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Contents:
Black-shoe Navigators on CVs Correcting Three Strategic Mistakes
We Need Leaders, Not Technocrats
Surface Warfare Is Still Eating Its Young
The U.S. Navy: A (Much) Smaller Fleet
The LCAC as a Forward Arming and Refueling Point
A New Approach for SWOS
Lighten the Marine’s Load
Dilemma: Coast Guard Women and Combat
Editorial Board Chairman’s Address
The Admirable Servant, Occasionally Obsequious
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays- an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Ships’ Status Changes
Still Serving
Black-shoe Navigators on CVs
Lieutenant Commander Brian C. Thomas, U.S. Navy, USS Midway (CV- 41)—I recently had a unique opportunity, as ship’s company in an aircraft carrier, to be the navigator when the navigator’s presence was required off the ship. During that period, all served at sea, the carrier completed qualifications for the air wing, an anchoring evolution in a port other than home port, and two transits of navigational straits. Why was it such a unique opportunity one might ask? Because I’m a black-shoe surface warfare officer.
By design, the navigator’s billet in carriers is filled by a brown-shoe aviator. There are a couple of reasons why. First, the complex nature of a carrier’s flight operations make an aviator the most logical choice. Second, it is a high-profile billet. Holding this job permits the senior aviator to stay competitive with his peers, who are filling aviator department head billets (e.g., air boss, operations officer).
Until I reported to this carrier, my first, I had limited knowledge of carrier operations. I had the opportunity to qualify as officer-of-the-deck (OOD). From that process and from standing bridge watches, I learned the hows and whys of navigator decisions required to support scheduled flight operations.
A carrier navigator billet for a surface warfare lieutenant commander, postdepartment head, would be a prime billet.
I propose that a surface warfare officer with experience as an operations department head be assigned as the carrier’s navigator. The billet tour would be 18 months, with his relief reporting on board six months prior to the navigator’s projected rotation date. The prospective navigator would qualify as OOD, and would learn from the incumbent the idiosyncrasies of carrier duty.
The black-shoe community has a wealth of knowledge and expertise to contribute to carrier operations. We already contribute a great deal, but let’s expand it. My stint as navigator, although extremely short, was most enjoyable and challenging. Most of all, I was involved in a billet where, as a black-shoe warrior,
I felt right at home.
“Correcting Three Strategic Mistakes”
(See N.L. Golightly, pp. 32-38, April 1990 Proceedings)
Commander Tom Fedyszyn, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer USS William V. Pratt (DDG-44)—Lieutenant Golightly’s essay was refreshing. It attacked the venerable maritime strategy at its core for aiming at the wrong enemy with the wrong weapons. But in revising the strategy to reflect new global realities, we must remember the lessons we learned on the first go-round. Otherwise, we will create more strategic mistakes than we correct.
First, conventional defense was never in competition with nuclear deterrence as the basis of maritime strategy. Maritime strategy is a war-fighting strategy that begins after deterrence fails. Deterrence may be high on our list of desiderata, but it can never be a war-fighting Strategy- Second, few naval officers considered an invasion of Europe as the West’s most pressing threat, but we were forced to address the U.S. Navy’s role in a NATO- Warsaw Pact conflict. The maritime strategy was developed to support national military strategy and to address Soviet capabilities, not intentions.
Third, naval strategists always thought that low-intensity conflicts were likely and were strategically significant. However, the regnant wisdom was that a large, offensive, and technically sophisticated navy capable of subduing the Soviets could harness lesser threats, while a Third-World-size navy would have no chance if required to engage the Soviets.
I do not agree that the previous maritime strategy was wrongheaded; however, it may be ill suited for the 1990s- not because the strategy contained “three increasingly mistaken assumptions,” but simply because of the incredible changes occurring in the world.
Captain W.H. Ruhe, U.S. Navy, (Retired), Editor, Submarine Review— Lieutenant Niel Golightly’s article is one of the best prize-winning essays in the more than 40 years that I have been an avid reader of Proceedings. His emphasis
°n limited naval war for the 1990s is right 0n target. His stated need for changes to correct three mistaken strategic assump- hons inherent in the present maritime strategy seems well considered. But hav- lng said that, 1 have reservations about which changes are important in develop- lng a new maritime strategy.
Lieutenant Golightly produces a shop- Plng list of recommendations for getting from here to there—innovative thinking, a more flexible Navy, organizational reform, effectiveness valued over procedure and combat readiness over adminis-
Many potential targets of the 1990s Won’t run deep enough for this Mk-48 torpedo, being loaded in the Haddock (SSN-621).
frative proficiency, leaner battle groups, and new ship-deployment patterns. All of these changes, however, are meaningless Without a primary focus on weapons— new or modified—to fit the limited wars °f the 1990s against Third World forces.
We should recall Karl von Clause- Witz’s emphasis on weapons: “The conduct of war [its strategies and tactics] is determined by mainly two factors, the nature of the weapons available and the modes of [their] transportation.”
Lieutenant Golightly’s vision of the role weapons should play in a new maritime strategy is flawed. He argues that new weapon systems are “not as important as the fleet’s ability to use effectively fhe equipment and people it already has.” He also calls for creative employment of weapons, using the systems we have on hand.
1 disagree. A new maritime strategy Will be best-structured using the appropriate weapons our Navy can bring into Play in the 1990s.
An article in the April Submarine Re- Vievv on submarine weapons for the 1990s dlustrates how present weapons carried by U.S. nuclear submarines are not the right ones for Third World conflicts— those weapons are designed to fight deepwater sea wars against the Soviets. For example, the submarine-delivered Mk-48 thermal, noisy, wake-making, $2 million torpedo is considered to be “the best antisubmarine torpedo in the world today.” It probably is the best for killing Soviet submarines transiting deep-water forward barriers.
Since Third World conflicts are likely to be fought primarily in shallow waters, however, a “cool” (no infrared signature), quiet, wakeless, electric torpedo would be more appropriate. Such state- of-the-art torpedoes are employed today by other navies. Moreover, U.S. submarines carrying such a torpedo would use a different ASW strategy than the one now in effect.
Another example from the same Submarine Review article highlights the U.S. submarine force’s need in the 1990s for a different kind of antiship torpedo than the current Mk 48. A relatively low-cost, wakeless, cool, quiet, medium-range, big-warhead torpedo is needed for sea conflicts involving coastal interdiction. Prophetically, former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman called for a program to obtain an antiship submarine torpedo costing no more than $200,000. The Whitehead A-184 was selected for the antiship job, but not acquired. Today, this seems to be an appropriate weapon for Third World limited wars and would bring about radical changes in submarine tactics and antiship strategy.
Similar weapon changes probably are indicated for other kinds of naval forces— with parallel changes in strategy and tactics. The “innovative thinking” and the “creative employment” of weapons will govern the character of a new U.S. maritime strategy.
“We Need Leaders, Not Technocrats”
(See J.E. McFadden, pp. 84-86, January 1990; K. Montor, p. 72, February 1990; T.L. Johnson, A.F. Campbell, and L.R. Wass, pp. 24-26,
April 1990; C. Graves and A.C. Bernard, pp. 16—21, May 1990; B. Howe, pp. 23-24, June 1990 Proceedings)
“Surface Warfare Is Still Eating Its Young”
(See B.G. McGrath, pp. 95-96. January 1990; G.D. Pash, pp. 19-20, April 1990; W.A. Weronko, p. 36, May 1990 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Michael J. Fitzgerald, U.S. Naval Reserve—The critiques by Rear Admiral Campbell, Captain Wass, and
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Lieutenant Pash all miss the central point made by Lieutenants McGrath and Mc- Fadden. Their testimonies are not a result of soul-searching by inexperienced and unhappy junior officers who do not know how to manage their time, people, or equipment. Nor do they come from wardroom grousing or mental malaise. Mc- Fadden and McGrath are pointing out that there is a serious problem in the fleet that the Navy hierarchy is not addressing. That problem is that we in the surface warfare community are not as ready as we should be to fight and win a war.
While McFadden and McGrath are persuasive, I believe that the loss of time to the daily drudge of mindless paperwork is the greatest threat to our combat effectiveness. I cannot speak for the submarine or the aviation community, but I believe that they face the same problem. The officers who spend too much time at their desks are not out on deck. The officers who try to delegate too much of their paperwork to senior enlisted subordinates are only taking them away from the deck plates instead. The officers who are locked in combat with the paper tiger are not taking care of their departments or divisions, they are not practicing leadership, developing seamanship, sharpening their tactical know-how, or learning about their equipment. They are clerking.
Many insist that greater use of computers will decrease many of the burdens associated with handling so much paper. But in fact it will just make the officer a more efficient clerk.
How much time out of an afloat warfare officer’s 4,000-hour workyear is spent preparing for 30 minutes of hyperintensive modem naval combat? On a surface ship—too damned little! Peacetime measures of effectiveness—e.g., administrative inspections—reinforce the development of clerkmanship and inspec- tioneering among the officer corps. The irony is that the very management systems that were designed to help us maintain our ships and take care of our people have grown out of control. Like cancerous cells, they have turned on us and are afflicting us with terminal clerkiness.
This might overstate the case—but you should not try to fight a war with an officer corps made up of clerks. The other side just might get sneaky and send in some real warriors.
Lieutenant Nicholas Dujmovic, U.S. Coast Guard,—As I finish a tour as an instructor of American history, international relations, and Western political theory at the Coast Guard Academy, I observe that Captain Bernard’s disparaging attitude toward the humanities is, unfortunately, also prevalent in the U.S. Coast Guard. We too regard history, literature, philosophy, and politics as ancillary disciplines that are nice for adding some diversity to an engineering curriculum, but that have little intrinsic value. Engineers claim they can pick up information they need to know about the humanities relatively effortlessly, much as Captain Bernard reads his Economist with such enviable ease. In other words, the service ethos is that we need only to produce engineers, and add to their education an esoteric specialty such as ethics or strategy.
What is especially disturbing in Captain Bernard’s letter is his treatment of the Navy—which he admits consists of little else but “pipes, valves, diesel generators, gas turbines, and weapon systems”—as an end in itself, He suggests that the Navy is something that ultimately reflects “the meaning of the universe,” a concept for which Captain Bernard has little but disdain, since “that is not what the Navy is about.” Captain Bernard’s navy is one that narcissistically provides its own reason for being.
Nothing in the Navy or Coast Guard is an end in itself—with the exception of people (which he includes in his list of pipes and valves)—not even the fleet ballistic-missile submarine that Captain Bernard commands. People, as Immanuel Kant reminds us, must be treated as ends in themselves. The Navy and the Coast Guard exist, not as inherently good or important things, but to serve higher causes that people regard as ultimate values—namely, peace, justice, and safety. That’s what all the pipes, valves, and nuclear-powered fleet ballistic- missile submarines are for.
The humanities are about these higher values, and the trouble with engineering curricula, as demanding as they are, is that they often leave out any consideration of the principles on which people rely to give their lives meaning. To coin a phrase, some of my best friends are technocrats, but objectively speaking they often lack the wider perspective, the big picture provided by a rigorous humanities program. They are mission oriented, but they often lose sight of what greater end the mission is supposed to serve.
As 1 often ask my students, “What’s the point?” The point is that, in confusing means and ends, the potential exists for bad decision-making, and in the Navy—more so than the Coast Guard— the stakes can be very high. We need only to look at the case of John Poindexter, engineer and submariner par excellance,
to see a military professional who forgot higher principles in the narrow-minded pursuit of a mere mission.
“Ships’ Status Changes: 1 January 1989-31 December 1989“
See F.W. Cassady, pp. 305-306, May 1990 Proceedings)
J. M. Peeler—In the 1990 Naval Review issue 1 learned, much to my shock and dismay, that the four Essex (CV-9)-class carriers—the Hornet (ex-CVS-12), Bennington (ex-CVS-20), Bon Homme Richard (ex-CVA-31), and Oriskany (ex-CV- 34)—that were held in reserve at Brem-
Originally designated CV-34, the Oriskany soon became an attack carrier (CVA) of propeller-driven aircraft for the Korean War (below) and jets for Vietnam before reverting to CV designation in 1975, near the end of her 26-year career.
U.S. NAvt
riskany, became a
erton, Washington, were stricken for scrapping last year. To find that four of my five favorite ships on the Navy list are to be turned into razor blades was simply too much for me.
1 never thought I would see the best
navy in the world simply throw away four of its best servants. While it is necessary to recover some of the money spent in upkeep, some justice must be done with the ships’ legacies. It is truly sad that not one of these erstwhile carriers, notably the Hornet or the museum somewhere bn the West Coast, where the major museum ship attraction is the submarine Paitwanitff_(SS-383)- With the impending transfer of the destroyer Turner Joy (ex-pKt-51)ylo Bremerton as a museum, lhe\M^any, which spent her most famous days off Vietnam, also would have been a fitting memorial to naval veterans of that war. San Diego, California, a hub of antisubmarine warfare support carrier operations in the 1960s, would be a natural locale for the Hornet.
I am sure that the reasons for scrapping the carriers far outweighed the reasons for saving at least one of them, but there are also the innumerable profits— monetary and otherwise—to be gained from preservation. The Navy should realize that museum ships help recruiting and help enhance support for its programs.
Perhaps most crushing of all is the thought of the thousands of people who have attachments to those ships. These taxpayers should have a say in what happens to them. I realize that creating a ship museum is a long, bureaucratic process, but there are individuals out there with sufficient means to help. Perhaps the federal government itself could preserve a major ship. I would be proud to pay a little extra per year to see a gallant old lady spend a happy retirement, supported by the same government that saved the U-505 but scrapped the Guadalcanal (CVE-60)—the carrier that helped capture that U-boat.
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“The U.S. Navy: A (Much) Smaller Fleet”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 141-144, April 1990 Proceedings)
Colonel James B. Soper, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Mr. Polmar’s column says that the modified Spruance (DD- %3)-class destroyers will supplement the battleships’ naval gunfire support with vertical-launched missiles. First, only s°me of the destroyers are scheduled for this modification. Second, the type of missile to be employed is not appropriate for the naval gunfire mission. Third, the modification, deployment, and testing of such a system have not occurred.
As former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has testified—and several new studies have upheld—it would be more Prudent to place many of the smaller ships of limited armor and armament in reserve instead of battleships, which can travel in harm’s way during peace or war.
“The LCAC as a Forward
Arming and Refueling Point”
(See B.C. Lindberg, pp. 103-104, November
1989 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Steven R. Boyce, U.S. Navy, Executive Officer, Assault Craft Unit Four (ACU-4)—The revolutionary
breakthrough in ship-to-shore speed offered by the air-cushion landing craft (LCAC) has spawned many suggestions for its possible tactical employment. At the ACUs, we check out the new ideas. Some work; some don’t.
Captain Lindberg suggests using the LCAC as a forward arming and refueling Point (FARP) for a variety of helicopters, ffis research and data are accurate. Unfortunately, there are still some flaws in his argument.
The LCAC’s primary mission is to transport weapon systems, equipment, Cargo, and personnel to the beach and across the high-water mark. Once offloaded, the LCAC returns to amphibious dipping offshore for follow-on sorties. The truly revolutionary aspect of the LCAC is its potential for supporting a rapid buildup of materiel ashore, break- 'ug the shackles of an 8-10-knot ship-to- shore movement that hampered amphibi- °us operations for half a century. Introducing a loitering FARP mission goes against this concept of employment, and 'Vould require a new—perhaps self- contradictory—LCAC mission statement.
There is a nuts-and-bolts problem, as 'veil: fuel source. The helicopters require aircraft (JP-5) fuel, and only the Wasp (LHD-l)-class amphibious assault ships carry it in enough quantity to fuel both LCACs and aircraft. All other LCAC- carrying ships fuel the craft with marine diesel fuel (DFM). For example, the Whidbey Island (LSD-4l)-class ships, designed specifically to carry the LCAC, can hold only 50,000 gallons of JP-5, as opposed to 750,000 gallons of DFM. It is clear that the JP-5 must be saved for flight-deck operations—not to fill an LCAC’s tanks for FARP operations.
At present, we have an efficient technique of carrying 500-gallon JP-5 fuel bladders ashore by helicopter to FARP sites. Tying up such expensive assets as LCACs and their crews on the beach to duplicate the function of a fuel bladder does not compute.
Let’s keep the LCAC dedicated to its primary mission.
“A New Approach for SWOS”
(See K.P. Weinberg, pp. 103-105, January 1990; N.J. Pattarozzi, pp. 26-30, April 1990; M.A. Helgeson, pp. 24-26, June 1990 Proceedings)
Editor’s Note: We introduced an error into Commander Helgeson's comment. The acronym ROE should have read ‘ ‘rules of engagement. * ’
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unit level have a responsibility to brief all hands annually on mobilization and readiness expectations, requirements, and goals. Our people are to assist DoD forces in transporting equipment, fuel, and other supplies to or from the vessels and shore facilities as safely as possible. Our responsibilities do not include military police duties away from the shore facility.
In regard to unit strength—in the reserve groups that I am familiar with—
“Lighten the Marine’s Load”
(See T.R. Spence, pp. 41-43, January 1990
Proceedings)
Captain Donald E. Young, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—I served in World War II from 1940-1946 in mine warfare (mine recovery units) and in the amphibious forces as Commanding Officer of Underwater Demolition Team 8. Some 42 years ago, I first read about the loss of life in the waters off Omaha Beach. I had trained with the Naval Combat Demolition Units at Fort Pierce, Florida, in the months preceding D-Day. They had faced the same obstacles seen in the Photo on page 42, in the pre-assault demolition phase of the operation.
I was recalled to active duty in May 1951 at the Navy Department, Bureau of Ordnance, Amphibious Munitions and EOD Section. The senior officer was a Marine lieutenant colonel. Civilians were constantly bringing their ideas to our attention, and on one occasion a salesman Persisted that he had invented something that “ every Marine—yes, every foot soldier needed.”
Try as we did, we could not get an inkling of what he had to sell (the salesman feared that someone would steal his idea). We inquired: “Was it large? Was it compact? How designed?” Still no clue. Finally, the boss said to him, “Well, if you have it designed, it better be designed to fit up that Marine’s rear end, for that is the only place he has left to carry any thing.”
Apparently, in 1990, this still holds true.
retention is above acceptable levels. Recent transfers to the Individual Ready Reserve can be attributed to the 30-year cut-off restrictions for assignment to a pay billet. We also have several Cate- gory-H members in our group who continue to serve with great dedication and do not want to leave the program.
Our reserve program is exceptionally good for both men and women; it provides challenge, recognition, and satisfaction for a job well done.
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“Dilemma: Coast Guard Women and Combat”
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P- 91, January 1990 Proceedings)
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Lieutenant Thomas M. Duzmal, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve—The training of Coast Guard reservists at marine safety offices and search-and-rescue stations has been neither discounted nor ignored. This training has been incorporated into the mobilization tasking of the teams to Much the reservists are assigned. The team assignments support Department of Defense forces around the world. Female members are not normally assigned to overseas billets, but training in combat skills is offered to our female members— Primarily because they deserve the opportunity to be prepared in the event of expanded assignments for females outside of the continental United States.
Coast Guard Reserve officers at the
Comment and Discussion
“Editorial Board Chairman’s Address’’
(See H.B. Thorsen, p. 12, June 1990 Proceedings)
“Still Serving”
(See R.F. Dunn, p. 46, June 1990 Proceedings)
“The Admirable Servant,
Occasionally Obsequious
(See G.V. Stewart, pp. 46-50, June 1990
Proceedings)
Colonel W. Hays Parks, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve—In his address as chairman of the editorial board, Admiral Thorsen asked “What examples can be cited to counter our claim to have established and maintained a reputation deserving of special trust and confidence— unbroken for 116 years?” I cannot provide an answer to the question asked by Admiral Thorsen, but I can provide a very specific example of abuse of present security review procedures by naval officers that 1 believe could only become worse through a more stringent security review system.
In December 1985, I was invited to a meeting in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). The meeting had been called to examine military options to respond to Libya’s continuing use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy, and rather specifically its support of terrorists who had carried out attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports on preceding days. I was invited because of my expertise in targeting and rules of engagement, and because I was the only person in the Pentagon who had been involved at the Washington level in planning the 1981 freedom of navigation (FON) exercise in the Gulf of Sidra—which, of course, was one of the options being considered in late 1985.
The events that followed are well known, and I will not belabor them. We went through the three phases of Attain Document, the nickname for the FON exercise, the last phase culminating in a three-day, three-carrier plus surface action group exercise above and below
the so-called “line of death.”
During that exercise I was working in the Army Operations Center. Although there was little play for the Army, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, and other Army general officers wanted to know what was going on, and we maintained a 24-hour watch monitoring events as they played out. During that time several general officers asked my recollection of the previous Sidra FON exercise. In addition to briefing them (several times) on the 1981 exercise, I distributed copies of Commander Dennis Neutze’s “Whose Law of Whose Sea” piece from the January 1983 Proceedings for background reading.
It was during those long hours in the Army Operations Center that I saw the potential value of a Proceedings article on Attain Document III. As I had taught at the Naval War College the preceding year, I recognized the value of timely articles for use at Newport and in similar schools. I also saw the need for an unclassified record of events for use as I had used the piece by Commander (now Captain) Neutze.
I began recording the events as they occurred. I continued my “living research” as we concluded Attain Document III and, just a few days later, began planning in earnest for the joint air strikes conducted against terrorist-related targets in mid-April.
Because I was working from a number of classified documents and other classified information I had become privy to in the course of our four months of planning, I went through three classified drafts before an unclassified draft was submitted for security review. Those classified drafts were carefully reviewed by the JCS office that had responsibility for the Washington end of the planning for Attain Document and the air strike; they were scrubbed down to every sentence, phrase, and word. The final classified draft also was reviewed within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD [PA|). That office did a great deal to help me with my article. Captain Robert Sims, U.S. Navy (Retired), was ASD (PA) at that time and was demanding the declassification of a maximum amount of detailed information regarding the air strike. He felt, as I did, that U.S. forces had performed well, and that the press and the people of the United States should be provided as complete a picture as possible. Not until the prospective article had been thoroughly reviewed by \ OJCS and ASD (PA) was it submitted in unclassified form for the formal security review process.
The article was not intended to be a critical analysis. I specifically wanted it to be factual, but upbeat, to review the history of our relations with Libya, to talk about the issues that arose in planning Attain Document and the air strike, and (as a lawyer) to illustrate to the line readership that the law, rather than being entirely negative, can be used as a planning tool and to exercise legal rights essential to our national security interests.
I had talked to the Naval Institute about the possibility of the article being published in the Proceedings. Because the staff expressed an interest, subject to security review and approval of the editorial board, the cover sheet that sent the article to the services for security review noted the urgency of the review because of its anticipated publication in the Proceedings. It also stated that the article had been thoroughly reviewed by OJCS and ASD (PA), and that it contained no information that had not previously been released to the press by ASD (PA) or otherwise was unclassified.
A response time of three weeks was set. The Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, OJCS, and OSD came in within that deadline, with no objections; everyone met the deadline except the Navy. 1 waited another week, and still had no Navy response.
At that time I saw no alternative but to use my ten years of experience in the Pentagon and an “old boy net” of former students of mine from the Naval War ; College to locate the logjams. I was able to ascertain that there were four within the OpNav staff. All four were commanders; each had read the article and found it interesting; but each believed . that the public had no right to know some of the details contained in the article, and had decided simply not to respond to the deadline.
• went to see each officer; I took with nie the Air Force major who had been the Principal OJCS planner and the major’s Nav>' captain boss. Each officer who had stonewalled his response switched his Ejection, suggesting instead that the ar- hcle contained classified material. In each case we asked him to point out his specific concerns. Three of the officers were evasive, and initially declined to Provide specific examples. When specific concerns were expressed, we were able to show that the information had been released previously by the ASD (PA). Even after these meetings, one officer confined to sit on the article until we went to his superior. The article was cleared for °Pen publication, and was published in the November 1986 Proceedings. It was ttsed as a reference at the Naval War College and the Air University, and continues to be used at the Marine Corps Com- tnand and Staff College and in other service schools. Following the January 1989 shootdown of the two Libyan MiG- 23 aircraft by Navy F-14s, my article was C'fculated again within official channels l°r background.
My point is a very simple one; if I had n°t been working in the Pentagon, and had not established somewhat of an “old h°y net’ ’ with a measure of clout to it— Ur>intimidated by the fact that there were Unspecified OpNav objections—the article in all likelihood would not have seen lhe light of day because four naval officers had personal views about what should and should not be published, even though their views reflected an ignorance °f published reports of current affairs based upon officially released information.
1 do not harbor any illusions that the 'vorld would have suffered the loss of a Sreat work of literature had my article not been published. What does concern me is that the existing security review process ls subject to abuse that may prevent the ^ork of a more junior officer, not work- lng near those responsible for security feview or unable to “fight the system’’ and demand strict adherence to security feview procedures, from having a piece Published that can be of considerable value to the naval service. A more rigid sccurity review process will only exacerbate the problem.
If greater constraints are placed on Writing, one of two things could occur. In ah likelihood the profession will lose a lumber of quality articles because their Potential authors do not care to struggle "Uth the security review process. In other cuses, the Naval Institute may receive Ufticles from authors who have decided to ■Snore the security review process and seek publication without such a review. One senior naval officer, a frequently published author, told me after my 1986 fight that I was foolish even to bother with the security review process; he had never submitted anything for security review because he lacked confidence in the integrity of the security review process, particularly within the Navy. Neither alternative would be good for the Navy or the Naval Institute.
Undoubtedly there are ways in which the security review process can be improved. But it should not place an author or publisher in the role of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she is not guilty of high treason, particularly when the jurors are non-authors who either would prefer to classify everything, or resent some other officer who has drawn upon his experience and invested his personal time to make the naval services better at doing the things they do.
The present review system permits resistance to publication rather than facilitating the free exchange of professional ideas at an unclassified level. If anything, I would set a deadline for reviewers to the effect that unless specific, written objections have been received within two weeks of a reviewing officer’s receipt of a draft manuscript, that individual’s concurrence will be assumed.
As an author whose articles have been appearing in the Proceedings since 1976, and who has served as a member of the board of editors of the Marine Corps Gazette, I am a strong believer in the role served by these professional journals. In my editorial board capacity for the Gazette, there were times when I felt that an author was dead wrong in some of his statements or assumptions. In my official capacity with the Army, I have read articles submitted for security review prior to their publication in Parameters or Military Review that I personally have felt should not be published. Neither as a member of the Gazette board of editors nor in my Army position have 1 felt that it is my responsibility—or right—to prevent an article’s publication simply because I disagreed with the author. But the present security review system permits that to occur, and a more restrictive system will offer further latitude to the naysayers while doing little, if anything, to enhance security.
In summary, I cannot provide an answer to the question asked by Admiral Thorsen; but I hope that others, including the Secretary of the Navy, can learn and benefit from my experience to improve the security review process rather than making it more draconian.
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