Prize Essay for 1886
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CONTENTS.
- Introduction.—Importance of subject. Types under consideration. Designs of Advisory Board. Statement of personal opinion.
- Complement and Organization.—Complement regulated by accommodation. Assignment of officers to command divisions. Engineer's force. Recruiting. Naval-apprentice system. Enlistment of landsmen. Marine guard. Responsibility for all grades. Continuous use of watch and station bills. Fighting organization and quarter bill. Equal divisions. Duties of officers. Communications.
- Seamanship and Sailing Drills.—Seamanship as a practical art. Reaction against evolution. Objects of drill. Physical development. Preparation for service. Failure of present competitive methods. Progressive training. Watch drills. Conditions of competition. Combined exercises. Rigs for harbor, sailing, steaming, or fighting. Maneuvering under sail and under steam. Training watches, firemen, and servants. Cleaning ship and scrubbing clothes. Instruction of boats' crews, divisions, and parts of the ship. Steam launches. Individual instruction. Standards for promotion.
- Armament and Preparation for Battle.—Necessity of preparation. Defects of present system. Armament. Obsolete weapons. Torpedoes. Fighting organization for U.S.S. Atlanta. Supply of ammunition. Communications. Distribution of force. Requirements of service. Officers commanding divisions. Classification. Allowance of time for instruction. Duties of watch and division officers. Great-gun drills. Inspection of battery. Pointing drill. Rifle practice. Targets, scores, and records. Combined target practice. General quarters. Value of target practice. Swords and pistols. Working ship in action. Passing ammunition.
- Training Men for Detached Service.—Composition of detachments. Instruction and armament. Objections to howitzers. Training of infantry. Equipment and supply camps for instruction. Combined boat exercises. Steam launches and torpedo boats. Control and record of drills
- Conclusion.—Summary of specific recommendations. Intentions of the writer. Responsibility and training of officers. Conclusion.
I.—Introduction.
The Naval Institute may be congratulated upon the strictly practical and professional nature of the subject now presented for discussion. Questions of policy or expenditure heretofore discussed may be left to be acted upon or ignored by Congress or the Cabinet. The work of naval officers cannot be extended or our shipping increased, except through the slow and uncertain action of public opinion as expressed in the press or in our national legislature. The question now before us is, however, one which only naval officers can discuss, and it is one which they cannot afford to ignore.
The frank statement of the question recognizes a fact of vital importance and supplies us with a fundamental proposition. Changes are necessary, both in organization and drill, if our ships are to be made effective men-of-war. There may be those who would denounce any proposition to sail our ships effectively in time of peace as un-seamanlike, and any discussion of methods for fighting in time of war as theoretical. In spite of these damnatory adjectives, we must undertake the treatment of this difficult but inspiriting subject, which appeals to the interest of every officer who believes in the future of our naval service or expects to share in the arduous work of sailing and fighting ships of modern type.
When we come to consider our vessels of modern type with a view to suggesting changes in drill and organization, we find that they are few in number, of moderate tonnage, and neither armed with the most formidable weapons now in use nor protected by armor. Their motive machinery has not escaped criticism, and their construction by contract has been attended with delays and difficulties. These facts must be noted without discussion, and we must proceed to ascertain and develop the capabilities of the ships now in progress.
The Chicago and Atlanta types are intelligent attempts to solve the problems of actual naval warfare. Within the limits of their size and cost they may be classed as fast and well-armed ships. The attempt has been made, for the first time since the Civil War, to give us ships that can fight under way. The ships are intended to have speed and handiness, and their batteries have been selected and disposed with a view to enable them to choose their distance and to fight without surrendering all the advantages of speed and maneuvering power. Vessels loaded with smooth-bore guns which can only be fired abeam, and hampered by unnecessary spars and rigging, can neither fight nor run away in action. A proper disposition of the battery and the complete subordination of sails to steam will enable our new cruisers to make a choice between these courses.
The successive Advisory Boards deserve the thanks of the service for their efforts to put an end to the period of reaction and paralysis which has lasted ever since the achievements of the Navy during the Civil War. Their designs are distinctly progressive, and a quarter of a century in advance of those of the last group of ships authorized by Congress. Ten years ago our constructors were allowed to copy the general plans of cruisers built before 1860 without effective protest from the service or criticism from the press. A slight gain in economy of coal was the only result of fifteen years of mechanical improvement. The partial success of the new cruisers will render such fatal errors impossible in future. Steam is accepted as the vital force for cruising as well as fighting.
These designs show evidence of a thorough study of the best foreign examples extant three years ago. Delays have enabled foreign builders to make a further advance and to reach higher speeds than are claimed for the vessels built by those contracts made under the direction of the Advisory Board. The lapse of time and the activity of naval improvement are sufficient to account for this. But the attempt to make use of examples from abroad implies a definite amount of progress in the sentiments of the service.
The vague, pseudo-millennial anticipations of some naval officers and politicians can no longer secure recognition. Nations will not turn their Krupps into smooth-bores, their torpedo boats into pleasure yachts, and forget what they know about war, simply because we are content to put up with less than our money's worth and maintain our Navy on an inefficient basis. Moreover, we must remember that our next war will certainly be a foreign war, and that it will bring us into collision with an actual naval power. We ought to welcome the assurance that our foes will not be of our own household, and we ought not to dread the possibility of a conflict with a warlike and maritime nation. It would seem as though another civil war, or one of those wretched little wars peculiar to colonizing nations, were the only contingencies for which we attempt to be prepared.
The new cruisers and their successors for which plans are now in preparation are fortunate in the discussion which their construction has stimulated. It will prevent that neglect of practical detail which too often characterizes meritorious designs. It should also do away with the tendency to rely upon miraculous inventions to solve all our difficulties, which seems to be one of our national peculiarities. In most of the arts it may be said that the age of the inventor has been succeeded by that of the designer. Certainly all recent progress in the instruments and appliances of naval warfare confirms this opinion. The results of experiment and the principles of science must be put into practical shape by the capable designer. New inventions may be incorporated, but designs of ships of war must be established on careful study of the latest facts.
Besides the special naval types under discussion, we must include others in any scheme of naval organization. Our traditional naval policy will always compel us to rely upon the mercantile marine for material to put our Navy on a war-footing. This fact suggests the incorporation of a few selected steamers of the latest mercantile type in our cruising squadrons. Officers should be trained to handle such vessels, and modern armaments should be experimentally adapted for their use. If proper care were used in selecting the best types of ships built from year to year, the Government might obtain many improved features in machinery and equipment, with opportunities for testing them with a view to their use in regularly constructed men-of-war. Steamers of 2000 tons register could carry two large torpedo boats, each with a full outfit, besides a light armament, and a large cargo of stores and coal for use on long voyages, or for issue to other vessels. Well-built and full-powered steamers of this class could be purchased for less than it often costs to repair an obsolete and inefficient wooden corvette, and they would perform the ordinary cruising duties of a man-of-war in time of peace more creditably and economically than any vessel designed twenty years ago. Such vessels must be studied and recognized as types of auxiliary or torpedo cruisers for use in time of war. It is hardly necessary to recall the vast recent experiments in this direction carried on by the British Navy. Our present deficiencies emphasize the importance of this example. Not more than six such steamers would be required, and they should be sold as soon as they ceased to represent modern types. Such sales would not involve serious loss, if made within five or ten years after the vessels were built.
The attempt to discuss any question of burning importance to the naval service may involve the use of expressions which are lacking in respect for some venerable traditions and respectable prejudices. The form of the question is such that the answer will be nothing if not critical or comparative in its methods. Moreover, it is difficult to seek brevity and clearness without appearing to indulge in uncalled-for emphasis and assertion. If facts and details could be omitted and the exposition of fundamental principles substituted therefore, some of these dangers might be avoided.
This essay contains the present opinions of the writer, stated with as much frankness and clearness as he can command. He does not bind himself not to modify these opinions, nor does he predict their general acceptance and application in practice. The paper cannot come before its limited public without a signature, which must relieve the author from any imputation of posing as one having authority. It is hoped that these suggestions may be so clearly expressed and so kindly received that they will not be misunderstood by those who read them, or misinterpreted by those who do not care to take that trouble.
II.—Complement and Organization.
Some notice of the rules which should govern the allowance of officers and seamen to make up the complements of ships of modern type must precede the discussion of plans of organization. The inevitable tendency towards replacing sails by steam might seem to promise a reduction in the number of men carried. Considering simple navigation as the work of a man-of-war, it might be practicable to follow the example of the mercantile marine in diminishing the proportion of crews to tonnage. Considering a ship as a military unit, we shall find that every improvement raises her fighting power and individual importance. The development of torpedo warfare and small-arm and machine-gun fire supplies employment for more men in action, besides multiplying occasions for detaching them for service on shore or in torpedo boats and steam launches. Ships cannot afford to deprive themselves of all power of maneuvering and defending themselves by detaching too large a proportion of their crews for military purposes, nor can they afford to miss occasions of rendering valuable service in emergencies. For these reasons they should have every mechanical appliance to save time and labor in getting under way and working ship and guns, and should have men enough to furnish parties for all kinds of detached service and reserves in action.
The complement of an efficient man-of-war should be fixed with a view to utilizing as many men as possible for attack and defense. It is not to be determined by counting the men required to man the great guns in her battery, nor does it depend upon the area of her sails, or the force required to handle them with primitive appliances. In fact, no arbitrary limits should be assigned. As many men as possible should be carried and trained to do their part in action. The practical basis for determining the complement is the berthing accommodation of the ship. Every improvement in lighting and ventilation can thus be made directly useful in promoting efficiency by obviating the disadvantages of large crews in contracted quarters.
There must not be a reduced complement in time of peace for the few ships of modern type which we can put in commission. Every one of them must be made a training-ship for all the men that can be carried. Modern ships and modern weapons must be utilized to afford real and practical training for modern warfare.
The complement of officers must vary with the number of the crew. While a small number of officers might suffice for navigating a ship on regular voyages, it is evident that an increase will be required if a large body of men are placed on board to be disciplined, instructed, and commanded in action. But tradition has its arbitrary standards, and requires four watch-officers for all men-of-war. Strict watch duty must be carried on in gunboats of obsolete type and worthless armament, and officers must be detailed accordingly. This may leave only one or two more line officers in a ship carrying 500 men than are nominally employed with a crew of 30. Against such customs of the service it is the purpose of this essay to appeal. It is maintained that there is an essential relation between the number of officers and the fighting force of the ship. A further attempt will be made to give approximate rules for determining the proportion of officers and men. There must be a certain natural relation involved.
The engineer's force is charged with the work of furnishing the ship with motive power for use in action and on all occasions of emergency. It is therefore an essential part of the fighting organization and should have a liberal allowance of men. The working force should be sufficient for long passages under steam, and some provision for a reserve is also required. This reserve should be drawn from a contingent of landsmen forming part of the complement of every ship. They should be trained and drilled with the ordinary working and fighting force of the ship and encouraged to fit themselves for advancement to higher ratings, either as seamen or firemen, according to aptitude.
This brings up the question of recruiting, and may serve as an excuse for some discussion of its problems. The supply of continuous-service men trained in ships of war is not sufficient. for our needs. By offering high wages in the open market we can get seamen quite equal to those who man the remaining ships of our unfortunate merchant marine. This class is, however, largely made up of foreigners.
It would be easy to exaggerate the disadvantages of this fact. The figures showing the nationality of any of our ships' companies would convey an unnecessarily alarming impression to most people. This is not a new or startling condition of things in the naval service of the United States. It is not, however, a condition with which we ought to be thoroughly satisfied, even in time of peace. In war it might give rise to serious inconveniences and complications. The inevitable failure of such a supply in time of urgent need can hardly be provided for. We could not then afford to train recruits whose first step must be the acquisition of the English language. Those we have trained may be relied upon as long as they are willing to remain in the service.
The naval-apprentice system is an attempt to Americanize the Navy by a supply of trained men for continuous service. The figures which should demonstrate the success or failure of this attempt are not available. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that there has been a failure in its numerical results. It would be interesting to compare the number of graduates from our training ships, now serving as seamen or petty officers, with the total number of those who have been enlisted or who have passed through the prescribed course during the last ten years. If the percentage turned out to be inconsiderable as compared with the total number of seamen required for the Navy, it would be hard to justify the maintenance of the training squadron on its present basis, with its fleet of obsolete ships and its large staff of officers withdrawn from service under normal conditions, in ships of modern type and armament.
Consideration seems to show that we cannot with safety and propriety continue our reliance upon the mercantile marine for a supply of trained seamen, and that our apprentice system is slow and inadequate in its supply of continuous-service men. We are therefore thrown back on the source of supply which will be our inevitable dependence in time of war. Let us enlist young men of good physique and intelligence and give them a rapid course of military training while they are acquiring the rudiments of seamanship by serving in cruising vessels. France and Germany have their whole maritime population to draw naval recruits from, yet they are compelled to accept men from the general conscription, without regard to nautical experience. This element forms a respectable contingent on board men-of-war of those countries, and they show no marked inferiority when drilled with the merchant seamen and fishermen of the regular enrollment.
All these facts seem to favor the plan of enlisting men under 25 for general service with a view to their advancement, according to ability, after a practical course of training. They should be liable to discharge at the end of six months, at the discretion of commanding officers, if they are found unfit for the naval service. They should be trained in cruising vessels on the home station. Increased pay and privileges, as well as distinguishing marks in uniform, should be used as inducements to work and improvement. They should not be called landsmen. The naval use of this word implies tendencies to stupidity and stagnation which are not desirable. They might be designated as mariners, or naval volunteers, before advancement to higher ratings. Their number should not exceed 25 per cent, of the complement of any seagoing vessel.
The training system should be kept up on a reduced basis to furnish trained men for special or technical work in connection with the armament and equipment of ships of modern type. Methods of training and principles of selection should be modified accordingly. The Government should in all cases reserve the right to get rid of bad bargains without waiting for the expiration of any fixed term.
The marine corps furnishes a valuable element in our ships' companies. Its services as a police force are invaluable, and justify its continuance in spite of the want of adaptability of its system of training to nautical conditions and modern weapons. These drawbacks are manifest enough to suggest the limitation of the marine guard of each ship to the smallest number which can be trusted to perform the strictly necessary sentry and police duties; otherwise they exclude men who might receive a thorough naval training from our few modern ships. It does not seem practicable to make any use of the nautical training and education possessed by the younger officers of the corps. The old routine restricts their usefulness, while their presence in small ships keeps out line officers who should be gaining experience and performing responsible duties. The maintenance of strong marine battalions at two or three central stations would furnish the corps with opportunities for advanced military instruction, and the country with an organized force for detached service. From these battalions temporary details for guarding navy yards and public property could be readily made. Guards for ships should be made up of trained men only, who should receive a slight increase of pay for sea service. Two officers to each squadron would be sufficient to inspect and organize the marine guards of all the ships. Qualified sergeants and corporals should act as guides at battalion drills, and might serve as instructors for seamen in the manual and marksmanship where junior officers were wanting.
The recently established courses of instruction in ordnance for continuous-service men should provide the Navy with qualified instructors for the elements of gunnery and rifle practice. They should drill recruits under the direction of division officers, and the latter should be required to devote the time saved from drudgery to the advanced instruction of capable men.
It would be well to apply in this connection the principle of official responsibility as the basis of all military organization. Petty officers of all grades must take their share of responsibility, and commissioned officers must be held responsible for results, while allowed to act for themselves in directing details and methods of training. Routine and regulations must leave something to be settled by commanding officers of ships and officers of divisions.
The watch bill is the foundation of our present system of drill and discipline. It is so ingenious and flexible in its methods that it can be adapted to ships of any class without essential modification. It should be given more continuous vitality by working and drilling its subdivisions, its watches and quarter watches, as active, organic units in port as well as at sea. Captains of parts of the ship should be supported and made to acquire a sense of responsibility for their men's presence and performance in answer to any call. Watches should be mustered daily in port, and parts of the ship should be preferred to mixed details in executing work of any kind. Organization and drill must combine to prevent the watch bill from losing its vital powers during a long stay in port. Work must be found for men in port to maintain physical training and discipline. But the force should be accurately proportioned to the work to be done, and the men designated must use their energies in working. Calling all hands to do the work of a watch encourages the idle to stay away, or to shirk when work is in progress. Each watch should have its strength developed by drill, and its organization perfected by careful stations and musters.
The station bills for working and sailing the ship adapt themselves readily to the watch bill. The force is always large enough for any rational evolution, and the superfluity of men to be drilled explains and justifies some combinations and exercises which might be found fantastic from a purely practical point of view.
The quarter bill or fighting organization must be regulated by more severe principles, while motive and maneuvering power must be maintained at the highest standard during action. Modern ships bristle with weapons requiring men to work them. Neither attack nor defense can afford to neglect any source of strength. Ships must be prepared to steam and maneuver while large portions of their crews are on detached service. Finally, we must provide for a vigorous course of training which shall utilize and develop the fighting powers of every man in the ship. Men learn to sail a ship after a fashion, without special training, because they cannot help taking part in the necessary work. They cannot, however, be trusted to pick up the art of fighting with great guns and small-arms, machine guns and torpedoes, without thorough organization and training.
Our present methods appear to recognize these necessities in principle. In practice they must be modified, to be thoroughly useful with modern armaments. Instead of forming a division of convenient size as a unit of organization for fighting and military training, we now distribute the material of the armament into groups and attach officers and men to guns, magazines or gear, according to arbitrary rules. The groups thus formed are called divisions, and form the basis of all subsequent organization and training. The idea of seniority is attached to these groups of material, and the removal of one officer breaks up all connection between those below him and the men for whose training they are responsible.
The gun divisions are generally fairly equal in force. The navigator's division varies greatly in size and efficiency. It may have five men or one hundred, but its commanding officer is rarely in a position to instruct it during drill hours, or to command it as a whole during action. The powder division is largely made up of inefficient men, who give a character to the whole organization and prevent the improvement of the rest. They are broken up in squads when stationed to pass ammunition, and usually receive only rudimentary instruction. They may do the work for which they are stationed, but they do it with much waste of numbers and strength, and in other respects make little progress towards military efficiency. The engineer's division is not drilled at all. Thus, only about one-half the ship's company receive a thorough course of training, or can do so under the present organization.
It is claimed that every man should belong to an efficient military organization, and should be trained for every kind of service according to his abilities. The great guns are only parts of the armament, and must not control the whole organization. The close connection between men and material is only important at the beginning of a cruise, and is not to be preferred to the connection between divisions and their commanding officers, which is now so often interrupted. To properly distribute work and responsibility, the divisions should be of uniform size and should be expected to receive equal amounts of training.
It is proposed to deduct from the ship's company the engineer's force, marines, and first-class petty officers, and to distribute the remainder in divisions of forty to fifty men each, and of nearly identical composition. These divisions will be assigned to portions of the armament, keeping at least one division on the spar-deck for working ship. The powder division disappears, and each division has its own chain of ammunition passers. The navigator confines himself to his duties as ordnance officer and officer of the deck in action. The divisions are commanded by lieutenants, assisted by ensigns if possible. It should be the purpose of the detail of men to equalize the force, and to make the divisions complete working detachments. Progressive Instruction should be given with a view to making the divisions Interchangeable, but they should not be shifted unnecessarily. The connection between the lieutenant and his division should be permanent, as far as practicable. Messes should be arranged by divisions and watches, as far as practicable.
While all divisions should be Instructed in the use of various weapons and prepared for detached service, it may be convenient in practice to class about one-fourth the men of each division as reserves to remain on board when more than two divisions are detached for other duty. This reserve would naturally be made up of coal-heavers, servants, rated men, and a few petty officers. The absence of men of these classes from daily drills may be tolerated at the discretion of the commanding officer. A record of all such absences should be kept and presented for inspection on occasion. The divisions should be paired to be combined under either of the lieutenants as a company of Infantry, when the reserves are not landed, and when it is desirable to retain some of the regular division and watch officers on board ship.
The executive officer should have direct command of the whole force employed in working the armament. The navigator should work the ship under the personal direction of the captain. The navigator should have a fixed position in action, but the captain and executive should go where they can best direct the working of the ship and her armament. On no account should the three senior officers of the ship be grouped on the bridge or in the pilot house.
As a detail of organization, the use of telegraphs for working the helm and engines in action may be pointed out as highly Important. A system of speaking-tubes to engine rooms, magazines, etc., is also required. Speed should be shown by revolution indicators, and the position of the rudder by a proper pointer, both under the eyes of the commanding officer and navigator. The terrible responsibilities of command in action do not admit of the distractions of the old system of passing the word.
The practical conclusions drawn from the consideration of methods of organization are two in number:
- Men must be stationed, worked, and drilled by watches in port, as well as at sea.
- Divisions must be equal in force and each of them an efficient and complete military organization.
These propositions will be developed in succeeding portions of this essay.
III.—Seamanship and Sailing Drills.
In taking up the question of drill, we have to begin by considering what changes are necessary to sail most effectively our ships of latest type. As seamanship may be defined as the art of sailing ships effectively, we are called upon to draw up a program for seamanship drills.
The object of seamanship in the mercantile marine is to make good passages. Men-of-war are subject to the additional requirements of keeping the sea in all weathers and sailing in company. Success in either class is measured by comparison of results rather than of methods, which must vary with the rig and propelling power of the ship—supposing the actual motive power to be regularly employed. The purposes and essentials of successful seamanship change slowly, while methods and details change with every improvement in motive power or steering gear.
Looking at seamanship as a practical art, we must study the parts which are undergoing change and adapt ourselves to new methods with the utmost promptness. We can study the practice of the past out of curiosity and to discover the tendencies of nautical progress. If we know what has become obsolete, we shall be ready to recognize what comes in its place.
The opposite view is held by a school which is lucky enough to have Mr. Ruskin as its literary advocate. He holds that seamanship went out when steam and iron came in, and that hemp and oak are the only materials which a seaman can use in learning his profession. A tided English admiral says that no officer can learn any seamanship on board an ironclad.
Reaction is supported in less picturesque but more familiar phrases in our own service. Seamanship is held to be an exact and arbitrary science, like heraldry or etiquette. The permanent type of ships of war dates from the first half of this century, is ship-rigged, and carries studding sails. The loyal seaman is expected to steam under protest, and to insist upon large sail areas and maneuvering power under sail for all men-of-war. Obsolete ideals and fidelity to tradition are preferred to practical usefulness and professional improvement.
Seamanship drills are to be kept up as factors in the struggle against evolution, the protest against progress, which these crusaders maintain. The old-fashioned military delight in exactly uniform and simultaneous movements still lives in our cruising ships. Sending down royal yards is called a squadron evolution—though Paul Hoste and Darwin would be puzzled alike at such use of the word—and hundreds of men are called on deck to lower three little spars as the colors are hauled down. Those who call these things practical will hardly tolerate suggestions of change. They make a fetich of the mainsail and regard tacking ship as a sacrament, and care nothing for plans for drilling our ships to sail and fight effectively.
The genuine purposes of seamanship drills are two in number:
- Development of the strength and activity of the ship's company, to promote health and discipline.
- Preparation for service at sea, with special reference to probable emergencies.
The importance of the first of these purposes is just beginning to be insisted upon by those who fear the discontinuance of the old sail and spar drills. They are defended as gymnastic exercises conducted under the stimulus of competition. This view has its exponents among British naval officers who demand full ship rig as a nautical gymnasium, without much regard to the practical usefulness of the spars or sails in actual cruising. A main yard 125 feet in length for an ironclad of low freeboard is an extreme case of the application of this doctrine. The actual and visible results of the present system of drills do not allow us to ignore their value as factors in the physical development of seamen. We must, however, seek to get the same results without waste of time, and to that end we must use more simple and direct methods.
If our methods of physical training are slow, wasteful, and indirect in developing the strength of the individuals of our working force, it is largely due to the practice of conducting all drills with all hands on deck, and leaving ordinary work at sea and in port to be carried on in an unorganized and haphazard manner by watches or smaller detachments. We must correct this by selecting those portions of drills which afford muscular exercise, and applying them to watches or parts of the ship in such proportion that each man shall be called upon to exert his strength fairly and continuously enough to keep him in full training.
Our present system is also defective in preparing men for ordinary duties at sea, and for the most probable emergencies and accidents of a cruise. Exercises are not carried on with any direct purpose of effecting such preparation. Show, smartness, and ensemble are the qualities specially cultivated by our competitive drills. Speed is preferred to safety, and external appearance to sound workmanship. By working only for success in a competition in which time is the chief element, we encourage the use of flimsy devices, the "gilguys and gadgets" dear to the heart of the top man in a man-of-war. This introduces an element of danger, as demonstrated by too many fatal accidents at drill. A more serious danger lies in the habitual neglect of security and finish practically taught by such methods. Sails are insecurely bent and reefed and spars imperfectly secured aloft in order to make time; and seamen do not always remember to change their methods when working at sea, even in heavy weather. In port men are sent aloft before the gear is up, and are thus taught to evade the heavy work in a gale of wind at sea, as well as to expose themselves to danger while laying out on the yards.
The invariable practice of calling all hands for spar and sail, drills destroys the likeness between exercise and actual work, and, deprives, seamen of opportunities for individual training aloft. In practice, ships are sailed by one watch at a time, and watch officers must learn to prepare for all probable contingencies with the actual force under their command. It is hardly creditable for a ship's company to have only one set of trained light yardmen during a whole cruise, but that seems to be accepted as a convenient solution of the problems of competitive drill.
Competitive drills with all hands also fail in providing for progressive instruction and continual improvement throughout the cruise. The first six months are occupied with zealous, if not altogether rational, efforts to approximate to the standard of the average cruiser, and success is marked by a cessation of interest and energy in exercising. Progressive instruction should correct this tendency, but it is not practicable to carry it on with a squadron made up of vessels of various rigs and crews in different stages of training, except by assuming an equality which cannot be maintained in practice. We even go so far as to attempt to establish an arbitrary equality by rigging vessels with superfluous spars and sails which are useful only in ships of different power and tonnage. Happily, our new ships are to have rigs suited to their types, and uniformity has not been preferred to efficiency.
It is claimed that changes in drill are required to secure physical training, preparation for service, and progressive individual instruction. The present methods are not wanting in ingenuity or elaboration. They fail because they consider results as less important than traditions. Their purpose is too general and their routine too inflexible to ensure practical efficiency. They assume and attempt to enforce conditions of equality among ships which are neither true nor desirable for those of modern type. They make drill rather an end than a means of progress. They are based upon the theory that full-rigged ships are the only real men-of-war, and that reaction in that direction must accompany every improvement in steam machinery.
We must not make changes blindly, but must keep the objects of our system always in view. We must begin with rudimentary exercises and make our routine progressive. This implies the selection of simple operations for muscular training and discipline, and the assignment of men enough to perform them smartly and without opportunities for shirking. Exercises will require constant repetition at first to secure active and organized movement among masses of untrained men, and to promote individual instruction for those charged with special duties. Competition must be postponed until there is no necessity for the repetition of details. After details have been mastered and watches have been trained for their work at sea, combined exercises may be ordered and all hands worked together. These combined exercises should aim at substantial results of practical importance. They may be ordered for squadron exercises where ships are reasonably fitted to compete with each other. The comparison must be directed to results, and the simultaneous execution of detailed movements should be no part of the program.
Competition should begin between watches, or among individuals and parts of the ship. Its premature application to fleet exercises will tend to cause hasty and inefficient work aloft and noise and confusion on deck. By concentrating the attention of officers during the progress of an evolution, better work will be secured. Drilling by the motions is not necessary even for soldiers in actual service, and invites accident in men-of-war. A deliberate comparison of the completed work after each evolution will afford the best test of efficiency. Times should be noted, but only used as one element in comparing results. Thoroughness should be the first requisite, and quiet and orderly work should also be insisted upon.
But we must not linger too long in the prolixities of general discussion. Detailed and specific suggestions must be brought forward. Their presentation does not imply any intention of furnishing an absolute and invariable program for ships of any class. The system must be flexible to ensure responsibility for results, and it must be experimental to encourage progress.
Let us take hoisting boats and bracing yards as elementary exercises important enough to be organized, and vigorous enough to be useful in developing the strength of the crew. The weight of boats being known, it should not be impossible to assign the proper force to hoist each or all of them. At any rate, a division by watches should be made and enforced whenever boats are hoisted. Squaring yards should never take all hands unless they are on deck for other purposes. As a rule, one watch should square yards while the other is cleaning ship in the morning watch. To make an exercise of it, the yards should first be braced up and then squared together. The men should be carefully stationed at the braces and the work done smartly. To complete preparations for steaming against a headwind, the topsail yards might be mast headed and braced up, and then lowered and squared with the rest. This is a suitable harbor exercise in all weather, and could be made spirited as well as useful, especially when a ship is first commissioned.
The work of loosing and furling sails in port should ordinarily be done by one watch. The other watch may be called on deck to man gear, but the working watch should frequently be sent aloft to prepare them for service at sea. They should also be stationed and drilled in setting all fore and aft sails together, and in hoisting topsails or setting other sails according to the force required. Shifting one topsail at a time is also a suitable watch drill, as it represents the only probable necessity of cruising under sail. Reefing comes last in the order of sail exercises for a watch. Still, it is often better not to call all hands to reef, and stations and drill should prepare the watches to do the work, as well as to shake out reefs in a smart and seamanlike manner.
Sending down light spars is also an operation for half rather than the whole of a ship's company. Sending them up together may require all hands, but it seems absurd to call on more than a quarter watch to work royal yards with the sails unbent. The advantages of having two or more sets of trained light yardmen are sufficiently evident.
None of these drills should be competitive between ships until they have been in commission for several months. Competition between watches and parts of the ship may be encouraged from the first. While the main object of these drills is to prepare watches for service at sea, it is evident that they would also provide the best preliminary training for more complicated exercises with all hands. In making combinations, we should keep in view the conditions and emergencies of practical navigation. No conventional or retrograde system should be established for the sake of uniformity or competition.
The system of watch drills should be kept up even after exercises with all hands have been attempted with success. It affords opportunities for repetition, and for successive and individual training. While the executive officer should superintend all drills, he should require the regular watch officers to carry on exercises with watches or parts of the ship. The morning watch could almost always be made to spare half an hour for one watch to drill in. Of course exercises should alternate, so as to train both watches.
Combined exercises or drills with all hands should be arranged for operations too heavy for a watch, and also with a view to competition between trained crews in ships of similar type. In such competitions a visible result should always terminate the evolution indicated by signal, and this result should have some practical meaning. For instance, a ship in port should be directed to prepare for getting under way, under either steam or sail, the signal indicating what spars were to be sent up or down. Four conventional rigs might thus be ordered by special signals.
- Harbor rig for neatness and uniformity. Topgallant yards crossed; sails bent or unbent according to climate and convenience.
- Sailing rig. Sails bent and gear rove off; boats up and booms alongside.
- Steaming rig. Light spars on deck; yards ready for bracing sharp up; topsail yards mast headed; covers on boats, etc.; fore and aft sail ready.
- Fighting rig. Spars which might interfere with the battery sent down and got ready for rafting ashore, or securing in booms all gear likely to foul screws unrove or stopped in snugly.
The amount of work to be done by each ship should be settled as soon as she joins a squadron, and should depend upon her peculiarities of construction or equipment. Clearing ship for action should not degenerate into trivialities, such as sending down royal yards and unshipping hatch railings. The fact that a general clearance of superfluous spars and rigging must precede active war service at sea should be recognized.
For the purpose of keeping up activity and interest in seamanship exercises throughout the cruise, certain revivals of maneuvers may be tolerated. Crews may be exercised in shortening sail as though a flying moor were to be attempted. Tacking and wearing, box-hauling and chapelling ship, may occupy leisure hours, in light breezes, with some benefit to officers and crews. Still, these evolutions must not be allowed to usurp time and attention at the expense of more practical exercises. Captains do not care to sail into crowded harbors, or to beat through narrow channels. We have gained so much by the adoption of steam power that we ought to be resigned to the inevitable accompanying loss of sail power. Steamers of high maneuvering power under sail are not found among vessels of the latest types, and this essay is not intended to provide for their management.
While we are attempting to perfect the ideal training of our officers by putting full-powered steamers through obsolete evolutions under sail, little or nothing is done to give them experience in handling vessels in fighting condition—that is, under full steam power. The essential point of the seamanship of to-day lies just here. To avoid collisions on the high seas, officers of mail steamers, acting under the international rules of the road, are compelled to use the utmost vigilance, and to employ telegraphs, steam steering-gear, and every device of nautical science. To avoid rams and torpedoes, to attack an enemy or assist a friend, in the desperate melee of a modern naval action, will require still more dexterity and judgment. Can we leave our officers to pick up this essential knowledge, or shall we give them practical opportunities for acquiring it?
The palpable neglect of such opportunities in the naval service is due to a variety of reasons. In the first place, our manuals for study are without precepts, and our examinations for promotion are without questions calculated to develop a practical interest in the handling of ships under steam. The standards of the past prefer sail to steam under all conditions, and treat steaming as a means of evading all nautical difficulties and responsibilities. Moreover, evolutions under steam require coal, and a certain opprobrium attaches to the expenditure of coal except in making passages where haste is ordered. We must learn to be practical in educating our officers, and to be liberal in ascertaining and developing the maneuvering power of our ships at full speed. Squadron evolutions will hardly serve our turn while they are regulated by a meaningless, rectangular system of tactics, and by the powers of the inevitable cripples, with leaky boilers and rattle-trap engines.
We must cultivate the maneuvering power of individual ships as a basis, or rather as a substitute, for all existing schemes of naval tactics. The first step should be to ascertain the actual tactical diameters and other data by experiment, and to familiarize officers with their meaning and use. This may not be what is understood by drill, but it is necessary to efficiency, and may serve as an introduction to other valuable exercises. Officers should be exercised in picking up moorings, in laying out targets, and in piloting the ship, to learn how to keep her under perfect control. Ramming rafts or other light obstructions, and dodging attacks by steam launches, are more specially warlike exercises which should follow in their turn. The problems of handling modern ships under steam are as varied as in the days of sail power. They require to be artificially repeated to give abundant practice for all the responsible sea officers of each ship. Time and coal must be allowed for such exercises, and as many of the officers and petty officers as possible must be employed in observing and noting results, as well as in working the helm and engines. The works of Captain Colomb will be of great assistance in elaborating details, as well as in demonstrating the necessity for such training.
While insisting upon the necessity for watch drills as required to train crews for actual service at sea, we should not ignore certain other advantages of the proposed methods. They should allow two or more operations, such as unmooring, taking in stores, hoisting boats, etc., to go on simultaneously. With a steam capstan it is wasteful to keep all hands standing by while a dozen men are heaving in a long scope of chain or picking up an anchor. Catting and fishing must of course be done by steam power, and a ship should be ready to get under way with a quarter watch. The rest of the ship's company might be hoisting boats, making sail or manning the guns. The military necessities of a vessel of war give additional importance to the training of detachments to do what is essential to get the ship under way and to navigate her.
Another disadvantage of the routine of drill is felt whenever a large liberty party is absent, or when firemen are cleaning or repairing the engines in port or working them at sea. It is also felt by the officers whenever drill hours and meal hours come too close together. In fact, useful exercises are often omitted from a dislike of mutilating the arrangements of the station bill, inaugurating an unfair competition, or interrupting preparations for meals. The training of the working force of the ship should not be sacrificed to such considerations. If servants and firemen must be drilled to aid in working ship, they should be exercised in manning gear, bracing yards, etc., at convenient hours. Without such preliminary work they are useless when called on deck with all hands, and actually interfere with the training of the seamen and ordinary seamen of the ship.
The solution of the ubiquitous servant problem may be found in a large reduction in the number allowed, to be compensated for by training in their special duties and by the introduction of modern improvements in lighting officers' quarters and in supplying water, etc. This, with a rational disposition of galley and pantry, hot water supply, etc., and the detail of men to keep officers' quarters clean, will allow a large reduction without any sacrifice of comfort or convenience.
The use of modern domestic appliances should also facilitate cleaning ship, and thus leave time for regular and systematic exercises by watches during the morning or at other suitable hours. Watches should alternate in cleaning ship and exercising. At certain stations, in cold weather, scrubbing should be postponed until some hours after sunrise, and drill substituted during the hours before breakfast. Sanitary considerations are opposed to the indiscriminate use of water in cleaning lower decks, and the use of soft coal for distilling and similar purposes, in port, will discourage wetting even the spar deck unnecessarily, if apparent cleanliness is desired. The liberal use of fresh water, hot or cold, in cleaning decks and paint-work, is also a means of saving time. We might even borrow a hint from the domestic economy of our own homes and from the practice of foreign services in regard to scrubbing seamen's clothing. If tubs or tanks of hot water for soaking soiled clothing, rubbed with soap over night, were provided, it would be easy to save half an hour of the morning watch for purposes of instruction. Neatness would also be promoted, and wear and tear of clothing obviated. The use of steam dryers in large ships offers similar advantages.
The station bill, either for all hands or for one watch, should be used to muster men for exercises, so that they may acquire the habit of prompt attendance and may learn to find the gear. A period of fifteen minutes, before or after supper, would serve to prepare a watch or ship's company for a morning exercise.
Besides the general training given to the watches, we should provide for instructing smaller portions of the ship's company, parts of the ship, divisions, or boats' crews, in the performance of special duties. Fitting rigging, fishing spars, constructing jury rudders or sea anchors, are suitable operations to be performed on board ship by working parties under the charge of proper officers. Organized groups should always be assigned to such tasks.
Boats' crews should be employed in a variety of similar undertakings, running lines, carrying out anchors, etc. These exercises may be made competitive in a squadron with advantage. The use of boats as means for affording physical and nautical training should also be recognized and extended. The irregular requirements of service for landing and other duties will not suffice. Nor will the usual exercises in arming and equipping boats and maneuvering by signal serve our purpose. Boats must be called away for sailing or rowing exercise alone, and sent out in groups or pairs to instruct their crews. One officer can control two or more boats, and can learn as well as teach during the drill. The effect of sails, the use of the rudder, and the principles of old-fashioned seamanship, can be learned more rapidly in boats than elsewhere.
The same principles apply to the use of steam launches, which must form a larger part of the outfit of ships of modern type. Their usefulness in towing other boats is an essential feature which requires notice and development. The speed of a launch towing a string of boats should be accurately measured and recorded, with the time required to get up steam, and other data of military significance. The armament and instruction of boats' crews for various kinds of detached service will receive notice in succeeding pages. The present suggestions deal with the use of boats to supplement sail and spar drills in developing the strength of seamen and instructing them in the elements of seamanship.
Individual instruction in seamanship must largely be left to the operation of natural causes. We assume a certain amount of training and assign duties in navigating the ship accordingly. Men learn by daily experience and by association with petty officers. We are not called upon to make radical and elaborate suggestions and rules for teaching everything connected with this subject. Ships are sailed continually, but fought very seldom. We must therefore concentrate our attention upon the methods required to make men comprehend naval warfare and to prepare them for action.
The improvement of individual seamen can be provided for by offering higher ratings to those who are qualified. The limits of the complement should not prevent such advancements, at least during the latter part of the cruise. There is some absurdity in discharging men of good physique and intelligence as landsmen or ordinary seamen after three years' service in a man-of-war. Here, as elsewhere, we must rely upon the setting up of standards for encouraging and securing progress. Let the qualifications of each rating be definitely stated and permission given for all men of approved character to present themselves for examination. One year's service before advancement and one year's interval after failure should be required from recruits or other candidates. Liberality in this direction will encourage useful and practical self-education.
In bringing this lengthy and discursive chapter to a close no attempt will be made to summarize all its conclusions. The principle insisted upon is that drills should be established with a practical purpose in view, and that the object must never be sacrificed to conventional or traditional standards. Of the two objects put forward here—physical culture and preparation for service—the first admits of some latitude in the selection of methods by which it may be secured. While practical views must be accepted, we need not be too severe in applying them to exercises which have the advantages of being familiar and showy in the eyes of old men-of-war's-men. We may continue to tack and wear, loose and furl sails, and send down topgallant-masts with all hands, if we remember the prime necessities of giving each man his share of a day's work and preparing the watches to do their duty at sea. If these essentials are neglected, no exactness in the swaying of yards together can make the ship efficient. The necessity for drilling squadrons by the motions is not apparent to the writer, who is even prepared to assert that there is no sense in combining the ceremonial of colors with practical exercises in seamanship.
In spite of such a degree of radicalism, it is impossible to leave the consideration of this section of our subject without expressing some toleration for the old drills which we may find means of retaining, and some regrets for those which must be rejected as obsolete. When methods of fighting are taken up in turn, we must, however, waive all sentimental sympathies and be severely practical and progressive.
IV.—Armament and Preparation for Battle.
Preparation for battle must be the watchword of all systems of organization and instruction for men-of-war. Armament and training must be alike rational and progressive. Nor will it answer to postpone this preparation until war is at hand. This would make our naval battles mere experiments, offering us solutions of professional problems at the expense of our ships. The study of all the experiments and failures made by foreign powers becomes a question of safety as well as efficiency to our service. The work of noting the facts may be left to the Office of Naval Intelligence, as now happily organized, but the observed results must be analyzed and published for the use of all officers, if our ships are to be prepared for actual warfare.
We need not, however, wait any longer for information to accumulate proof of the necessity of radical changes in our methods of attack and defense. It is not even necessary to look outside the armament of ships now in commission to realize the failure of our present system of drill in developing and utilizing the powers of modern weapons. The introduction of new weapons will only serve to make this failure more conspicuous.
At present the battery of great guns is treated as representing the fighting power of the ship under all conditions. In ships with rams this method of attack is practically ignored. Spars are permanently fitted to interfere with its use; and the officers are not assisted by telegraphs or trained by full-speed trials to maneuver their ships in action. Spar torpedoes exploded by electricity are fitted to ships, but no precepts are laid down to regulate their use in action. It has been held that even large and slow ships might surprise an enemy at anchor and attack with this weapon. It is now hinted that ramming attacks may be averted by employing it. The first view requires no discussion. For the second suggestion there is the fact that ships cannot surrender any part of their speed or turning power to employ such an uncertain weapon as the spar torpedo. Even at anchor the spar torpedo is inferior to a group of mines.
The only methods of attack and defense for which our Ordnance Instructions provide in detail are those by boarding. The principal use of machine guns is said to be "to prepare and clear the way for the boarders." Small-arm fire is reserved for the same improbable occasions. Riflemen and marines are rarely called on deck at general quarters, except to support or repel boarders. In the latter case they may be supported by a heterogeneous mass of men armed with all kinds of archaic instruments of warfare. Every general inspection sees crowds of men wildly rallying and charging about on uncovered decks in imaginary action. Can we suppose that our seamen can be made to take such drills seriously when in port with foreign ships whose tops and bulwarks bristle with Hotchkiss guns?
Nothing is done to develop the powers of these weapons to keep down the artillery fire of an enemy or to interfere with the command and steering of his vessels in action. Nor are commanding officers directed to organize or instruct their small-arm men or machine guns' crews to repel torpedo boats. If this means of defense is neglected, it will be idle to expect any amount of "ingenuity" to keep our ships afloat in war-time. In fact, the whole scheme of attack and defense may be set down as antiquated and inefficient.
This criticism does not involve any reflection upon those who administer our present system. Most of these defects are due to tradition or to the survival of obsolete material. Our system of drills is only a little behind our armaments. Our armaments are quite as good in their kind as our ships. The ships themselves are no worse than they should be, considering their age and the methods of administration under which they have been designed, constructed, and repaired.
Considering the armament of our ships of latest type as the basis of the proposed drill program, we have, in the first place, high-powered, breech-loading rifled cannon to replace the smooth-bores so long retained. It is evident that this change must seriously modify the methods of aiming and firing, unless all the advantages of rifled guns are to be sacrificed. Auxiliary batteries of Hotchkiss revolving cannon are promised for the new cruisers, and rapid-firing shell guns will also be required to complete the armament, if the ships are to be fought effectively. Magazine rifles of approved pattern will also be recognized and supplied as essential to the power of the ship in action and to her defense against torpedoes. They should be accepted as the standard weapon for all landing parties and all boats' crews on detached service. Enough rifles should be put on board to arm at least So per cent, of the ship's company.
Among the weapons displaced by modern armaments, we find all smooth-bore guns, from the XV.-inch Dahlgren to the 12-pounder bronze howitzer. The 3-inch rifle—so long the sole specimen of modern ordnance in our collection—will find it hard to keep its place against the intrusion of Hotchkiss rapid-firing guns of high power. The want of a proper rail-mounting has made this gun almost useless up to the present time. As machine guns and magazine rifles have put boarding out of the question, we must anticipate the disappearance of swords and pistols, pikes and battle-axes, as special naval weapons. If cold steel is to be retained at all, it should be in the form of bayonets for magazine rifles. At present, the obsolete cutlass and the impracticable revolver usurp about as much of the time of our officers and men as we devote to the accurate and invaluable magazine rifle.
If we are to differ from foreign navies in dispensing with the automobile torpedoes, we must resign ourselves to making the best of the spar or out-rigger torpedo. This may involve its disuse as a portion of the fighting outfit of our ships, and its practical development as a weapon for steam launches of all types. It is to be hoped that at least one genuine torpedo boat may form part of the equipment of each of our new cruisers. Mines or stationary torpedoes, for use in defending vessels at anchor, may also be supplied. Whatever torpedo armaments may be adopted must have men to work them. The necessity for relief crews in torpedo boats will compel us to train a considerable portion of the ship's company in handling explosives, working torpedo spars, and laying out mines. Every line officer should share in this practical instruction while on sea service. No advanced course in electricity and chemistry is required to prepare officers and men for practical training in the elements of torpedo warfare.
The plan of organization heretofore discussed distributes the complement of all ships into equal and interchangeable divisions of 40 to 50 men each. It remains to develop and apply this scheme to the immediate preparation of the armament for service, and for the progressive military instruction of the crews of our ships of latest type.
As an illustration, let us take the Atlanta as a ship to be organized according to the plan suggested. Accepting the estimate of 230 men as her complement, on the supposition that she cannot berth a larger number, we have to adjust this force to the armament proposed. In round numbers, we can set off 50 men, including first-class petty officers, a strong engineer's force, and a small marine guard, as already assigned for duty in action. This leaves 180 men, to make up four divisions of 45 men each. Four lieutenants, junior to the navigator, should command these divisions, with junior line officers as assistants. The natural assignment of divisions would put three of them in the superstructure to work the battery, and leave the fourth division to work rapid-firing guns on the upper deck and in the tops, to assist in navigating the ship, and to serve as small-arm men under the direction of their proper officers.
In stationing men at the guns, two reliefs should be assigned to guns having bow and stern fire, to all Hotchkiss guns, and the guns in one broadside. If the mechanical carriages are properly designed and constructed, five men should be able to work each 6-inch gun effectively. For 8-inch guns seven men may be allowed, and for Hotchkiss guns three each. These numbers are intended to admit of the regular relief of crews at short intervals. In French ships five men work 24-centimetre guns, mounted on turn-tables, with great ease and rapidity, and our men should be able to do as well. Men not stationed at the guns should keep up the supply of ammunition.
The advantages of this system will hardly be questioned by those who are willing to admit its practicability. In taking up drills in detail, an effort will be made to deal with all apparent difficulties in its application. In general it will be the duty of the division officer to work his force as a whole, and to employ both reliefs in casting loose and providing the guns, and in removing obstructions and repairing damages during action.
The supply of ammunition by the men of the division may seem to require some explanation. It should be quite as practicable to connect the control of the ammunition passers with the guns which they supply, as it is to maintain the present scattered and loosely organized system. The officer of the powder division of our ships must be ubiquitous, to regulate the working of all the groups and chains of men now stationed to handle ammunition. These chains diverge from his control, while the proposed groups would lead directly from the magazine or shell room to the guns under the direction of the officers working the battery.
It is evident that the present system of supplying powder is a mere survival from the days when ships had several decks and a large number of guns on each. Its elaborate arrangement of chains and scuttles assumes this, and supposes a great variety of guns of similar calibre in the battery. The fact that the handling of projectiles receives such scant attention, indicates the antiquated and unpractical nature of present methods. The real source of delay when firing is going on is in the whipping up of heavy projectiles from the shell rooms. This is largely due to bad stowage and awkward arrangements, which require more care for their correction than is needed to prevent any possibility of mistake in regard to the destination of charges of powder.
Of course, the construction and arrangement of store-rooms for ammunition should assist organization in facilitating rapid and regular supply. In a recent British ironclad each gun has its own magazine and shell room, with a common hatch or elevator for delivering its supply of ammunition. Detached guns of 6-inch calibre were among those thus provided. Without going so far as this in cruising ships, we should try to make progress in this direction. For heavy modern guns this arrangement is the only one that is practicable, and our organization should anticipate the development of our artillery and water-tight compartments with doors closed during action. The stowage and handling of shells might be facilitated by dispensing with boxes, and strapping the shells so that they should be slung by the point for hoisting and carrying. A block might be fitted over the point to protect the fuse, and a becket attached to metal straps passing under the base. Whipping up long shell in boxes slung in the middle is inconvenient in an ordinary hatchway.
Speaking-tubes should be fitted to allow the executive officer to give preliminary orders to the gunner or gunner's mate in charge in the magazine or shell room, and also to enable officers in charge of gun divisions to call for ammunition. This would be better than relying upon the polyglot contingent at intermediate stations to pass the word, or upon the necessarily intermittent control of the officer of the powder division. Other expedients will be suggested when detailed exercises are under discussion.
The purpose of the proposed organization as adjusted to the battery of the Atlanta is to provide for the immediate readiness of the armament of the ship upon going into commission, as well as for the progressive individual instruction of the members of the crew according to their various capacities. The distribution of the complement of any ship could be regulated by the same principles. A large ship might have two divisions to do the work now done by the navigator's division, and to keep up the fire of light guns and small arms during action. Moreover, all the relief crews not actually working the guns would always be available as riflemen, firemen, or wreck-clearers. They should be equipped as riflemen whenever the guns are cast loose in action, and rifles and belts for all the men in gun divisions should be distributed in racks ready for use. The relief crews might be sent below for shelter or for rest or refreshment, according to circumstances. The men actually working the guns should not be required to wear accoutrements, or to answer calls individually, though they may be detached in a body to act as riflemen.
Taking up the actual service requirements in their order, we have to arrange a system of exercises for securing two principal objects:
- The immediate preparation of the whole armament for efficient service in action.
- The training of all divisions for the performance of various kinds of detached service in time of war.
As we cannot hope for perfect success in either direction in the limits of a three-years' cruise, we must establish a continuous and progressive system of drill and instruction, to accomplish as much as possible of the desired result. It will not be practicable to sacrifice one of these objects to the other, either in point of time or otherwise. The defense of a ship often requires the detachment of part of her force, as well as the development of the full power of all the weapons which she carries.
We must now attack details and seek out the modifications by which our present mechanical drills can be transformed into a rational and progressive system of individual instruction. The phrase used in making entries in the log is too accurately descriptive; divisions are "drilled according to routine," which means that officers feel very little responsibility and men take very little interest. The suggestion has been made that officers can be made responsible only by allowing them a certain amount of liberty in regard to methods, and requiring the attainment of definite results. This will involve greater permanence in the connection between the divisions and their commanding officers. No general fleeting up or arbitrary scale of precedence should interrupt systematic training.
As a means of encouraging progress, men should be classed according to drill and training, in order to furnish a standard for measuring results and apportioning responsibility. Three classes might be established, as follows: 1st Class.—Trained men: fit to serve as gun captains, file-closers, and coxswains of armed boats. Marksmanship is a prime requisite for admission to this class. To be examined by a board on presentation of names and record of target practice by officer of division. 2d Class.—General-service men: familiar with stations, at guns, infantry drill, and rifle practice. They should be good oarsmen and expert in care of arms and cleaning bright work. A certain percentage at target practice is essential—say 40 per cent, at 200 yards. 3d Class.—Men who can march with a company, pull in a boat, and fill a station at quarters. Men should be assigned to the second and third classes by the commanding officers of their divisions. Recruits and others should not be classed until they have received a certain amount of instruction. Rating and length of service should not affect this classification. Officers should be encouraged to bring their men forward for the higher classes, and the number in each class, as well as their average proficiency, should be carefully noted at each general inspection. The classification and the marks upon which it is based, including a final average of target practice, should be noted upon each man's discharge or continuous-service certificate.
Any thorough course of progressive instruction must require more time than is allotted to the present routine drills. In port or at sea, in pleasant weather, it will be easy to find unoccupied hours enough during the forenoon to admit of two hours' drill for the body of the crew. An occasional afternoon hour might also be utilized.
All this will impose extra work on those officers whose regular duties involve more exposure and fatigue than those of any other class on board—viz.: the lieutenants who stand watch and command divisions. At sea they have real and responsible duties to perform. In port their presence on deck at all hours and under all conditions is a concession to routine and tradition rather than to any practical necessity. There are plenty of junior officers in the service who are without any regular and responsible duties. They could acquire the habits of command by standing watch in port without risk of impairing the discipline and efficiency of their ships. The simplest solution of the question would be the requirement that all commissioned officers of the line should take charge of the deck in port. The executive and navigator are, of course, excepted, and officers temporarily engaged in other work, such as compiling local information, surveying, or special ordnance or torpedo duties, should also be excused. This would improve the unfortunate position of ensigns, and it would allow lieutenants to give more time and attention to the instruction of their divisions. At sea no change is essential in the distribution of responsibility among officers, though junior officers should have a chance to acquire a practical knowledge of their profession.
It is proposed to establish a system of exercises which will leave no opportunity for wasting the two or three hours off watch which the average lieutenant would gain by putting ensigns on duty. Besides the extra time required for practical exercises, there will be occasion for increased study in preparing progressive courses of instruction. A certain amount of clerical labor is also required from officers in charge of divisions.
Ships with a reduced complement of officers must distribute the responsibility by day's duty. Three watches cannot be carried on in port, with any strictness, without depriving officers of the spirit and energy necessary to secure the thorough training of the men under their command. Works on military hygiene recommend that guard duty should be arranged to give soldiers four nights out of five in bed. Naval officers cannot expect so much consideration, but the facts of hygiene can hardly be ignored without loss of efficiency. The preceding suggestions are not, however, based on such grounds. They are made with a view to professional improvement among the officers and practical efficiency for ships' companies.
I am tempted to add, as a mere personal expression of opinion, that I see no harm in allowing the officer of the deck, in a well-disciplined and securely anchored ship, to stand part of his night watches in a conveniently situated chart room or pilot house on the upper deck. While there, he might occupy himself with professional study or work in connection with his duties as a division officer. Concessions of this kind, if properly regulated and recognized, would do more to secure vigilance and intelligence in the performance of duty than the mechanical routine of walking the watch realizes in practice. This suggestion is commended to the use of the naval authorities of Utopia, as I am aware that it will not be received with favor by those who control American ships of war of any type.
The details of a drill system we may well begin with the great guns. The introduction of mechanical and automatic carriages should promote accuracy and rapidity of fire and simplify drill by reducing the number of men stationed to work the guns. These changes tend to render great-gun drills less suited to competition,—less active, and, therefore, less useful as a muscular exercise. The guns can no longer be sent crashing into the water-ways in running out, as in the old days of four-truck carriages, with their tackles and handspikes. We must rely upon mechanism to work high-powered guns, and crews must be made familiar with its details and taught to keep it in perfect order.
To ensure the proper condition of the battery, the usual morning inspection at quarters should always include an examination of the guns and their carriages. After mustering the men and inspecting their clothing, the guns should be cast loose, run out, trained, run in, and secured by the proper orders, with strict attention to details, as well as to the condition of the gearing, hydraulic cylinders, and bright work. The breech should also be opened and the bore of the gun examined. This will prevent the rusting and sticking of parts which sometimes occur. While one relief is working the guns, the other should be inspected as riflemen, and the ammunition passers should be put through their stations. Both reliefs would be required to work the broadside guns. At other divisions, they should alternate as guns' crews and riflemen. Fifteen minutes should be allowed for muster and inspection, which should be thorough and practical, and conducted as a strict military formation. This exercise should serve to keep the crews as well as the guns in good working order, and should take the place of longer great-gun drills, which are apt to become very tedious with mechanical carriages.
The only real test for efficiency of armament in a man-of-war is the rapidity and accuracy of fire. The most important drill must be that which most directly secures progress in that direction. In practice, delays in firing are more often due to the imperfect training of gun captains than to any other cause. Misses and wild shooting are due to the same deficiency. The supply of ammunition and the loading and training are all minor difficulties. Quick and accurate sighting has not yet been mastered by any considerable proportion of our continuous-service men. This must be attributed to want of systematic instruction and practice. The object of quarterly target practice seems to be the transmission of reports to the Bureau of Ordnance. Certainly it is not the custom to publish the records or diagrams for the information and encouragement of divisions. Hardly any appeal to the intelligence of men is made to avoid waste of ammunition, and the simple methods of comparison of records, by which earnest competition might be inaugurated between ships or between divisions, are altogether ignored. Our failure to utilize the results of target practice is accompanied by neglect of the training necessary to prepare for target practice.
The recognition of aiming drill as a necessity in preparing for effective fighting, must involve the assignment of regular periods for the instruction of all men capable of improvement. Advanced: training for the best men, and elementary instruction for all, will require the attention of division officers during the whole cruise. Instruction in aiming should be the regular exercise with great guns and all rapid-firing guns. The crews will be made familiar with the mechanism of the carriages and slides by the regular morning inspection of the battery. Loading may be taught incidentally during the drill, using dummy cartridges and projectiles, and the necessary information in regard to ammunition, stations, etc., may be given to the more ignorant portion of the crew while aiming drill is in progress. The latter should be taught by the officer of the division who will be called upon to regulate firing in action. Rudimentary instruction should be given by junior officers, assisted by qualified petty officers.
The details of instruction should be practical and varied enough to be always interesting. This will involve an active interest on the part of division officers, and some extra work in measuring distances from the chart to be used in teaching the men how to estimate distance and use their sights. By keeping records of the progress of each man, by connecting the training in pointing with actual practice through inspection of targets and explanation of diagrams, and by using competitive exercises to incite progress, results of the highest value may be attained. Times required for sighting should be noted; men should be called up to verify the point of aim for which a gun has been laid by a gun captain; rapid-firing guns should be made to follow a moving object, using the open sights. Valuable suggestions will be found in the "Handbook of the Hotchkiss Rapid-Firing Gun," by Lieutenant E.W. Very. The methods of the Army Manual of Rifle Practice may also be adapted to naval uses with guns of all calibres. Aiming drill should occupy about half an hour two or three times each week.
Considering rifle fire as a means of supporting the fire of the battery and keeping down an enemy's fire or interfering with his steering in action, the necessity for careful training in aiming and firing will be manifest to all. Without such training with small-arms, no ship is fit for active service, or even to defend herself against attack by torpedo boats. Aiming drill with rifles should lead up to similar exercise with great guns, as well as to target practice. Aiming should be taught by the latest and most approved manuals, and should occupy about the same time each week as the corresponding exercise with great guns. This claim does not arise from any purpose of turning sailors into soldiers. This is not yet under discussion; but it must be admitted that marksmanship is required to fight a ship effectively just as much as seamanship is for efficient navigation. Rifle practice must be taught for use on board ships, in tops or boats, and riflemen must learn to distribute themselves properly, to concentrate their fire, to fire volleys at the word, and to take advantage of the bulwarks for cover and for resting their pieces in firing.
Aiming drill must be followed by target practice, which is, perhaps, the most practical of all military exercises. Drill generally consists in going through the motions without accomplishing anything. Target practice gives an actual result and furnishes an absolute standard for measuring efficiency. It must be taken seriously and made as thorough and practicable as possible.
Among the drawbacks which make naval target practice ineffective in securing marksmanship, a few require mention. Men are sent out for practice before they have received any aiming drill or fired any blank cartridge. They fire over too long ranges or at small targets which they are unable to hit, or at floating or swinging targets for which it is impossible to keep scores. If a man fires five or ten rounds without seeing where his shots strike or learning to correct his aim, he has wasted his ammunition. If he makes a clean score of misses without finding out why he fails to hit, his chances of becoming a marksman and his value as a man-of-war's-man have been injured instead of improved.
Remedies will suggest themselves to any one who realizes the importance of the subject. Preliminary aiming drill is indispensable. Ranges and targets must be adapted to the circumstances and the qualifications of the men firing. Scoring must be thorough, and the result of each shot should be signaled. Markers must be trained and scores must be shown to the men. Finally, the officer in charge of the firing must be required to give his best attention to the firing of each man. This may involve a reduction in the number of men taken on shore, and it will certainly require a police force for all ranges outside of navy yards. Seamen cannot be expected to shoot well with their worst enemy—liquor—taking them in rear. A detail of a corporal's guard of marines would often enable an officer to improve the shooting of his division 50 per cent.
For naval uses, canvas targets should be supplied, to be laced to uprights of iron plates or light angle irons with wire guys to support them. Squares of old canvas would answer, with ready-marked facings of paper to be pasted on, or muslin to be stitched on, to renew them. No difficulty would be found in transporting such targets, and no time would be lost in setting them up, if markers are properly instructed before they leave the ship. Miniature targets for use with parlor rifles are also indispensable for use on board ship.
As a means of securing permanent benefits from target practice, complete records should be kept and brought forward on all occasions to interest the men and incite them to improvement. Competition between different organizations should also be encouraged by comparing averages and results of volley-firing. The individual scores may be made most useful by furnishing each man with a small scorebook, wherein each shot that he fires, either with rifle, machine gun, or great gun, should be entered, and the score certified by his division officer. The production of these scores should be made a feature of general inspections, and their significance should be constantly impressed upon the men during instruction.
The same books should have pages and forms for keeping clothing lists, making requisitions, etc. They should be used and verified whenever clothing is overhauled and inspected. All entries should remain in pencil until after verification by responsible officers. Nearly all of our men can write, and they should be encouraged to make so much use of their education as would be involved in making these entries. The same note-books might contain a few pages of instructions in regard to gunnery, stations, and other particularly useful information. They should be small and well bound in soft leather. They would improve marksmanship enough to pay for their cost in a single quarter, if we count all ammunition wasted which does not result in hits, as we should always teach seamen to regard it.
Combined target practice at sea must also have its standards and methods of scoring. The targets should be large enough to catch all shots properly aimed from rapid-firing guns and small-arms. Diagrams tor plotting great-gun practice should be used in the same connection, and all results and records exhibited and explained to the men engaged in firing. Lieutenant Very says, in the manual previously mentioned: "As much is to be learned by studying the targets made as by the actual shooting."
It may be necessary to use arbitrary and approximate methods in recording great-gun practice at sea; but some methods of comparison are essential if men are to derive encouragement and improvement from the costly experiment. It will frequently be found possible to fire at rocks of known dimensions with targets marked upon them where practicable. Large screen targets can be constructed of boards and placed on reefs or sand-spits, or on piles driven in shallow water. For squadron exercises such targets should always be constructed. A very small percentage of the cost of the ammunition wasted in wild or unrecorded firing would pay for targets that would make these exercises practically significant and permanently instructive.
For sea or floating targets there should be a raft supporting a canvas target with its base an equilateral triangle and its three vertical sides six feet high by twelve feet long. For combined practice it should be marked by a black belt one foot in width, and vertical stripes at the corners and in the middle of the sides. For experimental practice with rapid-firing and machine guns, it might be painted a neutral color, to represent a torpedo boat. The actual work of framing, rigging, and mooring such a target would form a useful seamanship exercise for junior officers and boats' crews. Such targets would be adapted to practice while drifting in a tideway, and should be capable of standing upright in a moderate seaway.
No one who has noted the effect of a spirited and successful target practice on the crews and divisions which have made good shooting will be disposed to allow such interest to evaporate. Smartness in drill, attention to instruction, and promptness in cleaning bright work are among the direct and visible results of success in competitive firing. If these are worth cultivating, we must have better targets, and a thorough and intelligible record of practice.
The expression "combined target practice" has been used to indicate the use of the various component parts of the battery to render mutual support. This enables the Hotchkiss guns, with their explosive projectiles, to be used as range-finders, to regulate the fire of the great guns. Volley-firing with rifles and rapid fire with Gatlings may serve the same purpose at short ranges or in smooth water. The regulation of fire from all these weapons must be studied and made the subject of experiment and exercise, to avoid danger and failure in action. Small-arm practice on shore must precede the general exercise of the crew in firing at floating targets, but selected marksmen should always be posted to keep up a well-directed fire in action.
The feature of highest value in combined firing is its likeness to actual fighting. This resemblance should be emphasized and made as real as possible. The same idea should dominate all exercises at general quarters. The nature of the imaginary attack and the force, bearing, and distance of the supposed enemy should be communicated to officers of divisions, and guns should be loaded and laid in anticipation of his movements. General quarters should have the same relation to aiming drill that combined target practice has to divisional rifle-firing.
It may be objected that too much time is required to admit of systematic target practice, either for rifles or great guns. This can hardly be the case while steamers are sent to sea to cruise for a week or more, with light breezes, in summer. The difficulty seems to lie in some distorted comprehension of the relative importance of different exercises. Opportunities for drills and exercises of vital interest are passed by because a slight interruption of the prescribed squadron routine would be involved. Ships must be allowed time and coal for careful and rational target practice with their batteries. They must not be allowed to fire away their allowance in desultory or perfunctory practice, when there are hundreds of outlying rocks which might serve to give sound training to their gun captains and furnish data for the solution of vexed questions in modern naval artillery. If ranges on shore can be found within the limits of a station, ships must be sent there at least once a year to complete a certain amount of target practice—say 50 rounds per man. If time is limited, other exercises must be suspended and routine must be modified or temporarily sacrificed to more practical requirements.
Similar considerations will certainly impair the standing of such exercises as single-sticks and pistol drill as essential parts of the routine of a ship carrying magazine rifles and rapid-firing guns. We must choose our part, and we must yield to the tendencies of our age. These weapons are obsolete for general use, and exercises with them are abortive and fantastic. It may be said that broadsword fencing is a good exercise for the muscles and develops a fighting spirit among the men. If this were true, it would deserve as much recognition as we now give to boxing, and no more. But practical experience convinces me that our routine single-stick exercises develop no interest or instinct whatever among seamen. Ten years' drill does not secure any actual progress. For the revolver, it is sufficient to say that "it does not develop in practice the advantages claimed for that kind of arm." For once we can agree with the Ordnance Instructions of our youth.
Those drills which have been rejected here will hardly reappear when we come to consider methods of preparation for detached service. Substitutes for them will be suggested, and it is thought that all the advantages claimed for them may be attained without consuming the time and energy of instructors and ships' companies in exercises which have no direct practical value or significance.
The special duties of those divisions which are not stationed at the guns are evidently the same as those now assigned to the navigator's division. Their instruction should be revised and advanced far enough to recognize the existence of the screw propeller, water-tight compartments, and other modern improvements. Leaving all repairs of spars and rigging to be executed at leisure, and giving up their futile stoppers and fishes, they must keep the screw clear, look out for the steering gear, and remove obstructions to the working of the guns. To clear the screw a special grapnel guided by a pole and worked by whips to the gaff and yardarms should be fitted. The use of sails and mats for stopping leaks must also be made a regular exercise. Water-tight doors must be worked by the engineer's division and ammunition passers on lower decks.
This last class must be carefully stationed and drilled. To prevent confusion, projectiles and charges may be checked by attaching metal tags showing the division for which they are destined, and the weight of the shell or powder sent up. These checks should be used at all general exercises without ammunition, and should be rigorously accounted for when firing takes place. Any blundering or tampering with the checks should be punished severely. This expedient will, it is thought, secure better results than are attained by the present straggling arrangement of the powder division.
V.—Training Men for Detached Service.
The requirements of detached service have been touched upon in treating of complement and organization. It has been claimed that a ship should carry men enough to land an effective force without sacrificing her powers of defense or navigation. The organization of equal and interchangeable divisions has had this purpose in view. The distribution of trained men of all classes, from carpenters to cooks, is necessary for the complete efficiency of detachments. There should be a quartermaster or signalman in each landing company or group of boats, as well as officers' servants and berth-deck cooks to look out for messes. The assignment to regular messes should be by divisions, with the exception of petty officers and servants, who may be otherwise provided for. Boats' crews should be assigned on the same basis, and boats should be grouped under the control of divisional commanders.
Instruction should be adapted to organization, and should go as far as possible with each man. The untrained and ineffective forces which now make up the bulk of the powder division may hardly be advanced beyond elementary rifle practice, which should also be the only military training required from the engineer's force. For the remaining portion of the crew progressive training must be the rule differentiating according to individual capacities.
The principal weapons with which men must be trained for detached service on shore or in boats are, in the order of importance and frequency of use, as follows:
- Magazine rifles. Taking the Spencer-Lee as the accepted type, each man should carry 60 to 80 rounds in the loops, and four filled, detachable magazines in light pockets inside his woven cartridge belt in front. Reduced amounts may be carried for practice or special service. Reserve ammunition in boxes strapped for slinging and carrying may also be supplied. Light bayonets may be carried in leather buckets like the sling cases of a telescope, to be served out and fixed on landing or boarding.
- Light, rifle-calibre machine guns or single-barrel, rapid-firing shell guns. The former have some advantages for use on shore, but their continuous fire gives poor results in boats. Light field carriages capable of quick train should be fitted to carry a liberal supply of ammunition.
- Light or heavy rifled howitzers for special services, such as attacking an enemy sheltered by brick or stone walls or houses or entrenched among rocks. These, and their obsolete companion the smooth-bore bronze howitzer, appear to be considered as the special arm of seamen on shore. They are massed in battalions and trundled through the streets of our cities on all ceremonial occasions, in spite of their awkwardness and ineffectiveness for display or service in the field.
The persistent favor shown to these last-named weapons compels an inquiry into their real value. In the first place, they are almost useless against troops in extended order or under natural cover or that furnished by earthworks. Neither the attack nor the defense of Plevna was able to employ artillery with effect. In the next place, the development of rifle fire exposes the gun detachments to many dangers, due in part to their slowness of movement and the massing of men at the drag-ropes. The range of small-arms is quite equal to that of most naval howitzers, and the accuracy much greater. The scanty supply of ammunition is also a source of weakness. The employment of perpendicular or high-angle fire would seem to give machine guns and small-arms such a decided advantage over howitzers as to involve their withdrawal from all field movements. Two facts noted with reference to European field artillery tactics support this view. All field movements in action are supposed to be conducted with the horses at a gallop from the instant of limbering up, and guns are not to be brought into action without infantry supports deployed at least 600 yards in advance.
These considerations seem to forbid the subordination of all landing organization to the awkward necessities of field artillery without horses or limbers. When landed for battering houses or walls, howitzers should be worked by one relief, supported by the remainder of the division. Bayonets should not be carried by the men at the drag, and their load of rifle ammunition should be reduced. The same arrangements should be made for working such machine guns as may be landed. Higher numbers may carry revolvers at the guns instead of rifles. Being trained men, these numbers will readily learn to load and fire revolvers without making that one of the routine divisional drills.
Accuracy of fire with all these weapons is essential to the preparation of ships for naval actions, and a system of aiming drill and target practice has been elaborated with that end in view. Few changes will be necessary to make the same methods apply to service on shore. Firing from a rest must be encouraged in boats and on board ship, but men must not be allowed to depend upon finding rests while on shore. Judging distance must be taught under various circumstances at every opportunity, especially while on shore.
While complete divisions may be landed for drill and firing or detached for special service, it may be best to combine them in pairs for the permanent battalion organization for parades and distant service. A company of 72 men, with three officers, would be formed by leaving out the reserve men or ammunition passers from each division and alternate division commanders. These men should serve as boat keepers and ship keepers in port, and, with the assistance of a complete division, should suffice for the safe navigation of the ship and her defense against attacks by an inferior force. This disturbance of the relation between an officer and his division is suggested with reluctance as a means of detaching a full fighting force without crippling the cruising power of the ship. The two division officers should alternate in drilling the combined company at battalion parades, and each should drill his own division at other times.
In teaching sailors to drill as infantry, we must not waste time on superfluous movements, or in attempting to secure mechanical precision with the manual, or in wheeling. It sometimes seems as though the marine guards of our ships partially counteract their undeniable usefulness in other respects by offering an example of rigidity in marching which is as much out of place on a ship's deck as it would be on a field of battle. While we must teach position and marching carefully, to correct the defects incident to a seafaring life, we must not attempt to imitate the Marine Corps or the crack regiments of the National Guard. We may even be compelled to look abroad for practical military models, as well as for the tactical instruction which we need to fill out the bare framework of our accepted drill-books. It is well to know the exact position of each marker and guide in all evolutions, but it is also necessary occasionally to assume the possible presence of an enemy, and regulate our formations and marching with some regard to his position. There must be something to learn, to bridge the gap between the manual which usurps the name of Tactics and the formidable technicalities of military strategy. The methods of training infantry used in the German army, as described in various papers in the proceedings of the Royal United Service Institution, seem to furnish the information required.
On board ship we can only teach simple methods of passing from line to column and the reverse. Skirmish drill can be taught to small detachments, and the use of cover, advancing by rushes, and other practical matters, can only be taught on the rare occasions when the battalion is landed. These subjects, with a very few movements in company front, are all that can be allowed to interfere with the effort to teach the men to march steadily and without fatigue. Reasonably rough ground should be preferred for these exercises, instead of the streets and squares usually selected. Dress parades should be rare indulgences either on shore or aboard ship, but they should not be altogether cut off. A band and a crowd of spectators will often render much aid in developing military instincts among sailors.
Skirmish drills on shore should always be based upon the idea of an attack on an enemy's position, which should be marked by flags or by targets for field-firing. These arrangements should be made beforehand, and company officers should reconnoiter the ground before the companies land. Blank cartridge may be used to give more steadiness in firing, and ball cartridge for field-firing at targets posted to represent an enemy's force. This would serve to teach men to judge distances as in actual warfare, and to seek cover in advancing. Trained marksmen should be told off to estimate distance and fire trial shots. These exercises may be carried on independently by companies or by the battalion, skirmishing by numbers in the latter case.
In preparing to land the battalion, the equipment should be by companies rather than by boats. Men must carry their supplies, and they can be distributed with less confusion on board ship than on the beach or in the boats. Battalion formations should frequently terminate with the actual embarkation of companies in their proper groups of boats.
It is impossible to make fixed rules for the equipment of boats for any particular service with the idea of showing them all off together in five minutes or in half an hour. Actual requirements must govern the outfit for each case. The new ration should be able to furnish provisions in convenient packages, and the distribution of men by messes should secure the supply of mess gear for each detachment, with a cook to each boat to look out for it. The arrangements for feeding men on shore must be tested from time to time by actually giving men one or two meals on shore or away in boats. Soup or coffee could be carried in mess-kettles and the dry part of the ration in haversacks for a single day's absence. Such tests are necessary if our outfit of boats is to be anything more than a sorry farce.
As a means of carrying out such tests and giving practical military instruction, divisions or companies should be landed to camp out for a day or more in suitable positions. Forty-eight hours spent in camp in this way would give more time for deliberate target practice, skirmishing, sham fights, etc., than can be utilized in a year's cruise where men must return to the ship for meals.
It would also furnish much-needed variety and recreation, and would be preferred to the ordinary "rough liberty" for twenty-four hours by the best elements in our ships' companies. Of course climate must be carefully considered and hygienic precautions strictly enforced under the supervision of a medical officer. Discipline should also be secured by proper orders and properly posted guards, who should be held to a strict military responsibility.
This recommendation may meet with objections based on other grounds than discipline and hygiene. It may be urged that division officers cannot be spared without interfering with the harbor watch, or that men cannot be spared without interrupting. It is sufficient to say that all these difficulties must be encountered and overcome in actual practice. Landing an efficient naval battalion is often the only means by which bloodshed can be averted or the honor of the flag vindicated. The events which followed the bombardment of Alexandria will illustrate this statement. No mechanical routine and no traditional precautions should prevent the practical training of an efficient organization for landing.
Combined boat exercises should be simplified both in regard to outfit and evolutions. Not much can be learned by officers or men by going through the complicated, rectangular maneuvers of the signal-book. In action they would be as useless for boats as for ships. For landing men only two or three evolutions are necessary, and speed in pulling is more important than accurate dressing in line. Pulling-boats should never lie on their oars under fire, and should not carry guns with any view of firing while making an attack. Rapid-firing guns in swift steam launches are the only weapons which boats can use against an enemy armed with modern weapons. Gunboats must do their part in keeping back the enemy, or landing in the face of an enemy will be found impracticable.
The real use of combined boat exercises seems to lie in affording opportunities for training crews in pulling or sailing in competition with others. Divisional boat exercises are necessary to prepare them for such competitions, as well as for a variety of essential military uses. Boat-racing should be encouraged and extended so that nine-tenths of a ship's company will not be restricted to betting or boasting as their only part in the sport and exercise.
For military duties, as guard or picket boats, steam launches must be used as far as possible. Pulling-boats may be armed and assigned posts to complete a cordon, but launches must be relied upon for the active work. Divisional boat exercises should be directed to training relief crews for torpedo boats, guard boats and torpedo catchers. Every modern cruiser should have one real torpedo boat of high speed and one handy and seaworthy steam-cutter for towing and guard duty. Neither class of boats should be assigned places to maneuver in line with pulling-boats, but should always act independently. Unwieldy passenger steam launches should not be carried by men-of-war. Ships should be ready to furnish relief crews for torpedo boats of all classes which may be in use in the service.
The control of all exercises, which will remain with the captain and executive, may be most judiciously exercised by frequent inquiry and inspection, to ascertain results and comparative progress. Uniformity of method is of less practical importance. Any division officer who desires to carry on a special drill of unusual length should state his plans to the executive at least twenty-four hours in advance, in order to get permission to keep the men. The navigator, being relieved from all care of a division, should inspect all ordnance material regularly and take the deck during drills, as at present. He should receive full reports in regard to the drills of each division, and should keep a full register of drills for the inspection of the captain. This record should contain the character of each drill, the time occupied, the number of men present and excused, and such remarks, records of times, etc., as may be appended in explanation. A summary of the drill register might be sent in as a quarterly report, copies being retained on board for presentation at general inspection. It should not be the object of such comparison to secure exact compliance with any arbitrary routine, but rather to make sure that a reasonable amount of practical instruction has been given.
VI.—Conclusion.
This paper must be brought to a close without any attempt to summarize its arguments or suggestions in detail. Among the specific recommendations which may be noted are the following:
- Complements as large as berthing accommodations will allow.
- Divisions equal in force and efficiency. The number of divisions to regulate the detail of line officers.
- Physical training and preparation for service as the objects of seamanship drills.
- Regular watch drills in port and at sea.
- Competition to be directed to finished results, including changes of rig for different kinds of service.
- Gun divisions stationed in two reliefs, with sets of ammunition.
- Aiming drill and target practice as the principal exercises, with all arms retained in the service.
- Magazine rifles and machine guns to be the ordinary arms for all forces sent on detached service.
- Exercises on shore to include camping, field-firing, and skirmishing over rough ground.
- Boats, especially steam launches, to be prepared for special service by varied methods of equipment and exercise.
The accompanying arguments may be found unnecessarily discursive and aggressive, and the suggested details of various or uncertain value. The problems of naval reorganization and reform are too large and too intricate to be solved by any individual expression of opinion. Suggestions, rather than solutions, are set forth in this essay. The writer may have failed in formulating opinions which will stand the test of time or the criticism of his brother officers. From such failures not even official programs are exempt, and this paper assumes to be nothing more than a personal contribution to the discussion of a professional question.
If charged with the atrocious crime of being in earnest, the writer will hardly be able to offer a general denial. It would have been easy enough to keep within the limits of superficial safety by adhering to accepted methods and elaborating comfortable commonplaces. It has been thought right to make explicit and radical suggestions of change at the risk of giving advantages to whatever opposition may be provoked by the obviously and necessarily critical form and manner of this paper. Active and earnest discussion must prepare the service at large for important changes of routine. Without such discussion, the systems devised by boards or bureaus will fail to be accepted or assimilated in practice. If the Naval Institute succeeds in stimulating this discussion, it will confer a great benefit to the future of the Navy.
The leading novelties which have been presented are, in nearly every instance, in practical operation in foreign services. This does not guarantee anything except their practicability under certain conditions, nor is it urged as a final argument for their adoption in our own service. The principal labor in writing this paper has been in selecting and adapting such measures as appeared to be best suited to the peculiar conditions existing in the Navy of the United States.
There has been no intention of laying down an absolute and inflexible routine for all ships of modern type. Such an attempt would involve a disregard of the facts and tendencies of recent naval progress. Until these tendencies become fixed in direction, drill and organization must be more or less experimental. Individual responsibility must be encouraged to assist the development of higher forms of discipline and efficiency. Absolute uniformity of method is bound to check the process of evolution. Comparison of results must be substituted for exact control of methods to secure progressive improvement. There is little danger that such a change will produce a greater variety in standards of efficiency than is now brought about by laxity and lack of interest in regard to warlike contingencies.
The training of officers for command must always be recognized as an object of organization and drill. The development of individual responsibility is an indispensable factor here. Officers must learn to decide questions arising during exercises according to their own judgment within certain limits. The instinct of subordination must not be cultivated at the expense of responsibility and habits of decision. The chief object of professional education is not to teach officers to take exaggerated precautions against imaginary dangers, but rather to prepare them to accept necessary risks with coolness and confidence in their actual resources and in themselves.
It has not been found practicable to suggest changes without making those incessant comparisons which are apt to be considered the most odious forms of criticism. Unless we can say with full conviction, "The old is better," we are bound to criticize and compare, to eliminate the obsolete from our established methods. This attitude is not inconsistent with respect for constituted authorities or for the experience of the past.
Those who share with the writer the conviction that we need to transform the methods as well as to renew the material of our Navy, may sympathize with the purposes of this paper without accepting his conclusions. In spite of the reactionary routine which we are compelled to practice in our ships, and the traditional theories which we are expected to recite on examination for promotion, there are some believers in naval progress who cannot help standing up, like Galileo after his recantation, to say of our little world, " It moves for all that." This essay ventures to assert this principle of inevitable progress and to attempt its application to the details of organization and exercise for modern men-of-war.
APPENDIX.
SAMPLE ROUTINE.—PORT.
May to November.
4.30. All hands. Hammocks, 15 minutes; coffee, 15 minutes.
5.00. Turn to. Scrub clothes, 30 minutes (clothes soaked in fresh water overnight).
5.30. Starboard watch scrub spar-deck, ladders, etc., 1 hour. Port watch clamp down gun deck or superstructure with hot water, 40 minutes. Bathe, 20 minutes. Watches to alternate.
6.30. Port watch, seamanship drill and squaring yards, 30 minutes. Starboard watch bathe, 20 minutes.
6.50. Spread mess-gear.
7.00. Breakfast.
7.30. Shift into uniform of the day.
7.45. Turn to. Spread awnings, roll back hammock cloths, etc., 15 minutes.
8.00. Colors, lower boats. Clean gun bright work, 30 minutes.
8.30. Clean deck bright work and sweep down.
9.00. Quarters, Inspection of armament, 15 minutes.
9.30. 1st drill call, 2 divisions great guns. Stations and pointing, 30 minutes. 2 divisions infantry drill. Aiming and squad drill, 30 minutes. Company drill, 30 minutes.
10.30. 2d drill call, great guns, infantry drill. Divisions alternating.
11.30. Sweep down.
11.45. Spread mess-gear.
12.00. Dinner.
1. 00. Turn to. Sweep down.
1.30. 3d drill call. Boats. Torpedo instruction or skirmish drill, 1 hour (Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Friday).
3.30. Pipe down scrubbed clothing. Sweep down.
4.30. Muster starboard watch at stations for next morning's exercise.
5.30. Supper.
Half an hour before sunset, spar drill for all hands.
WEEKLY ROUTINE OF GENERAL EXERCISES.
Monday.—General quarters, 9.30 to 10.30 A. M.
Wednesday.—Sail or spar drill, or combined boat exercise, 9.30 to 11.30.
Thursday.—Battalion drill. Equip for landing, 10.30 to 11.30.
Note.—In winter, no exercise should be held before 9 or after 4. At sea only one drill call should be sounded; watch drills at 11 A. M. and 3 P. M. being substituted for divisional exercises.
DISCUSSION.
U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.
May 12, 1886.
Captain N. H. Farquhar, U.S.N., in the Chair.
Commander H. C. Taylor.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen—There seems to be but slight opening for any save favorable criticism in the suggestions of the essayist. It occurred to me, before reading this excellent essay, that the question proposed was difficult on account of its vagueness; for what are "our war ships of latest type"? If such painful doubt has presented itself to the essayist, he has skillfully set it aside by suggesting changes which are very valuable for war ships of either old or new types.
He strikes boldly one of the keynotes of our defects when he says that we prepare only for "little wars peculiar to colonizing nations." It is indeed true that we prepare only odds and ends of a fleet, when a complete naval force would cost but little more in the long run than these present odds and ends.
The suggestion that a proper relation between the number of officers and the fighting force of each ship be established and maintained, is a most valuable one. I think it an excellent plan also that all commissioned officers should have deck duty in port; nor do I believe that the plan of keeping harbor night watches in a pilot house would meet with such vigorous opposition as the, essayist fears.
The protests against superficial and showy drilling deserve the careful attention of all officers. Especially true and worthy of consideration also are the essayist's remarks upon handling steamers as a warlike exercise, and his statement that the problems of handling modern ships under steam are as varied as in the days of sail power. At this point, however, I fail to perceive that the most important element of success is dwelt upon by the essayist. I refer to that familiarity with the open sea which comes from training constantly at sea. If we can have steam cruisers and steam training ships kept as long at sea as the sailing ships, then I see clearly that the steamer practice is the more valuable, and can agree with the essayist that our present training squadron is obsolete. But so long as steamer training is confined principally to sheltered waters, and a cruiser waits for weeks to get a smooth day outside for target practice; so long as we permit the approach of bad weather rudely to interrupt sea maneuvers, while we make speed for the nearest harbor; so long, in fact, as we avoid the persistent sea drilling which is absolutely necessary to successful sea fighting—then, for just that length of time our present training squadron is not obsolete; and everything that is learned by a steamer's crew about a new ship, engine, or gun in the quiet waters of Chesapeake or Narragansett Bays, is more than balanced by that unconscious acquiring of the sea-habit by the crews and officers of those old sailing ships. When steamers will drop targets over in bad weather, cast loose their batteries in a half gale of wind, learn their tactical diameters with a heavy sea running, find out practically how much sternway their ships will stand in such weather; when they will practice ramming and work their torpedoes and machine guns with a topping swell on; when, in fine, they will use on the open ocean the tools meant for ocean fighting, and do this habitually as their every-day navy work—then, and not till then, will the usefulness of our old sailing ships have passed away.
Turning to other portions of the essay, I note that the present loose system of powder divisions has been thoroughly grasped by the essayist, and believe that much good may result from his instructive suggestions concerning it, and concerning the defects in our present methods of target practice.
To touch upon all the good points of this interesting essay would occupy unduly the time of the Institute, but I would ask permission to notice one statement which seems to me unsupported by the evidence. The essayist refers to boarding as an improbable event in the future.
Now, if ramming is to be attempted in fleet engagements, as is quite certain to be the case, it must often happen that ships will find themselves, whether they wish it or not, alongside of enemy's ships. Efforts to ram, and efforts to meet or avoid the blow, must frequently produce this result; and in such a situation I do not see what other course than boarding or being boarded is open to us. It seems to me that our crew would suffer less from the enemy's machine-gun fire, if they were on the enemy's deck engaged in a general melee with his people, than if they remained on board our own ship. Do away with swords and pistols, if desirable; replace them with bayonets and magazine rifles, if they are better; but not because boarding is obsolete, for few things seem more certain than that boarding is to be a marked feature in fleet engagements of the future. It played a great part in the galley period, and became less prominent when sailing ships came in and ramming was not practicable. Now, under steam, we revert in many ways to the tactics of the galleys. Ramming will again be known, and boarding as its inevitable consequent.
Commander Horace Elmer.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—Since first the subject of the present prize essay was proposed by the Board of Control, I have looked forward with interest to the result. The subject seemed to me not only important, but timely. It was fair to assume it would be published, with the accompanying discussion, by the time the new cruisers were ready to be commissioned. It was a practical subject, calling for a practical solution, and it was thought that such an expression of the views of the service at large might be of some value to the fortunate few who are to have the privilege of organizing and drilling the first of our new cruisers.
That the subject was proposed by the Board of Control would indicate that the necessity for change was recognized, and it hardly seems necessary for the essayist to have devoted so much time and space to prove this fact.
There is much in the essay that seems to me admirable—many valuable suggestions, many things very well said, and some others, perhaps, that might as well have been left unsaid. But, with all its details, sometimes very minute in matters of drill and routine, I think the commander and executive officer of the Atlanta will not obtain from this essay any very great assistance in their labor of organization. That the division should be the basis of organization I believe, and agree with the essayist thoroughly; but with that statement, though frequently repeated, he virtually stops. To make such a change effective, far more radical changes will be necessary than merely messing the crew by divisions. The present system of parts of the ship must be given up; the number, title, duties, and character of petty officers changed; the gun captain should become the standard of selection, not the accident, as heretofore. All these questions will meet one who attempts to organize a ship's company on the basis of the division, and it seems to me they are more to the point than discussing the advisability of calling all hands to send down royal yards, when none of the new cruisers will have royal yards; and, whatever may be their "feeling of toleration" for the old drills, I have no idea the officers of the deck of the new cruisers will spend many of their leisure hours in light breezes, tacking or even chapelling ship. Therefore, it seems to me that all this onslaught upon certain forms of seamanship drills, necessarily obsolete in the new cruisers, is wasted ammunition, and I feel sure the essayist will find, throughout the service at large, far more general agreement than he seems willing to admit with the principle that all drills should be established with a practical purpose in view.
With the one important change in the detail of organization advocated in the essay, the abolition of the powder division, I do not agree. An improvement in the character of the powder division is certainly desirable, but it seems to me that in the future this division will be of much more importance than in the past. All the larger of the new cruisers should have, and probably will have, an ordnance officer, having special charge of the ordnance, ordnance stores, torpedoes, and electrical apparatus. This officer, in my opinion, should have charge of the powder division. The stowage, care, and delivery of ammunition are matters of the first importance, and should be under the charge of one competent, responsible officer. Were it practicable to have separate magazines, shell-rooms, and percussion lockers for each division, the scheme proposed by the essayist would have strong argument in its favor; but, by looking at their plans, it is evident the new cruisers have not been arranged with any such scheme in view. I have made these remarks with no desire to be captious, but because, though in some matters of drill the essayist has gone largely into details, in the more important matter of organization he has, in my opinion, but skimmed the surface, and the question as proposed by the Institute still remains, in its more important part, unanswered.
Lieutenant R. R. Ingersoll.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—That the Prize Essay for 1886 is a very comprehensive and able paper, I think can hardly be questioned. That the changes proposed are a necessity, because of the introduction of new-type ships, is, however, not very clear. The suggestions will apply, with few exception, with equal force to our old ships, of whatever type. This should perhaps be a matter for congratulation, rather than for complaint, since nearly every feature of the scheme may be adopted at the pleasure of commanding officers—if, indeed, very many of them are not already being carried out—and our old ships can be modern in organization and drill, if not in other matters. I think no one will dispute the general spirit of the essay,—that all organization and drill should be carried out with a view to possible emergencies of weather or battle, with a definite standard of excellence to attain, and that all other exercises should be subordinated to those which have these definite objects in sight. There maybe many of us who believe that the present system of organization and drills has been carried out with a view to possible contingencies so far as obsolete material will permit, but it will probably do us no harm to agree, that the definite objects should be kept more distinctly in view in the future than perhaps they have been in the past.
It is to be regretted that in his scheme the essayist has not told us what relation his quarter bill bears to the watch bill, since he does not change the latter. What shall be done with the large class of men not now assigned to gun divisions, and known as idlers? What should be done by a modern man-of-war in clearing for action, and what preparations should be made to avoid the consequences of ramming or collision?
The scheme for drills offers but little for criticism and much for commendation, especially the suggestions in regard to aiming drills and target practice, which are excellent. No definite system of recording great-gun target practice has been recommended, however, and while the essayist dwells upon the importance of keeping such records, he does not enlighten us as to the method of scoring or of plotting the fall of the shot. The plan of observing the fall of such shot by two observers having given very good results at the Naval Academy and elsewhere, I think, for want of a better plan, that could be used with benefit.
I understand the object of this discussion to be to bring out all the points possible, as well as to talk of the features that the essayist has advanced. With this understanding, then, I venture to suggest the following as a scheme for determining the size of diagrams for scoring target practice at any range and for any arm. It is perhaps unnecessary to say just here that target practice without plotting the shot and a study of the diagrams made is a waste of public money.
I assume, first, that the normal target for high-powered great-guns should be a ship 300 feet long, 50 feet beam and 20 feet above the water line, and at a distance at which guns of the sort we have in mind would be used in a naval action with a probability of many shot hitting; and I assume, further, this distance to be 2000 yards. When we have accumulated sufficient data from the firing of high-powered guns, this distance may be modified. Now, it is not practicable to have a vertical target 300 feet long by 20 feet high, so all we need is a small target, yet of sufficient size to be seen clearly at the range used, if we suppose it to be placed at the centre of the ship at the water line. In plotting the fall of the shot around this target, no positive value should be given in the score to a shot that would not hit the ship, so we have a maximum lateral limit to the target diagram, or 150 feet each side of the target. The ship, when end on, presents a minimum target, so the lateral limit for which maximum values can be given is fixed—viz., the half breadth of the ship, 25 feet on each side of the target. Take points half way between the target and maximum limits, or 75 feet, for the limits for which one-half the maximum value can be allowed. For the dimension of the diagram in the other direction, I think first it should be taken on the horizontal plane, because a better comparison is afforded and less labor is required, a very small error on the vertical plane becoming large with high-powered guns on the horizontal plane.
The limits of the target diagram, then, on the horizontal plane should be the overestimate and underestimate that can be made with a high-powered gun when the true range is 2000 yards and still hit the target at some point of its height. These, in the case we are considering, and when the gun is aimed at a point its own height on the vertical target, say 10 feet high, will not be less than 150 yards; so our target diagrams for plotting target practice should allow for an error in range over and short of the target of at least 150 yards. For shorter ranges the lateral dimensions of the diagram should be diminished proportionally to the range, but the dimensions for range should not be changed, because with flat trajectories the errors in range for the same error in sighting rather increase than diminish as the range is diminished.
Let any value, say 20, be given to shot which fall within the lines which represent the ship end on; within the next lines 10; and the minimum value 5; then have a space 100 feet wide within which zero would be given; then give negative values to shot which fall without according to a fixed scale.
Hotchkiss guns should be judged by scoring on target diagrams representing the dimensions of the objects against which they will be used, such as torpedo boats 120 feet long by 12 feet beam, etc. Certain errors in gunnery practice belong to the gun alone and not to the gun captain. These could be ascertained at proving grounds, and should form a part of every range table. It is evident that the minimum dimensions within which shot plotted should have the maximum value should not be less than the errors due to the gun alone in range and direction. Practice at speed can be plotted and scored without serious error, provided the fire is delivered when the ship is near a line joining one of the observers and the target; this will require more time for practice, so that it can be plotted on rectangular diagrams, but it is believed that such diagrams better represent the effective work of the gun than when circles are used.
I think the sea or floating target recommended by the essayist is not a good one, for the reasons that if it is intended to be large enough to show the effect of firing against ships, or to encourage the men by showing a large number of hits, that it is not large enough, and it is so large in another sense that it is very unhandy. I think the target used by the Standish for three years past is the best I have seen for the purpose for which a target should be used; that is to say, to represent a point at which to aim and large enough to be clearly seen at all distances for which we need to use it. The Standish target consists of a float made of a square framework with diagonals, and is built of 4-inch pine scantling; the sides are eight feet, and a step is fitted at the centre of the float for the target pole. The target has four wings of black muslin, the same size as the regulation target. This target is simply hove overboard from the rail of the steamer, and has never once capsized, although it is often launched when going full speed. It does not require weights or barrels. It floats perfectly upright in a half gale of wind, and can be seen when smoke or haze would render a white target nearly or quite invisible. The expense attending target practice with service ammunition will probably result in the fitting of some sort of apparatus in the axis of the bore of large guns to fire Hotchkiss or small-arm ammunition. A reduced target to represent a ship 300 feet long by 20 feet high, at a distance of 2000 yards, if a vertical target must be used, at a distance of 100 yards from the gun, would be fifteen feet long by one foot high. If the gun sights are used, it will not be so easy to hit as at first sight may seem, and if the records of each gun and gun captain are kept and studied, valuable data can be obtained even with small-arm ammunition, and at small expense.
Copies of the records of all great-gun target practice should be kept with the ship, as they would afford the commanding officer knowledge of what his guns and gun captains can do at different ranges, and such knowledge will go far in influencing his decision as to the best range to begin an action.
The perfection of details of any plan of organization and drills can only be obtained by trial; and while many details would seem desirable in connection with so comprehensive a plan as we have before us, yet I think the essayist has given us much food for thought in those which he has submitted.
Lieutenant D. H. Mahan.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen: While I have listened with great interest to Lieutenant Calkins' paper, I must say that I think he does not go far enough into the matter, and I think his changes in organization and drill can be improved upon. One of the principal faults of our present system seems to be that a man has too much to remember. There is no system of association—that is, there is no attention paid to the simplifying of the work by causing one position to have a direct bearing upon other positions in drill. We station a man around according to the fancy of the executive officer. A man may be in the first division, third cutter, second howitzer's crew, and in the launch at "abandon ship."
I would suggest that two organizations be allowed, and no more—one to be known as the fighting organization, the other as the seamanship organization. The first to comprise under its heading the company, division, boats, artillery, and, as it has boats then, of course "abandon ship"; the second to have all the evolutions connected with the handling of the ship, its spars, and sails. As soon as the ship is cleared for action, then the seamanship organization ends and the fighting organization goes into effect.
Take the company as the basis of the fighting organization; the company to consist of forty-eight men and four sergeants. Allow four companies to a first-rate, three to a second, two to a third, and one to a fourth. Lieutenant Calkins needs only forty-five men to his divisions, so seven extra men will not be amiss. These companies should be put on board as the fighting complement of the ship, and should not include any non-combatants. Divide the company into two platoons for artillery drill, two pieces of artillery to each company: thus, you can drill them as infantry, artillery, or as both. Put this one company into two cutters, to be known as first cutters starboard and port. At boat exercise you will have a company in two boats, a platoon in one boat, and a piece in each boat if necessary. Have this company to form the first division for ship-fighting. This division would then have sixteen ammunition passers instead of nine—none too many. The divisions should be arranged on board ship as companies are arranged in battalion—in other words, having four divisions, a senior forward, then a junior, next a junior, and a senior aft. It must be remembered that the captain, executive officer, and navigator are going to have as much as they can attend to now. So forward and aft should be the proper positions for the seniors. I would station the men so that a man in the first platoon of the first company would be in the first artillery crew, first cutter starboard, and first division; and, still more to render his memory less burdened, I would have the first set of fours as the first set forward on the drag-rope, first set forward in pulling boats, and filling the first places at great-guns, so that a man will associate No. 1 front rank, first set of fours, with No. 1 at piece. No. 1 in boat, and what is now first loader at gun. The men will thus be continually working together, will become accustomed to each other, work better, and more quickly become accustomed to their places.
As Lieutenant Calkins suggests, it is desirable to have the ammunition passers belong to the different divisions. The powder division should consist only of the men stationed in the magazines and shell rooms. Now that ammunition passing has become the most important work of all, we no longer want Chinese, bandsmen, and ignorant servants to control the supply of ammunition.
Outside of the fighting organizations we find quartermasters, coxswains, berth-deck cooks, mess men, idlers, and engineers' force. It would be well to reorganize the petty officers. Make them a distinct set, and so separate them from the rest of the ship's company as to give them positions and authority such as sergeants and corporals have now in the Army. There should be two distinct sets of petty officers, with two grades of pay, and they should have a different uniform from the men, and at the same time not so different as to render them too conspicuous in action. They should be appointed by a board of officers, and only be disrated by sentence of a court-martial. In the first grade should be quartermasters, quarter-gunners, and coxswains; in the second grade boatswain's mates, captains of parts of ship, ship's cook, ship's corporal, etc. The quartermasters should be young men, intelligent and quick. Coxswains should be chosen from the intelligent men of the ship's company, and should be a sort of acting quartermaster, having charge of boats to which they may be assigned, and of the ammunition passers in their divisions under the officer of the division to which their boats belong. At boat drill, have a coxswain with two boat-keepers in each boat, to look out for the boats when the battalion lands. In the seamanship organization, these coxswains should look out for the rigging and gear on deck. Quarter-gunners should have a complete knowledge of small-arms and mechanical guns, as well as of ammunition. The boatswain's mate, and captains of parts of ship are placed in the second grade, as they do not now require so high a degree of intellect as those selected for the first grade. Berth-deck cooks should be shipped for the purpose; have charge of berth deck and around galley, hoist coal, pump water, etc. There are altogether too many idlers on board ship, and they are all too well paid for the duties rendered. The engineers' force, besides their regular duties, should be instructed in small-arm, Gatling, and Hotchkiss guns, so that they could assist in defending the ship during the absence of the landing party. The firemen should rank with seamen of the first rate and seamen of the second rate. There is no reason why the inequality of pay should exist amongst this set, although it may unjustly exist amongst the junior officers. The only seamen of the third rate on board the ship should be mess men, coal heavers, and berth-deck cooks; so we have seamen of the first rate, seamen of the second rate (formerly ordinary-seamen), and seamen of the third rate (formerly landsmen).
To promote this organization, officers ordered to a ship should go to her with the understanding that they are to make the cruise in the ship, not to be transferred to other ships, and only to be relieved from duty by cause of sickness, sentence of court-martial, or by orders from the Department. On an officer being relieved from duty, his place should be filled by one of his own rank and, as nearly as possible, about his own number. Such an arrangement will add to the content of all and give renewed interest in the discipline and efficiency of the whole Navy. Can you not realize why an officer changed from ship to ship, from division to division, soon loses some of his interest in the work? A change can also be made in the way of duty. Continual walking the deck and keeping spit-kids in line becomes monotonous after many years. In port have an officer of the day in charge of all. To be always ready for a call, allow him to turn in from 10 P.M. to "all hands" in the morning. If you will not let him sleep, let him read and smoke: if you see him smoking you will know he is not asleep. But the one thing above all others that must be done is to clear away favoritism and political influence. So long as these two hold their present power, no organization can be perfected.
Lieutenant Barry.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—After reading this essay I must confess to a feeling of great disappointment. I fail to see an answer to the question propounded, and upon careful examination, the essay, to me, seems mainly to be made up of words put together like one of Mr. Gladstone's replies when he does not wish to answer the questions of the Opposition. Except the rather vague suggestion that each division should supply its own ammunition, I fail to see a new idea advanced. For years the platitudes herein contained have been subjects of discussion throughout the Navy; and many of the numerous aphorisms easily can be reduced into more platitudes.
As to a practical application of theories. In a professional sense, the Civil War was the greatest misfortune that ever befell our Navy. Without even an elementary knowledge of military comparison, our politicians have been blinded by the results attained, and even to-day. Congressmen apparently sane on other subjects, continually are informing the country that when needed we can create a Navy as we did in 1861! How can we be expected to handle ships properly in actual war, when in peace there is no opportunity afforded for practical exercises? Were it the only definition of seamanship, "handling vessels in fighting condition, that is, under full steam power," would be what we want; but other and contradictory definitions are given elsewhere. Of these later.
As regards naval administration we are between two fires—efficiency and economy. Congress represents the economy, and the Department has to take its cue from the amount of available cash. I know I am talking treason when I whisper against the great efficiency of the Navy: but I venture to say the service would be ten times as efficient if there were money available to pay for extra coal and other expensive items required for practical battle drills; hence, our experimental and practical work is limited: we must cut our coat according to our cloth; though I hope the day never will come again when the captain of a filthy, slouchy ship will be complimented because he had never expended all his "allowances"!
I do not think it was the intention of the question to obtain a theoretical Utopia, but to get an answer showing what can be done for our modern ships and with them. What are these ships of the latest type? The essay fails to tell us. To be sure, the Chicago and Atlanta types are named, but the rest of the paragraph tells us "they are intended to have speed and handiness, and their batteries have been selected and disposed with a view to enable them to choose their distance and to fight without surrendering all the advantages of speed and maneuvering power." This means simply that they belong to the modern type, and the definition will cover the greater number of foreign naval constructions during the past ten years.
The second part of the question, and the most important part of it, is. What is to be required of them? In fact, this is really the main subject of the discussion. Is there anything in the essay to show the nature of their future duty? To fight, of course. But to fight what? Under what conditions? Where? What to do when not fighting? Are they coast defenders, or so-called line-of-battle ships, or are they cruisers? What kinds of wars are we likely to be engaged in? What kinds of naval operations are these vessels likely to be engaged in? Surely, to use anything "most effectively," it ought to be prepared—first, by finding out what it is intended for; secondly, by adapting the means to the end.
As to seamanship. The essayist defines seamanship "as the art of sailing ships effectively." This, while true of sailing-ships, contradicts the extracted definition first referred to. It is too narrow, and failed to be correct even as early as the second period of nineteenth-century development, when steam became a factor. To-day no commanding officer will allow his vessel to be endangered through failure to get up steam. In time of war, if his engines and boilers are not in a condition to do this, his ship has no business to be out of port. An officer is called a good seaman when he can handle a ship effectively under all circumstances, in port or at sea; or, better still (for this is meant by "at sea" ), when under way. In a recent discussion of a kindred subject. Commodore Russell defined seamanship as "simply a thorough, ready knowledge of the duties to be performed on board a vessel at sea." Excluding from this gunnery, navigation, steam engineering, and interior economy, no better definition can be asked. It will be seen readily that the seaman of to-day, be he officer or be he man, differs materially from the Benbows and the Tom Coffins of other days.
In any well-regulated ship the development of the strength and activity of the ship's company, with reference to health and discipline, is not dependent upon the presence of spars and sails. In mastless ironclads this can be and is accomplished. The essayist seems to appreciate the absurdity of all this when he says (and to my mind it is the happiest and best hit in the essay) hundreds of men are called on deck to lower three little spars (the royal yards) as the colors are hauled down. This calls to mind the statement, years ago, of an influential officer that at the time defeated the introduction of steam capstans: "When you call 'all hands up anchor,' what are the men to do?"
Without discussing the question of the status of our mercantile marine, I venture to say that, unless vastly improved before our next war, the "traditional naval policy" will find, as it would find to-morrow, nothing in our merchant fleet capable of performing the duties of a man-of-war. Until too late, and when the enemy is thundering at our gates, our traditional parsimonious naval policy, coupled with many other causes, never will permit the use of merchant steamers as proposed; nor, as in England, their special construction. With us this is Utopia, but not feasible.
We next come to the apprentice system. While not properly a subject for discussion under the question propounded, it seems to me the remedy proposed is worse than the disease. The real cure lies in reward. As continuous-service men, we never get back the very best apprentice graduates. Why? Because they always can find something better to do. This matter was discussed fully in a former prize essay, and needs no further reference. Is (naval) life worth living? Answer it in the affirmative, make it so, and the problem is solved.
Concerning sailors as infantry, it seems to me it would be well entirely to separate sailors from marines. At the very best, seamen never can approach the rigid infantry of Frederick the Great. When a small force is landed, the use of "rigid infantry," as such, manifestly will not be needed; when a large force is landed, enough marines can be gathered together to make up the soldier element; sailors will then devote themselves to skirmish and artillery work—their only efficient work when on shore.
"We need trained men to serve as gun captains, file closers and coxswains"; but what connection is there between a gun captain and a coxswain, or a file closer? I think we can be accused of the worship of the seaman. Practically we say: "A good seaman is good at everything." Let us make gun captains gun shooters, and let coxswains of boats stay with their boats; anybody can be a file closer. What are the requisites for marksmanship? By no means does it follow that a good musket marksman can shoot straight with a cannon. The vital need of our ships and of our future gun captains is target practice. We need a corps of gun captains—men that can take charge of a gun; and we never shall have them so long as we make Tom or Dick "Captain of No. 3" because his watch number puts him there. Gun captains and top captains should have no connection. The principal duty of the latter is to "wash down"; the principal duty of the former is to shoot correctly.
To supply ammunition, the essayist would use the divisions and do away with the powder division proper. If behave a magazine for each gun, the duty of the old powder division will be done by a vastly superior force, and I think less efficiently; if one magazine supply powder, who are to be the magazine? Is there to be one man from each gun, or just enough properly to handle the powder? If metal tags are to be attached to projectiles and to charges, who regulates their number? If a gun be disabled, can other guns make use of the "tallied" charges? Confusion and delay are sure to result. Does not the idea suggest itself that rapidity in the delivery of projectiles will remedy all the evil? Powder can always be supplied more rapidly than it can be used, but, with the increase of weight and size, projectiles must be delivered more rapidly at the battery. Increase in the number of shell rooms and the use of steam hoisting will produce the needed rapidity.
The essayist says of drills, "Uniformity of method is of less practical importance"; and of reports, "It should not be the object of such comparison to secure exact compliance with any arbitrary routine, but rather to make sure that a reasonable amount of practical instruction has been given." With this I beg to differ. I do not wish to be understood to say it is impossible to arrive at the same result by more than one method, but I submit, with all due deference to the powers that be, that one of our most crying evils is want of uniformity ; squadrons drill according to the will of the commander-in chief, ships as the commanding officer wishes ; and if division officers are to be encouraged in the same direction, individual caprice can go but little farther. The essayist seems to recognize this when he says later, "Officers must learn to decide questions arising during exercise according to their own judgment within certain limits''; which always has been conceded by the most ardent advocates of uniformity.
For the information of the essayist, I wish to state that the Copernican theory was taught first prior to 1464, by Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa; in 1504 by Copernicus, and in 1616 by Galileo. The famous recantation was made in 1633. As taught by Nicholas and Copernicus, this hypothetical theory continued to be taught after Galileo's death. Galileo's main proofs have been demonstrated false. Sir Isaac Newton was the first to demonstrate the truth of the theory. "It moves, for all that," has less foundation in history than Wellington's spoken remark, "Up, Guards, and at them!"
I close by asking if the executive officers of the Chicago and the Atlanta go aboard with this essay in their hand, how much will it aid them in organization, and how much will it aid them and others in drill?
Lieutenant Charles R. Miles.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I find very little room for comment of a purely critical character upon that part of the essay relating to the proposed changes in drill, but upon the changes in organization proposed by the essayist he has not made his position so invulnerable. He has advocated one change under this head that I fear may prove a stumbling-block in the way of one of the most useful branches of our service, and I cannot remain silent and permit his views upon that point to pass unchallenged. I refer to his proposition to keep up "on a reduced basis" our present system of training apprentices.
Perhaps some apology ought to be made for taking the time of the meeting in discussing a part of the essay wherein the essayist seems to have strayed away from the subject somewhat; for I take the subject as given out by the Institute to refer to the changes in organization of the ship's company, and not to the changes necessary in the organization of the Navy. As the essayist, however, has made the subject elastic enough to include the reorganization of the present system of training apprentices, I feel that I am not altogether responsible for the digression.
I am sure that most of the officers of the service that have been associated with the intelligent American youths sent out from the training school will agree with me in according to this most useful branch a place of first importance in our naval establishment. That there are defects in the present system, I shall not attempt to deny; but upon the implication made that one of these defects consists in its having been established on too extensive a basis, I am prepared to take issue with the essayist. It may appear true, on first thought, that the numerical results of this attempt to Americanize the Navy are more or less of a failure; for probably not more than ten per cent, of the apprentices re-enlist immediately upon the expiration of their apprenticeship. But I claim that this percentage does not represent the whole number of men of this class in the service at any given time, as many of those that retire to civil life undoubtedly meet with reverses, and in time drift back into the service. The essayist also seems not to have considered the valuable reserve force furnished in time of war for the Navy to draw from, by this very class of men that have retired to civil life—a class much superior to the raw levies that the Navy was obliged to accept to man its ships at the breaking out of the Civil War. I will venture to assert, therefore, that our Government would not lose by the bargain, should it increase this training service to twice its present basis; for, besides the increase in continuous-service men obtained, and the increase of the valuable reserve just mentioned, it would get from two to three years' service from every apprentice on board of the regular cruisers—a period during which, as has been satisfactorily proved, these apprentices would perform most acceptably the duties of ordinary-seamen, seamen, and, in exceptional cases, even the duties of petty officers. I believe the average apprentice of the 1st class to be superior in every way to the ordinary-seaman of former times, if we except their capacity for physical endurance, perhaps; and every apprentice of this class, when he becomes eighteen years of age, but not earlier, should be sent on board a regular cruising ship.
If the numerical results of the training service do not meet with the approval of the essayist, I wish to remind him that the fault lies not in the present system of training, but rather in the fact that sufficient inducements to remain in the service are not offered by the Government to these valuable trained men. In many cases, also, the officers with whom they are thrown after leaving the training ships take no especial interest in them, and as no attempt is made to wed them to the service, many naturally never learn to feel themselves an integral part of it, but, on the contrary, welcome the time when they can retire to civil life. I have in mind a case in point: An ambitious young apprentice, a leading boy on board one of the apprentice-ships, was sent to a regular cruiser, and there, for nearly a year, he was kept on duty as a messenger. Was it a wonder that his spirit was broken? or that he displayed what little spirit was left in him by endeavoring to get his discharge? I contend that a proper system of service pensions, better pay for petty officers and skilled men generally, and, finally, though not the least to be considered, juster treatment and a fairer estimate of the value of these trained youths by the officers with whom they serve, will bring about all that can be desired in regard to the numerical results of the present system.
In regard to the "mariners" or "naval volunteers" proposed by the essayist, I fail to see that the inducements offered them to remain in the service are any greater than those now offered to the apprentices; and, after much time has been wasted in training these raw recruits, I fail to see that we should possess any guarantee that they would not also retire to civil life at the end of their enlistment and thus produce the same inadequate numerical result complained of under the present system. The nautical habit and the love of a profession like ours are acquired early in life, and in a vast majority of cases at an earlier age than twenty-five American boys, trained in the service and growing up with it, will give us a patriotic and powerful fighting force of which in time we may well be proud. The man at twenty-five years of age that has not already chosen a profession will prove of little use to us, except in the performance of those simple menial duties that are usually performed on board ship by this same class of men at the present time.
The present system of training men, although yet in its incipiency, has proved itself one of our brightest jewels. Let us not be too critical about the details of the system, but let us unite, one and all, in assisting those that are engaged in the work by giving them our thorough co-operation and good-will.
Lieutenant C. D. Galloway.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I think the Institute and the service at large are to be congratulated on having received such a concise and lucid paper on this important subject. I believe from this article a compendium of rules could very readily be made which would improve the present methods, and which would wipe out much of the present routine nonsense.
As to what the essayist defines as seamanship, I take exceptions. Seamanship, in my opinion, is the correct care and handling of a vessel, no matter what her rig or motive-power maybe, whether at anchor or under way among shoals or among other vessels; in gales of wind or calms; at single anchor, moored, or with springs on cables; either during offensive or defensive maneuvering, or while making passages. There can be but only one higher type of seamanship than that of conducting a ship from port to port at the great speeds now developed. The nerve required for such work, the judgment required in navigating her in bad weather and in good, is seamanship, and the kind that should be cultivated by all officers. The one higher type I have referred to consists in correctly doing what should be done when disaster does come, as shown by the way the vessel and crew are handled, and the most made of every device that can relieve the distress of the vessel, by the readiness of resource and exposition of nerve that have been previously.
As the opportunity now offers, I should like to say something upon the remarks made by the essayist on the subject of training faults found by him In the present system. It is a lamentable fact that many of the best-trained apprentices do leave the service after reaching their majority, but some of them return after a short time ; others would probably come back in time of war. In fact, I know that some of them return denying that they were ever apprentices, owing to the treatment received by apprentices on some ships. Many more of them would re-enlist within three months, if permission to go on shore and to draw and spend their own money were more freely allowed.
I think that all good-conduct men and apprentices should be allowed to go on liberty in our own ports, at least, either in citizens' clothes or in some plain dress similar to that allowed to yeomen, writers, and others. There can be no objection to it but prejudice, and perhaps the difficulty of identification in case of attempted desertion or straggling. The latter reason can have no weight, however, as in cases of this sort the uniform is readily exchanged for old clothes, the "dean blue mustering clothes" being thus entirely lost. I am sure, from what I know from my own observation and from the opinions of fellow-officers, that such a simple change would keep many more men in the service: the reasons being that men in seamen's clothes have the doors of nearly all decent places shut to them, from barber-shops to churches. They are marked men, and the prey of sharps and runners. Their friends avoid them in public, and they are cut off from many of the amusements and pleasures open to a much lower class of society in civil life. Their pay is sufficient to enable them to have such clothes, and their more expensive blue clothes would thus be saved. I insist that this simple change in costume would encourage many men to remain. Much more might be urged to strengthen this argument, but it would be out of place here.
Officers should encourage the feeling that a seaman's position is an important one, and that each man is a very important part of the country's defense, an upholder of its honor, and his station much superior to many in civil life. If we can by fair treatment, and by giving good pay and good food, make our seamen proud of their position, of their ships, and of their flag, many more apprentices will remain in the service, and the more remaining, the higher type of crews we shall have, thus eliminating the weakest features of the present system as mentioned by the essayist. In the effort to retain good men in the service, attention should also be called to the classification and pay as shown in the Navy Register. To the eye of a layman the value of an article is to a great extent judged by its moneyed value, and to one glancing over that list it will be found that the actual fighting force of a ship's company is the least valuable. Compare any of the subdivisions, from petty officers, first-class, to seamen, third-class, and the result is the same. A chief gunner's mate gets less pay per month by ten dollars than a writer; a gunner's mate less than a cook, musician, or carpenter's mate ; a captain of forecastle or top less than a painter, an oiler, or a printer; a seaman less than a lamplighter, a tailor, or a barber; and yet wonder is expressed that many apprentices fail to remain in such a service.
It seems to me the strongest means should be taken to encourage apprentices to remain, rather than to accept the essayist's idea of getting older men. The efforts of all officers, therefore, should be exerted to attain this end.
Lieutenant E. H. C. Leutze.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—As much that I intended saying has already been anticipated by those that have preceded me, I will only add that in making changes in the organization of our vessels I think it is necessary to begin at the top—that is, with the officers. I think with the essayist that it is high time that the lieutenants of our Navy should be relieved from the onerous and deteriorating watch duty which they have to perform in port. The junior officers who now are without definite status in regard to duty, could, if necessary, perform that service as well, if not better, not having lost all spirit and ardor by years of monotonous tramping up and down. If necessary, one of the lieutenants could be on duty for twenty-four hours as officer of the day. The lieutenants should be required, however, to pay more attention to their divisions and have more frequent drills. One of them, I think, should be detailed as ordnance officer and have immediate charge of all articles pertaining to the battery, magazines, torpedoes, etc. It will probably be urged that the navigator will be able to perform that duty. In my experience, however, the navigator has plenty of work to keep him busy, especially, as being "the man who has nothing to do," he is ordered on every court-martial, board of survey, and any other duty outside of the routine that is to be performed.
While on this subject, I would like to put myself on record as being firmly convinced that it would be for the good of the service to have all commissioned officers in the wardroom. I would almost say all officers, but see many reasons why naval cadets should live by themselves. I think steerages are not only uncomfortable, unhealthy, and unfit for matured men to live in, but are positively indecent. Ensigns and those of assimilated rank are older men now than those of twenty years ago, many of them being married men, and these gentlemen are certainly entitled to some privacy and a spot where they can indulge in serious reading or study. We all know that they can have opportunity for neither in the steerage. They are sent on board ship and thrown in close contact with youngsters just turned loose from school, who may have been their pupils, or whom they may examine at their final graduating examination. I think the tone of both wardroom and steerage messes would be improved; the older men would become more dignified, and the younger, less frivolous and, perhaps, more respectful in their remarks about their seniors.
If it should be said that there is no room in the wardroom, then, as the steerages have to be retained for the cadets, I think it would be the lesser evil to knock down the bulkhead and take all officers into one mess. The breaking up of this one mess would also rid the ship of two non-combatants.
Lieutenant Charles Belknap.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I think that in proposing this subject for the prize essay, the Board of Control of the Institute had in view the Chicago, Atlanta, and Boston, the only vessels we have at all modern; and since these vessels must rely entirely upon the gun for their offensive power, I regret to find that the essayist has not outlined a more definite plan for the changes in organization needed to exercise that power most effectively. The organization we now make use of has come down to us, with a few modifications, from the days when the weather gage was considered of the utmost importance; but under existing conditions the watch, quarter, and station bills should be made out with sole regard to the end in view—the development of the offensive power.
In regard to the changes in drill, I do not agree with the essayist in extending, if I understand him aright, the scope of individual idiosyncrasies. There cannot, perhaps, be too much uniformity in putting the principles of so exact a science as gunnery into practice. The disadvantages of latitude seem to be tacitly admitted by the essayist, as he discourages changes among divisional officers. Were the practices carried out uniformly, a change of divisional officer could produce nothing more than physical effect.
To gain uniformity in exercises, the Ordnance Manual should, in the first place, be rewritten, separating it perhaps into two volumes. In addition, each ship after being put into commission should be placed under the instruction of the Ordnance Bureau until a thorough course of exercises should have been gone through with, involving all the varied circumstances in the uses of the offensive weapons on board. With headquarters in Lynnhaven Bay, for example, the ship could put out to sea, perform the various exercises under direction of an officer specially detailed for the purpose, returning daily to the anchorage, where targets could be carefully examined to show results attained, until all understood the manner in which the bureau wished the exercises carried on.
The results attained at different times during the cruise and before going out of commission would, by comparison, show the value of the course of instruction and exercise pursued.
I will not trespass any further upon your indulgence by indicating the series of exercises to be pursued; they naturally embrace all where hitting an object with a projectile is concerned. But such I believe to be the changes in drill and exercises needed to fight the new cruisers most effectively.
The Chairman.—Lieutenant Calkins is to be congratulated on being the first person to be twice successful in writing the prize essay. I am sorry, however, that he is not present to-night to answer for himself; no doubt, if he were, he would clear up much that seems obscure to some of those who have taken part in this interesting discussion. The paper has been so ably debated that little is left for me to say.
The Board of Control, of which I was a member, in selecting this subject, hoped to set officers thinking about the new Navy, so fondly hoped for. The seven essays submitted in competition show that its hopes have been realized.
It is evident that reorganizations of the personnel and drills are necessary to manage and fight properly the new ships. But I think the essayist loses sight of the modern improvements when he proposes to fill the ships with as large crews as they can berth. The effect would be, so to speak, to make too much food for the enemy's powder. The tendency of the age is to have machinery take the place of muscle; of machine guns to replace regiments, and of engines to "sheet home" and "hoist away," instead of hundreds of men to the music of the bugle. If there is a desire on both sides to engage, head-winds or calms will not prevent. The action will be of short duration; therefore, the ordinary crew will not be overworked. For the purpose of training men, the crews might be as large as the essayist suggests.
It is to be regretted that the author, while treating so liberally in generalities, has not gone more into useful detail, so that one might know how he would organize, equip, arm, and station a ship's company, and afterwards exercise it, and fight the battle.
On the motion of Commander Huntington, U.S.N., a vote of thanks was tendered to the Prize Essayist.
WASHINGTON BRANCH,
May 19, 1886.
Rear-Admiral Edward Simpson, U.S.N., President of the Institute, in the Chair.
Commander A. D. Brown.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I have jotted down a few points in the essay that attracted my attention in reading it, concerning which I propose to offer a few words, without attempting to discuss the paper as a whole. I think it may be said, however, that our author has given us a very good paper ; certainly he has laid out a good deal of work for those who are to have the control of our new ships.
Reference is made to the training system and its inadequate supply of men, with the intimation that it is regarded as our only dependence for supply. I do not think this can be the case, for in the complement of the Atlanta there are 28 landsmen—a pretty fair proportion as things go.
I think that the essayist is correct when he says that there should be no marine officers with the guard. I see no reason why the relation to the ship of the officer commanding the marine division should be different from that of any other divisional officer; and the laws do not appear to contemplate the necessity that is supposed to exist for this being the case. If we can make no use of the nautical training of the junior marine officers, we are better off without them on board ship. I say this without disparagement to them or to the gallant corps to which they belong.
Again, our author says that "every man should belong to an efficient military organization"; in this I heartily concur, especially if he includes in the term man the officers as well. In a paper which I had the honor to read before the Institute some years ago, I said that "every officer, except the medical officers and the chaplain, should be a combatant sea officer, a graduate of the Naval Academy," and from the opinion then expressed I see no reason to dissent; in fact, the necessity therefore seems to be every day more apparent.
A caution regarding the position of the three senior officers in action is well timed; it might be a matter of some interest to ascertain the probable chances of the survival throughout an action of the gentlemen who are to occupy those honorable situations; it does not seem likely that all of them would be able to pass through the fire of machine guns unharmed, and I suppose that it would be a mere question of duration as to the officer upon whom the command would fall after an action was closed.
I am entirely at one with Lieutenant Calkins in his denunciation of competitive drills in which time is to be made; for I consider that there are no words too strong to apply to them; they foster careless and slovenly work, and are of no earthly good whatever, that I can see. "Gilguys and gadgets" are in the highest degree un-seamanlike, and though I must plead guilty to having used them at an earlier stage, I must, in justice to myself, say that it has been only because the other fellow was doing the same thing without rebuke from our common superior. In general, the remark of the paper upon the subject of the character of the drills to be pursued is excellent, and many of the suggestions might be carried out to advantage in our older ships.
It is evident that there is a spirit of improvement abroad in the Department, for we have recently seen the North Atlantic Squadron displaying its naval power, or rather its want of that power, in a series of drills which, while they seem to have had a good deal of the time system in them, yet must have been productive of much knowledge on the part of all concerned, especially that portion of the officers who rarely have an opportunity for handling their ships under way. More of this should be done as suggested.
It occurs to me that we have presented to us an excellent plan for the service of the ammunition; certainly none could be much worse than the present one under which the powder division is exercised. I remember to have heard our honored president say that "the powder division was the most important one in the ship," and, if I am not mistaken, in one vessel commanded by him it was placed in charge of the senior instead of the junior watch officer. At all events, I should like to have the proposed experiment tried in the Atlanta, to see whether it is the improvement I think it.
It seems to me a matter for regret that we are obliged to have so large a proportion of our force afloat belonging to the non-effectives; in our ships the ratio is, I believe, higher than in any other service; and this state of affairs is continued in the new ships. In the Omaha and Atlanta the proportion of the different branches is as follows: servants, 10 per cent; special, 14; engineer's force, 20; battery and spar deck, 56. While it does not seem reasonable that there should be 24 per cent, of almost entirely non-effectives, yet it will require the exercise of great judgment on the part of the authorities to reduce this ratio; and perhaps I may say a great change in the ideas of officers, both in command and in inferior positions, to cause a proper disposition of the force placed at their disposal. I am sure that the number of servants could be materially decreased without any sacrifice of the comfort of the officers, while adding materially to the efficiency of the ship; and this is, I think, the first place where the pruning-knife should be used.
The essayist is not far out in his estimate of the number of men that the Atlanta will have. According to the present complement she will have 193, exclusive of marines, the engineer's force being 41. If we go back to the old fashion of having but two watches in the fire room at quarters, there will be left 163 men from which to draw the four divisions mentioned; from these must be deducted five for the surgeon, leaving 158; of these there are 19 servants, 11 engineer's force, 8 artificers, 14 first-class petty officers, so that the number of reliable men from which to draw is greatly decreased; still we would be able to have the divisions almost as large as contemplated. The second relief would not be a full one; with that exception the plan could be carried out, and I think that it is certainly worth trying.
I cannot close these brief remarks without saying that I think we make altogether too much of watch standing, and that to exact port watches is calling upon men to do too much. Where all the line officers are standing watch there would be no need for doing duty in this way; it fosters the idea so very prevalent, that when one is over his day's duty he is off until the next tour begins—a most pernicious doctrine, which leads one to forget that the first duty of every officer is to the ship upon which he is serving, and that practically speaking that duty is (like that of the executive officer) never done. Our ensigns are of the age at which the lieutenants of the war period, and immediately after, did their duty; and many of them are as old as are some of the captains now on the list when they held their earliest commands during the war. It will be observed that our author does not propose to lessen, but rather to increase the amount of work to be done, and therefore the change in the method of standing watch is an essential portion of his scheme. In three watches (where there is so great a misfortune) an officer of the day would be all-sufficient. In conclusion, I desire to tender my congratulations to Lieutenant Calkins for the manner in which he has enunciated his views, and I hope, with him, that they may prove of practical benefit to the service.
Lieutenant-Commander C. H. Stockton.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—This essay is found to be most interesting, being critical and suggestive, and, to a less extent, constructive. Taking the treatment of the subject, as given by the Naval Institute, as the matter alone to be discussed—i. e., the changes in organization and drill that are necessary to sail and fight most effectively our war ships of the latest type—I find the changes suggested in organization are few in number and to my mind not too radical.
They can be stated briefly as follows:
First.—The equalization in numerical strength of the divisions; the union of the effective men of two divisions as a company of seventy-two men; with provision for relief crews and ammunition passers as an integral part of the division.
Second.—The consequent abolition of the powder division.
Third.—The change of the navigator's division into a division of equal numerical strength as the others; but with duties in addition to their former ones of riflemen and of working the rapid-firing guns of the tops, etc. This division to be in charge no longer of the navigator.
No decrease in numbers of the men on board is favored, except in the number of servants, but a complement which will fill the ship without crowding is advocated. An additional system of classification is also urged, making proficiency in drill the basis.
I agree very decidedly with the essayist in the idea mentioned of equalizing divisions. This has been done, and is done to a great extent at present, and the advantages of having such units in organization can be readily appreciated in the formation of companies of infantry, sections of artillery, boats' crews, messes, etc. When practicable—and from our knowledge of the possibilities in these ships it seems feasible—I think all will assent to its advisability.
In regard to the suggestion of the formation of a company of seventy-two men from two of the divisions, I cannot but regard it of doubtful utility; besides the breaking up of the divisional unit and placing the men under an officer of another division, the advantages of a smaller company of from thirty-four to thirty-six strike me as greater. Besides being formed of the effective men of one division, under their own officers, it is a smaller unit, less unwieldy, occupying less boat space, and, hence, less likely to be scattered, and in addition also feeling more strongly and directly the personal influence of the officers and of divisional companionship.
The provision for relief crews and ammunition passers, and the abolition of the powder division, in my judgment is a good one, and tending to increased efficiency in the working of the battery and service of ammunition. It provides in broadside guns for the manning of each gun in an efficient way, besides furnishing trained men to replace deficiencies caused in action. As for the ammunition supply, as proposed, it is more under the control of the officer most concerned, renders the division independent and self-supporting, and the interchangeability of the men will make the division, I think, in every way stronger.
The change in the navigation division I think most excellent; and in addition would suggest the placing of the marine guard and its officer as an integral part of this division, to do the duty of sharpshooters and riflemen, and man a portion of the guns in the tops. From recent experience I found that the marines were sufficiently active and serviceable aloft for that duty; and as we have shaped the sailor into an infantry man without making him a soldier, I think we can readily station the marine aloft, and give him sufficient flexibility without attempting to make him a sailor. The marine guard as ordinarily drawn up at general quarters only serves as a most tempting target for machine guns.
The argument in favor of a complement that will fill the ship is a strong one, and in marked contrast to the reduction of complement suggested by Commander Glass in his recent paper published by the Institute. No matter how improved and how great in number the mechanical appliances on board may be, there should be an effective force for landing purposes and detached operations, the absence of which should not entirely disable the ship. It is a simple impossibility for military detachments or wandering transports to do the work liable to be demanded for the emergencies that may arise, and which can be so well and readily met by a large or small force from a cruising war ship.
In regard to the classification of the men according to their training and drill, it seems a move in the right direction, and opens up possibilities, in a far-reaching way, of a substitution for the present system of classification according to seamanship alone, based as it often is upon service in the merchant marine of a character entirely foreign to naval duties.
The changes proposed under the second heading—in drill—can be summarized as follows:
First.—Drilling by watches in port.
Second.—Abolition of competition among ships for the first six months of the cruise.
Third.—Greater attention to aiming drill and marksmanship in general.
Fourth.—The abolition of the cutlass and pistol and their drill.
And as minor changes: The working of the guns at daily inspection, and the establishment of four rigs.
More extensive drilling by watches in port is desirable, and is, I think, more practicable in our newer ships. It has its limits, and the writer has, I think, reached one extreme in his proposed drill routine for the morning watch in port. For reasons suggested in the essay, it would be most beneficial, while not absolutely abolishing competition, to limit it to two or three drills in that time, so as to enliven the ship as a whole at rare intervals.
The importance of much greater attention to aiming drill, though strongly stated, cannot be too forcibly urged, and its value cannot be overestimated.
In regard to the cutlass and pistol, in my opinion the cutlass is a thing of the past as a gymnastic exercise. Its drill is inferior to the pure gymnastics as practiced in the French Navy. The pistols furnished to ships, with which I have had experience, I think can be dispensed with as of little value, though I admit the value of a good weapon, well handled.
The daily working of guns at inspection I consider a decidedly good plan, mechanical carriages and appliances making it almost necessary. A visit to the Esmeralda a year ago, at Panama, showed the carriages there in bad condition, with the more delicate parts badly rusted, and an evident neglect of constant manipulation of the mechanical appliances.
The rigs, suggested and classified, though not novel, can be usefully combined, and the provision for their use in the system of signals can be readily made.
An omission of sufficient stress on ship-torpedo drill is noticed. No matter how indifferent is the plant with which we are supplied, we should have our men more frequently drilled. If the system is radically bad, the application of the maxim in administration, that "the best method of securing the repeal of a bad law is its enforcement," might be of use. These torpedoes are still manufactured and supplied, and that fact encourages the vague reliance placed upon them by the outside world.
In regard to what is said about the apprentice system, I have been so unfortunate as to have no exact knowledge of how matters stand, and what the statistics are upon the subject. I should not like to form or advance any opinion from the very limited field in active service from which I could alone judge. In addition I have discovered only general statements of an unofficial nature that do not cover the whole ground. How large the number that graduate each year into the service is, and what the cost per capita of each so entered, I do not know. I hope we shall be able to get the statistics of the system, and not have to depend upon generalities alone, more or less glittering though they be.
Lieutenant W. H. Beehler.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—The admirable essay under discussion seems to cover the ground so generally that it is difficult to find many features which will not meet with general approval. There are, however, a few points which might have been more thoroughly elucidated in order to offer practical suggestions to remedy the evils of our present organization and drill.
Certain changes in regard to the classification of our enlisted men are suggested, but they do not go to the root of the subject. The organization of the personnel should be completely changed in order to meet the growing requirements of the service. The essayist claims that the apprentice system has failed, and in lieu thereof suggests that "young men of good physique and intelligence" be enlisted and given "a rapid course in military training while they are acquiring the rudiments of seamanship by serving in cruising vessels."
This is, however, the aim of our present system. I believe the true remedy lies in lengthening the period of enlistments and to have each re-enlistment a graded sequence of the preceding. The present system of continuous-service men is an effort in the right direction, but the chief consideration in view is to provide pay and certain emoluments as a bounty for re-enlistment, while but little account is taken of the professional attainments of previous enlistments. The latest types of war ships require a specially trained personnel. The man-of-war's man of the present is not merely a sailor, but must be a skilled artillerist, a well-drilled infantry soldier, a machinist, a torpedoist, as well as a sailor, qualified for all kinds of strictly nautical work, such as boatman, top man, helmsman, etc.
The period of five years is necessary for efficient service in the Army and Marine Corps, where only one or two of the foregoing qualifications are required, and surely this term is absolutely necessary for the Navy. Not that a cruise should be for five years, but that the enlistment be for that term. The first and last years of each enlistment should be spent on shore in barracks at the navy yards, where a much more efficient course in military training can be given, rather than while serving in cruising vessels. This would leave two fifths of the entire enlisted personnel on shore and three-fifths in the cruising vessels. This, however, is not such a radical measure as would seem, as there are about five thousand men (generally less) serving in the ships on the five cruising stations, exclusive of the boys, while the entire force is seven thousand five hundred men. The essayist presents no scheme for a prompt mobilization of a reserve, because none is contemplated, whereas this plan enables the mobilization of a reserve equal to two-fifths of the entire Navy. In the present time war follows upon the receipt of telegraphic information, and the necessity for an immediately available naval force is the most striking feature of the times.
The organization should be thorough in all details. Each man should be enlisted for a certain ship; the ship should make a three years' cruise, and be held in reserve during the first and last years of every period of five years. The crew could then live in barracks while their ship is in reserve, and except when undergoing extensive repairs will be available for immediate service, with reduced complements, perhaps, owing to temporary absence of the deserving on leave for portions of this period. This reserve would supply a needed organized naval brigade at each naval station for any emergencies.
The classification suggested by the prize essayist is not sufficiently thorough in providing for a regular graded promotion of the men to petty officers and officers. The petty officers should all be regularly graded, and embraced in different special branches, so that proficiency in one grade should lead directly up to the next higher; then on to and including that of warrant officer. For example, captains of tops to become boatswain's mate; then chief boatswain's mate; then boatswains; ranking respectively as corporals, second sergeants, first sergeants, and warrant officers. The torpedo personnel should, in like manner, have graded petty officers such as might be: Torpedo mechanic, torpedo mate, chief torpedo mate, torpedoist, with relative rank of non-commissioned and warrant officers respectively. All the unorganized personnel of petty officers can be so grouped with relative rank that the status of every man may be thoroughly defined as in one of the following branches—viz.: Gunners, boatswains, masters, artificers, torpedoists, machinists; and the remainder, such as baymen, apothecaries, writers, cooks, stewards, and storekeepers, be assigned the relative ranks of non-commissioned officers, not to reach the grade of warrant officer. This will introduce two additional branches of warrant officers—viz.: torpedoists and machinists; the titles of carpenters and sail makers being changed to those of artificers and masters. The masters-at-arms and ship's corporals should be selected from the personnel in the boatswains', gunners', and masters' branches of warrant officers, and permanent petty officers. The difficulty of obtaining such men will be obviated by the adoption of some plan like this. The duties of the master-at-arms and ship's corporals are such that they must be good seamen in order to have the personal respect of their shipmates. The occasional detail of those so qualified, as will be ascertained from properly kept records, may be considered as a sort of detached duty for the cruise of the ship to which they may be assigned. Some such system must be introduced in our organization if we ever hope to Americanize our Navy. Americans are ambitious to occupy positions of trust and responsibility, and this scheme affords them some chance of gratifying their ambition as warrant officers. It does not pay Americans to ship.
The petty officers should be permanently attached to the Navy, and all those who reach the grades of first and second sergeants should have their names in the Navy Register. A certain amount of pride in the service, together with a permanent interest in the welfare of the Navy, will ensue, and contribute very much to Americanize the Navy. There is no hope for much improvement in the individual status of the enlisted men in our present organization. The enlisted man is no better off after a cruise than before, except, perhaps, by a little experience and a small sum of money, which is immediately squandered. Our present organization is the chief obstacle in the efforts to obtain young Americans for the service.
The five-year term of enlistment will also contribute, as explained, to improve the personnel. When a ship is commissioned her crew will have had a preliminary training of one year. No vacancies will have to be filled by enlistment of foreigners when on the cruise, and all the evils attending the wholesale discharge of men immediately after their return from a three-years' cruise, and the expense of extra pay for overtime men, will be obviated. The continuous-service certificates would have to be modified to suit this change in the period of enlistments.
The equalization of divisions in force and efficiency advocated in the essay sounds well, but it is practically not as feasible in the latest type of war ships as in the obsolete types in sail at present. The essayist seems to overlook the chief features of the modern war ship's armament: the primary battery of high-power breech-loading rifle, the secondary battery of rapid-firing, multi-fire and machine guns, and the torpedo armaments. He does not provide for any torpedo division, as if it had been definitely decided that the pot on the end of a pole is to continue to be our only torpedo armament. It is true that we have no other torpedoes yet, but then we have no modern ships, either. The organization of a torpedo division, comprising the trained torpedo personnel to manipulate the torpedo-launching tubes, cannot be placed in command of a divisional officer on the battery deck, otherwise fully occupied by his duties in charge of the battery.
The proposed abolition of the powder division I consider a very wise measure; but the reasons and advantages of the change are not fully specified, though a little reflection will satisfy almost everybody of the necessity of having the ammunition supply of the guns under the control of the gun divisional officers.
Some other features of our organization are not referred to in the essay, such as fire quarters. Only a few changes in the details will be necessary for the latest types of war ships. The present practice is therefore sufficient. There is, however, nothing said about the necessity, arising out of the great speed of a modern war ship, for having an organized detail for "Collision Quarters." The most prolific cause of disaster is undoubtedly what may be classified under collisions, including all accidents, such as grounding, colliding with other vessels, and shipwreck. The liability to collisions is much greater than hitherto, because of the great speed by which only a few moments intervene during which ships meeting are in sight of each other. Collision quarters should be prescribed in our organization similar to the organization of fire quarters. This should be of such a character that every possible emergency may be thoroughly provided for.
The essay contains many valuable suggestions concerning the changes in the drills, and some features will not be accepted immediately. The necessity for more thorough and more elaborate aiming drills is very ably discussed, but I think it should have gone further, to include annual prize firing throughout the Navy. Substantial money prizes should be awarded for superiority in the contest, provided a certain standard be attained. This should be minutely prescribed by the Navy Department, and be uniform throughout the service. Some special, distinctive mark, as flying a peculiar dogvane at the main, may be authorized for the ship which wins the annual prize. The methods in vogue in the English Navy may be adopted with a few modifications.
I regret that there is so little said about torpedo warfare. This is now recognized as a most important factor, and there should be constant drill with fish torpedoes and submarine mines. Every ship should carry a complete system of submarine mines, with cables, etc., so that it would be possible for her to protect a harbor of refuge. There should be drills in laying out the system of mines, and drills for attacking them. Without this practice the mere announcement that a place is defended by torpedoes will, perhaps, deter an attack which political reasons may demand as absolutely necessary. There is no definite plan proposed for defending ships against torpedo attack. The torpedo net is now recognized as the most effective means invented, and our ships should be supplied with it and their crews exercised in handling the net. I agree with most of the ideas suggested in this essay, but there should be a more thorough organization of the enlisted personnel, and provision for the drills I have enumerated, in addition to those advocated by the prize essayist.
Ensign W. L. Rodgers.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—As I have written an essay on this subject which is to be published, I feel at liberty to criticize the admirable one now under discussion without making any suggestions. The author very early says that "the services of the Marine Corps as a police force are invaluable and justify its continuance in spite of the want of adaptability of its system of training to nautical conditions." I prefer to invert and reverse the sentence, and would say that the want of adaptability of the Marine Corps system of training to nautical conditions justifies its discontinuance in spite of its valuable services as a police force. I have not the slightest wish to belittle the past great services of the Marine Corps, but the subject under discussion is the attainment of the maximum efficiency of our modern ships, and the question is whether men reach their greatest "all-around" usefulness and fighting efficiency for naval warfare when trained and organized as marines or as blue-jackets. For myself, I think that at the present time in our service the marines are better drilled, more reliable, and more efficient in their line than are our blue-jackets; but we will all acknowledge that a thoroughly good seaman well instructed in all his duties is a more useful man for general naval service than is an equally good marine. The blue-jackets at the recent encampments have proved reliable as police, and it is probably only necessary to trust them in order to find them trustworthy. As regards the special duties of landing parties, the marines are a small minority of the total force, and certainly we must admit that the French, who have no marines on shipboard, did not seem to feel their absence at the brilliant capture of Sfax. I would, therefore, conclude that as soon as we have a good body of blue-jackets the marines will be no longer called for.
The next point to consider is the organization as proposed for the Atlanta. In the first place the author proposes to do away with the powder division, alleging that the commanding officer cannot control its detached squads in time of action, and charging the well-known inefficiency of the powder division to this cause. It seems to me that the powder division is comparatively inefficient only because the executive is content to have it so. The author says that the officer of the powder division must be ubiquitous to ensure efficiency; but he seems to confuse the nature of his duties with those of the lieutenants of the gun divisions. The latter have to make their initiative felt at every moment of the battle; the former has merely to establish at his leisure a system which shall work mechanically in action, and this does not call for ubiquity. The confusion that would arise from each division procuring its own ammunition must be very great, and I cannot see the weight of the arguments urged in its favor. The next point is that divisions should be of equal force and efficiency. It seems rather that equal force would cause unequal efficiency, for if we compare the first and second divisions of the Atlanta as proposed by the author, we find (neglecting the rapid-firing guns) that a round weighing 525 pounds is provided by nine men of the first division, while thirteen men of the second division provide a round weighing 300 pounds. If we consider the rapid-firing guns, the disparity in the service of the heavy guns is still further increased. The author then sketches out an organization for the Atlanta for a complement of two hundred and thirty men. It will be admitted that this is a sufficient complement, though not large. He sets aside fifty men for first-class petty officers, a small marine guard and a strong engineer's force. In the British Navy the horse-power per man of the engineer's force varies from sixty to one hundred and twenty, but for ships of the type of the Atlanta it is fairly constant and may be regarded as about eighty-five. This allows forty-one men for the Atlanta's engineer force, and adding four men that we may have a strong force, we have five men left for the first-class petty officers and the small marine guard. The remaining one hundred and eighty men are divided into four gun divisions, each forty-five strong, and the author states that the natural arrangement would be to put three of them to man the primary battery, leaving the fourth for the rapid-firing guns on the upper deck and in the tops, to assist in navigation and to act as small-arm men. When the Chilian ironclads captured the Huascar they had twelve men in each top. If we adopt this arrangement for the Atlanta and put two men at each Hotchkiss gun—one to load and one to fire—we will have five men left to supply ammunition to the Hotchkiss battery, to assist in navigation and act as small arm men on deck.
But instead of the arrangement which he says is natural, the author adopts something else. He puts an eight-inch gun mounted en barbette on the main deck, a six-inch gun under the superstructure and two Hotchkiss on the superstructure, all in one division. The development of the use of voice-tubes and telegraphs advocated by the author must be carried very far to ensure to the lieutenant his control of such a division. What becomes of the fourth division in this organization is not apparent: either it mans the other two broadside guns, when there is no one left for the tops and deck work, or, as this seems contradicted by the context, it goes on deck as a division of riflemen, when it violates the principle of reliefs for each crew, and seems superfluous, as the reliefs of two divisions are already available as riflemen. But by a hasty examination of the probable distribution of the Atlanta's crew of two hundred and thirty men, I think that we may arrive at an important conclusion regarding the engineer's force. As I have already said, there will be about forty-five men in the engineer's force. The structural arrangement of the ship is such that at least forty-five will be required for providing ammunition: in a word, for the powder division. There will probably be twenty-five marines. This makes one hundred and fifteen men. If we place five men in each top and allow for five carpenters in the wing passages, and five first-class petty officers, ten men for general service about the decks, signal men, baymen, etc., and three men for each of the eight Hotchkiss guns, or say twenty-five men, we shall have a total of one hundred and seventy men, leaving sixty men for manning the eight guns of the primary battery. It will be generally admitted that a ship should be able to detach half her force and still remain fairly efficient. Let us see how we can make up a landing force of even one hundred men. I will assume that thirty men can handle the primary battery upon emergency. We thus have thirty men to land. The powder division is already none too large, but let us take ten from it. The marines (twenty-five) will all go. One of the Hotchkiss guns on a field carriage with its crew may be able to make up twenty men from those in the tops and about the decks on general duty. We cannot take any one from the secondary battery, for they have none to spare. We thus have a total of eighty-five men. As the engineer's force is the one whose services are least likely to be urgently needed when a detached expedition is called for, the conclusion seems inevitable that it must be thoroughly trained as a combatant force and send a large contingent to the naval brigade.
Watch drills, I believe, have long been discussed in the service, and it seems strange that they have never been adopted, although they have all the advantages enumerated by the author.
As gymnastics seems to be the only object of the proposed exercise of squaring yards, it is worthy of consideration whether it would not be better to form a column of fours and double time around the deck for fifteen minutes every morning.
The use of single-sticks as an exercise is condemned by the author because it develops no interest or instinct among seamen. There are two excellent reasons for this: no masks are furnished and officers take no interest in the exercise. If these matters were remedied, it seems as if great benefit would follow from single-stick drill.
In regard to what the author says of the present method of standing watch, it is probable that the great majority of officers will agree. Officers should stand days' duty without regular watches when in port, for it is impossible for them to be thoroughly efficient and take a proper interest in drills and studies when they are compelled to spend on deck a large part of every night absolutely without object, except concession to custom. That the present method is really unnecessary is shown by the custom of other services, and by the fact that commanding officers, who alone are opposed to change in this respect, make it a general rule not to come on deck during the night, although they must be aware that officers are not strict about walking the deck, and thereby, as it is claimed, endanger the safety of the ships.
Mr. Beehler wishes to keep petty officers in the service, and hopes to do so by entering their names in the Navy Register. There must be given some more substantial reason than that. The English system has given excellent results, retaining a good class of petty officers, and as this gives a tried system ready for use, we might adopt that without seeking further.
In regard to what the author says regarding the closer association of officers with their divisions I think almost all will agree; and in this connection I would like to suggest the advisability of making the quarter and other fighting bills more flexible by committing more authority to divisional officers. At the present-time it is usual to have a most rigid connection between the different bills, and a man's gun and number at the gun, his boat and company, are absolutely determined by his watch number, producing results frequently unfavorable to fighting efficiency.
It seems as if fighting efficiency would be increased and executive officers would be relieved of much work by making the quarter bill the basis of organization, so that officers would always command the same men in any of the fighting organizations; and then the complete control of the internal organization of the division should be turned over to its commander, who should station his men at the guns and make the detail and organization of his company subject only to the Ordnance Instructions and such general rules as the executive officer lays down.
Commander Winfield S. Schley.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I would like to make a few remarks upon the subjects treated in this essay, but I will premise them by the statement that the essay presents itself to my mind as an extremely aggressive argument, though I endorse it as a whole, because I feel that it is absolutely necessary that assaults of this nature should be made upon that conservatism of our service that tends rather to retard what under modern development may not inappropriately be termed the new or higher seamanship.
There are some of the author's statements with which I cannot agree, particularly those in which he attacks the present training service and states that it has failed to produce continuous-service men, and therefore the system is a failure. If the essayist had known more of this matter under discussion, I question if he would have committed himself to such a remarkable utterance.
At the outset I ought to say that the training system of our Navy differs radically from that of the British. In England a large proportion of the population are seamen, and the main object of their training system is to secure a class of trained petty officers, while with us the decadence of our merchant marine has made it necessary to train our boys first to be seamen and subsequently to be petty officers. It must be seen, then, that the training process is necessarily longer, and much more time will be necessary before the absolute result can have been determined. When I state that present results to the service at large justify the statement that nearly 15 per cent, of the service comes from the training system, it hardly bears out the statement of the essayist that the system has failed; and when we remember that a fair proportion of the crews are composed of apprentices under training, the per cent, is apparently increased.
But a much better and broader view of this system would not ignore the great benefit and advantage which must directly accrue to the community at large. Though many of these boys may leave us at the expiration of their apprenticeship to improve themselves financially, there can be no doubt that in the event of war many of them would find their way back again. Are not the masses from which these boys come impressed by the example of those who return in better condition than when they left their homes? Can a system be said to have failed which returns boys to a community disciplined and self-supporting? Does not the country directly benefit by having large numbers of boys already trained to the requirements of her defense whenever the time shall come for their need?
I think we can fairly trust that these trained boys will have patriotism enough to return to the Navy whenever the emergency may require them. If they do not, they will be very unlike most Americans.
Touching the matter of organization, I think that any one of our profession who has reflectively witnessed the wonderful advance of the last few years in constructing, in defending, and in protecting the modern war ship, must have observed that old types were giving way to new machines, and that new methods and newer instruments of all kinds were superseding the older; all of these changes mean that there are to be changes of organization, of training, and of preparation of the personnel, to adapt them to use on board the new type of war ships. All these things are just as certain as that the electric light has succeeded the tallow candle, and that a new education was necessary for the management of the former.
The fact that machine guns are so largely a part of modern armament indicates very clearly that the loss of life in future naval combats is to be infinitely greater than ever before, and this alone would appear to emphasize the necessity of obliterating all distinctions of corps as now organized. I think that every officer, except the surgeon, should receive such military education as will fit him to succeed to command.
A general order has just been issued by the Honorable Secretary of the Navy looking to the reduction in the non-combatant element on board our ships, which under old traditions had grown to 46 per cent, of the force on board such a ship as the Chicago. By this order all men belonging to the "artificer" and "special class" are required to be drilled in the use of great guns, machine guns, small-arms, and all other implements of attack or defense. This order reverses old organization, and is but the beginning of a new system under which the Navy will be improved when it shall have had full effect.
What would be the effect of an attempt to justify the defeat of a national vessel by the statement that 46 per cent, of her men were entrained to her defense? Who could withstand the vengeance of the people if a ship still capable of resistance had been forced to surrender with nearly half of her personnel uninjured, but untrained to warlike uses, or unskilled in the higher seamanship of maneuvering or defending her?
It is these facts which ought to suggest change of adherence to or adoration for our effete organizations, and for one I accept the essayist's suggestions as a move in the right direction.
There is something to be said for the old drills, when it is remembered that their purpose was twofold: First, as a means to discipline and order in holding the ship's company under quiet control for two or three hours each day; and second, as a means to secure uniformity and efficiency in working together simultaneously in performing evolutions with spars and sails that emergencies at sea often require done quickly and together. If "gilguys" are used to secure quickness rather than security, the fault lies more with the commanding officer who permits such makeshifts than with the system of drilling. My own experience in the various ships in which I have served as executive or commanding officer was to forbid such things. I always felt that the purpose of the ship's exercise was to secure the highest proficiency, and without the use of any "gilguys" it was accomplished to a remarkable degree. I always felt that nothing was well done unless completely and thoroughly done.
The essay is exceedingly discursive, so that in one reading it is impossible to take it all in; but my own thoughts for a number of years have tended precisely in the same general direction, until I was beginning to feel that I might be to some extent a "crank" in this matter. I believe in the march of progress now going on ; that masts, except military kinds, and sails must disappear; they must go; and the plea of many that we are to be professionally injured when they do disappear, I do not believe to be tenable. In a great degree they have disappeared from the merchant service, and I am sure we find that service more efficient to-day and the carrying trade quite as well taken care of as in former days. I had the pleasure, last summer, of making a sea-trip in a fine steamer the mate of which had never served in a square rigger, and a finer sailor, with more nerve or fuller of expedients, I never met.
Let me compare the qualities needed by officers who have to drive their own vessels in a fog on to the coast eighteen knots an hour to make time with those under similar circumstances approaching in a sailing vessel at five or six. The judgment and nerve of the former are not comparable to those required in the latter. The former demands training to the men and higher seamanship, and without this skill the newer war vessels would be of no use.
The essayist refers to continuous-service men of the Navy, and allusion has been made to-night to the advantages of five years over three as the period of enlistment. I would state that there are to-day 7200 men afloat, and of this number there are about 3000 continuous-service men, and this appears rather a good showing. The period of five-year enlistments is a matter about which there has been considerable discussion. No doubt the custom of enlisting for three years grew from the fact that all the laws referring to re-enlistments have a three-year condition as necessary to secure the gratuities of pay. It is a question whether men would not be cut off from the three months' pay now accruing to those who re-enlist within three months after discharge, if the period were increased to five years with the law stating three as the necessary condition. It is at least certain that the law must be changed, and this you must all know is not an easy affair. I have made a number of suggestions to the committees all looking to the betterment of the condition of our men, but up to this time we have not succeeded in securing what appears to me so necessary. If any one present feels that the task is easy, I cordially invite his assistance. At all events, I understand now for the first time in my life how to reply to that constant inquiry in the service, "Why don't they do so-and-so?"
The essay as a whole is an exceedingly instructive paper. Though faulty in some particulars and epigrammatic in others, yet it indicates to my mind that there are others who think and believe as I do about the changes that are surely in sight for the new Navy and its organization. I can even see, in the new necessities that are to come with the new ships, that there will be changes in the names of such personages as captain of top, captain of afterguard, quarter gunners, and the like. These distinctions of title will be swept away, to give place to others that will better express the duties that men are to perform. This may seem extreme, but if we look backward for twenty years to the monitor days, there must come the conclusion that if we had continued to develop that class of ships, we would have long since substituted names and distinctions for the men who served them that would have expressed their duties, rather than have continued distinctions of title which belong rather to the traditions of the days of Trafalgar and the Nile.
Assistant Naval Constructor Bowles.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—A greater familiarity with the arrangements of the Atlanta would have considerably changed the criticisms of some on the prize essay, expressed here this evening; and while I will not detain you with a description of the battery arrangements, still I would point out that six of the eight machine guns of the Atlanta are operated from within the superstructure. Those on the upper deck are not provided with fixed mounts. In fact, the battery is so arranged that the scheme of the essayist as to battery divisions appears practicable. It should not pass unnoticed also that the Atlanta is provided with an elaborate and complete system of speaking tubes arranged with special reference to the command of the battery and the supply of ammunition in action.
The Chairman.—I think the essayist has every reason to be gratified at the manner in which his essay has been received; for it has attracted a great deal of attention. I wish now to submit a few remarks of my own, which will come in as a general review of the subject.
If the question that was propounded to the Institute had for its object the production of a definite system for "changes in organization and drill necessary to sail and fight effectively our war ships of latest type," I think the question was premature; if, however, it was intended as a note of preparation to put the Navy on the alert, and to direct the naval mind to prepare itself for what is coming by inquiry, it is very well, and our essayist has well performed his task. We are not sufficiently familiar with the ships to conclude definitely on changes in organization; we are not sufficiently familiar with the guns, carriages and implements to determine on changes in drill, or the number of men, even, needed to manipulate the batteries. We are dealing with unknown quantities, and we can lay down no rules until practice may develop the necessities. It is right, however, that the naval mind should be exercised on this matter in advance, and the result of the propounding of this question is most satisfactory in showing that the subject has the attention of many of our most thoughtful minds. The proof of this is shown in the number of essays submitted in response to the question—seven in all—a number, I think, larger than for some years preceding.
Not being in a position to lay down definite rules, our essayist has most liberally supplied us with suggestions apt for consideration when the time to apply them shall arrive, and there is an admirable thoroughness apparent in the manner in which he treats them. He certainly has proved himself guilty of the crime of earnestness, and has not hesitated to pose as a target for the shafts of criticism. He is right: this is a time of transition in the Navy, and old customs and traditions do not now obscure the merit of new ideas. Innovations are not necessarily condemned because they derange established routine; the spirit of progress permits a hearing to all. Some may be roughly handled in the clash of ideas, but the intelligent manner in which advances are made must lead us to the belief that sound judgment will control our decisions on all questions of change.
I think the reference made by Lieutenant Calkins to the necessity of increasing the complement of men for our new ships is worthy of consideration. It is very timely, too, and will apply to the old ships as well. All executive officers have of late years been at their wits' end to provide men for the performance of various duties, and this scarcity of men has led to a practice which Lieutenant Calkins objects to, and I agree with him, of calling all hands on every occasion of performance of any, even the most trifling, evolution. I endorse fully the suggestion to work by watches as much as the force will make it practicable. The number of the crew is needed to be increased at this time, even in our old ships, if only for working the secondary batteries that must be increased.
The idea of enlisting young men of native birth to the age of twenty-five years, irrespective of their knowledge of seamanship, allowing them to form a large proportion of the crew, is not new, and it is one that I have approved. To change the title of these men from landsman to volunteer or seaman cadet, or any other more appropriate, is, I think, a good idea. They should be on trial, as it were, for a short term, on duty in the North Atlantic Squadron, subject to discharge at any time if found undesirable, retained on good behavior, and encouraged by rewards if proving suitable and efficient. Our service is un-Americanized by only enlisting seamen. In spite of the higher pay and increased comforts, we do not now secure American sailors for the Navy, and the number of apprentices who re-enlist in the Navy is sadly small (the Brooklyn, lately gone into commission, had only six of them in her crew). The trial has not yet been made of shipping young men of twenty-five in large numbers, irrespective of their sea experience, for short terms, during which they can decide whether they will persevere in the profession or not. The knowledge that they were not bound for a long period would impose contentment even on those who concluded not to continue in the service. Although I am strongly in favor of a seafaring man learning his first lessons in a purely sailing vessel, and had hoped that the training service for boys would supply such for the Navy, I am forced to admit that the results do not meet my expectations. The young men of twenty-five years of age would commence their instruction in ships where sails, ropes and spars occupy a secondary position; but their age and intelligence may compensate for what is wanting in primary instruction.
The subject of competition is well presented in the essay. It must be delayed until details are mastered, and it should not be reserved for ship against ship. It should be more encouraged in every ship. Working by watches will encourage it as watch against watch, and the different parts of the ship should compete with one another. The stringent application of this practice would logically lead to the abandonment of simultaneous crossing of royal yards and such-like evolutions, which are cited as illustrations of adherence to practices which militate against progress. It probably would need but the first plunge to reconcile us to such changes. The idea has been suggested before, but it stands a better chance now for the test of experiment. The adoption of such practices will show that the object of the exercise is achievement, not display. It would be in the same line of independence which we have assumed in the rig of some of our new ships, where we have asserted our preference for utility at the expense of conventional, seamanlike appearance. It may be that the time may come when the writer of the essay may be gratified even by having the "ceremonial of colors" divorced from "practical exercises in seamanship." The exercise that he proposes of four special rigs for harbor, sailing, steaming, and fighting is a useful addition to seamanship drills.
In relation to matters pertaining to action, whether with the battery, the company and battalion, or boat expeditions, the object of the essayist is to have the "division" as the basis of the organization. This effort is in the right direction. I think we will all agree to this: it is the decided tendency of the mind of the service. To apply this to battery drill, it is proposed to abolish the powder division as a separate organization, and to appoint men in each gun division to pass ammunition to their own guns. The assignment of men to a gun division is, of course, greater than is required to work the guns alone.
The division of force is made by setting off a certain number of men—petty officers, engineer's force, etc., as already assigned—and then arbitrarily dividing the remainder of the crew into equal divisions. Supposing the battery to be of such a character as to admit of this, the duties assigned to the navigator's division must also be made to provide the same number of men with occupation in action. I suppose this would be practicable by giving them some of the guns of the secondary battery.
Each division must be made up of similar material ; petty officers, mechanics, cooks, and servants must be represented in each. This is specially the object to accommodate expeditions from the ship, that each company may find itself equipped for all parts of detached service. In serving the guns we shall find then the same class of men as now assigned to the duty of passing ammunition. They will be under the command of the officer commanding the division; this officer thus controls everything relating to his battery, including the supplies from the magazine and shell rooms. I think there is a good element in this proposition. The gun division is no longer dependent on another division controlled by separate authority: the officer of the gun division has in his own hands the direction of every detail, and his responsibility is made more distinct. As a division officer I think I would like it: I would like to see the experiment tried. I recognize that there are men filling some stations who would not be attached to any division, as the gunner's mates in the magazines, the quarter gunners at the shell rooms and armory, etc.; but this is a matter of detail that would be adjusted. It is the "runners" and shell passers who would have a distinct interest to subserve, each working for his own division, and competition would be introduced in a quarter where it has hitherto been unknown. These men would be exercised with their own gun division, and each one would become familiar with the character of the ammunition and the place where it is stowed—information which, under our present system, is limited to a very few men in the powder division, to whom the runners and shell passers look for guidance and direction. Breaking up this force of idlers into smaller bodies, separately instructed, will widen the scope of useful knowledge on matters relating to fighting needs, resulting in a more complete absorption of this force into the fighting organization of the ship. There can be no doubt that such training as these men will receive, under the proposed system, will make them more efficient as a reserved force when left on board to defend the ship during the absence in boats of a large contingent on distant expeditions. Their enforced familiarity with the gun division will fit them for doing good service with the battery.
I have said enough to show that I have been interested in the essay, and I do not know of any of the radical changes proposed that I would not be willing to subject to experiment, which, after all, must determine what our future organization is to be. I repeat that we are not yet familiar enough with our new ships and guns to lay down fixed rules for our future practice; the changes must grow with our experience. It is enough that thought is at work in this direction, and suggestions are in order. Our essayist has given much thought to the subject, and his suggestions are not only worthy of consideration, but many of them will, without doubt, be acted on. I think his paper is a valuable contribution to the literature of the Institute and to progress in the Navy.
NEWPORT BRANCH,
May 7, 1886.
Commander W.T. Sampson, U.S.N., in the Chair.
Captain A. R. Yates.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—There are some points I should like to mention regarding the retention of trained seamen in the Navy which are, I believe, of sufficient importance to be carefully considered in connection with the essay.
By reference to the new pay-table, it will be seen that the first-class petty officers of the seaman class receive about 50 per cent, less pay than those of the special and artificer classes, although but one of each rate of the former class is allowed to any vessel, and there are of the latter classes sometimes two and more: as yeomen, ship's writers, schoolmasters of the special class, and machinists of the artificer class. No one can justly deny that the apprenticeship necessary to make a competent chief boatswain's mate, chief quartermaster, or chief gunner's mate is fully as long and difficult as that to make a machinist, and the qualities to be possessed by the former are rare and valuable. Further, these petty officers represent the seaman class, a calling essentially naval and seafaring, and the knowledge necessary to perform these requisite duties is obtained but at sea and in the Navy.
It is not surprising, with this fact of less pay, and consequently, in his opinion, less appreciation of the seaman class in the country before him, that the naval apprentice on completing his apprenticeship seeks a livelihood in other callings where more pay and greater comforts are obtained. He feels that he has been trained five or six years for a calling that can be followed but at sea and in the Navy, and the compensation he receives for this special knowledge is less than that received by those having a calling that can be followed afloat and ashore, and for which less preparation and knowledge is needed. While the pay of the special and artificer classes is not considered too much, it appears but just that that of the first-class petty officers of the seaman class, of whom there are but three in any ship, should be equal to it, and the pay of the other petty officers of this class, and the seamen themselves, should be more justly equalized with that of the other classes. It will not do to delay increasing the pay until there are competent men for these positions: inducements must be offered to make the apprentices render themselves proficient for these duties.
In this connection I would speak of the comforts of the enlisted men on board our war vessels. Wherein have they changed during the past fifty years? On the berth deck there are the traditional mess chest and jackstay. If men are allowed ditty boxes, or if their storm clothes and pea jackets are stowed elsewhere than surreptitiously in nettings and forbidden places where they can be obtained without permission from the officer of the deck, it is owing to the consideration of the commanding or executive officer, and not to any regulation or provision made by the service or by the naval constructors, who, having never been to sea in a war vessel, are necessarily ignorant of many of the essential requirements for the comforts of the men. In fact, the encroachments of the officers' quarters, store-rooms, electrical plant, and ventilating apparatus, have left the hammock swinger barely the old regulation space of 14 inches—the same distance between hooks that was allowed in the old sailing ships when but one watch of hammocks was down at a time.
The essayist is correct in saying that thus far the numerical results of the present training system are not satisfactory. But it is believed that it is not so much the fault of the system as it is in the treatment the apprentice receives after he leaves the training ships, and the consequent poor encouragements offered him to remain in the service. In a country where the working classes are so generally well and comfortably housed, it is strange that in its naval vessels the seamen have fewer comforts and conveniences than in those of the great European powers. It is to be hoped that in our new cruisers reasonable accommodations will be afforded the crew—not simply those in which they can exist, but those in which they can do so comfortably. Until this is done, no training system will be successful, for it will fail to retain the able seamen requisite for the efficient manning of the modern man-of-war.
Commander T. F. Jewell.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen—While approving in the main the recommendations of the essay, I am compelled to differ with the writer on several points. In the first place, I deprecate any interference with the training system. That system is now, after many years of effort, an organized system, and though the results are not as yet so satisfactory as we might wish for, I am certain that any curtailment would be a step backwards. The difficulty of obtaining efficient men in the service is not so much in the training system as in the retaining of the men after they have served their apprenticeship. As a matter of fact, the men so trained find that their training has qualified them for positions outside of the service more profitable than any they could hope to attain in the service. May not the real trouble be found by a comparison of the rates of pay of the several classes of enlisted men as given in the pay-table? By all means let us add to the number of efficient men in the service by enlisting and training young men in cruising ships, if it can be done; but does not experience tell us that this method will not give us the men we want? And I think you will agree with me that the man who is first of all a good, smart seaman is a handy man to have around for almost any kind of work.
I do not agree with the essayist in his suggestion that the numerical strength of the several divisions should be equal. As many men should be assigned to each division as are required to perform the duties of that division, and no more. The idea of the essayist seems to be that there should be the same close relationship between the men composing the division and the division officer as subsists between a captain and his company in the Army. I agree that a more direct and personal supervision of the men of the division by the division officers than now obtains as a rule, would be desirable; but that the number of men constituting a division should be determined by the desirability of giving each division officer a comfortable infantry company, I deny. Nor would I abolish the powder division as at present constituted. The present organization of the powder division makes available at general quarters and in action a large number of men who would not be available for service at the guns. To turn over the duties of this division to squads detailed from the gun divisions, away from the personal supervision of their division officers, would, in my opinion, be unwise. Let me add that a well-organized and thoroughly drilled powder division is not absolutely unknown in the service.
I am glad to see that the essayist lays so much stress on the necessity of better instruction in pointing and firing. It has always seemed to me that our practice in this respect was superficial and ineffective. Some method should be devised by which aiming and firing may be taught so that the instructor would be able to determine whether his men were profiting by the instruction. I confess that I have never been able to satisfy myself on this point. A good shot at a target—as target practice is usually conducted—is as likely to be an accident as to be the result of proper instruction.
There is one point with regard to reorganization that I should have been glad to see touched upon in the essay. This is the era in which the armament of a vessel of war is of the most complex character, and in which expert knowledge is of the utmost importance. The high-powered ordnance, machine guns, auto-mobile torpedoes, dynamo-machines, electric-light circuits, both for search lights and for interior lighting, the care and use of gun-cotton and other high explosives, to say nothing of the application of electricity to the training, pointing, and firing of guns, will demand the services of a class of officers with much more advanced attainments than are possessed by a majority of the officers of the service at present. As it is now, it is usually a disadvantage to an officer to know much outside the most ordinary routine of his profession, for if he is found to be proficient in any other class of work, he has not only the routine work to do, but the other work as well. I should like to see attached to every vessel an ordnance officer whose principal duty should be the supervision and care of the armament of the vessel, but who might command a torpedo division, or give instruction in torpedo service to men detailed from other divisions, and who should be relieved front standing watch and from duty with gun divisions. If such a position is created, it should be filled only by officers who have the proper qualifications; who have pursued a course of instruction in the Ordnance Shops at Washington, at the Proving Ground, and at the Torpedo Station.
The incentive to preparation for these duties would be the honor and distinction attached to the office. Mere lineal rank should not interfere with the assignment of officers to this duty, except that it should be confined to the grades below lieutenant-commander. The navigator, who is now the ordnance officer, if he properly performs the duties assigned to him as navigator, is already overburdened with work, and his rank alone is not a sufficient qualification for the position of ordnance officer.
The Chairman.—The author in his introduction very properly attributes the promise of improvement in the character of our ships to the work of the successive advisory boards. To whomever may be due the idea of the Naval Advisory Board, to him we owe a debt of gratitude. The old plan of leaving the designs and interior arrangements of our ships to the Bureau of Construction resulted in constantly reproducing the same type of vessel, and doubtless would continue to furnish equally unsatisfactory results. Improvements would be adopted only after they had been elsewhere long in use, and even after they had been superseded by greater improvements, thus leaving us always a long way to the rear in the march of improvement.
Even if our constructing and engineering departments were always managed by men the most able in their profession, still it would be too much to expect them to keep pace with the changes in the many branches of science and in the art of naval warfare which are absolutely necessary to the proper designing of war ships. There is probably to-day no product of the hand of man which embodies the application of more scientific and mechanical principles than a modern man-of-war. There is no more complicated machine, nor one which demands so much skill for its proper control and use.
This vastly increased complexity alone is sufficient reason why the constructor and engineer should, in designing new ships, call in the aid of those who must decide upon the armament and command the ship when she is completed. It is needless to say that, to command properly such a complicated machine, her construction and capabilities must be thoroughly understood, so that a double advantage is secured by associating the constructor, engineer, and military officer in producing the designs of our ships. We get, in the first place, more efficient ships, and those who are to command them acquire a knowledge of their capabilities of offense and defense which could not be so well acquired in any other way. From my limited experience in such matters, I am of opinion that in future our ships, and even our torpedo boats, should be designed by such a mixed board.
As a matter of naval policy, it would be, I think, a great advantage to the service, particularly at this time, when we are building up a new Navy from the beginning, if the Navy Department would prepare plans and specifications in anticipation of appropriations. Before Congress can make an appropriation with any degree of confidence, it must have the opinions of naval experts, or those who consider themselves such, as to the needs of the naval service in regard to ships. If an opinion is not forthcoming from the proper authority, there are always plenty of people in and out of the service who have their pet ideas of what a ship ought to be too often one-sided—which are likely to be the basis for an appropriation for building ships. If, however, the Navy Department would submit the whole question of the increase of the Navy to a properly constituted board, and have designs prepared, so that when Congress is inclined to make an appropriation, perfectly definite information can be submitted for its guidance, such a course would create in the Congressional mind such a degree of confidence in the administration of naval affairs as, I venture to say, has never existed in this matter. To keep pace with the developments of naval science in other countries; to be prepared to take advantage of all progress made by them; to be ready to present to Congress, whenever it requires them or can be induced to increase the naval establishment, such plans as would, at the time, embrace the latest and most improved designs—all this would furnish continuous occupation for an advisory board.
Concerning the complement of a ship, I venture to suggest that the number of men and officers required to develop the full fighting capacity of the vessel should decide the question. A vessel of given displacement can mount a certain battery the character of which is determined according to some theory as to her future duties. If she is a cruiser, she would not be expected to contend with armored ships or forts; consequently the calibre of her guns should not be great. If she is to be a ram, she should have the heaviest practicable fire directly ahead, etc. Now, whatever may be the character or design of her armament, the crew assigned to her should be capable of developing her maximum power of offense and defense. Any increase beyond this point must detract from her efficiency, because it must increase the weights, besides increasing the chance of casualties among the crew. The complement thus determined may or may not occupy all the berthing space in the ship. The same general rule should determine the number of officers. In this connection, it may be stated that for equal weights of armament the modern man-of-war requires a greater number of officers than vessels of older types, because the guns and their attachments are much more complicated than formerly. Each gun requires the close supervision of an officer, or, what comes to the same thing, the supervision of some man who thoroughly understands the use of the arm. When to this is added the complicated mechanism of torpedoes and search lights, and when we give proper weight to the fact that the movements of a modern man-of-war in action will be executed with the greatest celerity, it becomes evident that each part, combination of parts, and the whole ship must be supervised in the most rigid manner. For the same reasons, the education of our seamen must be vastly superior in some directions to what was required when sailing vessels and smooth-bores were the fighting tools. To go a little more into detail, it will be necessary to have an officer on board of each modern ship who shall be qualified to care for the batteries and torpedo outfits of the ship. He may be called the ordnance officer or the torpedo officer, but he should be appointed to the position because of his acquaintance with those weapons, and he should be responsible for the proper condition of them at all times. He should not have to stand a watch except at sea. These duties have heretofore been performed by the gunner under the general supervision of the navigator. This must be changed in our new ships if we wish to secure the maximum efficiency. The duty must have the exclusive attention of a trained officer.
We may say, then, in general terms, that the progress in naval architecture and high-power guns, with the greatly increased number of labor-saving devices applied in all parts of the ship, demands an increase in the number of officers, and a probable decrease in the number of men as compared with the same weight of battery of smooth-bores. When we have adopted some general scheme of this sort to determine the complement of the ship, all other duties to be performed must subordinate themselves to it. The engineer's force should be ample, and I am decidedly of the opinion that they should be instructed in their important duties; especially is such instruction necessary in the case of the firemen. We should not be annoyed by such variations in the speed of our ships under steam as are constantly occasioned by changing from one watch of firemen to another. The nicer adjustment of the capacity of boilers to the engines, and the use of forced draught, demand greater skill and care on the part of the firemen.
NORFOLK BRANCH.
May 26, 1886.
Captain Geo. Brown, U.S.N., in the Chair.
The Secretary having read the essay, it was decided to discuss that part relating to the Marine Corps first.
Major James Forney, U.S.M.C.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen—I think that the best way to reorganize the marines would be to give them regimental formations, provided that the present strength of the Marine Corps, which is now only 2000 enlisted men, could be increased. Also, that three large depots should be established at Mare Island, Philadelphia, and Norfolk, where at least 500 men should be stationed, commanded by the requisite number of field and company officers. A summer camp of the same number of men would also be of great advantage.
The essay mentioned that the marines are not armed with the best rifles. I would state that they all have new rifles, calibre 45, No. of 1884. It has been demonstrated that officers are better adapted to command the guards of ships than non-commissioned officers. The paragraph in regard to there being only two officers in a squadron, and these should be graduates from Annapolis, is hardly feasible; for what use are the other officers to be put to? Besides, many of the civil appointments are equally as well educated, and as efficient officers as the graduates. Many of the generals of the Army are from civil life. The marine officers should be graduates from West Point rather than from Annapolis.
In connection with the marines working the guns on board ship, it has been the general custom for them to do so. I myself commanded a division of guns on the Brooklyn, Hartford, and Pensacola. I consider that it would be very injurious for the marine to lose esprit du corps as a soldier, and to make him more of a sailor than he really is now; for in the ordinary duties of a ship they pull and haul on the ropes and keep the regular watch; they protect public property, and all prisoners of war, that at times outnumber the crew; while ashore they guard and protect the navy yards, with their immense amount of public property, and are always ready for emergencies in adjunct cities, and frequently mobs in New York, Maryland, and other States have been quelled by the marines from the navy yards.
Lieutenant R. M. G. Brown.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I cannot agree with the essayist in regard to reducing the guards of our vessels of war. I would favor larger marine guards, and would have them drill at the great-guns and all rapid-firing guns. They should of course have the best magazine small-arms, and be our main dependence for landing expeditions. By having large guards, the ships of our important squadrons would be able to land 500 men—sufficient for all ordinary purposes. Another advantage of large guards, is that it would utilize the 2000 men in the Marine Corps, and allow of smaller complements of seamen. We would thus be enabled to keep more ships in commission; and what the Navy needs at present is more ships in commission.
First Lieutenant L. W. T. Waller, U.S.M.C.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I think the marines should be placed in charge of the machine guns on board of ships; and, if necessary to instruct them at the other guns, that they be drilled under the marine officers. In landing, the marines could act as infantry, and as light artillery with Gatling and 3-inch breech-loading rifles. A central depot should be established. Details should be made from time to time for guarding navy yards. The depot should be made a school of instruction for officers and men; the use and care of rapid-firing, light and heavy guns, submarine mines, etc., to be a part of the instructions. Men should enlist for five years, and have regimental formation, and should be sent to sea under their own officers. The American marines are as capable as the English, and the system of marine artillery works well in that service. The corps should be increased by 500 additional men.
Commander P. H. Cooper Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I do not infer from my reading of the essay that the author intends to criticize the efficiency and value of the marines. His idea looks towards the manning of our future ships with a homogeneous body of men, if possible. Special training being needed for the secondary batteries, and there being no place on board ship for any but a force that will fight the ship, no room for a body trained especially as the nucleus of a landing party, it seems to me that the essayist on this ground minimizes the marine guards.
Granted, however, that the marines can receive preliminary drills and instructions with machine and rapid-firing guns, fitting them to be a body of marine artillerists, I have no doubt that the universal opinion would be that no more valuable and reliable adjunct to the fighting complement of the ship could be had.
The Chairman—During the war the marines were given great-guns to serve and were commanded by their own officers; they served those guns as well as the blue-jackets; and there is no reason why the marines should not be instructed on shore in the use of machine guns and on board ship at modern great-guns and carriages. When it becomes necessary to land a small force from a single ship, or a larger force from a squadron, the marines are better prepared, from previous training, to perform duty on shore than the bluejackets.
There should, in my opinion, be a marine officer in every ship having a guard, so that in the event of the whole force of marines being landed, there would be enough officers to organize properly one or more companies. I have never known a commanding officer to complain of having too many marines under his command.
The Secretary then read that part of the essay relating to the training system.
Lieutenant Brown.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I consider the training system a great benefit to the service, and would regret to see the system crippled. The supposition of the essayist that only a few return to the service is no reason for abolishing the system. If only ten per cent, return, I should advocate the system. The apprentices have to serve until twenty-one, and there are several hundred now serving on regular men-of-war after having completed a course on the training ships.
It is a question whether the unpopularity of the service is not greatly due to the constant drilling necessary in order to make a sailor "jack-of-all-trades." It is certainly desirable to retain the best graduates from the training ships in the service. To do this, the service must be made more attractive. We should remember that sailors, like all laboring men, are chiefly influenced by the relation between the hours of work required and the pay earned.
I think it is generally complained of by the officers of the training ships that the petty officers of the ships are not graduates from the training school. Many o£ the petty officers of these ships are men whose characters are bad. If the best graduates were retained as petty officers, it would remedy this evil.
Captain Geo. C. Remey.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I think the present apprentice system should be continued, but modified from time to time in its formal administration as experience may prove advisable. After serving a length of time, say six months or a year, if it be apparent that an apprentice has no aptitude for the service, he should be discharged in a home port. I would also adopt the plan of enlisting men under twenty-five years for general service. These men should also be liable to discharge at the end of six months, if found unfit for service. With the exception of the recommendation of the essayist to put the present training system on a reduced basis, I agree mainly with his views, and feel that he is entitled to the thanks of the for his vigorous essay.
Lieutenant-Commander E. S. Houston.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I am of the opinion that the present system should be continued, notwithstanding the somewhat discouraging showing of actual numbers permanently added to the service. This result comes from a state of affairs peculiar to the present conditions of American life—conditions which will gradually change for the better in the future; and while the service may not now get such benefit for the outlay, it undoubtedly will in the end and during a war. Keeping this in view, I favor not only its continuance, but its expansion by Congress as a wise national policy. Regarding its internal management, I think we may safely leave that in the hands of those having it in charge, as in this, as with most questions connected with the service, it is not the want of wise measures so much as it is the lack of means to carry them into effect.
Lieutenant-Commander Marthon.—Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:— In my opinion the training squadron should be continued, even enlarged. The small per cent, of re-enlistments does not by any means remove these trained men from a seafaring life. A large number of them ship in the merchant service, where they are able to reach the positions of mates. Others will, after a time, return to the naval service. Others, though giving up sea life, are always available in time of war to man our coast and harbor vessels.
The system in my opinion turns out able, intelligent, sober, and healthy men, and a more reliable class than those men who are picked up at home or abroad, and who, being only desirous of a living and good pay for a short time, soon leave the service and country forever. The greater part of our crews on foreign stations are of this nature, really "birds of passage," without character and, I might say, without country. The apprentices are all Americans, and extremely loyal to their flag. Therefore, in my opinion, the system should be continued. The petty officers of the training squadrons should be taken from the ablest of the graduates, as suggested by Lieutenant Brown, not only as an encouragement, but as a just reward for their merits.
These boys on cruising vessels I think are better informed in regard to great guns, shells, small-arms, infantry, and battalion drills than any of the old men on board. This very great advantage of knowing the internal rules and stations of a man-of-war, when a number of them are transferred to a vessel, saves men and officers a vast deal of trouble in the beginning of a cruise, as well as when on a foreign station. The naval education which they receive during their apprenticeship makes them good, reliable citizens, with a greater knowledge of what the outside world is like, and a stronger love for their own country, which they will be ever ready to defend in case of need.
The Chairman.—While it is desirable to have apprentices re-enlist and remain in the service after reaching their majority, the fact that only a small percentage do continue in the service is no evidence that the present system is a failure. The early training of a boy on board the training ships and in cruising vessels will never be forgotten by the man, and although he may find a more agreeable occupation on shore, we can rely on obtaining his service in time of war, and therefore the cost of his training is not thrown away. In civil life, the man who has had three or four years of discipline and training in the service as an apprentice will be a better and a more useful citizen in the community in which he resides, and the Government will not have thrown away the money expended in his education.