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Why Not a Cruiser/Destroyer
Wing?
In the future, the United States almost certainly will fight its wars against regional powers. As in the Persian Gulf, during future expeditionary-warfare scenarios, we will be confronted by small but potent surface combatants armed with antiship missiles, fast craft laying mines, and srnall boats attacking directly with | Machine guns and rockets.
| The surface commander has four I °Ptions for countering this type of sur- | lace threat—carrier aviation, ship! launched Harpoon and Tomahawk antiship missiles, guns, and armed helicopters.
Because they can engage small combatants long before they come within missile range of our ships, carrier-based aircraft would be the preferred option. However, as the carrier fleet shrinks,
| carrier air wings may be stretched too ! ihin to ensure protection at all times.
With fewer carriers, sending U.S. naval forces to distant hot spots without sea- based air cover is a distinct possibility.
Tomahawks and Harpoons are effective against larger ships, but probably I Wouldn’t be the weapon of choice against a speedboat or missile-firing I gunboat. Furthermore—because of the danger of hitting oil platforms, buoys, or neutral ships—long-range, over-the- horizon missile shots may not be possible in all war zones. Without accurate targeting data, a commander either might wait for better information or close with the enemy in order to ensure a kill—and possibly endanger his ship.
| Naval gunfire can be very effective against small combatants. But the range of the Navy’s heaviest gun—the 5-inch/ 54-caliber—is only about nine miles— Well within the range of most antiship missiles currently in service.
In the Persian Gulf War, the armed helicopter was a very potent weapon. The Royal Navy’s Sea Lynx helicopters, armed with Sea Skua missiles—controlled by ships, Royal Air Force Nimrod patrol planes, or U.S. Navy P-3s and SH-60Bs—proved deadly. The SH-60B also demonstrated its outstanding electronic-support mea
sures, command-and-control, and surveillance capabilities.
In order to get significant helicopter striking power to sea, the Navy should form destroyer- and cruiser-based helicopter air wings. Such wings would provide an effective alternative or supplement to carrier aviation, much the same way as the Harpoon-equipped P-3 Orions were supposed to support attacks on Soviet surface-action groups in blue- water engagements. A helicopter air wing would increase the striking power of the battle group or amphibious ready group and increase its offensive and defensive flexibility. If a small surface force is deployed without the support of a carrier battle group, armed helicopters would fill the gaps in antisurface-warfare (ASUW) capabilities.
Currently, all Aegis cruisers and Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers are supposed to deploy with two LAMPS- III helicopters. In theory, then, if a surface action group has two Aegis cruisers, two Spruance-class destroyers, and one Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate, it would embark eight LAMPS- III SH-60Bs and two LAMPS-I SH-2Fs. The Navy’s plans to modify a large number of SH-60Bs to fire the Penguin antiship missile have been curtailed sharply by budget reductions. To ensure maximum ASUW power then, one nonPenguin-capable SH-60B should be replaced by two AH-1 Sea Cobras.
The AH-l’s Hellfire or TOW missiles would be ideal for attacking frigates and guided-missile patrol craft, its 20-mm. gun would be devastating against high-speed boats. The Sea Cobra’s comprehensive countermeasures package—chaff, flares, and an infrared decoy jamming system—would increase its survivability in a hostile environment. The cost of integrating the Sea Cobra into the fleet would be minimal because it is already in the U.S. inventory, its systems are already modified for maritime operations, and its spare parts are in the Navy and Marine Corps supply systems.
During operations, an SH-60B could act as a command ship, vectoring missile-firing SH-60Bs and AH-Is to targets and—through positive control of the attacking helicopters—providing the
navigational assistance needed for overwater operations. Furthermore, an SH-60B could support—and,in s01™; cases, supplement or replace—the b-2C Hawkeye in the surveillance mission, and help provide an accurate surface picture for any commander.
One way of reconfiguring the helicopter community to allow for the new air wing would be to have one light
antisubmarine-helicopter squadron
on each coast provide the Penguin- equipped SH-60B and AH-1 detac ments. To reduce the strain on the active-duty Navy, one-third of the squadron’s shore establishment instructor pilots, maintenance technicians, and administrative staff—could be reservists. Reservists also could support exercises and, in times of crisis, provide additional shipboard detachments.
Another option would be to give the responsibility for providing the AH-1 Sea Cobra detachments to the Naval Air Reserve. Reservists could train with deploying battle groups during their work-ups, giving both sides experience in working together. If needed, the reserve detachments could be deployed with their battle group—if necessary, flying their aircraft, personnel, ordnance, and support equipment in U.S.
Air Force transports.
There is no reason to restrict these helicopters to the ASUW mission—the reserve and/or active-duty AH-Is could support special-warfare and brown- water operations. The aircraft could provide air support for the new Cyclone (PC-1) patrol craft now being purchased for the special-operations community.
In Vietnam, the helicopter came of age in land warfare. During the Persian Gulf War, the helicopter proved itself as an effective antiship weapon system. Since the Navy is planning to fight its future wars in brown and green water, it should look to its combat-proved systems to provide the capabilities needed to fight there.
Captain Liebman was the commanding officer of COMSEVENTHFLT 111, the reserve-augment unit for the Seventh Fleet. He served with Carrier Group Seven during the Persian Gulf War in the USS Ranger (CV-61). In civilian life, he is a marketing consultant and a freelance writer.
Proceedings / August 1993