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By Captain Robert C. Peniston, U.S. Navy (Retired)
During the 1980s, the 16-inch guns of the New Jersey, shown here, and her three sisters were restored to the active fleet to add potency to the nation’s naval capability. Now, however, the Defense Department wants to reverse the trend and again shelve the battleships.
On 19 April 1989 the USS Iowa (BB-61) suffered a dreadful casualty when an explosion in turret two killed 47 bluejackets. The incident was a sad precursor to several mishaps the Navy suffered in the months following. The eventual result was a Navy-wide safety stand down instituted later in the year.
The Iowa tragedy brought forth a wide range of reactions. At one end were anguish about the loss of life and heartfelt sympathy for the next of kin of those who had perished. At the other end were calls for the Navy to rid itself of the four battleships often ridiculed as dinosaurs. In this vein, the ships were described as antiquated gun platforms, World War II carryovers with no apparent mission, unsafe vessels, and on and on. This critical view was nothing new, for such has been the lot of dreadnoughts in recent years.
With the current turn of events in Eastern Europe and the talk of the end of the cold war, there is a movement to cut back on the armed strength of the United States for budgetary reasons. Already there are many in the Congress who are looking for the “peace dividend.” This is not a sound basis for reducing armed strength until the nation determines with reasonable certainty that its principal adversary does indeed intend to act in a civilized manner. One positive signal would be for the Soviet Army to withdraw from the countries of Eastern Europe that certainly want the troops to leave.
But the talk is for force reductions, and heading the list for the Navy are the battleships Iowa and New Jersey (BB- 62). Some citizens are calling for the reduction of the number of carrier battle groups from the planned 15. The hoped-for 600-ship Navy is already nothing but a dream, and it is probably safe to assume that the cuts will be made
without a reduction in commitments, the best of intentions notwithstanding. We have been down this road before.
I hope that before the decision is made to inactivate the other two ships of the Iowa class, the Missouri (BB-63) and Wisconsin (BB-64), due consideration will be given to the reasons for returning the four battleships to service. They came in as part of the plan to correct an unfavorable shift in the maritime balance in the early 1980s. The Navy needed both near-term and long-term augmentation of the deployable elements of the fleet because of a three-ocean commitment and a tempo of operations that exceeded that of the Vietnam conflict. To seek relief from the toll exacted in men and machines, initiatives were required. Reactivation of four battleships was an alternative to provide real near-term capability at a relatively modest cost.
The New Jersey and Iowa were brought in ahead of schedule and under cost. The Missouri was reactivated ahead of schedule largely from funds saved in battleship contracts. The Wisconsin came in on schedule. This program was the most expeditious way to restore offensive power to the surface Navy. Very simply, it provided kill power plus the shore bombardment capability so sadly lacking after the decommissioning of the New Jersey in 1969 and the last eight-inch-gun cruisers in the 1970s. With modest modernization, the /owa-class ships provided an impressive augmentation of offensive combat capability in most survivable hulls.
The concept was for the battleships to operate offensively with battle forces in the highest threat areas. The 16-inch rifles and the long-range cruise missiles complemented the strike power of the carriers. With appropriate escorts, the ships could operate independently of the carriers in areas of lesser threats. The battleship was never envisaged as a replacement for the carrier, but it could free the carrier to go to the higher threat areas. It provided a punch that we did not have, because we had nothing between the carrier and the cruiser to fill a war-fighting role.
Present-day battleship missions include operating offensively in support of amphibious landings, conducting offensive operations against surface and shore targets, providing naval gunfire support, and lastly, establishing a naval presence. This is a demonstration of war-fighting capability in peacetime or times of tension. To me this has
always been a real plus for the battleship.
Many examples of these ships’ value in this regard could be provided; one such was in September 1983. The New Jersey's shakedown deployment to the Far East was interrupted so she could establish a naval presence off El Salvador. Negotiations there were being conducted by Ambassador Richard B. Stone, who told the commanding officer, Captain William M. Fogarty, that the presence of the battleship close by helped him a great deal in carrying out his mission. From El Salvador, the ship was sailed on very short notice to Lebanon to establish a presence there. More on this later.
Throughout history, battleships have stirred controversy. I can remember being told during my early school years that battleships were a drain on the nation, were provocative, and many schools could be built with the money used for just one of them. In World War II, they were not used to their full capacity for various reasons. Two occasions come to mind. First, at the battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, the deployment of the battle line was delayed because of the lack of training in fleet tactics at night. When it was eventually split out, the awesome battle line saw no surface action. Perhaps timidity in this instance let the enemy surface fleet off the hook to fight another day. Second, at the battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, the fast battleships that were to be part of Task Force 34 never had the chance to engage the enemy because of a series of complicating events with a little bad luck thrown in. They were with Admiral William Halsey chasing the carriers of Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa when they were expected to be at San Bernardino Strait to protect against Admiral Takeo Kurita’s assault on the Leyte landing force.
There seemed to be no quarrel with their mission in the Korean police action. The Missouri was the only battleship in service when the conflict erupted. She was soon placing a steel curtain of major caliber fire around Hungnam before the term was made fashionable by the Pittsburgh Steelers. The other three were then reactivated in order to set up a rotation of heavy bombardment ships off the Korean coast.
The capabilities of the New Jersey were not fully utilized in Vietnam. Particularly well fitted to take out enemy caves and bunkers in the north, a bombing halt in November 1968 sent her exclusively to the south. She was certainly effective in supporting ground troops there, but the targets that most needed attention were in the north. During the conflict, the United States mounted a great effort to destroy the Thanh Hoa bridge, losing many planes in the process. The New Jersey could have done it in short order with little risk. Had she been in service in the spring of 1972, there would have been no need to mine Haiphong Harbor. The 16-inch rifles could have destroyed the port facilities in surgical fashion, thereby rendering them useless. Furthermore, the minesweeping operation would not have been necessary after “peace was at hand.” Finally, I will always question the action of the United States Government that deprived the soldiers and Marines remaining in Vietnam of the protection the New Jersey could have provided for a relatively few dollars. If young men are