Jarhead and Squid, two powerful and capable brothers, eye each other suspiciously in their own backyard. They throw mud, rocks, kicks, and punches. They wrestle to exhaustion. Meanwhile, out front, neighborhood bullies terrorize the local children. When things get really bad in the neighborhood, Jarhead and Squid emerge from their yard and calm things down, but usually, and despite being of the same family and blood, they are too immersed in their sibling rivalry to notice their surroundings.
The Navy Marine Corps team is the most potent war fighting force known to mankind, with capabilities that span air, ground, sea, and space. Institutionally, the duo are tough to beat when they work together, whether on the Joint Chiefs of Staff or in a low-level staff meeting. This is an era of naval power within the leadership of the Department of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a Sailor, the Vice Chairman is a Marine. The Combatant Commanders of Pacific, Southern, Central, and Strategic Commands are from the two services. One former Secretary of the Navy serves as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and two other former secretaries, also former Marines, are U.S. senators. But although these naval leaders as well as the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps often work closely together, there is a significant lack of true joint naval teamwork at lower levels. The Navy and Marine Corps must try to settle their historical and cultural differences. The services owe it to each other, and to the nation, to work toward better teamwork, interdependency, and synergistic efforts.
Recognition and Commitment
At the tactical and operational levels of war, the Navy Marine Corps team works well together, despite cultural tensions. The naval team works well within the larger context of the joint force, too. Expeditionary strike groups serve as a shining example of the potential of habitual teamwork. All is not perfect, of course, but at the tactical and operational levels, common missions, objectives, and shared hardships often assuage distrust and hesitancy to support each other. At the very highest levels the service chief level the CNO and CMC often work side by side. The service chiefs have acknowledged that the two services are growing apart, and are making efforts to stop the bleeding. In the recent Naval Operations Concept, both chiefs stated:
In order to maximize our contribution to the joint, inter-agency, and coalition environment, we must always: look first to one another to fully leverage our strong historic interdependence; conduct assessment and consultation before taking unilateral action that may affect one another; [and] recognize that open discussion and debate is acceptable provided we have a common goal in mind.
They also committed to "greater and more efficient alignment beginning at the service headquarters level." If only the Marine colonels and Navy captains would agree to abide by the guidance of their chiefs, both services would be on the road to success.
But at the institutional level of war, all is not well. This is a brutal and ruthless battlefield that is not discussed in staff colleges or found in doctrine. Its battlefields are the poorly air-conditioned meeting rooms at the component commander headquarters and the windowless caves of the Pentagon. The battles are fought over money and influence within the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, and the combatant commands. Many are fought by the two brothers who don't trust each other and can't seem to consistently join forces for common goals. Sadly, higher staffs abound with Marine colonels and lieutenant colonels and Navy captains and commanders who are just waiting for a hint that the "Navy (or Marine Corps) is about to screw us again."
The Rubs
The Navy frets that the Marine Corps is inflexible and unrealistic, especially in areas such as amphibious shipbuilding requirements (at the expense of building real ships carriers and submarines) and feels the Corps fails to adequately support traditional naval security missions (one reason for the creation of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command). The Marine Corps has raised paranoia to an art form, the result of several real survival-of-the-service struggles (though none recently) and an extraordinary institutional memory that still faults the Navy for leaving the Marines on Guadalcanal in World War II. To help assuage these concerns, the Corps asked Congress for (and received) a three-star deputy commandant for aviation to fight for the Navy's money that funds Marine Corps air programs. The disconnect was so strong in past decades that Congress mandated that the Corps have a general officer on the Navy service headquarters (OPNAV) staff overseeing expeditionary programs (currently called N85).
Today, OPNAV and HQMC are surprisingly separate. Very few officers serve on the other service's staff, despite the common naval heritage and mission, and despite the two services serving a common civilian Secretary of the Navy. Many Marines and Sailors consider it a bad career move to serve on the other service's headquarters staff. Joint meetings are often convened covertly by low-level staff officers, and though there is much common effort when necessary to get a particular job done, the officers return to their separate staffs and grumble about the other's shortcomings and/or prejudices. Imagine the potential power of Navy and Marine Corps staff personnel if they worked first to agree on issues, and only then working with the rest of the joint force staff representatives.
Recommitment to Jointness
The Marine Corps University and Naval War College have very limited joint efforts, again despite seemingly obvious common objectives. Though the Corps does send a strong contingent of Marine officers to Newport, there is weak Navy officer attendance in Quantico schools. There are no formal exchange programs for professors or students, few joint symposia or studies, and each jealously guards their tradition of innovation and academic gravitas. The Corps remembers fondly the role of its schools in the development of amphibious doctrine and equipment in the 1930s, and the Navy has deified Alfred Thayer Mahan who taught the world about seapower at the Naval War College.
Navy Fleets and Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) have limited formal connections, and the formal links between the Marine component commanders (MARFORs) and the Navy component commanders (NAVFORs) are also not what they could be. Happily, these linkages are improving, but more needs to be done. There are still few officers serving on these crucial warfighting, force-providing, and theater-logistics-enabling commands of the other service. There is very limited MEF-Fleet joint training conducted. But Marine and Navy leaders have recently committed to re-evaluating the billets required by the Fleets, NAVFORs, MEFs, and MARFORs, so as to better align the services' requirements and improve their joint efforts. Marine Forces Pacific Command and the Pacific Fleet, for example, have frequent joint G-3/G-5 and N-3/N-5 meetings. Marine Forces Command and Fleet Forces Command often work together on a wide variety of issues. These initiatives are cause for optimism, but need to be formalized and institutionalized.
Another potential effort to bring the Navy and Marine Corps closer together could be to create a joint component command as part of the new Africa Command AFRICOM. Joining the Navy and Marine component commands would save manpower and force the services to work closely together in a key (mostly non-kinetic) region of the world. This naval component commander would alternate between Navy and Marine Corps three-star leadership, with the deputy from the other service. Likewise, key billets would be shared. Naysayers might protest that the logistical roles of the components make this an impossible effort, and perhaps the logistics effort could remain separated into Navy- and Marine Corps specific areas of focus. In administration, intelligence, plans and operations, communications, and other key areas, however, synergies will be possible. If the experiment worked in AFRICOM, other component commands could be combined. There will be concerns about which service the naval components would report to. First, the components work for the combatant commander and will represent a true naval perspective. Second, they would report to both the Navy and Marine Corps service headquarters, and in the event of disagreements and disputes at the highest levels, service chiefs and their deputies might have to get involved. This would only serve to further link the two services.
Practical Realism
Most suggestions for improvement will be dismissed as flights of fancy by the same officers who encourage and sow the seeds of mistrust and paranoia. But a practical, realistic look at options for better linking the two naval services is nevertheless worth discussing. The idea is not to create a single service (although that idea has merit among true integrationists, it is a wholly separate topic), but rather to strengthen the historical bonds and ties to leverage modern naval capabilities. Can the Marine Corps provide highly-trained visit, board, search, and seizure teams to Navy ships, or must the Navy train Sailors in those skills Aviation training is smoothly integrated, and tactical air integration initiatives, if implemented wisely, can strengthen Navy and Marine Corps air capabilities and capacities (this concept is being challenged by Joint Strike Fighter problems, not fundamental Navy Marine Corps disagreements). Medical and religious personnel from the Navy serve honorably and valorously with the Corps, and neither service questions the logic of the arrangement. Perhaps there are similar possible arrangements. Should Marines help fill out the crews of destroyers and cruisers, as well as the new littoral combat ships, effectively bringing back the Marine detachments of old Should the Corps and the Navy join forces to train and employ foreign area officers? There are myriad tactical and operational combinations of the two services that could be implemented. The Naval Operations Concept calls for innovation and creativity (an "intellectual renaissance") in building Navy Marine Corps teamwork. But particularly at the institutional level of war, much needs be done to improve Navy Marine Corps bonds.
HQMC and OPNAV could commit to increased exchanges of officers, perhaps on a one-year basis (i.e., some officers would serve two years on his or her service staff and then the final year on the other service's staff). Perhaps more generals and admirals need to serve across service lines. The Plans, Policies, and Operations Department at HQMC could have a two-star admiral as the assistant deputy commandant and the Navy's N3/N5 could have a two-star Marine general as deputy. The Navy's cutting-edge Deep Blue cell a small research team created in 2001 to develop innovative ideas on how to tackle the war on terrorism on a strategic level should have at least two Marines on its staff. There are currently billets in key areas, such as aviation and programming/fiscal resources, but most departments' and divisions' billets are too few and are underutilized in integration roles, instead being employed as standard action officers.
Areas of Opportunity
The Marine Corps University and Naval War College have many areas for improvement. A twice-yearly symposium of instructors and hand-picked students could improve joint efforts as would joint wargames. The Navy needs to strongly commit to the Marine schools (on the order of 60 Sailors to Expeditionary Warfare School and 40 Sailors to Command and Staff College), and needs to send a solid cross section of Navy specialties. The Naval War College Review should be expanded as a joint effort between the two schoolhouses (perhaps renamed Naval Review) and curricula closely studied for areas of improved commonality.
Each fleet has a Fleet Marine Officer, a Marine colonel who advises the Fleet commander on Marine issues. Each MEF needs to have a Fleet Officer, a line Navy captain to advise the MEF commander on Navy issues. Strong efforts to train MEFs and Fleets together (at least through simulations and war games) should continue to be pursued as should a rebalancing of exchange billets. More Sailors should be on the MEF staff (above and beyond the typical medical personnel, ministers, and naval gunfire liaisons) and there should be an increased Marine presence on Navy Fleet staffs. The same applies to the MARFOR and NAVFOR staffs. Just as the Navy and Marine Corps should speak with a common naval voice within the Beltway, so should they seek a joint voice in combatant commander forums.
One of the obstacles to Navy Marine Corps common causes are the schisms within the Navy itself. The Navy communities submarine, aviation, cruiser/destroyer, etc. fight and bicker among themselves, sometimes making it hard for the Corps, which admittedly has air-ground-logistics rivalries of its own, to find a single-voice naval partner. The Navy should consider a modified version of the Corps' Basic School (the Army is also looking closely at this), in order to give its officers a common beginning and a shared set of basic beliefs. "Every Navy Officer a Ship Driver" might not be the mantra of choice, but some common cause should be sought. Perhaps the course could be three-months long and all officers would attend before heading off to flight school, Surface Warfare Officers School, and the like. This would improve the cultural integrity of the Navy and would boost Navy Marine Corps teamwork efforts. The Navy and Marine Corps should also consider sending more officers and senior enlisted to each other's training and tactics schools, not just the resident professional military education schools.
Look to Positive Examples
In the tradition of the useful Warfighter Talks (a two-day meeting of all the three- and four-star leaders of the two services), there should be lower-level joint meetings to create and develop opportunities for synergy and interdependence. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, and other Congressional directives, mandate that we become a truly joint force. It is hard to ever be joint if we can't even be joint within our own department.
Over the last 70 years (and long before), some Marines have tried to take advantage of the Navy and vice versa; the battle against deep distrust and skepticism will be a significant struggle.
The Naval Operations Concept offers a superb example about teamwork from history:
During World War II, Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly "Terrible" Turner and Lieutenant General Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith were renowned for their volcanic arguments about operational design, force organization, and tactics during the drive across the Central Pacific, yet together they formed an unbeatable team and wrote one of the greatest chapters in our history.
It is important to acknowledge that current operations are eroding the amount of interaction between Sailors and Marines at the tip of the spear. A significant percentage of Navy and Marine junior officers and enlisted personnel have not served closely together because of reduced amphibious deployments and the frequent disembarkation of the Marines once into CENTCOM's area of responsibility. Though units such as Task Force 58 in Operation Enduring Freedom, and other recent examples, confirm that the services remain fairly strong at the operational and tactical levels, in the glorious tradition of our World War II heroes, the Navy and Marine Corps must do better at the institutional level.
Many current naval leaders will have to make a leap of faith, and trust that the more distrustful forefathers' legacy has passed. Many current and former Marines will cringe at the thought of actually serving with Sailors on their staffs. Many Sailors will roll their eyes when they hear they've been assigned to a Marine command. But the effort to more closely integrate will come with rich benefits and will improve both services. It is time for the Navy and Marine Corps to pick themselves up from the mud, stop fighting, shake hands, and head out to do battle together.