From Humble Beginnings to ‘Where Are the Carriers?’
(See R. Dann and G. Galdorisi, pp. 34–39, September 2011 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired), President, Naval Historical Foundation—Captains Dann and Galdorisi do a credible job of presenting a short history of naval aviation, but in one area they come up short. There is no mention of Rear Admiral William Adger Moffett, billed by many as the “Architect of Naval Aviation.” Consider some quotes from the citation by the Secretary of the Navy that went along with the naming of Moffett as an Acquisition Pioneer in 1997:
A visionary who did more to advance the cause of naval aviation than anyone else in history, Rear Admiral Moffett served as Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics from 1921 through 1933 . . . three consecutive terms as chief of the Bureau. He pioneered the integration of aircraft with fleet operations and was significantly responsible for introducing new technology to naval warfare, most notably the aircraft carrier.
He never acted the outspoken rebel, yet without Moffett and his superb insight and energies, naval aviation today could well be an appendage to the U.S. Air Force. He was almost singularly responsible for the fact that naval aviation remained a part of the Navy when Brigadier General Billy Mitchell had almost convinced the Congress of the opposite.
It was Moffett who saw to legislation requiring that commanding officers of carriers and naval air stations be naval aviators. It was Moffett’s initiative at the Washington Naval Conference that led to the opportunity to convert the battle cruisers Lexington and Saratoga to large-deck aircraft carriers. It was Moffett’s Bureau of Aeronautics that satisfied the requirements of innovators like Joseph Mason Reeves. It was Moffett whose work revolutionized naval aviation and altered the course of history by laying the groundwork for the force that fought and won World War II in the Pacific.
Is Naval Aviation Culture Dead?
(See J. Lehman, pp. 40–46, September 2011 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas A. Davis, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Former Secretary of the Navy Lehman has it right in observing that the military leadership in naval aviation has gone south and has deserted the specialty. I would, however, extend that observation to include all of the warfare specialties. I served two tours inside the beltway, 1968–69 and 1972–75. In the first case I was coming in from a sea command; in the second I went to sea for a second command tour.
Duty in Washington was educational and illuminating, but it was clear even in those days that the civilian bureaucracy was in control. My presence and experience as a sea-serving officer was only endured, but my opinion or that of any other sea-serving officer really meant nothing to the civilian bureaucracy in any decision-making process. Almost all decisions regarding combat capabilities, readiness, manning levels, and so forth, were made by civilian bureaucrats who had served almost exclusively in Washington their entire careers. They knew what sort of funding requests for hardware and personnel Congress was likely to approve (researched and supported by congressional staffs of like-minded bureaucrats).
Today, it seems the senior Washington-level sea-serving officers have continued to let control of the Navy slip away and into the hands of the bureaucrats. No wonder 20 percent of the Navy’s commanding officers are being summarily relieved for not being politically correct. Commanding officers are afraid to sneeze without looking over their shoulders to see if they might be reported for doing it improperly.
Is Naval Aviation Culture Dead?
(See J. Lehman, pp. 40–46, September 2011 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired), President, Naval Historical Foundation—Secretary Lehman’s article is well written and describes the past environment accurately. That, in fact, is the problem: It describes yesteryear and touches on how we got to where we are today. Unfortunately, it also smacks of “They didn’t do it that way in my day.” Very few old people acknowledge that the world has changed since they were young. Right after Pearl Harbor, older citizens lamented that the United States was in for a real licking because the young guys of that day couldn’t even get to the corner drugstore without using the car. We all know now those soft teenagers of 1941 more than measured up and became “the Greatest Generation.” What the oldsters didn’t realize was that the world had changed from when they were young. So, too, has the Navy changed since Mr. Lehman was the Secretary. Given that, who’s to say the change is for the better or the worse? We won’t know that for some time to come, just like those who doubted the 1941 teenagers didn’t know how good they would become.
The author laments, “The average aviator spends a very small fraction of his or her time on active duty actually flying.” So? The F-35 and the F/A-18E/F/G require skills more akin to computer gaming than they do to flying in, say, an A-6. Besides, while one must admit it’s only a small sample, look at the incumbent vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Sandy Winnefeld: three squadron tours as an F-14 pilot, squadron CO, Top Gun instructor, CO of the Enterprise (CVN-65). Admiral Winnefeld is not alone either. Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, Director of the Joint Staff, has over 5,000 jet hours and more than 1,200 carrier landings. Other examples are available. One wonders from whence came the charge of not enough cockpit time. Perhaps revealed by such a charge is the failure to accept Washington Irving Chambers’ admonition that a naval aviator is a naval officer first and an aviator second.
As for the growth of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and joint-staff bureaucracy, how can one be certain any CNO (or SecNav) had a real say so in that? Didn’t it stem from a senator named Goldwater and a congressman named Nichols? Can any CNO (or SecNav) disobey the law of the land? And when it comes to length of the acquisition process, what does the average squadron pilot have to do with that? Acquisition is something for the Pentagon and the systems commands. What the Fleet is concerned about is what it has today, and what it has today are first-rate aircraft, first-rate weapons, and first-rate sailors (albeit not enough of the first).
Frankly, “Is Naval Aviation Culture Dead?” belongs in Naval History, not Proceedings.
The Bond Outlives the Scandal
(See W. Carroll, pp. 43–46, September 2011 Proceedings)
Colonel James R. Sandberg, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)—Bravo Zulu to Commander Carroll for an even-handed commentary on the Tailhook scandal and its aftermath, similar to the experiences of this Marine reservist. Selected for promotion to Colonel in the summer of 1991, I attended the infamous Hook ’91 that fall as an employee of a major aircraft manufacturer for the purpose of manning the company’s trade-show booth in the exhibit hall. Due to our extensive trade-show duties, I saw little of the other goings-on but, a few months afterward, I received that dreaded letter from Headquarters Marine Corps asking one binary question with specific instructions not to append any further explanations. It read something like, “Did you attend the Tailhook Convention at the Hilton Hotel in Las Vegas, NV between ___ and ___ September 1991?” with two boxes to choose from: YES and NO. Sorry that there was no opportunity to explain, and fully expecting that my beloved Corps would do the right thing with further inquiries, I checked YES, signed it with my honor, and mailed it in. Despite several inquiries, I never heard back from HQMC again on the matter.
I was eventually promoted to O-6 in the summer of 1994, but the three-year delay was certainly unusual. Although in no way an “anti-change agent,” I can associate with Commander Carroll’s observation that “It was all too much for naval aviation’s anti-change agents who elected to resign their commission, convinced that the culture had been changed forever,” and I retired at my very first opportunity from a Corps that had totally forgotten about the “leadership down” part of the pact we all make with our Marines.
During Budget Woes, Opportunity Knocks
(See R. R. Harris, p. 8, September 2011 Proceedings)
Commander Peter Gregory, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Since 12 September 2001, the Navy has had to respond to three key questions: What is the mission? How many people do we need for that mission? And how many platforms, ships, subs, missiles, planes, etc. do we need to carry out that mission? I do not think the Navy ever was able to articulate to the American public, let alone Congress at times, how it fits into the post-9/11 world and the global terrorism war. There was no overarching idea, concept, or phrase that the average person on the street could recall as to why countless billions needed to be appropriated for everything from the brown-water missile ships to F-35s and everything else in between. Yes, the Navy rogered-up on individual agumentees for the combat theaters, and seemed to rediscover the need for a new class of amphibious transports, but it seems we are better known in the last decade for cost overruns on the joint fighter program, and for design issues that will not go away with the San Antonio class of ships.
So as we enter this new phase of shrinking defense budgets and likely far less money than desired for the latest whiz-bang gadgets (let alone some program to keep full employment at Newport News or Avondale) the questions will remain: What is the mission? How many people do we need for that? And what do we need to buy or build to make that happen? The salad days of the Department of Defense are over. If the Navy is unable to sharpen its pencil, others will surely do it for them. Those are never pleasant experiences.
In Striving for Diversity, Don’t Forget Muslims
(See K. Eyer, p. 8, August 2011; and E. Dietrich-Berryman, p. 6, September 2011 Proceedings)
Captain Jim Fontana, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I was appalled by the naiveté and the general lack of understanding of radical Islam expressed by Captain Eyer. His premise is that we can win the hearts and minds of the Muslim world by first winning the hearts and minds of Muslim-Americans, and we can do that by showing them we are “good enough to practice diversity” and that we want them in our Navy. Wow! What a simple solution to al Qaeda abroad, homegrown terrorism in the United States, and to ending the conflict between Islamic fanaticism and the Western world. Whew! If only we had known.
To help make his case, Captain Eyer claims the French and British problem of homegrown terrorism resulted from their forced segregation of the Muslim communities away from each country’s core society. Accordingly, if only we could learn from their strategic error and embrace and integrate Muslim communities into our society—into our Navy—we would be taking an important step toward ending the mistrust that has fomented so much terror, death, and destruction.
Actually, the Muslim communities within Western Europe, and increasingly in the United States, are self-segregating. Their intent has been to establish Muslim enclaves, to create islands where Sharia law can flourish, and where they can make social and cultural changes within their host country. They have little interest in integrating. Their goal is to gradually make Sharia law acceptable to Western society and ultimately the law of the land.
Devout Muslims embrace Sharia as the set of laws that govern every aspect of Islamic life, and that of non-believers as well. It is totally incompatible with our Constitution. There is no freedom of religion under Sharia, no freedom of speech—no freedom, period!
OK, so it is unfair to suggest that all Muslims are enemies of Western civilization. But those who are dominate the discussion within Islam. They control most of the mosques, Islamic schools, and U.S.-based Islamic “interest groups.” The author quotes a member of the Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR) to validate his insight into Muslim thought. CAIR was founded by the Muslim Brotherhood, the ideological force behind al Qaeda and the motivating source for the “peaceful” movement to impose Islamic norms and Sharia law on the West. CAIR was an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation trial, the largest terrorism-financing prosecution in American history. To trust CAIR for one’s insight into the way ahead is a flawed strategy.
The author has some naïve notion that the conflict between much of the Muslim world and the West would go away if only the West could gain Muslims’ trust. He claims that if we can show American Muslims that we are “good enough to practice diversity,” problem solved. Does anyone really think that Islamic fanatics give a damn? That notion is not only unrealistic, it’s dangerous.
Amphibious Training: From Ugly to Good
(See A. Holmes and D. Fuquea, pp. 60–65, August 2011 Proceedings)
Commander Terry J. McKearney, U.S. Navy (Retired)—As a dyed-in-the-wool “gator” sailor, I enthusiastically endorse Colonels Holmes’ and Fuquea’s belief that we need to rebuild our amphibious capability. The uneven success they report in regard to Bold Alligator should not surprise us: Our amphibious capability has withered over the past decade for the reasons they state. However, I disagree with Bold Alligator’s focus on the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB.) Given the still-stretched nature of our amphibious and Marine forces and the prospect of further force cuts, we should not concentrate our efforts at amphibious training on the MEB. Instead of pouring time and resources into large-scale MEB exercises, we need to emphasize the reconstitution of our Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) capability.
Trained to work together on a regular basis and deployed for six months at a time, ARGs and embarked MEUs are a “ready-now” capability with the flexibility to perform a range of missions from humanitarian assistance to limited power-projection operations. The ARG/MEU is self-contained and self-sufficient; it requires no augmentation to accomplish the missions it’s designed and trained for. Most important, it is a quick fit into the naval component commander’s or joint force commander’s campaign plan.
Favoring ARG/MEU proficiency over the ability to land an MEB from an amphibious task force makes sense in light of the realities of our force structure and likely missions. As the authors point out, just summoning the lift required for an MEB from our shrinking amphibious force would be a challenge, and the likelihood of deploying an MEB-sized force to assault a hostile beach is remote, even in the major conflict scenarios where we claim the need for it. In reality, we would use the Maritime Prepositioning Forces to deploy an MEB if needed.
The ARG/MEU has been a staple of our forward-deployed maritime strategy for decades, although the pressures of the two wars in the Mideast have caused us to skimp on and curtail its regular deployment. We need to remedy this as soon as possible and get the ARG/MEUs back to sea.
Words vs. Deeds
(See T. J. Cutler, p. 93, August 2011 Proceedings)
Commander Earl Higgins, U.S. Navy (Retired)—In studying John Paul Jones’ heroic and bold words and fearless actions during the battle between the Bonhomme Richard and HMS Serapis, it is important to ask why those ships and their captains were in the location where the battle occurred. The Serapis was a frigate escorting a convoy of more than 40 ships carrying cargo to England from the Baltic ports through the North Sea. The Bonhomme Richard was a merchantman converted into a raider. Jones was after the convoy, the Serapis was there to stop him. The Serapis succeeded. Even though her captain, Richard Pearson, struck colors and surrendered to Jones, the convoy got through safely.
Jones’ failure to accomplish his designed mission does not detract from his audacity and inspiring words (whatever they were) in the heat of battle. History records Jones as a victor, with Pearson experiencing the ignominy of surrender. Nevertheless, Pearson succeeded in his mission and Jones did not. There is something beyond irony to be learned from that encounter.
‘For a Woman of My Generation, Serving in the Military Was a Godsend’
(See M. E. Lyons, pp. 12–13, August 2011 Proceedings)
Captain Ed Dangler, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—It was a most pleasant experience for me to see the “Answering the Call” article by Dr. Lyons, president of University of San Diego. Having been the commanding officer of the U.S. Naval Reserve Military Sealift Command Unit 1120 in the late 1970s when Lieutenant Lyons affiliated with our unit after release from active duty, I have followed her career achievements over the years. As a young officer, she showed much interest in learning the mission of the unit in support of our parent active command, MSCPACAREA, and quickly became a most valulable asset to our staff. Her educational background and writing skills gave the unit a decided advantage in having her as the public-affairs officer, and we received awards from both District and MSC Headquarters for our internally produced unit newsletter under her editorial direction.
As her former commanding officer, I was extremely proud when she was appointed president of the California Maritime Academy and shattered the glass ceiling in being the first female to head up an institution of great importance to the maritime industry. As a rear admiral in the U.S. Maritime Service she was the role model for all young women who had considered maritime education, but had been hesistant about being accepted in what was considered a traditionally male field. Her civilian career in the academic world, including her present position as president of a leading university, is proof that her early Navy service was a valuable experience in her outstanding achievements.
Book Review: When Johnny and Jane Come Marching Home: How All of Us Can Help Veterans
(See D. G. Brown, p. 76, June 2011; and P. J. Caplan, pp. 100–101, September 2011 Proceedings)
Ted Engelmann—Regarding Dr. Brown’s review, surely Dr. Caplan’s book is more of a whistle-blower than “controversial.” After all, she’s reporting what others have said (including in Army and DOD press releases) and has applied her own professional experience. History seems to be repeating itself with a modern-day twist.
Dealing with a difficult bureaucracy isn’t new for veterans. In 1945, director John Huston was commissioned by the Army to produce “Let There Be Light,” showing World War II vets being treated for emotional wounds. The Army withheld the film for 40 years, until 1985. Gerald Nicosia wrote how the government abandoned the veterans of a past generation in Home to War: A History of the Vietnam Veterans Movement. The modern-day version is found in The War Comes Home: Washington’s Battle Against American’s Veterans, by Aaron Glantz. The system is bent on keeping the cost of healing as low as possible, while many good people in the VA and other agencies strive to help veterans. It’s a tough battle.
The reintegration process for veterans takes place best in local communities, not so much in VA or DOD programs. Since most American civilians know next to nothing about war experiences, it seems fitting that veterans and their families should be heard by their communities. It also might help to consider post-traumatic stress an identity disorder instead of a stress disorder. Veterans have to discover who they are again after their war and traumas. They have new battles ahead to create a healthy postwar life. Reading When Johnny and Jane Come Marching Home, you might get angry at our bureaucratic system as Dr. Caplan highlights many of those personal battles. She also puts a spotlight on specific problems and offers some remedies. As a former teacher for grades 8–12 and the college level, I’ve seen the benefit of veterans speaking to the community. The empathy and understanding between both groups is heartfelt and deep. We certainly need more of it.
Dr. Brown in his review sounds like a bureaucrat defending the status quo. As an advocate for veterans and civilians alike, Dr. Caplan has stirred up the bureaucratic waters. Her book is thick with information and stories. At times it’s a bit overwhelming, but it’s the truth. You need to read it and decide for yourself.