This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
After a full day of operational planning with naval, air, ground, and special-operations component commanders and key coalition officers, the Army lieutenant general will receive a final target briefing from his joint forces air component commander (JFACC) staff. Minutes later, the joint task force (JTF) commander’s joint operations center will transmit an order to commence strikes in accordance with the air tasking order, and the JTF commander will move next door to the video teleconferencing room to contact both the Unified Comman- der-in-Chief and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (4,000 miles away) to assure them all is proceeding according to plan. Within another ten minutes, the commander will go with the public affairs officer to the press room where the live reporting by the 40 members of the press will play an important role in keeping the American public informed. Then, the commander will be off to the joint intelligence center, which should just be receiving indications of enemy reaction to the coordinated strike.
tior
fig!
neit
hop
job
P
wil
the
for<
joir
exe
bili
the
I
tea
cor
of
ena
niei
situ cor Plo she Pos 9ua in t Use
trai
tot
JTi
hir<
are
the
qu:
to
Prc
ing
%
be^
Seq
eX{
Prc
co,
arte
cot
erc
ags
Mr
Prc
lirr
Prc
\y;.
Of
he;
joi
Of
As learned from the lessons of Desert Storm, this scenario is not unique. The difference here is that this scene occurs on board a U.S. joint command-and-con- trol (JCC) ship, a concept that was recently evaluated during U.S. Commander-in-Chief Atlantic’s joint exercise Ocean Venture 93. Prior to this exercise, the USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20) was revitalized and transformed into a platform better able to support a joint commander and his staffs, including a JFACC. The lessons learned from Ocean Venture 93 provided a unique opportunity to demonstrate the viability of the JCC’s potential contribution to our new military strategy, which views the future as being characterized by shrinking defense budgets and personnel levels; a declining Russian threat, complicated by internal uncertainties of the former Soviet Union; increasingly complex regional threats; and a rapid advancement of military technology.
A new regional defense strategy is evolving to ensure success in this environment. War fighting will be done by integrated joint or combined forces with interoperable command-control-communications-computers-intelligence (C4I) systems. Our military posture will include smaller forward-deployed or stationed forces that will be used to strengthen alliances, show resolve, and dissuade challenges. While these forces must be poised to respond quickly and decisively if required to do so, rapid augmentation of forward-deployed forces by well-trained forces based in the United States will be key to any large-scale crisis response.
As in Ocean Venture, a joint task force commander fro* any service can be designated to head the regional cris response. An adaptive joint force package would be tJ lored specifically for the crisis at hand, and the JTF cob mander would have the benefit of continuous commun cations with all the component commanders, intelligent assets, war-fighting forces, theater CinCs, and the Nation Command Authorities. Degrading any aspect of these cob munications links would minimize coordination and d‘ grade combat potential. The joint command-and-contn ship specifically addresses these vital concerns by pi( viding the joint task force commander with a highly m( bile, integrated C4I capability—a vital waypoint towai the Department of Defense’s C4I for the Warrior concep As articulated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs c Staff in C4I for the Warrin “The C4I for the Warrior coned will give the battlefield coi* mander access to all informant1 needed to win in war and wi provide the information whet where, and how the command wants it.” Key to this concept1 force interoperability.
Today, Army, Navy, A' Force, Marine Corps, Coa! Guard and special operation forces C4I systems are not full interoperable; information whin could be of use to the entire ted in war cannot be shared rapidl) Resolving this situation is no\»' key goal for each service, allf which are currently building tf ward the C4I for the Warrior v> sion. The Joint Staff is ah' working to correct interoperabi ity problems by building trad lators for service-specific systefl1 to exchange data with otld forces.
At this stage in our develop ment, each service has built afl‘ used service-unique mobile cod mand centers and communic9 tions and intelligence-processing vans, but these mobil; systems are not interoperable and come together only un# ad-hoc conditions. Also, each system (except for tb Navy’s aging command-and-control ships) requires e> tensive host-nation basing, electrical power, and infd structure support for operations.
Interoperable C4I means not only systems that can tab to each other but also realistic training, common prod dures, and joint planning as well as collocation of the J’fl commander, his principal subordinates, and joint planni® boards. Our services are fully interoperable now at tb; JCS level, and changes in recent years have brought abo3 virtual interoperability at the Unified-CinC level.
58
Proceedings / January
Components of a joint task force must train togetb3 to win, but a JTF formed in response to a crisis have little training time. Expeditionary forces seldom enjc' the benefit of months of preparation time—as in Oped
:r frof tion Desert Storm—and forces that have practiced only to I criS fight the last war should not be sent into future combat; be taj neither should they be sent out lacking joint training, in 7 coif hopes of working out coordination issues through on-the- imun job training.
igent A joint command-and-control ship during peacetime ation- will provide an integrated C4I capability and serve as ; coif the nucleus for realistic training of a standing joint task nd di force command element, in support of various adaptive :ontr* joint force packages, on a continuous basis. For training y ph exercises and combat, a JCC will serve as the C4I capa- y bility that joins the vital links that are being forged in owaf the force packaging, training, and doctrinal arenas, incef During exercises or in the initial stages of a crisis lefs c reaction, the JCC can accommodate instantly the JTF irrioi commander and all or part oncef of the JTF staff, which will con1 enable joint training to com- natio mence quickly for the specific d wil situation at hand. As the joint whet command-and-control ship detank ploys to the operations area,
;ept1 she will carry with her a composite joint task force head- , A' quarters, trained and exercised Coai the same facilities she will ttiot use in combat, t fult The benefit of realistic whid training was readily apparent : teaf to the staff and augmentees of pidl) JTF-140 during Ocean Ven- now ture. The first few days of any all c exercise or real-world crisis tig to are always chaotic. This time, however, the majority of ord the augmentees were located in the same mobile head- als1 quarters. Exercise players trained together while en route trabs to the exercise area, helping each other understand the trani problem at hand, learning each other’s spaces, and learn- stefl1 'n8 the fastest way to contact various points of the ship, otltf Watch standers soon synchronized their schedules and began to codify the procedures they were developing. Con- ■elop sequently, by the time the Mount Whitney arrived in the It aH' e*ercise area, the JTF staff was operating smoothly. cor1 The efficiency of joint and combined operations im- inicJ Proves greatly through the exercise of joint doctrine and lobil common procedures. Techniques developed in training undc a°d exercises will be the ones used in crisis situations and ,r tli war. Current service-specific procedures fail frequently to :S e> consider joint interoperability, but JCC training and ex- infta ercising in peacetime—with representative joint force packages—provides a means of identifying procedural and doc- n tal' hinal areas that need modification. Some service-specific rocf Procedures will not be changed, but operations in peace- 2 jff time will give the joint JCC staff familiarity with these nniiif Procedures.
lt $ The nature of future conflict is joint. To do the job aboil with a new downsized base force demands the full use of the total joint military force, and the CinCs will rely ethf ^avily on the best contributions of all services to the wjl joint effort. Almost every major crisis response and joint enjo! exercise reestablishes the importance of the collocation pepi of the joint task force commander and principal subor
dinates (or their representatives), because only the component commanders can ensure that the JTF commander is properly advised of the potential contributions of their particular forces. In many scenarios, it may be necessary for the component commander to be separated from the joint task force commander. In cases where the component commander must be with his forces, a representative officer of sufficient expertise and authority should be with the JTF commander. Whether the component commander or a representative is collocated with the JTF, the JCC will provide adequate C4I to keep him in contact with his forces.
The joint command-and-control will provide suitable spaces for all service and component commander staffs and associated C4I connectivity as well as spaces and interoperable equipment to support all elements required of a joint task force commander, depending upon mission requirements and the adaptive force package selected.
In future major regional contingencies or wars, joint force operations will likely take place where host-nation basing is either geographically impossible, politically prohibited, or undesirable. The JCC’s ability to operate independently of shore support gives it a capability to react regardless of these considerations. Even when host-nation basing is authorized, there may be a lack of adequate infrastructure to support or defend command elements, in which case a JCC would also provide electrical power, hotel services for the staff, and environmental control for C4I systems.
As with any new idea, many questions must be addressed, and the answer to each of the following questions must be “yes.”
► Is the joint command-and-control ship defendable? The JCC must be able to operate worldwide, including
high-threat areas where it will rely on accompanying joint forces and its own mobility for defense. Point defense weapons will also be carried for overall system survivability against mission-degrading threats. Since the JCC's primary role will be C4I support to an embarked JTF commander, threats to the JCC will include severing communications links through electronic countermeasures and physical attack. Flowever, the JCC’s mobility and ability to use redundant communications paths should make it far less susceptible to this type of enemy action than a shore- based headquarters in the operating area.
> Can the joint command-and-control ship get in place quickly enough?
Joint Command and Control Ship Headquarters Spaces | |
JOC | Joint Operations Center |
JIC | Joint Intelligence Center |
JFACC | Joint Forces Air Component Commander |
JFSC | Joint Fire Support Coordination Cell |
JRCC | Joint Rescue Coordination Center |
JEWC | Joint Electronic Warfare Center |
JPOTF | Joint Psychological Operations Task Force |
JCATF | Joint Civil Affairs Task Force |
JMCC | Joint Movement Control Center |
JIB | Joint Information Board |
LRC | Logistical Readiness Center |
59
A ready-to-sail joint command-and-control ship can depart for a crisis area as soon as the JTF staff embarks; the JCC can even depart early and embark the staff later. Either way, permanent installation of all joint and component C4I systems, spaces, equipment, and support per-
Putting the JFACC to the Test
By Captain C. R. Rondestvedt, U.S. Navy
The Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) (Afloat) concept is new to the Navy, requiring extensive education and training to resolve operational control issues. To ensure that the deploying JFACC (Afloat) team is tested and combat ready, a training continuum is necessary throughout the battle group turnaround training cycle.
. . From the Sea” describes the future focus for Navy and Marine units in an expeditionary role. After initial crisis response, Army and Air Force units join the expeditionary force, bringing to bear the focused power of combined arms. This joint force in the air arena executes under the aegis of the Joint Forces Air Component Commander.
Because the initial response to many crisis situations involves only the Navy and Marine Corps team, JFACC doctrine embraces the concept that it be located with the preponderance of air forces. JFACC (Afloat) is a comprehensive organization located on a carrier at sea until the beachhead and shore support allows sorties to grow beyond approximately 250 per day, at which time the JFACC (Afloat) moves to a command-and-control ship or to the beach and becomes known as JFACC (Ashore).
Preparation for a January 1993 JFACC (Afloat) composite training unit exercise-air—an initial embarked air wing exercise—began in October 1992. Within three months, a comprehensive combat plans handbook was developed, and special instructions related to the exercise were created.
>■ Planning Cell. The 100-sortie- shell air tasking order development
time decreased to three hours by the third shift, leaving approximately eight hours for tactical planning and liaison. The need for laptop automatic data processing with fragmentary order works or a contingency theater air control system automated planning system (CTAPS) was identified. A component command liaison communication net is required. Planners must be current in both aircraft and tactics.
► Air Tasking Order Cell. Augmentation by carrier air group strike operations officer and yeoman support is crucial. Air tasking order preparation decreased from eight to five hours because of better planning cell input and training. The use of automatic data processing would significantly decrease transcription errors.
► Current Operations. Joint forces air component commander and combined warfare commander (CWC) do not overlay because of basic doctrinal differences of JFACC centralized battle planning and management and CWC limited communication with command by negation. Similarly, roles of nuclear-powered multipurpose carrier (CVN) strike operations, air operations, and CDC require doctrinal JFACC integration. More exercises are required to define a structure responsive in either non-JFACC or JFACC environments. JFACC component representatives sharing time between current operations and the planning cell were critical to exercise success.
► Communications. The Genser message system was used as a backup to more rapid PC-to-PC transfer via international marine satellite. Battle group teletype was extremely slow, and the worldwide
Tl
co
V
izt
tic
Cc
CO
V
Ci;
SC
ni:
or
Pa
m:
de
en
ne
V W;
ap
Jo
te
fa
°1
at
ar
A
tii
(f
di
m
in
JF
tii
ai
Pi
ol
ti;
at
Si
Pi
w
ai
sc
ei
c;
c;
as
th
o|
as
ta
military command-and-control system was cumbersome. The CVN CTAPS was capable as a remote site only requiring alternate transmil methods to overcome lack of CTAPS host-site capability.
Post-exercise perspective revealed the need for a JFACC training continuum, spanning the turnaround training cycle. Ideally, a contract- supported instructional system development training analysis would define this continuum and the equip' ment required. Because of the current fiscally austere environment, however, self-help empirical data will be required to identify problem areas for resolution. Consequently, the following timeline is offered to ensure that the teams are tested tactically prior to deployment.
► Two months post deployment: Team representatives meet and discuss training objectives. Sample combat handbook and special instructions are provided.
>■ Three months post deployment: CTAPS and JFACC concept training is provided by local weapons schools.
► To he announced: Limited air tasking order joint operations are conducted with available Air Force composite wing.
► To be announced: JFACC (Afloat) computer simulation (i.e., Air Force Blue Flag computer sirm1- lation) is conducted for a battle group / CVW staff.
► To be announced: Finalize JFACC organization, perform executive JFACC exercise, and identify communication limitations. Update special instructions for the compos- I ite training unit exercise-air (Comp' |
sonnel on a JCC alleviates previous requirements for moving these type of forces by strategic lift, removing C4I systems from competition with war-fighting forces moving into the area. Since a fully-manned JCC en route to a forward area would have full connectivity with joint forces in the operations area, joint forces preparing to depart, and
Proceedings / January
si
°1
St
60
the Unified CinC, time to move the JCC into the arc;i should not be a factor. International consensus buildi^ and the national decision-making process involved 1,1 larger-scale contingencies will allow the JCC to be the area of operations long before promulgation of ct»' cial National Command Authority decisions.
TUEx-A) scenario, and review the combat plans handbooks.
► Fallon CVW Detachment: Finalize CompTUEx-A special instructions and combat plans handbook. Conduct joint strikes with Air Force composite wing.
,irii
ild
nor
► Composite Training Unit Exercise-Air: The JFACC (Afloat) uses schedule of events only. The planning cell develops shell air tasking order. Air tasking order cell prepares air tasking order and transmits, and the current operations test decision flows in schedule-of-events environment. Intelligence and connectivity issues are identified.
d
uif
r
i j
en1
y-
to
ac-
iS'
► Fleet Exercise A, B, C: Full wartime scenario is provided with apportionment guidance to test the Joint Targeting Board, Joint Air Intelligence Cell planning cell interface, communications and current operations tactical decision process, augment integration effectiveness, and transition ashore to Marine or Air Force.
iii*$
;e
C'
S'
In light of a JFACC training continuum, the issue of Navy JFACC (Afloat) augmentees takes on a new dimension. The JFACC billet augment philosophy is based on extracting air wing combat pilots from JFACC (Afloat) headquarters functions within 72 hours. To this end, airwing pilot JFACC (Afloat) replacements must be comprised of tactically current aircrew. Potential location of new billets for these augment personnel includes Naval Strike Warfare Center, Naval Fighter Weapon School, Type Wing Weapon Schools, and carrier air group and tactical aviation squadron staffs. For instance, in the exercise above, the multipurpose carrier strike operations officer and carrier group yeoman shared duties as Deputy Current Operations, while the carrier group strike operations officer and multipurpose carrier assistant strike officer filled the air tasking order cell. Special opera-
tions and Air Force components provided representatives that split their time between current operations and planning cells.
Because the exercise lasted only four air-tasking-order days. Navy augmentees external to the team were not included. It became evident, however, that current operations requires four Navy augmentees (two per shift) with VA. VFA,
VAQ, VF. or VAW carrier experience. Combat plans requires a Deputy Director of Combat Plans, two team leaders, six planners, and two intelligence officers to extricate airwing pilots fully. From a JFACC training continuum standpoint, locating the planning team leaders and planner billets in the Type Wing Weapons Schools provides the subject matter expert source for early turnaround training.
Locating the Augment Deputy Director of Combat Plans billet as leader of the Combat Plans Augment Team at Naval Strike Warfare Center provides a subject matter expert for carrier air wing Fallon detachments. Current operations aviator augmentee billets could be spread among other source commands .Given this proposed structure, augmentee training occurs during the Navy-led joint exercise envisioned for fleet exercise. By participating in fleet exercise, the augment team not only realizes training but also assimilates procedures unique to the battle group that the JFACC augment team may next support. In the event that a parallel process occurs on the East Coast, two JFACC augment teams could be developed and available to respond in case of multiple crises.
A bad strike plan may lead to unnecessary losses, and the same may be said for a bad JFACC (Afloat) air tasking order or hesitancy in current-operations decision making.
Into whatever form the ultimate training and augment structure
evolves, there is urgency in these unstable times to ensure that the JFACC (Afloat) and its augment team are properly tested prior to deployment.
Recent recognition that a JFACC (Afloat) may be appropriate in the initial stages of an expanding interdiction operation that eventually transitions ashore led the Chief of Naval Operations in July 1993 to change OPNAV1NST C3501.298: Battle Group Staff Projected Operational Environment to state, “Battle group staffs can operate as a component of or as the JFACC directing tactical air control within a joint, unified, or allied environment.”
The August Tandem Thrust 93 Joint Exercise under Vice Admiral Wright’s 7th Fleet command demonstrated this capability by putting Air Force CTAPS software into Navy NTCS-A architecture on the Blue Ridge (LCC-19) and demonstrating the ability to transfer JFACC (Afloat) to the 13th Air Force Guam shore facility. It also showed that best JFACC location may not necessarily be with the preponderance of air assets but rather with the preponderance of C4I connectivity capability.
Concurrent joint JFACC working group meetings focusing on training and C4I connectivity issues are refining the JFACC concept, while numerous joint exercises are scheduled to test the evolving JFACC vision. The final organization developed—bringing Air Force, Navy, Army, and Marine Air Forces under one command structure—will effectively focus power projection capability of leaner expeditionary forces of the future.
Captain Rondestvedt was Third Fleet Joint Operations/Plans Officer, where he served as JFACC Naval Forces Representative during Tandem Thrust 93. He is currently Commanding Officer, Service School Command, Naval Training Center San Diego.
iP'
> Can the communications paths be supported?
■fil The Navy has made great strides in service-specific jii shipboard command and control. Experience gained by jii operating command-and-control ships with embarked staffs, as well as experience supporting embarked flag
staffs on many other classes, has proved that ships at sea can support multiple communications paths, as displayed by the Mount Whitney during Ocean Venture 93. The robust C4I capability required by Ocean Venture’s JTF commander and component staffs required multiple communications paths. For this purpose, the Mount Whitney
was revitalized by an extensive C4I capability, which provided increased access to military and commercial satellites; additional paths for voice, data, video, and imagery communications at high-data rates; access to the Public Telephone Switched Network, the Defense Switched Network, the Defense Data Network, and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS); and extensive internal communications systems and networks with access to various databases for planning and execution of operations.
One of the most notable successes of the communications upgrades was the JWICS system. JWICS provided the bandwidth required to support the joint task force joint intelligence center with video teleconferencing and high- baud-rate computer communications with shore-based intelligence centers at both the theater and national level.
JWICS was instrumental in providing quality intelligence support to the JTF-140 staff and component forces. It was used by JTF-140 analysts to maintain a continuous dialogue with analysts at the theater joint intelligence center. Because of JWICS, battle damage assessment was accomplished faster and targets that required restrike were hit sooner; component and staff requests for intelligence information were answered sooner, significantly speeding up the planning process; and confusing intelligence issues were frequently resolved using the video portion of JWICS, resulting in clearer presentation of intelligence information.
> Is there room enough on board?
A joint command-and-control ship designed for flexible, expandable joint force C4I must provide adequate living and working spaces for a staff of up to 800 (Ocean Venture required an augmentation of approximately 300 for the Mount Whitney). A large amphibious hull (LPD-4 or larger) could be reconfigured to support the JTF headquarters, including component commanders and on-board theater/tactical sensor processing capabilities. Purchasing a commercial passenger ship and converting its extensive public spaces to support a joint task force could prove cost-effective; however, a redesign of a hull currently in production would allow C4I systems to be more efficiently and effectively incorporated into the basic design and would provide a potentially significant increase in service life over the conversion of an existing platform.
► Can the nation afford a joint command-and-control
ship?
Economic issues will shape our future capabilities and
force structure. Despite all the capability a joint commas and-control ship would provide, a careful weighing c i these benefits against the cost of the ship will determif whether or not it is efficient at the national level. The JC( not only will contribute to a more efficient flexible re sponse for crisis support but also will be used for trail ing joint task forces and potential JTF commanders. Tf JCC is expected to save dollars, equipment, and—poter tially—lives. The benefits of the joint command-and-cof I trol ship are great, and the initial costs may be a goo investment and a way to contribute to efficiently dow1 sizing our forces. The question, therefore, is not “Ca } we afford it?” but rather, “Can we afford not to have it
The downsizing of military forces, the shrinking c the defense budget, and the changes in the internation order have resulted in increased reliance on C4I interof, erability and teamwork—words synonymous with join11 ness. The efficiency of joint and combined operations d be adversely affected or improved by the total force’s O system, and selective investments here can result in bi; payoffs in force optimization. The JTF commander shoe have continuous communications with his component' the theater CinC, and the National Command Authority All services must plan missions with full three-dime11 sional knowledge of the enemy’s disposition—all friend! forces must be playing from the same sheet of music.
On 19 August 1993, USCinCLant formally presented mission-need statement for a joint mobile command and- control capability to the Joint Chief of Staffs jof requirements oversight council. The presentation i,: eluded the option of filling this requirement by buildin a joint command-and-control ship, and the joint staff1 currently studying this proposal.
A joint headquarters should have the capability of ge: ting into a functioning mode immediately—while en rou1' to the area of operations—and should be able to mo' with or without host-nation support.
The young sergeant who seated our section for the Friday evening parade at the Washington, D.C. Marine Barracks was asked if the Army’s drill team from Fort Myer would be appearing that evening, as rumored. “Yes sir, they’ll be here,” he responded.
“What is the difference between the Army and Marine drill routines?” someone else asked.
“Well, sir—for one thing, we are not allowed to drop our rifles,” the sergeant said with a grin.
Anthony L. DeLuca
62
(I
*
The joint command-and-control ship is a concept tf will meet these and many other real-world requiremef economically, leading to an improvement in the joint ta>‘ force decision-making process, a better synchronizati'11 of varied war-fighting capabilities, and an overall increa' in U.S. combat potential. C4I is a high-leverage weapon' it deserves an effective platform.