It does not matter how sorties are categorized or how many are flown. What counts is what air power is achieving to help meet the joint force commander’s objective.
Air apportionment long has been a source of contention within joint operations. The issue has degenerated into arguments over which service component gets more or less air power contributing to its mission, and the joint force commander (JFC) now plays referee over who gets what, deconflicting component operations rather than orchestrating them toward a strategic end state.
Joint doctrine defines air apportionment as the "determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for a given period of time." Traditionally, air apportionment is expressed as a percentage of total available aircraft sorties or the actual number of sorties applied to mission categories such as counterair, close air support, air interdiction, and strategic attack.
Expressing air apportionment in this way, however, overlooks air apportionment as the level of combat power directed at achieving a task linked with the JFC's concept of operations. Using mission categories and sorties buries the supported JFC objective and does not measure air power's effect on the enemy. We focus on our own operations rather than focusing on how the enemy reacts to our operations.
A better way of expressing air apportionment is one directly connected to specific JFC objectives and the desired completion time for that objective. In fact, joint doctrine says the JFC's air apportionment decision is "based on the assigned objectives and concept of operations." This method simplifies air apportionment by expressing it in terms of "what" to achieve and "when" it should be achieved. More important, it maintains a direct link to the JFC's objectives.
The Problems of Categorization
The traditional air apportionment categories do not clearly describe what is to be achieved. They bury the JFC objective under a generic heading. The categories might be useful to the pilot or his squadron, but they are not useful to the JFC. The JFC is concerned with achieving a strategic end-state and the associated operational objectives. In turn, the JFC's components develop their own supporting objectives, nested within one or more JFC objectives.
For example, an essential objective during the 1991 Persian Gulf War was to reduce the combat effectiveness of Iraqi forces in Kuwait, especially the Republican Guard divisions. Air operations against these formations included destroying their command-and-control and logistics capabilities, both inside and outside the Kuwaiti theater of operations. These strikes would fall primarily under the traditional air apportionment category of air interdiction, but because the Republican Guard was considered part of the Iraqi strategic center of gravity, it also could have fallen under strategic attack. After Coalition ground forces made contact, air attacks on these forces fell under close air support.
Using these categories shifts the focus from joint operations and objectives as a whole to tactical-level details best left to the component commanders. The JFC begins to micromanage component actions—the number of sorties flown, for whom, and when. An example of this tendency to "get into the weeds" occurred during Operation Allied Force. Headquarters Joint Task Force Noble Anvil called the Combined Air Operations Center one evening and wanted to know why a particular B-2 mission did not release 2 of its 16 Joint Direct Attack Munitions. The component commanders are experts at what they do. Second guessing component actions, by the JFC or his staff, creates a hostile relationship, adding friction and ultimately impeding or preventing accomplishment of the assigned strategic objectives.
Measuring Combat Power
There are some problems with using sorties to measure combat power. The first regards the nature of a "sortie." Joint doctrine defines a sortie as "an operational flight by one aircraft," but this does not address whether the flight accomplished its assigned mission. A sortie is still considered successful even if the aircraft flies to its target and cannot employ its munitions, but nothing was done to affect the enemy's capability.
Second, there is no indication what munitions are being used, falsely implying that all sorties are of equal combat power. A B-2 sortie is not the same as an F-16 sortie; each aircraft has unique performance capabilities and carries different munitions in number and type. Using a sortie as a measure of combat power is even more meaningless when precision-guided munitions are considered. An aircraft with precision-guided munitions can attack multiple targets in one mission.
Third, using sorties drives the JFC's staff and components to focus on how many sorties the air component flies and for whom; this becomes an end in and of itself. The objective the sorties are attempting to achieve becomes invisible, or worse, is considered "achieved" when the appropriate number of sorties is reached. In fact, Air Force Instruction 13-1AOC advocates not using "percentage of sorties applied against aerospace mission categories" for air apportionment.
Most important, the number of sorties flown does not tell the JFC what those sorties are achieving; it does now answer the fundamental question of how close we are to achieving the JFC's objective. Nothing is gained by using sorties as a measure of "expected effort." It adds obscurity to an endeavor in which clarity is necessary for success.
A New Method
Air apportionment is an attempt to express a level of combat power using air forces applied to a desired task or end; this is the heart of strategy. Strategy is a matter of matching what is to be achieved by the operation, what must be done to the enemy to achieve that end, and what forces are available that can affect the enemy in the desired way. Implied in this is the time to achieve the desired end.
The JFC uses objectives to measure progress in a campaign. Clearly defined objectives prevent confusion over what the joint force is trying to accomplish and reduce the risk of mission failure. Quantifiable objectives ensure the JFC knows when the desired end has been achieved. Therefore, it makes sense to use the JFC's objectives for air apportionment—they are tangible and progress toward them can be measured. Because the JFC prioritizes his objectives, priority for air apportionment is half done. It will be clear to all components what the priority will be for the JFC objective they have been tasked with supporting.
Using an assigned objective for air apportionment will have more meaning to all the component commanders involved. For example, in a situation where a land component's attack requires a supporting effort to deal with an adversary's operational reserve, the JFC can assign the air component an objective to render the adversary's operational reserve unable to conduct counterattacks on the land component or to destroy its offensive capability by D+10. Using the objective as the apportionment category, the supported commander can see what will be done and when; he will not have to interpret what some number of sorties of air interdiction or close air support really mean.
This method encourages better collaboration between subordinates during operational planning because supporting objectives describe what aspect of the adversary's capability the JFC or other component wants to affect. Ideally, the JFC will become involved only if the components cannot accomplish their assigned tasks within the desired timeframe. The JFC must trust component commanders to accomplish their tasks and to coordinate without interference from higher headquarters so long as they remain consistent with his guidance.
Because sorties are inadequate measures of air effort, a better method is required. A simple percentage of aggregate combat power available to the air component may suffice; "50% of combat power to achieving air superiority over the joint operational area." However, using the time it takes to achieve that objective is a better way to express combat power. In fact, sorties or weight of effort are indirect means of expressing the time it takes to achieve an assigned task. In general, a higher number sorties or weight of effort implies that a given task will be accomplished in less time. The JFC is responsible for synchronizing his forces in space, time, and purpose, so time is an important factor in his mission.
The JFC will determine the time the task should take to complete based on how the task fits into his concept of operations. The air component commander can estimate the time it will take to achieve an assigned task with assigned resources; if the JFC's desired time cannot be met, more resources will be needed. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War there was an implied time limit to offensive operations based on the Muslim holy season of Ramadan. Consensus at the highest levels was that to maintain the coalition we would be wise not to fight a Muslim nation during Ramadan. Using time as a measure does not mean a "checklist" driven war—setting hard and fast timelines is a recipe for disaster—but orchestrating joint forces over time is the JFC's responsibility and will be the supreme test of his ability as an operational artist.
Ultimately, using time as a measure provides the JFC a better means of orchestrating what tasks the components are to accomplish. This changes the dynamic at the joint level from micromanaging what components are doing (i.e., counting sorties or bombs dropped), to watching how the enemy reacts to what the components are doing. The truest measure of operations is when the enemy reacts in a way that is consistent with the JFC's concept of operations or that can be exploited.
Colonel Weber spent ten years in Air Force space operations with assignments at the squadron, wing, and major command levels. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff Officers Course and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He is assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command in the Requirements and Integration Directorate.