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CDR R. Wallner, German Navy
Have the descendants of Doenitz and the Desert Fox been transformed into cowards? Their ancestors would turn in their paves at the thought of apparent German unwillingness to fight against Iraq, side-by-side with their Western allies. Remarks of a>s sort—and some even more offensive—have appeared Worldwide, especially in the British boulevard press. They have articulated widespread, derogatory opinion about the intestinal °rtitude of the Germans.
Let’s put things straight. Operation Desert Storm, in the eyes
the overwhelming—but silent—majority of the German people. was a great victory for a just cause. It also proved that their pajor ally, the United States, is and always has been serious about keeping its promises. The political determination with P'hieh the operation was prepared and carried out, the tactical skill and technological perfection, the bravery of the men and "'Omen in the field, and the wholehearted support of the American people left us Germans watching with awe from the side- •nes. It is with warm sympathy that the same overwhelming p*ajority of Germans now keeps watching televised reports about y'fnerican troops returning to their home bases in the United ^ates, in Bavaria, and elsewhere in Germany.
this country; never again should war spring forth from this soil. The Grundgesetz bans wars of aggression, limits the use of the armed forces (Bundeswehr) to the defense of the Fatherland’s territorial integrity and to other such actions the constitution explicitly authorizes.
With typical German thoroughness, the country’s lawyers and politicians have begun an in-depth dispute over a paragraph of the Grundgesetz (which permits Germany to lend assistance to threatened members of any “collective security system” of which Germany is a member) being extended to cover actions taken under United Nations, as well as NATO auspices. The anti-Iraq coalition, sanctioned by the United Nations and led by the United States, went to war in the Gulf—and won it—before this collective-security dispute could be settled in Germany. The matter is still unresolved.
So the newly united Germany—the “new superpower” as Newsweek put it—remained on the sidelines apparently paralyzed. Critics say that Germany, having benefited from 40 years of Western steadfastness during the Cold War, should have been among the first to assist Uncle Sam’s Gulf endeavors. But Germany did assist—not with troops for hot warfare, but with Deutschmarks and hardware. Twelve billion dollars were set aside for Desert Storm and for support of those countries suffering most from Saddam Hussein’s aggression. Some U.S., Israeli, and other allied troops were provided with German ar-
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Germany’s initial support for Coalition efforts in Southwest Asia was monetary—not military—as lawyers and politicians wrestled with a vexing constitutional issue of committing German forces to non-NATO contingencies. But a mine-countermeasures group (here, the command ship Schleswig) is now doing its ever-dangerous work in the Persian Gulf.
b'LDSTELLE der marine
Many of us have become aware of what Karl von Clausewitz Said in the 19th century: that war perhaps should not be, but still ls a continuation of politics by other means. This brings us to the heart of the matter. German soldiers and sailors in past wars have an undisputed record of bravery, professionalism, and spirit of sacrifice. At the end of World War II, however, they discovered that—after millions had been killed in action—their ideals and their patriotism had been cynically misused by a band of ruthless gangsters. Today, Germany’s Nazi past is nearly a half-century distant, but it is still too fresh in living memory to cast aside. The German Constitution (Grundgesetz)—an offshoot of postwar Anglo-American reeducation on the one hand and a revival of domestic democratic traditions on the other—has set the foundation for the development of a solid democracy over the past 40 years. Never again should a system of tyranny have a chance in mored vehicles, and trained in their use for gas detection. As a signal of NATO solidarity, 18 fighter-bombers, plus surface-to- air-missile systems for airfield protection, were deployed to Southeastern Turkey. A German Navy mine-countermeasures task group has been operating around Crete ever since August 1990; now in the aftermath of war, it is in the Persian Gulf. Thus, those critics who reproach Germany for its unwillingness to risk its soldiers’ lives for a just cause are clearly wrong, because there are probably more than 2,000 moored and ground mines that still must be swept—a dangerous business. This was the utmost Germany could contribute in its present situation for two major reasons: in addition to the constitutional issue there is an immensely complex socio-political problem, which can best be summarized by the term “sovereignty shock.”
To the constitutional reason for not deploying, little needs to
Desert Storm
be added, except perhaps for one point: Most of Germany’s members of Parliament are serious about their reluctance to deploy the Bundeswehr out-of-area—as serious as the considerable number of U.S. congressmen who voted to undercut President George Bush s authority to wage war on Iraq. Of course, there is nothing else as costly as human lives. But in terms of Deutschmarks, wouldn't it have been a lot cheaper to send some frigates to the Gulf, and perhaps a couple of Tornados to join the Coalition’s bomber missions, as the Italians did? Instead the Germans stuck to their principles and suffered a bad press worldwide, even while paying more than they actually could afford. Beginning on July 1991, federal income taxes will be raised by 7.5%, to finance Germany’s Gulf commitment. This became inevitable because of the tremendous expenses of German reunification, which experts estimate will climb up to at least $65 billion per year. This does not include the $8 billion required to finance the Red Army’s withdrawal from Eastern Germany. Many Germans have the feeling that they are not benefiting from the so-called peace dividend—instead, they are paying for it!
This brings me to the second reason for German rejection of the Bundeswehr’s deployment to the Gulf: the “sovereignty shock.” Although Germany found itself suddenly reunited last October, it was not until early March 1991 that the Soviets finally ratified the “Two-plus-Four” Treaty. After waiting more that 40 years, the Germans were released into full sovereignty almost overnight. Along with sovereignty came the shock of realizing that the world expected a lot more from this reunited population of 80 million—and from its armed forces—than it did from the divided nation’s Western part, the provisional Federal Republic of the past.
The expectations were twofold. On the one hand, both old and new fears were surfacing in neighboring countries, especially
those that had felt the boot heel of Nazi oppression. As Bernard Frank wrote in France’s Nouvel Observateur only a year earlier “Germany is not happy inside Germany. It is too strong to W happy with this barracks that serves as it temporary lodging. On the other hand, in the course of the Kuwait crisis, when Germany refrained from becoming as warlike as certain critics had predicted it would, this also was unacceptable.
The new Germany was not even four months old when the United Nations ultimatum against Iraq expired. Within this narrow time frame, reaching a national consensus about appropriate changes in the constitution is impossible, as is readying the Bi deswehr for out-of-area missions. Those forces were instructed and equipped to face a NATO central-front scenario, with rapid mobilization to a total of more than one million soldiers, most of them conscripts. Nevertheless, in the near future Germany will be prepared to shoulder the extended responsibility that goes with full sovereignty and with its greater international weigh1’ albeit in an unpretentious manner. It was the German government that initiated the process of constitutional change, to allow German troops to participate in United Nations-sanctioned opC' ations like Desert Storm. The recent announcement of a new rapid-deployment force is part of this initiative. Certainly, no one is eager to see Leopard tanks joining MlAls in a military action at some distant point on the globe, as they once might have joined in the Fulda Gap. But if that day should come, the United Nations will be able to count on us.
Commander Wallner is the Deputy Commanding Officer of Submarine Squadron One, homeported in Kiel. He is a graduate of the U.S. Navy Postgraduate Schoo1 , and the Armed Forces Staff College, and former commanding officer of the Gef" ‘ man Navy submarines U-30 and U-20.
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