Air Power for These Wars
By Commanders George Perry and William Mallory, U.S. Navy
Since the early 1970s, the use of U.S. air power has been guided by doctrinal publications such as Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1, Air Warfare. These were conceived and refined in the context of the Cold War or around large-scale major combat operations. In that type of fight, the current doctrine does an exceptional job of defining traditional roles. But these operational concepts are not well suited for dealing with the counterinsurgency wars in which we find ourselves today. In Afghanistan and to a lesser extent Iraq, fixed-wing-air power providers must adapt to give the best possible support to ground-combat elements.
After almost a decade of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, there are no more integrated air defenses to penetrate. There is no air threat to counter, and no traditional strategic targets are left for air power to destroy. According to major themes in both the Joint Operating Environment and its companion document, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's vision for 2016-28), our military will be required to counter asymmetric, irregular, and hybrid threats for the foreseeable future.1
As the December 2008 DOD Directive 3000.7, Irregular Warfare, states: "IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare." This being the case, U.S. air power must move away from dated philosophies such as effects-based operations and accept a more contemporary approach. Air power providers must embrace a more Soldier-focused, joint air-and-ground approach while simultaneously balancing requirements for the current counterinsurgency (COIN) fight and possible future major combat operations.
As the strategic emphasis shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan, former International Security Assistance Force Commander General Stanley McCyrstal wrote: "Protecting the population from insurgent coercion and intimidation demands a persistent presence and focus that cannot be interrupted without risking serious setback."2 This requires the expert use of measured air power—in the form of timely close air support (CAS) and precision strikes.
Close Air Support Must Evolve
As with counterinsurgency doctrine, COIN-centric CAS operations to support this type of fight have generally been neglected since Vietnam.3 In its present form, CAS is primarily reactive. Ground forces should instead be supported with the right mix of platforms and tactics before they ever come into contact with the enemy.
In the 1960s and 1970s in Southeast Asia, the Air Force and Department of the Navy flew aircraft such as the A-1 Skyraider and OV-10 Bronco. These platforms pioneered the concept of a tough, survivable counterinsurgency forward air controller (airborne) aircraft with long loiter times and large ordnance loads. These aircraft provided direct support to Soldiers on the ground. Most important, their capabilities, tactics, and costs were matched to the mission they supported.
But neither has a modern-day equivalent. Expensive, high-end fighter aircraft are filling roles historically preformed by low-cost, light-attack platforms. Moreover, many of our current aircraft and the capabilities they bring are dominant, but irrelevant to fighting a counterinsurgency. For example, the F-22 Raptor, our most modern (and expensive) fighter, has yet to deploy to the Central Command theater of operations.
Future strike-fighter development also seems to be centered around expensive fifth-generation platforms such as the F-35 JSF. Again, these aircraft are incredibly capable (and need to be to counter high-end threats)—but they are not well suited for low-end conflict. We should not overlook the development of low-cost CAS platforms that fit the requirements of COIN in a much more economical and effective way.
In Afghanistan, air power is one of our greatest asymmetric advantages. But rather than evolving our tactics to capitalize on this, air power providers seem satisfied with the status quo. Since 2001, naval aircraft carriers have stationed themselves off the coast of Pakistan to provide air power in support of ground forces in Afghanistan. Although highly capable and effective, these aircraft must transit hundreds of miles and burn thousands of pounds of fuel (from Air Force tankers) to loiter in theater for a precious few minutes before flying all the way back to the carrier for recovery. Air power by its very nature is flexible, but its recent implementation has not been. As campaigns mature, air power should adapt to better match the actual theater requirements.
Not only is long-distance support expensive, it does not allow for meaningful, real-time, collaborative synergies to develop between ground forces and their airborne counterparts. At the tactical edge, the lack of face-to-face interpersonal relationships, limited connectivity, and degraded situational awareness among those involved in the targeting chain make it more difficult to support ground forces.4
Co-Locate Air Assets with Troops
Relationships between commanders (people) are more important than command relationships (those between or within organizations). Ground commanders appreciate air support, but given the choice, most would prefer that these assets fight from the "same foxhole." Although some fixed-wing Tactical Air and electronic-warfare assets are co-located with the troops they support, they are the exception, not the rule.
The solution requires three major tenets: accessibility, precision, and matching theater requirements to the most appropriate platform. This means air power must be ready to service ground commanders around the clock and respond on a moment's notice. To provide this level of support, pilots, planners and infrastructure should be co-located with the ground forces they support. Only through the use of a tightly integrated, well-trained cadre of forward air controllers (airborne), joint terminal attack controllers, and aircraft tailored for counterinsurgency will joint fires achieve the desired level of persistence and precision.
To build a cohesive and effective integrated joint air-ground fighting team, the air power that supports ground forces must be accessible for two reasons. The ground commander must have round-the-clock access to air power, and aircrews must be accessible to—and involved in—planning and preparation.
Ground commanders must constantly balance rules of engagement, collateral-damage estimates, and civilian-casualty issues against the need to use kinetics in pursuit of the enemy and protect their forces. In the complex counterinsurgency operating environment, where conditions on the ground change rapidly, joint fires occur at what Stephen M. R. Covey termed "the speed of trust" in his 2006 book by the same name.
Relationships Matter
When the required level of situational awareness can only be achieved at the tactical level, relationships matter.5 Aircrews must be "mind melded" with the ground commander, know his intent, and be able to operate as a fully functioning team member with the ground-maneuver element.
Unintended casualties during war often trump any tactical success, especially during COIN operations. Every service member involved in the targeting chain must be thoroughly versed in his or her particular area of responsibility and equally aware of the strategic ramifications of civilian casualties on the battlefield. Only through established relationships and an intimate understanding of the commander's intent and ground scheme of maneuver will air power achieve the level of precision required.
Relationships must be developed at all levels between the supported ground forces, air power providers, and others directly involved in the targeting chain. If the ground commander trusts those directing fires, things happen quickly. If those personal bonds are not present, operational execution will always happen more slowly. These types of trust-based relationships must start at the top of the command chain and set the example for subordinates. Flag-level land and air-component commanders must live and breathe the same deployed dust. Likewise, operational- and tactical-level warfighters must also share these same interrelationships.
Some might argue that unmanned aerial systems such as Predator or Reaper are the solution for low-cost, direct CAS support. However, the distributed operations architecture, the competing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)/CAS mission sets, and lack of training, face-to-face interaction, and integration with tactical units make this option less than ideal.
Unmanned aerial systems have a place in the current fight—but are much better suited for ISR than for CAS missions. Ground commanders will argue that effective CAS requires a "man in the loop" and levels of connectivity and trust that unmanned platforms simply cannot provide.
Bringing Balance to Air Power
The Navy and Air Force should immediately acquire a modern light-attack and reconnaissance aircraft to provide capabilities similar to those lost after the retirement of the A-1 Skyraider and OV-10 Bronco, and to augment the aging A-10 Warthog. These "new" aircraft should be capable of operating from austere locations, providing ISR and joint-fires support from a low-cost, highly reliable platform built from the outset to integrate seamlessly with current Army and Marine Corps command-and-control systems.
Their footprint must be small enough not to necessitate major infrastructure improvements or unduly burden existing logistics systems. The current operational tempo is exhausting expensive fighter and tanker lifespans at an alarming rate. A less-expensive light-attack platform would reduce the operational strain on the legacy fleet by replacing or augmenting existing air power assets as needed.
From the standpoints of cost and readiness, the fuel used by an F-15E in one hour equals more than 40 hours of flight time in a single-engine light-attack/armed reconnaissance aircraft. Additionally, as indigenous air forces are established, these platforms are extremely well suited for transfer to partner nations.
Normally, programmatic decisions and platform acquisition require long lead times. In the case of light-attack aircraft, no research-and-development or technology-based delays will slow acquisition. The aircraft are already fielded by a number of commercial manufacturers and are in service with today's Navy and Air Force in pilot-training roles. Industry manufacturers are standing by for the call to produce badly needed light-attack aircraft.6 All of this makes a compelling case: This capability is what the military needs to reshape air power for counterinsurgency.
As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated: "The Defense Department has to consider whether in situations in which the United States has total air dominance, it makes sense to employ lower-cost, lower-tech aircraft that can be employed in large quantities and used by U.S. partners."7
Air power adaptation requires that the services challenge current assumptions and rethink and rebalance their posture, position, and platforms. Using a fully integrated joint air-ground, combined-arms force in conjunction with the other tenets described here will create a vicious harmony that will be lethal and effective on today's asymmetric battlefield.
1. 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, revision 3, https://us.jfcom.mil/sites/J5/J55/SC/default.aspx.
2. Commander International Security Assistance Force Initial Assessment, 21 September 2009.
3. U.S. Army FM 3-24, p. vii.
4. Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Joint Tactical Environment study of operations in Sadr City, 2008, https://us.jfcom.mil/sites/JCOA/.
5. Ibid.
6. Graham Warwick, "Boeing Offers Reborn OV-10," Aviation Week, 23 Sept. 2009.
7. Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Jan.-Feb. 2009.
Commander Mallory is serving as a Provincial Reconstruction Team commanding officer in Afghanistan. He served in the CAS branch of JFCOM J-85 as the forward air controller (airborne) SME. An F-14B Tomcat and F-18E/F pilot and qualified forward air controller, airborne, he has flown combat missions in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
An Affordable Alternative to EMALS
By Charles DeCosta; Lieutenant Commander Charles Greenert, U.S. Navy (Retired); and Eric Jensen
The fledging electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) is central to the success of the Ford (CVN-78)-class aircraft carrier program. System development has been expensive and plagued with technological challenges. According to reports from the Government Accounting Office, Congressional Budget Office, Pentagon, and recent congressional testimony, significant cost increases ($1.2 billion) may delay operational delivery of the CVN-78.1 EMALS is a relatively complicated system of integral motor-flywheel generators, power-control systems, and a large-scale electromagnetic linear induction motor. It will replace the basic steam catapult, a British design that was first used on a U.S. carrier in 1954.
In contrast to EMALS, the first steam catapult was installed on a previously decommissioned carrier, when carriers were plentiful. EMALS is unproven technology being installed on our nation's newest transformational platform at a time when carrier deployment availability is scarce and there is no developed alternative. The performance goals of the new system include:
- The ability to launch larger aircraft
- More even acceleration to decrease stress on airframes
- Greater operational availability
The Navy aims to reduce manning, life-cycle cost, and weight, and to launch aircraft with greater independence from ship's steam systems. So far, the Navy is gambling on EMALS alone. But there is an alternative backup for launching aircraft from aircraft carriers. Using a linear-induction shuttle powered by a series of flywheels containing permanent magnets, the technology is relatively simple. It is called the permanent magnet aircraft launching system (PMALS).
What Is PMALS?
The PMALS design concept was developed by Magna Force, Inc., a small company experienced in non-contact power-transfer equipment that is already installed on some Navy ships. The technology relies on tangential eddy current forces between permanent magnets, housed in a series of motor-driven flywheels, and conductive torque reaction rails.The reaction rails are attached to a shuttle that connects to the launching aircraft. PMALS technology is versatile and scalable. It promises to be efficient, reliable, and affordable. The size, speed, and quantity of flywheels can be adjusted for various performance envelopes, and the hardware can be arranged in various configurations. Regardless, kinetic energy is efficiently transferred directly to the launch shuttle.
In contrast, EMALS technology first converts flywheel energy back into electrical energy, resulting in energy loss. PMALS uses conventional motors and hardware while eliminating much of the wear resulting from mechanical contact between steam catapult components. For example, PMALS eliminates wear between the steam piston assemblies and the cylinders and braking systems. PMALS also operates without elaborate power control and conversion or the electromagnetic interference inherent in EMALS. The model shown here illustrates the design concept.
How It Works
A series of rotor-disc flywheels can transfer enough power to the aluminum-and-steel shuttle rails to smoothly and efficiently accelerate a 40-ton aircraft to 260 knots, without the aid of the aircraft-propulsion system or the speed of the aircraft carrier.The rotor assemblies can produce a linear force of about 360,000 pounds all along the catapult trough. Launch thrust can be adjusted by changing the distance between the rotors and the shuttle assembly. Launch speed can be adjusted by changing the motor-driven flywheel speed. After launching the aircraft, the shuttle is passively decelerated by permanent magnets, without the need for electrical power.
The shuttle that attaches to the aircraft's forward landing gear is accelerated and decelerated without contacting the flywheels or the braking hardware. The approximately half-inch nominal gap between the reaction rails and disks will minimize alignment concerns associated with thermal expansion and ship's movement.
Magnetic forces between the rotating magnets and torque rails act to center the shuttle, minimizing wear on its rollers and contact surfaces.2 The rotating disks also generate diamagnetic forces on the torque rails perpendicular to (repulsive at high relative velocity) the disk, serving to center the shuttle between opposing disk assemblies.
The PMALS system is compatible with shipboard electrical-power management. Use of magnetic couplings will minimize current spikes associated with motor startup. Each launch will use only about 2 percent of the energy stored in the flywheel assemblies. The system accommodates launching aircraft within two minutes of each other.
Eyes on the Horizon
The Navy is struggling to maintain and recapitalize a 313-ship Fleet. According to the president of the Navy League, Mr. Daniel Branch, the Navy is now on course to a Fleet of only 240 ships.3 With acquisition and life-cycle cost continuing to escalate, Navy leadership continues to look for ways to reduce total ownership or life-cycle cost of our capital ships. However, if the service is serious about its total ownership cost, then why is it risking building a brand-new aircraft carrier using advanced technology that is years behind schedule, without a backup plan?From Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead to the commanders of naval air forces and Naval Air Systems Command, naval leadership is committed to implementing EMALS. The CNO also has a strong desire to ensure that we understand and reduce the total ownership cost of our weapon systems.4 A wise old Sailor once said, "Keep it simple, stupid." The PMALS system accomplishes this, resulting in an affordable, low life-cycle cost catapult. The reason is that its technology is simple and easily maintained and operated.
Keep Costs Down
EMALS is complex, with significant dependency on electronics. The initial acquisition cost of any weapon system may represent 50 percent or more of the total life-cycle cost. The Navy and Marine Corps have been challenged in bringing new weapon systems and technologies to maturity and deployment on schedule and within budget. In Fiscal Year 2007, the General Accounting Office reports that the Navy exceeded its original budget by more than $4 billion for 41 ships under construction.To procure or maintain 11 carriers, the Navy will need to spend an average of $3.3 billion annually through 2026 on aircraft carriers alone. In FY 2010, the service will spend $14.7 billion for ship construction. While EMALS may represent a small percentage of the overall research and development and total acquisition cost of the CVN-78, it represents a culture that believes in quantum technological leaps regardless of the cost or impacts to other programs—and often without a fallback plan.
What can the Navy do now to ensure we have an affordable aircraft carrier in the future? Seriously look now at PMALS as a cost-effective backup plan to launch aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles from Navy ships. PMALS is not too good to be true. Both a small prototype launch and braking system have already been built in Washington state to validate the concept. It works.
1. "Navy Ford (CVN) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Report, 16 July 2009. Department of Defense Announces Selected Acquisition Reports, no. 258 10, 1 April 2010.2. IEECPS 2002 CP487 286 11 for December 2009.
3. Navy League of the Unites States Seapower Almanac 2010, p. vi, http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/president-msgjan2010.php.
4. CNO guidance for 2010, Executing the Maritime Strategy, September 2009, p. 5, http://www.navy.mil/features/CNOG%202010.pdf.
Mr. DeCosta is a retired Naval Sea Systems Command nuclear engineer with 45 years' experience in overhauling and repairing Navy ships and their systems. He works for Dell-Federal Systems at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility.Lieutenant Commander Greenert is the former comptroller at Naval Air Station Fallon and readiness officer for Electronic Combat Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island.
Mr. Jensen, a mechanical engineer with a master's in public affairs, is a lead engineer at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility. He has 20 years of experience in overhauling steam catapults and is currently focusing on process-improvement efforts.
Like a Diamond Near the Pearl of the Antilles
By Commander David Saunders, U.S. Coast GuardOn 27 August 2009, the Coast Guard's newest aircraft, the HC-144A Ocean Sentry maritime patrol aircraft, set out for a three-day tour of the northern Caribbean Sea. Commander Doug Nash, operations officer at the Aviation Training Center in Mobile, Alabama, where the HC-144A is based, led the crew. His copilot was Lieutenant Tavis McElheny. The objective was to gain operational familiarization of District Seven's area of responsibility and unique law-enforcement landscape. The Ocean Sentry made stops in Miami, Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Day One: All Quiet
Because of the aircraft's endurance it was able to depart Coast Guard Air Station Miami at a low level. From there it flew along the southern Bahamian chain, the northern coast of Haiti, and the Dominican Republic at 1,000 feet, finally touching down at Coast Guard Air Station Borinquen, Puerto Rico. Two mission sensor operators (Petty Officer First Class James Brewton and Petty Officer Third Class Eric Ernst) managed the complex technologies built into the aircraft's mission system pallet.This team scanned the radar, infrared, and TV cameras to rule out potential targets of interest. Using Inmarsat, a secure satellite network carrying telephone, e-mail, Internet, and file transfer, they communicated simultaneously with watchstanders at the District Seven Command Center in Miami and Coast Guard cutters operating in the region. No suspicious vessel activity was observed during the flight.
Day Two: Not Quiet
The second day was the highlight of the trip. The Sentry lifted off from Borinquen's 11,702-foot runway, fully loaded at its maximum gross weight, after rolling only 1,800 feet down the strip. Immediately after takeoff, the aircraft was requested to return to the air station to transport a small part for a broken helicopter in Guantanamo Bay.Still at maximum gross weight, the aircraft landed using less than 2,000 feet of runway. The reverse thrust features of its turboprop engine allowed for minimal brake usage, which greatly reduced a potential delay on the subsequent takeoff due to brake-cooling requirements.
While patrolling south of Haiti en route to Guantanamo Bay, the HC-144A received a call to divert to a position approximately 30 miles south of Guantanamo for a suspicious vessel spotted by a deployed HU-25 Falcon jet crew from Aviation Training Center Mobile. The Ocean Sentry crew coordinated a handoff and remained covert as surface assets moved into position.
As the HC-144A orbited undetected overhead, the aircraft's sensors provided pinpoint accuracy of the suspect vessel, which slowed to about five knots on a westbound heading, unaware that it was being watched. The boat appeared to be returning from a drug run with an empty load. The Sentry's crew provided updates to the Coast Guard cutter Mohawk (WMEC-913) as she launched a boarding team in her over-the-horizon (OTH) interceptor boat.
The Sentry tracked the OTH boat as it rapidly closed on the suspects: three men wearing all black on board the shady go-fast vessel. When they saw the Coast Guard boat skimming the water in hot pursuit, they powered up their three outboard engines and fled. This was the start of a chase that lasted for more than 100 miles in open waters.
The Sentry crew then changed its flight posture to descend low over the suspect vessel. The aim was to show an overt presence, serve as a deterrent, and provide visual reference guidance for the Coast Guard boat. Because of the excellent view from the HC-144A's cockpit and the all-glass instrumentation, the pilots maintained good situational awareness as events unfolded below.
The instrumentation displayed flight data, radar, and rendezvous (course and distance) information of the suspect and Coast Guard boats. This allowed the pilots to provide the OTH boat with course guidance during periods when the suspects were not visible from the surface.
Meanwhile, Chief Warrant Officer Tom Reed and Petty Officer Third Class Jamie Trout maximized use of the Ocean Sentry's bubble windows to observe and convey new information to the pilots and crew.
The mission sensor operators effectively snapped real-time images of the fleeing vessel and sent them directly to the District Seven Command Center. Additionally, they provided regular updates by chatting over the secure network. Within five minutes of receiving the high-quality pictures, with the vessel still refusing to stop, the commander authorized the Coast Guard boat crew to use warning shots and engine-disabling fire.
As the chase ensued, the Sentry eventually had to depart the scene for fuel. The suspects later escaped into foreign territorial seas where an end game was not possible.
Day Three: All Quiet
The Sentry's crew departed Guantanamo Bay on the morning of the 29th, patrolled through the Windward Passage, and then continued low level en route toward South Florida. They touched down at Coast Guard Air Station Miami in the afternoon and completed their mission.Commander Nash later observed, "The real-time air, sea, and ground coordination between the new HC-144A, Falcon, the cutter Mohawk, OTH, and District Seven was an outstanding technological success." Specifically, he noted:
The aircraft's state-of-the art technology and integrated systems greatly contributed to an expeditious command decision, heightened situational awareness, and overall crew morale. The HC-144A offers versatility and excellent opportunities to expand the Coast Guard's operational paradigm.
ATC Mobile now has five Ocean Sentries, and Air Station Miami received its third aircraft at the end of July 2010.
Commander Saunders is a pilot currently assigned to Coast Guard Air Station Miami. During his career, he has flown the HH-65 Dolphin, HU-25 Falcon, and recently qualified in the HC-144. He flew on board the Ocean Sentry during the operation described here.