Toward a Disposable Striker
By Rene Loire
The “Revolution at Sea,” as depicted by Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, U.S. Navy, in the January 1988 Proceedings (pages 34-39) continues to impress me, as does the ability of 133 commercial tankers to survive Exocet hits during the Iran-Iraq War in the Persian Gulf. In contrast, HMS Sheffield was destroyed off the Falklands (Malvinas) by an Exocet and the USS Stark (FFG-31) in the Persian Gulf was heavily damaged by two similar missiles.
Later, during Operation Desert Storm, a cheap influence mine put the $1-billion cruiser Princeton (CG-59) out of action. It appeared that her steel hull and aluminum superstructure did not have the same level of quality as her expensive sensing array. My “Striker” design (July 1992 Proceedings, pages 90-93) was inspired by what I knew of commercial ships’ structure. I proposed a rugged missile ship.
In accordance with Admiral Metcalfs recommendations, the Striker has no superstructure. Target detection, designation, and tracking are performed off-ship, by floating, flying, space- or land-based means, resulting in a drastic reduction in the ship’s acquisition and operating costs. As few as 20 sailors could man the ship.
The shallow freeboard—ten feet—makes it a difficult target for surface-to-surface missiles, while still providing ample reserve buoyancy (which makes it superior to submarines that cannot survive if holed). A sloped armor belt should defeat or deflect low-flying supersonic missiles. My earlier suggestion that the motion of the ship could be used to create a gunwale water curtain was an attempt at stealth—making the ship look like just another wave. Later, the missile manufacturers who saw my drawings made me realize that water screens created by a small tax on propulsive power would cause their missiles to overfly the ship, mistaking the screens for wave crests. An optional water blanket projected over the deck would not have the same effect on diving missiles, but might conceal the ship from their homing sensors.
My new Block II Disposable Striker design features a hull essentially made of five-foot-diameter bundled tubes, which should limit damage from torpedoes or mines. They also contain fuel or ballast water tanks (the shallow freeboard is maintained by segregated ballasting as fuel is consumed). Four of them, open-ended at the bow, feed the hydraulic curtains as the ship accelerates to 20 knots.
The biggest threat to the concept is sophistication. The key is to build a survivable ship—and leave the high-technology to the missiles she will carry.
Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, U.S. Navy, while Chief of Naval Operations, speculated on an arsenal ship with a crew of about 20, ballast-controlled shallow freeboard to reduce radar signature, and a tanker-like hull. A floating magazine, the arsenal ship probably would be operated with conventional Aegis cruisers and land-based controllers.
The idea is strongly opposed by those who like aircraft carriers. They are rightly angered by newspaper headlines trumpeting that "Missile Barges Might Edge Aside Carriers”—hardly a fair description of the concept.
It remains to be said that no naval staff would dare deploy carriers in a narrow sea—the Adriatic, for example—to fight a true anti-Balkan land war where they would confront land-based, concealed surface-to-surface missile batteries. Tomahawks, which risk no prisoners of war and no aircraft, would certainly be preferred in such a scenario. A couple of hard-to-detect and very tough Strikers could get the job done by firing 1,000 Tomahawks in just a few salvos. Speaking of a still limited conflict, the 13 Tomahawks recently launched into Bosnia from the USS Normandy (CG-60) apparently have had more effect on Serbian aggressiveness than hundreds of NATO aircraft sorties.
Critics point out that the Striker’s low acquisition cost—about $100 million, roughly the cost of two aircraft—will be offset by the cost of the large numbers of very expensive missiles, and that it will become a prime target. So what? The global capital cost put at risk is much lower than that of any other more decorative and more vulnerable ship. What about the carriers and their $50 million- per-copy airplanes?
In addition, the cost of a Striker’s missile load can be cut substantially. Today, reducing the missile’s capabilities by 10% could drop its cost by 50%. There is no doubt that prices can drop even more. The objection that the U.S. Navy is putting too high a percentage of its total inventory—say, 500 or 1,000 Tomahawks out of an inventory of 4,000—on a single ship will no longer be valid when we reach Spratly War time (2006). By then, the inventory will have surged to many thousands—and you can bet that the Chinese, for their part, will find a way to mass-produce very smart missiles at very low cost.
A Tomahawk that costs 50 times less than an aircraft is in essence consumable. Aircraft, including the costly crew, will have difficult time surviving 50 sorties against modern defenses. Ships and aircraft can disappear quickly in naval warfare. Of the 23 Royal Navy ships that went to the Falklands (Malvinas), four destroyers/frigates were lost and nine damaged in just three weeks to an adversary with only six Exocet missiles and two aerial refuelers—many of whose bombs failed to detonate because of improper fuzing.
Fleets themselves are partially consumable, although not necessarily to the same extent as Germany’s World War II U-boats. Tradeoffs between claimed tactical superiority and capital costs—humans included—must be considered if chances of quick consumption are high.
A single effective, mass launch by a Striker would justify her relatively low capital cost. Even in the case of the much costlier U$S Fife (DD-991), it could be said in retrospect that in 1991 she justified her entire life-cycle cost by striking Baghdad accurately with 60 Tomahawks. Note that her expensive sensing array was not used in the process. In a throwaway camera, it’s the film that does the work.
Strikers could be identified by numbers—changed frequently to cause order- of-battle problems for opponents—rather then named, and depreciation in the accounting books does not necessarily mean that the crew is expendable and the Strikers are to be thrown away like a cheap camera. Having survived one mission, a Disposable Striker could be reloaded to fight again.
Mr. Loire, an engineer, has spent more than 40 years in design and construction engineering of land- and maritime-related structures.
Joint Expeditionary Units Are the Future
By Captain S.D. Danyluk, U.S. Marine Corps
During a recent combined operation with a deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEUjSOCJ), the air and naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) detachment was supporting a French Foreign Legion force located on the southern flank of the battalion landing team (BLT). The night before, on the behalf of the French commander, ANGLICO requested five air taskings, using the joint tactical air request (JTAR) format. The day of the French attack, none of these requests was honored. In addition, “immediate”-precedence JTARs were submitted while the attack was in progress, after the French had crossed their line of departure. These requests also were denied, and the French attack ended without any supporting-arms assistance from the MEU.
This is not an isolated event. It highlights the need for careful consideration of fire-support apportionment by deployed Marine Expeditionary Units. The 1996 Department of the Navy posture statement declares that “essential to the success of joint operations is the integration of all supporting arms.” Whenever an adjacent unit in joint (interservice) or combined (international) operations is attached to the MEU (as the French were), a real possibility exists that it may be the MEU’s first line of defense. Supporting arms—and, in particular, the MEU’s close air support (CAS)—may be the critical factor that turns the battle in a MEU’s favor if it is properly apportioned to the attached unit at the critical time.
From the Adriatic to Somalia, it has become increasingly likely that a MEU(SOC) will partake in joint and combined operations rather than acting independently. Whether in a pre-deployment joint task force exercise (JTFEX), or various amphibious operations overseas, joint and combined units ranging in strength from a reinforced company through a battalion are certain to be included. Given this likelihood, a new name for a Marine Expeditionary Unit may well be in order. When these joint and combined units attach themselves for an operation, a MEU(SOC) essentially becomes a Joint Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (JEU[SOCJ). These instances of jointness present challenges to the MEU commander and his staff that have yet to be fully explored and reach beyond the scope of the six primary missions that the Special Operations Training Group (SOTG) emphasizes before granting a MEU the SOCEX qualification. Today’s evaluation process should be expanded to include joint operations, and test how well a MEU integrates other services and allied units into its organization.
The 31st Commandant’s planning guidance calls for a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) staff training program operating under the cognizance of the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Doctrine Command, with the intent of becoming the principal agent for instruction and training of joint battle staffs built around the MEU(SOC). Ideally, this instruction should take place in three distinct phases:
- Classroom
- Practical application
- Evaluation
The foundation for such a program already exists. All that remains is tailoring it to meet the needs of a MEU($OC).
The classroom phase should consist of a week-long fire support coordination course conducted by a Marine Corps presentation team, under the supervision of the Marine Corps University. The Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic, currently fields a fire support coordination course mobile training team and regularly sends its instructors to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to train infantry battalion battle staffs in combat operations center operations. A similar course, drawn along these lines, would familiarize the key members of the MEU’s supporting arms coordination center with each other and give them a baseline from which to build into an effective joint battle staff. Basic principles such as fire support coordination measures, weapons employment, call for fires, and close air support (CAS) indoctrination would be solidified into a MEU fire-support philosophy.
The instruction may turn out to be rather mundane; nevertheless, a review on things such as the difference between a coordinated fire line and a fire support coordination line would be beneficial for those who have been out of the arena for some time. Just as aviators need refresher training when entering the cockpit after an extended absence, our warfighters on the ground deserve the same consideration. This training will pay dividends and will get the joint battle staff thinking early about fire-support employment. Thus, it will be more likely to employ all its assets properly when needed.
The practical-application phase would take place in the combined arms simulation trainer (CAST). The CAST became operational in 1988 and provides the user with the opportunity to gather all the elements of a MAGTF fire-support team together under one roof to gain proficiency at their skills. At the end of an exercise, individuals from the different agencies intermingle, de-brief, and learn more about what each other does for MAGTF commanders.
Perhaps the most confusing mechanism in a MAGTF is the communications tree for the MEU’s supporting arms. The CAST allows all players to gather and meet the people to whom these nets are dedicated. Marines can put faces and names to the voices they hear on all the radio nets.
Typically, in the CAST, there are four operational supporting arms nets:
- Tactical Air Request/Helo Request to talk to the direct air support coordinator cell
- Tactical air direction, to pass nine-line briefs
- Conduct of fire, to call in fire missions to the Fire Direction Center
- Landing force command Fire Support Coordinator, to talk to the MEU Fire Support Coordinator.
At times we should include a naval gunfire cell as well, but often are limited by a shortage of radios. This is some of the best fire-support training currently possible, and everyone walks away from these exercises with a clearer understanding of MAGTF fire support and the roles different agencies play.
Unfortunately, considering all the other concerns a MEU faces, the CAST is not used often enough. The MEU joint battle staff should be in the CAST twice a month, and an evaluation process by special operations training group (SOTG) would go a long way towards making this occur.
The third and most critical phase would be application and evaluation in a tactical environment. This could take place in one of two locations; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Ft. Polk. Louisiana, or the Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) at Twenty-Nine Palms, California.
In essence, the JRTC takes the practical application environment of the CAST and places it directly in the field. But—more than shuffling game pieces about on a “war board”—real troop units maneuver and engage each other. The proper radio nets are being used, and battlefield damage assessment is meted out by a cadre of evaluators. If we factor in the elements of weather and logistical support, the JRTC provides one of the best training scenarios short of actual combat.
The JRTC is particularly desirable for MEU training because everything is in place for the special operations command exercise (SOCEX) evaluation, as well. For example, realistic over-the-horizon operations can be conducted from the Gulf of Mexico. The JRTC is set up for brigade size operations, so the evaluation of MEUs on their use of other national or allied forces under their control is possible. The time truly has come to turn the JRTC into a joint training center—instead of an Army training center.
Such an exercise would force the MEU joint battle staff to get out in the field and function in a tactical environment; something that is essential for the decision-making process when a MEU has operational or tactical control in joint and combined forces. We need to overcome the natural tendency of a MEU to fight as though the battalion landing team (BLT) it has trained with is its only ground combat force. The MEU does not focus on joint operations exclusively, but they do merit its attention.
The JRTC may be the preferred arena, but combined arms exercises (CAX) also could be effective. U.S. Army, allied forces, or other Marine units could participate. A side benefit of conducting the operation at Twenty-nine Palms is that the MEU’s fire support agencies are able to exercise their skills in a live-fire environment. The MAGTF staff should be in operational or tactical control of the attached elements, and evaluated on how well it incorporates these forces into its scheme of maneuver.
Where Does ANGLICO Fit In?
A debate of long standing is still under way: Does a MEU need an ANGLICO Detachment? The unequivocal answer is yes!
2d Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company was formed in June 1949. It’s mission—“To support a U.S. Army or Allied Division, or elements thereof, by providing the control and liaison agencies for the employment of naval surface fires and naval air support in the amphibious assault and other operations”—has remained unchanged. Historically, deploying MEUs have included an ANGLICO detachment of 14 Marines, who execute this mission on a smaller scale (usually with an U.S. Army or allied battalion).
Specifically, ANGLICO covers two areas:
- Fire-support control
- Liaison between the joint/allied unit
The ANGLICO detachment’s strong points are these:
- Extremely high fire-support skills
- Outstanding communications capabilities (especially if allowed to access their MRC-110/138/145)
- Strong experience in the Joint arena.
ANGLICO’s primary strength rests in its fire-support agencies. Often, the attached joint and allied units arrive with little or no organic fire-support capability. Therefore, ANGLICO has a vital mission to provide these attached units with supporting arms: naval gunfire, close air support, or the MEU’s artillery battery. Given the means to tap into the MEU’s extensive fire-support capabilities, these attached units become a much stronger element for the MEU commander’s use.
Marine fire-support expertise clearly is appreciated by allied units. During “Bright Star 95” when an ANGLICO team ran F-14s for the French Foreign Legion company they were attached to, the French company commander was astounded; he said he had never seen anything like that before. The Navy/Marine Corps team wrote the book on close air support, and in reality, we still are the only ones who truly practice it.
These unique capabilities warrant the inclusion of the ANGLICO detachment officer-in-charge (OIC) into the joint battle staff. The OIC should be account able for a working knowledge of the U.S. Army and allied units likely to be attached, tables of equipment and organization, and tactical standard operating procedures. The OIC can use this information to make recommendations on employment of attached forces. For quick- response operations, the OIC also should have a place in the crisis action team. As a liaison officer, he may be in a key position and have the right personnel on hand to help the MEU commander in times of crisis.
Any need for ANGLICO could be satisfied by a standby detachment. The advantages of a land-based ANGLICO detachment being tied into the CinCEur command structure would become evident in the new training opportunities generated. The detachment would have the opportunity to train with all regional allies, becoming familiar with their capabilities, weapons, and tactics. It also could prove to be an invaluable information asset for the MEU commander if other-service or allied units should become attached to the MEU. Conversely, the ANGLICO detachment would understand the capabilities that the MEU in theater possesses and could share that knowledge selectively with our allies. Marine Corps procedures, nomenclature, and tactics are all things that could be explained, helping smooth the period of adjustment. Many of these units have turnover rates that rival our own and the educational process needs to be a continuous one.
The great advantage of having an ANGLICO detachment with the MEU is that it becomes part of the team. Team members learn about the idiosyncrasies and nuances that make each MEU distinctive, and are better able to assist the commander. A standby detachment would be unable to appreciate this vital ingredient of expeditionary warfare, and would risk falling into the out-of-sight-out-of-mind trap.
Joint and combined operations are not the wave of the future; they are a fact of the present. Even without a clearly defined training and evaluation process for a MEU battle staff’s conduct of such operations, the MEU will continue to function adequately—but below its current capabilities. At present, we fail to exploit the opportunities other units offer our deployed MEUs. By instituting this three-phase training and evaluation process and fully exercising the capabilities that ANGLICO detachments offer our MEUs, the Marine Corps will be taking a step in the right direction.
Captain Danyluk, assigned to Training Wing Six, Pensacola, Florida, wrote “FACs Should Go To Fallon, Too," Proceedings, February 1996, page 73.