U.S. foreign policy in the 20th century was dominated by two competing concepts— the idealism of Woodrow Wilson and the realism of Richard Nixon. The Clinton administration took the idealist tradition to new heights of interventionism—dramatically demonstrated in the war to save Albanian Kosovars from Serbian aggression. The next administration must decide how U.S. power will be used in the new century—and whether we can help everyone in need.
George Kennan, one of the 20th century's most formidable foreign policy figures, has been a frequent critic of the lack of conceptual thinking in U.S. foreign policy. Writing in 1967, he commented bitterly that "it remains my hope that if the Vietnam situation takes a turn that permits us once again to conduct our affairs on the basis of deliberate intention rather than just yielding ourselves to be whip-sawed by the dynamics of a situation beyond our control, we will take up once more the quest for a concept as a basis for national policy."1
Kennan's views on the dangers of a reactive foreign policy lacking a conceptual bearing are as relevant today as they were in the 1960s. This is particularly true in an age when CNN reporting often spurs U.S. action abroad as much as long-term strategic thinking.
A general concept guiding foreign policy is important for a number of reasons. First, a nation's conception of its place and role in the world is analogous to a road map on a cross-country journey. No matter what unexpected contingencies might arise during the journey, a map helps one maintain a sense of balance and direction while fulfilling a long-term objective. Second, a policy based on a clear concept can convey general signals about a country's intentions and interests to friends and foes alike, thereby facilitating a more stable global order through enhanced communication, mutual understanding, and greater predictive powers among nations.
Finally, a foreign policy concept is particularly important in democratic societies. As Alexis de Tocqueville noted in the 19th century, "It is the nature of democracies to have, for the most part, the most confused or erroneous ideas on external affairs, and to decide questions of foreign policy on purely domestic considerations." This confusion is exacerbated by the way democracies (such as the United States) formulate foreign policy. The process is relatively open, and it involves the interaction of many people who often are motivated by different ideas and have governmental decision-making authority for only a brief period. A national foreign policy concept lends coherence to this haphazard process and also mobilizes the citizenry and its military behind the nation's policies.
Realists and Idealists
During the 20th century, two schools of thought dominated thinking about foreign policy in the United States: realism and idealism. Realists believe that relations among states are determined by raw power. National action, according to realists, should occur to balance the power of rival states and augment the power of one's own state. National-interest calculations usually focus on increasing national security through increased economic and military strength vis-à-vis other countries. Idealists, on the other hand, believe that international action should be guided by universal concepts and moral principles—not the balance of power. Notions of justice, human rights, and strict adherence to international law are their guideposts for national action. When action is taken, it should be done collectively—in concert with other nations and with the consent of international organizations. The policies of President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger are examples of the realist tradition, while those of President Woodrow Wilson are considered the paradigm of the idealist tradition.
As a general rule—at least since the late 1960s—Republicans have been aligned closely with the realist tradition, and Democrats generally have carried on the idealist tradition. For example, Nixon's opening of relations with China was a classic realist attempt at balancing the power of an ascendant Soviet Union. President Jimmy Carter, however, often emphasized moral principles and human rights above strategic concerns during his tenure.
It is important to recognize that the realist/idealist dichotomy among different presidents and different political parties is not always clear. President Ronald Reagan's tough anti-Soviet and pro-democracy policies had elements of both realism and idealism. Moreover, the character of Americans—both optimistic and idealistic—and the historical distaste they have had for European-style "power politics" have caused most presidents to articulate realist-oriented policies in idealistic terms. President George Bush's rhetoric during the Gulf War was laced with notions of international justice and democratic principles. His actions, however, were in large measure motivated by such strategic concerns as preventing Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction and gaining control of a quarter of the world's oil reserves.
Containment: A Unifying Concept
After World War II, the Soviet Union's military might and communist ideology posed a hostile, direct, and substantial threat to the national security of the United States. The U.S. response to this threat developed into one of the most purposeful and ambitious foreign policy concepts in U.S. history: containment. Although shaken to its foundations during the Vietnam War and its aftermath, the overall success of this strategy now is unquestioned. George Kennan's famous 1947 article in Foreign Affairs (signed only by "X") was the genesis of this concept.
The United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which the Soviet empire policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.2
Another remarkable feature of containment was its staying power. Every president from Harry Truman to George Bush made containment the centerpiece of his foreign policy, and Congress (for the most part) supported it. Such a policy of long-term patience and vigilance is uncommon for the United States. Containment had staying power mostly because it bridged the ideological divide between realists and idealists. It ultimately became obsolete as a victim of its own success. This is not to say that realists and idealists agreed on the reasons underlying the need for containment. A strong argument can be made that realists generally championed containment because of the increased strategic and national security threats they believed would result from Soviet expansionism, and idealists generally supported containment because the expansion of communism threatened free institutions, international legal principles, and human rights around the world. Nevertheless, there was a consensus that containment should be the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy.
A Splintering of the Consensus after the Cold War
Foreign policy in the post-Cold War world has lost its former sense of purpose and consensus. In one sense, U.S. foreign policy has changed little because realists and idealists have continued to view foreign policy through their same respective philosophical lenses. The Clinton administration, for example, with many of its top foreign policy officials Carter administration alumni,3 has continued the idealist tradition of emphasizing humanitarian concerns. What is different is that without the threatening menace of the Soviet Union, the uneasy foreign policy consensus that existed between realists and idealists has become increasingly difficult to maintain. This is most apparent in the area of deciding when to use military force.
A Reversal on the Use of Force
From the late 1960s onward, many idealists no longer viewed the use of military force as a legitimate or viable tool of U.S. foreign policy. This attitude stemmed in part from the shock waves from the Vietnam War, which rocked the Democratic Party establishment. Cyrus Vance, Jimmy Carter's Secretary of State, was perhaps the ultimate personification of this "Vietnam Syndrome." As Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1964 to 1967, Vance was scarred by his Vietnam experience. Later, as Secretary of State, he was committed to a foreign policy that rejected the use of force in almost every circumstance. In 1979, for example, Vance was utterly dedicated to resolving the U.S.-Iranian hostage crisis through negotiations, without the use of force, and resigned soon after the decision was made to launch a military rescue of the hostages.
During the 1970s, many idealists began to focus on North-South, not East-West, issues while still being acutely affected by America's experience in Vietnam. Even though Soviet-backed regimes and revolutionary groups made significant gains in parts of Africa and Central America during the 1970s, the Carter administration did little to check such communist expansion.
Realists, on the other hand, continued to see the world in terms of U.S. strategic interests vis-à-vis the Soviets, even after Vietnam. They believed it was necessary to employ military instruments, overtly and covertly, in areas where Soviet influence or dominance existed. Thus, Ronald Reagan embarked on a significant expansion of U.S. military might and frequently relied on it to check Soviet expansionism and attain other strategic goals.
This post-Vietnam paradigm—idealists as reluctant to employ military force, and realists as foreign policy warriors—has been altered dramatically by the end of the Cold War. Throughout most of the 1990s, realists generally counseled against using military force, and idealists became humanitarian warriors.
Without the Soviet Union, realists have been less willing to advocate using force abroad, since they believe such power should be used primarily when strategic interests are threatened. It is true that realists still act when national interests are at stake, as in Bush's massive use of force during the Gulf War, but they generally have been disinclined to use force for nonstrategic reasons.
Idealists, however, have become more emboldened in their advocacy of military force. The instability of the post-Cold War world has produced local bullies and warring ethnic factions, resulting in significant human rights abuses around the world. The threat of U.S. troops coming into conflict with Soviet forces or their proxies is no longer a possibility. Consequently, the attainment of traditional idealist goals such as the protection of human rights can now be realized through the use of military force.
Emboldened Idealism and Its Risks
The Clinton administration's foreign policy is a clear illustration of the new paradigm. Whether nation-building in Somalia, installing democracy in Haiti, cleaning up after genocidal conflict in Rwanda, peace keeping in Bosnia and East Timor, or conducting a war in Kosovo, President Bill Clinton consistently has used the military to vindicate humanitarian goals. Perhaps realizing that no previous administration has used the military so often for nonstrategic reasons, the Clinton administration has tried to argue that these uses of force were based on strategic interests. For example, at the beginning of the Kosovo war, Clinton stated that we needed a "Europe that is safe, secure, free, united, and a good partner with us for trading."4
This "emboldened idealism" appears to be a broad-based concept. Addressing NATO troops after the cessation of bombing in Kosovo, Clinton declared, "If somebody comes after innocent civilians to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background, or their religion, and it's within our power to stop it, we will stop it."5 A foreign policy concept for the United States based on such an ideal is troubling.
No matter how noble and heartfelt, basing the use of force on the abstract grounds of vindicating the world's human suffering and injustices will cause us to multiply our commitments dramatically, leading to a foreign policy of undifferentiated globalism. Moreover, most humanitarian interventions are open-ended, requiring long-term military commitments.
Already, there are signs that this situation is exhausting our military capabilities. Despite the Cold War's end, deployment and operational tempo for the U.S. military has increased during the 1990s, while most services are having problems meeting their recruiting goals. The war in Kosovo showed that even a superpower can become fatigued in a relatively short humanitarian intervention. The Air Force had to freeze retirements and end-of-active-service dates to prosecute the war. Such degrading of military capabilities will become a real danger if and when crises affecting our vital national interests arise and we are unable to respond to them adequately.
A policy of emboldened idealism also risks taxing the tolerance of Americans. The television images of suffering in places such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo sadden many Americans, but there is no groundswell of support for intervening militarily, especially when casualties result. Clinton recognized this when he pulled U.S. troops out of Somalia after the death of 18 Rangers. The danger, then, is that emboldened idealism, especially if unsuccessful or costly in terms of American lives, could try the patience of the public with the entire concept of military intervention abroad.
Finally, emboldened idealism has a tendency to crowd out realist-based strategic thinking. Seemingly lost in the din of celebration over the cessation of bombing in Kosovo is the fact that the war simultaneously and seriously strained our relations with China and Russia, the only two countries that have the capacity to seriously threaten U.S. security. If relations with these countries spiral into confrontation, the war in Kosovo in the future might be viewed as a strategic blunder, rather than as a humanitarian success.
Democratic Realism: A Potential Concept
What, then, should be the concept and guiding principles for U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world? Like containment, any foreign policy concept with staying power needs to be able to bridge the philosophical differences between idealists and realists, while also winning public support.
"Democratic realism," based on three fundamental principles, has this potential. First, borrowing from realists, it would focus on long-range strategic concerns. The demise of the Soviet Union did not end the need for strategic thinking in U.S. foreign policy. Issues such as preventing rogue nations from attaining and delivering weapons of mass destruction and bringing lasting peace to the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and the Taiwan Strait should top the agenda of any administration.
Second, democratic realism would borrow from idealists a focus on humanitarian issues, particularly the promotion of human rights and free market democracies abroad. This emphasis would be consistent with fundamental U.S. political ideals, and therefore would gain public support. Realists also could embrace such an emphasis, given the growing volume of scholarship showing the strategic significance of the proliferation of democracies throughout the world. According to Michael Doyle of Princeton University, liberal democratic countries have never engaged in war with one another.6
The goals and expectations of promoting such principles, however, should be undertaken with a long-term vision and a degree of humility. Free market democracies and the eradication of ethnic strife and human rights abuses cannot occur overnight in countries without traditions of self-rule or capitalism. Our policymakers would do well to remember that even the United States had to endure the failure of its first constitutional order, a bloody civil war, and a lengthy enfranchisement of all its citizens on the road to becoming a true democratic society.
The third principle of democratic realism would be to resist the urge, now seemingly prevalent among policymakers, to use the military as the principal tool to achieve idealist-oriented goals. Military intervention should not be viewed as a panacea to right every wrong in the world.
Resisting this urge will be difficult. Tragic televised images of suffering abroad tug at our hearts daily. There seems to be a consensus among current U.S. foreign policy makers that the military serves no purpose unless consistently deployed. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed this sentiment to General Colin Powell while arguing for sending troops to Bosnia. She asked him, "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?"7
Such a statement represents a naive assessment of the international environment at the dawn of the new millennium. Unfortunately, there are numerous serious national-security threats looming on the horizon that will provide our leaders the opportunity to use the military.
Preserving our military's capabilities and the public's appetite to see its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines fight wars that directly relate to our security is one critical reason why we need a coherent concept as the basis for national policy. Touching on the principles of democratic realism, George Kennan captured the essence of the need for such a concept when he said that the United States needs a
concept based on a modest, unsparing view of ourselves; on careful examination of our national interest, devoid of utopian and universalistic pretensions: and upon a sober, discriminating view of the world beyond our borders. . . . [A] concept, finally which accepts it as our purpose not to abolish all violence and injustice from the workings of international society but to confine those inevitable concomitants of the human predicament to levels of intensity that do not threaten the very existence of civilization.8
We would do well to heed the wisdom of his words.
1. George F. Kennan, "The Quest for Concept," Harvard Today, Autumn 1967, p. 90. back to article
2. "X" (a.k.a. George Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, July 1947. back to article
3. President Clinton's first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, and his current Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, held prominent foreign policy positions in the Carter administration. back to article
4. Charles Krauthammer, "Confused on Kosovo," The Washington Post, 26 March 1999, p. A12. back to article
5. Bob Davis, "Cop of the World? Clinton Pledges U.S. Power Against Ethnic Cleansing, but His Aids Hedge," The Wall Street Journal, 6 August 1999, p. A12. back to article
6. Michael W. Doyle, "An International Liberal Community," in Rethinking America's Security, eds. Graham Allison and Gregory Treverton (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), p. 307. back to article
7. Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 561. back to article
8. Kennan, "The Quest for Concept," p. 90. Captain Sullivan serves with E Company, 4th Reconnaissance Battalion. back to article