Naval aviation’s greatest challenge today is to field a credible air arm and prepare its operators to employ their invaluable assets effectively. In the future of tactical aviation, the most formidable aspect of this challenge resides in maintaining an unmatched level of pilot training with respect to any air defense system in the world.
The Navy has demonstrated a solid commitment to building a secure foundation for its air crews between their initial acceptance into flight school and graduation from the Fleet Readiness Squadron (FRS). Today’s FRS syllabus reflects an in-depth effort to expose young pilots in the strike fighter community (which now includes F-14 and F/A-18 aircraft) to the broad introduction required of current weapons and tactics. Effective training, however, cannot end there.
Ongoing fleet training is the cornerstone for success in producing a responsive naval expeditionary force that can withstand the rapid technological advances being made daily in threat weaponry. The difficulties associated with sustaining a superior force warrants continuous review by the Navy’s top leadership in these major areas:
► Who trains our forces?
► What equipment is required to support training?
► What means exist to improve the quality of the overall training program?
Under the current movement to downsize our forces, it would seem that an abundance of solid personnel are readily available to provide an unparalleled training team. Yet as the Navy shrinks, it is also looking for ways to restructure its adversary training program to reduce personnel. Current proposals within the Antiair Warfare Programs Office call for the Naval Reserve to man a major share of the adversary force. These reserve air combat training units would be comprised of three to four active-duty junior officers, six temporary active reservists, and 20-25 part-time reservists.
Although this approach may appear cost-effective at first, the Navy’s superb history of providing first-class air combat training does not support this nearly all-reserve structure. Organizations within the Navy that have produced the most effective tactical instructors have verified repeatedly that a new instructor’s teaching ability is determined and shaped largely during the initial apprenticeship in an adversary squadron. Teaching how to teach is a very time-consuming and well-regimented process; convincing a fighter pilot to listen as an instructor—rather than dictate his thoughts—is nearly impossible. Daily reinforcement of the initial instruction process over a six-month period yields unparalleled success in producing first-rate air combat maneuvering instructors for the fleet.
Even the best aggressor squadrons have observed that once an individual has developed a particular training presentation, it is difficult for that individual to implement any form of change or make regular updates and modifications to the presentation. Looking at today’s fleet squadrons and their incorporation of tactics standardizetion committees, many face tall obstacles in motivating personnel to stay abreast of current intelligence and fleet inputs. To overcome these same challenges in an organization manned primarily by part-time personnel will be extremely difficult.
Turning to the issue of equipment support, several additional lessons should be drawn on. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union, many budget analysts are quick to dismiss any future threats to U.S. security. Our military history, however, offers important lessons toward adoption of a different security posture.
Following the end of World War I, the United States worked hard to return to its own coastline, ignoring most international developments that led to the outbreak of the next war. The United States downsized drastically prior to World War II, and many military experts argue that reducing our force structure led to significant extension of the length—and losses—of World War II. The inability to counter Germany’s growing military might in the late 1930s forced a major delay while the United States faced the enormous task of rearming itself. The Korean War forced a quick reversal to an identical downsizing move that began after the close of World War II. That move to disarm began despite rapid growth of the Soviet Union as a major international military power.
Today’s naval military leadership needs to pursue the vital education of the President, Congress, and the media on issues that directly impact future threats to U.S. personnel. The Soviets led the world in arms exports to the Third World between 1987 and 1991.1 During that same period, China ranked fourth in the world. Companies like Mikoyan (producer of the MiG-29 Fulcrum) and Sukhoi (manufacturer of the Su-27 Flanker) continue to exist in Russia today. Decentralization of communist ecnomic control has created major incentives for actively pursuing the increased international weapons sales. In 1991 alone, 215 MiG-29 aircraft existed around the world outside of the Soviet Union.2 As the United States should have learned when alliances changed in Iran, Western-built hardware also presents serious military threat potential. In addition, 356 F-16 aircraft are found in countries outside of the United States, and an additional 108 Mirage 2000 fighters have been exported by France. Nations like Iran and India also have expressed significant interest in acquiring the Flanker from Sukhoi.
Today’s MiG-29 threat—located in every forward operating area visited by the U.S. Navy—is greater than ever. The Su-27 also represents significant accomplishment in narrowing and eliminating technical-performance advantages once enjoyed by U.S. forces. The U.S. cannot face these threats by stepping backward.
Having provided fighter pilots with unparalleled training that affords the defining advantage in today’s air-combat-maneuvering environment, the Navy must make tough decisions on ways to sustain such a precedent. The shortfall of the F-16N—the first U.S. adversary aircraft to model existing threats effectively—is inadequate fatigue life. This deficiency has forced the aircraft out of service well before original expectations. The Navy does not possess the resources to sustain F-16N aircraft support in the years ahead. Current plans initiated within air warfare call for fourth-generation threat simulation to be provided by Lot 9 and earlier F/A-18s. The current force multiplier chosen for the future is the F-5, forcing implementation of additional service-life-extension measures for an airplane already exceeding 15 years of age. Finding the means to challenge U.S. fighter pilots in training during the next ten years must be a prime concern in air warfare, and it can be accomplished only by extending the current boundaries of naval aviation.
Passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act has heightened the pressure to improve interoperability among the services. Major aircraft development programs face incredible odds if they do not transcend traditional development paths. Training of our tactical air crews offers a unique opportunity to improve the war-fighting capability inside the Navy and Air Force while substantially reducing costs.
The Navy maintains an outstanding training site at NAS Fallon, Nevada. To the south lies the equally impressive complex at Nellis Air Force Base. The current volume of traffic required to meet the operational commitments of each site already ensures that there is no duplication of effort and quickly dismisses any benefit in physically consolidating the two sites. The support structure at each site, however, holds the key to savings and improved training. Since the Air Force terminated its adversary program, the Navy has been attempting to avoid such a drastic costsaving measure.
Can a method be found to handle all of the current deficiencies in the training of Navy tactical aviation forces? The following proposals are put forth to aid in reorganization of the training structure for the stringent times ahead:
► Establish a single training center, located at Nellis AFB, that is responsible for providing to all Navy and Air Force tactics instructors a unified instruction program covering: essential teaching skills, tactical doctrines, U.S. weapon-system capabilities and limitations, threat weapon systems, tactics, and pilot-training expectations.
► Establish two detachments that will be responsible for providing training programs to Navy and Air Force operational units. Each detachment would be comprised of Navy and Air Force tactical instructors. Assigned instructors should continue to come from active-duty 0-3 and 0-4 personnel serving between fleet/tactical operational tours. The unit responsible for training Navy air wings would be assigned to NAS Fallon; the detachment supporting Air Force units would remain at Nellis AFB.
► Support the NAS Fallon site with Air Force F-16 and F-15 aircraft maintained by Air Force personnel, and support Nellis AFB with Navy F-14 and F/A-18 aircraft maintained by Navy personnel.
► Eliminate all other active-duty Navy adversary programs.
► Provide reserve air combat training units to support FRS training with T-45 aircraft. FRS instructors would assume primary instructional responsibilities with dedicated, well-trained reservists providing fundamental air-combat-maneuvering training support for FRS students.
► Offer the Air Force current Navy F-16N assets for repair and force integration into Fallon if the Air Force deems it fiscally advantageous when their F-16 modification program is finalized.
► Consolidate the Navy’s Fighter Weapons School with the Air Force’s. Redirect current Navy Fighter Weapons School training emphasis toward Air Force program objectives. Provide the fleet with competent tactics-training officers who graduate from this Joint Weapons School immediately prior to beginning a department-head assignment.
These proposed changes can serve to reduce the overall number of personnel currently employed to train Navy and Air Force tactical aviation communities. On an 18-month cycle, the Navy can handle up to 12 air wings at Fallon, allowing for two three-week sessions for each air wing over the course of an 18-month period. During the initial visit, current introductory programs now offered in the Fleet Fighter Air Combat Maneuvering Readiness Program, the Strike Fighter Air Combat Maneuvering Readiness Program, and the Advanced Attack Readiness Program can be presented. Allowing a six-month break for organic unit-level training to refine skills gained during the first visit to Fallon, the air wing can return for advanced power-projection training, including strikes against Air Force units at Nellis that would be receiving concurrent strike-warfare training. Attention to sound scheduling would ensure joint-training opportunities and replace the current Red Flag syllabus.
This program requires open communication and commitment between the Navy and the Air Force, from the top down. Its enactment can go a long way toward preventing the largest single worry inside the Defense Department today: a return to a hollow force.
1 S1PRI Yearbook 1992, “World Armaments and Disarmaments," Stockholm temational Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992.
2 The Military Balance 1990-1991, The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1990, Nuffield Press, Oxford, Great Britain, 1990.
Lieutenant Commander Burris is currently completing a masters degree in Aeronautical Engineering at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He flew as an adversary tactics instructor pilot in VF-45, located at NAS Key West, Florida.
Proceedings/February