This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
By Captain Michael Ott, U.S. Marine Corps
Aviation: It’s About Support
I attended the 1992 Naval Aviation Symposium—sponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute and the Naval Aviation Museum—in Pensacola, Florida. The symposium featured the panel discussion “The Gulf War: A Critical Analysis.” As a battalion air officer during the Gulf War, I looked forward to hearing about some of the lessons learned.
The topics included aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare, aerial combat, strategic bombing, “Scud busting,” battlefield preparation, and tactical air support during the battle for Khafji.
The panelists included veterans of A-6, F-14, F/A-18, P-3, SH-60B, AV-8, and EA-6 combat operations.
Some may consider this panel and its discussion topics a fair representation of the Gulf War naval aviation effort; however, there was an alarming oversight. With the exception of Colonel John R. Bioty, U.S. Marine Corps, the senior Marine representative in the Pentagon office that was drafting the Title V report on the Gulf War to Congress, the members of the panel spoke only about flying individual missions. And, while this led to the telling of some interesting stories, there was very little “critical analysis.”
The most crucial element missing from the panel’s musings, except for the brief mention of Khafji, was aviation’s supporting role. Public relations aside, the purpose of aviation is to tilt the balance of combat power in favor of friendly ground forces, on tactical and strategic levels. No one on the panel, however, assessed the effects of any aviation support; in fact, the subject of effect—the only real measure of success—never arose. To Marines and former Marines present, this was a gross omission, because, in the Marine Corps, aviation is truly a supporting arm—not an entity unto itself.
I was grateful for the effective close air support of Marine F/A-18 Hornets in the 36 hours preceding the penetration of the Iraqi minefield, during which we were not the highest priority for U.S. artillery support, but a fairly high priority for Iraqi gunners. The panel, however, didn’t find close air support worth mentioning. It also ignored Marine AH-1W Cobras—the only assets that could respond quickly enough to support Marine armor and mechanized units during the largest armor battle in the history of the U.S. Marine Corps. The after-action reports of Task Forces Ripper and Papa Bear—and any account of their role in saving the vulnerable and threatened forward command post of the 1st Marine Division—underscore their importance.
If a panel on naval aviation in the Gulf War did not include anyone who had to evaluate the effects and make tactical decisions based on the results of those missions, how could it claim to analyze naval aviation’s role in the Gulf War? Even if the panel excluded ground commanders, fire-support coordinators, and intelligence officers, at least it should have included aviators more directly involved in the conflict— e.g., AH-1W aviators. By failing to analyze the effect of aviation, giving short shrift to aviation in support of anyone, and ignoring combat helicopter operations altogether, the panel was a forum for self-justification and selfcongratulation rather than critical analysis and—thus was irrelevant.
Another ugly implication presents itself as the logical continuation of this train of thought. Have we become the Air Force in different uniforms? The idea of aviation for its own sake is central to the Air Force’s approach to its mission. For proof, refer to the statements by Air Force generals that they could have won the war without a ground offensive. To them—and any naval aviators with the same limited view—I ask: Has aviation ever taken or held a square foot of territory or a single sea line of communication? As if to underscore the ludicrous nature of this concept, the A-10 pilots with whom I have spoken indicated that, in the Air Force’s current doctrine, close air support begins five kilometers beyond the forward edge of the battle area—in other words, more than two and one half miles from the nearest friendly troops. Any Marine aviator who has
had the privilege of serving with the infantry will find this idea obscene.
Naval aviation exists for one thing: combat support. Even carrier aviation is just another supporting arm for a local or theater commander. It may hurt some carrier aviators’ feelings, but the only reason that they fly is to support surface combatants and Marines on the beach. Carrier aviation’s special quality is its mobility, not a recently acquired freedom from its support role. In the Marine Corps, it is much simpler—either you are infantry, or you support it.
In the current era of ever-tightening budgets, many military and civilian planners have begun emphasizing aircraft carriers as “close-air-support islands,” especially as Marine squadrons reenter carrier air groups. This reality of today makes the attitudes presented at the symposium even more irrelevant.
Sadly, no one was there to question some of the opinions aired or to counter some of the claims made about the success of aviation. For example, It was claimed that air power eliminated the logistical support of front-line Iraqi forces. My battalion’s forward air controllers watched an Iraqi ambulance haul away casualties within an hour of a strike against an Iraqi position. They also observed a night resupply by a vehicle that moved from foxhole to foxhole. And we faced Kurdish reservists!
If the panel had taken the time to analyze—or even observe—the effects of naval aviation and its ability to accomplish its mission and examined its positive and negative aspects, it might have had a shred of credibility.
As it was, the panel presented a onesided, shortsighted, and Air Force-like view of aviation. If this is the image that naval aviators have of themselves, then we are becoming quite a deluded bunch. If I wanted to do business the Air Force way, I would have joined the Air Force. And if I just wanted to hear war stories, I would have gone to an officers’ club.
Captain Ott is a flight instructor with Helicopter Training Squadron-18 at NAS Whiting Field, Florida.
Proceedings / November 1992