Consider the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP). It is not a carrier, nor an Aegis cruiser or destroyer, nor a littoral combat ship. And it’s not an amphibious warship, either. In short, it’s not even mainstream Navy—not high-tech, not sexy, and not on the radarscope of most typical surface warfare officers, aviators, or submariners. It’s going to be a part of the Maritime Prepositioning Force, or MPF. What’s that, you say? “Oh yeah, the MPF. I think that has something to do with the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, doesn’t it? No? Well, then it must have something to do with the Marine Corps, but it’s definitely not something I’ll ever deal with.” How is it going to work? “No clue, no idea, not my deal. Can we move on to another topic now?”
Although the relatively small cadre of sailors, Marines, and civilians involved with this program surely wouldn’t answer that way, this response would not be atypical if a pool of our best and brightest were asked to describe the MLP and what improved capability we are going to get for our money. Or if asked what the challenges will be to making the ship and concept work as envisioned—moving heavy Marine Corps gear between two large ships in open ocean, and then getting it to the beach expeditiously. For those not familiar, here is a short description of the MLP and what we have already begun building.
Back around the 2005–06, our Navy and Marine Corps were looking at a major upgrade to the three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons. A future squadron, referred to as the MPF Future, or MPF(F), was planned with far more capability than our current squadrons. The Navy and Marine Corps planned to incorporate some large-deck amphibious ships into each squadron, as well as MLPs and other significant ships. The MLP being planned was a vastly different ship from the one being developed today.
That earlier design was to be a huge, float-on, float-off (FLO/FLO) ship, built from the keel up to support the offload of Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on Roll-off ships, or LMSRs (64,000-metric-ton ships with cargo capacity of 393,000 square feet), by mooring alongside in a skin-to-skin configuration. That version of MLP would have had an open and clear stern.
LCACs Move the Marines
The plan was to use air-cushion landing craft (LCACs) to transport Marine combat gear—including M1A1 tanks—to the beach after the gear had been transferred to the MLP from the LMSR over a ramp between the two ships. To minimize roll and keep the ships stable while moored together, they would conduct operations with their bows into the seas while under way in open ocean. The LCACs would then launch and recover from the MLP by way of the ship’s stern, just as they do on board amphibious warships.
Unfortunately, after two wars and considerable economic challenges, the nation cannot afford the highly capable MPF(F). So we have had to down-scope projected improvements and upgrades to our MPF force. Instead of building the MLP from the keel up as a new design, we are now planning to use a modified Alaska oil tanker with extra ballast tanks to give it a FLO/FLO capability. But—and this is key—that design has the deckhouse/bridge structure aft and a raised forecastle forward, which means the LCACs will have to launch and land from the MLP’s beam, amidships and on a heading perpendicular to the MLP’s heading. This is a radical departure from standard LCAC operating procedures with our amphibious warships that launch and recover the LCACs on the same heading as the ships and enter/depart the ship’s well deck from astern. And with this change come some very significant seamanship challenges.
Seamanship, Sea State, and Sea Direction
The LCAC Safe Engineering and Operations Manual notes that for a standard LCAC recovery, “the ship shall be headed into the wind and sea” and when wind and sea are from different directions, “the ship shall head into the sea.” Having the bow into the seas is the most stable condition for the ships, as well as for the LCACs.
With beam LCAC landings and launches, the scenario becomes much more complex, because the seas that work best for the MLP (i.e., ship’s head into the seas) cause the most challenging scenario for the LCAC craftmaster making an approach, because the LCACs would be landing and launching in beam seas. Further, the rougher the seas, the more important it becomes for the MLP (and LMSR, joined together) to head into the seas. But piloting an LCAC onto an MLP deck with rough beam seas (on the LCAC) makes the evolution much more challenging for the craftmaster. The MLP Capabilities Development Document requires the ship to conduct LCAC operations, while moored alongside the LMSR, in up to mid-sea state 3 on the NATO sea-state scale.
The ability of LCACs to conduct beam launches and recoveries was tested in March 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico, using the MV Mighty Servant III as an MLP surrogate platform. Testing done on various headings confirmed that the best seas to launch and recover the LCACs were with the seas on the ship’s port beam (coming from 270 degrees relative to the ship’s head), thereby creating a lee for the LCACs to land and launch from the starboard side.
LCAC operations were still possible with seas somewhat abaft or forward of the beam, but the farther away from beam seas, the more challenging the operations became; it frequently came down to wave height, swell direction, and craftmaster ability. LCAC operations with the Mighty Servant’s bow directly into the seas proved too dangerous. And this testing was accomplished without an LMSR moored alongside, skin-to-skin. It was just one LCAC and the ship. Also worthy of note, testing was done using seasoned LCAC craftmasters (U.S. Navy, retired) with years, and in some cases decades, of experience. Those non-standard LCAC operations with MLP will be something all craftmasters will need to be competent in, including the newest and most recently qualified.
‘Two Major Concerns’
Therein lie two major concerns: First and foremost, we have never tested all three moving parts of this concept at the same time. And second, the seas that facilitate LCAC beam landings and launches are not optimal for the skin-to-skin mooring of two huge vessels of dissimilar hulls. In fact, the best and safest seas for the ships will be the most challenging and most unsafe for the LCACs, and vice versa. Are the sea-direction limitations mutually exclusive? We don’t know for certain, and we won’t know until we have tested all three parts of this concept together. It now appears that will not happen until after the first MLP is built.
Some ship tank modeling has been done overseas that would suggest there might be a “sweet spot” with quartering seas that will allow the two vessels to moor together at the same time and produce a sufficient lee for beam LCAC operations. But can we really count on finding this sweet spot renough of the time to make the MLP a key asset supporting Marine Corps combat operations on shore? Especially considering differences in wave periods in different parts of the world and in different oceans, as well as the countless other environmental conditions that always vary?
Will the Masters Be Among the Willing?
It should also be remembered that not all ship masters are created equal. Mooring two ships of dissimilar hulls together with only Yokohama fenders providing separation can be very challenging, even for the most capable mariners. And to provide an adequate lee for LCAC launches and recoveries, the ships cannot have their bows into the seas and will be on a heading much closer to having their beam in the seas, where their rolls will be most pronounced.
Some masters may be more comfortable executing these operations than others. Given the infrequency of prepositioning force exercises and the fact that the MLPs will be forward deployed, these very perishable skills will be costly to acquire and challenging to maintain. The MLP will be captained by a civilian master, but the shiphandling challenges faced will be at least equal to anything our Navy ship captains experience during underway replenishment, restricted piloting, amphibious operations, flight operations, undersea warfare, etc. To be sure, not too many senior surface warfare commanding officers would be comfortable knowing that their ships’ main wartime missions are to moor in the fashion described here. Some masters will do it, but others may simply say it isn’t safe and refuse to go alongside. We can’t have these challenges and uncertainties when it comes to supporting Marines fighting ashore.
The Best Solution
For a short period in early 2010, it appeared that we might have found the solution. It was a class 1 dynamic positioning (DP) system installed in the MLP that would keep both ships apart at a safe distance and maintain that distance precisely, while still being close enough to put a ramp between and transfer combat gear. Also to be used was a stabilized ramp (vertical transfer at sea) system that compensated for the varying roll and movements of both ships. Those were successfully tested in operations using the LMSR USNS Soderman and the MV Mighty Servant III (again, as a surrogate MLP) in the Gulf of Mexico. It worked, and it worked well. The DP kept both ships 34 meters apart, and the stabilized ramp allowed for the transfer of wheeled and tracked vehicles: MTVRs, AAV-7s, and even M1A1 tanks.
Keeping the ships apart using DP would allow the LCACs to operate with optimum seas and at the same time significantly reduce the chances of damage created when large ships are moored together, skin-to-skin. But because of funding issues, the use of this DP and the stabilized ramp were removed from the concept, and we have gone back to the concept of mooring these large vessels together with only Yokohama fenders between them. To enhance the MLP’s maneuverability, the ship will be built with a bow thruster, which will allow it to maintain desired heading. But a capable bow thruster is a far cry from the successfully tested class 1 DP system.
All this illuminates a seamanship concern and a tactical challenge. What is the value added by MLP to the MPF squadron offload? Our Navy–Marine Corps team is currently re-examining the distance from shore for amphibious operations, and MPF operations are directly related. For years, the goal was 25 nautical miles. The amphibious triad—LCACs, MV-22 Ospreys, and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles (EFV)—was being designed and built to realize this capability. LCACs operating at high speed from an MLP made sense to get prepositioned combat gear ashore over a long distance. But with the EFV being canceled, distances from shore might not necessarily be 25 nautical miles. Depending on the tactical situation, operations may well be conducted much closer.
Present Systems Can Do the Job
Our current prepositioned ships have an Improved Navy Lighterage System, or INLS, staged on their decks and designed to be craned off and used to transport Marine Corps combat equipment ashore. Introduced in 2006–07, the INLS is almost brand new, is state-of-the-art, has water-jet propulsion, and was built to replace a previous system that was well beyond its service life. Although slower than an LCAC, INLS can lift much more combat gear per trip to and from shore than an LCAC or any other ship-to-shore connector. This is a very capable and proven system. The closer to the shore the ships are positioned, the more efficient INLS becomes (and the less efficient the LCAC and MLP/LMSR concept will become).
The INLS has supported exercises and real-world operations in Haiti after the earthquake in 2010, and it passed with flying colors. This system is a viable method to offload our prepositioned ships, without a requirement to build a new ship (MLP) and test a new concept, where the operational gain will be questionable and potential seamanship challenges/operational risk still high.
The new MLP’s “mission deck” is smaller and more constrained than the previous concept ship, which will create operational challenges as well as questions regarding how much improvement in capability we really are getting over INLS. Multiple sections of INLS can also be connected to create what is known as a Roll-on, Roll-off Discharge Facility, or RRDF, that can be positioned astern of an LSMR as well as other MPF vessels. This is another tested and proven concept that works well. The RRDF and INLS together fulfill much the same mission as intended for the MLP, and it is in use/in place today.
Do We Need This, and Can We Afford It?
At a construction cost of $1.5 billion for three ships and significant follow-on life-cycle costs, in the current fiscal environment the MLP needs another critical look. Given that life-cycle costs can typically vary between 60 and 75 percent of total ownership costs, this could equate to an additional $2.25 to $4.5 billion over the projected life span of these vessels. A total ownership cost of somewhere in the neighborhood of $4.5 to $6 billion could be expected. And because of the Department of Defense decision to reduce the Navy and Marine Corps preposition assets from more than 20 ships to 13 and one squadron in reduced operating status, does it really make sense that three of these ships will carry no prepositioned cargo or any organic ship-to-shore capability? The LCACs will have to be sourced from a nearby amphibious warship.
While the MLP train may have left the station, other trains have left stations before, only to be called back or put on a siding, like the A-12 or more recently the EFV. $400 billion is a lot of money to cut from DOD. Clearly some military programs already in place will need to be evaluated, and some won’t make the cut. As with any other program, the MLP has significant pros and cons. It should be considered on its merits and the value it will potentially add to our national security. If deemed worthy of continued funding, we should strive to make it more operationally viable and reliable by adding a class 1 dynamic positioning system and stabilized ramp. If available funding precludes this, I would suggest we look at building just two MLPs instead of three, especially now, as we are moving to put one squadron into reduced operating status and scale down to two active squadrons. Two very capable platforms serving in our two active squadrons will serve our nation far better than three with significant seamanship challenges. And we would realize some significant dollar savings.
Clearly, keeping a strong shipbuilding capacity is in the best interest of the nation, and construction of the MLP would contribute directly in that regard. That said, we can execute the in-stream offload mission right now, without the MLP. Even though the MLP may enhance our ability to do it a little better, do we really need it, and is it worth the $1.5 billion to build plus additional billions in follow-on costs?
These questions would be best addressed by those who know what the MLP is competing against for our scarce resources. If this ship is required tactically, then we need to forget skin-to-skin operations in beam or quartering seas, and re-introduce dynamic positioning and a stabilized ramp transfer system. Our warfighter combatant commanders need a platform and concept they can depend on, even if it means building two MLPs instead of three. We owe our Marines fighting in harm’s way nothing less. If the program doesn’t add a significant extra punch to our capability, or if it isn’t necessary to meet offload requirements, it should be canceled and the funding reallocated to support a more critical capability. Or the funding should be cut altogether as part of our efforts to reduce the national debt.