That's a pretty explosive assertion. What makes supporters of the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System so sure they can deliver? For starters, the system can merge moving target information with synthetic aperture radar displays to provide near real-time, high-resolution images located in relation to their environment—as in this picture of north- and southbound traffic (yellow and purple, respectively) over the Zapanja pontoon bridges in Bosnia.
The lack of detailed, accurate, and timely information on the location and movement of friendly and enemy forces has had an immense influence on military operations—and an equally great impact on the way military forces are organized, trained, and equipped. The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) has demonstrated in war and peace—Operations Desert Storm and Joint Endeavor—its ability to pierce darkness and poor visibility to give commanders precise locations of almost all mobile forces operating within an area in excess of 40,000 square kilometers.
Joint STARS has the potential to exert an extraordinary influence on the conduct of joint operations at both the tactical and operational levels of war. If the U.S. military exploits it, the system can change the way U.S. forces are organized, trained, equipped, and employed to such a degree that a real revolution in joint warfare is possible.
JSTARS Capabilities
The system's radar, its operating and control capabilities, and its communications are the keys to success. In the moving target indicator (MTI) mode, the radar can continuously collect precise data on virtually all vehicular movement—including land vehicles, boats, and slow-flying aircraft—occurring within its coverage, provided the movement is not screened by terrain or foliage. Processed data are displayed in real-time as moving imagery on any of the operating and control subsystem's 18 on-board workstations.
At the same time, the system provides preprocessed data via the communications subsystem's encrypted surveillance-and-control data link to an unlimited number of ground stations, where it also is displayed as moving imagery. Airborne and ground station operators can enhance the moving imagery with a historical replay feature, as well as with data bases that include cartographic information. Exploitation is easy because the imagery is displayed in a form that allows them to detect, locate, and track vehicles, distinguish individual vehicles in a convoy, and even determine wheeled from tracked vehicles. For practical purposes, the radar can see an unlimited number of vehicles, but there is a limit to the number of automatic tracks it can maintain.
The system's ability to interleave synthetic aperture radar (SAR) images with moving target imagery further enhances the information. When tracking a vehicle's movement to a stop, for example, the subsystems' design makes it easy for airborne and ground operators to use the radar to collect a high-resolution, photograph-like still image in near real time. The synthetic aperture radar image allows the operators to locate the now-stationary vehicle in relation to its environment. Using moving target imagery to cue the radar reduces dramatically both the resources and the time devoted to SAR-imagery collection and assessment.
In addition to the data link used for communicating with ground stations, JSTARS also is equipped with two identical Joint Tactical Information Distribution System terminals and a communications suite of 2 high-frequency, 3 very-high frequency, and 12 ultra-high frequency encrypted radios. Given the system's unprecedented ability to collect and display moving and still imagery on the subsystem's 18 workstations, these communications make JSTARS an ideal battle-management platform, especially for air forces.
Warfare Before JSTARS
A look at the history of battle makes it easier to appreciate why the system provides such immense potential for revolutionizing future warfare. Over the years, several factors have worked against commanders fighting mobile forces:
- The practical impossibility of collecting information on forces that were moving during poor visibility or, until very recently, darkness
- Limitations on sensor fields-of-view, to include a soldier's vision, which usually limited intelligence collection to a small area
- The inability of a commander to react quickly enough to exploit developing opportunities or counter emerging threats—given the time required to collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, interpret, and finally communicate this intelligence to forces in the field
Given these problems, commanders often fought fire with fire—moving their own forces to confuse the enemy. Movement's impact on the reliability and accuracy of a commander's intelligence does much to explain the uncertainties and friction that have characterized warfare. It also explains why commanders like Napoleon put so much emphasis on movement.1 Successful commanders understood that movement intensified their enemy's friction and sense of uncertainty.
Neither the Industrial Revolution nor the technological (and doctrinal) developments associated with modern warfare changed the realities of Napoleonic warfare regarding mobile forces. In fact, by making it possible to move more forces faster and farther, even during darkness and poor weather, developments such as the railroad and internal combustion engine combined with organizational developments like the armored division to make intelligence on mobile forces increasingly unreliable.
While aircraft and satellites improved the quantity and quality of a commander's overall intelligence, they fell short when it came to mobile forces. Until infrared cameras were fielded, darkness still shielded movement. Synthetic aperture radar made it possible to collect information when the surface was obscured by clouds, but prior to JSTARS, the radars did not have adequate capability against moving targets to provide commanders with accurate, detailed, and timely information on mobile forces. Side-looking airborne radars (SLARs) have been used in combat before; the key difference with JSTARS is its exploitation of real-time, high-quality MTI. There are additional differences: area covered, standoff distance, endurance—and the presence of numerous on-board operators along with the communications to exploit the information.
Early synthetic aperture radars, in fact, had many of the same problems that handicapped optical photography and infrared technology as sources of information. Attempting to locate mobile forces operating within a large area using high-resolution synthetic aperture radar “still” images requires significant time and resources—collecting, Processing the imagery into usable information, and communicating the information to commanders.
Given these problems, commanders worldwide have organized, trained, equipped, deployed, and employed their forces based on the assumption that their intelligence on Mobile forces is likely to be unreliable. Recognition of the problems also does much to explain why commanders have developed doctrine that capitalizes on them—by using rapid movement to create the advantages of mass and surprise. World War II German and postwar Israeli commanders, in particular, have used rapid, deep movement to dislocate their enemies by magnifying their uncertainty and attacking their vulnerable rear area.
At the same time, the more effective commanders have assumed that they would operate in conditions of uncertainty caused by a lack of timely information on the location of their own forces as well. Recognition of the existence of uncertainty was the reason successful commanders such as von Moltke the Elder assigned great emphasis to individual initiative and mission orders. It also had a great influence on organization and tactics, as commanders attempted to ensure that their forces could move quickly without dangerously compromising their ability to react quickly to a threat or opportunity that was unexpected because of uncertainty regarding the enemy's location.
Lack of information often caused commanders to resort to physical contact—meeting engagements—to find the enemy; this was frequently the case during the Vietnam War. Even after locating the enemy, commanders had major difficulties maintaining accurate locations of their own forces. Lack of timely information made battles confusing and often too costly.
Intelligence limits also have exerted a great influence on the employment of air power. Many commanders used air power to conduct close air support, in part, because they recognized that knowledge of the enemy’s location tended to be more accurate and timely when these forces were in close proximity to friendly land forces. They believed that this intelligence advantage offset the increased risks of fratricide and the disadvantages of attacking forces that were likely to be dispersed and dug in.
Commanders who used air power for interdiction again were handicapped by the lack of accurate, timely information on the enemy’s mobile forces. They often employed fighter-bombers in armed reconnaissance, depending on the aircrews to find suitable targets visually. Fighter-bombers proved more suitable than bombers because they maneuvered better at the low altitudes required to find and attack targets as small as trucks or armored vehicles.
Employing fighter-bombers for armed reconnaissance was not without problems. At low altitude, the aircraft were well within the range of ground-based air defenses, making the mission a dangerous one. Their short range when carrying external stores—compared to high-altitude bombers—limited the enemy’s vulnerability to attack to a distance relatively close to friendly ground forces.2 Short ranges compounded the problem by making the availability of fighter-bomber bases a limiting factor in a campaign’s tempo. The need to fly many sorties to increase the odds of finding the enemy’s mobile forces dictated more airplanes and crews. Even when the sorties were available, enemy forces generally could avoid heavy losses—at the cost of some delay—by moving at night or during periods of reduced visibility.3
The many problems associated with armed reconnaissance do much to explain why commanders often devoted many air-interdiction sorties to attacking fixed lines-of- communication infrastructure, such as rail yards, bridges, and tunnels. Although this compensated for the lack of timely and accurate intelligence on enemy mobile forces, its effectiveness varied widely, according to the enemy’s dependence on the infrastructure for movement and resupply and its vulnerability to air attack. Since vital fixed parts of the infrastructure usually were well defended, attacks could be costly; furthermore, the risk of civilian casualties was high when the targets were located in populated areas. In addition, the strategy proved to be a double-edged sword: the need to repair damage caused by air interdiction could handicap a campaign’s tempo by delaying the advance of friendly ground forces.
A Concept of Operations for Warfare with Joint STARS
Today, however, JSTARS offers commanders timely and accurate information on enemy mobile forces operating within a very large area. Because modem armies depend on vehicles for mobility, firepower, and supplies, this information will enable U.S. commanders to change radically their air and ground concepts of operations. If they exploit JSTARS information fully, the military capabilities that U.S. commanders require also can be changed, making forces more deployable. More important, lives can be saved, because it will be possible to achieve success faster and to do so without risking as many friendly military or civilian lives.
Joint STARS will make true joint warfare possible. A joint force commander and component commanders who share the same real-time picture of land operations will be able to execute operations that create powerful synergies by design and not by accident. The system will allow them to synchronize air interdiction and maneuver so that each complements and reinforces the other.4
Synchronization is important because it can create a dilemma for the enemy that has no satisfactory solution. If he attempts to counter our land maneuver by using vehicles to move powerful forces rapidly, he exposes these forces to unacceptable losses from air interdiction and long-range missile artillery. If he does not use vehicles for mobility, his army will lack heavy firepower and be vulnerable to defeat in detail by a combination of air attack and maneuver. In any event, he faces defeat.
Maneuver supported by Joint STARS can draw or force enemy mobile forces into killing zones so extended in size and depth that they are of operational level, rather than tactical, proportions. Once enemy forces enter the zones, the system would be used to support sudden and destructive air interdiction and long-range missile artillery attacks intense enough to cause enemy units to disintegrate.5 At the same time, the system would be used to support friendly maneuver to reduce the risk of high casualties by avoiding close combat operations except under the most favorable possible conditions.
Whether the enemy is drawn or forced into killing zones will depend largely on his interest in closing with friendly forces. At A1 Khafji during Operation Desert Storm, for example, the enemy engaged in close combat in hopes of weakening U.S. political will by inflicting heavy casualties. In such situations, JSTARS can be the key to the early detection, enhancing the ability of commanders to maneuver away from the enemy, while drawing the enemy into an exposed killing zone.6 If the enemy declines the bait, friendly force maneuver can create a threat the enemy cannot afford to ignore. Should the enemy then respond, JSTARS again can provide early warning, allowing U.S. forces to avoid battle except on their own terms.
Essential to the success of such a campaign plan is the joint force land component commander's ability to use JSTARS information to determine, in close coordination with the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), how to use maneuver to set up air interdiction attacks against the enemy’s mobile forces.
Enhancing the effectiveness of the land force commander to support the overall commander’s campaign plan with maneuver is the increased speed with which land forces supported by JSTARS will be able to move. The system will ensure these forces can maintain a high tempo by enabling air interdiction forces to concentrate quickly against potential enemy threats. The JSTARS information, widely disseminated to land forces, also can reduce much of the uncertainty regarding the location of both friendly and enemy forces that, historically, has been one of the main causes for frequent pauses in the conduct of land operations.7 When the inevitable problems arise, JSTARS information will reveal them immediately—permitting the commander to set about solving them.
Equally essential to the success of the plan is the ability of the air and ground commanders to fix upon the best killing zones, given JSTARS’ field of view and air interdiction resources, and to use system information to set attack priorities. The air component commander will continue to depend on system information to target aircraft and long-range artillery delivering precision munitions such as the sensor-fused weapon and brilliant antitank submunition (BAT).
The overall system clearly has the potential to support the sudden destruction of large numbers of vehicles—and anyone in them. Exposure to these attacks will demonstrate to the enemy the uncanny ability of U.S. forces to find and destroy them, undermining the morale of the individual soldiers.8 Further magnifying this situation will be the enemy’s inability to strike back effectively. Before very many vehicles are destroyed, most enemy soldiers, like the Iraqis who quickly learned to fear “tank plinking,” are likely to be unwilling to occupy their vehicles, leading to a paralysis of the enemy army.9
Paralysis can lead to disintegration. Enhancing this likelihood would be the enemy soldier’s knowledge of the consequences of continuing to fight as light infantry—without armored vehicles to provide firepower, mobility, and protection and without trucks for resupply. U.S. commanders would be able to exploit significant advantages in mobility, protection, firepower, logistics, and information to kill the enemy at relatively little risk—while forcing the enemy infantry to fight on their terms.
Ideally, rather than attacking enemy forces located in complex terrain, our commanders would use their advantages to isolate and starve the enemy, much as Allied air and naval forces did with Japanese ground forces during the island campaigns in the Pacific during World War II- By making possible a much more effective form of joint warfare, JSTARS could influence significant changes in the way U.S. forces are organized, trained, and equipped.
The most significant equipment changes would be those involving the U.S. Army’s armored force, which will continue to play an important role in forcing enemy armored forces to react—setting up the enemy’s destruction with JSTARS-controlled, long-range precision strikes. Armored forces also will continue to play a central role in defeating infantry forces with minimum friendly casualties. JSTARS should reduce the requirement to defeat enemy armored forces primarily by means of close combat between armored forces, which should, in turn, permit a reduction in overall numbers of U.S. armored vehicles and lead to lighter, more deployable forces.
Army aviation and artillery, which can exploit JSTARS information by delivering long-range precision munitions, probably will face fewer changes. Changes are likely in organization and training related to command and control. Long-range precision attacks require centralized direction to exploit their potential fully. Because most long-range assets are aircraft, it is logical that the JFACC exercise tactical control over long-range Army assets when they are used against enemy forces in a deep kill zone, where there is no chance of close combat.
The system also makes possible a number of changes in the training and equipping of U.S. air forces. Reduced requirements for close combat with enemy armored forces should reduce significantly the need for fixed-wing forces trained and equipped to perform close air support and armed reconnaissance. Instead, with the development of precision Weapons like BAT, which can destroy mobile targets even when dropped from high altitude through clouds and in darkness, large-payload, long-range bombers often will be the ideal delivery aircraft for attacking mobile forces.
The importance of long-range air power for surface attack against enemy forces will increase because of the need to reduce the size of theater-based U.S. forces. Basing a larger portion of U.S. air power outside a theater can reduce vulnerability, especially to weapons of mass destruction, and reduce the magnitude of the theater logistics Problem. In addition to reducing congestion at exposed theater ports and bases, such basing will reduce theater transportation requirements. Operations in Korea after the Pusan breakout and during the advance toward the Yalu provide clear evidence of the way transportation requirements for supplying both land and air units based in theater can be a major constraint on a campaign’s tempo, especially in a heater where the route structure is limited and transportation assets must be brought into the theater.10
If current JSTARS capabilities are enhanced by developments in surveillance, battle management, communications, precision weapons, and simulation technologies, it is possible that the changes in the conduct of warfare will be as revolutionary as those associated with the introduction of gunpowder. Effectively integrated with the development of appropriate joint doctrine, a JSTARS-centered precision engagement capability will permit U.S. forces to become more deployable and far less vulnerable.
Most important, fully exploiting JSTARS potential can do much to prevent conflicts. Extremely early warning of preparations for aggression—made possible by JSTARS Peacetime surveillance—could be used to enhance diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict by providing irrefutable evidence of aggressive behavior, as was the case during Operation Joint Endeavor. Adding to this ability to prevent conflict would be the deterrence achieved when a potential aggressor recognizes the truly immense disadvantages he faces in attacking forces supported by JSTARS.
1 According to Napoleon, “Marches are war .... Aptitude for war is aptitude for movement.... Victory is to the armies which maneuver.” Le Comte de Dervieu, The Transformations of War, cited by J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War, 17891961 (New York: Minerva Press, 1968), p. 50.
2 According to an Army report on World War IPs Normandy campaign, “ ... it was the effort of the fighter bomber on armed reconnaissance to deny all enemy movement by day that most decisively aided ground units.” In support of this conclusion, the report quotes the German General von Rundstedt, who noted that in Normandy, “aircraft were dominating the main combat area and the main supply approaches to a depth of 150-200 kilometers—the closer the area is to the combat zone, the more frequently appear fighter and fighter bombers in road hunting— the main effort of the enemy air attacks now is directed in a zone of about twenty kilometers behind the main line of resistance, against any kind of movement, be it secondary road or cross country ...” General Omar N. Bradley and Air Effects Committee 12th Army Group, Effect of Air Power on Military Operations Western Europe, (Wiesbaden, Germany: US 12th Army Group Air Branches of G-3 and G-2, 15 July 1945), pp. 94-5.
3 A summary of U.S. interrogations of German prisoners of war notes that “After the initial lessons of the Normandy campaign had been learned, the enemy took air power into account at every turn, on the assumption that the Allies held tactical supremacy, at least during daylight hours. Movement was confined to hours of darkness; camouflage discipline was pounded into the heads of the troops; dispersal was practiced in every conceivable regard. Allied air power was an ever present factor in both strategic and tactical plans. The Mortain counteroffensive was delayed in hope of bad weather. The Ardennes offensive was planned for the worst period of the year, weatherwise, for the period of longest nights, in anticipation of optimum freedom from air interference .... Only in times of very great stress were these restrictions abandoned: in consequence, the great retreats from the Falaise-Argentan pocket, across the Seine, from Mons, and in January 1945 from the Ardennes, were carried out in daylight with fearful punishment from fighter bombers.” Bradley, p. 163.
4 According to joint doctrine, “Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver (both land and sea) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the JFC’s campaign objectives.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 9 September 1993), p. IV-19.
5 “Military disintegration is a condition of organizational paralysis characterized by the total and often sudden collapse of the willingness of the average soldier to resist or to attack the enemy .. . Once organizational control over the fighting ceases and combat becomes a matter of individual survival, disintegration has occurred.” Stephen D. Wesbrook, “The Potential for Military Disintegration," Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military, Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), p. 244.
6 The tactic of retreating to set up an attack has been used many times very successfully, especially by the “great captains” of history. The Mongols were recognized for their skills in this regard. Despite its demonstrated effectiveness, few U.S. commanders have used the tactic.
7 The impact of the “imperfect” knowledge on military operations was remarked upon by Clausewitz, who wrote, . . one must admit that partial ignorance of the situation is, generally speaking, a minor factor in delaying the progress of military action and in moderating the principle that underlies it." Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 85.
8 Many military analysts devote insufficient attention to the difficult-to-quantify impact of terror on behavior, but as Clausewitz noted, “Without an accurate conception of danger we cannot understand war." Clausewitz, p. 114.
9 For an excellent treatment of how fear can affect behavior see Col. Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Firepower: The Psychological Dimension," Army, July 1989, pp. 4350; and Ian Gooderson, “Allied Fighter-Bombers Versus German Armour in NorthWest Europe 1944-1945: Myths and Realities,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, June 1991. pp. 210-231.
10 As Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK) moved north after the Pusan breakout, it moved over a road and rail network that had been severely damaged by earlier air attacks. Compounding the problem during much of the advance was the inability to use Inchon because the port was tied up with the embarkation of the First Marine Division for a planned landing at Wonsan. The road, rail, and port constraints caused EUSAK to depend almost entirely on airlift for its supply. With airlift tied up by EUSAK requirements, the movement of fighter-bomber wings to forward bases was delayed, which seriously handicapped air power’s effectiveness in terms of sortie rates, weapons loads, and time on target. EUSAK took this calculated risk regarding air power because of their belief that the greatest obstacle to reaching the Yalu was not the enemy, but lack of supplies. See Frank F. Futrell, The United States Air Force In Korea 1950-1953, revised edition (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp. 201-203 and 215-217.
Colonel Bingham works at Northrop Grumman’s Surveillance and Battle Management Systems. He flew fighters in the United States. Europe, and Southeast Asia, and was the Chief of the Current Doctrine Division. Airpower Research Institute, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education. Maxwell AFB, Alabama, where he helped write the Air Force’s 1992 Basic Aerospace Doctrine Manual (AFM 1-1).