'More Than Just Blockade Duty'
(See R. M. Browning Jr., pp. 14-21, December 2009 Naval History)
William R. Deeble
An extra complication to the West Gulf squadron's blockading duties came from the frequent test visits by Royal Navy cruisers. If no U.S. Navy ship challenged their entry, they could claim the blockade to be merely on paper, of no effect under international law. But if fired on, that could be cause for war, so blockaders had to act cautiously. This put Union warships at a disadvantage against Confederate cruisers built, equipped, and manned in Britain, which could easily pretend to be Royal Navy, as mentioned in this excellent article.
Captain John Newland Maffitt sustained CSS Florida's false identity until close enough to the Mobile Bay entrance before the USS Oneida could raise steam for pursuit. Captain Raphael Semmes identified his CSS Alabama as British in twilight hails off Galveston until a second before loosing his broadside at close range to sink the outgunned USS Hatteras. Firing while still under false colors would have been dishonorable. However, in later meeting the USS Kearsarge off Cherbourg, Semmes honorably flew his true colors from the start. Unfortunately, he also lost his ship.
Lieutenant Commander Robert Wallace Blake, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)
Many thanks for the latest issue of Naval History with its thorough coverage of the Battle of Mobile Bay. This was of particular interest because two of my ancestors served in the sloop-of-war Brooklyn during the Civil War.
My father, Marine Corps Major General Robert Blake, had six uncles who served in the Civil War. Two of them, Cyrus Oscar Blake and Don Woodbury Blake, both born in Hill, New Hampshire, spent their war in the Navy on board the Brooklyn. They made a special trip to Boston to enlist on the sloop, which they had heard was a good ship. I believed that the Brooklyn had mainly been engaged in blockade duties, so was greatly interested in learning of her role in the Battle of Mobile Bay.
'How the Japanese Did It'
(See R. J. Hanyok, pp. 44-50, December 2009 Naval History)
Adam Lynch
Congratulations on your December issue and to historian Hanyok on his superb examination of how the Japanese were able to maintain total secrecy up to the moment their planes appeared at Pearl Harbor. His research on what took place prior to the attack cannot be challenged.
However, for him to argue that "it is likely the Americans could have done nothing to alter significantly the outcome of the attack" is hard to accept.
The mindset of American intelligence that an attack at Pearl Harbor was highly unlikely is (unfortunately) understandable. What is not acceptable is the fact that Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short had nothing in place to respond to conditions that might suddenly alter the situation.
After Washington sent its "war warning" to Hawaii, prudent military planning demanded a contingency alert of some kind. However, no system was organized to monitor future events. No attempt was made to monitor and evaluate-radar reports. No system was in place to alert higher authorities of unusual activity in the harbor. Nothing was done to have in place any alert plan to respond to anything new except sabotage.
And so a radar report of approaching aircraft went ignored in the total absence of a proper plan. Even the incredible sighting and sinking of a submarine in the harbor was ignored for the same sad reason.
Later, the sudden appearance of huge numbers of Japanese aircraft might be a legitimate surprise given the state of American intelligence. What cannot be dismissed is the uncomfortable fact that Kimmel and Short failed to put in place any kind of system that would have alerted them that something very alarming was taking place long before the bombs began dropping. Neither commander had in place any order saying, in effect, "let me know immediately of anything unusual." Certain vulnerable-ammunition locked up against sabotage and some aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip for the same reason is perhaps understandable. What is not is the total lack of any alternative plan to immediately react to anything new, such as radar information or the submarine in the harbor.
A military commander is not expected to be clairvoyant. He is, however, expected to be informed and prepared for the unexpected. It was that monstrous failure that cost Kimmel and Short their careers.
'The Pearl Harbor Warning that Never Was'
(See R. E. Young, pp. 6-7, December; R. J. Hanyok, pp. 6-8, October; L. Jewell, p. 6, August; P. Ribbey, pp. 7 and 64, June; R. J. Hanyok, pp. 50-53, April 2009 Naval History)
William F. Ruck
I have been following the Pearl Harbor story for a long time and am amused by revisionists and conspiracy theorists. The full and complete story of Pearl Harbor has never been told, with many documents that are still classified and not available to historians. Many more documents were never saved or have been lost over the years. But even if all of those documents were available, the men who handled them and could fill in the details have all passed away and their memories are forever lost.
The Pearl Harbor story can be summarized in two ways. First, the Japanese Navy practiced textbook operational security. Even if we were intercepting every radio message, promptly decrypting and decoding each, and translating clear text messages into English-all of which we were not-the Japanese Navy never transmitted the message "Attack Pearl Harbor December 7." While signal analysis suggested that something was happening with the Japanese fleet, one should expect that a fleet would move about. They might have been on nothing more sinister than a training exercise like the U.S. Navy Fleet Exercise XXI the previous year.
Second, the United States military was a peacetime military in December 1941. The Army and Navy suffered during the Great Depression, and officers concentrated on staying within their limited budget and polishing their officer reports in the hope of being promoted. Most historians do not dwell on this subject, but it is germane to Pearl Harbor.
A couple of examples. The new radar in Hawaii was still under the operational control of the Signal Corps. Those radars were powered from engine-driven generators that required maintenance. Because the Signal Corps did not have the budget to maintain those generators the hours of operation were limited.
Because the radars were not fully operational and not integrated into an air-raid warning system, the large radar return when reported was dismissed.
Had operational control of the radars been transferred to Hawaii and the air raid warning system operational, combined with a timely warning from Washington, the reported radar contact would have resulted in interceptors being launched to investigate. There was plenty of time to do this. Even though the limited air power in Hawaii could not have stopped the raid, their warning would have allowed the Navy to set all ships to General Quarters. There still would have been loss of life and materiel but the Japanese pilots would have been met with antiaircraft fire and shipboard watertight integrity. I believe that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were honorable men who accepted their fate as scapegoats. They were completely let down by the system.
'Who Will Hear the Bells?'
(See J. Sweetman, pp. 38-43, December 2009 Naval History)
Kenneth Willis
One of the things I enjoy in any history-related magazine is first-person-based accounts such as Mr. Sweetman's article offers. As usual, however, there are almost always minor details that need clearing up or points that could use elaboration in such accounts. There are two that I noted in the story of Chaplain Rost's sojourn in SMS Gneisenau.
The first involves the time line following Admiral von Spee's encounter with Admiral Craddock's squadron off Coronel, Chile, on 1 November 1914. Following the Battle of Coronel, Spee dispatched the majority of his squadron and its support train to Mas Afuera in the Juan Fernandez Islands to repair and replenish. In keeping with the limitations of the neutrality laws, he detached the Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, and Nurnberg for a port visit to Valparaiso. They called at the port on 3 November, and keeping within limitations, departed the next day. Accordingly, they would not have known about either the fall of Tsingtao or the destruction of the Emden. The Japanese did not take Tsingtao until 7 November, and the Emden's fateful encounter with HMAS Sydney at Cocos-Keeling did not occur until the 9th. More likely these events were reported to the squadron by either the Leipzig or Dresden. After Spee rejoined the squadron at Juan Fernandez, the latter ships were dispatched to Valparaiso to counter rumors they had been sunk at Coronel. They called there on or about 11 November, which would have been after the fall of Tsingtao and the sinking of the Emden.
The second point involves the fate of the Dresden. She escaped destruction at the Battle of the Falklands on 8 December and played cat-and-mouse with the Royal Navy until March 1915. While she backtracked into the Pacific through the Strait of Magellan and hid in several coastal inlets along the Chilean coast, her destruction did not come in a Chilean fjord.
The Dresden eventually fled back to the Juan Fernandez group and took shelter in a bay at Mas a Tierra (now known as Robinson Crusoe Island). She was discovered there on 14 March by HMS Glasgow and Kent. In need of repair and low on both coal and ammunition, the Dresden was unable to effectively fight or run. After the exchange of a few rounds and receiving minor damage, she ran up a white flag. However, while her captain put an officer in a boat to negotiate surrender with the British captains, the rest of the cruiser's crew and officers mined the ship and scuttled her. The wreck still lies in about 200 feet of water at the bottom of Cumberland Bay off Robinson Crusoe and is a popular site for recreational divers.
The Dresden's crew was interned in Chile for the duration of the war, with many choosing to remain in the country afterward. One of the repatriated crew members, and the officer sent to negotiate with the British, was then-Lieutenant Wilhelm Canaris, who went on to become Admiral Canaris, head of Adolf Hitler's military intelligence organization Abwehr. On 24 February 2006, a group of German and Chilean navy divers on a training exercise recovered the Dresden's bell. The government of Chile formally presented the bell to the Museum of the German Armed Forces in November 2008, on the 100th anniversary of the Dresden's commissioning.
'Museum Report: The World's Oldest Battleship'
(See R. S. Bolia, p. 72, December 2009 Naval History)
C. P. Hall
It should be mentioned that the Mikasa was one tough nut to crack. Admiral Heihachiro Togo was a man who believed that the flagship should lead the battle line and Russian naval doctrine was to focus fire on the head of the enemy's line. On 10 August 1904 the Mikasa survived numerous hits and the explosion of a 12-inch shell in a gun when fired, which resulted in ruining the gun and disabling the aft main turret. At Tsushima, she took more hits than any other Japanese vessel. Shortly after the war, on the night of 10 September 1905, she suffered a magazine explosion and sank with the loss of more than 600 dead and wounded. The cause was said to be a spontaneous explosion in a powder magazine, but there was some doubt. Nevertheless, 104 years later, the Mikasa survives.
There is one magnificent history waiting to be written about the battleship. I hope that I live to see it.
Donald Kloenne
The author states that Russian losses as a result of the Battle of Tsushima, were "19 sunk and 16 captured, while a cruiser and two destroyers, (presumably the Almaz, Grozni, and Bravi, respectively) escaped to Vladivostok."
He neglected to mention the cruisers Aurora, Jemtchug, and Oleg, which eluded Admiral Togo's forces, and fled to Manila, where they were interned by the Americans. The cruiser Izumrud also got away and fled north but ran aground off the Siberian coast, where she was scuttled to avoid capture.
'A Warrior's Destiny'
(See J. D. Hornfischer, pp. 30-34, October 2009 Naval History)
Captain Edmund Shimberg, Medical Service Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
I am a plankowner subscriber to Naval History and in all the years I have been reading it, most issues have been interesting and stimulating. Some more than others, but always some articles that seized my imagination. This issue, though, is the first one that made me angry-furious!
This piece cited a presumed quote by the subject of his article, Captain Robert C. Hagen, saying of the five Sullivan brothers that none of them was "promising by any official measure of intellect or aptitude."
I wonder what the Sullivans' level of intellectual functioning has to do with the thrust of this article? I wonder if the author had given any thought to the fact that these men were no less heroic in giving their lives for their country than if they were possessed of towering intellectual endowments? I wonder if the author gave any thought to the fact that he demeaned the Sullivans and diminished their sacrifice? And finally, I wonder where was the editor who allowed that defaming statement to be included?
Mr. Hornfischer responds:
I agree with Captain Shimberg that official measures of intellect or aptitude say nothing about one's character, integrity, worth, or potential for heroism. As readers of my books will probably suspect, I've given plenty of thought to the sources of ordinary people's ability to perform gallantly under fire. The fact that Captain Hagen, the Sullivan brothers' service school selection officer, told me he didn't find them suited for specialized training does nothing to diminish or demean their service.
'Naval History News: Laffey in Drydock'
(See p. 65, December 2009 Naval History)
Personnelman 1 Lawrence C. Allin, U.S. Navy Reserve
For many years I have worn a navy blue t-shirt emblazoned with the motto "Bath Built is Best Built!" I believe in this because of the Laffey's record. She provided escort to landing craft and bombarded the shore on D-Day, then, off Okinawa on 15 April 1945, helped fight off dozens of Japanese aircraft attacking the picket ships. She took four bomb hits, six Kamikaze strikes, endured straffing, and survived to be towed stateside for repairs. On 21 May 1946, the Bath-built veteran participated in Operation Crossroads, the atomic bomb tests at Bikini Atoll. She was back at war off Korea in January 1951 assisting in the blockade of Wonsan Harbor and with coastal bombardment.
Into the Cold War she became a rescue vessel in 1954, speeding to the aid of the foundered schooner Able, saving four of her passengers, and two years later responded to the Suez Crisis. Further supporting national policies, she operated with NATO vessels in the Mediterranean.
In 1986 the Laffey's builders, crews, and achievements were honored when she was declared a National Historic Landmark and moored at the Patriots Point Naval & Maritime Museum near Charleston, South Carolina.
'Growing Up with the Pearl Harbor Story'
(See J. Adams, p. 52, December 2009 Naval History)
Captain Matheos Tsoupakis
The author describes his dive into Turret 4's barbette as "a cylinder about 70 feet in diameter." The barbette looks to be about of the vessel's breadth, which would make her beam 210 feet. This would have restricted her passage through the Panama Canal. The Arizona's extreme beam was 106 feet.
Editor's note: Scale drawings show a diameter of approximately 34 feet.
Correction
Because of an editing error, James D. Hornfischer's article "A Warrior's Destiny" (October 2009) incorrectly stated that retired Navy Captain Robert C. Hagen was the last surviving officer of the USS Johnston (DD-557). At the time of his death on 25 May 2009, Captain Hagen was the destroyer's senior surviving officer.
The family of one of the Johnston's officers who was still alive, Lieutenant Commander Ellsworth Welch, pointed out the mistake to us. Before we could publish a correction, however, Commander Welch also passed away.
During the Johnston's famous dash toward an approaching Japanese fleet at the 25 October 1944 Battle off Samar, then-Lieutenant (junior grade) Welch was on the port wing with Lieutenant Ed DiGardi, Lieutenant (junior grade) John Bechdel, and the ship's skipper, Commander Ernest Evans. "I went into the pilot house with Digardi and about ten seconds later we took our first hits," Welch had recalled. "A battleship salvo (three 14 inchers) hit the after-engine and fire rooms, followed by a six incher salvo which hit the port wing of the bridge. When I returned to the bridge, it was in carnage."
Later, after the captain ordered the decimated ship abandoned, Welch took off his shoes, neatly placed them together, and dove into the debris-strewn water. He and other crewmen battled the effects of dehydration and exposure for more than 48 hours before being rescued.
Shortly after Commander Welch's death, his daughter, Lee Ann Welch, wrote us that "even though it was the last couple hours of his life, I know it meant a lot to my father that you were interested in hearing his story of the Johnston. His Navy experience and the battle shaped his life. And he ended his life feeling appreciated for it."