery has freer choice of position with small forces.
REFORMING ENGAGED TROOPS.
"The necessity of reforming engaged troops as soon as the engagement ceases or during any pause in the fight is so great in these days of fighting in extended order against an unseen enemy hidden by cover, that it cannot be too strongly impressed on leaders of all ranks. It is only by so doing that command, control, and cohesion can be maintained, the evil caused by the mixing of the larger units reduced to a minimum, and the moral effect of numbers impressed on the men, who are apt to think their losses greater than they really are. Reforming the tactical units also has the effect of rendering the men available for use in other directions, which they were not before, and of having them as completely in hand as possible to meet any further attempts of the enemy. These remarks apply equally to attack and defense."
SAVAGE WARFARE.
"It may be considered that fire discipline, direction and control are not required in small wars against savage or undisciplined nations. This is a great mistake; the nature of the enemy and his weapons may govern and change our tactical formations, but never the fire discipline, direction and control, which alone can assure the fullest efficacy of the fire being attained under any conditions. With an enemy unarmed with modern weapons or unskilled in their use, closed formations may be retained from the great advantages of the control and the moral support they give the men, and volleys may be used up to a much shorter range, but otherwise the fire tactics described in the foregoing pages can alone develop the full efficacy of the fire."
BUSH FIGHTING.
In regard to bush fighting Lord Wolseley says: "Considerable method is required by all commanding officers in bush fighting; if there is hurry, your force gets cut up into several parts without any connection between them, and it is difficult to collect them again for any concerted action. In no sort of warfare is it more essential to have a small reserve kept intact up to the last moment, for it is impossible to see what your enemy is about or to know where he is until his attacks have actually developed themselves, and panics are more probable in a dense forest than in an open country. Teach your men to go into the bush, there is no use in lying down and firing; the savage is perhaps better at that game than you are, your only safety is to go straight at your enemy whenever and wherever you see him; this demoralizes the savage, and although you may lose a few men in the rush, your loss will be less in the long run than if you endeavored to turn him out of his position by a heavy fire. As the result of all actions in a dense forest depends upon the company officers and on their fertility of resource, they must to a very great extent rely upon themselves and act upon their own responsibility."
ARTILLERY.
The drill and instruction of artillery, like that of infantry, may be divided into two parts, the maneuver drill and the battle exercises. The first part is sufficiently dealt with by the present drill book. The instruction in sighting and pointing is fairly good, being covered by great gun practice, although there is little regarding the matter in the exercise manual; what is known by the officers of the service is passed along orally and the instruction is not as thorough as it might otherwise be. Before considering the employment of artillery it will be necessary to say a few words about the nature of the ammunition. The three kinds of projectile which may be carried are shell, shrapnel, and case, and earlier in this paper the 47-mm. gun was selected (for manual drag) as being able to fire shrapnel of effective size.
The percussion shell is the most useful projectile for general service. It is always used for ascertaining the range, as the puff of smoke from the explosion of the projectile shows the exact striking point. It may also be used against earthworks, entrenchments, and buildings, and its effect is good against masses of men and artillery against troops in extended order its effect is moral rather than actual.
Shrapnel shell is effective only against men and horses, and when well delivered is very valuable; but it is difficult to regulate its point of bursting, on which all its efficiency depends. The shrapnel fuze should be a double acting one (time and percussion), as is the French service fuze. The proportion of shell to shrapnel varies from 3 to 1, to 1 to 3 in different foreign armies, but the average proportion is about 3 shell to 2 shrapnel. Case shot is used only at the shortest ranges, and the proportion carried is small; not more than 9 per cent.
Preliminaries to Opening Fire.—It is proper for the commanding officer of a battery to precede it on the ground it is about to occupy, in order to reconnoiter and decide upon the best position, and to observe the enemy, estimate his range, and note the arrangements made by adjacent forces. The commanding officer leaves his second in command to bring up the battery, and on its arrival the chiefs of pieces make their preparations for opening fire, while the battery commander assembles the officers and indicates the target, the exact point of it which is to be aimed at for the adjustment of the range, and also the point of aim for each gun after the fire is spread.
Range Finding.—The battery takes up a position for firing and loads with percussion shell. The range finding is by trial by the whole battery and is in two parts. In the first part, called the "trial firing" or "adjustment," it is the object to place the sheaf of projectiles so that it touches the target ; in the second part, called "battery firing" or "rectification," it is the endeavor to cause the centre of the sheaf of projectiles to fall on the centre of the target.
To adjust the fire the battery commander points out the target and orders the projectile, elevation, and allowance for drift and wind, and the first piece fires. The explosion indicates whether the projectile falls short or over, and the elevation is altered sufficiently to make it almost certain that the second shot will fall on the opposite side of the target from the first. With this object the correction should be 400 yards for a range of 2000 yards or more, 200 yards between 1000 and 2000 yards, and 100 yards for less than 1000 yards. If there is the slightest doubt about the correct observation of a shot it must be rejected, and the next shot must be fired without altering the range. As soon as the target has been enclosed in a "fork" (formed by two shots falling on opposite sides of the target), the next shot is fired with the range corresponding to the mean range of the fork, and a new fork is formed with this shot and one of the shots of the last fork. In this way the fork is diminished until it is only fifty yards deep, when the adjustment of fire may be considered complete, because fifty yards is within the limits of the natural dispersion of the shots, and the range for the entire battery is set at the smaller of the ranges composing the last fork. This method of adjustment is that used by the majority of European nations and differs somewhat from the English method, of which that described in the U.S.N. Ordnance Instructions (paragraphs 779-786) is an adaptation for use at sea.
Rectification of Fire.—The adjustment being complete, a series of six or eight shots is then fired with the range so found, and the result shows whether the elevation should be altered by 25 yards or not. The rules for altering the fire after the fire has been adjusted depend upon the theory of probabilities and the mean dispersion or deviation proper to the guns. If the centre of the sheaf of projectiles is placed exactly upon the centre of the target, a certain proportion of shot will strike the target, and half the remainder will go over and half will fall short; but out of all the shots fired, those which fall short are the ones which can be most accurately observed, and the rectification to be made is therefore based upon the proportion of shots which fall short. When the centre of the sheaf is adjusted to the centre of the target, this proportion varies from 1/20 to 2/3 according to the range and height of target, but the service rule for the Germans is to consider the rectification complete when from ¼ to ½ the shot fall short. If, however, at 2000 yards range all of the first six shots out of the series of eight fall short, a correction may then be made to the elevation without completing the series; and if at 1500 yards range the first three shots all fall short, there is a very strong probability that the range should be increased. In general, the greater the depth of the target, the greater is the permissible proportion of shots "not short." The errors in direction are corrected by each piece separately, because the relative height of the wheels on which the lateral deviation greatly depends is different for each piece on account of the ground. In the case of a strong wind, the commander of the battery may make the first allowances and corrections for lateral deviation. After the rectification is complete, if the chief of a division (of two guns) observes one of his pieces steadily shooting "short" or "not short," he may make corrections of 25 yards to the range.
When the rectification is complete it is very frequent to spread the fire, that is, to cause each piece to fire at that part of the target which is most nearly opposite it, instead of continuing to fire at the centre or most prominent part of the target upon which the fire was first regulated.
Shrapnel Fire against Fixed Targets.—As shrapnel fire is more difficult to observe correctly than shell fire, it is usual to adjust the fire with shell and then change to shrapnel. By omitting to cut the time upon a double action fuze it explodes by percussion, and a shrapnel with this fuze may therefore be used to find the range. The effective use of shrapnel depends principally upon a low burst in front of the target. Having found the range by shell fire and begun shrapnel fire with the fuze adjusted to the corresponding time-length, the burst will probably occur either too high or too low, the proper height being three or four yards. There are two ways of correcting this error, either by altering the time-length of the fuze or by altering the elevation. The first method is better theoretically, but in practice the projectiles already cut and in the guns are wasted, so a practical rule is to alter the range. The distance between the point of burst and the target is then unchanged. If, however, it is seen that the explosions take place in rear of the target, then the time-length of the fuze and the range must both be decreased. When the commander of the battery thinks he has found the range accurately he orders the length of the fuze, and chiefs of sections may afterwards make alterations in the elevation of their pieces to rectify the height of burst, but they must not alter the fuze time-length.
Fire at a Moving Target.—In firing on an advancing target it is usual to enclose the target in a fork whose depth is proportional to the speed of the target's advance, and then to fire slowly at the less range of the fork until a shot is observed "not short," when the pieces that are ready fire rapidly, and then a new fork is formed and the same process is repeated. On account of the great depth over which a shrapnel shell is efficacious, its use is preferable against a moving target. To pass from shell to shrapnel fire, having fired shell slowly as above described until the target has entered the zone of natural dispersion of the shot, which will be shown by a shot falling, "not short," the remaining pieces ready are rapidly discharged, and the fire is changed to shrapnel and continued with a range and corresponding fuze time-length, 100 to 300 yards less, according to the target's speed of advance, until a new fork is necessary.
In firing against a retiring target the converse of the above rules holds good.
The rules for firing against a target moving to the flank are similar to those for fire at sea against a passing enemy.
In firing at a target moving obliquely it will be advisable, if possible, to adjust the fire upon a point by which the target must pass, and fire rapidly when the target approaches it.
Observation of Fire.—Quick and correct adjustment of the fire requires the greatest care in the observation of each shot, for an error in observing a single shot may cause the waste of a large number of others before the mistake is discovered. It is therefore necessary to neglect doubtful observations altogether, and to adjust the fire only by good observations. To obviate false observations as far as possible, the following precautions are necessary:
The commander of the battery, whose duty it is to observe and correct the ranges, should choose a position well to the windward flank of the battery, but near enough to make his orders heard; and his observations should be assisted by a trustworthy man on the flank and advanced as far as possible, who should signal the result of each shot "short," or "not short," or "doubtful." When the fire is not spread, the point in the target most favorable for observation should be selected for aiming. Field glasses for the battery commander are better than the naked eye or than a telescope. Care must be taken to observe the cloud of smoke at the instant of the explosion, or it may drift and cause a false observation. Owing to the parallax due to the position of the commander of the battery, it will frequently be necessary for him to inquire from the chiefs of sections regarding the direction of the shot before he can decide whether it is short or not. When the target is covered, as sometimes happens, by little thickets or clumps of trees, observation becomes difficult, and an observer far out on the flank to signal the general result of groups of shots would be very useful. Finally, no opportunity should be lost of practicing the observation of shooting.
Fire Discipline and the Direction of Fire.—The position for the commander of the battery is on its flank; the more distant he is the more accurately he can observe results, but he must remain within reach of his voice. The target should be clearly pointed out to all. As for the order and rapidity of fire, the following rules should be observed: First, the fire should begin at one flank, usually the leeward one—this order should be maintained during rapid fire, and should be neglected only where firing case shot; second, the rapidity of fire depends on the facilities for observation and the circumstances of the fight. Fire is usually distinguished as slow, ordinary, and rapid. Slow fire is used when the ammunition supply is low, when the phase of the action is a delaying one, when the "fork" has been determined for a moving target, and when observation is difficult. As the commander of the battery gives the order for firing each shot in slow fire, it may be used during the determination of the range. Ordinary fire, as its name indicates, is most generally used; the interval between shots is from 15 to 20 seconds in 6-gun batteries, and from 22 to 30 seconds in 4-gun batteries. Rapid fire is most frequently used in firing on a moving target after the latter has been seen to enter the beaten zone. The interval between shots should be from 6 to 8 seconds in a 6-gun battery. Rapid fire affects the aim, the smoke becomes annoying, and the physical effort is great, so that it cannot be long maintained.
A salvo or broadside is sometimes used to facilitate the observation of the range, and as the object is to increase the cloud of smoke caused by the burst, the guns must be fired exactly together. The limit of range for field artillery is that at which good sight aided by field glasses can observe the effect of the shooting. This is about 3000 yards.
Role of Artillery in Battle.—The role of artillery in attack is the preparation and support of the infantry advance. In the first stage of the fight the artillery opens fire at long range, say from 2500 to 1600 yards, and endeavors to silence the enemy's artillery and shake his infantry. This part of the action is usually an artillery duel. When the commander-in-chief considers that the time has come to push forward the infantry, the artillery is also advanced, the better to aid the infantry, and covers the latter by its fire as far as possible.
The artillery forms the stable element in the attack; its moral effect is very great, both upon friend and enemy, and it lends a solidity to the line which is lacking to the open order of infantry. Although artillery should always be well to the front, yet it is useless and specially vulnerable while in motion, so changes in position should be few and for considerable distances, for small changes in range do not much affect the power of artillery. When the infantry is closely engaged with the enemy, the artillery will be directed upon the reserves of the enemy in order to shake them, as well as to avoid injuring the attacking force. As soon as a position is taken the artillery will advance and occupy it, to assist in holding it against a counter-assault. In the case of a repulse of the assaulting line, it will be the duty of the artillery to cover its retreat and prevent the enemy's advance.
On the defensive the action is begun by the artillery, which, if possible, should temporarily place part of its force beyond the main fighting line in order to cause the enemy to deploy early, for this renders the enemy's advance slow, and makes it more difficult for him to rectify any mistakes he may discover than if he were in closed formation. As soon as the infantry gets well within range, fire should be directed against it until the action is decided. The general rule for directing artillery fire both on the attack and defense is, that that arm of the enemy which is at the instant taking the most prominent part in the fight should be the principal target.
Employment of Machine Guns.—Machine guns partake of the nature both of artillery and small arms, and their management will accordingly be a combination of artillery and infantry methods.
In the attack, the machine guns will be advanced on the flanks or to some commanding position, where they will replace with great advantage the long range infantry fire which is so wasteful of ammunition, for the gun can keep up a more steady fire than the infantry; its ammunition supply is abundant, and its accuracy is much superior. The machine guns will, if possible, take their range from the artillery.
On the defense the machine guns will probably be more scattered than in attack, occupying the salient angles where infantry fire is weak; but as in attack, their fire will replace long range infantry fire. In this employment of machine gun fire it resembles that of artillery fire, but in the actual delivery of fire machine guns will follow the infantry methods, firing a few rounds rapidly and then waiting for the smoke to clear and to pass orders. The methods of range finding, too, will only be those practicable for infantry, and the use of two sights will happen as with the infantry. In general, the machine guns should maneuvers as artillery and fire as infantry.
Escorts.—Guns are usually able to protect their own immediate front, still they frequently require escorts; as the manual transport of naval field artillery necessitates large crews, these, if organized as suggested in this article, afford ample escort for protecting the flanks of their guns. When the guns are perfectly secure, this arrangement also permits the assignment of the relief platoon of one gun to act as another gun's crew and the withdrawal of a complete company to act as infantry.
Choice of Position.—In the choice of position, the first consideration is a clear field of view not only towards the target, but in every direction, and at close as well as long ranges. The cover afforded to the battery may afterwards be thought of, but the rule is general for artillery as well as for infantry, that cover must be sacrificed to an efficient fire.
The best locations for artillery are generally found just behind the crest of a hill, or behind a fold in a ground sloping gently towards the enemy, or behind hedges, thickets or cultivated fields, because these make it difficult for the enemy to observe the effect of his fire.
A damp and marshy soil just in front of and on the flank of the battery will diminish the effect of the enemy's projectiles, but in taking advantage of such ground care must be taken not to impede one's own future movements. Positions behind stone walls or on stony ground will cause dangerous splinters, and positions affording near cover for the enemy should be avoided. A hard, firm soil for the pieces to stand on is very important.
ENTRENCHMENTS AND SHELTER.
The effect of improved weapons is so great that it is absolutely necessary to provide some shelter against them, and for this reason troops should always carry their entrenching tools with them. The object of the defense is not to oppose an obstacle to the enemy's advance, and therefore both shelter trenches and gun-epaulements need be very shallow, because only cover is needed. With savage enemies, however, where forces are exposed to the sudden attack of great numbers, obstacles to hold them in check under fire are a necessary part of the defense, and wagons and baggage should be placed to afford such protection.
When in battle, every advantage should be taken of such natural shelter as can be found, provided the vigor of the attack is not too much sacrificed. On this subject Colonel Shaw remarks as follows, in his work on Elements of Modern Tactics, p. 182:
"A soldier posted behind cover to await the attack of an approaching enemy should not open fire until the adversary comes well within effective range. He should take advantage of the latter becoming necessarily exposed in advancing from one point of shelter to another, in order to fire at him with the best chance of success. But a soldier behind cover cannot reap the full advantage of his position unless he carefully follows all the movements of his approaching enemy; never, if possible, losing sight of him. He must therefore clearly understand that although he may conceal and protect himself by accidents of ground, the cover so obtained is only to be used as a means to an end, to enable him by its assistance the better to fight and overcome his adversary. This object cannot be attained by mere avoidance of the enemy's fire, and the soldier will never gain a victory by simply lying behind an obstacle. A habit of clinging to safe places would be worse for an army than any extent of rashness at all likely to be shown. Hence the soldier should be carefully instructed not only in the practice of using cover, but also of readily issuing from it at the proper moment. The most secure shelter must be changed without hesitation to right, left, front or rear, or abandoned altogether, in order to obtain some new advantage of position, or to follow the enemy's motions as he seeks to gain new shelter."
The general tendency of attack formations as developed at the great maneuvers of recent years has been to push boldly towards the enemy without much thought of shelter, and accept the necessary losses in the hope of quickly deciding the battle.
OUTPOSTS.
The duties of outposts are threefold, and are (1) to delay the enemy from attacking the main body of a force at rest sufficiently long to enable it to form up for action on its chosen ground. (2) To obtain information as to the numbers and disposition of the enemy so far as can be done without patrolling or reconnoitering to a long distance. (3) To prevent the enemy from obtaining like information with regard to one's own forces. From the official reports of the various landing drills and of the Panama expedition, guard duty in our Navy seems to have partaken principally of the nature of police duty, and the attention of sentries seems to have been directed towards the interior of the lines and the maintenance of order there rather than towards the enemy.
The line of sentries with its pickets and grand guard fulfills the first object of outposts by resistance to the advancing enemy until sufficient time has been afforded to the main body to prepare for action. This is a most important duty, and the necessity for occasional self-sacrifice in order to fulfill it is noted in the regulations of some services.
The distance at which the outposts are stationed from the main body of course depends upon the size of the total force. The line of outposts also performs the duty. of lookouts, and in this way also it may give timely warning to the main body.
To obtain information regarding the enemy's movements, patrols are employed. These are groups of men sent out to examine the country beyond the sentry line. They should not go farther than a mile, and should observe all secrecy in their movements.
The knowledge of patrol duties required of German troops is indicated as follows in Major Von Arnim's Infantry Captain's Journal: 1. Skillful and prudent conduct of detached men and patrols in examining a certain extent of ground; in seeking for and observing an adversary; in retiring before an enemy; in transmitting intelligence. 2. Proper instruction in the duties of sentries, and knowledge of how to act and how to transmit intelligence according to the different events that may occur. Unfortunately, it seems to be assumed by our officers that instruction in such duties is unnecessary; but as these duties must be performed in war, it would be advantageous to pay more attention to them.
DISEMBARKING AND EMBARKING.
As soon as the boats of the landing forces are manned, they should be formed into divisions of some twelve or fourteen boats each, corresponding to the battalions and batteries of the brigade, and each boat should bear its distinguishing number both on bows and stern, besides a special mark for artillery boats. The latter mark would facilitate re-embarkation. Besides the ordinary equipment required for boats by the Ordnance Instructions, each boat should have a reserve of ammunition so that the brigade may land carrying its full supply, and that on re-embarkation the expenditures may be made good; the reserve ammunition may even be pushed to the front to meet the returning force.
If there should be boats armed with guns which it is not intended to land, they should be formed into a separate division immediately under the officer commanding the covering gunboats. Certain boats in the rear should be detailed to assist disabled boats, so as to prevent too much disorder among the leading boats. The brigade should be towed to the landing place, and should remain out of range while the artillery of the covering ships and steam launches and torpedo boats prepares the landing. Frequently, however, the artillery of the small boats will be of little assistance in preparing the landing, owing to its small height above the water and consequent lack of command.
When the artillery afloat has silenced the enemy, the landing may be attempted. There will be two typical cases in landing; in the first, the covering vessels will be able to maintain their fire until the landing is complete, either by virtue of a favorable flanking position or because the enemy's line of defense is some distance in rear of the beach, so that the covering gunboats may maintain their fire over the boats of the brigade. In the second case the enemy will be so placed as to oblige the fire from the gunboats to cease when the brigade moves to the attack, and thus he will be able to renew his opposition.
The first case is practically that of an unopposed landing. Each division of boats would pull for the shore, select its landing place, and after landing, the battalion would form and await orders.
In the second case the landing would be hurried and the force would be obliged to move to the attack immediately, so that the plan of attack should be carefully prepared and understood by all leaders before attempting the landing.
In landing, it will be the object to disembark the force in a compact formation from which the battle formation may be readily assumed. As the battalions will land abreast of each other, it will be convenient to form the corresponding boat divisions abreast of each other. The interval between the divisions should be 50 fathoms, which is about the battalion front and will allow 20 feet between boats with an interval of 40 feet between divisions. After landing, each battalion will form its own fighting line, reinforcement and support, unless it is to form the reserve; the formation of the different boat divisions should therefore be such as to permit the boats to land in succession. The following plan is suggested: The boats containing the skirmish line should lead in abreast of each other. Their distance apart should be at least 50 feet when first coming within range, in order that both may not be within the same sheaf of fire. The next boats containing the second line, or "reinforcement," should follow at a distance of about 150 or 200 yards, and should be slightly on the quarter of the leading boats in order to deprive the enemy of the chance of a raking fire. If the water is smooth, ricochets will be very effective, so that if other circumstances permit, the echelon should be formed on one bow-and-quarter line or the other, according to the direction of the twist of the enemy's rifling, which should have been made known by the Navy Department to the force engaged. The rest of the boats containing the third line, or "support," and the auxiliaries should follow in double column at a distance of about 150 to 200 yards and should also be a little on the quarter of the boats ahead. In landing, the boats should be about 20 feet apart, but if boats containing the second line are intermingled with those of the first, it is a matter of no importance, provided that the first line on shore has moved forward so that no confusion occurs among the men. The artillery division of boats should be in the centre, for there the artillery can be better covered by the infantry, and it should be formed similarly to the other divisions. The two leading boats should contain half companies without guns and should be immediately followed by the corresponding half companies with guns. The rest of the battery should then be landed as rapidly as possible, the relief half companies preceding their guns in every case. The guns should be landed as early as possible because they lend great moral support, besides their actual service making it worth while to run the risk of their capture.
Beach Forces.—After the landing is complete it will be the duty of the beach-master and his force to take charge of the boats, to repair damages to them, to haul them off to an anchorage or draw them up in order on the beach, as the circumstances may demand, in order that the returning force may find no difficulty in re-embarking. If he expects an attack, either while the brigade is away or when it re-embarks, he should throw up entrenchments so as to aid the re-embarkation, taking care that they shall be planned so as to receive all possible aid from the covering gunboats. It will also be his duty to have ammunition ready to distribute to the returning troops, and to disembark and send forward all supplies needed for them.
In re-embarking, the flank companies should shove off first and the centre companies last. As in the haste and confusion of a re-embarkation under fire there will be many stragglers and men separated from their commands, each boat officer should observe before shoving off that his boat contains about her proper number, in order that on the one hand the last boats may not be overcrowded, and on the other that they may have crews sufficiently large and no boats be left. The guns should be kept on shore as long as possible. The Gatlings should be re-embarked first, as they are better able to cover the field guns from the water than are the field guns to cover them. The boats containing guns should push off before those containing the corresponding relief half companies, which should be left to cover the embarkation of the guns and then follow.
Boats which have shoved off should remain near the beach until all are clear of the beach, when they should retire in succession, leaving a few as a rear guard to cover the departure of the rest and then to follow in their turn.
RIOTING.
It was the experience in the riots of 1877 that the respect paid to the United States forces was such that they never had to resort to fire; nevertheless it would not be well to rely too implicitly on that precedent.
In the first place it should be an invariable rule for United States forces never to appear before compulsory measures are a necessity. The mere parade of numbers is specially to be avoided, for it always arouses the mob; but the commander of the force should see that information regarding its presence is informally spread among the rioters. The commanding officer should obtain maps of the city and distribute them among his force, which should be quartered in some central building outside of the district occupied by the mob, and in communication with the local authorities. Wagons should be provided to convey the force at an instant's notice wherever its presence may be needed. Patrol or express wagons would be suitable.
The force should dismount from the wagons away from the scene of disturbance, form and march instantly upon the mob. In all probability the mob will yield, no matter what resistance it may have offered to the State National Guards; it should therefore be understood by every one in the force that fire is the last resort, to be employed only upon a direct order.
When in presence of the rioters, the sailors should form line with fixed bayonets and unloaded muskets at "arms port," and should move forward steadily without any halt. The commanding officer should be immediately in rear of the front line in order to feel the temper of the mob, and should be accompanied by three or four good marksmen of approved coolness whose rifles should be loaded. If fire should become necessary, a few leaders picked off by them under the immediate directions of the commanding officer might break up the assembly.
A small force may readily hold back a mob, but a much larger one is necessary to drive it, for the houses on each side of the streets must be searched, which takes time, and a small advancing force is quickly surrounded; and if blood has not already been shed, such a force loses that perfect coolness which alone can prevent it.
The troops may be formed either in a hollow square extending from house to house, or in closed column of divisions or of companies with a front reaching from house to house. At cross streets, when employing the latter formation, the leading company (or division) executes "platoons (or companies) right and left turn," and the cross street is thus closed in both directions until the column has passed, when the platoons (or companies) follow as the rear company (or division). A Gatling or shell gun would probably produce great moral effect upon the mob, and might be taken with the column, but it should not be used except in a desperate conflict, for when few shots at short ranges are required, they can be better applied from small arms than from machine guns.
Barricades should always be turned and the mob are not to be permitted to occupy squares and open places. The districts occupied by the rioters should have their water supply cut off, and it should be the object of the forces attacking the mob both to isolate and divide it.
CONCLUSIONS.
The conclusions to be drawn from a study of this subject are as follows:
The history of every nation shows that in almost every war the Navy is called upon to take a more or less active part against the best troops of the enemy, and therefore, while its knowledge of military matters need not be so profound nor so wide as that of the Army, yet it must have enough both of theory and practice to acquit itself without discredit. Naval officers should look upon duty ashore as an integral, though secondary, part of their profession, instead of adopting the idea given by the suggestions of the Ordnance Instructions that extemporary measures only are necessary for the creditable performance of military duties.
The artillery training is not sufficient, and that of the infantry is utterly insufficient and so far behind the times that it may be said to be on a wrong basis. The deployment of the skirmish line by numbers is a maneuver condemned by the military nations of Europe, and we should hasten to adopt a development of the skirmish line by the group system, which best fulfills the requirements of battle.
When the Naval Brigade has been landed for exercise, attention seems to have been paid to maneuver drill, but very little to scouting, reconnaissance, outpost duty, and the other minor operations of war which form the daily occupation of small forces in the field. Even the target practice cannot have given results adequate to the expenditure of ammunition, for we learn from the Army Manual that some months of preliminary drills and exercises are necessary to enable a man to derive full benefit from range practice.
Finally, to those who fear to sacrifice the well known distinguishing characteristics of seamen in the endeavor to teach them soldiering, may be pointed out the seamanlike qualities and the military efficiency of the Naval Brigades in the long campaigns in the Indian mutiny, at the siege of Paris, and in Zululand. Attention may also be called to the facts that the large proportion of officers in the Naval Brigade decreases the necessary amount of detailed training for the men, and that the essential difference between soldiers and bluejackets lies not in the nature nor depth of their respective militant acquirements, but in the different modes of discipline and habits of thought developed by their daily life. Not only is it desirable to retain all the qualities of the ideal bluejacket, but it may be asserted that his versatility and resource give him the making of a better modern soldier than the soldier himself, who is trained to a certain rigidity of thought and discipline which is now in a large degree merely a survival from former necessities.
The splendid record of the marines, both in this country and England, bears out this assertion, for although the amount of their training cannot equal that of soldiers, yet their association with seamen, and consequent assimilation of naval modes of thought and action, more than supplies the deficiency.