Patrol Craft Can Maintain Littoral Sea Control
By Lieutenant Richard C. Arthur, U.S. Navy
There is plenty of rhetoric these days about the littoral aspect of modern naval warfare. As much as official policy touts the doctrine of ". . . From the Sea," however, no one on the leadership side of the house seems to be paying much attention. In spite of policy, the last decision to come out of the Pentagon in this regard was that the Navy didn't need coastal patrol boats. Our leading admirals and civilians talk with gleaming eyes of buying "the next generation" of the same planes and aircraft carriers and Tomahawk-throwing ships that we have now (and, incidentally, of figuring out a way to send them out unmanned because today's officers and sailors no longer desire to follow these same leaders to sea).
Sadly, this is no surprise. In times of great change, leaders without a clear vision of the future often cling to notions of what worked earlier. Yet, now more than ever, platform-design emphasis must be reevaluated in terms of likely battlefield environments and likely adversaries. Given these factors, it is easy to understand the composition of our present fleet. But it also should be easy to see why we need to consider decentralizing and diversifying our fleet.
Today, the U.S. Navy is composed of platforms designed to fight the Soviet Navy, a powerful deep-water adversary During the past decade, however, the fleet has been modified to depose ramshackle despots who can't fight back. Modern doctrine seems to rely on the premise that all that will ever be necessary is to shake our big sticks—aircraft carriers and cruise missiles—and the beasts will shrink back into their holes clamoring for mercy. But even after monumental efforts in Iraq (repeatedly) and Kosovo, this is proving ineffective.
Any good hermit crab knows he just has to climb back into his shell until the sea gull gets bored and leaves. (Milosevic, after all, did not settle until NATO threatened the use of ground forces.) Our weak-willed reliance on technology alone has developed into a white-glove doctrine that infers that in future conflicts the Navy will not need to get its hands dirty; after all, say planners, that's why we have cruise missiles and Aegis ships. But has the Navy become a stand-off force? If so, where does " . . . From the Sea" fit in, including the nasty little business of taking Marines to the beach and then supporting them?
Consider a scenario in which close-in capabilities will really count, to see why it is imperative that the U.S. Navy have a powerful fleet of toothy (and cheap) patrol boats.
Our amphibious Navy is cutting circles off a hostile coastline to which we have just deployed our Fleet Marine Force. The ships cannot be too far out because it would take the helicopters too long to reach the beach—not to mention the landing craft, air cushion (LCACs), and the utility boats. (The next-generation MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, while capable, will be no substitute for LCACs and boats when it comes to carrying the massive loads of supplies, equipment, and vehicles required to support the force on the beach.) So here we are, launching and recovering helicopters and boats less than 20 miles from the beach—but we're not the only ones around.
In war or peace, a local fishing fleet probably will be on hand, trying to make a living. We know that potential foes (North Korea, for example—and there are others) use tactics that include dressing up their missile-bearing small combatants to look very much like fishing boats. How do we combat enemies who use these tactics?
Take it from a fleet officer-of-the-deck who has spent the last four years forward deployed to the Western Pacific that you cannot identify positively anything about the multitudes of small fishing boats among which we operate constantly in close quarters. Any one of them could have had missile launchers on board, and there would have been no way to know about it until we already were in flames. If some venture to assert that fishing boats will be restricted from the theater of operations, or intelligence sources will identify friend from foe, they are mistaken. If we engage in conflict with North Korea, are we to restrict fishing in all of the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea to protect ourselves? That is what we would have to do to identify guerilla boats and it probably cannot be done; it is hard to imagine that local governments would agree to curtail a major economic activity. The idea that our intelligence forces would be able to pick one guerilla boat out of thousands is ridiculous.
This is a perfect environment for U.S. Navy patrol craft—sea control is imperative throughout the amphibious objective area (AOA), from the beach out to and beyond the amphibious ready group. Volumes of doctrine spell out the way in which Tomahawks, naval surface fire support, and sense-and-destroy armor munitions are integral to littoral warfare, but what units will truly ensure that the amphibious ready group will able to operate in the AOA? Will an amphibious task force commander risk assigning an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class guided-missile destroyer or even an Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class guided-missile frigate to maintain sea control of the littoral?
Right now, I am sure that the admiral will say "Yes," although it is doubtful if these ships designed to shoot down Soviet bombers can deal effectively with small surface contacts other than oil platforms. But what will the admiral say after one of them is sunk with all hands by a fleet of fishing boats, and the American people watching the television news see the coffins begin to roll out of the cargo aircraft? Congress and a shocked American public might not allow another admiral another opportunity to commit such a ship.
Because of the uncertain risks posed in this area, by low-cost, low-technology weapons that are part of any Third World arsenal—mobile shore-based antiship missiles, antisurface and antisubmarine mines, and rogue high-speed fishing boats carrying the ubiquitous shoulder-mounted rocket-propelled grenade launchers—the answer is "No."
There are too just many ways to target with cheap weapons our high-technology, expensive, blue-water ships for our commanders to send them in to do the job. According to U.S. Marine Major General Edward Hanlon, Jr., writing in the 1997 July/August issue of Surface Warfare, "The loss of any vessel in today's environment is unacceptable." (Unacceptable, that is, in terms of loss of life, loss of defense assets, and loss of public resolve for the mission.)
Aviation might be used as an alternative to maintain sea control, but this approach would not fit into the oft-touted vision of amphibious ready groups operating independently of aircraft carriers. Marine Corps aircraft might be available, but most of these probably will be heavily engaged in supporting Marines ashore. If so, the only option might be the small number of armed helicopters—Army or Navy—deployed on our cruisers and destroyers. While this option proved marginally effective during Operations Desert Strike and Desert Storm, their limited firepower and time-on-station presented real problems. Aviation assets can provide presence, but they would find the search-and-seizure mission quite difficult.
The solution to this problem is the littoral patrol craft—an inexpensive patrol boat that is equipped to detect and deal with a range of threats, including small enemy combatants, armed fishing vessels, small rubber raiding craft, and localized air threats. They should also be capable of providing limited fire support for coastal and riverine raids.
Another attractive feature of the patrol boats is their capability to maintain forward-deployed pockets of limited presence. While we have allies in all theaters, many of these nations would object to a large, permanent foreign presence. They might accept a smaller, less-obvious force—perhaps three patrol boats whose crew and support personnel would total less than 100 Americans. Using these assets, the U.S. Navy could maintain a continuous—albeit small—presence in South America, Southeast Asia, and African countries without tying down our larger, crew-intensive, and already overcommitted larger ships. We should deploy the littoral patrol craft continuously in independent squadrons—working closely, but not exclusively, with amphibious ready groups. When not employed with these groups, the squadrons could become a naval version of the U.S. Army's Green Berets, assisting allied countries in antipiracy and counterinsurgency operations.
If our global strategy depends heavily upon success in the littoral environment and not merely blue-water sea control, it is time to get serious about building and supporting a platform that is capable of controlling the shallows. Littoral sea control promises to be a dirty proposition that will not be won by over-the-horizon combatants that commanders are unwilling to place in certain danger. It calls for ships that are, small, but swift, heavily armed, austerely manned—and expendable.
Lieutenant Arthur is assigned to the Naval Recruiting District San Francisco, California. He served in the Western Pacific in the Germantown (LSD-42) and the Belleau Wood (LHA-3) home-ported at Sasebo, Japan, and most recently was a United Nations observer in the Western Sahara.
Transitioning to Digital Chart Navigation
By Commander Zdenka S Willis, U.S. Navy, James Goodson, and Edwin Danford
The Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS in combination with Global Positioning System (GPS), provides one of the biggest advancements in bridge navigation since the introduction of radar.
The navigation of a Navy vessel, steeped in tradition, is fundamental to all operations. In March 1998, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) established a new policy that sets the stage for a revolution in the way the Navy will navigate its surface vessels and submarines. The policy, which provides for the safe transition from paper charts to digital data and computer systems, establishes a new term: Electronic Chart Display and Information System-Navy (ECDIS-N).
Based on a United Nations Safety-of-Life-at-Sea (SOLAS) Convention, all commercial ships must carry an up-to-date chart; formerly, that meant paper charts. In November 1995, the International Maritime Organization promulgated a resolution entitled "Electronic Chart Display and Information System" (ECDIS) that sets the requirements for commercial vessels to replace paper charts with digital charts displayed on interactive computer systems. The resolution does not specify a specific system as the "S" in ECDIS implies, but rather defines the term:
ECDIS = Hardware + Software + Data Format + Data Content + Displays Control + Testing Plans
The resolution is the foundation for the Navy's ECDIS-N policy developed by Navy representatives, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the U.S. Coast Guard. Although the Department of Defense is not bound by U.N. conventions, it makes sense from both a safety and business perspective for Navy to follow the ECDIS performance standard as closely as possible, for the following reasons:
- ECDIS represents a ten-year worldwide effort that has been tested at sea.
- The number of commercial SOLAS bound vessels (30,000) significantly exceeds the Navy's inventory.
- The Smart-Ship program on board the USS Yorktown (CG-48) proved that commercial electronic-charting systems can be used safely with only a few modifications.
In addition to providing guidelines for safe transition from paper to digital formats, the ECDIS-N policy defines the minimum performance standards for electronic navigation systems. Changing the way a vessel navigates involves issues that are just as much cultural as technical—much like going from sail to steam during the last century. To allay fears of moving too quickly away from the paper charts, the policy requires use of paper charts until the Navy certifies ECDIS-N systems and fleet commanders-in-chief grant approval for use within their theater of operations. The first systems are being introduced now; the goal is to equip the entire fleet by fiscal year 2007.
Planners minimized changes from the civil standard. The recent DoD mandate to use commercial standards and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software and products was a key issue. Because many commercial endeavors sell digital charting data and systems to support the commercial shipping community, it was evident that the Navy had to establish a policy and requirements for using any commercial electronic-charting system, as well as the digital products to support these systems.
Since the policy does not specify a single system, both commercially available and government systems will meet requirements. The Navy decided, however, that only the DoD digital products will be used on board Navy vessels. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency produces these in the vector product format (VPF) family, e.g., (Digital Nautical Chart (DNC . . .) and Tactical Ocean Data (TOD . . .) series. These products must be used in their original format without change to ensure compatibility across combat systems. The decision was based on the following factors:
- Interoperability. Operation Desert Storm emphasized the importance of a common tactical picture. Products in VPF allow for a smooth transition from submerged to surface and overland operations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has adopted the same standard.
- Cost. NIMA is funded to provide maps and charts to U.S. forces at no cost. Commercial charting products would require expenditure of additional ships' funds.
- Liability. The Navy depends on NIMA to certify that its products are safe for navigation.
- Crisis support. NIMA is chartered as a combat support agency, and is directed to support real world crises.
The mapping and charting digital products provide the foundation for system design in two product formats: raster and vector. Raster products are essentially pictures of a chart or map. The Navy uses these for command-and-control, and for aviation mission planning. For nautical charting applications, however, the Navy chose vector products, which are contained in a relational data base that can be interrogated and manipulated for tailored display. New inventories of vector products are being produced to support ECDIS-N. Table 1 correlates these digital products with their paper product equivalent.
DNC is a smart relational data base derived from the paper charts used by the Navy today. In simple terms, DNC is made by scanning the paper charts into the computer and then digitizing the features on the chart into points, lines, and polygons. The features are further described in details within each file. NIMA expects to complete the Navy's worldwide DNC requirements by late 1999; Coast Guard requirements will be satisfied during fiscal year 2001. Figure 1 shows the location of the current DNC holdings.
TOD is a companion product designed principally to support submerged navigation. It also will provide surface and subsurface vessels with operating information during military exercises; production has begun.
ECDIS-N, used in combination with GPS, represents a significant step forward in navigation. It allows the user to plot where one "is" as opposed to where one "was." By automatically assessing the navigation information, it increases situational awareness and allows the navigation team to evaluate the current situation rather than simply plotting the ship's position. Most of the errors in navigation are introduced by human error—adding, subtracting, and plotting incorrectly; ECDIS-N will reduce these types of errors significantly.
It permits three types of displays: standard, base, and other. Figure 2 depicts a standard display, which is considered the minimum for safe navigation. Figure 3 depicts a base display that contains the minimum information than can be displayed by the system—this is useful only for mission planning but is not adequate for navigation. The "other" display is used by the crew to add information unique to its operations. A watch stander can tailor the display to a specific preference by turning features on or off. Figures 2 and 3 depict this capability by turning the sounding data off. Interestingly, soundings are not normally part of the standard display, but are considered by many mariners as critical for safe navigation.
To ensure that the display of the chart is familiar across all systems, ECI)IS-N defines standards for both colors and symbols. The operator must be able to adjust the display for ambient light. ECDIS-N defines six color palettes that support dawn, day, dusk and night steaming. Figures 2 and 3 are examples of the display for day bright and day with black background respectively. Many of the systems can overlay either radar contacts and the radar image onto the chart display—useful while navigating in restricted waters or in areas with reduced visibility.
The system supports both route planning and monitoring, enabling multiple routes to be planned and saved for future use. The system must be able to select automatically the best resolution of the chart product for an area and refresh the display so the ship does not "fall off the edge of the screen." One of the most powerful tools of ECDIS-N systems is the automatic grounding avoidance feature found in route planning and route monitoring. Automatic grounding avoidance correlates the ship's position, draft and safety ellipse with the DNC, and generates alarms if the system detects potential hazards along the ship's track. The system must also provide a full set of alarms if the system is malfunctioning.
Figure 4 illustrates a combination of these capabilities. The numbers associated with the waypoint indicate the planned route. The time tics of the own ship's vector indicate where the ship will be if it maintains course and speed. The time stamp indicates track history. Automatic grounding avoidance is shown by the soundings in red. Finally, the popup window indicates query capability. Other standard tools support distance measurement, dead reckoning, anchor detail, and navigational notes.
The system also provides a record of a vessel's track. The following information is recorded: digital chart used, course and speed information, acknowledgment of alarms and indications, and historical ship's track. In addition to the obvious legal implications, it is useful for retracing a ship's course in the case of a man overboard. It also can serve as a training aid.
ECDIS-N calls for automated updating of the digital charts, which will significantly decrease the workload in correcting the charts. Today, one can update charts with the onboard drawing tools, but the goal is electronic updating. Government and industry partners are working together to ascertain the best update methodology. One possible method under study, emissions using web technology, would allow a ship to access the home page and download the appropriate updates. Navy communications lines will be used in supporting the submarine force and ships without a network connection. Update CD-ROMs also will be mailed to ships in the interim.
There will be a steep learning curve. Although DNC offers the navigation team some very powerful tools, it is technically complex and will require training to understand its full capabilities. NIMA has developed full utility navigation demonstration software to ease the transition. The software does not fully meet the requirements of ECDIS-N and therefore cannot replace the paper chart; it can be used, however, to increase situational awareness on the bridge significantly. It also can be used as a training aid for transitioning to the new navigation products and tools. A copy was sent to every Navy vessel in December 1997, and copies can be downloaded from the NIMA home page www.nima.mil. The delivery was accompanied by a navigation handbook, which expands the ideas presented in this article. The navigation handbook and other information on ECDIS-N can be viewed by going to the following web site: www.oceanographer.navy.mil, and then clicking on the "GI&S" acronym in the table of contents.
The policy has been signed; now it is time to make ECDIS-N a reality. The benefits will include real-time plots of one's position on the display, automated plotting of the navigation information, reuse of stored navigation routes, minimizing human error, and alerts to navigation dangers. Although the transition presents a challenge, the enthusiasm of Navy sailors to accept electronic charting will bring this goal to reality.
Commander Willis, a 1999 graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, is assigned to the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. James Goodson is responsible for mapping and charting requirements in the Office of the Oceanographer of the Navy. Edwin Danford is NIMA’s liaison officer with the Navy.
Naval Propulsion for the 21st Century: The Azipod System
By Kit Bonner
The Azipod System (Azimuthing Electric Propulsion Drive) is becoming the favored marine propulsion system for many ships ranging from river icebreakers to Carnival Cruise Lines' 70,400-ton Fantasy—class ships.
Built by ABB Azipod, an affiliate of Finland-based Kvaerner Masa Yards, the system is an electric-powered main propulsion unit that can be installed on any size vessel. The unit consists of an aerodynamic strut-supported, hullmounted pod, which contains an electric motor turning a fixed pitch hydro-dynamically designed propeller.
Integrated support systems that provide control, engine cooling and hydraulic steering are mounted in the hull above the unit. An Azipod unit can be placed in any location on the under side of a ship's hull and can rotate—or 'azimuth' 360 deg. Its electric motor(s) can be powered from any source, e.g., diesel, gas turbine. To ensure watertight integrity, the unit is provided with an oil seal and bilge-pumps. The system is controlled from the bridge through wheel and joystick steering. The pod(s) can provide either pushing or pulling (tractor) power.
Since its inception in 1990, when Kvaerner Masa Yards first installed a prototype unit on board the waterway service vessel Seili, the system has enjoyed phenomenal popularity among European shipping lines. No naval vessels, however, have yet been designed to use the Azipod system, nor have any been retrofitted.
Keeping ice channels accessible has been a constant concern for the Finnish Maritime Administration, which is interested in any system that allows a ship to maneuver with high power in all directions. Icebreakers leading merchant ships through open leads must be able to maneuver at will through surrounding ice fields to provide assistance. ABB was asked to provide a new system that could direct propulsive thrust in any direction, thus giving a vessel an unlimited number of maneuvering options. A self-contained, pod-like unit was conceived that combined the steering and propulsive power system, and quite literally abandoned the contemporary shaft, propeller and rudder assemblies.
Also eliminated were all of the required engineering spaces, such as the shaft alley, and the constraints of power drive alignment and placement. The Azipod Propulsion System, as it became known, could be powered from an electric source in any designated location aboard ship permitting flexibility in ship interior layout not possible with the traditional approach.
Rather than convert an existing icebreaker, the Maritime Administration opted to retrofit a small waterway service vessel, the Seili, with a single 1,500 kiloWatt Azipod unit. The results were extraordinary; within four years, two 16,000 dead-weight ton arctic tankers, the M/S Uikku and the M/S Lunni were converted as well as an icebreaker, the IB Rothelstein. The success of these units coupled with cost savings and improvements in performance over the traditional shaftpropeller-rudder system led to contracts with Carnival Cruise Lines (CCL) and, most recently, with Royal Caribbean International (RCI). The newly commissioned 70,400 ton Fantasy class MIS Elation and sister M/S Paradise (CCL) both employ two 14 megaWatt Azipod units and the 136,000-ton Eagle-class cruise ships being built by Kvaerner-Masa for (RCI) will be equipped with three such units. The Eagles, expected just after the turn of the century, will be the largest cruise ships ever built at 1,054 feet in length; they will be capable of carrying 3,840 passengers.
Azipods can be placed anywhere on the hull of virtually any size vessel employed for any purpose. They are not yet limited in size or power output. The two 170-ton (unmounted) 14 megaWatt Azipods installed on the 70,000-ton CCL cruise ships give them a speed of 22 knots; an increase to 25 mW could provide up to 27 knots. Higher speeds are possible dependent on hull design and propeller shape.
The unit is angled at 6 deg on the hull for the best possible propeller traction. Its shape and strut assembly act as a competent rudder with steering capability at speeds as low as two knots without propeller power. Hagglund hydraulic motors provide rotative power that turn the pods at 8 deg per second. It takes 22.5 seconds to turn the unit 180 deg or 20 seconds to reverse the thrust from full ahead to reverse. Crash stop performance is thus extraordinary with the added safety margin of being able to steer toward a desired stopping point. Course keeping and yaw checking present no problems as evidenced in tests at sea on board a number of Azipod-equipped vessels.
Tests confirmed that the two 70,000ton Fantasy-class cruise ships equipped with Azipods achieved an 8% increase in propulsion efficiency and reduced the diameter of their turning circle by 30% compared to sister ships equipped with traditional systems. Increased maneuverability with the Azipod system is a given, especially in confined areas. Interestingly, had the Titanic been so equipped, she likely would not have struck that iceberg!
Depending on design need, a ship can be equipped with one or more pods, some fixed (Fixipod) and others azimuthing (Azipod). The Eagle class will use two rotating 14 MW Azipod units and one 14 Mw Fixipod. The pods and normal bow thrusters will enable these ships to remain in a designated location despite high winds and inclement weather.
Aside from the obvious advantages, vessels equipped with Azipods benefit from reduced vibration, quieter operations, space savings, and versatility in machinery location. In essence, they provides a marine architect with opportunities for creativity not possible with contemporary designs.
The U.S. Navy has experimented with a variety of propulsion options over the years ranging from controllable jet drives to the immediate post-World War II Kirsten Cycloidal Propeller. No system to date has been deemed to offer enough improvements to replace the conventional shaft-propeller-rudder combination.
Future naval vessels will require speed, instantaneous responsiveness, quiet and economical operation, and maximum flexibility of internal space arrangement. Personnel requirements will be low, as will life-cycle costs. It is widely recognized that the surface warship of the 21st century will be an on-call, multimission, floating, microchip-controlled weapons platform. The Azipod concept comports well with that definition. It allows war fighting and seakeeping dimensions not previously possible with current design. Here are some of the advantages:
- Increased maneuvering power for ships of any size-critical for close-proximity, high-speed operations
- Speeds better than 35 knots for surface vessels
- Adaptable to gas turbine and other power plants
- Reduced shipboard propulsion plant vibration
- Overall quieter operation-vital for ASW
- Expanded interior space availability in lieu of shaft-lines, rudder machinery, and other associated traditional propulsive systems-more room for electronics, improved crew habitability, and/or fuel.
- Flexibility in machinery location
- Fuel savings and reduced personnel requirements for operations and planned maintenance
- Retrofitting warships of any class or size
- Replacement of damaged Azipod units can be accomplished within days after the vessel is docked
- Hull design versatility
The primary overriding benefit is that the Azipod concept could allow navies and marine architects the freedom to design a warship without being hampered with the constraints of the traditional propulsion methods. This would enable a whole new spectrum of possibilities in creating the warship of the future. The only concern voiced so far is that the old salts will miss the comfort of the traditional system. Of course the same comments were heard when atomic power, missiles, and Aegis were introduced.
Mr. Bonner is a naval and maritime historian specializing in research, consulting, analysis, and lectures. A technical consultant for director James Cameron’s hit movie Titanic, he resides in Fair Oaks, California.
History on Ice
By Carl L. Olson and Robert W. Selle
Contrary to popular misimpression, Alaska was not acquired in one piece. It was assembled in parts over several years. Some of the coastal areas were ceded by Czar Alexander II for $7.2 million in gold in 1867. The word "Alaska" never appears in the convention (treaty) of cession signed in Washington, D.C., on 30 March 1867. Moreover, no boundary line was established in it, since the land areas ceded were separated by open waters from Russia.
To define what was being ceded, however, lines in open ocean were described in the treaty (sometimes collectively called the "1867 convention line"). One segment started in the Bering Straits at a midpoint between two islands less than three miles apart (Little Diomede Island on the U.S. side and Big Diomede Island on the Russian side), and then proceeded due north into the Arctic Ocean. The next segment started at the same midpoint and proceeded generally southwesterly through the Bering Sea for about 1,000 miles through a midpoint between Attu and Copper islands. The final segment was the north-south 167 deg east longitude line, which goes between Bering Island (on the Russian side) and Copper Island (on the U.S. side).
The treaty stated that Russia was ceding all of its territorial possessions east of those lines. These consisted of isolated coastal and island settlements, plus some limited inland claims. Nothing in the Arctic Ocean itself or on the north side of modern-day Alaska was under consideration, since the Russians had never explored or discovered anything there.
Government officials from the United States discovered and claimed 14 years later the Arctic islands of Wrangell, Bennett, Jeannette, and Henrietta. These newly acquired U.S. territories were not contested by the Russians and were listed in various U.S. government publications. The Board of Geographic Place Names made appropriate designations. Herald Island, which lies about 60 miles east of Wrangell, was claimed by the United States in the late l9th century after the British abandoned any claim.
Scattered activity took place on and around Wrangell in the ensuing years. It served as the setting for a 1910 Hollywood movie, numerous polar bear and whale hunts, and expeditions from the Field Museum in Chicago and the Carnegie Museum in Pittsburgh. In 1921 Vilhjalmur Stefansson, a U.S. citizen with Canadian backing, acquired land rights on Wrangell and established a small settlement. In 1923 he sold it to the well-established firm of the Lomen Brothers (Carl and Ralph) in Nome. They expected to develop reindeer herding and other businesses and outfitted a party there.
The Russian government began diplomatic moves against these U.S. islands in 1902, asserting that its sovereignty extended deep into the Arctic Ocean in a whaling and sealing dispute. But the United States rejected this pretense. Again in 1916, the Russians concocted a "sector theory" of sovereignty such that everything north of the Russian mainland, all the way to the North Pole (including Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Jeannette, and Henrietta), automatically belonged to Russia, regardless of any actual historical events. Again, the United States rejected this "theory."
As the communists gained control of the government, they became more aggressive. On 20 August 1924, the Soviet gunboat Red October landed on Wrangell Island, seized the Lomen settlement, forcibly hauled down the U.S. flag, and removed the Lomen party to Siberia. All of the Americans, except two who died in captivity, eventually were repatriated.
The State Department made no meaningful follow-up to this invasion by Nikolai Lenin's Bolshevik government. After all, the U.S. government did not recognize the Bosheviks until 1933. No peace treaty ever was negotiated, and no cession of territory was made. Being in such a remote area, this Arctic territory dispute remained on the diplomatic back burner through the years. The Lomens tried for years to get the U.S. government to take action to recover its occupied real estate, but to no avail. For their confiscated equipment and furs, the Lomens were awarded compensation by the Department of Justice's Foreign Claims Settlement Commission in 1959.
Cold War (Very Cold) Still Rages
By Lieutenant Commander Carl L. Olson, U.S. Navy (Retired), Mark J. Seidenberg, and Commander Robert W. Selle, U.S. Navy (Retired)
If a contest were held for the largest U.S. foreign-aid program in history, the winner by far would be the pending de facto abandonment of eight strategic Alaskan islands—and their vast resourcerich seabeds—to the Russians. This is being accomplished under the rubric of creating a "maritime boundary" in the ocean between Alaska and Siberia.
The land area of the eight islands themselves is considerable, equaling more than Rhode Island and Delaware combined. Much more vast are the surrounding hundreds of thousands of square miles of seabeds with their billions of dollars in oil, gas, fishery, and other resources—all pending transfer to the Russian government.
The militarily strategic location around Siberia has further crucial significance now that Congress and the President are getting serious again about the strategic defense initiative oriented toward China, Russia, and North Korea. The area also comprises vital patrol areas used both for Russian and U.S. under-ice operations for ballistic-missile and attack submarines.
Under current law, the U.S. Department of State has been able to adopt this concessionary policy on its own initiative. No approval from or consultation with Congress was needed, much less input from the State of Alaska or the public in general.
Extreme secrecy has veiled State Department negotiations with the Soviets from the beginning, in 1977 at the end of the Ford administration. Talks proceeded through the Carter and Reagan administrations and ended in 1990 in the Bush administration with a "US-USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement." With no presidential signature required, Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze signed it on 1 June 1990, at a Washington, D.C., summit meeting.
During the 13 years of negotiations, the State Department received tens of thousands of protest letters from the public, pointed inquiries from Congress, and repeated opposing resolutions from the Alaska and California legislatures. But all were ignored. To this day, the State Department considers all the negotiations, including the names of the participants and the dates and locations of the sessions, to be classified matters.
The resulting agreement drew a line in the waters of the Bering Sea and Arctic Ocean to divide the seabeds and ocean resources between the United States and what is now Russia. According to concepts adopted in the 1970s and 1980s, exclusive economic zones and fishery conservation zones had granted rights to all littoral countries out to 200 miles from their coastlines. If two countries' coastlines came within 400 miles of each other, they would need to negotiate a "maritime boundary."
The key problem now is that the State Department drew a line that places the Alaskan islands of Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Jeannette, and Henrietta in the Arctic Ocean, and Copper Island, Sea Otter Rock, and Sea Lion Rock at the western end of the Aleutians, on the Russian side. By doing so, the United States abandons these islands, de facto, plus the hundreds of thousands of square miles of seabeds that bound them.
The status of the maritime boundary agreement is still tentative. It is not a treaty, but an executive agreement. And it can be amended or abrogated by the State Department as easily as it was adopted.
For its part, the Russian government for the last two years has been threatening to renege on the agreement. It wants more, demanding fishing rights equal to 300 million pounds of fish per year to be taken away from the U.S. fishing industry in the Bering Sea. And the State Department has been receptive to the idea, conducting negotiating sessions with the Russians led by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering.
At the same time, Alaska's legislature has passed House Joint Resolution 27, its most recent protest to the State Department. Sponsored by State Representative John Coghill Jr., it declares the current maritime boundary agreement "null, void, and non binding on the State of Alaska" and demands that "new negotiations must include representation by the State of Alaska, and terms in a new proposed treaty regarding Alaska's territory, sovereignty, or property should require consent of the State of Alaska."
Oddly, Alaska's senior U.S. Senator, Republican Ted Stevens, always has supported the State Department's side. He addressed a joint session of the Alaska legislature in 1986 with the sentiment, "Alaskans don't belong in that fight," and has maintained that posture ever since. The junior Senator, Frank Murkowski has followed suit. The state's Republican Congressman Don Young, however, was cosponsor of a bill to require that any such maritime boundary agreement be in the form of a treaty, and not merely an executive agreement.
In 1973 the Digest of International Law declared plainly: "The United States has not relinquished its claim to Wrangell Island." In the mid-1970s the State Department was forced finally to deal with the issue. The international concept of fishery zones out to 200 miles from national coastlines had been established. Following passage of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, the Ford administration decided to abandon the islands and their fishery zones to the Soviets. Exactly how this political decision was reached remains a mystery, though the "detente" theme had governed quite a bit of the decision-making in those years. Even the Soviets were surprised at the swiftness and generosity of the unilateral gift.
For the fishery zone around Alaska, the question was how to draw a maritime boundary. The Ford administration's State Department seized upon using two out of the three segments of the 1867 convention line delineated in a treaty with Czar Alexander II. This put onto the Soviet/Russian side the Arctic islands of Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Jeannette, and Henrietta, and Copper Island (with Sea Otter Rock and Sea Lion Rock) in the Bering Sea. This also put on the Russian side hundreds of thousands of square miles of fishery zones that went with the islands.
During the transition month between the Ford and Carter administrations, a secret diplomatic note was sent to the Soviets on 21 January 1977. The Secretary of State's instructions to the U.S. embassy in Moscow stated: "Note speaks for itself, and accordingly, we do not wish to comment or solicit reaction from the Soviets orally at this time." The note that was presented declared, ". . . the U.S. Government, in enforcing its fishery jurisdiction, intends to respect the line set forth in the Convention signed at Washington, March 30, 1867."
The U.S. embassy reported back to the Secretary of State about the nonplused reaction of the Soviet diplomat who had received the note: "He did ask, as a personal aside, whether it was not customary to negotiate or at least discuss such matters before giving notice about enforcement provisions."
The Soviets accepted the offer eagerly, with the proviso that no maritime boundary would be created by the 1867 line where it was more than 200 miles from either country's shoreline. And so, these two diplomatic notes created a de facto giveaway of U.S. sovereign rights.
This started to unravel, however, later in 1977, when each side found the other was using different geographic coordinates for the lines, most especially for the 1,000-mile diagonal segment in the Bering Sea. The 1867 treaty had no coordinates. The State Department's version used a line that was the shortest distance between two points on the globe (an "arc of a great circle"), while the Soviets used a straight line on a Mercator projection map (a "rhumb line"). Not surprisingly, the Soviet version lay several miles to the east of the State Department's and yielded the Soviets about 50,000 more square miles of fishery zone.
Unaware of this interchange, William Butler, Dean of the Faculty of Laws at University College in London, wrote in 1978: "The Russo-American Convention Line of 1867 is not regarded as a state frontier, and the continental shelf boundary in the Chuckchi Sea and northward remains to be negotiated."
An uneasy impasse continued until 1981, when negotiations began. They took on an added significance when, on 10 March 1983, President Ronald Reagan proclaimed exclusive U.S. economic zones (for seabed rights) in general with specific boundaries to be negotiated with neighboring countries. Thus, a maritime boundary would establish rights both to the ocean's contents and the land beneath the ocean floor.
In 1984 the existence of the negotiations popped suddenly into public view. The Department of the Interior had recognized the vast gas and oil potential in the Bering Sea and was leasing enormous tracts in what was called the Navarin Basin. In its lease sale announcement in the Federal Register of 16 March, the Interior Department had to caution bidders. If they bid on the westernmost tracts, they might not receive the leases, because the Department of State had not settled on an exact boundary line with the Soviets. The notice also revealed for the first time that "The United States depicts the 1867 Convention line as the maritime boundary...."
Sharp disapproval of the State Department's actions reverberated throughout Congress, in state legislatures. and in public groups across the nation. Initiatives in the Senate were led by the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms (R-NC). who introduced a series of measures over the years to stop it. In the House, Congressmen Mark Siljander (R-MI), William Dannemeyer (R-CA), and Dan Burton (R-IN) introduced bills in the 99th, 100th, and 101st Congresses respectively. In addition to questioning the apparent giveaway, they also reiterated that any agreement would need to be in the form of a treaty.
Understandably, the Alaska legislature was upset. A resolution introduced by State Representative Roger Jenkins, urging the State Department to resist the Soviet demands, passed both houses unanimously and was signed by Governor Bill Sheffield in April 1986. After repeated rebuffs from the State Department, the legislature passed another resolution by State Senator Rich Uehling that Governor Steve Cowper signed in May 1988. It reiterated that Alaska was excluded improperly from the negotiations.
California's legislature chimed in with a resolution authored by Assemblywoman Marian LaFollette in September 1987 to support Alaska's right as a state to be included in any negotiations affecting its boundaries, territory, or property. Numerous national and local groups passed resolutions questioning the impending giveaway, including the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Daughters of the American Revolution, and Young Americans for Freedom. A public advocacy group, State Department Watch, sponsored a letter-writing campaign that delivered 50,000 protests.
Nevertheless, the State Department continued on its own plan and arrived at an agreement with the Soviets in 1990. It was based on segments of the 1867 Convention line, somewhere between the "arc of a great circle" and "rhumb line" depiction, with some added zigs and zags based on Soviet "sovereignty" over Copper and Herald islands.
At a public ceremony in Washington on 1 June 1990, Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed the prospective maritime boundary treaty. They also signed an unpublicized executive agreement that bound both governments immediately to the terms of the proposed treaty until the treaty was ratified by both sides and went into force. In essence, the proposed treaty was a sideshow to the main act, as soon became apparent.
Congress was kept in the dark about this executive agreement. It was not mentioned in the President's transmittal of the proposed treaty to Congress, nor in the State Department's testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee on 13 June 1991, nor in the committee's report, nor in the Senate debate in September.
Prior to the Senate vote, the state legislatures of Alaska and California responded again. A letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, signed by 28 bipartisan members of the Alaska legislature, led by Representative Ramona Barnes, stated:
We firmly believe United States interests and Alaskan interests are at stake and in jeopardy in the proposed treaty. . . . No Alaskan official has ever been invited to participate in the treaty negotiations, in spite of abiding Alaskan interests in fisheries, petroleum, and other potential continental shelf resources and the consideration of navigation in the area. In the entire history of the treaty negotiations, Alaska has had no official voice.
California's legislature unanimously passed a resolution by State Senator Don Rogers that supported Alaska and called on the President to withdraw the proposed treaty.
The State Department testified at the 13 June 1991 hearing that: "The agreement is a maritime boundary agreement. It does not recognize Soviet sovereignty over these (five Arctic) islands." During the 16 September debate, Senator Helms stated: "Since I doubt that the State Department will make use of the opportunity to press U.S. claims to the five islands—even though the right to do so is preserved—I intend to vote against the treaty." Nevertheless, the treaty passed the Senate in a wave of post-Soviet Union euphoria, and President George Bush ratified it.
Now, eight years later, the Russian government never has ratified the proposed treaty, which therefore has not been put into force. Russian internal politics have asserted that the Russian side did not get enough in the 1990 agreement and now demand hundreds of millions of pounds more of fishing rights from the United States.
At stake are U.S. resources worth billions of dollars. Alaska is the number one fishing state in the United States. Obviously, it has plenty to lose. As for petroleum, the Department of the Interior estimates oil and gas potential for offshore tract sales. In the cases of the Navarin Basin sale in the Bering Sea and the later Chuckchi Sea sale in the Arctic Ocean, the estimates ran in the billions of barrels.
The military strategic value of these Arctic outposts is obvious. In fact, at its national convention in June 1999, the Reserve Officers' Association passed a unanimous resolution to support renegotiating the boundary, citing its militarily strategic location. As far back as World War II, the Senate considered the potential for an airbase on Wrangell Island. Now, the icepack provides one of the few effective means of masking the locations and maneuvers of attack and ballistic missile submarines. Cat-and-mouse games between U.S. and Russian submarines have gone on for years in the Arctic.
More global in nature, the impetus toward developing a strategic defense initiative makes this area critical. Near unanimous votes in the Senate and House in March 1999 have spurred the idea. And the posture of the Clinton administration on this issue sounds promising. The Arctic and Bering areas most assuredly could be valuable forward staging areas for surveillance systems or missile deployments oriented to defend against attacks from China, Russia, or North Korea.
Since the existing maritime boundary agreement is merely an executive agreement, it can be rescinded with the stroke of a pen by the Secretary of State. No peace treaty ever has been negotiated that settles the Russian military invasion of the U.S. islands in the Arctic. As such, the Cold War has not really wound down. The issue has dragged on too long and should remain on ice no longer.
Commander Olson, Mr. Seidenberg, and Commander Selle are chairman, vice chairman, and senior advisor of State Department Watch, a nonpartisan foreign policy watchdog group headquartered in Washington, D.C.