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manding and threatening ingress and egress portions of the mission to reduce exposure time, thereby reducing threat probability of kill. Bombing a target 400 to 500 miles away may require a straight-line radius capability of 600 to 700 miles; and that capability must be available at other than best cruise altitudes and speeds in order to survive. The A-6E has such a combat radius, and the AFX should have no less—with a significant increase in survivability.
It should also carry a lethal payload. The AFX must deliver precision-guided munitions to achieve high kill probabilities. It also must carry a meaningful quantity of iron bombs in the signature-controlled configuration when smart weapons are not available, and ideally no less than .the A-6E when low observability is not required.
The AFX must be stealthy. The United States must capitalize on its lead in stealth technology to gain a lasting advantage. Stealth has restored surprise and survivability to the art of war. Its benefits were clearly demonstrated during the Air Force strikes against a heavily defended nuclear target near Baghdad during the Gulf War when a force of only eight F-l 17 stealth attack aircraft successfully destroyed a target that would have normally required nearly 75 tactical sorties.
Stealth technology, along with accuracy in all-weather delivery of air-to-ground munitions, is absolutely essential in providing the flexibility to neutralize high-value targets early in a conflict. But state-of-the-art stealth capability cannot be bolted- on to existing designs. To exploit stealth properly, the Navy needs a new integrated design built from the bottom up.
Stealth cannot be the only ingredient of a survivable aircraft, though—putting all our eggs in one basket would make it too easy to counter. The AFX must adopt a balanced approach to survivability and incorporate superb maneuverability and agility. Competitive performance, dash capability, and the ability to perform multiple missions—overwater, overland, in support of ground troops, or in support of ships—are essential characteristics of the AFX.
This gives the carrier a tremendous range, and the depth of tactical combat capability needed to protect U.S. interests worldwide. Naval aviation needs an all-weather, survivable, and agile force-multiplier with endurance and lethality. An AFX will maximize this power projection requirement from the sea, meeting both operational and budgetary priorities. It is an absolutely essential element of a smaller, but flexible and powerful naval force in the future.
Carrier battle groups do more than bomb. They provide air superiority, sea control, intelligence, and close air support in the immediate battle zone.
The Navy needs an AFX—ask any experienced strike leader who has been tasked to project power “from the sea.”
VAdm. J. K. Ready, USN (Ret.)
A year ago, few were asking whether the Navy needed the AX, but things have changed. The Soviet threat is gone, the recession lingers—and the deficit is rising. The Navy has shifted from a blue water “open ocean” to a littoral “from-the-sea” focus, and Congress has directed yet another major tactical aircraft review. Some fear this portends a showdown between the AX and the F/A-18E/F. It must be an AFX.
Obviously, the next carrier aircraft must be multimission, but the AX must first and foremost be an all-weather medium- attack bomber, to replace the A-6E Intruder and continue to provide precise power-projection capability from the sea. It must also be capable and competitive in the air-combat arena, to maintain access from the sea and effectively contribute to battle space dominance.
Aviators in the years ahead will face hazards far more severe than those encountered in Desert Storm. The next enemy may not refuse to fight in the air, and the world’s aggressors have learned that they cannot depend on older Soviet-type air defenses. Russia, starved for cash, has state-of-art equipment for sale, as do many other nations,
Third World antiaircraft weapons will likely include the SA- 10 and SA-12 surface-to-air missiles, which are well suited to defend both fixed installations and mobile invasion forces. Neither the A-6E nor the Tomahawk missile can readily penetrate air space protected by these missiles.
Still the centerpiece of carrier operations, the current A-6E, remains mission capable and upgrades are improving it. By 2015, however, the Intruder will be gone. To replace it, naval aviation will need an advanced-technology strike aircraft, with endurance and precise weapon-delivery capability as well as the ability to survive new threats. These features are essential to complement the light attack F/A-8E/F, whether it’s “at sea” or “from the sea.”
The AFX must be affordable. It must have long endurance and the flexibility associated with extended-range capability. When Marines fighting an over-the-beach ground action call for air support, they do not want to wait for an aircraft to arrive from a carrier even a short distance away. They want the aircraft nearby, airborne and ready to respond on demand. This dictates loiter capability, “trucking” capability, endurance, and persistence—“range” by any other name.
Some have argued for a shorter-range alternative, citing the Navy’s increased emphasis on littoral operations. This argument is understandable, but it ignores the proved realities of carrier strike operations. Endurance and extended-range power projection are fundamental performance requirements of the carrier system.
By the same token, strike missions against heavily defended targets involve more than flying straight to the target and home again. Strike missions often must follow circuitous routes to enhance survivability, and must sustain high speeds during de
Vice Admiral Ready is Director, Weapon System Integration for the Lockheed Advanced Development Company “Skunk Works.” He commanded the Navy Fighter Weapons School (TopGun), VF-24, Carrier Air Wing 11, the USS Ashtabula (AO-51), the USS Saratoga (CV-60), Carrier Group Two, the Naval Air Test Center, and served as Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet, prior to his retirement.
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Proceedings / January 1993