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Commandant of the Marine Corps
In concluding the first half of this two-part interview (see April Proceedings, pages 47-51), General Gray talked of his new approach toward the professional military education (PME) of Marines. Here, he expands upon the idea.
PROCEEDINGS: Let’s define our terms. What do you have in mind when you speak of “professional” education?
GRAY: For Marines, professional education is the study of warfighting. We study warfighting primarily through combat history. We also study the classic war theorists, such as Sun Tzu, Jomini, Clausewitz, and Fuller, who have based their studies and writings on combat history. Studies of war that are divorced from the history of war have often been extremely misleading. For this reason, Marines will study real war—not fanciful war sometimes projected by peddlers of technology.
By studying combat history, we learn how successful commanders think. By studying battles and campaigns of past wars, we can analyze them through the eyes of the great captains and see how they thought through their solutions to the problems they faced. Wars may differ, but the nature of war is unchanging. And the lessons drawn from studying the thoughts of history’s great warriors are timeless.
Professional education teaches us about the forces at work in war—the military forces committed to combat, of course, and also such forces as the effects of national policy, the importance of public opinion at home and abroad, and the potentially terrible effects of war on society. In an age of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, the attitudes that civil populations hold toward military forces are critical.
Studying war also develops military judgment, which is central to understanding maneuver warfare. Strengthening that sense of judgment is the primary goal of military education. It will become the focus of all Marine professional military education. Under the old doctrine of attrition warfare, such schooling generally focuses on transmitting knowledge, especially knowledge of internal tactical processes that too often becomes a substitute for real tactical skill. On the other hand, maneuver warfare is judgment warfare; it requires Marines at every level to exercise independent military judgment. Especially in peacetime, the primary tool for developing military judgment is combat history; seeing how others judged rightly—and wrongly—in the past, and why. That’s why combat history will be the basis of Marine military education, formal and informal.
We also study combat history to predict trends in future war. We study how technology and other factors changed war in the past so we can discuss and predict intelligently how war will change in the future. A sound background in history also will allow us to look at current theory and doctrine with a critical eye. We either must do this or see our preparation for war fail to keep pace with change. Rigorous critical study and review is a sign of organizational health in any profession. It is especially important in ours.
I am not yet satisfied that our institutional level of military education is up to snuff. There are several reasons for this. At present, most Marines do not have to study combat history and theory to be judged competent in their billets. This is because the details of peacetime daily routine sometime become more important in measuring the day-to-day performance of a Marine than his warfighting judgment, skills, and knowledge.
You cannot ignore the study of military theory and history in peacetime— then suddenly become endowed with sound military judgment when we go to war. Competence comes only through education and experience. In times of peace, all Marines must study war.
The Marine Corps PME program has two main components: The first is mandatory self-study, for all Marine officers—commissioned and noncommissioned—in grades corporal through general. This program will prescribe mandatory readings and correspondence courses for each grade.
The second component is formal schooling. All Marines will attend appropriate formal schools, or complete their equivalent nonresident correspondence programs, before being considered for promotion. Resident schools will focus primarily on developing military judgment. For example, a captain
will study tactics and operational art— historically and theoretically—then go on to exercise acquired military judgment in map exercises and war games.
PROCEEDINGS: How does this tie in to the University concept?
GRAY: It s not a “concept” anymore. It’s in place. The Marine Corps University will touch the life of every Marine. It encompasses all the formal PME schools, from NCO School up through the Command and Staff College and our new Top-Level School Fellowship Program, which begins at Quantico in the fall. There will be nonresident programs available to those who are not able to study in residence.
Studies will focus sharply on warfighting theory and practice, and students will have to work—that is, to study and demonstrate thinking ability. Our faculty will be world-class. It will take a while to get it in place at Quantico. Right now, we have faculty members who are fine field Marines but they need more training in how to teach—at least a year’s preparation. Civilians with Ph.D.s in military history are now joining our faculty and there will be more.
A 300,000-volume research center will be the focal point of the University. We hope to see the ground-breaking in 1991. In addition to scholarly works, it will have after-action and les- sons-leamed reports—from both training exercises and combat operations.
Our goal is for Quantico to offer a graduate-level program, awarding an advanced degree, by combining the Marine Corps University’s core curriculum with courses from affiliated civilian universities. Both resident and non-resident students will earn degrees. This will not happen overnight, but we will get there quickly.
PROCEEDINGS: Has your emphasis on training and education gone beyond the Marine Corps University?
GRAY: There is nothing more important than what we are doing in training and education—and it involves much more than the University. Nothing we have done better positions the Marine Corps to respond to the future and nothing is more in keeping with our tradition. Our efforts touch on every aspect of training and education, from boot camp to our highest level of officers’ schools. In fact, it now begins even before boot camp. We provide training materials for new recruits, to prepare them for boot camp. The system continues through the noncommissioned officer and officer ranks, with either formal schools or structured self-study, correspondence study, and reading requirements. As I have said— every Marine, from private to general, is either attending a formal school or participating in a self-study program.
PROCEEDINGS: You have said that this is your most important initiative in the last three years. Why?
GRAY: Because the future of our nation depends on naval forces that are forward deployed, ready, and trained to respond to situations for which there will be no time to prepare.
PROCEEDINGS: But hasn’t that always been the case?
GRAY: For years, we have maintained a high state of readiness to deploy naval forces of combined arms, to escalate combat power to meet whatever threats are encountered and to operate with relative self-sufficiency. And we are very good at that. But times have changed—and we now see an almost infinite array of situations that naval forces might face when they arrive in an objective area. The difference is the ever-changing world that Marines will encounter from now on. In such tactical situations, we must respond to such
Reading for Professionals
There are many books dealing with war; not all of them are worth reading. The Marine Corps professional reading program, built on a list of 153 books, provides some guidelines. Senior officers, enlisted Marines, and others helped compile the list, drawing upon years of reading and study. The books are divided into 18 categories, including “History,” “Theory and Nature of War,” “Civil-Military Relations,” Strategy,” “Low Intensity Conflict,” and “Leadership.” The list is further divided by rank, from corporal through colonel. Selected readings, not on the master list, are also required for general officers.
The list runs from Tolstoy’s War and Peace and Crane’s Red Badge of Courage to Mao’s Guerrilla Warfare and such current selections as Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie. Some of the books are clearly flawed, and they are “approved” only in the sense that they are worth reading despite their flaws. The list is neither exclusive nor restrictive. Marines are encouraged to read whatever they like. The reading list is merely a starting line for self-education—not the finish line.
The profession of arms has developed a profound body of knowledge that requires constant study if a military leader is to become and remain proficient. Marines fight better when they fight smarter, and systematic and progressive professional reading contributes directly to that end.
The reading program has several objectives:
- To impart a sense of Marine Corps values and traits
- To increase knowledge of the military profession
- To improve analytical and reasoning skills
- To enhance reading skills
- To increase knowledge of our nation’s institutions and the principles upon which our government and our way of life are founded
- To increase understanding of the world’s governments, culture, and geography.
Marines must always prepare for the next war. This requires, among other things, education in the values and history of our country, an understanding of what men have endured in historic battles, and a sense of how future wars might be fought. Books can provide many answers for the regular and discerning reader.
The reading program is systematic and progressive, and its elements are interwoven. For example, the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) category contains 11 books:
The Village (F. West)
War In The Shadows (R.B. Asprey)
The Terrorism Reader (W. Laqueur and Y. Alexander) Guerrilla Strategies (G. Chaliand)
A Savage War Of Peace (A. Home)
The Army And Vietnam (A.F. Krepinevich)
On Guerrilla Warfare (T.T. Mao)
People’s War, People’s Army (Vo Nguyen Giap)
rapid change almost by instinct. We are trying to prepare leaders both with the lessons of the past and with the agility °f mind to apply those lessons and experiences to the complexity of today’s and tomorrow’s rapidly changing battlefield. That is why books like Managing Chaos are now part of our curriculum.
Also new is the reorganization of training and education into one center at Quantico, institutionalizing a training establishment vertically and horizontally. Let me explain. Now that we have placed all education and training aider one center—the Marine Air- Ground Training and Education Center, 0r MAGTEC—one headquarters now develops the curricula for all of our schools. This ensures logical upward training progress throughout a Marine’s career—I call that vertical integration, tt also helps the flow of lessons devel- °Ped in one school to other schools and, even more important, to the operating forces. That is what 1 call hori- Zc>ntal integration. Let me give you an example: Our future forces must be Prepared for short-notice, high-tempo, combined-arms, maneuver-oriented con- met in an environment of uncertainty. The rapid-planning sequence has been developed and exercised in our Marine Expeditionary Units, (MEUs) and rapid planning is now taught routinely in our PME schools. The curriculum now comes to grips with the rapid application of fire support and maneuver.
This, in turn, has evolved into a three- phase course taught to all Marine Expeditionary Brigate staffs. So you see that the consolidation of training and education in one headquarters connects the training-and-education establishment with the operating forces. Incidentally, it took years to move rapid planning from the decks of our amphibs into the formal-school curriculum. After the reorganization, it took less than six months to move our MEB battle-staff training from the classroom to the FMF—and it is being revised and updated even as we speak. Another example is our combat water-survival program. It was tested at The Basic School and then implemented in the recruit depots. We also have gained in establishing Corps-wide management systems for ranges, ammunition and training devices.
PROCEEDINGS: And as part of the reorganization, the Warfighting Center was located in Quantico . . .
GRAY: Yes—again, for the purpose of integration. The Warfighting Center is linked with the FMF and works closely with MAGTEC to ensure that education and training programs respond to the Force commanders. It also integrates education and doctrine into a cohesive whole. 1 put the research-and-develop- ment folks down there in Quantico for the same reason. The Warfighting Center and MAGTEC’s action officers work daily with the R&D program managers. Warfighting requirements and our training-and-education programs have had more visibility in our POM-92 program document than ever before. Things are working well.
Incidentally, the primary focus of the Marine Corps Inspector General (IG) is now on training and education. The IG works closely with MAGTEC and, in effect, evaluates all the training and education programs.
We also established the Marine Corps Wargaming and Assessment Center at Quantico. It assists us in validating changes to our concepts, doctrines and plans. Wargaming is a cost-effective substitute for extensive field exercises. We are tailoring and conducting wargames for all levels of conflict. In less than two years, we have conducted more than 30 wargames for formal schools, operating forces and Reserve units of the Marine Corps. Additionally, our CMC Policy and Strategy Series provides wargames for flag and
By Captain John D. Kuntz, U.S. Marine Corps
Seven Pillars Of Wisdom (T.E. Lawrence)
How \ye yjon The War (Vo Nguyen Giap)
4 Bright Shining Lie (N. Sheehan)
The first book, The Village, is on the reading lists for captains and sergeants. In a Marine rifle company, then, ttle squad and section leaders and the company commander—the captain—are reading the same book. Discus- s‘°n, debate and interaction are encouraged. Before long, jhe platoon leaders (lieutenants) and platoon sergeants bftaff non-commissioned officers) will also have to read Village, to stay abreast.
The reading program is just one facet of a new empha- Sls on professional military education throughout the Ma- r'ie Corps. In contrast to acquiring specific task or techni- skills, professional military education consists of .'belong learning: structured self-study, professional read- ln§. symposia, and formal schools attendance, as well as experience gained through duty assignments. The primary Purpose of professional military education is to assist all Marines in achieving competence in combat.
Initial reaction to the new reading program has been enthusiastic, particularly among the junior corporals and Sergeants. They are so eager and are reading so much, so rapidly that older Marines will have to start reading more '1 self-defense, if for no other reason. In any organization, Pe junior people are the ones who can make things
happen—even the “brain-stretching” preparation that the modern battle-field demands.
Marines must be ready to go to war tonight. The words, “First to Fight” mean that they must know how to fight, as individuals and as an organization, before the outbreak of hostilities. A common body of knowledge must be created among Marines, allowing each to understand what the other is doing. The common ground of professional military education is the factor that will allow every Marine to understand how decisions are made and how actions are to be carried out. In short, professional military education permits widespread communication of intent in a common language. Further, for those in technical fields, the assimilation of technological change is possible only when there is an understanding of the larger picture that change will affect. Such a common educational background exists today, but the Marine Corps is taking action to sink the roots of professional military education ever deeper. The future is here and is making us all run faster just to keep up. But Marines must do better than merely keep up with the future. They must meet and master it. By reading about today and yesterday, they will be better prepared for tomorrow, no matter what tomorrow brings.
Captain Kuntz is the special assistant to the President of the Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia.
general officers of the Marine Corps and other services, CINCs, and the senior leadership of civilian agencies. Last October, we conducted an indirect warfare/counterinsurgency game focused on the Philippines. The issues that we addressed during the game proved to be both timely and important. This year, the Center will conduct a countemarcotic game focused on policy and operational decision making.
PROCEEDINGS: How does the University fit into the overall training and education system?
GRAY: The Marine Corps University has cognizance over all the schools of professional military education. The faculty is supplemented with visiting scholars and practitioners of the operational art. An integral part of the University will be the new research center, which will provide library and research services in support of the University’s mission—and will be available to Marines worldwide. It will serve as a world-class repository of historical records, studies, and analyses of expeditionary and amphibious warfare operations.
Two new programs will be offered in September 1990—the School of Advanced Warfighting and the Art of War Studies. The School of Advanced Warfighting will be offered to selected graduates of the Command and Staff College. The officers selected will remain at Quantico for an additional year of study in preparation for assignment to key positions in the Marine expeditionary forces or in high-level joint and combined staff billets. The course will emphasize the operational art—through a series of war games, battle studies, and a thorough comprehension of the dynamics of joint and combined warfare. The second new program, the Art of War Studies, is a top-level school equivalent designed to educate selected officers in the nature of war across the spectrum of conflict and doctrinal concepts of warfighting. Graduates will get two-year follow-on assignments as members of the Command and Staff College faculty. The program is the foundation stone of our effort to ensure the military faculty is comprised of the finest officers available in the Marine Corps.
PROCEEDINGS: When did you start looking at this education package? GRAY: Many, many years ago. I was a fly-on-the-wall when we did a study in 1968 about a possible Marine Corps University. The idea ran aground, for lack of an adequate research facility and other reasons. I always believed in the idea and I thought about at for many years, along with some of my colleagues. Like the other ideas on training, it’s a product of ten or fifteen years of talking to my fellow officers under the trees or whatever, whenever we got together and kicked around ways we could do things better.
PROCEEDINGS: Your timing has been excellent, with respect to all the change that is taking place today. In a way, you’re prepositioned to address a lot of issues in a timely manner.
GRAY: Well, yes. We came in with a package that was the product of years of thinking about things, especially while I was at Quantico. A good example of this is the planning process we brought back, which now includes the campaign plan, the long-range plan, and the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) master plan, which replaced the old mid-range objectives plan. The planning process had been allowed to atrophy over time—for whatever reasons—but it’s fixed now.
What we had to do was to decide where we had to go, then get something moving. Because time was short, we had to implement and execute quickly-drawn plans—even while we brought new planning concepts forward. This may be hard for some people to understand—until they recall that I had been thinking about these things for a long time. Then, of course, there is always resistance to change, because not everybody knows where you’re coming from. But we thought that one through, as well.
I’m a big proponent of studies. We need to keep looking at things. I remember the Hogaboom Study in the mid-1950s. I was part of the Armstrong Study in 1969, the long-range studies right after that, and the post-1972 Vietnam studies—the long-range and structure studies we did later in the 1970s.
So you know how the process is supposed to unfold. There are different ways to do it, but the main thing is that you’ve got to get it done. There are reasons for this. In the 1960s, I was a young officer, coming back from five years overseas, where I had been involved in special operations and some other things. But this time, I became initimately involved in planning—the long-range plan, the mid-range plan, and the capabilities plan. We had the first long-range plan of any service. I came to believe in that kind of process, and now everybody else does.
The outgrowth of this planning process is probably in many ways our best programming and best POM [Program Objectives Memorandum] effort to date. There’s visibility to it. More people understand it, we know what the priorities are, and we’re trying to reach clearly defined objectives.
The great weakness in the planning process before was the two- or three- year gap between concepts or hardware coming out of development and being introduced into the budget, where they became structure or equipment changes. We have bridged that gap, and now I would dearly love to have some of the funding we had in the 1980s. We’d really put together a Marine Corps for the 21st century! But money or not— the planning framework is there and it’s institutionalized.
It’s the same way with the research and development acquisition plan. In 1979 and 1980, we gave a great deal of thought to that idea. We even did a study on it. The plan was not accepted at the time, but I remember vividly the assistant commandant then, General Ken McClennan saying, “You know, this is really a good idea. Right now, we just don’t have the people to do it, but you ought to keep this idea in mind.”
So when I came back to town, we resurrected the idea. At the same time we sent 38 officers to program manager school so that we would have the people we needed to execute the plan. We made it happen. That kind of streamlining has already paid dividends, both in day-to-day operations and in planning the budget for the development program. And it saves people. There are fewer people in this headquarters today than there were in 1950, and it’s going to get smaller.
PROCEEDINGS: That's a major change. . .
GRAY: You’re right! And the groundwork was laid 20 years ago. In 1969 and 1970 and 1971, we went through a major change in the role played by Quantico. We created the long-range, mid-range, and the short-range study groups. We created the Doctrine, Tactics and Techniques Division, because General Chapman, then the Commandant, rightfully wanted to preserve the lessons learned in Vietnam. Major General Ted Metzger was head of research, development and studies at the time, and he caused 55 officers to be sent to Quantico to do the work. The division was off and running, but when I went back to Quantico in 1978, almost all that capability had atrophied from a lack of people. It’s like buying a suit of clothes. You get what you pay for. If you want a good product, you have to make an investment. You can’t draw down on people and expect the output to remain unchanged.
PROCEEDINGS: That was around the hme that the Advanced Amphibious Study Group was created—in effect, moving the policy analysis function down to Quantico. . .
GRAY: You know, I’m in the process °f recreating that capability right now. ^Ve have a study capability in the Warlighting Center, but we need to have a small group of people who can respond t0 short-range study requirements and w°rk directly for either the Chief of Staff or the Commandant.
There are a lot of different ways to do things. We also use task forces. That’s how we did the force structure study. And you have to make a personal investment as well. I spent hundreds of hours with the force structure study, and I spent the same kind of hme with the MAGTF master plan. You’ve got to do that. I’d spend six, seven, eight hours at a time, listening to them and tossing ideas back and forth. That’s the same thing we do at the Warfighting Center. Our system sends generals down there periodically to get updated and to take part in discussions. You cut out all that middle layering and all that middle management of people.
PROCEEDINGS: People who like to say> “What the general really means. . . ”
GRAY: Well, more importantly, people who do the general’s reading for him and thinking for him. We don’t have the numbers of people to do that kind °f thing. The top leaders have to be involved. One of my pet peeves was Senior officers not reading and understanding studies we did. We did a huge study in the early 1960s called the Rear Area Security for Marine Expeditionary Force,” which we called |hem that in those days. The word expeditionary” was later dropped be- eause the Vietnamese disliked it.
PROCEEDINGS: The French connection . . .
GRAY: The French connection. But anyway, that study was pretty damned good, done by Stanford Research Institute. But nobody in this building ever heard of it. Nobody could find it. I couldn’t even find it when I returned to the Development Center at Quantico in the late 1970s.
Anyway, the new framework is just about in place. The Research, Development, and Acquisition Command is networked out now to all the laborato-
Always ready to match words with deeds, General Gray has been an active participant in the Naval Institute’s ongoing open forum of the sea services at many seminars and other meetings, to advance professional knowledge.
ries, to all our Marine representatives around the country and into all the schools. The Wargaming Center has been a tremendous help already. In addition to that useful game on the Philippine situation several months ago we played a very good one on Panama, which brought people up from the Southern Command and elsewhere. All in all, things are going along pretty well.
PROCEEDINGS: We have heard a lot about the transformation of boot camp. What programs have you implemented there?
GRAY: Entry-level training is more combat-oriented than ever before.
There are no rear areas or occupational specialities that do not require a comprehensively trained warrior. All Marines, regardless of their specialties, train rigorously in infantry combat techniques. Marine battle skills constitute an entire system, and we have a comprehensive training program to develop and sustain basic combat skills throughout a Marine’s career. The Marine battle skills program includes extensive firing of individual and crew- served weapons, basic knowledge of field skills, and combat-oriented conditioning. It is organized into four progressive, mutually supported stages which begin at boot camp and follow Marines throughout their years of service. In conjunction with the battle skills training, major improvements have been made in combat marksmanship, close combat, combat water survival and physical training. The approach to physical training emphasizes forced marches, combat conditioning and increased use of obstacle and confidence courses.
Our training focus even goes beyond the Corps, and I would like to say something about that.
I feel strongly that our Corps has a responsibility to the American people that transcends preparation for battle. We are proud of the fact that the young Marines who serve our nation but decide to leave the Marine Corps are departing as better citizens, because of their training and education. Our reading program has a similar auxiliary benefit, both for Marines and for libraries and schools across the country that request reading material to motivate their students. I also recently requested a major expansion of JROTC units in high schools. School administrators consider the JROTC a challenging elective and useful program in the war against drugs. In that regard, we never turn down a request from local authorities to assist in the war against drugs. Many Marines serve as counselors in schools on their own time. We deploy specialized training teams to assist border patrol efforts in Texas.
We continue to assist in training drug enforcement agents at Quantico and elsewhere. A mobile training team has deployed to Colombia. And, in response to Governor William Donald Schaefer’s request, we train the Maryland state correction officers in methods used to motivate young men and women, also at Quantico.
PROCEEDINGS: You said the magic word a minute ago: “warfighting.” Of course, the Warfighting doctrinal publication is the focus of a lot of interest.
In it, you called for the development of bold leaders. I think back to the experience of the Navy in the 1930s, and one very vivid example in the submarine force. During that period of relative austerity everything had to be accounted for, and the tendency on the part of individual officers was to become very cautious, almost timid. As a result, once World War II got under way, it took a couple of years to find the right skippers with the required audacity to go out and take the fight to the enemy.
Obviously, in the case of the Marine Corps, we don’t have that kind of time if we expect to respond rapidly to a fast-moving situation. But it does seem that the call for boldness and recognizing and rewarding the bold leader flies in the face of this historical trend toward zero-defects thinking. How can that trend be reversed and how can this concept of boldness be implemented? GRAY: You’ve pointed out a very, very critical problem for all the military. It has its genesis in the zero- defects mentality, which has to be eradicated in the Marine Corps. We have to develop initiative and boldness. We have to enter the thought processes of our leaders, whether they’re corporals or generals. To do this, we have to create the kind of environment that embraces uncertainty and still allows people to do things on their own. It’s when people can act independently that they grow and gain experience. And if they do enough things over a long period of time, maybe that experience will be translated into wisdom.
The zero-defects mentality, where a person is afraid to do something because he’s afraid to make a mistake, goes hand-in-glove with the down side of careerism. There is no place for that in the Marine Corps or, in my judgment, any military service. Stamping that out is extraordinarily difficult to do. We probably have less careerism and zero-defects thinking in the Marine Corps than any of the armed forces, I dare say by a considerable percentage. But we still have way too much and it must be eliminated. We intend to do just that.
Stopping careerism does not mean that people should stop getting promoted and getting ahead. Healthy ambition is as American as apple pie. I am trying to eliminate the unhealthy kind.
Careerism shows up in several ways. Often it is a desire for advancement in grade, personal decorations or some other form of recognition. It may be a self-centered desire for a ticket-punch command tour. Or it may be a wish to have a soft assignment and personal comfort. But no matter if careerism is driven by a desire for power, a need for money, a search for a stepping stone to success, envy of someone else, a wish for an easy life, or any other selfish motivation, the result is the same. Sooner or later, people sense that they are being taken advantage of and they resent it. Marines probably feel the resentment most sharply. After all, we joined to serve our country, not to serve some prima donna who is looking out for number one. Professions often establish codes of ethics to guard against common human failings. Careerism is one such failing we need to watch closely.
Concerning this entire zero-defects idea, we’re moving in the right direction. We took a major step when we changed the inspector general system. The IG is looking at readiness and preparedness, and whether or not units are carrying out the forward-looking philosophy and policies that we are developing and announcing. There is still a place for the other kinds of advance- notice inspections, which will be conducted by local commanders. We’ve decentralized inspections.
In tactical training, free maneuvers are essential for molding young leaders. The free-maneuver thought processes are as relevant here in this building as they are in any Marine unit in the world. It takes mission-type orders, providing people with mission- oriented guidance and having them execute on their own, thinking their way through the problems they encounter on the way. You can do a lot of this in war games, too, in simulation. You can throw out challenges to people and let them think them through, then come back and explain how they are doing. Free maneuver has to become a way of life, a state of mind. And it carries with it the freedom to make errors, correct them, and start in again, somewhat wiser for the experience. Show me a carpenter who never hit his thumb with a hammer, and I’ll show you a carpenter who never drove many nails.
PROCEEDINGS: I’m sure it’s still the case that any battalion commander worth his salt can tell you down to the last platoon leader who the warriors are and who needs more work. They are in a key position to be the proponents of boldness. Has there been any thought about revising the fitness report system, so that the reporting senior either is enjoined to or enabled to comment on such things?
GRAY: We’ve encouraged that through our philosophy and our guidance.
There was a major change, three or four years ago, that we have re-emphasized. Back then, we said that the reviewing seniors had to play a much more active role in commenting on the reports they reviewed, to make sure that these things are considered. We have re-emphasized that this past year, and we’re seeing more of it. The Assistant Commandant and I take a look at some of these reports, and I see more attention being paid to identifying and encouraging warriors. But I’m not sure we have a total lock on this yet. I still see evidence of zero-defects thinking out there. We still have people more worried about the shoe dropping outside their office than about getting on with it and doing what has to be done. We have a wait-and-see attitude on the part of some. We are making major changes in a culture and that will take time, but I’m convinced that we will do it.
PROCEEDINGS: It would just about have to be all or nothing. Everybody has to play, because as long as some folks are holding back. . .
GRAY: Either they play or they’ll have to go. The ways of determining whether they’re playing have been tightened considerably—in the IG process, in the instructions to reviewing seniors, and in other ways. We cannot have people at any level holding back this kind of idea. “Boldness” doesn’t mean that you can’t be practical, patient, or careful—but it does mean that people have to be allowed to do things. They must be allowed more opportunity and responsibility at lower levels. We have to have the guts to stand by these young people when they make mistakes—all the way. That has to be. We really have to win this one.
PROCEEDINGS: With the doctrinal foundation laid, are you moving forward with institutional changes to put the doctrine into effect?
GRAY: We’re doing that. The force structure of the Marine Corps is essentially in place. The warfighting enhancement initiative is pretty well completed, although they’re still making some adjustments to that. We’ve already brought civil-affairs people into the active force; we’ve institutionalized that. We’re keeping deploying forces together longer now. We are also expanding the number of units that are in the operating forces and going back to the Marine Corps Manual for basic guidance. We have security forces around the world in 76 locations, as
THE SPECIALISTS
ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING AND TESTING
- SHOCK, VIBRATION
- VIBRATION FIXTURE DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
- EMI-EMC, TEMPEST
- TEMPERATURE,
HUMIDITY
- STRESS SCREENING DEVELOPMENT AND TAILORING
- NOISE TESTING
- ACOUSTIC ANALYSIS
- ROAD TEST COURSE,
RAIL IMPACT
- DATA ACQUISITION,
DATA ANALYSIS
- THERMAL ANALYSIS
- INFRARED IMAGING
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part of our operating forces. We will also task certain units, traditionally in the support establishment, with operational-force missions. We’ve tightened up a lot. Today, 72% of the Marine Corps is in the operating—not supporting—forces, and that’s pretty good.
We still have to further refine and streamline the command elements of the Marine Expeditionary Forces and subordinate command elements of the various task forces, and we will do that. We also need to redistribute some of our equipment. The heavier items will go into storage. We are still streamlining and working on the balance between the Selected Marine Corps reserve and the active establishment. So there are a number of things here yet that will emerge in the next two to six months. They may be criticized as “more change by the Wild Man.” But they are still coming.
PROCEEDINGS: Conventional wisdom used to be that the Commandant had one year to effect change that would be seen before his tour was up, but that was usually tied to procurement. You are halfway through your tour, and it still looks like most of these changes will be seen before your tour is up.
GRAY: That remains to be seen. We really won’t be able to see any lasting effects until the end of the century. But one thing we’ve done is to make a conscientious effort to institutionalize the decision-making process. The senior leaders have been active players in all of this. Consensus still emerges— whether you’re talking about nominees for a third star, warfighting enhancement initiatives, or anything else. My successor—and his successor—have probably been active players in this process. That, coupled with the institutionalization of the Training and Education Center, at the Warfighting Center, and the Development Center at Quan- tico, and other things serve to augur well for continuity. There will still be additional initiatives. Things will still change. We’ve got momentum going here.
PROCEEDINGS: We always close with this question: Is there any question that we have not asked that you would like to answer?
GRAY: I would like to talk a little bit about the roles and missions of the other services, to put that in the right perspective. There aren’t any crowded battlefields; there’s plenty for everybody to do. There will not be a roles- and-missions dogfight if I have any influence. So I need to try to defuse some of the intellectual efforts now under way to get a dogfight going with the Marines.
I think that one of the key responsibilities of any commandant is to keep the Marine Corps focused. Don’t let them get distracted by things like the women-in-combat issue. Our dog’s not in that fight, either. A good case in point is the amphibious strategy. We owe it to the American people to point out that the character of our naval forces today is not like those of World War II, and they shouldn’t conjure up visions of Tarawa or Okinawa whenever amphibious operations are mentioned.
PROCEEDINGS: Wading ashore in water up your armpits. . .
GRAY: Today, we have a forwardlooking kind of capability developed by some very bright people at all levels.
PROCEEDINGS: General, you have been very generous with your time and your thoughts. Is there anything else you would like to add?
GRAY: Earlier, I talked about learning from history. You know, sixty years ago Commandant John A. LeJeune was faced with a world similar to the one in which we find ourselves today.
Much is different but there are many similarities in Europe, the Caribbean and Asia as there are similarities in the budget austerity we face today. His response was to keep his eye on the threat—out ten or twenty years in the future. While doing that, he worked continually to shape a naval expeditionary force to meet that threat. The only way that could be done was to concentrate on education and training. That was the beginning of Quantico. That is how the forces that crossed the Pacific were ready at the moment the nation required them. His formula is what we have applied today, as we look ten to twenty years to the future. To keep our eyes on the threat and to shape our expeditionary forces to meet that threat by concentrating on training and education. There is nothing more important to our Marine Corps, our Navy or to our country. Our Corps’s contribution to our country has always resulted from the vision of our leaders—translated into battlefield performance by a professional corps of staff noncommissioned officers and executed by well- trained Marines. And that is why our efforts have concentrated on every aspect of training and education.