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trying also to create a legal structure of social guarantees for servicemen and their families—a recognized shortfall of the previous system of service.
In terms of ships, the plan is to preserve the navy’s ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force, although at a lower level. The actual numbers will be re-
Russia’s naval aviation combat force levels are projected to be reduced by 40%. The candidates for removal seem easy to identify—such as the Yak-38 Forger, seen here on the flight deck of the Minsk—because many of the navy’s aircraft are rather long in the tooth.
It has been a year of considerable turmoil for the Russian Navy. In an early April press report, for example, Vice Admiral Georgiy Gurinov was noted arriving to take command of the Pacific Fleet, replacing Admiral Gennadiy Khva- tov, who had been fired because of irregularities in the treatment of Pacific Fleet conscripts. Earlier in the year, Vice Admiral and Hero of the Soviet Union Eduard Baltin was identified in Rossiyskaya gazeta as the new commander-in-chief of the Black Sea Fleet. He will command the fleet during a transition period, while it is under joint Russian and Ukrainian control. Vice Admiral Baltin, a submariner with impeccable Professional credentials, will have his Work cut out for him, as unrest in the Black Sea Fleet continues.
Meanwhile, the service has been involved in a major reassessment of its future roles, missions, and makeup. Numerous articles have appeared that describe the planning under way to recast the Russian Navy to meet the changed environment in which it must operate. Among the issues highlighted for discussion have been combat force levels, organizational structures, primary operational missions, and methods and techniques of employment. Four central features of what is described as the “common approach to future development” are familiar to those who have been following Russian military literature:
>• An “orientation on qualitative parameters” in the development of the navy >■ “Maintenance of close contact with the other services”—essentially a commitment to combined-arms operations F More complete use of ‘ the country s overall scientific and military-technical potential”
V Standardization of combat systems and weapons
A new focus for the Russian Navy involves plans for full participation in U.N. deterrence and peacekeeping functions.
A continuing requirement in the development of the navy is the ability to deal with possible threats to Russian interests from the ocean and sea. But this
must now be done with an understanding of the country’s “real economic capabilities.” The military in general and the navy in particular must be designed within a truncated and economically weakened Russia. The concern for constraints also recognizes the less militarized economy and the resultant lower priority that military procurement will receive as the country continues its transition and reform.
One key aspect of the future is the navy hierarchy’s desire for an across-the-board commitment to quality. Primary attention will be given to ensuring increased quality of new ships as they are acquired. In addition, three other areas have been identified as central to naval development: equipping ships with precision- guided weapons, improving all aspects of navy troop control, and improving all types of support. Part of the logistics shortfall will be addressed by the rapid drawdown of ships in the Russian Navy—akin to shaping the navy to fit the logistics infrastructure rather than building the infrastructure to support the navy. This is referred to as “repairing the imbalance in combat and support forces, and it clearly is a case of making a virtue of necessity.
In addition to reducing the ship inventory, the navy also intends to reduce manpower. This also may reflect necessity, as continuing conscription shortfalls have left gaping holes in units. The navy plan is to reduce end strength 22% by 1995, which should represent a reduction of almost 100,000 men—from former levels of about 450,000 to about 350,000. The navy will be manned both by conscripts and by the contract method, which notably will be extended to the officer corps. Although the precipitous decline in the ruble has made it difficult to meet contract personnel goals, the intention is to continue to work toward a mixed manning of the force. The Russian military is
duced substantially by START requirements and by old age. At current rates of retirement, by the year 2000 there should be no more than 26 SSBNs in the force, possibly fewer. There are currently six Typhoon and eight Delta IV SSBNs in the Northern Fleet, and these easily could represent the entire submarine-launched ballistic missile order of battle beyond the year 2000, until a replacement is designed and built or one of the old designs is rejuvenated. There appear to be no SSBNs currently under construction.
If all the Delta IV and Typhoon submarines are retained, they would account for nearly 2,000 reentry vehicles, a large percentage of the number of weapons agreed to by Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin in the latest discussions.
The Russians might find it necessary to offload some submarine-launched missiles to allow for retention of land-based missiles in their inventory. Also, if these systems are the only SSBNs retained, it seems possible that the Pacific Fleet may go out of the SSBN business. Moving either of these newer systems there would be a cost the navy seems unlikely to be able to afford.
Building programs in the new navy will be considerably constrained from past practice. Plans currently call for continued building of general-purpose submarines at low annual rates, and optimizing their capabilities and readiness. The discussion implies that a single type may be built (probably Akula for now) and that attention will be paid to equipping them with, among other things, precision-guided weapons. Surface forces will be streamlined, with construction of the current Kirov- and Slava-class cruisers and Udaloy-class destroyers coming to an end. Emphasis will be placed on multimission destroyer development and construction, with the ship equipped with practically all types of missile weapons (land-attack, precision-guided antiship, and antiair missiles) and a unified weapons control system. This ship, perhaps a derivative of the Sovremennyy class, will be designed with organic targeting capability.
Other elements of the fleet also will include small displacement ships with some multimission capability, to provide coastal patrol—the role of the inshore defense forces in the past. This implies some type of ship like the old Grisha classes, with both antisubmarine warfare capability and at least point defense antiair capability. Furthermore, minesweeping and mine warfare will remain in the mix, with replacements for the aging inventory of minesweepers.
Naval aviation also will remain one of the navy’s primary combat arms, but its combat force levels will be reduced by approximately 40%. This is a large reduction, but the candidates for removal seem easy to identify, because many of the navy’s aircraft are rather long in the tooth. Primary areas for attention will be improving carrier-based fighter aviation, missile-equipped aviation, and ASW aircraft systems. The Russian Air Force has indicated that it intends to have only fourth-generation aircraft in the combat fleet by 1995. The navy may follow suit with its tactical aircraft, but it remains to be seen what will happen in the navy’s missile-armed aviation and ASW air force.
Although their plans seem sensible in thrust and reflect a new understanding of economic constraints, the Russians face serious problems in achieving even this program. Drastic reductions apparently have taken place over the past year in the appropriations for both ship construction and operations; 1992 was the first year in several decades in which not a single ship was laid down for the Russian Navy. Such reduced budgets make it impossible to even begin the contemplated revitalization of the fleet. If Russian commentary is accurate, the next two or three years will see even further decline in the shipbuilding and conversion budget and substantially reduced production of other systems. For the time being, we may see only very limited production in any of the potential programs.
Nevertheless, it is important that priorities be set and clearly understood, especially with such constraints. The Russian Navy has set its priorities to emphasize development and production of effective, precision-guided weapons systems, improved troop control systems, and to develop new reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and information systems. Since these have been discussed in Russia and the West as central elements of the military-technical revolution, this prioritization is not surprising.
One area for emphasis in the new Russian Navy will be improving the troop control process. This effort reportedly will focus on ensuring that forces can be brought to proper readiness levels, that they will be able to conduct combat operations, and that the commanders and staffs will be prepared to provide and use comprehensive support, i.e., both logistics support and operational support such as targeting, refueling, and control. These all were noted as key shortfalls for Russian forces in their analysis of the 1991 Iraq war.
In the talks of future requirements for the navy, evidence of current problems also has surfaced—discussions of aims for the future invariably include a call for strengthening military discipline. Clearly, this has been a problem of late, and the maintenance of good order and discipline has gone by the boards in several areas. A concern for control in the Far East may be partially responsible for the recent decision by the Russian General Staff, announced by General Pavel Grachev in May, to create two new joint High Commands of Forces, one in Komsomolsk and one in Ulan Ude. The two High Commands may facilitate central control in a region that stretches from the Urals to the Pacific, suffers from its remoteness from Moscow and a lack of infrastructure, and has developed several regional movements for autonomy. The Pacific Fleet will be subordinated to the commander in Komsomolsk, and it seems conceivable in view of its mission that this command might be rotated between a naval officer and an air force officer.
In addition to the reorganization it® pending in the Pacific, the Russian Navy also has reorganized the former Naval Infantry and Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops into a single new command, the Naval Shore Troops. The commander of the Shore Troops is a familiar face to the West: the former head of the Soviet Naval Infantry, Lieutenant General Ivan S. Skuratov. According to an interview with General Skuratov, the new command was established to provide a combined arms force as a part of the fleet that would be able to defend shore facilities while acting both from land and sea.[1][2] The general notes that such a shortfall in capability was “one of the causes of out losing major fleet bases in the first months of the [Great Patriotic] war.” There are apparently three elements of the Naval Shore Troops. The Naval I® fantry retains its amphibious warfare charter for landings from the sea; the Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops provide a shore-based, antiship missile capability; and the Shore Defense Troops provide for the defense of fleet bases and for defense against assaults, i.e., antilanding defense. The Shore Defense Troops apparently were formed from elements of the other two component services (Naval Infantry and Missile and At- tillery Troops) in 1989. Although the forces are designed with specific missions, the Naval Infantry and Shore Defense Troops “with their modem weapons and vehicles and high level of professional skills, can be assigned other missions, including acting as part of mobile forces for the neutralization of possible local military conflicts.”
It is too early to tell how far the Russian Navy will be able to go with this program. Planning always has been a strong suit of the Russian military, but— in the face of downsizing, economic turmoil, and manning and training problems—it remains to be seen if the Russian Navy can execute its plan for conversion, especially by the year 2000.
'See Captain First Rank V. Y. Moiseyenko, “The Russian Armed Forces Military Structural Development Concept: A View on the Problem of the Navy,” Morskoy sbomik, No. 10, October 1992, pp. 3-7; and Admiral Gromov, “The Russian Navy: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow,” Morskoy sbomik, No. 1, January 1993, pp. 3-8. Admiral Gromov also discusses some of the same issues in even more detail in “Russia at Sea,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, 15 April 1993, p. 4.
[2]Captain Second Rank Ye. Privalov, Interview with LGen. I.S. Skuratov, “They Are Naval Infantrymen,” Morskoy sbomik, No. 11, November 1992, pp. 8-10.