Move over, maneuver and mass; information may be the new way of war, and it will require a different approach.
Today's challenging and diverse security environment is being further complicated by information-age technology. Greater global interactivity, fueled by the proliferation of information technology and an increasing flow of information, is creating a more complex geosocial and political environment. This same technology appears to offer a unique opportunity to make a quantum leap in military power—a potential revolution in military affairs (RMA). To spur such a revolution and capitalize on its consequent military advantages, the services should consider establishing an information-based Network Force that incorporates advanced technology, operational (doctrinal) innovation, and organizational adaptation.1
Elements of Military Systems
In the past, military systems have been based primarily on mass and maneuver, with operational organizations that emphasized those principles. During the Cold War, for example, the Soviets relied primarily on mass, while the United States stressed maneuver and mobility to counter a numerically superior foe. Both systems employed generally hierarchic or matrixed operational organizations—similar to corporate patterns found in the industrial world of mass production and transportation. Information—about the adversary, the status of friendly forces, or the conditions of conflict—supported these main themes. Today, however, information has become the predominant factor, with ramifications for all elements of the military system.
Mass and maneuver still apply, but information resources offer what could be a new basis for the U.S. military—a new "American way of war." Current information-based processes reflect a mix of perspectives: reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition; battle-damage assessment; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; command, control, and surveillance; command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence; information warfare; and command-and-control warfare, among others. These processes all are connected by a flow of related information, but it is not necessarily efficient or effective. The new military system could unify them into a predominant basis for action, using the three elements of an RMA.
Advanced Technology. The technologic resources to tie forces and capabilities together in an integrated information system are at a revolutionary level. Already we have seen the potential of Aegis, Patriot, the joint deployable intelligence support system, cooperative engagement capability, and numerous task force data links. Former Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Admiral Bill Owens has written about the emerging "system of systems," which integrates precision weaponry and advanced sensors with modern C41.2 The Russians see a future of integrated reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire "complexes." But without a technologically advanced network, a new information-based military system is impossible. Fortunately, much of the needed technology is available today—with more in sight—and the U.S. commercial sector is leading the way. Computers and special software are embedded in these telecommunications systems to process, manage, and route information.
► Organizational Adaptation. An appropriate network design is needed to adapt the technology for best operational results. Most current operational-level proposals support existing organizational structure—based almost exclusively on the idea of more fully disseminated information, including related schemes like user-pull, selective push, and direct sensor-to-shooter flow. The deepest levels of current organizations will experience new awareness from this one-way How. But the smartest, most responsive, and most adaptive organization is achievable only through multidirectional information sharing—the essence of a true network organization.
Armed forces generally are unfamiliar with this form of organization; they often choose hierarchic organization because it provides tight upper-level control to impose order and standardization. Unfortunately, hierarchy also is stove-piped and rigid. Information only flows directly up or down a single organizational line, often causing inflexibility in highly dynamic circumstances. Matrix organizations—such as the Navy composite warfare commander structure—permit some information crosstalk to coordinate overlapping skills and capabilities, but network organizations appear to offer something better.
Uncertain, complex, and rapidly changing operating environments require high degrees of both functional specialization and integration, especially in an organization’s shared, systemic information-based processes.4 U.S. corporations are exploiting network organizations to balance these requirements. Management expert Peter Drucker describes this transformation as follows:
Improving the productivity of knowledge workers and service workers will demand fundamental changes in the structure of organizations. It may even require totally new organizations. Re-engineering the team so that work can flow properly will lead to the elimination of most “management layers.” In the symphony orchestra, several hundred highly skilled musicians play together; but there is only one “executive,” the conductor, with no intermediate layers between him (or her) and the orchestra members. This will be the organization model for the new information-based organization.5
Networking can break the current military operational mold and orchestrate a new organization. A Network Force would be a significant departure from current form and function, but it would capture and optimize the numerous, informal information-driven networks that already exist to circumvent stovepipes.
Operational Innovation. In many scenarios, especially facing the threat of weapons of mass destruction, our military would benefit from a more dispersed, nonlinear posture and reduced physical profile—sometimes called demassification. On the other hand, under many circumstances, such as a major regional contingency or precision strike, physical concentration of force is desirable. Conflicts with more than one layer—like Vietnam's concurrent civil insurgency, guerrilla action, and conventional operations by the North Vietnamese Army—will alternate between dispersion and concentration. Maritime warfare especially in the complex littoral environment, also exhibits this alternating character. The mutable posture of the Network Force—the ability to change the force profile at will in correct proportions throughout the battle- space—would be ideal.
Critical functions of the Network Force will include sorting out complex situations, recognizing and understanding diverse factors, adjusting force posture, and maintaining coherence. This “understanding” is deeper than just situational or battlespace awareness. Awareness is certainly a prerequisite (i.e., I know who the enemy is and where he is), but understanding also brings knowledge about an adversary’s way of operating. “Coherence” takes understanding a step further; it implies a force’s shared understanding and integrated knowledge, put toward a common purpose (i.e., we all know what the enemy is doing and what he can do, and we share the same approach toward him). This coherence will reinforce both the physical and intellectual mutability of the force.
Seizing initiative disrupts an opponent’s orientation, affords greatest control over events, and is necessary to shape the end-state. This operational concept implies a predisposition for action and is encouraged by the “generative” learning process of the Network Force. Both initiative and mutable posture will require a high degree of force mobility.
The operational concept that accompanies the Network Force would not be a wholesale change from currently held views, such as Admiral Owens’ system-of-systems or the precision operations of “Joint Vision 2010.” However, the Network Force’s emphasis on mutability instead of concentration, understanding rather than awareness, and interactive learning over data dissemination will enable it to operate with greater adaptability, speed, and agility; increased efficiency through smarter application of limited resources; increased sensitivity to surprise and sociologic nuances; and balanced levels of stability and innovation.
A Pattern for the Network Force
Every network “node”—points where information input, output, or flow management occur—can be tied together, with continuous information flow in almost every direction. To conserve resources and achieve the synergy of organizational integration and specialization, network nodes would be divided among basic information functions: sensing, action, and fusion. A network “backbone,” with emphasis on physical maneuverability, reach, and complementary assets, is highly appropriate. If the largest contingencies outgrow the physical constraints of nodes (range, speed, etc.), adjacent forces could be joined through a network of networks. A summary of the force’s structural pattern appears in figure 1.
Network Links. Links must handle two-way exchange— not one-way dissemination—of a variety of multimedia information. Capacity must be adequate to support heavy network information flow over a relatively large area of interest—for example, all of the Persian Gulf. Linking will depend heavily on satellite communications, preferably via smaller, more maneuverable communications satellites than the massive commsats of today. A highly responsive satellite launch/replacement capability is desirable. Streamable optic fiber and mini-mobile cellular telephone systems also should be provided as link options. The Network’s distributed, multiple information paths would permit self-healing, that is, they would have the ability to circumvent localized flow disruption. In most scenarios, therefore, physical security could concentrate on preventing espionage. Information-warfare security measures, including antiviral and electromagnetic pulse protection, must be developed and incorporated.
Sensing Nodes. The network’s “understanding” relies on having the best input possible. Because everyone is a potential sensor, standard equipment for small nodal teams should include lightweight sensor packages. Dedicated sensing nodes should be rapidly deployable, have high endurance, and be fielded in sufficient quantity to cover a region of interest. They should complement each other in range and spectra, to form a blanket of coverage. They must be able to find targets at strategic depth, as well as stealthy or mobile targets, and must be sensitive to small targets (including people), unusual centers of gravity (such as chemical weapons sites or information infrastructures), and key adversary capabilities (such as sea mines) in all weather. Nontraditional areas and sources should be exploited, for example: software agents, earth-penetration capability, sensing of nuclear and biochemical indicators, and ground acoustics. Many sensing nodes should be capable of rapidly deploying subnetworks (like the rapidly deployable sonobuoy system). A standoff-insertion capability—perhaps a Tomahawk variant for sensor delivery—should be developed. Mobile multisensor platforms (such as patrol aircraft) could fill gaps in coverage prior to full network deployment, where there is a disruption, or where an unanticipated deficiency exists.
Action Nodes. Action nodes should be fast, mobile, affordably stealthy platforms or small teams. They should be equipped with mixed, complementary capabilities based on anticipated tasks and conflict scenarios. They must be able to conduct deep strike against strategic targets; kill stealthy or mobile targets; and neutralize opposition in operations other than war. Weapons and skills should include: information warfare and psychological operations capabilities, precision-guided munitions, penetration strike delivery, standoff “cruise torpedoes,” precision small arms, and nonlethal weapons. They should be fitted with lightweight sensor packages and have the ability to plug into an adversary’s information system to deliver software weapons.
Fusion Nodes. The primary functions of fusion nodes will be to facilitate smooth flow and add value to information. They will be the centers of force learning. Connected to one another by the network backbone, they would have sensor and action links radiating from them. They would be manned by teams of “knowledge managers” assisted by smart software and computer systems that learn from training and historical observation.6 As virtual reality matures, it would find major application here. Fusion nodes would be alternate command centers, requiring minor communications augmentation packages to tap strategic systems and connect to coalition partners. The networking of fusion nodes will support distributed problem solving and information correlation. In addition, these nodes will require tight information defense measures, maintain small arsenals of off-the-shelf information-warfare software, and ad as conduits for fresh software transmitted from the rear, Finally, because fusion nodes would be key centers of gravity, they must be housed in highly stealthy, highly maneuverable or unreachable platforms, such as submarines, ultra-high altitude loitering aircraft, small manned space platforms, or burrowing land rovers.
Network Management. Operationally oriented group' ware (software that supports collaboration among nodes) and netware (that helps manage network flow) need to be developed. Rugged user-friendly input/output devices—especially displays and touchpads—will be needed at every node.
Teams and Platforms. The Network Force would deploy with complementary capabilities radiating from fusion node hubs; however, link shifts, overall organizational mutability, and temporary team building would be supported as needed as operations unfold. The network’s complementary task approach implies that platforms should be small and specific or should emphasize modularity and mission tailorability. Some suitably equipped multipurpose platforms and teamed personnel—such warships or Special Operations Forces—could act as multifunction nodes. Special Operations Forces, in particular, have the right complexion for nodal teams and should be given increased emphasis. Generally, all teams should be highly mobile and ready to “plug and play.” Finally, it is important to recognize that all teams or platforms must be designed to serve the needs of the network, not vice versa.
Strengths of the Network Force
The Network Force will have several natural strengths, including: innumerable ways to shape the organizational structure; the ability to correlate dispersed membership and complementary skills; the promotion of joint learning throughout the force; and adaptive and responsive continuous system adjustment. Just-in-time, just-enough, and just-right customized action is achieved by increased operational process sensitivity.
In the Network Force, virtually anyone can input information. Fire calls can be posted multi-directionally, with responses limited only by maneuverability and reach of the responder. Everyone becomes a sensor to some degree, bringing an immense variety of perspectives into the system. Shared information can help war fighters recognize key factors and information associations and can speed incorporation of battlefield lessons learned. Indeed, the ability to sense, think, share, learn, question, advise, and otherwise transfer information almost instantaneously in any direction offers an exponential increase in overall information-based function. Instead of one big organizational OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop, the NetWork Force unleashes an array of individual OODA loops, each free to respond to a local and transient set of diverse, complex battlefield elements—which is especially important in nonlinear circumstances such as mobs, mass migration, or the chaotic friction of war. Coherence and coordination will be maintained through normal network function.
The OODA loop encompasses two vital challenges: (1) understanding the environment, adversary, and self and knowing how to act; and (2) allocating and applying limited physical resources. The Network Force incorporates these overlapping functions and derives competitive advantage from optimized use of its information basis.
The entire balancing act can remain fully in the commander’s hands. Through carefully crafted coordinating instructions and mission-type orders, the commander can choose any combination of points on the following functional spectrum:
loose control tight control
aggressive restrained
speed deliberation
stability innovation
concentration dispersion
focused surveillance spread coverage
linear action nonlinear action
He can even choose a flexible operational scheme, for example: fight fast, loose, and dispersed; assess the situation; then switch to fight slow, tight, and concentrated. The commander can empower the intellectual function and retain control over resources or release authority to any desired degree. In addition, as the levels of conflict (i.e., strategic, operational, tactical) continue to merge, it makes sense to increase responsibility at the former tactical echelons and strip out redundant middle layers.7
The Network Force also empowers individuals in two important ways. First, individual human experience, perception, and understanding all contribute directly to information-based processes. Second, individuals freely share information and perspectives, which encourages flexibility, creativity, organizational learning, and initiative.
The RMA in Action: Real-World Examples
Mission-specific examples of the Network Force in action can illustrate its value. In war, hunter-killer operations (against stealthy and/or mobile targets) severely test the intellectual and resource applications of an operational organization. They can include antisubmarine and anti-surface warfare, antimissile, anti-armor, and even antipersonnel operations. Today’s hunter-killer procedures typically call for the overlay of a geographic grid on the area of operations, with sensing and action resources allocated among grid subdivisions by a central commander. These assets report to the central commander, who composes the overall tactical picture, injects external intelligence, and reallocates resources. Situational understanding is built through disparate on-scene reports, data, and debriefs, which generally are received as staggered input at the central site. This understanding gradually is incorporated into the resource adjustment process in sequential fashion. Upon eventually achieving new understanding of an ASW problem, the ASW commander can shift assets among distinct scenes of action.
By comparison, the Network Force would see the entire area of operations as one seamless scene of action. Understanding would be built force-wide, in minute increments—with cognition expanded through the assistance of smart computing. Operational “truth” occurs to every player at a rapid and nearly equal pace. Resource shifts are arrived at naturally, in accordance with the commander’s preset rules and intent—and ideally without his intervention, although that option is always available.
Anti-mobile missile hunter-killer operations currently are even more compartmentalized. Attack aircraft. Special Operations Forces, Tomahawks, and other assets are allocated by spatial or time divisions, with virtually no sharing of understanding in real time. In addition, offensive and defensive operations are handled as separate processes. Adjustments to resource allocations can take as long as 48 hours, based on the air tasking order. The Network Force would break down these barriers. Key bits of information would be uncovered, tested, and incorporated force-wide nearly instantaneously, capitalizing, for example, on the sudden discovery that a Scud launcher is found to be most vulnerable during the first ten seconds of erection or can only be erected on a slight downslope, because of a design flaw. And as with the ASW example, resources would be shifted almost at will to optimize effect and efficiency.
The greatest power of the Network Force would be realized when all these operation subsets become one system. Assets pursuing theater ballistic missiles also can be applied to enemy cruise missile batteries. Complementary assets can be shifted from ASW problems to anti-mobile missile problems, or to anti-armor, and so forth. The stratification of operations virtually would disappear. In regional contingencies and potential peer competition—where media blend, functions overlap, and effects interact to the broadest degree—the coherence and mutability of the Network Force should deliver its greatest benefits. A Network Force operating in complex, often subtle, nonlinear fast-changing operations other than war should realize similar advantages.
Managing Risk and Uncertainty
Clearly, the Network Force’s information-unified system is a departure from past ways of war, but most of the risks and uncertainties appear manageable:
- Cost. Cost likely can be reduced by relying in part on existing commercial systems and off-the-shelf technology. Any new designs must support frequent upgrades.
- Technology Development. Satisfactory telecommunications, computing, and sensing technologies are steadily emerging.8 The biggest fusion/processing challenge is artificial intelligence—which appears to be on the verge of a breakthrough—although fusion nodes could rely on other types of advanced expert systems with satisfactory results.9
- Loss of Effective Control. The new military system, if used as intended, would eliminate former measures of control. The commander’s values will be reflected in a “mentored” learning organization, his application of rules of engagement, his translation of military end state, and his continual design of the organizational form and processes. In addition, the network has a hedge against control loss because any organizational form can be shaped through coordinating instructions or the deactivation of links— even a temporary hierarchy can be imposed rapidly.10
- Information Pathologies and Internal Friction. Information pathologies might include inadequate system capacity, inadequate filtering and fusion, cognitive information overload, improper use of information systems, or groupthink." Measures to head off such pathologies must include software techniques, standard operating procedures, and training—especially at the fusion nodes.
- Vulnerability to Countermeasures. Defenses must include information warfare security, electromagnetic-pulse protection, and space control.
- Disruptions. The Network Force must be conditioned to deal with a continuously fluctuating, adaptive design of the overall system. The loss of a network limb, interim levels of less-than-dominant understanding, and otherwise unanticipated malfunctions or battle damage must be handled through learning and mutability.
- Credible Deterrence. The Network Force does not relinquish the traditional deterrence options of massed or concentrated force, but this might not be clearly observable prior to action. Deterrence will come, however, from periodic demonstrations.
► Applicability. The Network Force seems inherently flexible. A model should be tested in scenario-driven war games and simulations, using a range of diverse, representative scenarios.
A Revolutionary Choice
The Network Force would harness U.S. superiority in technology and competitive, creative people. It should be pursued in advanced simulations, war gaming, prototypes, and exercises, to test and refine its concepts and define more detailed structural requirements—followed by a strategically and operationally sound implementation scheme.
Because it will have tremendous impact on institutional culture and mind-set, we should begin with a seed core that eventually will expand outward. Real-world mission-based milestones should be adopted to reflect increasing scale, complexity, and risk—perhaps beginning with counter-narcotics operations and moving to noncombatant evacuation operations, port seizure, regional contingencies, etc. Intense training, exercise, and mentorship will be required throughout to grow the new culture and mind-set.
The proposed network is more than C4 lash-ups; it is a bold new system, unified by information and thriving on a new way of organizing and operating. It can realize the much-advertised but elusive revolution in military affairs. The information age has arrived. The Network Force appears to be a powerful choice for the needed leap into that challenging and promising era.
1 James Fitzsimonds and Jan Van Tol, "Revolutions in Military Affairs," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 94, pp. 24-31. Andrew F. ICrepinevich, "Keeping Pace with the Military Technical Revolution," Issues in Science and Technology, Summer 1994, pp. 23-29, and "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," The National Interest, Fall 1994, pp. 30-42.
2 Adm. William A. Owens, USN, "The Emerging System of Systems," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1995, pp. 35-39.
3 Mary C. Fitzgerald, The New Revolution in Russian Military Affairs, (London: RUSI, 1994), P. 14.
4 Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 11-14, 17, 26, 27.
5 Peter Drucker, Post-Capitalist Society (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 93'
6 Knowledge managers will have the expertise previously associated with intelligence officers and analysts but also a depth of C4 management skills. They will facilitate information flow and understanding through a combination of software assistance and the powerful cognitive functions only a man-in-the-loop of' provide.
7 Douglas A. MacGregor, "Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War," Parameters, Winter 1992, pp. 33-47; and David Jablonsky, "U.S. Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs," Parameters, Autumn 94, pp. 18-36.
8 See for example Jones & Elam, "High Performance Computing Looms as Technology Matures," Signal, November 1993, pp. 76-78; and "Sensor Fusion Exploitation Braces War Fighting Forces," Signal, November 1994, pp. 53-55.
9 Douglas B. Lenat, "Artificial Intelligence," Scientific American Special Edition: Key Technologies for the 21st Century, September 1995, pp. 80-82.
10 Uncoordinated free flow of information would increase the risk of fratricide. efficient use of resources, and the potential breakdown of the overall operational scheme. However, coherence can be achieved through common understanding of mission and purpose, a nominal set of preoperational coordinating instructions, and the joint learning that permeates the network organization. If the commander sees coherence slipping, he can post altered coordinating instructions and temporarily reshape his organization as he sees fit.
11 Lane Tracy, Leading the Living Organization (Westport, CT: 1994), pp. 101-2.
Commander Tempestilli, a recent graduate of the Naval War College, the executive officer of Patrol Squadron 26.